Cabiling vs. Fernandez (G.R.

183133, 26 July 2010)

Facts:

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma
(Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma
(Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.2

Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. 3

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60)
years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education
in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and
they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines. 4

During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates
of Registration (ACRs). 5

Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr.
executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before
then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. 6 On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City,
Surigao del Norte.7 In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C.
Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7
March 2005.8

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27
July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo
and Felix, Jr. did so.9 On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the
registration requirement.

Individual certifications10 all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election
Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are registered voters
of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous
registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every ten
(10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the
incumbent Barangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.11

Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in 1953 12 and
1959,13 respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that
the documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were
registered in its Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other supporting documents appear to
show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists that will provide
information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.

1
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit 14 of a certain
Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are
undesirable and overstaying aliens.

Ruling:

The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and
second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the
documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has
not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such
election.

For what purpose is registration?

In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,59 we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:

To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the
meaning of the term "to register" as "to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to
enroll; to enter in a list."60 In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the
registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation,
and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry
which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. 61 Simply
stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification. 62

Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge
thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of
the deed, contract, or instrument to others." 63 As pertinent is the holding that registration "neither
adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties." 64 It
lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.

Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.

In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third
parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the liability of the partnership and of
the partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure affect the partnership’s juridical
personality.65 An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it
has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third
parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their
contract.66 The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration
is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of
registration serves chiefly to bind third persons.67

Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an
analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means
of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 68

2
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is
the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election,
although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine
citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.

Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. 69 Thus, has it been
admitted through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not
erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the
failure to have the marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency.

Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious
undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their
identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.

Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that
which they chose upon reaching the age of reason.

Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR
presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present an
E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly documented. 70 On the contrary, petitioners should
not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of
citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among others, their
exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners’
election of Philippine citizenship.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly
negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The
documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the
civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate
agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the
administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of
Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.

3
Director of Lands vs. Santiago (April 15, 1988)

Facts:

On September 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Maria O. Garcia in
the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Bataan; 1 a copy of the application was forwarded
to the Solicitor General thru the Director of Lands. On February 19, 1974, the Director of Lands filed
an opposition to this application, and at the same time the Solicitor General entered his appearance
and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearings of the same.
Subsequently, respondent Inperial Development Corporation, with the conformity of respondent
Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria O. Garcia to Imperial Development
Corporation without amending the boundaries and the area of the parcels of land stated in the original
application, which motion was granted by the respondent Judge. A Notice of Initial Hearing was sent
by the respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear
would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and
posted by the sheriff as required by law. On January 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither
petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent
Judge on the same date. After the reception of evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the
respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the
respondent corporation.

It is undisputed that on February 19, 1974, or prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
an opposition was filed by the petitioner Director of Lands to the original application for land
registration of respondent Garcia.   That verified opposition was precisely the answer referred to
3

in the above-quoted section, for, as therein alleged by the Director of Lands, neither the applicant
nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the
parcels of land applied for; neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest, have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question
for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the present application; that the said
parcels of land are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
and that, therefore, the same should be declared part of the public domain.   As a matter of fact,
4

under the Property Registration Decree, issued on June 11, 1978, which supersedes all other
laws relative to registration of property, the word used is "opposition" and not "answer."  5

Thus, the opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally
filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to
declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial
hearing. The pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within
the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded ...,"   cannot be interpreted to mean that the
6

court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation
would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of
the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his
having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the
serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case where the greater public
interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the
respondent Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another date for the
reception of the oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein
should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government's claim.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent corporation’s application for land registration was valid.

4
Ruling:

Further, we hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent
corporation's application for registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an
imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Verily, we said
in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court that: "No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth, be little more than
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested."   But precisely we are not convinced with the conclusion of the
11

respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through
its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years.

First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation
purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted
to the land registration court by Maria Garcia herself which contain the following footnotes: "This
survey is covered by S.A. (x-5) 582" ... "This is covered by S.A. No. (x-5) 583," S.A. being the
short form for Sales Application. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they
do not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of
Lands, to which the applications were submitted.   Therefore, their possession was not that of an
12

owner, as required by law. We note that the private respondents were conspicuously silent on
this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital fact.

Secondly, if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first
time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property. 
13

More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of
Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

as the above provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears
from Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971,   that the subject lands,
14

with an approximate area of 56,598 square meters and situated at Sitio Babuyan, Cabcaben,

5
Mariveles, Bataan, under Project No. 4-A, were forest lands and only later, declared as alienable
or disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the
assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The
respondent Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because
they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show
that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after the lands
had been declared as alienable and disposable.

