Rulings in Tenancy

"RULINGS IN AGRARIAN CASES"

BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

HOW TO ESTABLISH TENANCY
The fact that defendants did not at all question the plaintiff's tenancy over
their respective land in question for several years, there is an implied admission
or consent to the establishment of tenancy relationship between the parties. The
relationship may be considered established where the landowner knew of the
cultivation of the land by the farmer and he tolerated the same (PACHECO VS.
DESIDERIO, CA G.R. NOS. SP-06078-CAR, FEBRUARY 25, 1977).
For establishment of tenancy relationship, it is not essential that the
landowner has personal knowledge of the cultivation by another, in the concept
of tenant of his landholding. It is sufficient that he is chargeable with
knowledge, through his overseer or agent of such cultivation and he tolerates the
same (LONTOC VS. VDA. DE ASIS, CA-G.R. NO. 39331-12, JULY 13,
1968).
We emphasize that, it is not necessary that consent be given
wholeheartedly, as consent given out of pity is sufficient (POLIDARIO SR.,
VS. BROGONIO, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. 46702-R, MARCH 9, 1972).
Nor lack of written contract is an obstacle to the establishment of the
relation of landlord and tenant under the Tenancy Law. It is enough that there be
mutual consent for the tenant to cultivate for a consideration, in writing,
expressly or impliedly (JAMORA VS. DIAMCAY, CA-G.R. NO. 47379-R,
APRIL 13, 1972).
As long as the legal possession of the land constitutes a person as a
tenant-farmer by virtue of an express or implied lease, such an act is binding on
the owner of the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to
such arrangement. (CO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 162
SCRA 392).
The fact that complainant has a hut erected on the landholding shows he
is a tenant since only tenants are entitled to a homelot where he can built his
house thereon as an incident to his right as a tenant (CRUZ VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 129 SCRA 222).

AGRARIAN DISPUTE
Any controversy relating to terms, tenure or condition of employment, or
concerning an association or representation of persons in negotiating,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms on conditions to employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
employers and employees (LAW OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BY
RECAREDO P. BARTE, 1991 EDITION, P. 26).

ABANDONMENT/MORTGAGE/VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Herein respondent-appellant had voluntarily abandoned her landholdings
in litigation after she has sublet it without the consent and knowledge of the
landowner (COSCOS VS. ESTATE SIBUGON, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO.
05658, FEBRUARY 28, 1977).
Persons therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be
considered tenants, and who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation
of the land, ceases to hold and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant; and ceases to enjoy the status, right and privileges of one (GABRIEL
VS. PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
The gauge in the determination of whether petitioner-appellant has
abandoned or surrendered the subject landholding, is the simultaneous and
subsequent acts indicative of her intention to do so. There is no such thing as
presumptive voluntary surrender of abandonment by implication, and most
certainly, not from vague and doubtful evidence. If there should be a waiver of a
right, public policy demand that the same be clearly and convincingly
established by competent and sufficient evidence (BARRAMEDA VS. OCA,
ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. 07164-SP; POLICARPIO NISNISAN, ET AL., VS.
CA, ET AL., GR NO. 126425).
Abandonment has been invariably construed to include two essential
elements: (1) the intention to abandon, and (2) the physical act or acts of
abandonment. The primary elements of abandonment are the intention to
abandon and the external act by which intention is carried into effect. The
intention to abandon is considered the first and permanent
inquiry (MONTEMAYOR, 1ST EDITION 1964, P. 232).

TENANCY EMANCIPATION PATENT
Anyone who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to land given to
him by the government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of
proving that the farmer does not deserve the government grant.
The above findings notwithstanding and assuming that petitioner really
waived his tenancy rights in favor of private respondent, this case should still be
void for being made in violation of Presidential Decree No. 27 (TORRES VS.
VENTURA G.R. NO. 86044, July 2, 1990).

CLOA/CLT/EP
It being so, We rule that the EPs' previously issued to defendant-appellee
partakes the nature of a "public document which is entitled to full and credit in
the absence of competent evidence that its due execution was tainted with
defects and irregularities that could warrant declaration of its
nullity (ANCHUELO VS. IAC, 147 SCRA 434).
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) does not
vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. It is only
after compliance with the conditions set forth in PD No. 27 which entitled him
to an Emancipation Patent (EP) that he acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA
252).
It must be emphasized that once a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) has
been issued to a tenant covering a property under the supervision of and in
compliance with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, he is thereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land
in question. There is no more landlord and tenant relationship and all that
remains is for the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the valuation of
the land in accordance with existing rules and regulations for purpose of
compensation to the landowner (QUIBAN VS. BUTALID, 189 SCRA 106).
Nullification of a CLT maybe had only in a case directly attacking its
validity but never collaterally (MIRANDA VS. CA, GR NO. L-59730,
FEBRUARY 11, 1986).
An Emancipation Patent holder acquires the vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding — a right which has becomes fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (PAGTALUNAN VS.
TAMAYO, 183 SCRA 253).

E.P. — TORRENS TITLE
1. Certificate of Title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except
in a DIRECT PROCEEDING in accordance with law (WIDOWS AND
ORPHANS ASSOCIATION ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 210
SCRA 165).
2. Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership of
the land (CHING VS. CA, 181 SCRA 9).
3. When EP is issued then he acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA
252).
4. The government recognizing the worthy purpose of the TORRENS
SYSTEM, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder
once the condition laid down by the law are satisfied (REPUBLIC VS.
UMALI, 171 SCRA 647).

TORRENS
Lands under Torrens Title cannot be acquired by prescription (Sec. 39,
Act No. 196; Rosario vs. Auditor General, L-1187, April 30, 1958).

TENANCY — PERSONAL CULTIVATION
For one to be considered a tenant, he must NECESSARILY WORK THE
LAND HIMSELF although he may avail of the labor of his immediate
farmhousehold (SABIDORIO, ET AL., VS. UGAY, C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01495,
July 25, 1973).
DCN 0808 = When he went to Saudi Arabia and left farmwork to his
wife, he was clearly no longer taking advantage of the assistance of his farm
household (ESTABILLO VS. RUIZ, CA-G.R. NO. 42019-20-R, January 12,
1972; CRUZ VS. MARCELO, CA-G.R. NO. SP-05933, May 30, 1977).
In the following cases involving a GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE (DIMANAWA VS. PLANA, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. SP-02004,
January 7, 1975) a BUS CONDUCTOR (BALANAY VS. RAFAEL, C.A.-
G.R. NO. SP-01746-CAR, August 2, 1976) a FULL TIME MACHINE
OPERATOR (MAGALANG VS. YAP, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-03163, April 14,
1977), and a JEEPNEY DRIVER (ESCUETA VS. GERODIAS, ET AL., CA-
G.R. NO. SP-06963, March 30, 1978, the COURT of APPEALS found it hard
to believe that these people could still have the time to work the land personally.
IF THE LAW ABHORS ABSENTEE OWNERS, MORE SO WITH
ABSENTEE TENANTS (BUENO VS. BASCO, C.A.-G.R. NO. 07644-CAR,
May 31, 1978).
Failure to comply with one's obligation as a tenant is tantamount to
abandonment (LIMBO VS. BRAGADO, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-05891, March
28, 1977).

TENANCY
The six (6) essential requisites for the establishment of tenancy
relationship are:
1. The parties are the LANDOWNER and the
TENANT;
2. The SUBJECT is AGRICULTURAL LAND;
3. There is CONSENT;
4. The PURPOSE is AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION;
5. There is PERSONAL CULTIVATION;
6. There is SHARING OF HARVEST.
CABALLES VS. DAR - 168 SCRA 247
QUA VS. CA — 198 SCRA 236; GRAZA VS. CA

— 163 SCRA 39
Unless a person has established his status as a DE JURE tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the government under existing tenancy laws (CASTILLO VS. COURT OF
APPEAL, 205 SCRA 529).
Tenant is defined as the "person who personally cultivates the same
(landholding) (Sec. 6, R.A. 3844)" Absent the element of personal cultivation,
one cannot be a tenant, (CASTILLO VS. CA) (REYES VS. ESPINELI, 30
SCRA 574) At most he can be considered a CIVIL LAW LESSEE because the
civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased (GABRIEL VS. PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
The fact of sharing alone, is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship; . . . (CABALLES VS. DAR 168 SCRA 247)
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or
usurpation (HILARIO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148
SCRA 573).
Consequently, the mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer
upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the law (HILARIO VS. IAC, SUPRA).
The caretaker of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land
and, hence, a tenant (LATAG VS. BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to
cultivation (COCOMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 568).
Cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of tenancy
relationship. However, the mere fact that it was not the plaintiff who had
actually seeded the land does not mean that they are not tenants of the land. The
definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or
harvesting of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the case of the
plants or husbanding the ground to forward the products of earth by general
industry (GUERRERO VS. CA, 142 SCRA 136, May 30, 1986; COCOMA
VS. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the government under existing laws (PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. HON.
FILEMON GAPULTOS, ET AL., 181 SCRA 159).

INTRUDER
It is a settled rule that tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful owner and not by the imposition or usurpation by
any intruder or usurper (GRAZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 163 SCRA
41; BERENGUER VS. COURT OF APPEALS 164 SCRA 432).
Mere cultivation by a usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to
work on the land as a tenant and thereby involve the protective mantle of
security of tenure under the law (GONZALES VS. ALVAREZ, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 77401, February 7, 1990).
Parenthetically, mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer
upon him any legal right to work on the land as tenant and enjoy the protection
of security of tenure of the land (ANTONIO VS. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. L-
14631, March 30, 1962; SPOUSES TIONGSON VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 130 SCRA 482 (1984) ).
Indeed, tenancy IS NOT A UNILATERAL RELATIONSHIP deriving
substance only from what an alleged tenant does upon the land. It is basically a
legal relationship of mutual accord by and between him and the owner of the
land (TUAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 118 SCRA 484).
Tenancy is not purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship the intent of the parties,
the understanding when the farmer is installed, and, in this case, their written
agreements, provided, these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important (TUAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 118 SCRA
484).
There are no SQUATTERS in agricultural lands, squatters are only found
in URBAN COMMUNITIES, not in rural areas (on PD 772) (PEOPLE VS.
HON. VICENTE ECHAVES, 95 SCRA 663).
The court is aware of the practice of landowners, by way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws to have their tenants sign contracts of agreements
intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship (CRUZ VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 129 SCRA 224; VDA DE DONATO).

RES JUDICATA
For res judicata to set in, the following requisites should be clearly
established:
1. There is a FINAL FORMER JUDGEMENT;
2. That the former judgment was rendered by a
COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER and THE PARTIES;
3. The former judgment is a JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS; and
4. That there is between first and second action,
IDENTITY OF PARTIES, OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
and CAUSE OF ACTION.
Decisions of Administrative agencies has the force and effect of final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata (IPEKDJIAN
MERCHANDISING CO., VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, 9 SCRA
72; SAN LUIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 174 SCRA 258; YSMAEL, JR.
AND CO., INC. VS. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 190 SCRA
672).

IDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The TEST for determining whether or not there is IDENTITY OF THE
CAUSES OF ACTION between the first and second action is whether the same
evidence would support and establish both the present and former causes of
action (SANTOS VS. IAC G.R. NO. 66671, October 28, 1986).
The doctrine of RES JUDICATA is a rule pervading a well regulated
system of jurisprudence and is based upon two GROUNDS embodied in various
COMMON LAW MAXIMS = The first based on PUBLIC POLICY AND
NECESSITY which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation — Interest republicae ut sit finis litium; and the second, on
the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause
— nemo debet bix vexari pro una et eadem causa. (NABUS VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 91670, February 7, 1991).
Once a ruling or judgment has become final, all the issues therein or
implied thereto should be laid to rest (ZANSIBARIAN RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, 135 SCRA 235; DE
BORJA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. L-37944, JUNE 30, 1988).

FINAL JUDGEMENT
Final judgment are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed.
Otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust to the courts. In the absence of an
appeal from a trial court decision, the judgment becomes final and executory. It
becomes the law of the case. Having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting within its authority, that judgment may no longer be altered
even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain. They cannot be
corrected by a special civil action of certiorari, filed long after the judgment had
become final and executory (SAN JUAN VS. RALLOS G.R. 45063, 15 April
83, Third Div. Fernan, J.; INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL VS. MINISTER
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. 54243, 21 JULY 89, Second Div.
Paras, J.).
Once a decision has become final, the court can no longer amend or
modify the same, much less set it aside. To allow the court to amend the final
judgment will result in endless litigation. Every litigation must come to an end.
Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a
litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The
prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless
litigation were to be encouraged, unscrupulous, litigants, will multiply in
number to the detriment of the administration of justice (MARQUEZ VS. CA
G.R. 79743, 6 November 1989, Second Div. Sarmiento, J.; NGO BUN
TIONG VS. JUDGE SAYO, G.R. 45825, 30 JUNE 1988, Second Div. Paras,
J.).
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the only jurisdiction left
to the trial court is to order its execution (BACLAYON VS. COURT OF
A decision no matter how erroneous becomes the law of the case between
the parties upon attaining finality (BALAIS VS. BALAIS, 159 SCRA 37).
An execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is aptly called the life of
the law (GARCIA VS. ECHIVERI, 132 SCRA 631).

APPEAL
It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege
which must be exercised only within the time and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed for it. It is also the established rule that the perfection of an
appeal within the period provided by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well. So it has been held that, unless an appeal is timely taken,
the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the appealed case and has power
only to dismiss the appeal (VELASCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 51 SCRA
439; RODRIGUEZ VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 47 SCRA 153).
The 30 day period to appeal from decision of Land Registration Court
should be counted from receipt by the Office of the Solicitor General of the
decision, NOT from receipt thereof by the special counsel or fiscal acting for the
O.S.G. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 135
SCRA 156).
ART. 13, NEW CIVIL CODE
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.
The protection of an appeal within the reglementary period from the
decision is JURISDICTIONAL (ITALIAN VILLAGE RESTAURANT VS.
NATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, 207 SCRA 04)
Beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of
the power of review of any court. (BORILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
209 SCRA 130). The filing of appeal within the reglementary period is
MANDATORY (FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE
PHIL. VS. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY EMPLOYEES
UNION, 212 SCRA 39)
Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. (ADEZ REALTY,
INCORPORATED VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 212 SCRA 823)
Public policy and sound practice demand that the risk of occasional errors
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at same definite date
fixed by law; Litigation must end and terminate something and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprive of the fruits of the verdict. Court must, therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. (LI
KIM THO VS. GO SIY KAO, ET AL., L-2676, Jan. 31, 1949, 82 Phil. 776,
778; MASAGANA TELAMART, INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, L-69623, May 31, 1985) (COMPENDIUM OF
PHIL. JURISPRUDENCE, SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM 1845-
1980). Volume II, By Celso L. Magsino, page 33).

APPEAL PROCEDURE
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to secure not override substantial
justice (GREGORIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore,
we ruled in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 that a SIX DAY
DELAY in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again
in RAMOS VS. BAGASAO, 96 SCRA 395, this Court held that a delay of
FOUR (4) DAYS in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time
to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity (VELASCO VS.
GAYAPA, JR., 152 SCRA 440).
Moreover, rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat,
substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense (ANGEL VS. INOPIQUEZ, 169 SCRA 129; CALASIAO
FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION VS. CA, 106
SCRA 630; DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ROMAMBAN, ET AL., 131
SCRA 431 [1984]).

PROCEDURE
In the word of the Supreme Court, "The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. It's proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of the contending parties (MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 PHIL. 523, 529).
Consequently, lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will
be overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an
honest mistake or unforseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse
party and have not deprived the court of its authority (CASE and NANTZ VS.
JUGO ET AL., 430 G. Mo. 11, p. 4620; ALIGARBES VS. AGUILAR, ET
AL., G.R. NO. L-5736, JAN. 30, 1954).
It is settled, jurisprudence than an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the
first time an appeal (REPARATIONS COMMISSION VS. VISAYAN
PACKING CORPORATION, 193 SCRA 531; MATIENZO VS.
SERVIDAD, 107 SCRA 276). In the word of Supreme Court Justice Isagani A.
Cruz — They must choose one or the other and stand or fall by whatever choice
they make.
Perfection of an appeal within the period prescribed by law is
jurisdictional so that the failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory (ANDAYA VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, 188 SCRA 253).

SECURITY OF TENURE
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. COURT OF
The right to surrender possession of the tenanted land can only be
exercised by the tenant (SEE SEC. 27 (2) R.A. 3844; MANUEL VS.
VALENTIN, C.A. G.R. NO. 03982, MARCH 15, 1976).
Essence of the decision = DARAB
He pointed out that there is no question that he was then sickly even
before the first cropping season of 1987 and so it was natural for him as a tenant
to get the services of others to perform farm activities which he, as the tenant
cannot do during his temporary incapacity.
The right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants. It
also applies to ACTUAL TILLERS of the land. Pursuant to Department
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform for
the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 27, security of tenure is likewise
available to actual tillers of the land (MEJORADA VS. OHAGAN, ET AL.,
CA G.R. NO. SP-01665, July 7, 1975).
As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a person as a tenant-
farmer by virtue of an express or implied lease, such act is binding on the owner
of the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such an
agreement. This is a settled-jurisprudence. The purpose of the law is to protect
the tenant-farmer's security of tenure which could otherwise arbitrarily
terminated by an owner simply manifesting his non-conformity to the
relationship (CO VS. IAC, 167 SCRA 392).
The agricultural tenant's security of tenure in holding has become one of
his most deserved rights under our tenancy legislation, guaranteed by both RA
No. 1199 and RA No. 3844, as amended. For without it, a tenant becomes the
easy prey of the landowner's whims and caprices. Without it, he can be deprived
of his principal and sole means of livelihood for no cause at all (ADOLFO, ET
AL., VS. CABANSON, 8 CAR 2s 84; IBAN VS. PLANAS, CA-GR. NO. SP-
01768).
The DAR has taken cognizance of certain methods employed by
landowners to defeat said policy, such as "forcing their tenants to sign
documents implying voluntary surrender to evade the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law which act was pronounced to be illegal. In PD No. 583, it is made a
criminal offense for any landowner who by any other act, scheme, or strategy
shall eject, exclude, remove or oust and/or cause the ouster, exclusion, removal
or ejectment of a tenant-farmer from his landholding in contravention of
decrees, laws and other orders on land reform (ALCALA VS. AMARANTE,
CA-GR NOS. SP-05669-95672, FEBRUARY 4, 1977).
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as
amended, enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it
prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated
for causes provided by law. The principle is epitomized by the axiom in the land
tenure that once a tenant, always a tenant. The law simply provide that the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant should be preserved
in order to insure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being
unjustly dispossessed of the land (PINEDA VS. DE GUZMAN and
PELICIANO, 21 SCRA 1450).
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee which they
value as life itself, and the deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to the
deprivation of their only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. CA).
(O)nce a leasehold relations (tenancy) has been established, the
agricultural lessee (tenant) is entitle to security of tenure. He has a right to
continue working on the land and he may not be ejected therefrom except for
causes as provided by law (DE JESUS VS. IAC, 175 SCRA
559; DOLORFINO VS. CA, 191 SCRA 880).
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in the possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sell, alienates or transfer, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted
to the obligations of the agricultural lessor (SECTION 10, RA NO. 3844).
A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer of
legal possession of the subject property. The purpose of the law is to maintain
the tenants in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land and to afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings by the transferee or
purchaser of the land (PRIMERO VS. CAR, 101 PHIL. 675).
A tenant can only be ejected by the Court for cause and such cause for
dispossession must be proven and justified (ANCHETA VS. COURT OF

P.D. 816 LAWFUL EJECTMENT
The appellant has these many years (from 1968 to the present) succeeded
in evading payment of rentals while at the same time holding on the land
bespeaks much louder than words his evident bad faith in trying to enrich
himself at the expense of another, a situation that is unjust when practiced by a
landowner. We are not unaware of the special concern that the state takes over
agricultural tenant and/or lessors, the tillers of the country's economy, for these
protection should be meant only to save the man from harassment and undue
advantage; it was certainly not meant to aid and abet wrongful inroads by the
tenant into legitimate rights of landowners/lessors who, too, deserve equal
protection of the law. Otherwise, there would be neither rhyme nor justification
in all of the land reform measures of the government, . . . (PABUSTAN VS.
ANGELES C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-01632, OCT. 11, 1974).
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the
lease rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in
possession and cultivation of farmholding without giving the landowner his
share in the produce, for the law recognizes the basic right of the landowner to
enjoy his legitimate share of the produce of his property. Thus, PD 816 has been
promulgated in pursuance of the policy of the government to equalize the rights
and obligation of the landowners, agricultural lessor and agricultural
lessee (VILLANUEVA VS. MENDOZA, CA-G.R. NO. 06612-SP, JUNE 17,
1977).
The tenant who has been in possession and cultivation of litigated land
must be held liable for rentals which he failed to pay beginning the x x x to the
present, since this is a legal obligation which he cannot evade (Sec. 26, RA
3844 as amended by RA 6389). Should he fail to pay the same he shall suffer
the consequences decreed by PD 816, Sec. 3. (CANJA VS. BANGOY CA-
G.R. NO. 06433-R, MAY 31, 1977).

