Republic of the Philippines On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together
SUPREME COURT with the heirs of the deceased victims, namely, Purificacion Vizcara, Marivic Vizcara,
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190022 February 15, 2012
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, JAPHET ESTRANAS and
BEN SAGA, Petitioners,
vs.
PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD,
HECTOR VIZCARA, JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Petition
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated July 21, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021, which affirmed with modification
the Decision2 dated March 20, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Palayan City, and Resolution3 dated October 26, 2009, which denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo)
was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel
Natividad (Samuel), Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While
crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR)
train, then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned
up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous
death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and
Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.4
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop"
signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another
signboard.5
Page 1 of 9
Cresencia Natividad and Hector Vizcara, filed an action for damages against PNR,
Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan
City. The case was raffled to Branch 40 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 0365-P. In
their complaint, the respondents alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and
serious physical injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioners’
gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to
persons and properties. They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon
where the accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or
bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching
train. They concluded their complaint with a prayer for actual, moral and compensatory
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.6
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating
the train and monitoring its roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the
collision, Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. Four hundred (400)
meters away from the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn motorists
of the approaching train. When the train was only fifty (50) meters away from the
intersection, respondent Estranas noticed that all vehicles on both sides of the track
were already at a full stop. Thus, he carefully proceeded at a speed of twenty-five (25)
kilometers per hour, still blowing the train’s horn. However, when the train was already
ten (10) meters away from the intersection, the passenger jeepney being driven by
Reynaldo suddenly crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to
avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the train, it did not instantly
come to a complete stop until the jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from
the point of collision.7
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision8 dated March 20, 2007, ruling
in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants
Philippine National Railways Corporation (PNR), Japhet Estranas and Ben Saga to,
jointly and severally pay the following amounts to:
1. a) PURIFICACION VIZCARA:
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Reynaldo
Vizcara;
2) P35,000.00, for funeral expenses;
 3) P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses;
4) P40,000.00 for wake/interment expenses;
5) P300,000.00 as reimbursement for the value of the
jeepney with license plate no. DTW-387;
6) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
7) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
8) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
b) MARIVIC VIZCARA:
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Cresencio
Vizcara;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
c) HECTOR VIZCARA:
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Samuel
Vizcara;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
d) CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD:
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Crispin
Natividad;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
Page 2 of 9
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
e) JOEL VIZCARA
1) P9,870.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
f) DOMINADOR ANTONIO
1) P63,427.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorney’s fees.
and
2. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
The Ruling of the CA
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Subsequently, on July
21, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming the RTC decision with
modification with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the respondents. The
CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, as follows:
 (1) The award of P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses and P40,000.00 for
wake/interment expenses to PURIFICACION VIZCARA is deleted. In lieu
thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded;
(2) The award of moral damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC
VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 each while moral damages awarded to JOEL
VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced from P50,000.00
to P25,000.00;
(3) The award of exemplary damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC
VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby reduced
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 each while exemplary damages awarded to
JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced from
P25,000.00 to P12,500.00; and
(4) The award for attorney’s fees in favor of the Appellees as well as the award
of P300,000.00 to Appellee PURIFICACION as reimbursement for the value of
the jeepney is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.10
In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of negligence on the part of
the petitioners. It concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure
to install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars or safety railroad bars
and signage, was the proximate cause of the accident. Nonetheless, in order to conform
with established jurisprudence, it modified the monetary awards to the victims and the
heirs of those who perished due to the collision.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the decision of the CA. However,
in a Resolution12 dated October 26, 2009, the CA denied the same.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following grounds:
I was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS;
II
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE;
Page 3 of 9
III
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONERS OR ERRED IN NOT FINDING AT THE LEAST, CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS.13
The petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence
and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. They argue that as a professional driver,
Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules and regulations, including the
right of way accorded to trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary measures to
observe in traversing the same. However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed
by PNR trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad
track and thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to
maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was driving and the truck ahead of
the same prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed along the crossing.14
In their Comment,15 the respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that
