Introduction
Integrating human
behavior and response
issues into fire safety
management of facilities
Brian J. Meacham
The author
Brian J. Meacham is the Research Director for the
Society of Fire Protection Engineers. He is currently at
Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, USA.
Keywords
Fire safety, Risk management, Behaviour, Alarms,
Fire services
Abstract
Although there is a growing international movement
toward the use of engineered or performance-based fire
safety design, current practice is dominated by prescrip-
tive-based design. In prescriptive-based fire safety
design, only those requirements prescribed by appropriate
building regulations, installation standards, or approved
documents tend to be applied. Because these require-
ments typically include fire protection measures, such as
fire detection and signaling systems, automatic sprinkler
systems, fire compartmentation, and emergency egress
systems, there is often an assumption that occupants,
employees, and users of a facility will be safe should a fire
occur. However, there are a variety of factors that could
affect the actual fire safety of a facility that comply with
the appropriate regulations. Fuel type, loading, config-
uration, and location can change, leading to an increase
in fire risk. Occupants may not see, hear or understand
fire alarm signals as fire alarm signals. Fire detection and
signaling systems, fire suppression systems, or smoke
management systems may not be 100 percent functional
at all times. Fortunately, many of these factors can be
controlled for, if they are understood and addressed,
within a fire safety management plan. To assist with such
planning, this paper discusses various human behavior
and response issues that may affect life safety during a
fire or emergency, and provides suggestions for inte-
grating these issues into a fire safety management plan.
Electronic access
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is
available at
http://www.emerald-library.com
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . pp. 303±312
# MCB University Press . ISSN 0263-2772
303
Fire safety management plans are often
developed separately from fire safety designs,
in many cases after the design is complete and
by someone other than the fire safety design
engineer. If this occurs, and the design
engineer did not have a good appreciation for
the operation of the facility, and the developer
of the fire safety management plan does not
have a good understanding of the fire safety
systems, the resulting level of safety may be
less than expected. This is especially true
where human behavior and response factors
are not adequately addressed in the fire safety
design, the fire safety management plan, or
both.
If, for example, the fire safety systems for a
facility are designed in accordance with pre-
scriptive regulations, there are likely to be
some built-in assumptions regarding fuel load,
fire spread potential, fire detection, fire alarm
signaling, and occupant evacuation. These
assumptions could include the following: the
fuel load will not change significantly over
time, fire and smoke doors will operate as
expected, fire detection and signaling systems
will provide sufficient early warning of a fire,
and people will begin to evacuate immediately
on activation of the alarm. Unfortunately, all of
these assumptions could be wrong. As part of
living and working, people will change the
nature of a fire hazard. Combustibles of all
types accumulate in residences, hotels some-
times use corridors for temporary storage,
businesses reconfigure open-plan office spaces,
the types of material stored in a warehouse
may change over time, and production equip-
ment may change in industry.
If the hazards change significantly from
what the design engineer or the regulation
The author is indebted to Richard Custer and
Pamela Powell for their contributions and
assistance in preparing the original text of the
sections on human response to alarm signals,
behavioral response to fire effects from which this
paper is derived (Custer and Meacham, 1997).
The author would also like to acknowledge the
First International Symposium on Human
Behaviour in Fire, where the above material
serviced from Custer and Meacham (1997) was
presented (Shields, 1998). The material presented
in this paper reflects the view of the author and
does not reflect the views, opinions, or consensus
of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, its
members, or its directors.
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
assumed, the fire safety systems may be less
effective than expected. In addition, people
can inadvertently change the intended func-
tion of a system. Fire and smoke doors only
work properly when they are able to close
during a fire. This cannot happen if they are
wedged open by wood blocks or tied open by
wire or string. Sprinklers are most effective if
the water can reach the base of the fire. This is
difficult if materials are stored up to the
ceiling, effectively blocking sprinkler water
from reaching a potential fire. The number of
egress paths from a building are selected so
that there is typically more than one way out.
If materials are stored in an egress corridor,
an exit is effectively lost. If the materials are
combustible, they could make a fire situation
worse.
