The Washington Quarterly

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The COVID-19 Effect: US-China Narratives and

Realities

Min Ye

To cite this article: Min Ye (2021) The COVID-19 Effect: US-China Narratives and Realities, The
Washington Quarterly, 44:1, 89-105, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513

Published online: 23 Mar 2021.

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Min Ye

The COVID-19 Effect:

US-China Narratives and
Realities

T he COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated geopolitical tensions

between the United States and China while restricting policy dialogues, amplify-
ing extreme sentiments, and sidestepping rational observations. The outcomes
are extremist and divided narratives, emphasizing China’s triumphalism on one
hand and inherent weaknesses on the other. Under such narratives, China’s
policy voices and actions in combatting the pandemic and economic fallout
were under-studied and discounted, with harmful impacts on the US response
to the virus, economic recession, and shifting globalization. This paper studies
China’s official statements, research reports, and scholarly opinion networks in
2020 and finds that, though there were various policy discussions, the general
argument was for expanding China’s globalism during and after the pandemic.
Meanwhile, China’s policy actors—national agencies, local governments, and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—strive to continue globalization and adapt to
new realities after COVID-19.
Undoubtedly, during the pandemic, China has had vocal “wolf warriors” that
have loudly rejected any external criticism of China and argued for making coer-
cive moves overstretching its power internally and internationally. These
hawkish and nationalist tendencies have become outsiders’ main characterization
of China, indicating Beijing’s triumphalism or internal fragility, and have

Min Ye is Associate Professor of International Relations for the Frederick S. Pardee School of
Global Studies at Boston University, where she previously served as the Director of East Asian
Studies and Director of Undergraduate Studies. She holds a BA from Beijing University, an
MA from South Carolina, and a PhD from Princeton. Her most recent book is The Belt,
Road, and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China 1998–2018 (Cambridge University
Press, 2020). She can be reached at ye@bu.edu.
© 2021 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 44:1 pp. 89–105
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513

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 Min Ye

intensified geopolitical tensions between China and the United States. In reality,
pragmatic globalists have largely shaped China’s policy choices and activities in
2020. By ignoring them, the United States risks exaggerating the geopolitical
threat from China on one hand and underestimating China’s ability to expand
regional and global influence on the other.
This article first discusses the effect of COVID-19 on US-China relations,
focusing on the gap between narratives and realities. It then synthesizes the
US narratives on China in 2020, highlighting their extreme and divided
nature. Third, it introduces China’s geostrategic, diplomatic, and economic dis-
courses that underscore expanding globalization to address COVID-19’s geostra-
tegic and economic effects. The fourth section shows that China’s policy actors
seek to maintain and expand China’s engagement in globalization after the virus
outbreak. Finally, the paper discusses sources of globalism in China and impli-
cations for US-China competition beyond the pandemic.

COVID-19 Exacerbates US-China Competition

The United States and China’s great-power rivalry started long before the
COVID-19 pandemic.1 For years, Washington has debated how to cope with
China’s rise and its increasing global ambition.2 Geo-strategists pointed out
the failure of “engagement policy” and called for active decoupling from
China; area specialists, though disappointed by the authoritarian turn in Beijing’s
leadership, preserved the faith in dialogues and exchange.3 In the Trump admin-
istration, hawkish strategists were ascendant, and long-term area scholars were
defensive.
Nevertheless, before the pandemic, US-China competition involved diverse
interests and issues, leading to an interactive and evolving process of dialogues
and adjustment. For example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was the
focal point of geopolitical competition after its launch in 2013, yet it also signifi-
cantly boosted US study of China’s outbound investment and lending in BRI
countries and beyond.4 To manage the rivalry and watch out for dangerous rami-
fications, policy and professional dialogues between China and the United States
were frequent and reasonably influential. In 2019, exchange and interactions
among bureaucrats, think tank scholars, and business groups in the two countries
and others helped shape the BRI strategy toward moderation and soft institution
building.5
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic suddenly broke out in China, then sped to
other Asian countries, and finally engulfed numerous advanced democracies in
America and Europe, with raging effects still felt in many countries today. The
deadly and infectious virus has profoundly aggravated geopolitical contexts in

