LECTURE GUIDE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY AUGUSTO P.

QUIJANO
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
 

1.   Discuss the requisites for the existence of tenancy relations:

a)   The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b)   The subject is agricultural land;
c)   There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land,
given either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;
d)   The purpose is agricultural production;
e)   There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm
household; and
f)   There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in
money and/or produce.
(Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58
       
SCRA 590 (1974); Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235, [1997] ; Qua vs. CA,
198 SCRA 236 [1991].
2.   Agricultural leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease.
a)   Subject Matter — agricultural leasehold is limited to agricultural
land; while a civil law lease may refer to rural or urban property;
b)   Attention and Cultivation — leasehold tenant should personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land; whereas the civil law
lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased;
c)   Purpose — In leasehold tenancy, the landholding is devoted to
agriculture; whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits;
d)   Law governing the relationship — Civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special law
(RA 3844 as amended by RA 6389). (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA
590 (1974))
3.   An overseer of a coconut plantation was not considered a tenant (Zamoras vs. Su, Jr.,
184 SCRA 248 (1990); Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529 (1992).
4.   The owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation
of law. (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 197 (1990).
5.   Certification of tenancy/non-tenancy issued by DAR are not conclusive evidence of
tenancy relationship. (Oarde vs. CA et al., 280 SCRA 235 [1997]).
6.   Successor-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the
consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the
agricultural land (Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 [1992]).
7.   The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work on the
land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons to
help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).
8.   "We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord
is divested of his landholding and somebody else is installed to became a new
landlord." (Oarde, et al., vs. CA, et al., 780 SCRA 235 [1997]).
9.   Tenancy relation was severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm
household ceased from personally working the fishpond (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58
SCRA 590 (1974)).
10.   Since there is no sharing arrangement between the parties, the Court held that
Matienzo is merely an overseer and not a tenant (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276
(1981)).
11.   The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been
established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The tenant has a right
to continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom for cause as
provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 (1989)).
12.   Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 439 (1988)).
13.   Security of tenure afforded the tenant-lessee is constitutional (Primero vs. CIR, 101
Phil. 675 (1957); Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967) Once a tenant, always a
tenant.
14.   The Supreme Court held that only the tenant-lessee has a right to a homelot and that
members of the immediate family of the tenant are not entitled to a homelot (Cecilleville
Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819 (1997).
15.   Causes for Termination of the Leasehold Relation:
a)   Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor (Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969);
b)   Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in
advance (Nisnisan, et al., vs. CA, 294 SCRA 173 (1998); or
c)   Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her
death or permanent incapacity (Section 8, RA 3844)
16.   The lessor who ejects his tenant without the court's authorization shall be liable for:
a)   Fine or imprisonment;
b)   Damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to
the fine or imprisonment for unauthorized dispossession;
c)   Payment of attorney's fees incurred by the lessee; and
d)   The reinstatement of the lessee.
17.   The Supreme Court in upholding its constitutionality held that there is no legal
basis for declaring LOI No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and
taking of property without just compensation grounds. (Zurbano vs. Estrella, 137 SCRA
333 (1989)
18.   In the case of  Locsin vs. Valenzuela which was promulgated on 19 February 1991,
the Supreme Court explained the legal effect of land being placed under OLT as vesting
ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent case dated 13 September
1991 Vinzons-Magana vs. Estrella citing Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo which pre-dated
the Locsin case, the High Tribunal ruled that mere issuance of a certificate of land
transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee.
19.   The consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not needed in the determination of just
compensation pursuant to Section 18 of RA No. 6657 (Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
CA and Pascual (G.R. No. 128557, December 29, 1999).
20.   "Just Compensation" is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court, that the
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)).
21.   "It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section II, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petition for determination of just
compensation has already been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means
that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such
determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
"The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive",
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not
a continuation of the administrative determination. For the matter, the law may provide
that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to courts
cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of
administrative action." (Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 132767,
January 18, 2000).
22.   The Supreme Court decided not to apply that 6% increment to the valuation because
the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARAD's use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in the
valuation of the private respondent's land (following the ruling in the Court of Appeals
case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No. 23168; Rollo, p. 36) (LBP vs. CA and Jose
Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)
23.   The DAR must first resolve the issues raised in a protest/application before the
distribution of covered lands to farmer-beneficiaries may be effected. (Roxas & Co., Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17 December, 1999).
24.   The CREATION and JURISDICTION of the DARAB was discussed by the
Supreme Court in the case of  Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995). The Supreme
Court held that:
"Section 17 of EO 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those following under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law.
"Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR,
created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases". (Also
Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609 (1991).