The above are all factors that most people
responsible for fire safety management plans
understand and address in one way or
another. Good housekeeping, maintenance of
fire safety systems, and good fire prevention
practices (material control, ignition control)
are hallmarks of a thorough fire safety
management plan. The more difficult issues,
however, are those related to human behavior
and response once a fire occurs. If the fire
safety design or the fire safety management
plan assume people will hear a fire alarm,
recognize it as an alarm, and begin moving
immediately to an exit, the time needed for
safe egress could be significantly underesti-
mated. If the time needed to safely egress is
underestimated, the exposure to untenable
conditions could also be underestimated. As a
result, there may be a higher likelihood of
injury than expected.
However, if those responsible for the fire
safety management plan understand human
behavior and response factors, adjustments
can be made if necessary. To help those with
this responsibility, the following overview of
human behavior and response factors is
provided.
Human response to alarm signals
Many regulation-prescribed fire safety designs
assume that building occupants will be alerted
by a non-voice signal (either from a smoke
detector or as part of a building alarm
system), will recognize that signal as a fire
alarm, will accept the signal as a true alarm
(i.e. not a false or nuisance alarm), and will
304
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
immediately respond positively to the fire
alarm signal (i.e. begin to escape as planned in
the fire safety design and written emergency
procedures)[1]. However, when developing a
fire safety management plan, one should
question the validity of such assumptions,
particularly the likelihood that all of these
actions will occur instantaneously and as
expected.
The first issue to consider is that many new
and existing buildings only utilize bells, horns,
or piezo-electric signaling devices to alert
people, with voice alarm communication
systems typically required or used only in
high-rise buildings and large assembly spaces.
Unfortunately, people do not respond well to
non-voice signals. Bryan has cited one study
that found ``the response to fire alarm bells
and sounders tends to be less than optimum''
(Bryan, 1995). Similarly, within United
States Department of Veterans' Affairs hos-
pitals, the largest delay by staff in responding
to alarm signals was observed when coded-
bell type signals were used (Cable, 1994).
Part of the problem may be that people are
uncertain about what the signal actually
indicates. It has been reported that there is
usually skepticism as to whether the noise
indicated is a fire alarm and, if so, whether the
alarm is merely a system test or a drill (Bryan,
1995). There is also the concern about
whether or not the signal is a true alarm or
false alarm. According to Moore, the decision
to leave a building when the fire alarm sounds
will depend on occupant experience with the
fire alarm system in the building, and the
decision will often be no (Moore, 1988). In
such a case, delayed response results from the
occupants' waning belief that the signal is a
true alarm. If the occupants do not acknowl-
edge the signal as a true alarm, they will delay
identifying the signal as indicating a fire or life
safety threat. Various references on the
nuisance alarm problem are available in the
literature (e.g. Cable, 1994; Moore, 1988;
Meacham, 1994a; 1994b; Breen, 1985; Bu-
kowski and Jason, 1991).
The next issue to consider is whether
people will be able to hear or see an alarm
signal. The problem of signal audibility and
visibility in buildings is not new, and is
discussed in detail in the SFPE Handbook of
Fire Protection Engineering (Schifiliti et al.,
1995) and elsewhere (Butler et al., 1981). For
this discussion, the focus will be on audibility
issues other than attenuation though building
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
materials (visibility issues will not be ad-
dressed). An important factor in signal
audibility analysis is the frequency of the
signal. First, as the frequency of an alarm
signal increases, the sound pressure level of
the signal decreases (Schifiliti et al., 1995).
Second, people generally hear low frequencies
better than high frequencies. These factors
would seem to indicate that lower frequency
alarm signals would be best for alerting
people. This is supported by a recent study
which indicates that people, especially the
young and the elderly, respond better to
alarm signals at 500Hz than to alarm signals
at 4,000Hz (Huey et al., 1994). However, the
signal frequency in many residential smoke
detectors is in the 4,000Hz range.