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 The COVID-19 Effect

the world and caused much of the bilateral and regional interactions between
China and the United States to stop. Without active policy networks and area
scholars’ work, the US narratives on China have become hostile and extreme,
making it easy for geostrategic tension to erupt and difficult for common interest
to emerge.
In March 2020, while China curbed the pandemic within its borders, the
United States saw rampant COVID infections spread across the country. The
ensuing months were a significant political, economic, and social blow to the
United States, China, and other countries. Concerned about domestic reper-
cussions, the Trump administration intensified its blame on China for the
infections. Worried about international repercussions, China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Zhao Lijian started a Twitter post
blaming the origin of China’s coronavirus on the US military.6 The MFA
further pursued so-called “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” celebrating China’s
success in combating COVID-19 internally and giving aid to other countries
to extract gratitude.7 A new Cold War was on the horizon, and countries
dependent on both China and the United States were torn between the
superpowers.8
The rhetorical rivalry has dominated the US coverage of China, discount-
ing main policy discussions and activities in Beijing and China’s localities.
On one hand, the US narratives highlight China’s triumphalism and exagger-
ate economic, security, and value attacks from Beijing. On the other hand,
the narratives underscore China’s internal fragility and the external predica-
ment Beijing faced after the COVID-19 outbreak. In reality, China’s dis-
courses and activities were complex and demonstrated continuity across the
pandemic cycles. Specifically, Chinese discourse comprises pessimistic strate-
gists who advocate for stable globalization as a counterforce to escalation
of the great-power rivalry; optimistic expansionists who promote Beijing’s lea-
dership in technology, health, and multilateralism; and pragmatic pro-
fessionals who argue for China’s global participation to save the national
economy—all generally support globalization, though for different purposes.
Chinese actions in 2020 show that Beijing’s economic priorities are to main-
tain foreign trade and investment while launching new initiatives to stimu-
late the domestic market. Externally, China’s actions emphasize defending
globalization and multilateral cooperation to cope with challenges in the
post-COVID world.9
By ignoring such complex policy trends in China, Washington is prone to be
overly aggressive on one hand, resisting China even in innocuous areas like
private business and educational exchange, or easily dismissive on the other,
downplaying Chinese actions as toothless rhetoric in multilateral settings.
Such tendencies are counterproductive. Even when US coercion manages to

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 Min Ye

hurt the PRC’s economy and diplomacy, it also hurts global efforts to fight the
pandemic, recover from depression, and rebuild a stable and healthy environment
for future globalization. More importantly,
ignoring China’s pragmatic globalists, the
T he US risks United States underestimates China’s ability
and willingness to lead post-COVID recon-
underestimating struction and concedes the leadership opportu-
China’s ability and nity to Beijing in critical areas such as global
health and sustainable development. With
willingness to lead
Beijing at the helm, post-COVID globaliza-
post-COVID tion is likely to enhance authoritarianism at
reconstruction the expense of the liberal order. In this scen-
ario, China’s moderates lose, too.

Extreme Divisions Dominate US-China Narratives

In 2020, absent bilateral travels and exchange, the US observations on China

and COVID have revolved around rhetoric by individual leaders, nationalist dip-
lomats, and populists, overlooking broader views by Chinese policy communities
and activities on the ground. The outcome has been partial and divided views of
Chinese behavior and growing hostility against China, profoundly shaping policy
choices in America.10
Emphasizing China’s triumphalism, the narratives point to its authoritarian
domestic system and aggressive external behavior. Such narratives reached new
heights after China contained the pandemic within its borders in March 2020,
while the advanced American and European democracies were engulfed by
virus infections.11 Political observers suggest that Xi Jinping’s “centralized
command, compared to democratic practices in the United States and Europe,
is more effective at curbing virus infections.”12 China’s local organizations and
virus control methods were praised to help the state contain the pandemic and
stabilize household supplies across China.13 Externally, foreign policy observers
find that China has become “considerably more assertive, demanding, unyield-
ing, confrontational, and punitive in its international postures.”14 Washington
politicians, leveraging China’s aggression and triumphalism, have reached a
broad consensus to confront and coerce China on a wide range of issues.
Emphasizing China’s vulnerabilities, the narratives focus on China’s internal
fragility and the limits to its international influence. Here, many reports under-
score the fragility of Communist rule in China and observe signs of internal
implosion in the aftermath of COVID-19.15 Other observers from a foreign
policy perspective find that few countries are buying the Chinese model or