25.   In Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996), complainant filed
an administrative case against the respondent Judge for taking cognizance of the
ILLEGAL DETAINER case filed by their landowner against them notwithstanding
knowledge of previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the
complainants containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent judge
took cognizance of the illegal detainer case. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation
and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of
prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for
preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law.
However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just
compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57). Jurisdiction over said
matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided by
DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885 (1990).
26.   DARAB's Jurisdiction over Agrarian Disputes was also resolved in Central
Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86.
27.   "Agrarian dispute" refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee" (Isidro vs. CA, 228 SCRA 503 (1993)).
28.   In the case of Vda. de Areiola vs. Camarines Sur Reg. Agricultural School, et
al., 110 SCRA 517 (1960), the Supreme Court explained the phrase "by a third party" in
Section 21 of RA 1199 (Ejectment; Violation; Jurisdiction. — "all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party . . .) The Supreme Court
held that when no tenancy relationship between the contending parties exist, the Court of
Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction". "The law governing agricultural tenancy, RA
1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a "juridical tie" which arises between a
landholder and a tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake jointly the
cultivation of land belonging to the former, etc."
Necessarily, the law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and tenant.
This does not exist where one is owner or possessor and the other a squatter or
deforciant."
29.   Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation and all criminal offenses. The Supreme held that "any effort to transfer the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR Adjudicators and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 of RA
6657 and therefore would be void. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 758 SCRA 263
(1996).
30.   It should be stressed that the motion in Fortich was denied on the ground that the
"win-win" resolution is void and has no legal effect because the decision approving the
concession has already become final and executory. This is the ratio decidendi or reason
of the decision. The statement that LGUs have authority to convert or reclassify
agricultural lands without DAR approval is merely a dictum or expression of the
individual views of the ponente or writer of the Resolution of August 19, 1997. It does
not embody the Court's determination and is not binding. (Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et
al., G.R. No. 131457 (August 19, 1999)).
31.   Agricultural lands expropriated by LGUs pursuant to the power of eminent domain
need not be subject of DAR conversion clearance prior to change in use. (Province of
Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993)
32.   Respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner's
landholding does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners'
application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. (Roxas
vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, (December 16, 1999)
33.   The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside
its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the
land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in
a separate proceedings before the appropriate trial court between the claimants
thereof. (Jaime Morta, Sr., et al. vs. Jaime Occidental, et al. , G.R. No. 123417, (June 10,
1999) (Note the Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davide Jr.,)
34.   P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program,
covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program
are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops: and (2) there must
be a system of share crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either of these requisites
is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for
retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of
retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there
must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the
landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares or it could be more than twenty-
four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and
more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands."
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention
rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. We
disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his
application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn
statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit
of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5)
hectares under R.A. No. 6657. (Eudosia Daez and/or Her Heirs presented by Edriano D.
Daez, vs. The Hon. C.A. et. al., 325 SCRA 857).
35.   Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited
Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt (LBP vs. Severino Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611.
(August 5, 2003)
There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1)
through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the
court MOTU PROPRIO.
36.   We hold that our decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of
appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts is a rule of procedure which affects
substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP's
right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed
outright in mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be
unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a
contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said
doctrine. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon, et al. , G.R. No. 143275
(March 20, 2003) (Note: Sec. 60 in relation to Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657).
37.   The Supreme Court ruled that "if landowners are called to sacrifice in the interest of
land reform, their acceptance of Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural
lands, government lending institutions should share in the sacrifice by accepting the same
Land Bank bonds at their face value (Ramirez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 81)
38.   The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus seeking to compel
respondent GSIS to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as payment for a pre-
existing obligation (Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281).
39.   It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands
involving agrarian reform although such valuation may only be considered preliminary
as the final determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
40.   Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 6657 to rice and corn lands when it
upheld the constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for Presidential Decree
27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18, R.A. 6657. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
41.   Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 granting the
Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction (administrative proceeding) to
determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction
over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" which includes
the determination of questions of just compensation, and the provisions of Sec. 57, R.A.
6657 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction" (judicial
proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under Republic Act No.
6657. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
42.  It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just
compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. (Philippine
Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
43.   The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive"
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not
a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide
that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts
cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of
administrative action. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
44.   In Vda. De Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters
involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land
tenure-related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA 167).
45.   The findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantial
evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal. (De Chavez vs. Zobel, 55
SCRA 26).
46.   The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers
under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no
reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted
above. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
47.   That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not
conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution.
Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide
for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is
one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds
from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform. (Ibid.)
48.   The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should
be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article
XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for
such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. (Ibid.)
49.   In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable
delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts
will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the
duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. (Ibid.)
50.   With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of
the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is
not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious as
the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification
of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in
our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree
today. (Ibid.)
51.   Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the
other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the
areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted
that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small
landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The
other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation. (Ibid.)
52.   The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions. (Ibid.)
53.   CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to
retention limits. (Ibid.)
54.   The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of an action. There can be no question that at the time
the complaints in CAR Cases Nos. 760-802-UP '78 and 806-810-UP '78 were filed, the
RTC of Pangasinan had no jurisdiction over them pursuant to Section 12 (a) and (b)
of P.D. No. 946 which is vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted and obligations imposed by
presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program. However,
when Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, took effect, the Courts of Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional
Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. It can thus
be seen that at the time Branch 46 of the RTC of Pangasinan dismissed the agrarian cases
on 29 October 1985, Regional Trial Courts already had jurisdiction over agrarian
disputes. The issue that logically crops up then is whether Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 automatically conferred upon the aforesaid Branch 46 jurisdiction over the subject
agrarian cases considering that these cases were filed seven (7) years earlier at a time
when only the Courts of Agrarian Relations had exclusive original jurisdiction over
them. We rule that it did not, for such a defect is fatal. Besides, the grant of jurisdiction
to the Regional Trial Courts over agrarian cases was not meant to have any retroactive
effect. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 does not provide for such retroactivity. The trial court
did not then err in dismissing the cases. (Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197).
55.   On 22 July 1987, the President of the Republic of the Philippines
promulgated Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 providing for the mechanisms for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted
by Proclamation No. 131 dated 22 July 1987. Section 17 thereof provides: "SEC.
17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of
Agriculture (DA). . . . The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the
Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such
appeal." This provision not only repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of B.P. Blg. 129. The
above-quoted Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 was the governing law at the time the
challenged decision was promulgated. Then, too, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, substantially reiterates said Section 17 while
Sections 56 and 57 provide for the designation by this Court of at least one (1) branch of
the Regional Trial Court in each province to act as a special agrarian court which shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just
compensation and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. (Tiongson vs. CA,
214 SCRA 197).
56.   The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions No.
474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well settled.
More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of  Letter of
Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella
to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or
less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families". (Vinzons-Magana vs. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536).
57.   It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion but not
the discretion itself. The writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion but not the
discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but not specific action where the act
sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion. (Sharp International
Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299).
58.   Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land transfer for failure to pay lease rentals
for more than two (2) years fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Agrarian Relations. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567).
59.   Referral of preliminary determination of rights of tenant-farmer and the landowner
to Ministry of Agrarian Reform, not necessary, where tenancy relationship between the
parties is admitted in the pleadings. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567).
60.   Presidential Decree No. 816 imposes the sanction of forfeiture where the
"agricultural lessee . . . deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals
or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years." Petitioners
cannot be said to have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They acted in
accordance with the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good faith.
Forfeiture of their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as decreed by
the CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted. (Curso vs. CA, 128
SCRA 567).
61.   Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts
of  forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail
themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform.
Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates the above provisions of the Act
shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court. (Central
Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).
62.   The DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it
involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the
school to be necessary for its purposes.
There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute
in the implementation of the CARP.
An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial
rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture. (Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).
63.   Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 deemed repealed by Section
17, Executive Order No. 229. — The above quoted provision should be deemed to have
repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then
Courts of Agrarian Relations with the original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and
questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the Regional
Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. (Quismundo
vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609).
64.   The Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those
falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR,
created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. (Machete
vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).
65.   Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian
Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by this Court — at least one (1)
branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and
exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. (Machete vs.
CA, 250 SCRA 176).
66.   The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold contract is an issue
which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the Regional Trial Courts to resolve. (Ibid.)
67.   The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties
since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency
presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. (Ibid.)
68.   The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except on the
aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over which regular courts
have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885).
69.   Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever between
the parties that could bring a controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws, the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has no jurisdiction. (Heirs of the
Late Herman Rey Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293).
70.   The CARETAKER of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and,
hence, a tenant. (Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88).
71.   The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation.
(COCOMA vs. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
72.   There are no squatters in agricultural lands. Squatters are only found in URBAN
COMMUNITIES, not in RURAL AREAS. (Presidential Decree No. 772 — Illegal
Squatting) (People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663).
73.   It bears noting that the Decision, which prescribed for Rule 42 as the correct mode
of appeal from the decisions of the SAC, was promulgated by this Court only on 10
September 2002, while the Resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said case
giving it a prospective application was promulgated on 20 March 2003. Respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 July 1998 via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. Though appeal under said rule is not the proper mode of appeal, said
erroneous course of action cannot be blamed on respondent. It was of the belief that such
recourse was the appropriate manner to question the decisions of the SAC. In Land Bank
v. De Leon, we held:
On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657
regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the
conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the
wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP
acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.