PD 816 - SEC. 36 (6) RA 3844
R.A. 3844 (Sec. 36 (6)) states — does not pay the lease rental. It should
not be meant as does not pay in full the lease rental to justify dispossession.
To hold such view would sanction quasi-judicial legislation frowned
upon by our courts (LORENZO, ET AL., VS. PNB [DAVAO BRANCH] ET
AL., VOL. 51 NO. 11, O.G. 5658, NO. 9555-R, MAY 11, 1955).

SEC. 36, RA 3844
An agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of
his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that
valid grounds exist for his ejectment therefrom.
Thus, the essential requirement for lawful dispossession are —
a) The court, body or tribunal acquires competent
jurisdiction;
b) There must be hearing on the merits;
c) The judgment must be final and executory; and
d) The judgment must be based on valid and lawful
ground provided under agrarian laws.

PERSONAL CULTIVATION AS LEGAL GROUND FOR EJECTMENT
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Personal Cultivation by owner — lessor,
still a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant; Reason: We are in full
agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals upholding the Court a quo
that insofar as COCONUT LANDS are concerned, personal cultivation by the
owner-lessor, a ground for dispossession of the tenant-lessee under Section 50 of
Republic Act 1199, is still a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant. This is
so because Section 35 of Republic Act 3844 expressly provides that with respect
to lands principally planted to CITRUS, COCONUTS, CACAO, DURIAN and
other similar PERMANENT TREES. The consideration, as well as the tenancy
system prevailing, shall be governed by the provision of Republic Act 1199, as
amended (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
AND ALBINO ESTAVAS, NO. L-44678, APRIL 8, 1986, 142 SCRA 34).
NOTE: Fishponds not included, Also take note of effectivity of
CARL

FORUM - SHOPPING
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion [other than by appeal or certiorari]
in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling. This is specially so as in this case, where the court in which the second
suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
Forum shopping is condemnable and punishment therefore is the
dismissal of all actions pending in different courts (BUAN VS. LOPEZ, JR.,
145 SCRA 38).
Pendency of an identical action between the same parties in another is a
ground for dismissal of the second suit (Ibid).

TECHNICALITIES OF LAW
May disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits
based on evidence (RUIZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 577).
Technicality when it deserts its proper office, as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts (ALONZO VS. VILLAMOR, ET AL., 16 PHIL. 315; CITED ON
YONG CHAN KIM VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL., 193 SCRA
344).
Following the stand of the S.C., the Board will not allow substantial
justice to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural law.

POINTS TO PONDER IN AGRARIAN CASES
1. Rules of Technicalities must yield to the broader interest of
substantial justice (LAMSAN TRADING INC. VS. LEOGARDO
JR., 144 SCRA 571).
2. Technicalities in pleading must be avoided in order to attain
substantial justice (MUTUC VS. AGLORO, 105 SCRA 642).
3. Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the
vindication of legitimate grievance (FUNTILA VS. CA, 93 SCRA
251).
4. Trial judges should refrain from procedural technicalities in
deciding cases and get down to the business of hearing and
deciding cases on their merits (GERIAN VS. BONCAROS, 93
SCRA 862).
5. Due process is only for the vigilant not those having right to
be heard, choose to be silent, only to complain later that they
have not been heard (BAUTISTA VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR
& EMPLOYMENT, 196 SCRA 470).
6. Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks
more eloquently than a hundred witnesses (PEOPLE VS.
SACABIN, 57 SCRA 707).

DUE PROCESS
The requirement of due process are satisfied when the parties are given
the opportunity to submit their respective position papers and submit any
evidence they may have in support of their defense (MUTUC VS. COURT OF
APPEAL, 190 SCRA 43; ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. DE LA SERNA,
182 SCRA 472).
The failure of the courts to consider all issues raised in the complaint is a
violation of procedural due process; The issues raised by a party should not be
left undecided, especially, so when such issue have been raised on time and
insisted upon at all stages of the proceeding (GRACILLA VS. CIR, G.R. NO.
L-24489, SEPTEMBER 28, 1968).

EVIDENCE

AFFIDAVITS
Affidavits are often unsatisfactory at best. The affiant swears that what he
started is true, but he does not swear that it is the whole truth, nor has the
adverse party an opportunity to inquire whether it is so . . . . . . Affidavits on the
same side are sometimes uniform in appearance as eggs in the shell, but if one of
them be prodded with the point of cross-question or two, the yolk is at once
exposed SALONGA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON EVIDENCE, p. 373, 1965 ed.).
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely
hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not
have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not, has no probative value as the affiant could not have
been cross-examined on the facts stated therein (SALONGA VS. PAÑO, ET
AL., G.R. NO. 59524, Feb. 18, 1985; J. HUGO GUTIERREZ CITING
PEOPLE VS. LABINIA, 115 SCRA 223 and PEOPLE VS. VALERIO, 112
SCRA 661).
He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence (TOP-WELD MANUFACTURING INC., VS. ECED, S.A., 138
SCRA 118; LAGASCA VS. DE VERA, 79 PHIL. 376; RODRIGUEZ VS.
VALENCIA, 81 PHIL. 787).
Petitioner or anyone in his right mind for that matter, would not waste his
time, effort and money, especially if he is a poor, to prosecute an unworthy
action. If at all, petitioner is an example of a poor tenant farmer who, due to
sheer poverty, was constrained to mortgage his only land to somebody else — a
situation which Presidential Decree No. 27 sought to prevent by providing an
explicit prohibition on transfer (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).
Lastly, it is already settled that, this Board, unfettered by the technical
rules of evidence and procedure, can rule on unassigned errors as long as this
will enable it to arrive at a just solution of the conflict before the court
(Board) (DE LEON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 612).

PARTIES IN A CASE
It is generally accepted that no man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger (ED. A. KELLER & CO. VS. EDLERMAN &
BUCKMALL STRATEMSHIP CO., 38 PHIL. 514, 520; GATCHALIAN
VS. ARLEGUI, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
And strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court (BIEN VS. SUNGA, 117 SCRA 249 [1982]).
An EXECUTION case can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court (GALANG, ET AL. VS. UYTIEPO, 92
PHIL. 344; CASTANEDA VS. DE LEON, 55 O.G. 625; MARTINEZ, ET
AL. VS. VILLACETE, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-18695, AUGUST 31, 1962).
Notice to counsel of record is binding upon the client (DURAN VS.
PAGARIGAN, 106 PHIL. 90).
Recovery of real property is one of the actions that survive against the
decedents' representatives (BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS. HEIRS OF
KALAW, L-18805, AUGUST 14, 1967).

L. B. P.
LBP assumed the responsibility of financing the acquisition of
agricultural lands by LESSEES through PRE-EMPTION and REDEMPTION
pursuant to Sec. 11-12, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389 (LBP
CIRCULAR NO. 3, SERIES OF 1980).

V. O. S.
Decisions of the PARAD and RARAD on preliminary determination of
just compensation for landholdings covered by the Agrarian Reform Program
are NO LONGER APPEALABLE to the Board as the remedy is to file
an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (ESTATE OF JUAN
MIRANDA VS. LBP DARAB CASE NO. 0585; LBP VS. DARAB, C.A.-
G.R. NO. SP-30325).

LANDOWNERS' RIGHT
Landlords, especially small farmers, deserves protection; Tenants are not
to be solely protected by law (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ, 138 SCRA
173).
The concept of "social justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to
landowner - lessor (CABATAN VS. CA, 95 SCRA 323).
For what he has consented to, he cannot now set up as an injury, Justice
Edgardo Paras — one who trifles with the law must suffer the fruits of his
scheme (ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 209 SCRA 350).
Social justice is not for the tenant alone. (NILO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 128 SCRA 519)
The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument
to hoodwinks court of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the
plea of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner.
False pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in compassionate
society (DEQUITO VS. LLAMAS, 66 SCRA 505).
The landowners deserve as much consideration as the tenants themselves
in order not to create an economic dislocation where tenants are solely favored
but the landowners become impoverished (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ,
138 SCRA 173).

VESTED RIGHT
Vested right is some right or interest in property that has become fixed
and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Rights are vested
when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of
some person as present interest (BALBOA VS. FARRALES, 51 PHIL. 498).

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

It is a fundamental rule, that what determined the jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the allegation made in the complaint. Jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon the pleas and defenses made by the defendant in his
answer or motion to dismiss" (CARDENAS VS. CAMUS, G.R. NO. L-17191,
JULY 30, 1962, cited in the new Rules of Court by Martin, Second E.d.,
Vol. I; MARTINEZ LEYBA VS. EFREN V. MENDOZA, NO. 43157-R,
APRIL 30, 1971; 68, NO. 23, O.G. 4513, JUNE 5, 1972).

DARAB ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS PURSUANT TO:
1. Sec. 17, E.O. No. 229, dated July 22, 1987;
2. Sec. 13, E.O. No. 129-A, dated July 26, 1987;
3. Sec. 50, R.A. No. 6657, June 10, 1988, and
4. Sec. 1-2, Rule II of the Revised Rules of the
DARAB

CONTRACT
Well settled that to determine the nature of the contract, courts are not
bound by the name or title given to it by the contracting parties. Contracts are
not what the parties may see fit to call them but what they really are as
determined by the principle of law. (BALURAN VS. NAVARRO, 70 SCRA
309).
The Supreme Court, after construing a "Labor of Contract" as in fact a
tenancy agreement, took notice of some landlords of asking their tenants to sign
agreements that camouflage their real agreement by way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws (CRUZ VS. CA, 129 SCRA 222).
We agree with petitioner that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter
into a civil lease contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly
impress, however, is that once a landholder enters into a contract lease whereby
his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is
susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with help of labor
coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very
essence of a leasehold agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage
of tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the
liberty to contract, the intendment of law of protecting the under privilege and
ordinary credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious
practices of the landed gentry (TEODORO VS. MACARAEG, 27 SCRA 7).

DEEMED OWNER
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of
PD No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was deemed owner of the land in
question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the
soil. As such he gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding
for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the
government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of
transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his
successors (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).

HOMESTEAD
We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to
uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally
the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy
relations (PATRICIO VS. BAYOG, 112 SCRA 41).

LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
While it is true that there have been no presidential proclamations to the
effect that measures have been adopted to insure efficient management of the
agricultural processing phases of crops covered by marketing allotments, it
would be nothing short of regressive to deny sugarland share tenants of their
right to elect the leasehold system. Considering the policy of the government as
enunciated in Section 4 of the Code as amended, which mandates the automatic
conversion of share tenants to leaseholders, individual sugarlands should not be
discriminated against. Hence, any share tenant in sugarlands may, in accordance
with law, exercise his option to change his relationship with the landowner into
the leasehold system. However, all sugarland tenants who do not avail of said
option may still be subject to existing lawful arrangements with the landowner
in the absence of the presidential proclamation adverted to in Section
4 (WILFREDO DAVID VS. CA, ET AL., GR. NO. L-57719-21, MAY 6,
1988).
This Courts has time and time again sustained the constitutionality of
Section 14, holding that the contested section is a reasonable and valid exercise
of the police power of the State to alleviate the socio-economic situation then
prevailing in the fundamental constitutional mandates providing that "[T]he
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people should be the concern of the State" and that the State " shall regulate
the relations between landowner and tenant . . . in agriculture". We finds neither
cogent reason nor sufficient justification to heed the petitioner's proposition to
revised or later the view we have so far adhered to on the constitutionality of
section 14 (DE RAMAS VS. CAR, 1 SCRA 171; CAYETANO DE BORJA
VS. CAR, 79 SCRA 557).

CERTIORARI
NOTE: 1. Section 1, Rule XIV, DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure;
2. Section 54, RA 6657
From the above rule and provisions of law, the mode of view that the
losing party before this Board should avail of is not a Petition for Review but a
special civil action on Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (DCN 0218).
Under Section 54, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, any decision of the DAR can be brought to this court
"BY CERTIORARI". In this case, what petitioner filed is not by certiorari but a
petition for review. It also appears that the docketing fees of P116.00 have not
been remitted as required under Section 2 (b) of Rule 6, Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals. For these reasons, petition for review is hereby
DISMISSED (ADRIANO JARDIEL VS. ROSARIO PLANAS, CA G.R.
NO. SP-UDK-94, JANUARY 30, 1990).
Basically, for certiorari to prosper, it must be shown in the petition that
the DAR has no JURISDICTION, or acted in excess thereof, or with grave
abuse of discretion. The function of certiorari is to keep an inferior court, Board,
tribunal or officer within its jurisdiction, to relieve persons from arbitrary acts
— that is, of acts which they have no authority to perform and not to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in their findings or conclusions. For certiorari to
issue, it must not only be shown that the board, tribunal or officer acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, but also that there
is no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of
law (ARCAYA VS. TELERON, ETC., ET AL., L-37446, MARCH 31, 1974,
57 SCRA 363, 367).
And, certainly, QUESTIONS OF FACT CAN NOT be reviewed by
certiorari.
Grave abuse of discretion MUST BE SHOWN (PALM AVENUE
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, 153 SCRA 579).
On matters, where the trial courts are given discretion to grant or deny
relief to a party in an action pending before them, the policy of the Supreme
Court is NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION
UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY SHOWN THAT IT WAS GRAVELY
ABUSED (TRINIDAD, ET AL., VS. HON. MOYA, ET AL., NO. L-16886,
APRIL 30, 1965).

REDEMPTION
In an action for redemption, CONSIGNMENT OR TENDER OF
REDEMPTION AMOUNT is a jurisdictional requirement (BASBAS VS.
ENTENA, 28 SCRA 665).
Timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of
the price or valid consignation thereof (CONEJERO VS. COURT OF

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
A compromise is basically a CONTRACT perfected by mere
consent (GO VS. IAC, 183 SCRA 82; ART. 2037, NEW CIVIL CODE).

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution and by
law (BACALSO VS. RAMOLETE, ET AL., 21 SCRA 519).
Jurisdiction of the DARAB is centered by Sec. 14 of E.O. No. 129-A, in
relation to Sec. 17 of E.O. No. 229, and Section 50 of RA 6657.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says (INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA
EMPLOYEES UNION (IBAAEU) VS. INCIONG, 132 SCRA 663). where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation (SUCALDITO AND DE GUZMAN VS. HON. MONTEJO,
193 SCRA 556), but only room for application (CEBU PORTLAND
CEMENT CO. VS. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, 24 SCRA 708).
Between a general law and a special law, the special law
prevails (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, XXV, 190 SCRA 477).
Jurisdiction is the authority of the tribunal to try a case (HERRERA VS.
BARRETO, 25 PHIL. 245).
Jurisdiction is fixed by law (VICTORIA BISCUIT CO., INC. VS.
BENEDICTO, 7 SCRA 611).
Jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage of the
proceeding (CRISOSTOMO VS. CA, 32 SCRA 54).

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
In the judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies or agencies,
the rule of evidence which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise (LANSANG VS. GARCIA, 42 SCRA 480) (1971).
Substantial evidence rule does not necessarily mean preponderant proof
as is required in an ordinary civil action but such kind of evidence relevant as is
reasonable and may be accepted as an adequate proof of a
conclusion (SESARIA VS. ROSALES, 17 SCRA 368). This is sufficient in
agrarian cases (ULPIENDO VS. CASE, 10 SCRA 825; VILLANUEVA VS.
PANGANIBAN, 17 SCRA 368).

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, 69 PHIL. 642).
The settled rule is that the conclusions and findings of fact of a trial court
are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for
strong and cogent reasons (LEE VS. ROMILLO, 161 SCRA 589; ALBA VS.
SANTANDER, 160 SCRA 8; MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 156
SCRA 597). We find no such strong or cogent reason in the present case as
would warrant Our disturbance of the foregoing findings of the court a quo. On
the contrary, Our examination of the assailed rulings discloses that the same are
supported by substantial evidence (ROMEO PUJALTE VS. THE PROV'L
TREASURER OF PALAWAN, ET AL., CA G.R. CY NO. 18833-34).

EXECUTION
The Court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control
over its process of execution (Vda. de PAMAN VS. SENERIS, 115 SCRA
709).

CARP COVERAGE
As to whether the lands are CARP covered. The Supreme Court has this
to say:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity
as defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential commercial
or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation. "Agricultural Lands" are only those lands which are "arable and
suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
The rule on the liberal construction of social legislation is applicable only
where there is no doubt or ambiguity in the law, and not when the law itself is
clear (TAMAYO VS. MANILA HOTEL CO., 101 PHIL. 810 [1957]).
It is not within the province of judiciary to legislate. It cannot, in the
guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of the statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the law makers. They should not revise
even the most, arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative, nor rewrite the law
to conform with what they think should be the law.
It is noteworthy that the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed by
Congress to establish owner-cultivatorship and family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agricultural, to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers to
be more independent, self reliant and responsible citizens and a source of a
genuine strength in our democratic society (DE JESUS VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, 175 SCRA 559).
Those who are involved in the execution of agrarian laws that is the
farmer beneficiary's interest must be primarily served. This also hold the
Agrarian Laws are to be liberally construed in favor of farmer-beneficiary.
Anyone who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to the land given to him
by the government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of
proving that the farmer does not deserve the government grant (TORRES VS.
VENTURA, 187 SCRA 97).
Land for the landless, is a slogan that underscore the acute imbalance in
the distribution of the precious resource among our people. But it is more than a
slogan. Through the broaden centuries, it has become a battle cry dramatizing
the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth
as their place in the sun. (ASSOCIATION OF SMALL FARMERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. DAR SECRETARY, GR. NO. 78742, JULY 14, 1989).

NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS
In GARCHITORENA VS. PANGANIBAN (6 SCRA 339) The
Supreme Court ruled in issue that, the ejectment of tenants is justified if failure
to pay rentals is not attributed to any extraordinary event. Otherwise, said
tenants would hold the land for life; or at least, indefinitely, without giving the
owner or landowner any share in the produce, thus virtually depriving him of
one of the main attributes of ownership, which is the enjoyment of the
possession and use of the thing owned, as well as of the products thereof, in
violation of the Constitution. The principle of social justice cannot and should
not be construed as to violate the elementary principles of justice and bring
about a patent injustice.
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the
lease rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in the
possession and cultivation of landholding without giving the landowner his
share in the produce, for the law recognizes the basic right of landowner to
enjoy legitimate share in the produce of his property. Thus, PD No. 816 has
been promulgated in pursuance of the policy of the Government to equalize the
right and obligations of the landowner, agricultural lessor and the agricultural
lessees (VILLANUEVA VS. MENDOZA, CA-G.R. NO. 06612-SP, JUNE
17, 1977).
Where person cultivate the land and did not receive salaries but a share in
the produce or cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them
and the landowner is one of tenancy and not employment (SINTOS VS. 246
SCRA 223).
The mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not
necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former where there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay (TANEDO VS. DE LA CRUZ,
1 SCRA 1106).

JURISDICTION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
JURISDICTION; APPEAL; PERFECTION OF APPEAL;
EXECUTION; The rule is that once appeal is perfected; the trial court loses its
jurisdiction over the case and to issue the writ of execution; The rule does not
apply to a tenancy and/or agrarian case. — It is well settled in this jurisdiction
that once appeal is perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case
and to issue writ of execution (UNIVERSAL FAR EAST CORPORATION
VS. CA. ET AL., 131 SCRA 642 [1984]); MONTELIBANO VS.
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., and C.A., 136 SCRA 294 [1985]). It
should be pointed out , however, that this ruling does not apply to the case at
bar (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, G.R.
NO. 66712, JANUARY 13, 1989, 129 SCRA 169).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Appeal; Perfection of appeal does not
necessarily mean that the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case since the
rules of procedure defined under P.D. 946 apply. — This is a tenancy and/or
agrarian case. Hence, the perfection of the appeal does not necessarily mean that
the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case, since the rules of procedure as
defined under Presidential Decree 946 apply (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON.
PONCIANO INOPIQUEZ, SUPRA).
SEC. 16 of PD 946 precludes the application of the Rules of Court to
agrarian cases while Section 18 thereof provides that appeal shall not stay the
decision in agrarian cases; The decision may be executed despite perfection of
appeal except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the tenant. —
Section 16 and 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 are too clear and explicit in
this respect as to require interpretation or construction. Section 16. precludes the
application of the Rules of Court to agrarian cases which Section 18 provides
that appeal shall not stay the decision in agrarian cases. Consequently, said
decision may be executed notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal
therefrom except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the
tenant. (ANGEL VS. INOPIQUEZ, SUPRA)
PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence over the Rules of
Court which is of general applicability. — Finally, Presidential Decree No. 946.
being a special law, the same shall have precedence over the Rules of Court
which is of general applicability (DE JOYA VS. LANTIN, 19 SCRA 893
[1967]; PAPA VS. MAGO, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]).

JUST COMPENSATION

I. DEFINITION
Just Compensation in general has been defined as fair market value. It is
the price which a buyer will pay without coercion and seller will accept without
compulsion. Just compensation cannot be an absolute amount disregarding
particularities of productivity, distance to the trade center. Land valuation is not
an exact science but an exercise fraught with inexact estimates. What is
important is that the land value approximates as closely as possible, what is
broadly considered a just.

II. JURISDICTION
Where the total amount of compensation being offered by the
government to the landowner does not exceed TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00), the proceeding shall be conducted by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) concerned. Where the compensation so offered is
TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) BUT NOT MORE THAN FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00), the proceedings shall be handled by the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). If the amount exceeds FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the proceedings shall be deducted at the
DARAB Adjudication Board Central Office.
The decision of the PARAD, RARAD and DARAB on preliminary
determination of just compensation shall be final and executory if no original
action is filed by the party-in-interest to the Special Agrarian Court within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision pursuant to Section 16, paragraph
"e", of Republic Act No. 6657.