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 The COVID-19 Effect

messages from Beijing.16 Or, they argue that China’s soft power campaign has
been ineffective before COVID-19 and will continue to face challenges after.17
Regarding China’s outbound investment, they also find that China’s cash
reserves could not deliver international promises before COVID-19, and now
Beijing is less likely to keep up with its ambition after the pandemic.18
Such prevalent narratives outside China,
however, only capture segments of Chinese voices
and behavior, missing mainstream policy patterns T hree different
based on Chinese writings and activities in 2020. Chinese schools all
Chinese-language materials show that neither tri-
umphalism nor imminent implosion capture the generally support
COVID-era realities in China. Instead, China’s dis- globalization, but
courses have dominantly observed that the
COVID-19 pandemic has been the gravest challenge
for different
to China and the world, with optimists, pessimists, purposes
and pragmatists alike emphasizing the virus as the
main factor shaping China’s engagement with the
rest of the world in the coming months and years. The activities by Chinese
policy actors, in particular, demonstrate an earnest effort to maintain and
expand globalization after COVID-19 while adapting to new circumstances
after the pandemic.

China’s Three Schools of Thought

Chinese policy thinkers argue that the country should both save itself and help
other countries recover. Furthermore, activities by Chinese central and local
agencies during the initial outbreak and after have aligned with pragmatic global-
ism and focused on expanding foreign investment and trade in the country.
Reflecting such discourses and activities, Beijing passed essential planning docu-
ments in late 2020 and provided guidelines that such policy trends are to be con-
tinued in the future.19
Contrary to external perceptions of a monolithic and totalitarian system,
China has vibrant policy communities that showcase different coalitional inter-
ests and policy ideas. They are most vocal in a crisis and while a significant policy
is being considered before it is adopted.20 During China’s COVID-19 pandemic
in early 2020, Chinese policy communities can be grouped into three subsets:
strategists (or pessimists), expansionists (or optimists), and professionals (or prag-
matists). Each of them speaks to different issues and challenges facing China. Yet,
they all show an emphasis on pragmatic globalism—the idea that China should

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 Min Ye

maintain robust globalization for the sake of its strategic, diplomatic, and econ-
omic imperatives.
Strategists in Beijing are long-term specialists and policy advisors in US-China
relations, and their views have been pessimistic during the COVID-19 cycle.
They argue that the US-China rivalry is on an “irreversible” downward turn
and that there will be a whole-scale confrontation in information, technology,
industry, military, and diplomacy during and after the pandemic.21 Furthermore,
because US-China cooperation is vital to the stable functioning of international
institutions, strategic observers also fear that the existing global order is not going
to work under intense US-China rivalry.22 In this scenario, they pessimistically
predict an extended global recession and volatile geopolitics in many world
regions.23 Since China’s domestic economy and continual rise rests on a stable
external environment and a working relationship with the United States, the
US-China rivalry and global turmoil mean that China’s future trajectory is uncer-
tain.24 But China has to try its best to meet challenges from the breakdown of
great-power politics.
Despite China’s strategic thinkers being
well-known internationally, during COVID-
D uring COVID- 19, their views have been paid little external
19, China’s well- attention. In China, in 2020, they continued
to have large followings in online news, social
known strategic media, and broadcasts, shaping policy and
thinkers have been popular discussions in the country. They are
gloomy about US-China relations due to
paid little external
COVID-19 geopolitics, emphasizing hostile
attention official rhetoric and popular sentiments in the
two countries. They remain convinced that
globalization and China’s active participation
in the world serve the country’s short- and long-term interests. They thus
welcome efforts to maintain globalization under the BRI and other forms, includ-
ing diplomacy and aid in Africa and central Asia, renewed investment negotiation
with European economies, and close cooperation with Asian neighbors.
Expansionists in China tend to be younger and based at active think tanks in
Beijing and elsewhere. They frequently express their views in their institutions’
policy briefs and online state media such as China Daily and People’s Daily.25
Their optimistic views, which gained salience in China as the country curbed
the pandemic in March 2020, center on the following: China has demonstrated
great strengths in public health, technology, and crisis management and should
exert active leadership roles in regional and global institutions including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the BRI, and the World Health Organiz-
ation (WHO).26 These optimists believe China’s aid to other countries fighting