Thus, while the rule is that the appropriate mode of appeal from the decisions of the SAC
is through petition for review under Rule 42, the same rule is inapplicable in the instant
case. The Resolution categorically stated that said ruling shall apply only to those cases
appealed after 20 March 2003. (Fernando Gabatin, et al., vs. LBP, G.R. No. 148223,
November 25, 2004)
74.   The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determination of
just compensation absent respondent Land Bank's participation. Logically, it follows that
respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of just
compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program.
Assuming arguendo that respondent is not an indispensable party but only a necessary
party as is being imposed upon us by the petitioners, we find the argument of the
petitioners that only indispensable parties can appeal to be incorrect.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court that prohibit a party in an action before the lower
court to make an appeal merely on the ground that he is not an indispensable party.
The Rules of Court does not distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable party or
not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement is that the persons appealing must have
a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must be aggrieved or
prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved or prejudiced when his
interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the lawsuit, is injuriously affected by
the judgment, order or decree. The fact that a person is made a party to a case before the
lower court, and eventually be made liable if the judgment be against him, necessarily
entitles him to exercise his right to appeal. To prohibit such party to appeal is nothing less
than an outright violation of the rules on fair play.
75.   The Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
In BPI v. Court of Appeal, 402 SCRA 449 this Court explained:
. . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of
the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and
in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence there cannot be resolution of the dispute of the parties before the
court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the
other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does
complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence
would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties
to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation. (Ibid.)
76.   In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, this Court even went on to
say that without the Land Bank, there would be no amount to be established by the
government for the payment of just compensation, thus:
 As may be gleaned very clearly from EO 229, the LBP is an essential part of the government
sector with regard to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the
instrumentality that is charged with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of agrarian
reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the government machinery that fixes and
determines the amount compensable to the landowner. Were LBP to be excluded from that
intricate, if not sensitive, function of establishing the compensable amount, there would be no
amount "to be established by the government" as required in Section 6 of EO
229 (emphasis supplied). (Ibid.)