In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever clasification belong to the State, courts
must scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent
Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and plans submitted by the private respondents
were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the petitioner's opposition to the application
were so casually ignored.

6
Legarda vs. Saleeby (G.R. No. 8936)

Facts:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the
25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued
to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912,
the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under
the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included
said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration
of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including
the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Issue:

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

7
Ruling:

The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If
he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may
be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud,
is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered,
with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged,
or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of
the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of
titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the
parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who
should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that
all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there
can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights
which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions
which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be
defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the
world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner
of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May
this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one
or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an
"innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or
interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the
later certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule
that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496
indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor
would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by
virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a
right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce
such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold
the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said
sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original
certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to
the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent
purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same
is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are
both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and
effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.

8
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first
original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the
public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons
are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so
recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser
is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin
on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio
State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7
House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good
faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains
any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of
law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of
real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and
606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the
face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded,
upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and
by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land,
after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona
fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he
had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must
take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule
that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men
know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that
they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It
would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a
public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that
said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that
the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which
is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The
rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and
in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we

9
think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said
sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included
in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system,
the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land
included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had
never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the
appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his
vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants
precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the
strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the
title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by
the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his
successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the
present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to
rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had
full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he
is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such
purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act
of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do
we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the
record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will
be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.

10
Sapto vs. Fabiana (G.R. No. L-11285)

Facts:

Sapto (Moro), now deceased was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alambre,
Toril, Davao City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5701 (0-28) of the Register of Deeds of
Davao City. When Sapto died, he left his children Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon as heirs of
the property in question. Ramon pre-deceased his two brothers, leaving no, other heirs. On June
6, 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale of a portion of four hectares of
the land aforementioned if favor of defendant Apolonio Fabiana, in consideration of the amount
of P245.00. The sale was duly approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao, but was never
registered. Possession of the land conveyed was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter
has been in the possession thereof 1931 up to the present.

Thereafter, Constancio Sapto died without any issue, Samuel Sapto married one Dora (Bagoba)
and upon his death was survived by his widow and two children, Laureana and Vicente Sapto.
On October 19, 1954, the widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed this action in the Court of
First Instance of Davao for the recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to
defendant Apolonio Fabiana in 1931. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale
between Samuel and Constancio Sapto and defendant in 1931 was never registered, it was valid
and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs, and ordered the plaintiffs to execute the
necessary deed of conveyance in defendant's favor and its annotation in the certificate of title.
From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

Issue:

whether the deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors in favor of the appellee over the
land in question, although never registered, is valid and binding on appellants and operated to
convey title and ownership to the appellee.

Ruling:

The question is not new. In a long line of cases already decided by this Court, we have
consistently interpreted sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing that "no deed . . . shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration" in the
sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not necessary to make it valid and
effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration (Obras Pias vs. Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil.,
45; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Quimson vs. Suarez, 45 Phil., 901; Winkleman vs. Veluz,
43 Phil., 609; Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, 2874; Carillo vs. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
"The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 492", we said in Medina vs. Imaz and Warner Barnes
and Co., 27 Phil., 314 (syllabus), "is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third
parties the land described in the conveyance. Generally speaking, as between vendor and
vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in relation to land not so registered". In Galanza vs.
Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, we held that "registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of
third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to
give effect as between the parties to their deed of sale". And in the recent case of Casica vs.
Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957, we reiterated that "the purpose of registration is
merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant
thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the
parties thereto of their obligations thereunder".

11
No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in question is
involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the possession of the vendee of
appellants' predecessors, herein appellee. It is, therefore, clear that the conveyance between
appellee and his vendors and valid and binding upon the latter, and is equally binding and
effective against the heirs of the vendors, herein appellants. To hold otherwise would make of the
Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs (Gustilo vs.
Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442), who would then be able to reconvey the same property to other
persons.

Appellants cite several cases wherein we have held that under the Torrens system, registration is
the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. The authorities
cited refer, however, to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of
innocent transferees who relied on the clean titles of the properties in question. These cases
have, therefore, no bearing on the instant case, where the appellee has always, remained in the
possession of the land in question and no subsequent transfer thereof to other persons has been
made either by appellants or their prodecessors-in-interest.