FORMULA: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657
DAR Adm. Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Adm.
Order No. 11, series of 1994, provides:
There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by
VOS or CA regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI X 0.6) + (CS X 0.3) + (MV X 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present,
relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present and CS and MV are applicable,
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable,
LV = (MV x 2)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27
Under Executive Order 228
Riceland : LV = AGP x 2.5 x 35*
Cornland: LV = AGP + 2.5 x 31*
Government Support price 1972
Computed Land Value x 1.06 (N)
PAYMENT:
Under Voluntary Land Transfer, the landowner will be paid directly in
cash or in kind by the farmer-beneficiary under terms mutually agreed upon
them subject to DAR approval.
Under Compulsory Acquisition, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall
compensate the landowner in the following mode:
a. Cash payment which shall vary according to
land size;
b. LBP bonds or other government financial
instruments.
Under Voluntary Offer to Sell, the landowner will be paid under the same
mode as CA except that the cash portion is higher by five percent (5%).

Proportion of the total compensation is in cash:
The cash portion shall vary according to the size of the landholdings. The
larger the landholding, the smaller the cash portion. The underlying principle is
that small landowners are presumed to have greater need for cash to aid them in
their bid to shift their capital from agriculture to industry.
Payment shall be under the following terms and conditions.
a. Lands above 50 has. — 25% cash; 75% bonds
b. Land above 24-50 has. — 35% cash; 70%
bonds
c. Land 24 has. & below — 35% cash; 65% bonds
Cash portion is increased by 5% for VOS.
The compensation package under CARP is already much approved
compared to the compensation schemes of past land reform programs. This is so,
precisely to make the program more acceptable to landowners and facilitate the
shift of their capital from agriculture to industry.
Full payment in cash in not feasible. This will tremendously increase the
current funding requirements for CARP which the government can ill afford at
present. Furthermore this will infuse a large amount of money into economy
which could result in inflation.
Compared with previous LBP bonds, the present bonds are definitely
more attractive.
a. Past LBP bonds have a maturity of 25 years. This means, bond
holders can only get the principle at the end of 25 years. On the other hand, the
new LBP bonds matures every year from the date of issue until the tenth year.
b. The New LBP bonds also bear market rates of interest the same as
those of 91-day treasury bill Old LBP bonds have a fixed six percent (6%)
interest rate.
c. Finally, these bonds have alternative uses. They may be used by the
landowners; his successors, or his assignees, for any of the following:
* acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Trust, and other assets foreclosed by
governments financial institutions;
* acquisition of shares of stock of government
owned or controlled corporation, or share of stocks
owned by the government in private corporation.

JURISPRUDENCE ON JUST COMPENSATION

LAND BANK VS. CA, PEDRO YAP ET AL.
"the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment of the land within the reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered as just for the property owners is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprives of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss."
"the opening of "trust account" is not within the coverage of
the term "deposit". . . . Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the
opening of a trust accounts as mode of deposit under section 16 (e) of
RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore
impermissible.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NAVAL AND BENOSA
"While it is true that the determination of just compensation is
an exclusive domain of the court and that executive and legislative
acts fixing just compensation are by no means conclusive or binding
upon the court, but rather at the very least, merely guiding principles
as pointed out in the case of Republic vs. CA, 159 SCRA 165, the
court's discretion is not unlimited and its prerogative uncanalized
within its banks to keep it from overflowing. To place our imprimatur
on respondents' court ruling that the value of private respondent's land
which was taken in 1972 should be based on the current government
support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay, would be disregard
existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter. The value of the
property at the time of the taking not at the time of payment as
respondent court would suggest, is what controls in this jurisdiction."

SECURITY OF TENURE
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a
thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of
ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his
naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the
tenant. Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding
once the leasehold relationship is established.
xxx xxx xxx
[S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which
they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Sec. 10 of the same
Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relations is not extinguished
by the alienation or transfer of legal possession of the
landholding. (TANPINGCO VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 76225, 207 SCRA 652
[1992], CITED IN PNB VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO.
105760)
At this stage in the country's land reform program, the agricultural
lessee's right to security of tenure must be "firmed-up" and not negated by
inferences from facts not clearly established in the record nor litigated in the
courts below. Hand in hand with diffusion of ownership over agricultural lands,
it is sound public policy to encourage and endorse a diffusion of agricultural
land use in favor of the actual tillers and cultivators of the soil. It is one effective
way the development of a strong and independent middle-class in
society (GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, G.R. NO. 85041).

LEGAL POSSESSOR
Property; Agrarian Reform Law; Leases; A Legal possessor may lease
the property by way of agricultural leasehold. — There is no dispute, as it is
admitted by the parties in this case, that Benigno Bito-on was granted possession
of the property in question by reason of the liberality of his sister, Natividad (the
private respondent). In short, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the
property and, as such, he had the authority and capacity to enter into an
agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. Consequently, there is no need to
dwell on the contentions of the private respondent that her brother Benigno was
not a usufructuary of the property but actually a bailee in commodatum.
Whatever was the true nature of his designation, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL
POSSESSOR of the property and the law expressly grants him, as legal
possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on
the property he legally possessed (GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON
DEITA, G.R. NO. 85041, AUGUST 5, 1993).

APPEALS
Civil Actions; Parties may not change theories on appeal. — The long
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is not allowed to change his theory
of the case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that
"courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue"
and that a judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate
something upon which the parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule is based on the fundamental tenets of fair play
and, in the present case, the Court is properly compelled not to go beyond the
issue litigated in the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals of whether or not
the petitioner, Graciano Bernas, is an agricultural leasehold lessee by virtue of
his installation as such by Benigno Bito-on, the legal possessor of the
landholding at the time Bernas was so installed and, consequently entitled to
security of tenure on the land. Should grounds for the dispossession of Bernas,
as an agricultural leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then and only then can
the private respondent (landowner) initiate a separate action to dispossess the
lessee, and in that separate action, she must allege and prove compliance with
Sec. 36 (1) of the Code which consist of among others, a one year advance
notice to the agricultural leasehold lessee (the land involved being less than 5
hectares) and readiness to pay him the damages required also by the Code.
Property; Agrarian Reform; Leases; Landowner who gives to another
legal possession of his land cannot complain that the latter's agricultural lessee
used the land for a purpose not agreed upon. — There was, as admitted by all,
no privity or tie between Natividad and Bernas. Therefore, even if Bernas had
improperly used the lots as ricelands, it was Benigno who could have objected
thereto since it was his (the legal possessor's) landholding that was being
"improperly" used. But he (Benigno) did not. It is not for Natividad (as
landowner) to now complain that Bernas used the land "for a purpose other than
what had been previously agreed upon." Bernas had no agreement with her as to
the purpose for which the land was to be used. That they were converted into
ricelands (also for agricultural production) can only mean that the same
(conversion) was approved by Benigno (the undisputed agricultural lessor-legal
possessor). It is thus clear that sec. 36, par 3 of the Code cannot be used to eject
Bernas.

EJECTMENT
Same; Same; Agricultural lessee installed by legal possessor cannot be
ejected by landowner on the land's return to the latter. — Clearly, the return of
legal possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the rights of
Bernas as an agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an
agricultural leasehold lessee are provided for by law. The enumeration
is exclusive and no other grounds can justify termination of the lease. The policy
and letter of the law are clear on this point.

INTERVENTION
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Intervention is not a matter
of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts
which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. —
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the
applicants shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention [Gibson vs. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA
219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a
person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is
so suited as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled
that such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent
and expectant [Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Batama Farmer's
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526,
November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson vs. Revilla, supra.]

CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER

SHARE TENANCY
Tenancy; When share tenancy exists. — A share tenancy exists where,
as in this case, a person has physical possession of another's land for the purpose
of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. Where the contract
entered into by the parties provided that plaintiff would take care of the plants
that are planted and those still to be planted on the lands within a period of five
years, giving the defendant, as owner of the lands, a share in the crop, a tenancy
relationship was established between the parties (MARCELO VS. DE LEON,
L-12902, JULY 29, 1959; CITED IN SILVERIO LATAG VS. MARCELO
BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).

CARETAKER
Same; Caretaker of the land is considered a cultivator. — A caretaker of
an agricultural land is also considered "cultivator" of the land (SILVERIO
LATAG VS. MARCELO BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).

DAMAGES
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over tenant's
claim for damages. — Plaintiff-appellant's claim for damages was based on his
having been allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or unjustifiably by the defendant-
appellee of the two parcels of land under his care and management. The action,
therefore, relates to an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship
which existed before the filing of the complaint. Under the circumstances, the
Court of Agrarian Relations has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case, even if the tenancy relationship no longer existed at the time of the filing
of the action (BASILIO VS. DE GUZMAN, L-12762, APRIL 22,
1959; MILITAR VS. TORCILLERO, L-15065, APRIL 28, 1961).

CONSENT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP
Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Tenancy; Pres. Decree 27; Tenancy is a
legal relationship between the tenant and the landowner, it cannot be made to
depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land, consent of the landowner
is necessary. — It has been ruled that Tenancy cannot be created nor depend
upon what the alleged tenant does on the land. Consent of the landowner is
necessary and tenancy cannot be formed where the alleged tenant does not pay
any rentals or share of harvest to the landowners (Hilario v. IAC, 148 SCRA
573 [1987]). In the case at bar, it will be observed that the consent of the
landowner was not obtained. As ruled by this Court, tenancy relationship can
only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder through
lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation (Hilario v. IAC, supra); so
that mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer upon him any legal
right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of
the law (Spouses Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482 [1984]; Hilario v. IAC,
supra). Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, which are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important (TUAZON V. C.A., 118 SCRA 484 [1982]; SUZANO F.
GONZALES, JR. VS. HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, BONIFACIO
FRANCISCO, EMETERIO REYES, GENEROSO SALVADOR,
ALBERTO LIWANAG, LEODEGARIO MADRIGAL and FEDERICO
SORIANO, G.R. NO. 77401, FEBRUARY 7, 1990).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondents not being bona
fide tenant-farmers cannot avail of the benefits under PD 27. — Moreover, the
requirements set by law for the existence of tenancy relationship have not been
met by private respondents in subject case, such as: 1) that the parties are the
landholder and tenant; 2) that subject land is agricultural land; 3) that there is
consent; 3) that the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) that there is
consideration (Vda. de Donato v. CA, supra; Hilario v. IAC, supra). Hence,
PD No. 27 cannot apply to private respondents. PD No. 27 and PD No. 316
apply and operate only to bona fide tenant-farmers (Elena Vda. De Reyes v.
CA, 146 SCRA 230 [1986]; Geronimo v. CA, 121 SCRA 859 [1983]; Jacinto
v. CA, 87 SCRA 263 [1978]).

Same; Evidence; In agrarian cases, all that is required is submission of
"substantial evidence," not preponderance of evidence. — In the case
of Evangelista v. CA, 158 SCRA 141 [1988] this Court ruled that the finding
that petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land based on evidence
is final and conclusive. In addition, in agrarian cases, all that is required is
submission of "substantial evidence" not preponderance of evidence (Bagsican
v. CA, 111 SCRA 226 [1986]). Administrative findings of facts are sufficient if
supported by substantial evidence in the record (Police Commission v. Lood,
127 SCRA 737; Antonio v. Estrella, 156 SCRA 68 [1987]; Castillo v.
Napolcom Adjudication Board, 156 SCRA 274 [1987]). It is an elementary
rule that the findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect and finality (SSS v. CA, 156 SCRA 383 [1987]; Rosario Bros Inc. v.
Ople, 131 SCRA 74 [1984]; Special Events and Central Shipping Officer
Workers Union v. San Miguel, 122 SCRA 557 [1983] except when such
findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or constitute
grave abuse of discretion (Franklin Baker Company of the Phil. v. Trajano,
157 SCRA 423 [1988]; Baby Bus Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 158 SCRA 225
[1988]. Such circumstances are however not obtaining in the case at bar.
Furthermore, the concept of "Social Justice" was not meant to perpetuate an
injustice to the landowner-lessor (Cabatan v. CA, 95 SCRA 232 [1980]).

CULTIVATION
Same; Same; Cultivation is an important factor to determine the existence
of share tenancy. Cultivation, defined. — Now well-settled is the rule that
cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of a share tenancy
relationship. As to the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already held that:
"x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing
or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of the
plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike the
rice, the planting of coconuts seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing.
Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the
seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some
coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work
in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then
it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the
coconut trees applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the
produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless all
phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra,
although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land,
shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (COCONUT
COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 570).
Same; Same; Same; Sharing of harvests, if taken together with the other
factors characteristic of tenancy, strengthens respondents' claim that they are
share tenants of petitioners. — Further supportive of the existence of a share
tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents is their agreement to
share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner
COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the existence of tenancy
relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other factors
characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the
claim of respondents that, indeed, they are tenants (COCONUT
COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS.

TECHNICAL RULES NOT APPLICABLE TO CAR —
Same; RA 3844; Procedure; Sec. 155 of RA No. 3844 provides that,
except expropriation cases, the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound
strictly by technical rules. — In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled:
"Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not ‘restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in
the order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing
further disputes, provided said matter for determination has been established by
competent evidence during the hearing.'" Further, RA 3844, Section 155,
provides: "SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x The Courts
of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court: Provided, That in
the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy
pending before them, the Courts without impairing substantial rights, shall not
be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in
expropriation cases"(COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA
571).

LANDHOLDER
Same; Words and Phrases; Landholder, defined. — Thus, assuming,
without conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are
considered tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only an
agent of defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of its
principals. Petitioner's contention is not in accordance with applicable laws,
because — "A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either
as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use
or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share
tenancy system." In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA
is the landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it is a "juridical person"
being a domestic corporation established under the laws of the Philippines; (b) it
is the "legal possessor" of the land for it has the sole management and
administration thereof; (c ) it has authorized or retained the private respondents
to cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit
unlawfully, making it appear that they are laborers instead of
tenants (COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION,
INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 571).
Same; Same; Same; A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in
case of transfer of legal possession of the subject property. — Further, in several
cases, this Court sustained the preservation if the landholder-tenant relationship,
in cases of transfer of legal possession: ". . . in case of transfer or in case of
lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and
his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or
protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of
the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the
tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings." (Primero vs.
CAR, 101 Phil. 675); ". . . that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of
the land to enforce obligation incurred by the former landholder in relation to
said land, for the reason that ‘such obligation . . . falls upon the assignee or
transferee of the land' pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondents are
in turn free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it is not
iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligation. Moreover, it
is the purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that
the right of the tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land us
unhampered by the transfer of said land from one landholder to
another" (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154). Therefore, petitioner,
being a landholder, can be held liable to private respondents for their shares in
the coconuts harvested from the landholding in question.

Same; Evidence; Substantial evidence is all that is required in agrarian
cases. — As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private
respondents' thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made
by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is
erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such
computation, as it is a part of the findings of facts and conclusions drawn
therefrom by the respondents appellate court. Such findings and conclusions
should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof that they are
unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had failed
to consider important evidence to the contrary. In Bagsican vs. Court of
Appeals, it was held that: ". . . in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
substantial evidence COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA
572).
Agrarian Law; Tenancy relationship; Jurisdiction. — Private respondent,
in her original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated
the Land Reform Code and could be ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner answered
that he was a tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point in time, no
need of referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform as the landowner-tenant
relationship was admitted. However, when private respondent's amended
complaint — where she alleged violation of a civil law lease agreement-was
admitted, the issue of actual tenancy-raised by petitioner in both his Answer and
Amended Answer-had to be referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform for
determination as this was now a genuine issue (OCIER VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 216 SCRA 510 G.R. NO. 105088, DECEMBER 11, 1992).

EXECUTIVE ORDER 229 VEST
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER TO DAR
Agrarian Law; Jurisdiction; Executive Order No. 229 vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters. — Executive Order No. 229, which provides
for the mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests
in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946
deemed repealed by Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229. — The above
quoted provision should be deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations
with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights
granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in
relation to the agrarian reform program (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the courts of
agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial court and the jurisdiction
of the former was vested in the latter courts. — In 1980, upon the passage of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and
the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts (QUISMUNDO VS.
Same; Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of Executive Order No.
229, (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 610) the
regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian
reform matters. — However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229,
which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for
publication in the Official Gazette, the regional trial courts were divested of
their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is
now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6657 contains
provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform
matters. — The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took
effect on June 15, 1988. The said law contains provisions which evince and
support the intention of the legislature to vest in the Department of Agrarian
Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters (QUISMUNDO
VS. COURT OF APPEAL, 201 SCRA 610).
Evidence; Rule that factual conclusions by the Appellate Court not
reviewable by the Court admits exceptions. — Ordinarily, the Appellate Court's
factual conclusions are not reviewable by this Court, and since here those
conclusions are decidedly adverse to Hernandez, the application of the rule
should result in a verdict against him. The rule admits of exceptions, however,
as when facts of substance were overlooked by the appellate court which, if
correctly considered, might have changed the outcome of the
case (HERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 821).

LUNGSOD SILANGAN RESERVATION
Agrarian Reform Law; Coverage; Commercial, industrial and residential
lands not included. — We now determine whether such lands are covered by the
CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as
"land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitations. "Agricultural lands" are
only those land which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands." Based on the foregoing, it
is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot
in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended
for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural land upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in
question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a
snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members
even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such
development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a
subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the
fact that these land are still residential land and outside the ambit of the
CARL (NATALIA REALTY, INC. and ESTATE DEVELOPERS and
INVESTORS CORP., VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR
REGION IV, G.R. NO. 103302, AUGUST 12, 1993).

SHARE TENANCY
Agrarian Reform; "Share tenancy" defined. — The law defines
"agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate
farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest
with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in
money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural Tenancy
Act, as amended; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same. — With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy"
exist whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for a agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec.
4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same, "Farmhand" or "Agricultural worker" defined. — In contrast, a
farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is
not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair
labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment" (Sec. 166 (15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutes; Contracts; An agreement which states that the rights and
obligations of a person allowed by the landowner to cultivate and take care of
his coconut farm, shall be governed by R.A. 1199, is not abrogated by the
subsequent repeal of said law by R.A. 3844, which abolished share tenancy and
which does not include coconut lands, inasmuch as the vested rights of a share
tenant to security of tenure would be adversely affected thereby. — On August
8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its
stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act
6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as
contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the petitioner
asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower court's
committed grave error in upholding the respondent's status as share tenant in the
petitioners' landholding. The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if
followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of
the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the
movement not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual
ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never
intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers
with no tenurial rights whatsoever (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA
136).
Same; Same; Same; Same. — It is important to note that the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844)
have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389)
even if the same have been substantially modified by the latter. However, even
assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute
defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere general principle.
Among the established exceptions are when the vested rights are affected and
obligations of contract are impaired (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108
SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Mere fact that a person was not the one who seeded the land with
coconuts does not mean that he could not be a tenant thereof. — Cultivation is
another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It
is admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had
originally cleared the land in question and planted the coconut trees, with
respondent coming to the landholding only after the same were already fruit
bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually
seeded the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition
of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the
land. It includes the promotion of growth and the case of the plants, or
husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry.
The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the
planting of coconuts seedling does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are
merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed
in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are
planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts
begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by
smudging or smoking the plantation, taking case of the coconut trees, applying
fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that
respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless all phases of farmwork
from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with
the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant,
not a mere farm laborer (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Added indication of share tenancy is sharing in the harvest. —
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners
and respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio
basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioners-landowners. Though
not a positive indication of the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing
of harvests, taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to
be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he
is a tenant (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Contracts; Use of the word "tenant" in the contract to cultivate a
coconut farm indicates that the cultivators is a "share tenant" and not a
"farmhand" or "worker". — The petitioners, however, contend that the word
"tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to mean a hired laborer or farm
employee as understood and agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their
relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates against such an assertion.
It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an employer-
employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other than its
general acceptance had been given the word "tenant", the instrument should
have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could not
be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical terms, the
private respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant (Guerrero vs. Court
of Appeals 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutory abolition of share tenancy did not end the rights of share
tenants in coconut and sugar land even if leasehold tenancy in these types of
lands has not yet been installed. — Before we close this case, it is pertinent to
reiterate that the respondent's right as share tenant do not end with the abolition
of share tenancy. AS the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty,
ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and
responsible citizens . . . active participants in nation-building", agricultural share
tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the
ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the
government program of land reform. It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut
lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy makers of
government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the
consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted.
Nonetheless, whenever it may be implemented, the eventual goal of having
strong and independent farmers working on the lands which they own remains.
The petitioners' arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian
Reform Code as the basis for setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of
the tenant have no merit (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).