77.   We must stress, at the outset, that the taking of private lands under the agrarian
reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a number of
cases, we have stated that in computing the just compensation for expropriating
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking not at the time of the
rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration. This being so, then in
determining the value of the land for the payment of just compensation, the time of taking
should be the basis. In the instant case, since the dispute over the valuation of the land
depends on the rate of the GSP used in the equation, it necessarily follows that the GSP
should be pegged at the time of the taking of the properties.
In the instant case, the said taking of the properties was deemed effected on 21 October
1972, when the petitioners were deprived of ownership over their lands in favor of
qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to E.O. No. 228 and by virtue of P.D. No. 27. The GSP
for one cavan of palay at that time was at P35. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion,
the GSP should be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP at the time of the taking of the
subject property. (Ibid.)
78.   Petitioners are not rendered disadvantaged by the computation inasmuch as they are
entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded
annually pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply
explained by this Court:
The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned interests. Had they
been paid in 1972 when the GSP for rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00,
respectively, and such amounts were deposited in a bank, they would have earned  a
compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the
product of (2.5 x AGP x P35.00 or P31.00) could be multiplied by (1.06) to determine the value
of the land plus the addition 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972.

79.   Petitioner's reliance on Land Bank v. Court of Appeals where we ordered Land

Bank to pay the just compensation based on the GSP at the time the PARAD rendered the
decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not well taken. In that case, PARAD, in its
decision, used the GSP at the time of payment, in determining the land value. When the
decision became final and executory, Land Bank, however, refused to pay the landowner
arguing that the PARAD's valuation was null and void for want of jurisdiction. We ruled
therein that the PARAD has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands
involving agrarian reform. Thus, the decision of the PARAD was binding on Land Bank.
Land Bank was estopped from questioning the land valuation made by PARAD because
it participated in the valuation proceedings and did not appeal the said decision. Hence,
Land Bank was compelled to pay the land value based on the GSP at the time of
payment. (Ibid.)
80.   As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from
judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against.
Measured against this standard, the reason proferred by Land Bank's counsel, i.e., that his
heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration
included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.
Indeed, counsel's admission that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for
Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch
48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" speaks volumes of his
arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable
negligence. (LBP vs. Hon. Eli G.C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005).
81.   Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing
but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it, much
less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The trial court therefore correctly
considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for
denying Land Bank's motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. (Ibid.)
82.   At any rate, in the Philippines Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, We declare that
there is nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes jurisdiction of regional
trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers
to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested
in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands
taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under
agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
83.   Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation
should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of
possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila
v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the
date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled.
Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of
this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded
under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO
228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. (Ibid.)
84.   It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation on the guideline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just condensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial,
full and ample.
85.   All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even through they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.
All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special
and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters. (DAR vs. Roberto J.
Cuenca and Hon. Alfonso B. Combong, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 154112, September 23, 2004).
86.   In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by
respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case of
doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, "even
if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character, as in this case." (Ibid.)
87.   Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows
that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity.
Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the
CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These
Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
 "Section 68.  Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. — No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program."(Ibid.)

88.   It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be received by the Supreme

Court in an appeal by certiorari. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
(which are ordinary accorded great respect) is when these are based on speculation,
surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial evidence. (Samahan
ng Magsasaka sa San Jose represented by Dominador Maglalang vs. Marietta Valisno, et
al., G.R. No. 158314 June 3, 2004).
89.   The relevant laws governing the minors' redemption in 1973 are the general Civil
Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1327 of
the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a contract. Article
1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent is viodable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by the minors in 1973 was
merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab initio, as petitioners argue.
Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered into by the minors would
require that: (1) the plaintiffs must have an interest in the contract; and (2) the action
must be brought by the victim and not the party responsible for the defect. Thus, Article
1397 of the Civil Code provides in part that "[t]he action for the annulment of contracts
may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However,
persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they
contracted." The action to annul the minors' redemption in 1973, therefore, was one that
could only have been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved
parties in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never initiated
by the minors. We thus quote with approval the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals:
Respondents contend that the redemption made by the petitioners was simulated, calculated to
avoid the effects of agrarian reform considering that at the time of redemption the latter were
still minors and could not have resources, in their own right, to pay the price thereof.
We are not persuaded. While it is true that a transaction entered into by a party who is
incapable of consent is voidable, however such transaction is valid until annulled. The
redemption made by the four petitioners has never been annulled, thus, it is valid. (Ibid.)