The appellants aver that it was error to require them to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
the plaintiff, appellee, and argue that the latter's action to obtain it had long prescribed, twenty
years having elapsed since the original sale. This contention must be overruled, being predicated
on the assumption that the reconveyance is sought by way of performance of the contract of sale
entered into in 1931. No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of
possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser,
registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties. Actually the action for
conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by
the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action
accrued only when appellant, initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an
established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the
New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L. R. A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs.
Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).

12
Lee Tek Sheng vs. CA (G.R. No. 115402)

Facts:

After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his father, herein
private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. 2 In his
answer with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land
registered solely in petitioner's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278
are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the
conjugal regime but was registered in petitioner's name only as a trustee
considering that at that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the
family. Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case
and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner - the conjugal regime.

Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the
case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT
8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by
the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or
harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court
pending litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice
of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA),
but to no avail. 

Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an

incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to
thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be
passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack
of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as
shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be
done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that
evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or
land registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.

Ruling:

Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily
for private respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute
that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not
material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case
amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate
of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on
Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:

Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. 6 (Emphasis Supplied).

13
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. 7 Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence
of ownership. 8 Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance
of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is
only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioner's fears, his certificate of
title is not being assailed by private respondent. 9 What the latter disputes is the
former's claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may
have become incontrovertible one year after issuance, 10 yet contrary to his
argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership. 11

It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the
motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of
procedure 12 or substance, 13 a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two
grounds, which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title
of the adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title
of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the
notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would not even be fair to
justify the cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that such
annotation amounts to a collateral attack of petitioner's certificate of title or that
ownership cannot be adjudicated in a partition case. It must be emphasized that the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that
one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties are
still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower
court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving
information to the public that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who
deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice
it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature
to effect partition of the property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice of lis
pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to
prove that the land belongs to him. 16 Besides, an action for partition is one case
where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper. 17

14
Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the
parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the spouses
during their marriage. 18 In addition, private respondent in his answer with
counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the
issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must present their
respective evidence to substantiate their respective allegations. 19 Considering that
this is a partition case, the court is required to inquire into the "nature and extent of
title" of the supposed claimant. 20 The title referred to by the rule is the purported
ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of
P.D. 1529, although the latter may be considered in the determination of the former.

15
Sepagan vs. Dacillo (G.R. No. 43206)

1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; NATURE OR PROCEEDINGS; PERSONAL NOTICE

UNNECESSARY. — Land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in
personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or
claimants of the land or lands sought to be registered, to give the courts jurisdiction
or authority to pass upon the questions arising from the actions whereby said right
is exercised (Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil., 31; Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49).

Facts:

On April 10, 1931, Felix Sepagan applied for the confirmation and registration in his
name in the registry of deeds, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, of his
alleged title or right to the two parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Bula
and Nabua of the Province of Camarines Sur, described in his application and more
particularly in his plans Exhibits A and B, and in the technical description sheet
attached thereto.

After the publication of the notices required by said Act, and also after the issuance
of the order of December 15, 1931, declaring in default all those persons who,
pretending to have an interest in the lands claimed by Felix Sepagan to belong to
him, failed to appear to file their opposition to said application, the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, after due hearing, rendered its decision and judgment on
March 10, 1932, decreeing the adjudication and registration of the parcels of land in
question in the registry of deeds, in the name of Felix Sepagan. The final decree of
registration in the registry was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office on December 23, 1932.

Two years later, or on August 7, 1934, the applicant asked for the issuance of the
corresponding writ of possession in his favor and his petition was granted in the
orders of September 10th and 12th of said year. Before the writ authorized by said
two orders could be executed, Paulino Dacillo, who claimed to be one of the twenty
occupants of one of the parcels of land in question (land in Bula, parcel 1, plan
Exhibit A), filed a motion in the lower court on October 22, 1934, praying: (1) That
he be not ejected from the portion of the land in Bula where, according to him, his
house is built and where he has been exercising acts of possession under claim of
ownership continuously for more than twenty-seven years, and (2) that the
provincial sheriff be restrained from executing the writ of possession in question to
his prejudice. He alleged in his motion that he had not been a party to the
registration proceedings instituted by the applicant; that said applicant did not notify
him of the filing of his application, notwithstanding the fact that they had met
several times, and that for said reasons he was informed of the proceedings had in
this case only a few days before the filing of his motion in question.

16
Issue:

Was the appellant a party to these registration proceedings or not? and if he was,
Can he now prevent the carrying out of the writ of possession issued?