The variability in ambient sound levels
should also be considered. Ambient sound
levels vary by geographical location, season of
the year, function of a facility, and several
other factors. However, it is not uncommon
for a regulation to indicate that the required
sound power level of an alarm signal must be
at least XdBA or YdBA above ambient, with a
minimum of supporting information describ-
ing ``ambient'' conditions (BOCA, 1993;
NFPA, 1993). In many cases, a minimum
sound power level of 70-85dBA or 15dBA
above ambient is specified, with a level of at
least 70-75dBA being required at ``pillow
level'' in sleeping rooms. Although basing a
design on such minimum values may be
adequate in most cases, these values may not
consider internal or external changes in a
facility. Such changes may include increasing
traffic noise levels over time, the installation
of a room air-conditioner in summer months,
reconfiguration of office or factory partitions,
or the volume of a television set or piece of
equipment in an adjacent room, apartment,
or building.
For example, a ``typical'' residential air-
conditioner has an ambient sound level of
55dBA (Nober et al., 1981). With this level of
ambient noise, a regulation compliant alarm
signal would need to be 70dBA (15dBA
above ambient). Although this complies with
the referenced regulations (BOCA, 1993;
NFPA, 1993), what would happen if the air-
conditioner were noisier, say 60-65dBA? The
required sound power level of the alarm
would then be 75-80dBA. Would this be
assumed at the design phase, and if not,
would the 70dBA level be sufficient to wake
someone? Kahn indicates that a signal-to-
305
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
noise ratio of less than 10dBA at the ears
failed to awaken sleeping subjects (Kahn,
1984). In the case of a 60-65dBA ambient
sound power level (noise) and a 70dBA alarm
sound power level (signal), the signal to noise
ratio would be 10dBA or less. Would the
occupant awaken? In Kahn's study, even
when the signal-to-noise ratio was increased,
and the subjects awoke, they failed to identify
the smoke detector signal, even though
radiant heat and smoke odor cues were
present as additional indications of a fire. It
should also be noted that, to meet code
requirements, apartment building alarm
sounders located in common corridors (i.e.
not inside units) may be set to sound at more
than 100dBA to reach a level of 70dBA inside
the individual units. In this case, the resultant
sound power level within units may be
insufficient to awaken some occupants (see
above), and such a loud alarm in common
corridors or staircases may prevent essential
communication among occupants (Proulx et
al., 1995a).
Another important factor in alarm signal
audibility analysis is the physical condition of
the occupant. Hearing an alarm or otherwise
sensing the presence of fire is only part of how
occupants respond to fire. Basic physiological
factors greatly influence how people respond.
For example, two people could react very
differently to the same fire; the same person
could have a different physical reaction to a
fire today or a month from now. The
occupant's physiological ability to withstand
the physical assault of fire's heat, smoke, and
gases depends on a combination of age, size,
weight, pre-existing physical or medical con-
dition, and the presence of medication, drugs,
or alcohol. Although such inter- and intra-
individual variability is seldom accounted for
in regulations or by design professionals, it
should be. According to some estimates
(Conley and Fahy, 1994), at least 10 percent
of those who die in residential fires were
impaired by alcohol or other drugs when they
died, with 20-64 year-old fire victims being
impaired twice as often as the general
population. In addition, a 1970s study con-
cluded that more than 70 percent of fire
victims between the ages of 30 and 60 in
Maryland were legally intoxicated (Berl and
Halpin, 1979). Given the indications that
people with hearing impairments or who are
taking sleeping pills or other medication may
require alarm signals with sound power levels
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
exceeding 100dBA to alert them (Berry,
1978), the condition of occupants at the time
of alarm is a serious concern.
Behavioral response to fire
Assuming that building occupants will hear
the fire alarm signal, one should also consider
how people may react to the alarm and other
fire cues. As this is a complex issue, the
discussion provided here will not attempt to
duplicate work published elsewhere, such as
in Canter's comprehensive ``Human behavior
in fire'' (Canter, 1990), but will focus on
broad categories of human behavior in fire
that are particularly relevant to engineered
designs.