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 The COVID-19 Effect

the virus will boost China’s national image and strengthen its diplomatic ties
globally.27
As 2020 proceeded, expansionists seemed to gain more strength in Beijing,
driven by the US withdrawal from the global system and China’s return to
normal political-economic life. Yet, they remain practical. In collections pub-
lished by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), these scholars
map out future scenarios globally and how China should respond in each. The
message is clear: the recent US “deglobalization” presents China with opportu-
nities to expand its roles in the global arena. They argue that China should
pursue the BRI—boosting collaboration with developing countries—and work
with advanced economies to provide “convenient, resilient, and smart” global
supply chains.28 They underscore the salience of trade in services, technology,
and digital globalization, addressing backlash from COVID-19 and concerns
with supply chains. Under this view, China has to step up its technology capa-
bility, and the world needs to construct new coordination and risk management
systems in fighting global economic and health crises. Finally, the CASS collec-
tion concludes that COVID-19 challenged the existent international order and
accelerated de-globalization. After the pandemic, however, there will be new
demand and opportunity for global governance, in which China can play stronger
parts.29
Among China’s policy discussions, neither pessimists nor optimists are as
abundant as pragmatists, particularly from non-state news outlets and venues.
Pragmatists focus on China’s economic wellbeing and diplomatic reputation fol-
lowing COVID-19. They predict that China will face hurdles in Eurasian diplo-
macy as COVID-19 has swept those countries. Yet, they also recognize that
China’s rapid containment of the infections and proactive assistance to other
countries helped regain some soft power and diplomatic advantages in the
world.30 Unlike the optimists, they do not believe that China has gained
enough leverage from COVID-19 to achieve regional and global leadership in
the foreseeable future. Pragmatists in the economy view COVID-19 as the
worst challenge facing the world since the 1930s and expect that China will
have a lengthy and challenging process of recovery from the recession. And
China’s recovery cannot be successful without the revival of significant export
and import markets in the world.31
In short, pragmatists underscore the severe economic and diplomatic chal-
lenges that China will face after the pandemic.32 For one thing, China’s econ-
omic recovery cannot succeed without the global economy’s adequate
recovery. In addition, China will face more significant diplomatic challenges
after COVID-19, particularly with advanced societies, making an economic
recovery in China and the world even more difficult. Hence, pragmatic policy
actors argue that China should conduct robust multilateral efforts to fight the

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pandemic and help other countries when it can. In the pragmatists’ views, staying
global and staying multilateral are needed for China to revive the economy from
recession and rebuild diplomatic space abroad. Thus, similar to both other groups,
pragmatists advocate global engagement, but view the path as likely to be difficult
and the outcome uncertain.

China’s Actions to Save Globalization

While different schools of thought were building a policy consensus that China
had to maintain and strengthen global ties for its recovery, different levels of
Chinese government and SOEs already sprang into action to do just that. In
early 2020, after its initial mishandling and negligence, China’s response to the
COVID-19 outbreak was swift. Rapidly, the political leadership mobilized grass-
roots organizations and companies to test, trace, and control the virus’s spread
across the country.33 Beijing and local governments focused on saving the
economy, stabilizing international business operations, and keeping foreign
investment in the localities. SOEs strived to manage the pandemic while addres-
sing the economic fallout, saving international
N umerous projects as much as possible. To Chinese econ-
omic actors, fighting virus infections and fight-
Chinese actors ing economic recession are both important
helped maintain tasks. One has to accompany the other, and
both are essential to maintain globalization
growth and adapt to
during and after the pandemic.
post-COVID-19 This section presents measures adopted by
globalization Chinese entities to maintain globalization fol-
lowing the virus outbreak. Together, these
measures help China’s economic actors main-
tain growth and adapt to post-COVID-19 glo-
balization. If successful, they are likely to increase China’s roles in the
international economy, especially as countries recover from the pandemic and
a new round of reconstruction begins in the world.

Local Governments
China’s localities are important players in the national economy and globaliza-
tion. Among them, Jiangsu province had been involved in high-profile overseas
economic zones, i.e., preferential sites constructed by Chinese companies to
facilitate manufacturing and exports.34 When the virus broke out in early
2020, the province and its special zones were quick to act and respond. The pro-
vincial government sent officials and experts to help combat the virus on site.