90.   As owner in their own right of the questioned properties, Redemptioner-

Grandchildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. This right of
retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by
balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine
that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A
retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to leave the landowner's
dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to
return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.
91.   On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on
the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative action
is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (DAR vs. Apex Investment
and Financing Corporation; G.R. No. 149422, April 10, 2003).
92.   In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrieved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it
had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official
indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the
landowners has to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for
certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In the
same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve
its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to
alienate respondent's lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals
did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case,
respondent need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition
for certiorari and prohibition. (Ibid.)
93.   In Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
"For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to
DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657.
"The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply
with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an
exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the
CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 373-374
[1989]. But where to carry out such regulations, the owners are deprived of land they own in
excess of the maximum area allowed there is also a taking under the power of eminent
domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farm beneficiary (id.). The Bill of Rights
provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without de process of law"
(Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution). The CARL was not intended to take away
property without due process of law (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 262 SCRA 245, 253 [1996]). The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires
that due process be observe in taking of private property." (Ibid.)

94.   In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the
Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latter's old address. Petitioner
explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those notices upon
respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment and Financing
Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that personal service could
not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner caused the service of the
notices via registered mail as required by Section 16 (a) of R.A. 6657, On this point,
petitioner claimed that the notices were sent "not only by registered mail but also by
personal delivery" and that there was actual receipt by respondent as shown by the
signature appearing at the bottom left-hand corner of petitioner's copies of the notices.
But petitioner could not identify the name of respondent's representative who allegedly
received the notices. In fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible. It is
thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of
the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. (Ibid.)
95.   Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, "all public and
private agricultural lands." Section 3© defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." (Ibid.)
96.   In dismissing outright the petition for certiorari, the CA reasoned that since it
(petitioner LBP) was assailing the writ of execution issued by respondent Provincial
Adjudicator, then its recourse was to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:
Sec. 1.   Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among there agencies
are the . . . . Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657. . .

Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, however, Rule 43 does not apply to
an action to nullify a writ of execution because the same is not a "final order" within the
contemplation of the said rule. As this Court fairly recently explained, "a writ of
execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the
court in the enforcement of a final order or a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a
final order or judgment against the losing party." As such, an order or execution is
generally not appealable. (LBP vs. Hon. Pepito Planta and Faustino Tabla , G.R. No.
152324, April 29, 2005.)
97.   On the other hand, certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in part, that
"the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be
brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the notice hereof." In relation to this provision, Section 16(f) of R.A.
No. 6657 prescribes that any party who does not agree with the decision (in the summary
administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the court for final determination of
just compensation. (Ibid.)
98.   Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between the
period to file certiorari under Section 54 of  R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days from
receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Section 4 of
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judgment, order or
resolution). The Court holds that Section 54 of RA No. 6657 prevails since it is a
substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or cases pertaining to the
application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws.
However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is extendible, but such extension shall
not extend the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
99.   Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion for extension on the grounds that the petition "which petitioner
intended to file is not the proper remedy". . .
Petitioner's contention is well-taken. The Court of Appeals was rather hasty in concluding
that the petitioner was going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the basis of
petitioner's allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have
reserved judgment on the matter until it had actually received the petition especially
considering that petitioner's motion for extension was filed well within the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review. (Ibid.) Supreme Court citing De Dios vs. CA, 274
SCRA 520)
100.   Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or
procedural imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid
application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states
that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring
the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Paulina
Diaz, et al., vs. Carlos Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345, March 19, 2004)
101.   The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the
agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be
cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations, Section 12 (g) of P.D.
946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with
jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued
under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB
under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Aside from ordering the cancellation of emancipation patents, the DARAB may
order reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to agrarian reform
beneficiaries, forfeiture of amortization, ejectment of beneficiaries, reallocation of the
land to qualified beneficiaries, perpetual disqualification to become agrarian reform
beneficiaries, reimbursement of amortization payment and value of improvement, and
other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of emancipation patents. (Liberty Ayo-
Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato, G.R. No. 155181, April 15, 2005).
102.   Only questions of law, however, can be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact by the CA
are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so
if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of the DARAB, an
administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized
jurisdiction. This Court is not thus duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below, subject to certain
exceptions. (Ibid.)
103.   Petitioner furthermore argues that the amortization payments she made to the Land
Bank in the amount of P9,825.80 should not have been forfeited in favor of respondent.
On this score, the Court finds for petitioner. While the DARAB has jurisdiction to Order
forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficiary, forfeiture should be
made in favor of the government and not to the reallocatee of the landholding. (Ibid.)
104.   In Monsanto v. Zerna, (G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001) it was held that for
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be
essential to establish all its indispensable elements: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the case a bar, the element that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee" on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends,
is absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both
parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert
ownership over Lots Nos. 5198-A, 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an
Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show
any juridical tie or tenurial relationship between the parties' predecessors-in-interest. The
questioned lot it allegedly declared for taxation purposes in the name of petitioners'
father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to have any connection with the private
respondents nor with their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Caridad Fuentebella. (Rodolfo
Arzaga, et al., vs. Salvacion Copias, et al., G.R. No. 152404, March 28, 2003).
105.   In Chico v. Court of Appeals, (348 Phil. 37 1998) also an action for recovery of
possession, the Court was confronted with the same jurisdictional issue. The petitioner
therein claimed ownership over the disputed property pursuant to a final judgment, while
the respondents asserted right to possession by virtue of an alleged tenancy
relationship with one who has no juridical connection with the petitioners. In holding
that it is the trial court and not the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case, the
Court ruled that the absence of a juridical tie between the parties or their predecessor-in-
interest negates the existence of the element of tenancy relationship.
106.   The basic rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set
up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. From the averments
of the complaint in the instant case, it is that the petitioners' action does not involve an
agrarian dispute, but one for recovery of possession, which is perfectly within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trail Courts. (Ibid.)
107.   Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land." The term "agriculture" or "agricultural activity" is also
defined by the same law as follows:
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the
soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities,
and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
by persons whether natural or juridical. (DAR vs. DECS, G.R. No. 158228, March 23,
2004)
108.   Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which
are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:
xxx                    xxx                    xxx
c)   Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public
or private schools for educational purposes . . . shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
xxx                    xxx                    xxx
Clearly, a reading of the paragraphs shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1)
the land must be "actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2)
the purpose is for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated
by public or private schools for educational purposes."
The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not
taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law
are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. (Ibid.)