UNLAWFUL POSSESSOR CANNOT INSTITUTE A TENANT
Same; An agricultural tenancy relationship cannot be created by one who
is not a true and lawful owner or legal possessor. — A judgment by the court of
agrarian relations declaring that a person is a tenant is null and void where based
on a wrong premise because the one who constituted him as such tenant was
previously declared an unlawful possessor by the court (CFI). — Happily for
private respondents — whose initial action to recover the lot date to August 28,
1958 — Paule, at the time he allegedly constituted Cunanan, petitioner herein,
as tenant, was not the landowner or lessee or usufructuary or legal possessor
thereof, and therefore, no tenure relationship was created between them. As a
necessary consequence, the declaration by the CAR that petitioner was the
"tenant" — which findings was induced by Paule's confession of judgment and
concealment of his prior ejectment from the holding under the final and
executory judgment of the CFI and, therefore, was a fraudulent imposition upon
the Court. — was and should be considered inficacious and unavailing insofar as
petitioner's claim that he became the tenant of the lot is concerned. For the
jurisdiction of the CAR is limited ". . . to cases or actions involving matters,
controversies, disputes . . . arising from agrarian relations . . ." and " . . . such
agrarian relations can arise only where the parties stand in the relation of
landholder and tenant . . . and one of the parties work the land (Cunanan vs.
Aguilar, 85 SCRA 47).
Same; Same. — Consequently where, as in this case, there was no tenure
relation because the alleged landholder, Paule, has precisely been ordered to
surrender the holding to its rightful owner by final and executory judgment at
the time he constituted petitioner as tenant, the declaration by the CAR to that
effect — in a judgment which it was misled to make by the very
misrepresentations of Paule — must of necessity be null and void and of no
legal effect. Otherwise stated, the CAR cannot create or recognize a tenure
relation between persons, where none exists, because the alleged landholder is
not the owner, lessee or possessor or usufructuary of the holding (Cunanan vs.
Aguilar, 85 SCRA 47).
Appeals; Execution of decision of agrarian court pending appeal;
Republic Act No. 5434 merely provides for uniform procedure for appeal and
cannot upturn fundamental substantive aspects of Republic Act No. 3844.—
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, created in favor of the agricultural lessee a
substantive right to "continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when the dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory" and that Republic Act No. 5434, on the
other hand, "as its title indicates, is purely procedural in nature, in that it
purports to do no more that prescribe a uniform procedure for appeals from the
bodies and entities enumerated therein. It is easily comprehensible, then,
considering the adjective nature of R.A. 5434, that section 12 of R.A. 1267, as
amended, was explicitly and precisely referred to as one of the procedural
provisions to be superseded by R.A. 5434." . . . "Within the context of the
environmental legislative intention directly pertinent to the issue at bar, this
Court cannot construe R.A. 5434 an adjective law, in a manner that will upturn
one of the fundamental substantive aspects of R.A. 3844, although the latter, in
terms of end-results, would seemingly operate to constrict the scope of the
former (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL
VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. —-
Under the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and
possession of their landholdings except when their dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56
SCRA 612).

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM PROGRAM

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., ET AL. VS. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989).

ARSENIO AL. ACUÑA, ET AL., VS. JOKER ARROYO, ET AL., (G.R.
No. 79310, July 14, 1989).

INOCENTES PABICO VS. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, ET AL., (G.R. No. 79744, July 14, 1989).

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR. VS. HON.
PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 79777, July 14, 1989).
Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry. — In addition, the
Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations by judge-
made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question
only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself.
Same; Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of the President
Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the
same authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution. — The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the
exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales
vs. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for
the power of the President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos.
229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, quoted above.
Same; Same; Pres. Aquino's loss of legislative powers did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when she possessed it;
Reasons. — The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27,
1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took
over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactment intended to
pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and
the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid
when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in
force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the
courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the
dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure; Reasons. — That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being
questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is
not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said
fund, for that is not its principal purpose of which is to authorize the release of
public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the
main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention limits. — The argument
of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657
does not provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one
of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. -
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly
or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares
may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall
be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents. — The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed
in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does
not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action. — Finally, there is the contention of the
public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific
department of the government. That is true as general proposition but is subject
to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is
that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself
but not to the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to
require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a
public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene
by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For
example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should refuse to great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of
a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the
first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be
taken of the cause.
Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property
condemned under Police Power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is
not compensable. — There are traditional distinctions between the police power
and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both
powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio vs.
NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent
value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain
because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is
not expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits,
police power, deprivation, excess of the maximum area under power of eminent
domain. — The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures
under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined;
Requisites of a valid classification. — Classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform
to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the
class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection. — Equal
protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of
the other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion
is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the
police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and method. — It
is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the
police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful
method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished
from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less
important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied.
What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve
the Constitutional goal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined. — Eminent
domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to
sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed
of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the
vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the
time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of
the people is the supreme law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper exercise of power
of eminent domain. — But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use
and (2) just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of political question. — A becoming
courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments
when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief
Justice Concepcion in the of Tañada v. Cuenco: The term "political question"
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined. — Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court
that the measure is not the take's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is
used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable taking. — As
held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking
when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry
must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be
devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just Compensation,
addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch.
— To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to
the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenged to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for
property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by
the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was
lower.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and
manner of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative
of the Constitution. — With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that
the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do
not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our
decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for
its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see
the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We
are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of
the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization
and
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than
those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits; Case at bar. — In connection
with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been
resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action,
there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they
do not own other agricultural lands than the subject of their petition. Obviously,
the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners
have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any under P.D. No. 27, the Court
holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No.
6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the
decree PETITIONS to review the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sale; Agrarian Reform; Deed of Sale is valid where there is no indication
that it is simulated; Fairness and regularity in a private transaction is disputably
presumed; Presumption of regularity of notarial document overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence. — Public respondents MAR Minister and the
Office of the President, both found in the evidence on record and the applicable
laws, that the deeds of sale in question are valid and legal , not tainted with
fraud, and the tenants have actual knowledge thereof. More importantly,
Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Atty. Amanda V. Cabigao who investigated the
petition of herein private respondents for cancellation of the subject certificates
of land transfer, found from the evidence presented that while the properties left
by Clara and Teodora Zafra (the previous registered owner) who both died after
the promulgation of PD No. 27, are covered by Operation Land Transfer, the
same is not true of the portions of said land, transferred to other persons before
the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972 whose documents of sale
are in accordance with the formalities of law and the evidence of ownership
presented. Specifically, the disputed deeds of sale were executed on July 13,
1972, as established by the Certification of the Acting Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and cannot therefore be considered fraudulent
transfers to circumvent the provisions of PD No. 27 which was still non-existent
at the time. Thus, it has been held that a deed of sale is valid where there is no
indication that it is simulated. The disputable presumption that the private
transaction has been fair and regular has not been rebutted. (Par. p. Sec. 5, Rule
131, Rules of Court; San Luis vs. Negrete, 98 SCRA 95 [1980]). To
contradict the facts contained in a notarial document and the presumption of
regularity in its favor, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant (ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET AL., VS. HON.
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Land Registration; Actual knowledge of the contract by third
persons is equivalent to registration. — Petitioners point out that the deeds of
sale were registered only on December 7, 1972 in the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan, that is after the date promulgation of said decree. It is however
elementary that "while under the Torrens System registration is the operative act
that binds the land, and in the absence of record there is only a contract that
binds the parties thereto, without affecting the rights of strangers to such
contract, actual knowledge thereof by third persons is equivalent to registration.
In the case at bar the records show that petitioners were notified by the Zafra
sisters of the sale of the parcels of land to private respondents as evidenced by
the Joint Affidavit dated July 12, 1972 (Exhibit "A-6" for appellees) and that
such fact was never controverted at any stage of the proceedings by the
petitioners. Petitioners insist before respondents MAR and the Office of the
President, that private respondents own other lands planted to rice and corn in
order obviously to bring this case within the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to PD 27. The former however failed to adduce evidence to
support their allegation. Accordingly, he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence (ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET
AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Same; Factual findings of government agencies respected if
supported by substantial evidence. — Finally, two agencies of the government,
MAR and Office of the President, examined the evidence and came up with the
same findings. It is therefore without question that such findings supported as
they are by substantial evidence, should be respected. In line with this view, the
Court has ruled: "x x x in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing
court cannot re-examined the sufficient of the evidence as if originally instituted
therein, and receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned. The findings of fact must be respected, so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant."(Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757, 763
[1984]; ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Same; Generally, compromises are favored and cannot be set aside
if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to each other
in order to terminate a case. — Compromise are generally to be favored and
cannot be set aside if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal
concessions to each other in order to terminate a case. This holds true even if all
the gains appears to be on one side and all the sacrifices on the other (MARIO
V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Remedial Law; Ejectment; Rent Control Law; Under the Rent Control
Law, the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is not
absolute. — Under the Rent Control Law, the prohibition against the ejectment
of a lessee by his lessor is not absolute. There are exceptions expressly provided
by law, which include the expiration of a lease for a definite period. In the
instant case, it was noted that the rentals were paid on a month-to-month basis.
Thus, the lease could be validly terminated at the end of any given month upon
prior notice to that effect on the lessee. After all, when the rentals are paid
monthly, the lease is deemed to be for a definite period, i.e., it expires at the end
of every month (MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Same, Judgment; Appeal; Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact
upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. —
It may be worth to note that the petitioners failed to appeal from the order of the
then City Court of Pasay City; instead, he filed a petition for certiorari with the
then Court of First Instance, which was however dismissed for late filing. As a
consequence, the order of the City Court which approved the compromise
agreement of the parties had become final and executory, hence, can no longer
be set aside. Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to
the issues actually determined and to every matter which the parties might have
litigated and have had decided as incident to or essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate
purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of
defense (MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232
SCRA 104).
Court of Agrarian Relations; Appeals; Factual finding not reviewable. —
A factual finding by the Court of Agrarian Relations, when supported by
substantial evidence, may no longer be reviewed by the Supreme
Court (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Landlord and tenant; Agricultural Tenancy Act (Rep. Act No. 1199);
Non-retroactivity of amendment by Rep. Act No. 2263 as to succession to
tenancy relationship. - Since the law in force at the date when the tenant died
was Rep. Act No. 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and
respondent landowner was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent
enactment of Rep. Act No. 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner, son of
the deceased, any successional right to continue as tenant. In case of Ulpiedo vs.
CAR, L-13891, October 31, 1960, it was held: "The amendment to Section
9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263, providing for the
continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant's death or incapacity
‘between the landholder and one member of the tenant's immediate farm
household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity
and who shall cultivate the land himself personally x x x' which took on 19 June
1959, cannot be applied retroactively." To hold otherwise would lay open this
particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the
ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become
vested (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Same; Same; Right of succession to tenancy under Rep. Act No. 2263;
Exception. — Section 9 of Republic Act No. 2263 provides an exception to the
right of succession by a relative of the tenant within the second degree, namely,
if the landholder "shall cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of mechanical farm implements" (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. — Generally, an order of
dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special
civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it
may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow,
insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of
the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.
Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of
appeal, where such loss is occassioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in
the choice of remedies (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON.
ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Instant action was resorted to as a substitute
for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. — The petitioners admit that they
received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4
October 1991. The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the
15-day period to appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted
to explain why they were unable to appeal from the challenged order within the
reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to as a substitute for the
lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the exceptions to the rigid
rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or even
indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be dismissed (Ms. EMILY YU
FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232
SCRA 291).
Same; Jurisdiction; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Trial Court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case
Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C, 1686-91-C and 1688-91-C. — Even if
we were to accept this petition in the broader interest of justice, it must still fail
for the trial court correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter in Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C,1686-91-C, and
1688-91-C. Jurisdiction thereon was originally vested in the National Housing
Authority (NHA) under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344. Under
E.O. No. 648 of 7 February 1981, this jurisdiction was transferred to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of
17 December 1986, was renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I.
BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the complaints do involve
unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and developers
of the subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the petitioners. — We
agree with the trial court that the complaints do involve unsound real estate
business practices on the part of the owners and developers of the subdivision
who entered into Contracts to Sell with the petitioners. By virtue of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1344 and our decision in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the NHA,
now HLRB, has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. In
addition to involving unsound real estate business practices, the complaints also
involve specific performance of the contractual and statutory obligations of the
owners or developers of the subdivision. The claims for annulment of the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan" in favor of HABACON and the certificates of title issued
to him and for damages are merely incidental (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO,
ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incidental claims for damages may be
resolved by the HLRB. — In CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. Vs. Hibionada, we
further declared that incidental claims for damages may be resolved by the
HLRB (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I.
BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Civil Law; Mortgage; Right of Redemption; In the foreclosure of real
property by banking institutions as well as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by any
other mortgagee, the mortgagor of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of
Deeds. — When Presidential Decree No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of
Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of
the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism therefor," was
enacted on 21 October 1972, the parcels of land in dispute were clearly still
subject to private respondent's right of redemption. In the foreclosure of real
property by banking institutions, as well as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by
any other mortgagee, the mortgagor could redeem the property within one year
from date of registration of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of Deeds
(Santos v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 38 SCRA 42; Reyes vs. Noblejas, 21
SCRA 1027). In Medida vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA 887), we ruled that
the "title to the land sold under a mortgage foreclosure remains with the
mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption of the
redemption period . . . " (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON
REMIGIO, ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Constitutional Law; Non-impairment of Contracts; Police Power; The
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligation of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the state; The reason being that public
welfare is superior to private rights. — In passing, the Secretary of the
Department of Justice has himself opined thus: "I am aware that a ruling that
lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure
proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would
concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly
executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is no question, however,
that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D. No.
27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken
in the exercise of the police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of
decisions of obligation of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power
of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises from
the police power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private
rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like that in eminent domain
proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the
only condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation.
Technically the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy
its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use (citation omitted).
As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage,
the mortgagee is not left without any compensation." (Opinion No. 92, Series of
1978; Rollo, pp. 88-89; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON
Same; Same; Same; Police power subordinates the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution. — The opinion deserves respect (42 Am. Jur. P. 421,
Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 218; Ramon
Salaria vs. Hon. Carlos R. Buenviaj, et al., 81 SCRA 722). This Court, likewise,
in a number of cases has expressed the dictum that police power subordinates
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (Ortigas & Co. Ltd.
Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533; Kabiling vs.
National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623; Anglo-Fil Trading
Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494; Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978;
Rollo, pp. 88-89; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON
Civil Law; Mortgage; Right of Redemption; Right of redemption by the
mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor bank all the amount
owing to the latter, "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total
indebtedness at the rate agreed upon in the obligation from said date. — In
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Mirang, 66 SCRA 141, we have ruled
that the right of redemption by the mortgagor could be exercised by paying to
the creditor bank all the amounts owing to the latter "on the date of the sale, with
interest on the total indebtedness at the rate agreed upon in the obligation from
said date" (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO,
ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Personal Cultivation by owner-lessor, still
a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant; Reason. — We are in full
agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals upholding the Court a quo
that insofar as coconut lands are concerned, personal cultivation by the owner-
lessor, a ground for dispossession of the tenant-lessee under Section 50 of
Republic Act 1199, is still a valid ground for dispossession of a tenant. This is
so because Section 35 of Republic Act 3844 expressly provides that with respect
to lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, durian and other similar
permanent trees " the consideration, as well as the tenancy system prevailing,
shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act 1199, as
amended" (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
ET. AL., 142 SCRA 34).
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; Minute Resolution; Value of
decision of Court of Appeals in Arambulo vs. Conicon affirmed by minute
resolution of the Supreme Court, lost in Supreme Court's en banc decision of
Nilo vs. Court of Appeals. — Petitioner invokes the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Arambulo vs, Conicon, CA-G.R. No. 46727-R dated January 6, 1972
which was affirmed by this Court in a minute resolution dated March 14, 1972,
G.R. No. L-34816 in support of his contention that personal cultivation as a
ground for dispossessing the tenant had been repealed by Republic Act 6383.
Aside from the fact that said case refers to an agricultural riceland, this Court in
Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, 524, a decision by this Court en banc
has in effect reversed the decision in the Arambulo case when contrary to the
ruling in said Arambulo case, it held that Republic Act 6389 abrogating personal
cultivation as a ground for the dispossession of a tenant cannot be given
retroactive effect. The value of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
Arambulo case which was affirmed by this Court in a minute resolution has,
therefore, lost its force in view of the en banc decision of this Court in Nilo vs.
Court of Appeals, supra (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS ET. AL., 142 SCRA 34).
Appeals; Execution of decision of agrarian court pending appeal;
Republic Act No. 5434 merely provides for uniform procedure for appeal and
cannot upturn fundamental substantive aspects of Republic Act No. 3844.-
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, created in favor of the agricultural lessee a
substantive right to "continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when the dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory" and that Republic Act No. 5434, on the
other hand, "as its title indicates, is purely procedural in nature, in that it
purports to do no more that prescribe a uniform procedure for appeals from the
bodies and entities enumerated therein. It is easily comprehensible, then,
considering the adjective nature of R.A. 5434, that section 12 of R.A. 1267, as
amended, was explicitly and precisely referred to as one of the procedural
provisions to be superseded by R.A. 5434." x x x "Within the context of the
environmental legislative intention directly pertinent to the issue at bar, this
Court cannot construe R.A. 5434 an adjective law, in a manner that will upturn
one of the fundamental substantive aspects of R.A. 3844, although the latter, in
terms of end-results, would seemingly operate to constrict the scope of the
former (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL
VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. —
Under the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and
possession of their landholdings except when their dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56
SCRA 612).
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. — The Court of Industrial Relations is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable
(Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No.
46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character (Ang
TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO et al., vs. THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).
3. ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. — There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does simply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not
only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it (Ang TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO et al., vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).
2. ID.; ID.;ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL
GRANTED. — In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of a new trial prayed
for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest
of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred
to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant
to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the
Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and
the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth in the decision (Ang TIBAY,
represented by TORIBIO TEODORO et al., vs. THE COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).

JURISDICTION, QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF DAR
Agrarian Reform Law; Court agrees with the DARAB's finding that
Obrique et. al, are not tenants. — We agree with the DARAB's finding that
Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed
by Obrique, et al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project).
The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by
the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land
use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the
participants by the CMU (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86)
Same; Same; Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of
committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as
beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian
reform. — A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith
the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some
agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land,
is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by
stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as
landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing
prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries
and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any
such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act
shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the
Court (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to
be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP. — In view
of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless
peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657 it is
crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. — Under Section 4 and Section 10
of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited
only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it
is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within
the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among
such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm
stations, research and pilot production centers, etc (CENTRAL MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO
A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; DARAB has no power to try, head and adjudicate
the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site. —
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the
portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The
CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and
has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at
bar (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR
quasi-judicial powers. — Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-
judicial powers as follows: The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform x x
x (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the
CARP; Definition of agrarian dispute. — Section 17 of Executive Order
No .129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt
that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the
implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as
any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy
stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Agrarian Relations; Agricultural Land Reform Code; Prescription; Suit
for reinstatement as tenant of landholding, fixing of leasehold rentals and
damages, not barred, as the three-year period under the Code within which to
enforce any cause of action has not yet elapsed. — Although Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, does provide that "an action to enforce any
cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three
years after such cause of action accured", respondent Court had overlooked the
fact that petitioner had first filed a Complaint for reinstatement on January 9,
1980, but that the same was dismissed for non-compliance with the requirments
of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The prescriptive period, therefore, should be
reckoned from the filing of that first Complaint, in which event, only two (2)
years and three (3) months from the acrrual of the cause of action have
elapsed (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129
SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Same; Barangay; Courts; Jurisdiction; Dismissal of
complaint for reinstatement as tenant of landholding for not having passed the
Lupon Pambarangay Law under PD 1508, is procedural technicality; Better rule
that courts under the principle of equity should not be bound strictly by statue of
limitations or doctrine of laches when to do so manifest wrong and injustice
result. — Clearly, petitioner had not slept on his rights, the dismissal of said
Complaint having been due to a procedural technicality. But even assuming that
the prescriptive period is correctly reckoned from the filing of the second
Complaint on November 20, 1980, this Court in Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78
SCRA 175, 185 (1977) held: "x x x In brief, it is indeed the better rule that
courts under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong
and injustice would result" (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Failure of respondent to controvert the fact that petitioner is
a bona fide tenant of the landholding; Security of tenure granted to tenants,
meaning of. — Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the
landholding in question. Not only did respondent fail to controvert this fact, but
he even impliedly admitted the same in his Answer to petitioner's Complaint
when he raised, as one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary surrender of the
landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court should have taken this fact into
consideration for tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the
continued enjoyment and possession of their landholding except when their
dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory judgement,
which is not so in the case at bar (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Purpose and nature of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
— The Agricultural Lnad Reform Code has been designed to promote economic
and social stability. Being a social legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to
give full force and effect to its clear intent, which is "to achieve independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our
democratic society" (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et
al., 129 SCRA 210).
The concept of "social justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to
the landholder-lessor (Cabatan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 323).
Certiorari, Indispensable elements of — the indispensable elements of a
petition for certiorari are: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Quite often, this Court has warned that for the extraordinary writ
to issue, it must be clearly established that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It, therefore, follows
that before a petition of or certiorari can be instituted, all remedies available in
the trial court must have first been exhausted (Domingo Gelindon, et al., vs.
Honorable Jose Dela Rama as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139, et
al., 228 SCA 322).
Same; Exceptional circumstances where petitions for certiorari
entertained even in the existence of he remedy of appeal. — True, we have on
certain occasions entertained petitions for certiorari despite the existence of the
remedy of appeal; in those exceptional cases, however, either public welfare and
the advancement of public policy have dictated or the broader interests of justice
have demanded, or when the orders complained of are found to be patent
nullities, or that an appeal is considered clearly an inappropriate
remedy (Domingo Gelindon, et al., vs. Honorable Jose Dela Rama as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139, et al., 228 SCA 322).
Same; Courts; As a matter of policy, direct recourse to the Supreme
Court should not be allowed where relief available form lower courts. — Let is
also be emphasized that while this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals, as well as with the Regional Trial Courts (for writs
enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, or certiorari, the litigants are well advised, however, not to disregard
the policy that has heretofore been set by us. In Veragra, Sr. vs. Suelto, the
Court, speaking through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R.
Narvasa, said: "We now turn *** to the propriety of a direct resort to this Court
for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a municipal
court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional Trial
Court of the district or the Court of appeals, both of which tribunals share this
Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse
of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental character and immemorial tradition (Domingo
Gelindon, et al., vs. Honorable Jose Dela Rama as Presiding Judge of RTC,
Makati, Br. 139, et al., 228 SCA 322).