Ruling:

This question is not new because it has already been held over and over again that
land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and
therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of
the land or lands sought to be registered, to give the courts jurisdiction or authority
to pass upon the questions arising from the actions whereby said right is exercised
(Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil., 31; Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49)

In the case of Roxas v. Enriquez, supra, it was said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The requirement that personal notice shall be a pre-requisite to the validity of

registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the
reason that personal notice could never be given to ’unknown claimants’. The great
difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants.
Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the
transfer of titles. Courts have held that in actions in rem, personal notice to owners
of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of
the res. . . ." (29 Phil., 31.)

In the case of Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, supra, it appears that although the appellee
was not expressly mentioned as one of those who had an interest in the land virtue
of the general notice or summons to the effect that all those who wished to oppose
the application must appear at the trial in order to do so. The court, well informed of
said facts, held in said case that the decree issued therein was conclusive against
the appellee as well as the world, considering him necessarily included in the last
phrase "all the world", or, using the same language of the notice: "all whom it may
concern." It was said in said case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem, and not
in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the State or
notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this is not so, for it
would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants
who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all." (17 Phil., 49.)

17
If it is true that the appellant, as affirmed by him in his motions of October 22,
19934, and December 12th of said year, was occupying the land which he claims to
have belonged to him for about twenty-seven years, and that he has been actually
living there because he built a house thereon, he and his family must have
necessarily seen the notices posted thereon, inasmuch as the evidence, particularly
the return made by the sheriff appearing on page 20 of the record, shows that the
notices in question had really been posted on the land. If he saw them, and yet he
refused to take action by appearing, as was required of him, in order to file his
objections to the confirmation and registration applied for, he now has no cause to
complain against anybody. He is to blame for his carelessness and negligence.

After the issuance of a decree in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 496,
which is in accordance with the Torrens system, and after the lapse of the period of
one year fixed by law (sec. 38), to question the validity of said decree in a review
proceeding, the title becomes perfect and unimpeachable, because if it were not so,
there would be no end to litigations (Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon and Director of
Lands, 50 Phil., 791; Director of Lands v. Gutierrez David, 50 Phil., 797). The veiled
purpose of the appellant’s motion, which was denied by the lower court in its order
from which the appeal now under consideration was taken, is no other than to
reopen the case in order to give him a chance to prove that the land claimed by him
is really his; that his own house is built thereon, and that the appellee succeeded in
registering it in his name fraudulently and behind his back.

The ruling invoked by the appellant in support of his contention is not applicable to
the case at bar because Pedro Manuel, the petitioner in said case of Manuel v.
Rosauro, supra, did not begin to exercise acts of possession over the land in
question until long after the issuance of the decree of adjudication and registration
in favor of Jeronimo de Leon, and the possession of said petitioner thereafter
continued uninterruptedly for eleven years. It was only after the lapse of these
eleven years that when Pedro de Leon, Jeronimo de Leon’s successor in interest,
sought the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. From this it naturally follows
that Pedro Manuel was really not a party to the registration proceeding wherein the
writ of possession was issued because while said proceeding was pending he did not
yet have any interest or right in the land in question. This case is different.
According to his own allegations, Paulino Dacillo began to possess the land claimed
by him many years before this case was instituted by the applicant. Under such
circumstances it cannot be denied that he was a party thereto.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we hold that the errors attributed to the lower
court by the appellant are not true and that his appeal is unfounded.

18
Republic vs. CA and Ribaya (G.R. No. 113549)

Facts:

On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits,   on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920,
5

a parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
was survived for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses
Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to
comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-
13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as
noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 1 decision,   these exhibits do not at all show
6

the surveyor's signature. Moreover, its per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of
Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for
disposition only on 31 December 1930.  7

In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by
Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as
LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application and hearing thereof
were published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette,   and in its decision of 18
8

September 1925,   the CFI granted the said application.

9

Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of
land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave
rise to Plan II-13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an
aggregate area of only 10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square
meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26
February 1926.   The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan
10

was not published.

In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land
during the war. 14

In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land
covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075,
approved on 16 December 1968.   Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and
15

separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents.  16

In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land  7 and claiming
1

ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-
10848 (3947).   Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17
18

August 1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of
nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from
the original title, viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 6198.

The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the
amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45 (],) of Act No.
2874.   The petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the
19

land covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.

19
Issue:

1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for
annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title;

Ruling:

Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the
public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public
land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time.
In Republic vs. Animas,  we ruled:
40

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be

recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute
of Limitations does not run against the state. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.

We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public
forest and released only on 31 December 1930,  the land registration court acquired no
41

jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action
to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred
by prescription.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan
(Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the
first and total want of publication of the second.