After an occupant senses and understands
an alert or alarm signal, or identifies another
fire cue (such as heat, flame or smoke), the
next step is a process of interpreting this
information and deciding if the alarm or fire
cue is a real threat to him/her. It has been
reported that the decision process people use
to decide what to do in a fire has six basic
components: recognition, validation, defini-
tion, evaluation, commitment, and
reassessment (Bryan, 1991). Recognition: For
lay people, the first cues of a fire can be very
ambiguous and unclear. In fact, people may
worry that ``something isn't right'', and, at the
same time, optimistically hope that the threat
is false. In some cases, the transition between
awareness of a fire cue and recognizing its
threat is nearly simultaneous (if people see
flames and thick smoke 3m (10ft) in front of
them, they are quite likely to perceive the
situation as life threatening). In other cases,
there are time gaps between becoming aware
of fire cues and recognizing their threat.
Consider the impact of nuisance alarms and
the ``cry wolf'' syndrome (Pate-Cornell and
Benito-Claudio, 1987). The ratio of nuisance
or false alarms from smoke detectors to real
fires in college dormitories has been reported
to be as high as 46:1 (Breen, 1990). If the
signal has been a ``false'' alarm for the past 40
alarms, how likely are people to respond to
the next alarm?
In general, recognizing a threat as real takes
time, as many fire incidents illustrate. In the
1986 fire at the Dupont Hotel and Casino in
San Juan, Puerto Rico, occupants remained in
the casino and ``gambling activities apparently
continued'' even after they saw smoke and
306
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
heard an ``explosion'' (actually, sounds asso-
ciated with rapid fire growth and spread)
(Klem, 1987). Similarly, for more than an
hour, an alarm technician steadfastly believed
that an alarm was merely a trouble signal at
the remote Illinois Bell Central Office facility
in Hinsdale, Illinois; a passing motorist finally
reported the fire (Custer and Powell, 1989).
In 1991, employees at the John F. Kennedy
Federal Building in Boston, Massachusetts
watched burning debris fall past their win-
dows, without evacuating the building or
pulling the manual alarm (Devir, 1996).
Delayed threat recognition may seem inex-
plicable to fire safety engineers, but it does
occur and must be considered in fire protec-
tion design.
Validation: When people are unsure about a
threat's severity, they seek reassurance that
the threat is mild. When threats seem more
serious, people will ask others for information.
Seeking more information proves or validates
that there is indeed a serious problem. ``Do
you think we really need to evacuate the
building?'' or ``Do you smell smoke?'' are
examples of validation questions. Definition:
Through definition, people structure or even
try to quantify what they know about a threat.
Defining how much smoke people smell, how
much heat they feel, or how many flames they
see helps people relate a threat to their own
situation. Evaluation: During evaluation,
people decide whether to use fight or flight to
reduce their danger. The decision often
happens very quickly, within seconds, and
under great stress and threat. The actions of
other people greatly influence the evaluation
process. Commitment: Through the commit-
ment process, people act on the decision
made during evaluation. Reassessment: If an
action does not appear to be working, the
person in the fire becomes more anxious and
more frustrated. Decisions become less ra-
tional, and the likelihood of injury increases.
Another way to understand how people act
in fires is to view actions in the light of four
socio-psychological concepts (Proulx, 1994a).
These concepts are avoidance, commitment,
affiliation, and role. Avoidance: People feel
that they can protect themselves, psychologi-
cally, by denying unpleasant situations.
Psychological denial is very common during
the first moments of a fire, when people find
reassuring and benign explanations for the
cues they see, smell, and hear. Avoidance
explains why people delay recognizing the
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
threat and spend long minutes ignoring the
situation. Commitment: People are often very
committed to their current activity (standing
in line at the supermarket, watching televi-
sion, or working at a desk, for example) when
they perceive their first cues of a fire. Because
of commitment, people will continue what
they are doing, despite warnings of danger.
Many people, for example, will notice flashing
fire warning lights on their way into a hotel or
office building, but will continue into the
building. Affiliation: Affiliation is one cause of
a delayed start of evacuation. Often no one
starts to evacuate until everyone in the group
(family members or friends) is ready. Once a
group has started to evacuate, the slowest
member determines the speed of movement
for the entire group. Affiliation is such a
strong concept that it over-rides threat.