POSITION PAPER/AFFIDAVITS

COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS
Labor Law; Due Process; The requirements of due process are satisfied
when the parties are given opportunity to submit position papers. — The
petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact
conducted by the hearing officer of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the
parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his
decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the
requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given an
opportunity to submit position papers (Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phil., Inc., vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 78787, December 18, 1989; Asiaworld Publishing House vs.
Ople, 152 SCRA 224; Manila Doctors Hospital vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 262).
What the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but
rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Antipolo Realty Copr. Vs.
National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399). There is no denial of due process
where a party is given an opportunity to be heard and present his case (Ong, Sr.
vs. Parel, 156 SCRA 768; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA
237). Since petitioners herein participated in the hearings, submitted a position
paper, and filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 1988 decision of
the Labor Undersecretary, it was not denied due process (ODIN SECURITY
AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA
472).
Same; Same; Regional Directors; Jurisdiction by Estoppel; A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. — The petitioner is estopped from questioning
the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the private
respondent's claims. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director by taking part in the hearing before him and submitting a position
paper. When the Regional Director issued his March 20, 1987 order requiring
petitioner to pay the private respondents the benefits they were claiming,
petitioner was silent. Only the private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. It was only after the Undersecretary modified the order of the
Regional Director on March 23, 1988 that the petitioner moved for
reconsideration and questioned the jurisdiction of the public respondents to hear
and decide the case. The principle of jurisdiction by estoppel bars it from doing
this. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, we held: "It has been held
that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
S.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rules, it was further
said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-
matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court
is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
can not be tolerated - obviously for reasons of public policy. "Furthermore, it
has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbunjones, etc., 243 U.S. 273,
61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed.
659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right
for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty. "Sibonghanoy was reiterated in Crisostomo vs.
C.A., 32 SCRA 54; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Carculitan vs. De la Cruz, 65
SCRA 7061; and PNB vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 299 (ODIN SECURITY AGENCY
VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction once vested continues until
the entire controversy is decided. — The fact is, the Regional Director and the
Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint
which was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor Code).
Only later did the guards ask for backwages on account of their alleged
"constructive dismissal" (p. 32, Rollo). Once vested, that jurisdiction continued
until the entire controversy was decided (Lee vs. MTC, 145 SCRA 408;
Abadilla vs. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92; and Pucan vs. Bengzon, 155 SCRA 692;
ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET
AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Actions; Ejectment; The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is
the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises or possession de facto. — In ejectment cases, the only issue to be
resolved therein is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto (De Luna vs. CA, 212 SCRA
276 [1992]). It has for its purpose the restoration to the aggrieved party the
possession of the premises from which he had been forcibly ejected or which
had been detained from him. This relief is available to a landlord, vendor, or
vendee or any party after the detainer's right to hold possession of the subject
property, by virtue of a contract express or implied, has expired or has been
otherwise terminated (Lim Kieh Tong, Inc., vs. CA, 195 SCRA 398
[1991]; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Damages; Litis Pendentia; Private respondent cannot deny
that the complaint for damages was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting
her. — Private respondent cannot deny that the complaint for damages, taken in
its full context, was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting her from Unit No.
1166 of the Victoria Apartment. Indeed, a careful examination of the complaint
reveals that it demanded, as private respondent's main relief, that petitioners be
permanently enjoined from doing any act to force out and/or cause her ejectment
from said apartment unit. Private respondent's complaint for damages bears
unmistakable earmarks that show off its true nature and character touching as it
does, on her alleged right to continued possession of the
premises (UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is the right of the lessee to
occupy the subject apartment unit, the same should be properly threshed out in
an ejectment suit and not in an action for damages where the question of
possession is likewise the primary issue to be resolved, even if the unlawful
detainer suit was filed later than the one for damages. — The issue of whether
private respondent had the right to occupy subject apartment unit should
therefore be properly threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in action for
damages where the question of possession is likewise the primary issue to be
resolved. We cannot simply ignore the fact that private respondent, after her
unjustified refusal to vacate the premises, was aware that an ejectment case
against her was forthcoming. It is therefore evident that the filing of the
complaint for damages and preliminary injunction was but a canny and
preemptive maneuver intended to block the action for ejectment which petitioner
was to take against private respondent. The matter raised in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila may be properly determined in the ejectment suit before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, in consonance with the rule prohibiting multiplicity of
suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer suit was filed later than the
one for damages does not change the situation of the parties (Rosales vs. CFI,
154 SCRA 153 [1987]; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., ET
AL., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Contract of Sale; In a contract of
sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in
a contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is
not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor
has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved
or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the
full payment of the price. — In view of the extended disquisition thereon by
respondent court, it would be worthwhile at this juncture to briefly discourse in
the rationale behind our treatment of the alleged option contract as a contract to
sell, rather than a contract of sale. The distinction between the two is important
for in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved
in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract
of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by
the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive
suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but an even that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
Thus, a deed of sale is considered absolute in nature where there is neither a
stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until
the full payment of the price, nor one giving the vendor the right to unilaterally
resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed
period (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; An implied agreement that ownership shall not pass
to the purchaser until he had fully paid the price is valid and therefore, binding
and enforceable between the parties. A contract which contains this kind of
stipulation is considered a contract to sell. — In effect, there was an implied
agreement that ownership shall not pass to the purchaser until he had fully paid
the price. Article 1478 of the Civil Code does not require that such a stipulation
be expressly made. Consequently, an implied stipulation to that effect is
considered valid and, therefore, binding and enforceable between the parties. It
should be noted that under the law and jurisprudence, a contract which contains
this kind of stipulation is considered a contract to sell (ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Irrefragably, the controverted document should
legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell. — Irrefragably, the
controverted document should legally be considered as a perfected contract to
sell. On this particular point, therefore, we reject the position and ratiocination
of respondent Court of Appeals which, while awarding the correct relief to
private respondents, categorized the instruments as "strictly an option
contract" (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; The important task in contract interpretation is
always the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties. — The
important task in contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the
intention of the contracting parties and that task is, of course, to be discharged
by looking to the words they used to project that intention in their contract, all
the words not just particular word or two, and words in context not words
standing alone. Moreover, judging from the subsequent acts of the parties which
will hereinafter be discussed, it is undeniable that the intention of the parties was
to enter into a contract to sell. In addition, the title of a contract does not
necessarily determine its true nature. Hence, the fact that the document under
discussion is entitled "Exclusive Option to Purchase" is not controlling where
the text thereof shows that it is a contract to sell (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Option Contract; Sales; An option is not a sale of property
but a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of
property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his
property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does
not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something, that is, the right or privilege
to buy at the election or option of the other party. — An option, as used in the
law on sales, is a continuing offer or contract by which the owner stipulates with
another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price
within a certain time, or under, or in compliance with, certain terms and
conditions, or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or
demand a sale. It is also sometimes called an "unaccepted offer". An option is
not of itself a purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy. It is not a sale of
property but a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the
owner of property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy
his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he
does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something, that is, the right or
privilege to buy at the election or option of the other property. Its distinguishing
characteristic is that it imposes no binding obligation on the person holding the
option, aside from the consideration for the offer. Until acceptance, it is not,
properly speaking, a contract, and does not vest, transfer, or agree to transfer,
any title to, or any interest or right in the subject matter, but is merely a contract
by which the owner of property gives the optionee the right to or privilege of
accepting the offer and buying the property on certain terms (ADELFA
Same; Same; Same; Same; An option is an unaccepted offer. It states the
terms and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell his land, if the holder
elects to accept them within the time limited. A contract of sale, on the other
hand, fixes definitely the relative rights and obligations of both parties at the
time of its execution. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent. — The
distinction between an "option" and a contract of sale is that an option is an
unaccepted offer. It states the terms and conditions on which the owner is
willing to sell his land, if the holder elects to accept them within the time
limited. If the holder does so elect, he must give notice to the other party, and
the accepted offer thereupon becomes a valid and binding contract. If an
acceptance is not made within the time fixed, the owner is no longer bound by
his offer, and the option is at an end. A contract of sale, on the other hand, fixes
definitely the relative rights and obligations of both parties at the time of its
execution. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the
contracting parties meet in the terms of the agreement (ADELFA
Same; Same; Same; Same; Except where a formal acceptance is so
required, it may be made either in a formal or an informal manner, and may be
shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a
present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. — A perusal
of the contract in this case, as well as the oral and documentary evidence
presented by the parties, readily shows that there is indeed a concurrence of
petitioner's offer to buy and private respondent's acceptance thereof. The rule is
that except where a formal acceptance is so required, although the acceptance
must be affirmatively and clearly made and must be evidenced by some acts or
conduct communicated to the offeror, it may be made either in a formal or an
informal manner, and may be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting
party that clearly manifest a present intention or determination to accept the
offer to buy or sell. Thus, acceptance may be shown by the acts, conduct, or
words of a party recognizing the existence of the contract of sale (ADELFA
Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a contract is a
"contract of sale or purchase" or a mere "option" is whether or not the agreement
could be specifically enforced. — The test in determining whether a contract is a
"contract of sale or purchase" or a mere "option" is whether or not the agreement
could be specifically enforced. There is no doubt that the obligation of petitioner
to pay the purchase price is specific, definite and certain, and consequently
binding and enforceable. Had private respondents chosen to enforce the contract,
they could have specifically compelled petitioner to pay the balance of P
2,806,150.00. This is distinctly made manifest in the contract itself as an integral
stipulation, compliance with which could legally and definitely be demanded
from petitioner as a consequence (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An agreement is only an "option" when no
obligation rests on the party to make any payment except such as may be agreed
on between the parties as consideration to support the option until he has made
up his mind within the time specified. — This is not a case where no right is as
yet created nor an obligation declared, as where something further remains to be
done before the buyer and seller obligate themselves. An agreement is only a
"option" when no obligation rests on the party to make any payment except such
as may be agreed on between the parties as consideration to support the option
until he has made up his mind within the time specified. An option, and not a
contract to purchase, is effected by an agreement to sell real estate for payments
to be made within a specified time and providing for forfeiture of money paid
upon failure to make payment, where the purchaser does not agree to purchase,
to make payment, or to bind himself in any way other than the forfeiture of the
payments made. As hereinbefore discussed, this is not the situation obtaining in
the case at bar (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Earnest Money; It is a statutory rule that
whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as
part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. It constitutes an
advance payment and must, therefore be deducted from the total price. — In
other words, the alleged option money of P50,000.00 was actually earnest
money which was intended to form part of the purchase price. The amount of
P50,000.00 was not distinct from the cause or consideration for the sale of the
property, but was itself a part thereof. It is a statutory rule that whenever earnest
money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price
and as proof of the perfection of the contract. It constitutes an advance payment
and must, therefore, be deducted from the total price. Also, earnest money is
given by the buyer to the seller to bind the bargain (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
Same; Same; Earnest Money; Option Money; Distinction Between
Earnest Money and Option Money. — There are clear distinctions between
earnest money and option money, viz. (a) earnest money is part of the purchase
price, while option money is the money given as a distinct consideration for an
option contract; (b) earnest money is given only where there is already a sale,
while option money applies to a sale not yet perfected; and (c ) when earnest
money is given, the buyer is bound to pay the balance, while when the would-be
buyer gives option money, he is not required to buy (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
Same; Same; Same; In a perfected contract to sell, Article 1590 would
properly apply.— To justify its failure to pay the purchase price within the
agreed period, petitioner invokes Article 1590 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ART 1590. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or ownership of
the thing acquired, or should he have reasonable grounds to fear such
disturbance, by a vindicatory action or a foreclosure of mortgage, he may
suspend the payment of the price until the vendor has caused the disturbance or
danger to cease, unless the latter gives security for the return of the price in a
proper case, or it has been stipulated that, notwithstanding any such
contingency, the vendee shall be bound to make the payment. A mere act of
trespass shall authorize the suspension of the payment of the price." Respondent
court refused to apply the aforequoted provision of law on the erroneous
assumption that the true agreement between the parties was a contract of option.
As we have herein before discussed, it was not an option contract but perfected
contract to sell. Verily, therefore, Article 1590 would properly apply (ADELFA
Same; Same; Sales; In Article 1590, the vendor is bound to make
payment even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee should
give a security for the return of the price. — Petitioner was justified in
suspending payment of the balance of the purchase price by reason of the
aforesaid vindicatory action filed against it. The assurance made by private
respondents that petitioner did not have to worry about the case because it was
pure and simple harassment is not the kind of guaranty contemplated under the
exceptive clause in Article 1590 wherein the vendor is bound to make payment
even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee should give a
security for the return of the price (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS.
Same; Same; Same; It is consignation which is essential in order to
extinguish petitioner's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. A
contract to sell involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the
exercise of a privilege or a right. Consequently, performance of payment may be
affected not by tender of payment alone but by both tender and consignation. —
The mere sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to pay,
without the accompanying payment, is not considered a valid tender of payment.
Besides, a mere tender of payment is not sufficient to compel private
respondents to deliver the property and execute the deed of absolute sale. It is
consignation which is essential in order to extinguish petitioner petitioner's
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. The rule is different in case
of an option contract or in legal redemption or in a sale with right to repurchase,
wherein consignation is not necessary because these cases involve an exercise of
a right or privilege (to buy, redeem or repurchase) rather than the discharge of
an obligation, hence tender of payment would be sufficient to preserve the right
or privilege. This is because the provisions on consignation are not applicable
when there is no obligation pay. A contract to sell, as in the case before us,
involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the exercise of a privilege
or a right. Consequently, perfomance or payment may be affected not by tender
of payment alone but by both tender and consignation (ADELFA
Same; Same; Same; Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides for automatic rescission in case of breach.
— By reason of petitioner's failure to comply with its obligation, private
respondents elected to resort to and did announce the rescission of the contract
through its letter to petitioner dated July 27, 1990. That written notice of
rescission is deemed sufficient under the circumstances. Article 1592 of the
Civil Code which requires rescission either by judicial action or notarial act is
not applicable to a contract to sell. Furthermore, judicial action for rescission of
a contract is not necessary where the contract provides for automatic rescission
in case of breach, as in the contract involved in the present
controversy (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made
extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in court. If the debtor impugns the
declaration, it shall be subject to judicial determination. Otherwise, if said party
does not oppose it, the extrajudicial rescission shall have legal effect. — We are
not unaware of the ruling in University of the Philippines vs. De los Angeles,
etc. that the right to rescind is not absolute, being ever subject to scrutiny and
review by the proper court. It is our considered view, however, that this rule
applies to a situation where the extrajudicial rescission is contested by the
defaulting party. In other words, resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made
extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in court. If the debtor impugns the
declaration, it shall be subject to judicial determination. Otherwise, if said party
does not oppose it, the extrajudicial rescission shall have legal effect (ADELFA
Squatting; Presidential Decrees; Pres. Decree 772 on squatting; Decree
does not apply to pasture lands but to squatting in urban communities. — We
hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture
lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in
urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas
made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture
lands in rural areas (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural lands punishable by
Rep. Act. 947. — On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public
agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by
Republic Act. No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or
association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands (THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET
AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Rule of ejusdem generis
merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is
uncertain; Rule does not apply to Pres. Decree 772 where intent of decree is
unmistakable. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked
by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory
construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is
uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil.
615, 618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
AL., VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Civil Law; Obligation and Contracts; The various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all them taken jointly. — As in statutes, the provisions of
a contract should not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on
the contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related provisions. It is a canon
of construction that "the whole and every part of the statute must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole". This is also the injunction in Article 1374 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them
taken jointly" (SPOUSES VICENTE and SALOME DE LEON VS. THE
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Power of review of the
Supreme Court on issues not raised in the lower court; The Supreme court may
review an issue in the interest of substantial justice even if it has not been
properly raised. — The private respondents also contend that the matter of the
correct computation of the consideration for the sale cannot now be raised
because it was not assigned as an error in the Court of Appeals. The petitioners
deny this and insist that the matter was properly raised and argued at length in
their appellants' brief, which they have quoted in their Reply. The issue is not
that crucial. Whatever the merits of their respective contentions, we have held
that, in any case, we may review an issue in the interest of substantial justice
even if it has not been properly raised in the lower court. Thus: And although
this issue may not have been squarely raised below, in the interest of substantial
justice this Court is not prevented from considering such pivotal factual matter
that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed
with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. At any rate, the
Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even of they are not
assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, and We find it unfair and
unjust to deprive the petitioner of the rentals on her property due to a mere
technicality (SPOUSES VICENTE and SALOME DE LEON VS. THE
Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence; Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform
language. — As for the testimony of De Leon earlier quoted, it is appropriated
to recall the observation in Air France v. Carrascoso that spoken words could be
"notoriously unreliable" as against "a written document (that) speaks a uniform
language." The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of
the terms of a written contract, the purpose being to give it stability and to
remove the temptation or occasion for possible perjury to falsify the intention of
the parties. Considering the factual circumstances attending this case, we are
disposed to dismiss the said declaration as an unguarded and honest mistake that
was not really intended to modify the written agreement (SPOUSES VICENTE
and SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205
SCRA 612).
Civil Law; Obligations & Contracts; Contract; The interpretation of
obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused
the obscurity. — It is significant that, as the trial court noted, it was the private
respondents' lawyer who prepared the Contract to Sell which Manuel Franco and
Vicente de Leon signed at the hospital. According to Article 1377 of the Civil
Code, "the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity." Any ambiguity in the contract
prepared at the instance of the private respondents and by their lawyer should
therefore be interpreted to the prejudice not of the vendors but of the vendees,
who were responsible for such ambiguity (SPOUSES VICENTE and
SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA
612).
Administrative Law; Agrarian Law; Judgments; Where land certificates
ordered distributed were marked "Under Protest" the order does not become
final. — The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-
taken. The orders for the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer to the
petitioners had not become final and executory because the certificates had been
marked "under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella (THE TENANTS OF
THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by FERNANDO
CAYABYAB VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 210 SCRA
545).
Agrarian Law; An heirs does not have to cultivate personally the 7-
hectare retention area. — There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the
Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural lands
of the estate for failure to comply with the requirement that "such landowner is
cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo). The Secretary
interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained
riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as
agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The concerned
Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted
areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish
the task of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs" (p.
23, Rollo; Italics ours) (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE
SISON, represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON.
Same; Secretary of Agrarian Reform may recall Certificates of Land
Transfer which violate the law on retention scheme. — Petitioners' contention
that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to
cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the
tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of
certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction
as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were
entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and
had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously
issued to the petitioners (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE
SISON, represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON.
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy. — There are important differences between
a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural
or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold
tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, where as the
civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to
purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas
in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the
law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land. — There is
no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46 (c ) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar
lands, fishponds saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties." This Court has already ruled that
"land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land" (TRINIDAD
GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase "immediate farm
household." — Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in
the term "immediate farm household" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked
by tenant or immediate farm household. — The law is explicit in requiring
the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a)
of Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act
limits the relations of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land
and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor
available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the
same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his
immediate farm household work the land (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant. — A
person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself with the aid available
from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who
do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires
others whom he pays for doing cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
considered as abandoned, the land as tenant within the meaning of section 5 and
8 of Republic Act 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of
one (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Agrarian relations: Agricultural lease; In determination of annual lease
rental, if direct evidence on normal harvest of one of three preceding agricultural
years prior to establishment of leasehold not available, circumstantial evidence
may be considered; Case at bar. — While is true as a general rule that it is
incumbent on the lessee challenging the reasonableness of the rentals to prove
that the same are excessive, in the peculiar circumstance of the case, it is
believed that the lessee has sufficiently discharged such burden by showing by
evidence which may be considered circumstantial, the improbability that the
normal harvest for the agricultural year 1959-1960 could have exceeded 100
cavans. It would have been pointless for the agrarian court to require the lessee
to prove the normal harvest of that agricultural year, since it is a fact found by
both the agrarian court and the Court of Appeals, that respondent lessee only
commenced working on the land during the agricultural year 1959-1960 at the
commencement of the leasehold, as prior thereto the land was cultivated by
other tenants. There is no question that proof of collateral facts and
circumstances may be allowed provided the existence of the main fact may be
reasonably inferred therefrom according to reason and common
experience (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53
SCRA 76).
Constitutional law; Republic Act 1199, as amended, enacted to improve
lot of sharecropper; Social justice defined. — It must be observed that Republic
Act 1199, as amended, has been enacted by Congress pursuant to the
constitutional mandate that the "promotion of social justice to ensure the well-
being and economic security of all the people shall be the concern of the state"
and of the obligation of the state to accord protection to labor and to regulate the
relations between landowner and tenant. Social justice, in the words of Justice
Laurel in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) means the "humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
the rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated."
The statute was, therefore, designed to improve the lot of the sharecropper by
granting to him a more equitable participation in the produce of the land which
he cultivates (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53
SCRA 76).
Same; Under New Constitution, property ownership impressed with
social function. — Under the new Constitution, property ownership has been
impressed with social function. This implies that the owner has the obligation to
use his property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, it
provides under section 6 of Article II thereof, that in the promotion of social
justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition of private property, and equity diffuse property ownership and
profits." The Constitution also ensures that the workers shall have a just and
living wage which should assure for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life (section 7 and 9,
Article II) (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA
76).
Statutory construction; In interpretation of tenancy and labor
legislation, doubts resolved in favor of tenant and worker. — Viewed within the
context of the constitutional mandate and obvious legislative intent, the
provisions of the law should be construed to further their purpose of redeeming
the tenant from his bondage of misery, want and oppression arising from the
onerous terms of his tenancy and to uplift his social and financial status. Under
the established jurisprudence of this Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and
labor legislation, "it will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of
the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of
the tenant and worker (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET
AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Court of Agrarian relations; In hearing and determination of cases, court
not bound strictly by technical rules of evidence. — Section 10 of Republic Act
1267, as amended by Republic Act 1409, creating the Court of Agrarian
Relations, provides that "in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duty and power under this Act, the
Court shall, in the hearing and determination of cases pending before it, not be
bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence." Complementary to this
provision is section 155 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which provides
that "in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy pending before them, the Courts without impairing substantial
rights, shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and
procedure, except in expropriation cases" (INECETA ALFANTA, VS.
NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Moot and academic; Dismissal of case as moot and academic; When a
decision on the merits in a case is rendered and the same has become final and
executory, action on procedural matters or issues is rendered moot and
academic. — This Court ruled in Muñoz vs. Bagasao, et al., (44 SCRA 526
[1972]) that "where a decision on the merits in a case at bar, the action on
procedural matters or issues is thereby rendered moot and academic." Therefore,
an adjudication of the procedural issue presented for resolution (similar to this
case with respect to the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal) would
be futile exercise in exegesis (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.
INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Legal Issues; The nature and importance of the legal
question raised in the petition makes it necessary to discuss and resolve the same
with finality. — Considering, however, the nature and importance of the legal
question raised in this petition, it is necessary to discuss and resolve the same
with finality (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 [1971]; Salonga v. Pano,
134 SCRA 438 [1985]; Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer,
135 SCRA 25 [1985]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeal; Perfection of appeal; Execution;
The rule is that once appeal is perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over
the case and to issue the writ of execution; The rule does not apply to a tenancy
and/or agrarian case. — It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once appeal is
perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case and to issue writ of
execution (Universal Far East Corporation v. C.A., et al., 131 SCRA 642
[1984]; Montelibano v. Bacolod-Murcia Willing Co., and C.A., 136 SCRA 294
[1985]. It should be pointed out, however, that this ruling does not apply to the
case at bar (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ,
ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Appeal; Perfection of appeal does not
necessarily mean that the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case since the
rules of procedure defined under P.D. 946 apply.
This is a tenancy and/or agrarian case. Hence, the perfection of the appeal
does not necessarily mean that the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case,
since the rules of procedures as defined under Presidential Decree 946
apply (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET
AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 16 of PD 946 precludes the application of the
Rules of Court to agrarian cases while Sec. 18 thereof provides that appeal shall
not stay the decision in agrarian cases; The decision may be executed despite
perfection of appeal except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of
the tenant. — Section 16 and 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 are too clear and
explicit in this respect as to require interpretation or construction. Section 16
precludes the application of the Rules of Court to agrarian cases while Section
18 provides that appeal shall not stay the decision in agrarian cases.
Consequently, said decision may be executed notwithstanding the perfection of
the appeal therefrom except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of
the tenant (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET
AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very
rigid technical sense. — Moreover, "rules of procedure are intended to promote,
not to defeat substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a
very rigid and technical sense" (Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing
Association v. C.A. 106 SCRA 630 [1981]; Director of Lands v. Romamban,
et al., 131 SCRA 431 [1984]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.
Same; Same; Same; PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence
over the Rules of Court which is of general applicability. — Finally, Presidential
Decree No. 946 being a special law, the same shall have precedence over the
Rules of Court which is of general applicability (De Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA
893 [1967]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS.
HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).