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The Sihanoukville Port Industrial Zone in Cambodia, with the Jiangsu team’s
help, quickly set up protocols and checkpoints of detection and prevention. In
May, as China’s COVID-19 cycle was winding down, Jiangsu province upgraded
its commitment in the Sihanoukville zone, expanding investment to connect this
zone more closely with ports and export industries in Jiangsu and other locations.
In Guangdong, another province with prominent export economies, local gov-
ernments worked with business associations and large companies individually
to help them survive the virus and maintain their international purchasing
orders.
Local governments also sought to maintain and stabilize globalization in
their jurisdictions, particularly regarding inbound foreign direct investment. In
Shanghai, the government set up a special task force to help address foreign
investors’ needs in the city, ensure existing projects, and attract new ones if poss-
ible. In Zhejiang, the provincial government established a special office for
foreign investment, designating one official to liaise for one major foreign
project in the province. Surveys of American companies in China show that,
in 2020, China improved in intellectual property protection, technology transfer,
and access to digital networks (VPN), major concerns of American companies
operating in China’s localities in the past. The onslaught of COVID-19 and
the US-China trade war, on the other hand, have damaged their businesses in
China.35

State-Owned Enterprises
SOEs are the main body of Chinese investors abroad, and they have built
extensive supply networks with subsidiaries in China and abroad over the
years. When COVID-19 broke out, their priority was to ensure the operation
of global supply chains and stabilize international trade and capacity
cooperation [channeng hezuo]—the central government’s mandate too.36
Among the SOEs, China Merchants’ Group recovered, to the extent possible,
production in overseas projects and tried to maintain its 2019 volume. China
Railways Heavy Manufacturing continued its production schedule in China. It
ensured its shipment of heavy machinery to Turkey to fulfill its parent com-
pany’s tunnel projects in Turkey and Russia. China Chemical’s subsidiaries are
essential exporters of chemical products used in agriculture, medicine, textile,
and fertilizers in many countries. To continue their delivery, they kept their
production schedule throughout the virus outbreak. To ensure supplies for
China Energy Engineering Corporation’s Poland project, Huaye Steel retained
150 employees to work overtime while meeting the COVID-19 capacity
limit.37

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Companies with less pressure to fulfill supplies to other SOEs had more relaxed
production schedules during the virus outbreak. Companies like China Metallurgi-
cal Group extended the delivery time and reduced their personnel in overseas oper-
ations. Some SOEs do not have full control over overseas projects and paused their
project completion during the pandemic. China Railways, for example, paused its
US$6 billion speed rail construction in Indonesia, resuming in late 2020.
Finally, recipient countries have changed priorities following the pandemic
strike. For example, Myanmar used to focus on hard infrastructure from China
and now asks for technology and health-cen-
L arge-scale infra- tered projects instead. As a whole, with shift-
ing financial and social conditions in the
structure is less recipients, China’s SOEs are likely to adjust,
likely, while digital scale back, and renegotiate their operations
in the post-COVID-19 world. Costly and
and health projects large-scale infrastructure is likely to be less
are likely to grow desirable, while digital and health-related pro-
jects, with less financial and environmental
post-COVID-19 burden, are likely to grow.

National Agencies
China’s national agencies have sought to stabilize and expand overseas business
links. In addition to various incentives, loans, and online logistics, their primary
efforts in 2020 are three-fold: expand cross-border trade through e-commerce,
stimulate new growth to attract foreign capital to stay, and help the global recov-
ery to stabilize the world economy.
First, in international e-commerce, China has experienced exponential
growth due to low operating costs and generous tax and tariff incentives com-
pared to conventional international trade. In 2015, Beijing approved five cities
for e-commerce experiment zones, which grew to 59 in 2019. The e-commerce
trade was growing at 49 percent annually in the four years. Following the pan-
demic, the State Council approved an additional 46 zones in 2020, covering
most cities in China, and expected that e-commerce would make up for the
steep decline in processing trade.38
Second, the New Infrastructure Plan—different from traditional infrastructure
such as power plants, railways, and ports—was in consideration before COVID-19.
Facing the pandemic recession, Beijing rolled out the plan swiftly in April 2020 and
mobilized local governments as well as financial institutions to develop localized
proposals and projects employing information technology, digital networks, big
data, and artificial intelligence. In Zhejiang, for example, the provincial govern-
ment enhanced its support for the cloud-based economy and facilitated small