Regardless of the threat, parents will not leave
without their children; children are reluctant
to go without their siblings. People will wait
for their co-workers, friends, or anyone they
feel responsible for (such as an elderly
neighbor living down the hall). Role: An
occupant's role or status in a building
determines their response to a fire or other
emergency. For example, visitors to a building
will be more passive during an emergency
than residents or employees. Simply because
they are unfamiliar with a building under
normal conditions, visitors are likely to spend
more time on threat recognition and valida-
tion. Occupants will turn to supervisors and
others in authority for instruction.
Cataloging what people reported they did
(and in what sequence) during a fire has been
useful in putting the decision-making process
into better perspective. Specific reported
actions include ``notifying others'', ``called
Fire Department'', ``left building'', and
``fought fire'' (NFPA, 1991). Note that this
type of cataloging captures what occupants
report (which may differ from what they
actually did), lacks a time context, and does
not necessarily reflect actions to prepare for
evacuation. In recent studies of human
behavior during emergencies (Fahy and
Proulx, 1996), occupant actions have been
grouped into the broader categories of ``in-
vestigate'', ``seek information'', ``prepare to
evacuate'', ``evacuate'', ``alert others or report
incident'', ``assist others'', ``seek refuge'', and
``wait''. Survivors of residential fires in the UK
engaged in similar patterns, as Canter has
reported (Canter, 1990). Occupants noticed
307
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
fire cues very early in a fire, but found them
ambiguous (misinterpreting or ignoring
strange noises, or perhaps discussing them
with others). When the cues persisted, people
investigated, including entering a room with
smoke or fire in it.
Researchers at the National Research
Council of Canada's National Fire Labora-
tory and at the National Fire Protection
Association have also studied human behavior
during evacuation drills and actual emergen-
cies. According to Canadian research on
evacuation drills in seven apartment build-
ings, it took people from 30 seconds to 14
minutes to start evacuating, with most of the
people starting approximately three minutes
after the alarm was sounded in buildings
where the alarm was readily audible
throughout (Proulx, 1994b; Proulx et al.,
1994; 1995b). Some of the delays can be
attributed to not hearing the signal and not
linking the signal to the threat of fire. In all
buildings, some delays were related to people
deciding what to do (e.g. looking in the
corridor, looking for children, getting dressed,
gathering valuables, etc.). In the evacuation of
the World Trade Center following a bombing
(Fahy and Proulx, 1995; 1996), which in-
volved a much larger and more complex series
of buildings, there were remarkable simila-
rities to the Canadian study. In the World
Trade Center evacuation, for example, occu-
pants did not initially consider the situation to
be extremely serious. Delay between becom-
ing aware of the event and first attempting to
leave the building was common; the mean
time between awareness of the event and
attempting to leaving the building was 8.9
minutes in Tower 1 and 39.9 minutes in
Tower 2. These two studies highlight some
very significant concerns for fire safety en-
gineers to consider: inaudible alarms clearly
delayed the start of evacuation (audibility);
people delayed evacuation further by actions
such as verifying the signal or gathering
personal effects (commitment); and occu-
pants who did not hear the alarm did not
move until the fire department arrived.
Physiological response to fire effects
As part of the life safety hazard assessment for
design, a critical component is the selection of
tenability or survivability criteria: the trigger
points to assess success or failure of a
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
proposed design. If a regulation-based design
is used, these criteria may not be known. In
this case, it is important for the fire safety
management plan to consider the levels of
hazard that may be present and adjust as
appropriate. Common metrics selected for
tenability and survivability criteria are related
to conditions that cause physiological impacts
on people. Such conditions include tempera-
ture, heat flux, smoke obscuration, oxygen
depletion, and exposure to fire gases. A
detailed discussion of physiological response
is well beyond the scope of this paper.
However, this section will briefly review
physiological response to conditions that are
particularly germane to life safety hazard
assessments used as part of fire safety
management plans. All data provided are for
the purpose of illustration only. The refer-
ences should be consulted for selection of
appropriate data based on specific design
parameters.
Temperature: Effects of temperature vary
with the length of time exposed to heat, the
amount of relative humidity (moisture in the
air increases the effects of heat), and the
``breathability'' of clothing worn. Tempera-
tures as low as 448C (1128F) can begin to
cause skin burns (Wieczorek and Dembsey,
1997) with temperatures as low as 508C
(1228F) producing severe discomfort in the
mouth, nose, and esophagus (NFPA, 1959).