        Note: To be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income
derived therefrom, that must be actually and exclusively used for educational
purposes.
109.   In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP
beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a
Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since
the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the court to exercise great
caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was none.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of
poor, landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the
natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who
seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life.
The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will
receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward
sound rural development and industrialization. (Ibid.)
110.   The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his theory of the
case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that "courts of justice
have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." A judgment that goes
outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear
the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid. The rule rests on the
fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present case, the Court must stick to the issue
litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the
right to eject the Spouses Velasco from the land under RA 3844. (Henry Mon vs. CA,
Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 118292, April 2, 2004).
111.   Administrative Law: The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative
bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details,
and all that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulations be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by the law. The power of subordinate legislation allows
administrative bodies to implement the board policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in" the details. All that is required is that the regulations be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. One such administrative regulation
is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel,
emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27, i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they are tilling. (Rolando
Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15).
112.   Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to accomplish the
noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid and has the force of law. The rationale for
the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that
"The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the
tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. . . . The
circular is meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer's lease rentals to
landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the
land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price." Since the assailed
circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore
valid. Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. (Ibid.)
113.   The Court cannot see any "irreconcilable conflict" between P.D. No. 816 and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-
farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the
property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the
other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the
tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been
determined. (Ibid.)
114.   Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in
implementation of P.D. 27 — these must not be read in isolation, but rather, in
conjunction with each other. (Private respondent, however "splits hairs," so to speak, and
contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circular
implements P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in
implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction
with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After
the value of the land has been determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay
their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly, there is no
inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No.
6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payment of lease rentals
on the agricultural property. (Ibid.)
115.   That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has
been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court. — Further, that P.D. 27 does not
suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized
by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of  De Chavez
v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the
law of the land, viz: "There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal
is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the
land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is
simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the
Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not
only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the
fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at
naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war
with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of
the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new
Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as
the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other
decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to
the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals." (Ibid.)
116.   Eminent Domain; Just Compensation. — The determination of just compensation
under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or
conclusive — unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the
property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may
bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation,
a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. The determination of just
compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law
is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of Section 2
of E.O. 228: ". . . In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of
lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within
thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian
Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 , and other pertinent issuances. In
the event a party questions in court the resolution of the dispute, the landowner's
compensation shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in
trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court." Clearly
therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the
property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may
bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation,
a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. (LBP vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales,
387 SCRA 15).
117.   Republic Act No. 6657; The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or
the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private
agricultural and including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as
provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D.
27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for the
mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states:
"(P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice
and corn lands, covered thereunder. . . ." It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657
did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that
are not inconsistent with R.A 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired
by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
118.   We have repeatedly stressed that social justice — or any justice for that matter —
is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel.
It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in favor of the poor
to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it
justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich
alike according to the mandate of the law. (Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 616 cited
in Victor G. Valencia vs. CA, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003)
119.   From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law
lessee cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under to Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee,
although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly
authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of
lease, the occupants of the property are merely civil law sublessees whose
rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement. (Victor Valencia vs.
CA, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003).
120.   Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; Homesteads; Parcels of land,
though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by
land reform under Presidential Decree 27. — Petitioner's contention is without legal
basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation Patents sought to
be cancelled here were issued to respondents, "applies to all tenanted private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy,
whether classified as landed estate or not." The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in
its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are
exempt from its operation. The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum
No. 2, Series of 1978, which states: "Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and/or corn which have been acquired under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land
Transfer." Unquestionably, petitioner's parcels of land, though obtained by homestead
patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD
27. (Florencia Paris vs. Dionisio A. Alfeche, et al., 364 SCRA 110).
121.   The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute — it is premised on the
condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually
cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. — Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven
hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner
is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of
the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted
by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is
clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally retain any portion of her
landholdings. (Ibid.)
122.   Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. — Indisputably,
homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original
homesteads only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are
covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of
land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage. (Ibid.)
123.   Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land
they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within
fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the court held in Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform: "It is true that PD
27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as of October 21, 1972 and
declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-
sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also
had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement." (Ibid.)
124.   Executive Order 228; Evidently, the law recognizes that the land's exact value, or
the just compensation to be given the landowner cannot just be assumed — it must be
determined with certainty before the land titles are transferred' although Executive Order
228, provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from October 21, 1972 shall
be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption that such rentals
are automatically considered as equivalent to just compensation for the
land. — Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which
recognized the rights acquired by tenant-farmers under PD 27, provides in detail the
computation to be used in arriving at the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently,
therefore, the law recognizes that their exact value, or the just compensation to be given
to the landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainty before the
land titles are transferred. Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for
the lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not
sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent to
just compensation for the land. The provision significantly designates the lease rentals as
advance, not full, payment. The determination of the exact value of the lands cannot
simply be brushed aside, as it is fundamental to the determination of whether full
payment has been made. (Ibid.)
125.   Respondent correctly cited the case of Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines ,
where the Court held that "in computing the just compensation for expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking [or October 21, 1972], the
effectivity date of P.D. No. 27], not at the time of the rendition of judgment, which
should be taken into consideration." Under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, the following
formula is used to compute the land value for palay:
LV (land value = 2.5 x AGP x GSP x (1.06)n
It should also be pointed out, however, that in the more recent case of Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Natividad, The Court categorically ruled: "the seizure of the landholding
did not take place on the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation." Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, the following factors
are considered in determining just compensation, to wit:
Sec. 17.   Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. (Emphasis supplied).