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and medium-size companies’ internet-enabled business. In Chengdu, a supercom-

puter and data-processing center was completed to fully cover western China,
enabling the digital economy and information technology.39
Third, on global commitment, China received a lot of external criticism due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. As countries in the West besieged China, pressing to
investigate its handling (or cover-up) of the virus in the early weeks, Beijing was
defensive, rejected external calls for investigation, spread the conspiracy theory
about the US military origins of the virus throughout China, and conducted its
“wolf warrior” diplomacy.40
Behind the combative facade, however, the pragmatic and globalist approach
has prevailed.41 Initially, China received foreign aid and medical supplies to assist
its pandemic combat, then was proactive in providing medical and financial
assistance to other pandemic-stricken countries.42 In the G-20 framework,
China agreed to pause debt repayment of virus-struck economies for extended
periods. Following the US halt in funding, China announced additional
donations to the WHO, bringing its total cash donation to the organization to
US$50 million. At the 73rd World Health Assembly in 2020, President Xi
Jinping announced that “China will provide $2 billion over two years to help
with COVID-19 response and with the economic and social development in
affected countries, especially developing countries.”43
In mid-2020, as China held the nation’s top political event—known as Two
Sessions [lianghui], announcing government policies and reshuffling personnel
—Beijing affirmed its goal and whole-government efforts to expand overseas
activities, especially in the BRI regions. It pledged to focus on 1) a network of
free trade zones along the BRI routes, 2) BRI projects in the health sector and
digital economy, and 3) “soft” and social cooperation between China and the
BRI countries, emphasizing institutional and non-governmental cooperation
and projects.44 Furthermore, the ministers of National Development and
Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs—
representing domestic industry, international commerce, and diplomacy—all
pledged that China would promote the Health Silk Road and Digital Silk
Road construction with BRI countries.45

International Skepticism
China’s “wolf warriors” are very much alive. With a growing economy, its foreign
policy is likely to remain assertive. Understandably, there remains uncertainty
and suspicion about China’s intention and behavior internationally regarding its
roles in the ongoing fight against the pandemic and the post-COVID-19 recession.
Some doubt China’s real commitment to global efforts, and some fear China’s
opportunistic expansion in the international arenas.46 Such concerns are justified,

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 Min Ye

but China is more complex than the pandemic narratives show. China’s policy com-
munities, as demonstrated in different schools of thought and policy actions, still
predominantly support pragmatic globalism in China during and after COVID-19.
In 2020, while China’s leadership pledged
actions and financial commitment to globali-
C hina is more zation, considerable flexibility was left to the
complex than pan- bureaucracy to work out the details. Given
the policy discussions and actions, allocation
demic narratives of aid and funds are likely to be tied to
show Chinese SOEs and local governments. In
other words, operating under pragmatic global-
ism, China will be an active player in post-
COVID-19 global affairs, but its actions seek to serve Chinese actors and
Chinese interests. These actors are not geopolitically motivated per se, nor are
they likely to impose strategic conditions on the recipients, such as military
access, resource monopoly, or diplomatic dependence. Instead, pragmatic global-
ists are diverse, and their interests underscore market integration, industrial col-
laborations, and overall international influence.47

Thinking Beyond COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented destruction to human life

and the global economy. And instead of working together to lessen the blow,
the world’s two largest powers have opted to fight each other. The United
States has been permeated with extreme and divided narratives, adopting
hawkish postures and policies against the PRC. The cost has been dear. While
focused on fighting Beijing, Washington had belated, and even ill-advised,
responses to the pandemic, economic recession, and international obligations. In
2020, China also witnessed its own nationalist rhetoric and aggressive behavior,
damaging its external reputation and relationships with many countries. In
short, the US-China competition was intense before 2020, and the pandemic—
or, more importantly, how the two countries reacted to it—has dramatically
exacerbated their confrontational relationship, with lasting damage to public
health, social well-being, and geostrategic stability of the world as well as them-
selves and each other.
In the United States, both the extreme narratives—China’s triumphalism or
internal fragility—failed to capture the policy discourses and activities in the
PRC. Specifically, China’s strategic thinkers have maintained conviction in
the values of multilateral institutions and global cooperation. Economists have
argued that China’s economic revival cannot succeed without the world’s