COMPROMISE
Action; Suit between members of the same family; Requisite before suit
is filed; Article 222, New Civil Code construed. — Article 222 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the same
family this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. The only way to make it
so appear is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law
forbids a suit being filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise
appear, the showing that such efforts had been exerted is a condition precedent
to the existence of the cause of action. Hence, the failure of the complaint to
plead that the plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action. It may be so attacked at
any stage of the case on appeal (CECILIO MENDOZA VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 19 SCRA 756).
Same; Compromise; Support; Validity of marriage; Article 222 is not
applicable to a suit to claim future support or to the validity of a marriage. — A
claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise. It is, therefore,
outside the sphere of application of Article 222. The validity of a marriage is
also a non-compromisable issue. Since no valid compromise is possible on these
issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be
superfluous (CECILIO MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 19 SCRA 756).

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Labor Law; Agrarian Relations; Tenancy Relationship; Jurisdiction;
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over both agrarian and non-agrarian
litigation. — The jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner has no merit.
Nowhere in the decision of the agrarian court did it rule that it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, a finding by a Court of Agrarian Relations
that no tenancy relationship is involved does not bring a case beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In truth, the appellate court has jurisdiction
over both agrarian and non-agrarian litigation. To sustain the petitioner's first
arguments would result in most agrarian decisions favoring landowners brought
out of the reach of the Court of Appeals. It is precisely these appeals, where the
agrarian courts have ruled that no tenancy relationship exists, which deserve full
and careful consideration from the Court of Appeals (LEA PAZ TUAZON VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118 SCRA 484).
Same; Same; Same; Concept of tenancy. — Tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It
is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided these
are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important (LEA
PAZ TUAZON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET
AL., 118 SCRA 484).
Same; Same; Same; Intention of agrarian reform program; Farmer and
spouse who themselves cultivated a riceland they inherited cannot be forced to
enter into a permanent tenancy relationship with a person who worked
temporarily over the land for 3 crop years. — And finally, it was never the intent
of the agrarian reform program that a poor farmer and his wife who inherited a
small farm of one and a half hectares of riceland which they cultivated
themselves must be forced to enter into a permanent tenancy relationship with
another man whom he hired temporarily simply because a major operation
forced the farmer to rest for three crop years (LEA PAZ TUAZON VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118 SCRA 484).

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Agrarian Law; Contracts; Court of Appeals; Finding of the Court of
Appeals on a question of fact — whether or not petitioner voluntarily
surrendered his landholding by means of a document entitled "Kasulatan ng
Pagsasauli ng Karapatan — will not generally be disturbed. — We are in accord
with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the document designated as
"Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan" was voluntarily executed by the
petitioner. It is supported by the evidence. The issue as to whether petitioner
voluntarily surrendered the landholding is clearly factual. Being a question of
fact, it is for the Court of Appeals to decide and its findings will not be disturbed
by this Court unless clearly baseless or irrational (ROMAN JACINTO VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Voluntary surrender of landholding is one of the recognized
grounds for severance of tenancy relationship. — The fact that petitioner could
have exercised his option as provided but did not do so is a potent Circumstance
to show the intent of petitioner to surrender the landholding. This
notwithstanding, if petitioner had not exercised his option, under the Code, their
share tenancy relation would eventually have ceased to be operative and become
converted into leasehold, by virtue of the afore-quoted statutory provision. There
is no question that one of the means of the extinguishment or severance of
tenancy relationship is the voluntary surrender of the landholding by the tenant.
Thus, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 permits voluntary surrender of the
landholding by a share tenant. And even in Cases of leasehold, Section 8 of
Republic Act 3844 provides as one of the causes of the extinguishment of
agricultural leasehold relation the "voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee * * *." Pursuant to Section 28 of the same law, the
agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year by
voluntarily surrendering the landholding due to circumstances more
advantageous to, him and his family (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Extinguishment of tenancy relationship by means of voluntary
surrender of the landholding does not require court approval. — This mode of
extinguishment or severance of the tenancy relation does not require the
authorization of the Court of Agrarian Relations, since it proceeds either from
causes outside the control of the parties or arises from the volition of the tenant,
and is distinct from dispossession or ejectment of a tenant (ROMAN JACINTO
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; The Tenancy Act 1199 prohibited surrender of his landholding by
the tenant to take effect in the future. — Neither can he invoke the provisions of
Section 49, in relation to Section 50, of Republic Act No. 1199. What Section 49
prohibits is the stipulation by the agricultural tenant and the landowner on the
date of the tenant should leave or surrender the land in the future. Thus, it has
been held that an agreement between a tenant and a landholder whereby the
former shall return his landholding to the latter after one crop year cannot justify
the tenant's dispossession because said agreement is expressly prohibited by law.
But as explained by this Court in Datu, et al., v. Cabangon, supra, it is different
if the tenant voluntarily surrenders his landholding because the voluntary
surrender of his landholding by a tenant is a ground sanctioned by law for
terminating the tenancy relationship (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT
Same; Fact that tenant did not immediately vacate ½ portion of his
landholding does not make the surrender thereof by means of contract less
voluntary. — The fact that petitioner did not at once vacate the other one-half
portion of the landholding after the execution of the contract does not make the
stipulations thereof any less voluntary. His continued possession of one-half of
the property (until the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
in 1967) became possible only because he was entitled, under the terms of the
contract, to harvest the "extra" crop as part of the consideration, and once said
harvest was completed, his possession became that of a mere squatter (ROMAN
JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; P.D. 27 does not apply retroactively. In the case at bar the Court of
Appeals already rendered judgment finding that tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondent was extinguished and said judgment was rendered
prior to the effectivity of P.D. 27 on October 21, 1972. — Neither can We find
merit in petitioner's claims that with the advent of Presidential Decree No. 27, he
has become the owner of the land. Firstly, said decree applies only in favor of
bona fide tenants. It cannot be denied, however, that at the time of the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 (October 21, 1972), the Appellate
Court had already rendered its judgment finding that the tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private respondent had been extinguished. Secondly, the
decree cannot operate retroactively in favor of petitioner who had surrendered
one-half of the land in July 1966 and, by virtue of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations, was
dispossessed of the other half in February 1967 (ROMAN JACINTO VS.
Same; P.D. 316 in relation to P.D. 583 prohibiting and penalizing the
ejectment of agricultural tenants do not apply to the petitioner who was no
longer in possession of the land when said Decrees took effect. — Nor does
Presidential Decree No. 316, prohibiting the ejectment of tenant-tillers from
their farmholdings, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 583, prescribing
penalties for the unlawful ejectment, exclusion, removal or ouster of tenant-
farmer, apply to petitioner's case. In the first place, at the time the aforesaid
decrees were promulgated, petitioner was no longer in possession of the land. If
at all, the said decrees must operate in favor of the present tenant (ROMAN
JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).

ABANDONMENT
Tenancy; Tenancy relationship is extinguished by tenant's abandonment
of the land; Findings of Agrarian Court, supported by substantial evidence, will
not be disturbed. — A tenancy relationship is extinguished by the "abandonment
of the land by the tenant" (Sec. 9 Rep. Act 1199). Because a tenant has
possession of the land only through personal cultivation, his leaving the land
amounts to his abandonment thereof. Where the tenancy relationship was
terminated by the tenant, through his own voluntary act, he cannot invoke the
protection of the principle of security of tenure. The finding of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, that the tenant abandoned the land, will not be disturbed if it
is supported by substantial evidence (SEVERINO GAGOLA VS. COURT OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 18 SCRA 992).

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Remedial Law; Action; An action must be brought against the real party-
in-interest or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be
reversed therein. — Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary
proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real-party-
interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered
therein (Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. Supra citing Salmon and
Pacific Commercial Co., v. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 [1917]). The real party-in-
interest is one who stands to be benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA
800 [1989] citing Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile
Market, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 598 [1988]). If the suit is
not brought against the real-party-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (ESPIRIDION
TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207
SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports as the party defendant. — We agree with the
contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300
[1991], a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownerhip, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law. — Under Article 428 of
the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore,
there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the
land (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold
relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession
of the landholding. — As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals
(168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural
lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is
tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section
10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not
extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is
extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms
of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy
relationship. However, the donation itself is valid (ESPIRIDION
SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland
and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the
disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844,
as amended. — Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept
payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the
landholding in question, the real issue is who should pay the compensation. We
rule that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot
oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school
thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in
accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (ESPIRIDION
SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance
compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. —
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial court
correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation
because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. And having
arrived at this conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other
errors assigned by the petitioner for as stated in Filamer Christian Institute v.
Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a person who was not impleaded in
the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man
shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of
the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or
whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to for it (ESPIRIDION
SCRA 652).
Actions; Res Judicata; Justice and Equity of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the
Supreme Court is empowered to suspend its operation. — Petitioners raised
before the respondent court that inasmuch as the judgment award in favor of the
La Torre spouses had already been fully satisfied when the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 21846 was sold to them as the highest bidder in the
execution sale, the La Torre spouses no longer have any right to levy upon TCT
No. 60152 registered in the name of the Buan spouses. Regrettably, respondent
court did not pass upon this issue. It implied, however, that the issue is no longer
a tenable subject for resolution inasmuch as the Court of Appeals' decision in
C.A.-G.R. No. 14768 from which the order of execution stemmed had already
become final and executory, and as such, is already beyond question. . . . Taken
in this light, the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue
unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable and conclusive. But judging
from the facts presented by the present case, it beyond doubt that serious
injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be
followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial injustice, this
Court is empowered to suspend its operation. . . . . In the present appeal, rather
than dismissing the issue of overpayment as not within the scope of the power to
review, this Court deems it best to decide the same on the merits (SPOUSES
LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Writs of Execution; A writ of execution should conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. — It is axiomatic that
a writ of execution in any case should conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision sought to be executed (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 156 SCRA 740 [1987]), such that where the
judgment is for a sum of money, the writ of must state the exact amount
thereof (Zamora vs. Medran, 90 Phil. 339 [1951]; SPOUSES LORENZITO
BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235
SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Where two parcels of land are levied upon pursuant to a
writ of execution and the proceeds from the sale of one satisfies in parcel of land
should be cancelled. — In the civil action for a sum of money between the La
Torre spouses and G.L. Mejia Enterprises, Inc., the judgment award in favor of
the former amounted to a total sum of P20,729.00 exclusive of legal interest. It
is undisputed that pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the court, two
parcels of land then registered in the name of the judgment debtor were levied
upon, the first one covered by TCT No. 21846 having been sold at the auction
sale to the La Torre spouses themselves for P33,958.54. It is therefore
mathematically conclusive that by reason of this sale, the judgment award in
favor of the La Torre spouses in the total sum of P20,729.00 had already been
satisfied in full. Correspondingly, the notice of levy annotated on the other
parcel of land now covered by TCT No. 60152 should have been
cancelled (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS.
Same; Same; The levy and execution is void if it is in excess of and
beyond the original judgment award. — However, instead of cancelling the
annotation, the La Torre spouses pursued the execution of the remaining
property levied upon despite the apparent satisfaction of the judgment debt. This
property was by then already registered in the name of the Buan spouses who
resisted the attempted execution. It is beyond question that as per the applicable
laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the levy and attempted execution of the
second parcel of land is void for being in excess and beyond the original
judgment award granted in favor of the La Torre spouses. For, as this Court held
in the case of Mutual Security of Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(153 SCRA 678 [1987], "where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and
exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity"
(italics supplied). Stated categorically, an execution has been regarded as void
when issued for a greater sum than is warranted by the judgment (Windor Steel
Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 275 [1981];
SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF
Same; Same; Writs of execution cannot be equated with judgments which
are final and conclusive. — At this point, it is proper to emphasize that writs of
execution cannot be equated with judgments which are final and conclusive
(Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 28 SCRA 1033 [1969],
such that although the decision of the lower court in the action for a sum of
money is conclusive, the part of the writ issued which went beyond the money
award is not valid at all (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA
BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; The judgment creditors having received
what is due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more, not even by a
final and executory judgment, for to do so would be to sanction unjust
enrichment. — On the basis of the foregoing, it is quite clear that the levy on
TCT No. 60152 is invalid and should be cancelled accordingly. Not only is it the
legal and moral direction that should be taken, but the just and equitable solution
as well to this long-standing controversy. If the La Torre spouses were allowed
to take the property covered by TCT No. 60152 on the basis of an excessive
levy, they would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the Buan spouses. That
the La Torre spouses were able to sell the property which they bought at the
auction sale for P280,000.00 to the David spouses, which fact is undisputed, is
already beside the point. What matters is that the judicial award of P20,729.00
has already been fully satisfied. The La Torre spouses having received what is
due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more, not even by a final and
executory judgment. To do so would be to sanction unjust enrichment and cause
unlawful deprivation to the Buan spouses (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN
and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Courts; Injunction; Trial courts have no power to interfere by
injunction with the orders or judgment issued by another court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. — With respect to the preliminary injunction set aside
by the respondent court, the statute books are replete with jurisprudence to the
effect that trial courts have no power to interfere by injunction with the orders or
judgments issued by another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
(Republic vs. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313 [1987]; Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, 174
SCRA 59 [1989]; Prudential Bank vs. Gapultos, 181 SCRA 159 [1990]). As
applied to the present case, it would appear that Branch 56 of the RTC of
Angeles City has no power nor authority to enjoin the order of execution issued
by Branch 58 of the same court (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and
AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Where the Court of Appeals set aside
only the preliminary injunction, missing the fact that a permanent injunction was
also issued by the lower court, logic dictates that the Court of Appeals' decision
also intended the inclusion of the permanent injunction; A judgment is not so
confined to what appears on the face of the decision but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. — It appears however that the respondent
court missed altogether the fact that a permanent injunction was issued by the
lower court (Branch 56) in its decision dated August 8, 1990 such that it set
aside only the preliminary injunction earlier issued. Logic dictates however that
owing to the nature of the order being set aside, it is a necessary consequence
that the Court of Appeals' decision also intended the inclusion of the permanent
injunction in its questioned resolution. For if not, the appellate court would be
rendering for naught its own reversal of the May 8, 1990 Order. Besides,
although the decision of the respondent court did not so state explicit terms, it is
beyond cavil that a judgment is not so confined to what appears on the face of
the decision but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto (Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]; SPOUSES
LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 235 SCRA 424).

RES JUDICATA TO A NON-PARTY TO A CASE
Civil Procedure; Res Judicata. — The case at bench presents an
exceptional instance where an inflexible application of the doctrine of res
juridicata will not serve ours constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of
due process. Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not given
any chance to contest the claim of Guerero. Her children, then in the United
States, were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were declared in default.
Thus, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private respondent, obtained a
favorable judgment by default from the trial court pursuant to which he was
given the right of preemption over the contested lots. Petitioner attempted to
intervene in the case but unfortunately, her motion for intervention was denied.
The late Guerero, therefore, prevailed primarily because his claim was not
disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where Guerero
claimed the same right of preemption against the other children of petitioner. In
this case, however, one of the children of petitioner sued by Guerero, was in the
Philippines and he answered the Complaint. The case was tried on its merits and
the trial court dismissed the Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of
preemption of Guerrero was not yet in esse (ISIDORA SALUD VS. THE
Same; Same; Doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be
rigidly applied where it will result in injustice. — The difference in the results of
Civil Case No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity not to give res judicata
effect to the default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner was a
non-party. The demands of due process present a weightier consideration than
the need to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than the
need to write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be not justice
that satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard. The
constitutional right to due process of petitioner cannot be defeated by the
argument that petitioner is a privy of her children in Civil Case No. 3022, and
hence is bound by its judgment. x x x Petitioner does not fall in any of the above
categories. She is not a successor-in-interest of her children in Civil Case No.
3022. Petitioner's children were not sued in Civil Case No. 3022 in a
representative capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or
participate in Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied.
Petitioner's interest, therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022
where judgment was obtained by default. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of
justice and cannot be rigidly applied where it will result in injustice (ISIDORA
SALUD VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 384).
Actions; Ejectment; Judgments in ejectment cases are immediately
executory; Requisites to stay the execution of judgments in ejectment cases. —
Judgments in ejectment cases which are favorable to the plaintiff are
immediately executory. They can be stayed by the defendant only by: a)
perfecting an appeal; b) filing a supersedeas bond; and c) making a periodic
deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur.
Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed
to pay the accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the
plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and upon proof of such failure, order the
immediate execution of the appealed decision without prejudice to the appeal
taking its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory
requirement; hence, if is not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of
right. The only exceptions are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from making the monthly
deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a
material change in the situation of the parties and would make the execution
inequitable (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
Same; Same; Pendency of an action questioning the ownership of
property will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments
therein. — Firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action questioning
the ownership of property will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of
the judgment suit involves only the issue of material possession or possession de
facto while an action for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, involves the
question of ownership. There may be identity of parties and subject matter but
not of the cause of action or the relief prayed for (CATALINO SAN PEDRO,
ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 145).
Same; Same; Certiorari; In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine
itself to the issue of whether or not the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. — The instant petition
being one for certiorari, this Court must confine itself to the issue of whether or
not the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City authorizing the execution of the decision in the ejectment suit is
still pending with the Regional Trial Court. The question of whether or not the
action for unlawful detainer was the proper remedy of the private respondent
should be addressed in that appeal, not in this certiorari
proceeding (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS. COURT OF

VOID CONTRACTS CANNOT BE RATIFIED
Civil Law; Contracts; Void contracts cannot be ratified. — In this light,
the reliance of the petitioners on the sketch of July 9, 1961 signed by private
respondent Jose Seradilla allegedly confirming the Consolidation and Partition
Agreement dated November 6, 1959 is hardly of any moment. As Article 1409
of the Civil Code, op. Cit., expressly states that void contracts cannot be ratified.
Needless to state, the July 5, 1963 Agreement of the heirs of Patricio Seradilla
revoking the void Consolidation and Partition Agreement dated November 6,
1959 cannot be faulted (HEIRS OF LEANDRO OLIVER, REPRESENTED
BY PURITA OLIVER and PEDRO REMOQUILLO VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 234 SCRA 367).
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Petition for Review; Jurisprudence forbids
entertaining questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. — Obviously, petitioners are grasping on questions of fact
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
rule finds stronger application in the petition at bench considering that it
involves facts established in administrative proceedings and confirmed by both
trial court and the respondent court (HEIRS OF LEANDRO OLIVER,
REPRESENTED BY PURITA OLIVER and PEDRO REMOQUILLO VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 234 SCRA 367).