Consequently, the question that arises is: which of these two rulings should be applied?
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court deems it more equitable to apply the
ruling in the Natividad case. In said case, the Court applied the provisions of R.A. No.
6657 in computing just compensation for property expropriated under P.D. No. 27,
stating, viz.:
Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should based on
the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that
the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would
take effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as
the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the
passage of Republic Act No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our
ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
xxx                    xxx                    xxx
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline proved
by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that
the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in
accordance with, and guided, by RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. (Emphasis supplied) .

As previously noted, the property was expropriated under the Operation Land Transfer
scheme of P.D. No. 27 way back in 1972. More than 30 years have passed and petitioners
are yet to benefit from it, while the farmer-beneficiaries have already been harvesting its
produce for the longest time. Events have rendered the applicability of P.D. No.
27 inequitable. Thus, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 should apply in this case. (Anacleto
R. Meneses, et al. vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, et. al. , G.R. No. 156304, October 23,
2006)
126.   The Court agrees with the petitioner's contention that, under Section 2 (f), Rule II
of the DARAB Rules of Procedures, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA.
However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such case, they must relate to
an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued
by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB. (Heirs of Julian dela Cruz, et al. vs.
Heirs of Alberto Cruz, represented by Benedicto V. Cruz. , G.R. No. 162890, November
22, 2005)
127.   Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an "agrarian dispute" as "any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers'
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental (G.R. 123417, 10 June 1999, 308 SCRA 167), this Court held
that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. (Ibid.)
128.   Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as
TCTs issued in registration proceedings. Ybañes v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R.
No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743,749-750) provides that certificates of title
issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
judicial proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceedings
pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by the said certificate
is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public
land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a pubic land patent certificate of
title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases
clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was
applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved
by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines
in accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date
of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards
the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director
of Lands equally and finally grant, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.
This, to our minds, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead
laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and
cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in
favor of the homesteader would be subject to inquiry, contents and decision after it has been
given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public
Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government's system
of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the
State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-

acquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would
still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an
administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the
indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act
where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted
thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who
come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the
patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources,
under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.
(REGISTRATION OF LAND, TITLES AND DEEDS, Antonio H. Noblejas, p. 431 (1992 revised
ed.).

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required
to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who
have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27) (Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section
105), the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection
accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order
for the issuance of the patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the
subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person. (Amado
D. Aquino, LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS, Chapter XII,
"Land Patents", p. 139; citing Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77770, 15
December 1988, 168 SCRA 503, 511; Duran v. Olivia, 113 Phil. 144, 148-149 (1961)
(Samuel Estribillo, et. al., vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and Hacienda Maria, Inc.,
et. al., G.R. 159674; June 30, 2006)
129.   As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. (147 Phil.
301, 304 (1971).
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent thereof is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding (Emphasis supplied).