As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the
hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the
original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there
was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two
publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void
for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential
bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court;  it is a jurisdictional requisite.  Land registration
42 43

is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive

seizure of the land through publication and service of notice. 44

Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan.
The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan
II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the
court amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the
parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued
was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.

A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land.  On the basis of the
45

decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have
attended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their
way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No.
3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the
decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of
publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over
the land embraced by the amended plan.

20
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private
respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary
under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon.  This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine
46

Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial,   7 Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz,  Bank of the Philippine Islands
4 48

vs. Acuna,  Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus,  and Director of Lands vs. Benitez,  that only
49 50 51

where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of
land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the
original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary,
a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.

The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved
because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are
a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible
for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided therein and to establish the
conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.

Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included
in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).

21
Republic vs. Enciso (G.R. No. 160145)

Facts:

A parcel of land (Lot 2278-A of the subdivision plan Csd-03-012562-D being a portion of Lot
2278, Cad. 652-D L.R.C. Rec. No.), situated in the Barrio of South Poblacion, Municipality of
Masinloc, Province of Zambales. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by Sta. Lucia Street; on the
NE., along line 2-3 by Capt. Albright Street; on the SE. & SW. along line 3-4-1 by Lot 2278-B of
the subd. plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 39 deg. 35’E., 12.05 m. from
BLLM.1, beginning; containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE
(1,475) square meters. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 40 cms. Bearings; true; date of original survey; Sept. 1927-
July 1928 and that of the subdivision survey; July 22, 1999 and was approved on Jan. 20, 2000. 3

The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the said lot by virtue of an extrajudicial
settlement of estate and quitclaim on March 15, 1999; the said property is not tenanted or
occupied by any person other than the respondent and his family who are in actual physical
possession of the same; and the respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous, peaceful, open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for not less than 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.4

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondent nor his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the respondent failed to adduce any
muniment of title and/or the tax declaration with the application to prove bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax
declaration adverted to in the application does not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations
indicate such possession to be of recent vintage; (d) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the respondent considering that he
failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from
February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892; and (e) the subject land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation.

Issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR REGISTRATION SANS ANY SHOWING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

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Ruling:

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive,

and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945. It is not disputed that the land sought to be
registered was originally part of the reclamation project undertaken by the Municipality of
Masinloc, Zambales. The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain
may only be leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which the government could not sell to private
parties except if the legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.24 The ownership of lands reclaimed
from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters
of the public domain belong to the State.25 On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly
approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, compiling all the
existing laws on lands of the public domain. This remains to this day the existing and applicable
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The State
policy prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain to private individuals continued under the 1935 Constitution.

Indeed, there is nothing to support the respondent’s claim that the property "was reclassified as
residential … already segregated from the public domain and assumed the character of private
ownership." At the

moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities classified the subject as alienable and
disposable. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 26

According to the CA, "the Municipality of Masinloc must have been in possession of the subject
land even before 1969 considering that it was originally surveyed way back in 1927-1928." This
is not the kind of possession and occupation contemplated under the law. While the subject
property was still in the hands of the municipality, it was undeniably part of the public domain.
The municipality cannot then be considered a predecessor-in-interest of the applicant from whom
the period of possession and occupation required by law may be reckoned with. Any other
interpretation would be dangerously detrimental to our national patrimony.

Even assuming that Honorato Edaño, the respondent’s earliest predecessor-in-interest,

possessed the property as early as 1969, the respondent’s claim must still fail, as he was unable
to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. As the Court ruled in Republic v.
Alconaba:27

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.

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Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.

The respondent’s possession and that of his "predecessors-in-interest" will not suffice for
purposes of judicial confirmation of title. What is categorically required by law is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The evidence on record shows that a house was constructed on the subject property only in
1991. Certain discrepancies likewise surround the application for registration: Honorato Edaño
sold a parcel of land consisting of 2,790 square meters on December 9, 1980 to Vicente Enciso
alone; on January 17, 1981, Vicente Enciso, Natividad Edaño Asuncion and Thelma Edaño
executed a deed of partition covering the same lot. Why was there a need to partition the
property if the entire land had already been sold to Vicente? The Court also notes that in the said
deed of partition, one-half of the total area of the land, which was 1,398 square meters, was
adjudicated in favor of Vicente; however, in the respondent’s application for registration, the land
sought to be registered consists of 1,475 square meters.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession
and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law. Bare allegations, without more,
do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden to the oppositor. 28

Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1) Lot No. 2278-A was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in
the concept of owners since time immemorial, or from June 12, 1945.

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