the petitioners' negligence in maintaining adequate and necessary public safety devices
in the area of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap. They asseverate
that if there was only a level crossing bar, warning light or sound, or flagman in the
intersection, the accident would not have happened. Thus, there is no other party to
blame but the petitioners for their failure to ensure that adequate warning devices are
installed along the railroad crossing.16
This Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a
person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence. It states:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,17 negligence was defined as the omission
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 18 To
determine the existence of negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.19
In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine whose negligence
occasioned the ill-fated incident. The records however reveal that this issue had been
rigorously discussed by both the RTC and the CA. To emphasize, the RTC ruled that it
was the petitioners’ failure to install adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing
which proximately caused the collision. This finding was affirmed by the CA in its July
21, 2009 Decision. It is a well-established rule that factual findings by the CA are
conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to
great weight and respect, even finality, especially when, as in this case, the CA affirmed
the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.20
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into
issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.21 To distinguish one from the other,
a question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a
certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers
on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.22 Certainly, the finding of negligence by the
RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass
upon as this would entail going into the factual matters on which the negligence was
based.23 Moreover, it was not shown that the present case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions24 to the oft repeated principle according great weight and
respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA.
At any rate, the records bear out that the factual circumstances of the case were
meticulously scrutinized by both the RTC and the CA before arriving at the same finding
of negligence on the part of the petitioners, and we found no compelling reason to
disturb the same. Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence
expected of it, taking into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any
untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to
prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train.
Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage installed
in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the
impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated
"Stop, Look and Listen" signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices
in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. 25 Having
established the fact of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully
held liable for damages.
Page 4 of 9
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.
As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents, this
court rule in the negative. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring
with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.26 Here, we cannot
see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not
even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the
jeepney carrying the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only
about three to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad
track, Reynaldo, the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under
the impression that it was safe to proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing
circumstances immediately before the collision did not manifest even the slightest
indication of an imminent harm. To begin with, the truck they were trailing was able to
safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent them from
proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the approaching
peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to
anticipate the impending danger.27 He proceeded to cross the track and, all of a sudden,
his jeepney was rammed by the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then, the
circumstances before the collision negate the imputation of contributory negligence on
the part of the respondents. What clearly appears is that the accident would not have
happened had the petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety devices along the
crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the same.
At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to exert serious efforts to
catch up with the trend, including the contemporary standards in railroad safety. As an
institution established to alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of the PNR to
promote the safety and security of the general riding public and provide for their
convenience, which to a considerable degree may be accomplished by the installation
of precautionary warning devices. Every railroad crossing must be installed with
barriers on each side of the track to block the full width of the road until after the train
runs past the crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be
equipped with a device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify the danger
or risk of crossing. It is similarly beneficial to mount advance warning signs at the
railroad crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign to inform motorists of the
existence of the track, and a stop, look and listen signage to prompt the public to take
caution. These warning signs must be erected in a place where they will have ample
lighting and unobstructed visibility both day and night. If only these safety devices
were installed at the Tiaong railroad crossing and the accident nevertheless occurred,
we could have reached a different disposition in the extent of the petitioner’s liability.
The exacting nature of the responsibility of railroad companies to secure public safety
by the installation of warning devices was emphasized in Philippine National Railways
v. Court of Appeals,28 thus:
[I]t may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at
railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the
maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a
railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public
road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at such points, at sufficient
elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign
with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the
railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. The failure of the
PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence
of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said device or equipment
be installed.29
arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence
of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.32 To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the
petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross
the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have
any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them.
Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety.
Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last
clear chance cannot be applied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 21, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not end with the installation SO ORDERED.
of safety equipment and signages but, with equal measure of accountability, with the
upkeep and repair of the same. Thus, in Cusi v. Philippine National Railways,30 we held:

Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings, the
travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their
guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. A need, therefore,
exists for the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep such devices in good
condition and in working order, or to give notice that they are not operating, since if
such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace. Thus, it has been held that if a railroad
company maintains a signalling device at a crossing to give warning of the approach
of a train, the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be evidence of
negligence, which maybe considered with all the circumstances of the case in
determining whether the railroad company was negligent as a matter of fact. 31

The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad crossings is

equally important as their installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices
court as much danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of safety warning
signals at railroad crossing carries with it the presumption that they are in good working
condition and that the public may depend on them for assistance. If they happen to be
neglected and inoperative, the public may be misled into relying on the impression of
safety they normally convey and eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.

The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in
the instant case. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought
about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences

Page 5 of 9
 Republic of the Philippines extraordinary diligence required by law from common carriers. In this relation, they
SUPREME COURT claimed that a common carrier is not an absolute insurer of its passengers and that
Manila Battung's death should be properly deemed a fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the payment of their counterclaims for
SECOND DIVISION damages and attorney's fees.10

The RTC Ruling

G.R. No. 208802, October 14, 2015
In a Decision11 dated August 29, 2011, the RTC ruled in respondents' favor and,
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ROMEO L. BATTUNG, accordingly, ordered petitioner, et al. to pay respondent the amounts of: (a)
JR., REPRESENTED BY ROMEO BATTUNG, SR., Respondents. P1,586,000.00 as compensatory damages for unearned income; (b) P50,000.00 as
actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.12
DECISION
The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to rebut the presumed liability of
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: common carriers in case of injuries/death to its passengers due to their failure to
show that they implemented the proper security measures to prevent passengers
from carrying deadly weapons inside the bus which, in this case, resulted in the killing
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 31, 2013 of Battung. As such, petitioner, et al. were held civilly liable for the latter's death
and the Resolution3 dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. based on culpa contractual.13
CV No. 97757, which affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated August 29, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 22-1103 Dissatisfied, petitioner, et al. appealed to the CA.14
finding petitioner G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. (petitioner), Federico M. Duplio, Jr.
(Duplio), and Christopher Daraoay (Daraoay) jointly and severally liable to
The CA Ruling
respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (respondents) for damages arising
from culpa contractual.
In a Decision15 dated May 31, 2013, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in toto.16 It
held that the killing of Battung cannot be deemed as a fortuitous event, considering
The Facts that such killing happened right inside petitioner's bus and that petitioner, et al. did
not take any safety measures in ensuring that no deadly weapon would be smuggled
Respondents alleged that in the evening of March 22, 2003, Romeo L. Battung, Jr. inside the bus.17
(Battung) boarded petitioner's bus with body number 037 and plate number BVJ-525
in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila.5 Battung was seated at the first row Aggrieved, only petitioner moved for reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in
behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine a Resolution19 dated August 23, 2013; hence, the instant petition.
Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and
alighted to check the tires. At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of
The Issue Before the Court
the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus
conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.6 Hence, respondents filed
the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner liable for damages to respondent arising
a complaint7 on July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of
from culpa contractual.
P1,826,000.008 based on a breach of contract of carriage against petitioner, Duplio,
and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103.
The Court's Ruling
Respondents contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers; and in
case of injuries and/or death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at The petition is meritorious.
fault and, thus, responsible therefor. As such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly
liable for Battung's death.9 I.

In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised the The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or

Page 6 of 9
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public20) the highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring
the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of
or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption may also be
overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.21
The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the law does
not make the common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
In Mariano, Jr. v. Callejas,22 the Court explained that:
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the
safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against
them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care,
vigilance[,] and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common
carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all
the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter,
for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere
presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common
carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the
performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the
passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and
Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common
Page 7 of 9
carriers in the conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for
personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its
failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.23 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the
above-said provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from
the negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe
transport to its passengers.
In Pilapil v. CA,24 the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger
was in no way due (1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's employees
with respect to the foregoing - such as when the injury arises wholly from causes
created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to
prevent — there would be no issue regarding the common carrier's negligence in its
duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent employees in relation to
its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under
Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not apply:
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is
only a disputable presumption.[The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are
established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence
required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner
was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method
of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the common carrier'sl
employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable [care] as well as competent employees, with the
injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the
carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held
liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, Battung's death was neither caused by any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of
petitioner's employees, namely, that of Duplio and Daraoay, in their capacities as
driver and conductor, respectively. Instead, the case involves the death of Battung
wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger who, after consummating
such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.25 Thus, there is no proper issue on
petitioner's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the
passengers transported by it, and the presumption of fault/negligence against
petitioner under Article 1756 in relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
should not apply.
II.
On the other hand, since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the
applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that "a
common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." Notably,
for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a
good father of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common
carrier's part.
Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes
reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether
negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence."26
In ruling on this case, the CA cited Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals27 (Fortune) in ascribing negligence on the part of petitioner, ratiocinating
that it failed to implement measures to detect if its passengers were carrying firearms
or deadly weapons which would pose a danger to the other passengers.28 However,
the CA's reliance was plainly misplaced in view of Fortune's factual variance with the
case at bar.
In Fortune, the common carrier had already received intelligence reports from law
enforcement agents that certain lawless elements were planning to hijack and burn
some of its buses; and yet, it failed to implement the necessary precautions to ensure
the safety of its buses and its passengers. A few days later, one of the company's
buses was indeed hijacked and burned by the lawless elements pretending as mere
passengers, resulting in the death of one of the bus passengers. Accordingly, the
Court held that the common carrier's failure to take precautionary measures to
protect the safety of its passengers despite warnings from law enforcement agents
showed that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
preventing the attack against one of its buses; thus, the common carrier was
rightfully held liable for the death of the aforementioned passenger.
In contrast, no similar danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel
petitioner or its employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the
safety of its passengers. There was also no showing that during the course of the
trip, Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would have forewarned
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petitioner's employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the
passengers. Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company,29 has
held that common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the
passengers they take in will not bring anything that would prove dangerous to
himself, as well as his co-passengers, unless there is something that will indicate that
a more stringent inspection should be made, viz.:
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the
passengers of appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over which
they had no control, as enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His
Honor, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty
towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that
should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in
regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will
not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-
passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the
right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to
any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage
and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other
words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's
baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the
trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the
passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other
miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected
domain. Police officers acting without judicial authority secured in the manner
provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to
protect individual human rights and liberties. Withal, what must be importantly
considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of
the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling
would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers,
considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and
abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the
representations of the passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may
not be true, in the interest of the common safety of all, the assistance of
the police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the
passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed investigation
consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the constitutional
rights of the passenger. It is in this sense that the mentioned service manual
issued by appellant to its conductors must be understood.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4)
men ride petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers),
the bus driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they
were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these
men and have them pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did.31 During the
foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which would rouse their
suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity. With no
such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e.,
bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be
concluded that petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a
good father of a family in relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil
Code. As such, petitioner cannot altogether be held civilly liable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 31,
2013 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 97757 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint
for damages filed by respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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