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are
enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact
devotes Chapter IX (Chapter IX: CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER,
EMANCIPATION PATENT, AFFIDAVIT OF NON-TENANCY) on the subject of EPs.
Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as
certificates of title issued in registration proceedings. (Ibid.)
130.   More importantly, petitioner is not a real party-in-interest in this case. According to
Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. We stand by the ruling in Fortich v. Corona that farmer-beneficiaries, who are not
approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-interest. In Fortich, the farmers who
intervened in the case were mere recommendees. We stated in said case that:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question
is a mere expectancy Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.

In the case at bar, members of petitioners Samahan are mere qualified beneficiaries of
CARP. The certification that CLOAs were already generated in their names, but were not
issued because of the present dispute, does not vest any right to the farmers since the fact
remains that they have not yet been approved as awardees, actually awarded lands, or
granted CLOAs. Respondents cannot be considered estoppted from questioning
petitioner's legal standing since petitioner appeared before the OP after the latter decided
in respondents' favor. When the petitioner appealed the case to the CA, respondents duly
questioned the petitioner's capacity to sue. (Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hectarya,
represented by Elvira M. Baladad, et al.  vs. Wilfredo G. Mosquera, et al., G.R. 152430,
March 22, 2007)
131.   In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes
the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a
clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity". The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is
different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great
portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such
as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feed mill
with grinders, mixers, conveyor, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester
plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds. Deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded it
power in issuing the assailed A.O. (DAR et al., vs. Delia T. Sutton et al. , G.R. 162070,
October 19, 2005)
132.   The subsequent case of  Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR reiterated our ruling in the Luz
Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercials and residential
lands are not covered by the CARL. We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the
term "agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hill
Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as
agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as
residential lands.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a
statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and
adoption of the previous law. On the other land, by making a new law, Congress seeks to
supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provision of the CAR.
Specifically, the new law change the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and
commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification,
Congress clearly sought to align the provision of our agrarian laws with the intent of the
1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of
agrarian reform. (Ibid.)
133.   As general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative
redress (Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 378 Phil. 727 (1999). In the instant case,
it is beyond dispute that petitioner failed to resort to proper administrative recourse in
resisting the Notice of Coverage issued by respondent MARO. Unsuccessful in its
attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverage when it lodged its protest with the incorrect
administrative offices, petitioner resorted to a judicial remedy. The petition for
mandamus, which it filed, however, was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals. Truly,
a petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to
petitioner (Gualberto Castro v. Ricardo Gloria, 415 Phil. 645 (2001) (Nicanor T. Santos
Dev't. Corp. vs. Hon. Sec., DAR, et al., G.R. No. 159654; February 28, 2006)
134.   Is it settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duly, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to
fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely pressed, it must nevertheless be
clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed. (Erlinda C. Pefianco v. Ma. Luisa C. Moral, 379 Phil. 468 (2000). (Ibid.).
135.   Petitioner's filing of an answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it
now raises. As we have said time and again, "the active participation of a party in a case
pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount to a
recognition of that court's or body's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's or
body's jurisdiction". (Alcantara vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land  [problems, 361
SCRA 664, 669 [2001]). (Lapanday Agricultural & Dev't. Corp. vs. Maximo Estita, et
al., G.R. No. 162109, January 21, 2005).
136.   Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government
are invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To quote from our decision
in Torres vs. Ventura, as reiterated in Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe, (333 SCRA 425, 436
[2000]):
". . . As such [the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the
government to him and no other. To ensure his continued possession and enjoyment of the
property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government
or by hereditary succession, to his successors." (Ibid.)

137.   The court finds that the December 22, 1994 Order of Execution issued by the DAR
Regional Director suffers from jurisdiction and procedural defects as it directed the
relocation of petitioners without first conducting a hearing or survey to determine the
portion of the subject property excluded from the CARP.
A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be
executed, and the execution is void if it is excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly
with every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. (Ex-Bataan Security Agency,
Inc. v. NLRC, 320 Phil. 517 (1995)). It may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, et al., 383 Phil. 229 (2000)). Where the writ of
execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ
has pro tanto no validity (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424 (1994). (Ernesto
Ingles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125202, January 31, 2006).
138.   Petitioners' contention that the authority to issue the Order of Execution is vested
with the DARAB and not with the DAR Regional Director is likewise correct.
A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under
the Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for "supporting the field units and
supervising program implementation of the Department within the region." The function
of the DAR Regional Office includes "[implementing] laws, policies, plans, rules and
regulations of the Department in the regional area." A similar function is delegated to the
DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order No. 129-A. Thus, the functions of the
DAR Regional Director are purely administrative, that is, to put into operation agrarian
laws and fill out the details necessary for their implementation, and not adjudicatory.
On the other hand, when a dispute arises between parties affected by the operation of
agrarian laws, the controversy should be settled in an adversarial proceeding before the
DARAB, the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR (Section 50, R.A. No. 6657; Quasi-Judicial
Powers of the DAR. — the DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agricultural (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)). A function becomes judicial or quasi-
judicial in nature when the exercise thereof involves the determination of rights and
obligations of the parties. (Ibid.).