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recovery, so China and other countries need to work together. Finally, Chinese
diplomats and government think tanks, facing worsening external relations on
one hand and growing domestic ambition to expand global leadership on the
other, have advocated for China’s proactive roles in global health, crisis manage-
ment, and scientific cooperation. In terms of activities, China has focused on
domestic development and pursued economic globa-
lization to ensure internal growth. The central
agencies, local governments, and SOEs were eager
M oderate ideas
to keep their business and investment projects in and groups are
China and abroad from the outset.
prevalent in China
Moving beyond COVID-19, it is essential to
understand that, first, despite radical rhetoric and
tightening in Beijing’s top politics, moderate ideas and groups are prevalent in
China. They include strategic scholars, diplomatic professionals, and economic
agencies and actors. They argue for and epitomize “pragmatic globalism,”
which has mostly guided China’s development and foreign policy in recent
decades. The moderates are not in minority or obscurity; their views often
command wide attention and readership among Chinese bureaucrats, business,
and scholarly communities.
Furthermore, China’s moderates often have past experiences in exchange with
foreign institutions. Prominent strategic scholars, for example, have received
doctoral degrees or lengthy visiting posts in preeminent US universities and
served at prestigious universities and policy research positions in China. The
expansionists consist of younger researchers who also either have overseas edu-
cation or have frequently exchanged with foreign counterparts. To be sure,
these exchanges were not limited to exposure to the West, nor did they shift
these actors’ pursuit of Chinese interest and influence. However, their global
experiences have made China more willing to stay engaged globally and more
capable of steering challenges and opportunities in the worldwide system.
Second, underneath the political and strategic rhetoric, particularly the head-
line-grabbing antics of the wolf warriors, this paper has shown that China’s main
actions to fight COVID-19 and its associated economic recession were conducted
by professional agencies, economic actors, and societal groups that are mostly
pragmatic and globalist. Chinese companies and local governments remain the
chief players in China’s global business and domestic development. Their top pri-
ority is to overcome the recession and stabilize domestic and international
businesses. For that, they work hard to keep international purchasing orders
filled and attract foreign investments and joint projects. The national agencies
are obliged by economic priorities on the ground. Through e-commerce liberal-
ization and new infrastructure planning, they incentivize local projects and pro-
grams that facilitate local governments and enterprises’ interests. Beijing’s moves

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to facilitate multilateral collaboration in pandemic assistance and debt relief are

arguably motivated to secure a stable external environment for China’s business
interests.
Finally, US-China competition is likely to continue and intensify after the
pandemic in bilateral settings and global arenas. Extreme rhetoric and hawkish
policies will thus continue, shaping the context of the great-power rivalry in
the foreseeable future. This paper’s findings can hopefully help correct divided
and partial narratives, as well as caution against the unwise bilateral competition
to the detriment of public health and economic well-being.
In 2020, the US focus on fighting China has been counterproductive to com-
bating the COVID-19 pandemic. With China as a target, US withdrawal from
global institutions and international obligations was particularly ill-advised.
Unintentionally, the United States has created vacuums in global leadership
for Beijing to fill, leaving China to shape the post-COVID-19 global construction
and revival. If Beijing continues to operate at the helm, the international order is
likely to be lopsided, hurting hard-earned liberal values and moderate interests
across the globe.

Notes

1. Avery Goldstein, "US-China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century: Déjà Vu and Cold
War II," China International Strategy Review 2 (2020): 48–62, https://doi.org/10.1007/
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2. Aaron Friedberg and Charles Boustany, "Partial Disengagement: A New U.S. Strategy for
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40, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1736882.
3. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China,”
Washington Quarterly 42, no. 2 (2019), 99–114, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.
1626688.
4. Min Ye, The Belt, Road, and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China 1998-2018
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
5. Min Ye, “Thucydides’s Trap, Clash of Civilizations, or Divided Peace? U.S. China Com-
petition from TPP to BRI to FOIP,” Journal of Peace and War Studies 2 (2020): 1–23,
https://www.norwich.edu/pawc/journal/2767-2020-second-edition-journal-of-peace-and-
war-studies.
6. Lijian Zhao (@zlj517), “2/2 CDC was caught on the spot. When did patient zero begin in
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98828066823.
7. Min Ye, “Wolf Warriors Blow Hot before Cooling Down,” Global Asia 15, no. 3 (2020),
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8. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia: What, How, and Why?” ASAN
Forum, June 6, 2020, http://www.theasanforum.org/hedging-in-post-pandemic-asia-
what-how-and-why/.

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9. Ren Lin, “dazao houyiqing shidai quanqiu zhili xinjinxiang” [“Creating a New Global
Governance Order after the COVID Pandemic”], Guangming Ribao, November 22,
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http://www.aisixiang.com/data/123852.html.

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24. “zheng yongnian: zhongmei guanxi yiqu bufufanle” [Zheng Yongnian: US-China Has No
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