NATURAL RESOURCES; LAND REGISTRATION; CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE
Natural Resources; Land Registration; Confirmation of Imperfect Title; It
matters not whether the vendee/application has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the said
period being tacked to his possession. — It must be noted that with respect to
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest." Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so
long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been
complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his
possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not
only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this
except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land
sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of
time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private
respondents through their predecessor-in-interest, who in turn, have been in
open, continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into
the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the
legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an
imperfect title (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; Occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
by an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public land. — Subsequent cases have
hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the
same to private property (Director of Land v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992];
Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]. This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessor-in-
interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41
[1993]; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; Torrens System; When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued; The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. —
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
(Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by
law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued (National Power Corporation c. CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. In other words, the Torrens system was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of
Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution allows natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship to acquire private lands; BP 185 governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship. — But what should not be missed in the
disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Section 7 and
8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the pertinent provisions. Section 8 is
similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution. Pursuant
thereto, B.P. 185 was passed into law. From the adoption of the 1987
Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on
the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of
a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to
be BP 185 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; A foreign national may apply for registration of title
over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the law. — Even if private respondents were already Canadian
citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question,
said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently
there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in
view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be
registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land,
were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with
the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessor-in-interest over the subject lots, their application
for registration of title must be approved (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; The requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. — The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185
do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to
the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements
must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the
approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration
of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance
of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of
the land registration court approving the application for registration has become
final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the
requirements of Sec. 6 BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied
with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to
the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor
of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of
deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of
title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).

TITLE VENUE
Actions; Civil Procedure; Venue; Where the language used in the
contract clearly evinces the parties' intent to limit the venue of all suits between
them, this means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided
for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). — In the case at bar it is clear from the parties' contract
that the venue of any action which they might bring are the courts of competent
jurisdiction in Pasay City, whether the action is for "breach [of the lease
agreement] or damages or any other cause between the LESSOR and LESSEE
and persons claiming under each." The language used leaves no room for
interpretation. It clearly evinces the parties' intent to limit to the "courts of
appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City" the venue of all suits between the lessor
and lessee and those between parties claiming under them. This means a waiver
of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4, sec
2(b) (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; By laying in Pasay City the venue for all suits, the
parties made it plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each
other. — This case, therefore, differs from the cases cited by petitioner. It is true
that in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, a stipulation that "The parties agree to
sue and be sued in the City of Manila" was held to merely provide an additional
forum in the absence of any qualifying or restrictive words. But here, by laying
in Pasay City the venue for all suits, the parties made it plain that in no other
place may they bring suit against each other for "breach [of their lease contract]
or damages or any other cause between [them] and persons claiming under each
[of them]" (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; It is irrelevant that neither party resides in Pasay City
since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action without regard to
their residence. — Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private
respondent Jaime Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however, irrelevant
to the resolution of the issue in this case since parties do stipulate concerning the
venue of an action shall be in the City of Manila. It was held that it was
reasonable to infer that the parties intended to fix the venue of their action, in
connection with the contract sued upon, in the proper court of the City of Manila
only, notwithstanding that neither one was a resident of Manila (VIRGILIO B.
GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234
SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Inclusion of the spouses of lessee and the
President of the lessor is not necessary in action based on an alleged breach of
lease contract. — It is nonetheless contended that the stipulation as to venue is
inapplicable because (1) only one of the petitioners (Virgilio B. Gesmundo) and
only one of the private respondents (JRB Realty) are parties to the lease contract
and (2) their cause of action is not based on the lease contract. The contention is
without merit. Petitioner Edna C. Gesmundo is the wife of the lessee Virgilio B.
Gesmundo, while Jaime R. Blanco is the president of the lessor JRB Realty
Corporation. Their inclusion in this case is not necessary. What is more, as
already noted, by its terms the stipulation applies not only to the parties to the
contract but to "any persons claiming under each" (VIRGILIO B.
GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234
SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Technicalities and Procedural Rules; Procedural
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights since, like all rules,
they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they be relaxed. — Nor is there any warrant for petitioners' view that a
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue is based on a "mere
technicality" which "does not even pretend to invoke justice " and, therefore,
must not be sustained. As we have in other cases held, "procedural rules are not
be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted
in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed." Here what
is involved is no less than the parties' agreement to limit the venue of any action
between them and those claiming under them the contract. Petitioners must
abide by that agreement (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB
REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Civil Procedure; Default; Affidavit of Merit; Grounds for a motion for
new trial. — We agree that the verified motion of petitioner could be considered
as a motion for new trial. The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the
same as the grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which are (1) that
petitioner's failure to file his answer was due to fraud, mistake, accident or
excusable negligence; and (2) that he has a meritorious defense. Petitioner
explained that upon receiving the summons, he immediately saw private
respondent and confronted him with the receipt evidencing his payment.
Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to
withdraw the complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought to be collected by
private respondent is good defense to the complaint to collect the same loan
again. The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion of
petitioner as a motion for new trial was because the said motion did not include
an affidavit of merit. The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required
to be attached to a motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial need not be
embodied in a separate document but may be incorporated in the petitioner
itself. As held in Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975): "Stated otherwise,
when a motion to lift an order of default contains the reasons for the failure to
answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense of the defendant
and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal verification or a separate
affidavit of merit is necessary" (AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF
Same; Same; Same; Appeal; Remedy against an order of default. —
Speaking for the Court in Circle Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 196
SCRA 166 (1991), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa opined that the affidavit of
merit may either be drawn up as a separate document and appended to the
motion for new trial or the facts which should otherwise be set out in said
separate document may, with equal effect, be alleged in the verified motion
itself. Respondent court erred when it held that petitioner should have appealed
from the decision, instead of filing the motion to lift the order of default,
because he still had two days left within which to appeal when he filed the said
motion. Said court must have in mind paragraph 3 of Section 2, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that: "a party who has been declared in
default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order
of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38". Petitioner
property availed of the remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court because the appeal under Section 2, Rule 41 was not, under the
circumstances, a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." In an appeal under Section 2, Rule 41, the party in default can only
question in the light of the evidence on record. In other words, he cannot adduce
his own evidence, like the receipt to prove payment by petitioner herein of his
obligation to private respondent (AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the
Supreme Court; Exception in the present case since the findings of the Court of
Appeals is contrary to that of the trial court. — The question in the case at bench
is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent
appellate court erred in concluding that both decedent's Last Will and
Testament, and it is Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses in
separate occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this
court. In the present instance, however, there is reason to make an exception to
that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is contrary to that of the trial
court, viz: ". . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of
the petitioner's witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that
the latter's signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been written in
ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said witnesses that all
of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the subscribing
witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not simultaneously sign
each of the documents in one sitting but did it piecemeal — a violation of Art.
805 of the Code. This conclusion of the (private respondents) is purely
circumstantial. From instance, considering the time interval that elapsed
between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition
for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the attesting
witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when they attested
the documents in question. . . . " (Rollo, pp. 36-37.) A review of the facts and
circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its impugned
finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in
question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a
single occasion (CLEMENTE CALDE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 233 SCRA 376).
Civil Law; Succession; Forms of Wills; Evidence; Contradiction between
the autoptic preference and the testimonial evidence. — As sharply noted by
respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in
decedent's will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in
black. This discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6)
witnesses testified that two pens were used by the signatories on the two
documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner's witnesses even testified that only one
(1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents. It is accepted
that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire
knowledge for making its decision, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial
evidence, and real evidence or autoptic proference. . . . In the case at bench, the
autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner.
The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black
and white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen
was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for
respondent court to disbelieve petitioner's claim that both testamentary
documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of
Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err when it did not
accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his
testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents were
subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent's thumbmark thereof, to the
alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order.
Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Tolete's testimony is there any kind of
explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments (CLEMENTE
CALDE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 376).
Ejectment; Damages; Forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property and not the
damages which may have been suffered but which have no direct relation to the
loss of material possession. — The rule is settled that in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in
ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could
be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property,
and not the damages which the he may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to his loss of material possession (TEODORO ARAOS, ET AL., VS.
Same; Same; Although the Rent Control Law allows unilateral increases
in rentals by the lessor within the period and the maximum rates provided
therein, still the demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee himself
since the courts have no authority to fix the same for the parties where no valid
demand for an increased rent has been made by the lessor. — It should be borne
in mind that although the rent control laws allow unilateral increases in rentals
by the lessor within the period and the maximum rates provided therein, still the
demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee himself. The courts
have authority to fix the same for the parties where no valid demand for an
increased rent has been by the lessor. Hence, in the case of Orlino vs. Court of
Appeals, we reversed the MTC's award of increase in rental in accordance with
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 877, after finding that the award was merely based on the
prayer in the complaint, although no previous demand was made on the
defendant-lessee. In the present case, the demand letters to vacate sent to the
petitioners only mentioned the purchase of the apartment units by the private
respondent. Nothing in the record shows that there were prior disputes on the
rentals or that there was a demand for increased rentals made by the private
respondent or its predecessor on the petitioners. Hence, the MeTC did not have
the authority to decree the increase in rental rates (TEODORO ARAOS, ET
AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA770).
Agrarian Reform; Tenancy Relationship; Evidence Required in Agrarian
Cases; "Substantial evidence" Defined; In agrarian cases, all that is required is
mere substantial evidence; Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, it refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable man
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case of Bagsican v.
Court of Appeals (141 SCRA 226, 229-230, January 30, 1986), we hold in no
uncertain terms that: ". . . in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
substantial evidence'. That has been the consistent ruling of this Court in a long
line of cases (Ulpiendo v. CAR, L-13891, Oct. 31, 1960; Villaviza v.
Panganiban, 10 SCRA 824; Gagola v. CAR, 18 SCRA 992; Beltran v. Cruz, 25
SCRA 607). This substantial evidence rule was later incorporated in P.D. 946
which took effect on June 17, 1976 and has been expressly made applicable to
agrarian cases. . . . Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that
there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief (Picardal v. Lladas, supra; ANTONIO J. CASTRO VS. THE COURT
Agrarian Law; Tenant, defined; Agricultural tenancy, defined. — Under
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is "a person who by himself, or with the
aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging
to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system" (Matienzo vs.
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276). Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally
possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of
which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable; whether in produce or in money, or both" (Sec. 3, R.A.
No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56; Miguel Carag vs. CA, et al., 151 SCRA
44; VICTORIANO ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU
HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
189 SCRA 248).
Same; Same; Same; Requisites of tenancy relationship. — The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between
the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between landholder
and tenant (Antonio Castro vs. CA and De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January
26, 1989; Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. CA, SCRA
189 SCRA 248).
Same; Same; Same; Elements of personal cultivation. — The element of
personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential
in establishing a landlord-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the
relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 390; Graza vs.
CA, 163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su's plantation
either by himself or with the help of his household (VICTORIANO
ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 189 SCRA 248).
Same; NLRC, Jurisdiction; It is the NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian
Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras' complaint for illegal
dismissal. — Since Zamoras was an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the
NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and
decide Zamoras' complaint for illegal dismissal (Art. 217, Labor Code; Manila
Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 368; Jacqueline
Industries Dunhill Bags Industries, et al., vs. NLRC, et al., 69 SCRA
189 SCRA 248).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy. — There are important differences between a
leasehold tenancy and civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is
limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law
lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law
lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that
governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold
tenancy is governed by special laws (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land. — There is
no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishpond and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46 ( c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar
lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall
be governed by stipulation between the parties." This Court has already ruled
that "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural
land" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA
391).
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase "immediate farm
household." — Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in
the term "immediate farm household" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked
by tenant or immediate farm household. — The law is explicit in requiring the
tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act
limit the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land
and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor
available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the
same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his
immediate farm household work the land (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant. — A
person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons,
therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and
he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to
hold, and is considered as having abandoned, the land as tenant within the
meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act 1199, and ceases to enjoy the
status, rights, and privileges of one (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO

NOTARIAL LAW
Evidence; Notarial Law; When the evidence as to the validity or nullity
of a notarial document is conflicting, the document should be upheld in the
absence of a clear, strong and convincing evidence showing such falsity. — We
are in full conformity with appellate court's reversal of the trial court's decision.
The disputed deeds of sale, namely: (a) "Bilihang Tuluyan" dated 29 July 1963
between petitioner Erlinda and respondent Eusebio; (b) "Bilihang ng Lupa na
Walang Titulo" dated 26 October 1966 between respondents Eusebio and
Renato; and (c ) "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" dated 17 July 1967 between
respondents Renato and spouses de Guzman, were all duly notarized. In this
connection, we have held that when the evidence as to the validity or nullity of a
notarial document is conflicting, in the absence of a clear, strong and convincing
evidence showing such falsity, the document should be upheld (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Contracts; Rescission; The remedy of rescission only applies to
contracts validly agreed upon by the parties in the cases established by law. —
Petitioners sought rescission of those documents on two grounds: first, Erlinda
"never executed nor signed any document or any deed of sale whatsoever
transferring or selling her share on the real property . . . to defendants or to any
person for that matter," second, she was still a minor at the time she allegedly
executed the deed of sale in favor of respondent Eusebio. It should be pointed
out that petitioners' prayer for rescission is erroneous because this remedy only
applies to contracts validly agreed upon by the parties in the cases established by
law. Anyway, the error appears to concern terminology only because petitioners
are actually assailing the validity of said documents (ERLINDA B.
Same; Same; Forgeries; An accurate examination to determine forgery
should dwell on both the differences and similarities in the questioned
signatures. — The trial court resolved the first ground in this wise: ". . . on close
observation, the signature of Erlinda appearing on the alleged Deed of Sale to
Eusebio, which of course denied, is very different from her signature appearing
in the verification of her complaint in the instant case, and even in the Deed of
Sale from Alberto Causapin to the de Guzmans which Erlinda signed as
Administratrix." This is a loose end which the lower court failed to settle. An
accurate examination to determine forgery should dwell on both the differences
and similarities in the questioned signatures (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET
AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; The passage of time and a person's increase in age
may have decisive influences in his writing characteristics, thus, in order to
bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison
must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. — A
comparison of Erlinda's signature in the "Bilihang Tuluyan" with her signatures
on the other documents reveals that the slight differences in strokes are
overshadowed by the significant similarities. These similarities suffice to
convince us that the signature of petitioner Erlinda on the deed of sale between
her and respondent Eusebio in genuine; a fortiori, the deed of sale between them
is valid. Moreover, it is highly noticeable that the signatures of Erlinda that were
analyzed by the trial court are on documents executed several years apart, to wit,
29 July 1963, 17 August 1967 and 20 June 1986. The passage of time and a
person's increase in age may have decisive influences in his writing
characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the opinion that in order to bring about
an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as
close as possible in point of time to be suspected signature (ERLINDA B.
Contracts; Action for Annulment of Contracts; Prescription; An action
for annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons
shall be brought within four years from the time the guardianship ceases. — As
regards the second ground, Art. 1391 of the Civil Code is specific that the action
for annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons
shall be brought within four years from the time the guardianship ceases.
Conformably with this provision, Erlinda should have filed a complaint for
annulment within four (4) years from 1966 when she turned 21. Her claim of
minority has undoubtedly prescribed when the complaint was filed in
1986 (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Land Titles; Public Lands; Homestead; Sec. 101 of the
Public Land Act vests in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
the authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of
title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government. — Furthermore,
petitioners' action for the cancellation of OCT No. P-1796 was not property was
a public land. We have held in a multitude of cases, among which are Lopez v.
Padilla and Maximo v. CFI of Capiz, that Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act vests
only in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the authority to
institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of title and for
reversion of the homestead to the Government. A recognized exception is that
situation where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant
public land unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of
enforcement of a constructive trust, but such principle is in no way applicable
nor even invoked in this case (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An original certificate of title issued on
the strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued in a
judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year
from the date of issuance thereof. — In addition, an original certificate of title
issued on the strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued
in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one
(1) year from the date of issuance thereof; in this case, one year from 28 April
1977. The exception is where an action for the cancellation of a patent and the
certificate of title pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are void
because the Bureau of Land had no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in
question having been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent
award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person, which
does not obtain in this case (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT
Equity; Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside
legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure. — As aforestated, the trial court granted relief to
petitioner Erlinda based on equity since it found that respondent-spouses de
Guzman acted in bad faith when they acquired the land. Equity, which has been
aptly described as "a justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity. Besides, respondent-spouses de
Guzman did not act in bad faith because there was no evidence of impropriety in
the sale made by respondent Renato Manalo to them (ERLINDA B.
Remedial Law; Entry of Judgment; In civil and criminal cases, unless a
motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court,
judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon
the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to the parties. — Rule 11 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides guidelines to be
observed by the Division Clerks of Court and the Archives Section in entry of
judgments and remand of the records. Section 5 thereof provides that after
promulgation of the decision or final resolution, it shall be the study of the
Division Clerks of Court to see to it that the entry of judgment is made in due
time without undue delay. As to when final judgments and resolutions should be
entered, Sec. 1 provides the general rule that in civil and criminal cases, unless a
motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court,
judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon
the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to the parties (ERLINDA B.
Same; Same; Same; The Division Clerks of Court shall determine the
finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the mails. — However,
Sec. 6 requires that in making entries of judgments, the Division Clerks of Court
shall determine the finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the
mails, computed from the last day of the period of appeal from the decision or
final resolution, as follows: forty five days, if the addressee is from Luzon,
except Metro Manila; and ten days if the addressee is from Metro
Manila (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 233 SCRA 128).

APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF APPELLANT
BRIEF
Remedial Law; Appeals; Appeal correctly dismissed when no appellant's
brief was filed. — As Navarro filed only a notice of appeal and not an
appellant's brief, her appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of interest in
prosecuting it (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF
Same; Same; The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the
appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the
accused or his counsel. — In the present case, the motion for new trial was filed
with the Court of Appeals after the dismissal of the appeal for non-filing of the
appellant's brief. The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the
appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the
accused or his counsel unless the period is suspended by a motion for new
trial (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; A lost appeal could not be retrieved by a motion for new
trial. — Neither did she move to have her appeal reinstated after it was
dismissed, nor did she offer any explanation for her failure to file her brief. It
was only on March 1, 1993, or more than 60 days after the lapse of the 90-days
extension granted by the appellate court, the she filed her motion for new trial.
The petitioner probably hoped that her lost appeal could be retrieved by a
motion for new trial. It was not (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE
Criminal Law; BP 22; Evidence; Elements of the offense punished in BP
22.
— The elements of the offense punished in B.P. 22 are: (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; Same; Payment of the value of the check either by the
drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the
dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. — Payment of the value of
the check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days
from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense.
The prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency
of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance and on its presentment for
payment is rebutted by such payment. This defense lies regardless of the
strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution to prove the elements of the
offense (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 234 SCRA 639).

UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Remedial Law; Unlawful Detainer; The rule is that the one year period
provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a
complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last
letter of demand to vacate. — Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh v.
Garcia upholding the established rule that the one (1) year period provided for in
section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful
detainer can be filed should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to
vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action
based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the
premises (SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR., represented by ELPIDIO
R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 233 SCRA 744).
Same; Same; Notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the
increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by
the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. — "The notice giving the lessee
the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is
not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases.
When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the
new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5( c), P.D. 902-A specifically
provides SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the
election or appointment of officers of a corporation. — In intra-corporate
matters concerning the election or appointment of officers of a corporation,
Section 5, PD 902-A specifically provides: "SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory
and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over
corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: . . . (c ) Controversies
in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
such corporations, partnerships or associations" (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240
SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Generally speaking, the relationship of a
person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not
determined by the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the
relationship as they actually exist. — The matter of petitioner's not being elected
to the office of Executive Vice-President Chief Operating Officer thus falls
squarely within the purview of Section 5, par. (c ) of P.D. 902-A. In the case
of PSBA v. Leano, supra, which involved an Executive Vice-President who was
not re-elected to the said position during the election of officers on September 5,
1981 by the PSBA's newly elected Board of Directors, the Court emphatically
stated: "This is not a case of dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate office
having been declared vacant, and that of TAN's not having been elected
thereafter. The matter of whom to elect is a prerogative that belongs to the
Board, and involves the exercise of deliberate choice and the faculty of
discriminative selection. Generally speaking, the relationship of a person to a
corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not determined by the
nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they
actually exist." (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A corporate officer's dismissal is always a
corporate act. A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act and/or an
intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or
wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the reason behind the non-election of
petitioner to the position Executive Vice President-Chief Operating Officer
arose from, or is closely connected with, his involvement in the alleged
irregularities in the aforementioned cases which, upon investigation and
recommendation, were resolved by the PAL Board of Directors against him and
other senior officers. Evidently, this intra-corporate ruling places the instant case
under the specialized competence and expertise of the SEC (LESLIE W.
ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporation, partnership and associations with the
end in view that investment in these entities may be encouraged and protected,
and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development. — The
jurisdiction of the SEC has likewise been clarified by this Court in the case of
Union Glass and Container Corporation, et al., thus: "This grant of jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the nature and function of the SEC under the law.
Section 3 of PD No. 902-A confers upon the latter ‘absolute jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations, who
are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit issued by the
government to operate in the Philippines x x x.' The principal function of the
SEC is the supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and
associations with the end view that investment in these entities may be
encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of
economic development (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that SEC can take
cognizance of a case. — It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of
the SEC must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly specified and delimited its
jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of
corporations, partnerships and associations and those dealing with the internal
affairs of such corporations, partnerships or associations. Otherwise stated, in
order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain
to any of the following relationships: (a) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; (c ) between he
corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned, and (d) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA
52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The affirmative reliefs and monetary claims
sought by petitioner in his complaint reveal that they are actually part of the
perquisites of his elective position; hence, intimately linked with his relations
with the corporation. — The fact that petitioner sought payment of his
backwages, other benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in his complaint for illegal dismissal will not operate to prevent
the SEC from exercising its jurisdiction under PD 902-A. While the affirmative
reliefs and monetary claims sought by petitioner in his complaint may, at first
glance, mislead one into placing the case under the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter, a closer examination reveals that they are actually part of the perquisites
of his elective position; hence, intimately linked with his relations with the
corporation. In Dy v. NLRC, et al., the Court, confronted with the same issue
ruled, thus: The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is
not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be
said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes
within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate
controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code" (LESLIE W. ESPINO
VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,
240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is still within the competence of and
expertise of the SEC to resolve all matters arising from or closely related with
all intra-corporate disputes. — The Court has likewise ruled in the case of
Andaya v. Abadia that in intra-corporate matters, such as those affecting the
corporation, its directors, trustees , officers and share-holders, the issue of
consequential damages may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the
SEC. Undoubtedly, it is still within the competence and expertise of the SEC to
resolve all matters arising from or closely connected with all intra-corporate
disputes (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because
estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has none over
the cause of action. — It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred by law and the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
anytime even on appeal. The principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent
this Court from taking up the question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent
on the face of the pleadings since the start of the litigation before the Labor
Arbiter. In the case of Dy v. NLRC, supra, the Court, citing the case of Calimlim
v. Remirez reiterated that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void. Again, the Court in Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department v. NLRC reiterated the rule that
the invocation of estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction upon a tribunal
that has none over the cause of action. The instant case does not provide an
exception to the said rule (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Labor Law; Agrarian Reform; Homestead; Right of homesteader or his
heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and livelihood prevail over the
right of tenants to security of tenure over the landholding; Reason; Intention of
Code of Agrarian Reform. — This is a case where two competing interests have
to be weighed against each other: the tenant's right to security of tenure as
against the right of the homesteader or his heirs to own a piece of land for their
residence and livelihood. We hold that the more paramount and superior policy
consideration is to uphold the right of homesteader and his heirs to own and
cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered
by tenancy relations. This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of
Agrarian Reform to abolish agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture" and "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices" (LUCRECIO PATRICIO, ET
AL., VS. ISABELO BAYOG, ET AL., 112 SCRA 42).
Same; Same; Homestead Act, purpose of enactment of. — The
Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The
law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for
himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the
satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to
the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.
They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human
beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is
under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right (LUCRECIO
PATRICIO, ET AL., VS. ISABELO BAYOG, ET AL., 112 SCRA 42).
Certiorari; Appeals; Proper mode of appeal from judgments of the
Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law is a petition for review on
certiorari to the Supreme Court in the form and manner provided for in Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. — Petitioner is correct that the proper mode of
appeal from judgments of the Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law is a
petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the form and manner
provided for in Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, in Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 201
SCRA 51 (1991) had occasion to pass upon the issue at hand, as follows: "Under
Section 5, subparagraph (2) (e), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
Supreme Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved. A similar provision is contained in Section 17,
fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law are
involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440,
provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule,
therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of
law have to be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. . . . By
way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on
March 9, 1990, Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which provides: 2 Appeals
from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court.— Except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua,
judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this
being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that ‘(a)ppeals
to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be
governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.' "(SOUTHERN NEGROS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233
SCRA 460).
Same; Same; Same; An erroneous application of the law or rules is not an
excusable error. — It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to
utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decision of trial courts to the appellate
courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but
themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v.
National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]; SOUTHERN NEGROS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233
SCRA 460).

APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeal, Perfection of; Mere fact that one party has
already filed his notice of appeal does not mean that the appeal has already been
perfected; The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last
day to appeal by any party.— The mere fact that one party has already filed his
notice of appeal does not mean that the appeal has already been perfected
because the adverse party still has the reglementary period within which to
perfect his appeal. There can be several reasons for this, but one will suffice for
purposes of this case, namely, the latter party since presumably, they received
the decision also on October 5, 1985, (the same date it was received by
petitioner herein), respondents still had fifteen (15) days within which to appeal.
They filed a motion for execution pending appeal on October 11, 1985, (note
that they had up to October 20, 1985 within which they could still appeal, before
the judgment as to them would be final) therefor before the appeal is deemed
perfected as to themselves. (See Universal Far East Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
131 SCRA 642). Note that under the law (Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules, See
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129) — The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the
expiration of the last day to appeal by any party (ALEJANDRO MAGTIBAY
VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 168 SCRA 177).

APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule that date of mailing is date of filing, not
applicable in the instant case, as the records reveal that the petition for review
was filed, not by mail but by personal service. — The procedural aspect of this
case is the issue of the timeless of the petition for review. Petitioner claimed that
on July 14, 1986, he posted with the Central Post Office of Manila his petition,
under Registry Receipt No. 1608, which was received by respondent Court of
Appeals, through its authorized representative Dever Catindig, on July 17, 1986.
In support thereof, he submitted Registry Receipt No. 1608 and a certification of
Postmaster Wilfredo R. Ulibarri (Rollo, p. 68). He therefore avers that as held in
the case of NAWASA v. Secretary of Public Work and Communications, 16
SCRA 536 [1966], that the date of mailing by registered mail is considered the
date of filing of any petition to pleading, therefore he filed his petition on time.
The contrary is however, shown by the record which reveals that petitioner filed
his petition for review with the Court of Appeals not by mail but by personal
service on July 15, 1986 at 3: 25 p.m. as stamped on the front page of the
petition (Annex "3", Rollo, p. 101). As against the certification of the postmaster
which is not conclusive to prove that the registered letter alluded to is the subject
petition for review, coupled with the lack of registry return card that would have
shown the receipt thereof by the authorized representative of the Court of
Appeals, the evidence of receipt by personal delivery is more persuasive as it
tallied with the records of said court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
Same; Same; Failure to perfect appeal in the manner and with the period
provided for by law rendered the judgment final and executory. — Hence, the
Court of Appeal did not err when it ruled that it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass
upon the assailed decision of the trial court which has become final and
executory as of July 14, 1986 (Rollo, p. 99). This Court has invariably ruled that
perfection of an appeal the manner and within the period laid down by law is not
or mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal required by
the rules has the effect of rendering judgment final and executory (Quiqui v.
Boncaros, 151 SCRA 417 [1987]; RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
Same; Unlawful Detainer; Courts; Jurisdiction; An ejectment suit filed
within one year from termination of the right of possession is one of unlawful
detainer, hence, it falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. — Petitioner would have this Court.— Petitioner
would have this Court consider, the instant case as an accion publiciana,
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
An action of unlawful detainer is defined as "witholding by person from another
for not more than one year, of the possession of a land or building to which the
latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract express or implied." (Spouses Medina and
Bernal v. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 282 [1975]). However, should the action be filed
more than one year after such deprivation or unlawful witholding of possession,
even if the plaintiff decides to raise the question of illegal possession only, the
case is accion publiciana or recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance (Banayos v.
Susana Realty Inc., 71 SCRA 558 [1976]; Bernabe v. Dayrit, 125 SCRA 423,
425 [1983]). In the case at bar, the ejectment suit having been filed within the
one (1) year period, the proper action is one of Unlawful Detainer which
necessarily falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the lower court
(Bernabe v. Luna, 148 SCRA 114 [1987]), or the Metropolitan Trial
Court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
DUE PROCESS
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to be heard; Due process is not
violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason,
not to be heard; If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot
later complain that he was unduly silenced. — The Court cannot agree. The
argument assumes that the right to a hearing is absolute and may not be waived
in any case under the due process clause. This is not correct. As a matter of fact,
the right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as
the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. The circumstance
that the chance to be heard is not availed of does not disparage that opportunity
and deprive the person of the right to due process. This Court has consistently
held in cases too numerous to mention that due process is not violated where a
person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard.
It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he
cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced (STRONGHOLD
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA
605).
Labor Law; Surety Bond; It is too late now for the petitioner to challenge
the stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal what it should
have done was object when its conclusion as a condition in the surety bond was
required by the POEA. — At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to
challenge the stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what
it should have done was object when its inclusion as a condition in the surety
bond was required by the POEA. Even of the POEA had insisted on the
condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the petitioner from
refusing altogether to issue the surety bond. The petitioner did neither of these.
The fact is that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the end filed the
surety bond with the suggested condition. The consequence of its submission is
that is cannot now argue that it is not bound by that condition because it was
coerced into accepting it (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
Same; Same; Purpose of surety bond; The purpose of the surety bond is
to insure that if the rights of overseas workers are violated by their employers,
recourse would still be available to them against the local companies that
recruited them for the foreign principal. — The surety bond required of
recruitment agencies is intended for the protection of our citizens who are
engaged for overseas employment by foreign companies. The purpose is to
insure that if the rights of these overseas workers are violated by their
employers, recourse would still be available to them against the local companies
that recruited them for the foreign principal. The foreign principal is outside the
jurisdiction of our courts and would probably have no properties in this country
against which an adverse judgment can be enforced. This difficulty is corrected
by the bond, which can be proceeded against to satisfy that
judgment (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON.
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; The technicalities raised by petitioner
do not impair the rudiments of due process or the requirements of the law and
must be rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative of justice for the
worker. — Give this purpose, and guided by the benign policy of social justice,
we reject the technicalities raised by the petitioner against its established legal
and even moral liability to the private respondent. These technicalities do not
impair the rudiments of due process or the requirements of the law and must be
rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative of justice for the
worker (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON.

P.D. 772
Land Titles; Anti-Squatting Law; P.D. 772; Purpose for which the land is
intended and not the place where it is located that is material. — We find the
Solicitor General's contention well taken. That it is the purpose for which the
land is intended and not the place where it is located that is material is clear
from the text of the statute. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 772 provides: Section 1. Any
person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing
the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one
year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at
the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M.
EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; So long as it is for residential, commercial or any
other purposes, comes within the purview of the Decree. — Thus, a piece of
land may be found in a barangay. So long as it is for residential, commercial, or
any other purposes, it comes within the purview of the Decree, and any person,
who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner, occupies or takes possession of such
property against the will of the latter is guilty of squatting (ALEX JUMAWAN,
ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural land is punishable
under another statute, R.A. 947. — It is true that in People v. Echavez it was
stated that the Decree was intended to apply to squatting in "urban communities
or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals." The statement, however, is only a dictum, because the lands in that
case were pasture lands. As this Court noted, squatting on public agricultural
lands is punishable under another statute, Republic Act No. 947 (ALEX
JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234
SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; P.D. 772 is not limited to squatting in urban
communities. — Indeed, the preamble of P.D. No. 772, on which this Court
relied for its dictum in the two cases, does not support the view that the law is
limited to squatting in urban communities. The preamble reads: WHEREAS, it
came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19
dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public
Works and Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works,
the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and
Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and
District Engineers, to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public and private property, squatting is still a major problem
in urban communities all over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities
found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to
the affluent class; WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the
government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice (ALEX
JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234
SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; Elements of squatting. — Indeed, the function of a
preamble is to state the reason or occasion for making a law or to explain in
general terms the policy of the enactment. It may, therefore, be resorted to only
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation. In the case
at bar the Decree is unambiguous. It requires as element of squatting (1) that
there be occupation or a taking of possession of property for residential,
commercial or any other purposes, and (2) that in occupying or taking
possession of the property, the offender did so by force, intimidation or threat or
by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of its owner and against his will.
To require that the land be in an urban community or center of population
would, therefore, be not to clarify but to add to the elements of the crime as
these are enumerated in the Decree (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON.
DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party in Interest; The real
party in interest is the party who stands to benefit or be injured by the judgement
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. — The Court has defined the real
party-in-interest in the recent case of Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa
Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 68357,
Sept. 26, 1988), as follows: The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgement or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. `Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. . . . (Francisco, The Revised
Rules of Court in the Phil., Vol. I, p. 126 cited in House International Building
Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 705).
Furthermore, the Court in Walter Ascona Lee, et al. v. Hon. Manuel Romillo,
Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 60937, May 28, 1988) said; . . . ". . . A real party in interest
plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in interest defendant is
one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the
legal rights of the former" (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL.,VS.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; The dissolved Pepsi-
Cola is the real party in interest for purposes of valid service of summons. —
For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in
interest defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is
the registered owner of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of
action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party
involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another (CRISOSTOMO
REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.,
170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; A cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of the other. — The
petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against Pepsi Cola. A cause
of action is defined as "an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are a legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right" (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 145 SCRA 248 [1986] citing Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, et al.,
79 Phil. 666 [1947]; See also Republic Planters Bank v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 131 SCRA 631 [1984]; CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS.
Same; Same; Service of Summons; Corporation Law; Dissolved
Corporations, Liabilities of; A defendant corporation is subject to suit and
service of process even though dissolved. — On the second and main issue of
whether or not the service of summons through Ms. Nenette C. Sison, upon
Pepsi Cola operates to vest jurisdiction upon private respondent, it is important
to know the circumstances surrounding the service. At the time of the issuance
and receipt of the summons, Pepsi Cola was already dissolved. The Court is of
the opinion that service is allowed in such a situation. In the American case of
Crawford v. Refiners Co-operative Association, Incorporation (71 NM 1, 375 P
2d 212 [1962], it was held that a "defendant corporation is subject to suit and
service of process even though dissolved (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET
AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been held in some cases that
there is substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons when it
appears that the summons and complaint are actually received by the
corporation through its clerk, though the latter is not authorized to receive the
same. — A liberal interpretation of Section 13, Rule 14 has been adopted in the
case of G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 466 [1988]:
Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not
authorized to receive the same . . ., nevertheless since it appears that the
summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said
clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance, with the rule on
service of summons. Indeed the purpose of said rule as above stated to assure
service of summons on the corporation had thereby been attained. The need for
speedy justice must prevail over a technicality" (CRISOSTOMO
REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.,
170 SCRA 800).
Corporation Law; Dissolution of Corporation; Assumption of Liabilities;
By virtue of the assumption of debts, liabilities, and obligations of Pepsi Cola by
PEPSICO, Inc., any judgement rendered against the former after its dissolution
is a liability of the PEPSICO, INC. — it is clear that private respondent is aware
that the liabilities of Pepsi Cola are enforceable against it upon the dissolution of
Pepsi Cola. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, by virtue of the
assumption of the debts, liabilities and obligations of Pepsi Cola, "any
judgement rendered against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is a 'liability' of
PEPSICO, Inc., within the contemplation of the undertaking". Hence it was
incumbent upon respondent PEPSICO, Inc., to have defended the civil suit
against the corporation whose liabilities it had assumed. Failure to do so after it
received the notice by way of summons amounts to gross negligence and bad
faith. The private respondent cannot now invoke a technical defect involving
improper service upon Pepsi Cola and alleged absence of service of summons
upon it. There is the substantive right of the petitioners to be considered over
and above the attempt of the private respondent to avoid the jurisdiction of the
lower court (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).

Agrarian Relations; tenancy; Judgements; General rule that the findings
of facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations, are accorded respect; Substantial
evidence, concept of. — This Court has consistently held that the findings of
facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal where
there is substantial evidence to support them and all that this Court is called
upon to do insofar as the evidence is concerned, in agrarian cases, is to find out
if the conclusion of the lower court is supported by "substantial
evidence" (Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226).
Substantial evidence in support of the findings of the Court of Agrarian
Relations does not necessarily import preponderant evidence as is required in
ordinary civil cases. — Substantial evidence has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, "direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief. (Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1483).
Same; Same; Same; Leasehold Tenancy; Finding that private respondents
are considered leasehold tenants of petitioner over the riceland portion of her
hacienda, are supported by substantial evidence. — It cannot be said therefore
that the finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Cresenciano Prado and
Orlando de la Guison are leasehold tenants of petitioners Maria Luisa Vda. de
Donato over the riceland portion of the hacienda Mercedes which finding was
affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals in its now assailed decision, is not
supported by substantial evidence (MARIA LUISA VDA. DE DONATO VS.
COURT OF APPEAL 154 SCRA 119).
Agrarian Relations; Certificate of Land Transfer, Tenancy; Court of
Agrarian Relations; Jurisdiction Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land
transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for more than two (2) years fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. — There
is no question that an action for forfeiture falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the CAR as provided for by Section 5 of P.D. 816. . . . The related
Section 2 of P.D. 816 has been quoted previously. A subsequent law, P.D. 946,
which took effect on 17 June 1976, similarly vested the CAR with exclusive and
original jurisdiction over violations of P.D. Nos. 815 and 816 (ARTURO
CURSO ET. AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL.,128 SCRA
567).
Same; Same; Same; Sanctions of forfeiture of certificates of land transfer,
not imposable, where agricultural lessees did not deliberately refuse to pay the
lease rentals but acted in accordance with circular of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform and in good faith. — Presidential Decree No. 816 imposes the sanction
of forfeiture where the "agricultural lessee x x x deliberately refuses and/or
continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall
due for a period of two (2) year". Petitioners cannot be said to
have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They acted in accordance with
the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good faith. Forfeiture of
their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as decreed by the
CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted (ARTURO
CURSO ET. AL., VS. HON. COURTS APPEALS ET. AL.,128 SCRA 567).
Administrative Law; Status; R.A. No. 6758; Allowances; Under R.A.
6758, incumbents who were receiving RATA as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to
continue receiving the same. —Under the second sentences of the
aforementioned provision, such other compensation includes the RATA. Hence,
RATA being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to continue
to receive the same. Republic Act No. 6758 has therefore, to this extent,
amended LOI No. 97. By limiting the benefit of the RATA granted by LOI No.
97 to incumbents, Congress has manifested its intent to gradually phase out this
RATA privilege under LOI No. 97 without upsetting its policy of non-
diminution of pay (Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, 214
SCRA 653 [1992]; MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The date July 1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-
off date with respect to the amount of RATA but becomes crucial only to
determine those who may be entitled to its continued grant. — With regard to
the question as to what is the basis of the RATA to be given to incumbents after
July 1, 1989, petitioners contend that according to LOI No. 97 they are entitled
to RATA equivalent to 40% of their basic salary. With the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6758, the 40% must be adjusted based on the standardized salary.
Respondent COA, however, alleges that starting July 1, 1989, the RATA is no
longer based on 40% of the basic salary but on the highest amount of RATA
received by the incumbents as of June 30, 1989. The issue has been answered
in Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, 214 SCRA 653 (1992),
where we held: "* * * The date July 1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-off date with
respect to the amount of RATA. The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to
determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving
the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant. The given date
should not be interpreted as fixing the maximum amount of RATA to be
received by the official" MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Courts; Judgements by Default; Courts can only award in a judgement by
default the relief specially prayed for in the complaint. — A court is bereft of
jurisdiction to award, in a judgement by default, a relief other than that
specifically prayed for in the complaint. Observe that this Court's decision of 29
November 1988 accords with the prayer of private respondent in it
complaint (LUMEN POLICARPIO VS. RTC ET AL., 235 SCRA 314).
Same; It is settled that final decisions are no longer open to amendments
or modifications. — The decision has long since become final and executory. It
is settled that final decisions are no longer open to amendments or
modifications; otherwise, we will see no end to litigations (LUMEN
POLICARPIO VS RTC ET AL., 235 SCRA 314).

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Civil Law; Compromise; Court gives its sanction to the compromise
agreement found to be in order. — We find the compromise agreement of be in
order. In consonance with the policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes
amicably and finding the compromise not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy, the Court gives its sanction to the
agreement. (HEIRS OF GABRIEL CAPILI VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND HON. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LANA ET. AL., 234
SCRA 110).
Same; Same; Same; The compromise agreement entered into by and
between the parties is approved. — WHEREFORE, the compromise agreement
entered into by and between the parties is hereby APPROVED. The parties are
ENJOINED to faithfully comply with the covenants, terms and conditions
therein expressed (THE HEIRS OF GABRIEL CAPILI VS. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LANA, ET AL., 234 SCRA
110).

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