School fire tests conducted in Los Angeles
and known as Operation School Burning
concluded that children and teachers could
not be expected to enter a corridor in which
the temperature was 658C (1508F) (NFPA,
1959). It has also been reported that death
from hyperthermia occurs at temperatures
above 1008C (2128F) (Powell, 1997). Addi-
tional information on other physiological
effects of heat are available in the literature
(e.g. Pryor and Yuill, 1966).
In estimating the potential for burn injuries,
the combination of temperature and exposure
time required to cause a burn must be
considered (Hartzell, 1991). The higher the
temperature, the more quickly a burn injury
will occur. For example, one reference reports
that the time required for a second degree
burn to occur is 60 seconds with a skin
surface temperature of 718C, 30 seconds with
a skin surface temperature of 828C, and 15
seconds with a skin surface temperature of
1008C (Hartzell, 1991).
308
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
Heat Flux: Heat flux describes how much
heat is available for transfer to any surface,
including human skin. Generally, the upper
limit of heat flux without severe pain is
2.5kW/m2 for three minutes (Babrauskas,
1979). To put this into perspective, holding a
hand about 100mm (a few inches) from a
100-watt light bulb for three minutes would
produce a heat flux of about 2.5kW/m2. A
recent report prepared for the SFPE provides
an excellent discussion on skin burn issues
due to radiant energy, and provides various
engineering approaches for predicting first
and second degree burns that can be a
valuable tool for life safety hazard assessment
(Wieczorek and Dembsey, 1997). Smoke
obscuration: Visible smoke has two kinds of
negative physical effects during a fire: reduced
visibility and the irritation and toxicity caused
by inhaling smoke particles. Smoke may also
have a marked emotional effect, by causing
fear. Although, recent studies have shown
that smoke often does not stop occupant
movement, even in worsening conditions
(Fahy and Proulx, 1995), reduced visibility
does reduce the ability to escape (NIST,
1984). Oxygen depletion: Oxygen normally
makes up 21 percent of air, and the human
respiratory and nervous systems have evolved
to function at that concentration. When the
percentage of oxygen drops even slightly,
physiological effects occur. The precise effects
on an individual, of course, may vary widely
and are influenced by factors such as age and
overall condition. Table I summarizes some
effects of oxygen depletion on humans
(Custer and Bright, 1974).
Exposure to fire gases: Carbon monoxide
poisoning alone reportedly accounts for about
half of all fire deaths, with carbon monoxide
combined with other factors being responsible
for another 30 percent of all fire fatalities
(Hartzell, 1986). Carbon monoxide easily
attaches itself to hemoglobin (in red blood
cells), decreasing the blood's ability to carry
oxygen. It is so dangerous that even relatively
Table I Effects of oxygen depletion on humans
Percent O2 Time Effect
17-21 Indefinite Decreased respiration volume; loss of
coordination; difficulty thinking
14-17 Two hours Rapid pulse; dizziness
11-14 30 minutes Nausea; vomiting; paralysis
9 Five minutes Loss of consciousness
6 1-2 minutes Death
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
small amounts may be incapacitating or
lethal. One measure of toxicity is the exposure
concentration (C) in parts per million (ppm)
times the time (T) of exposure (in minutes)
and is expressed as the CT product or ppm-
minutes. Any concentration above 35,000
ppm-minute is hazardous. Very high concen-
trations for even very short times can be
incapacitating or lethal. Table II outlines
some of the effects of carbon monoxide
poisoning (Claudy, 1957).
Carbon monoxide levels are frequently
expressed as the percentage of carboxyhemo-
globin (COHb) saturation in the blood. In
general, carboxyhemoglobin levels below 30
percent will not harm a person's ability to
escape a fire. By 40 percent saturation,
however, escape becomes much more diffi-
cult. At saturation levels of 50-60 percent,
severe symptoms and even death occur
(Hartzell, 1989). It is important to note that
carboxyhemoglobin levels, while a valuable
tool in measuring toxicity, do not consider the
length of exposure. The CT measurement, on
the other hand, does account for how long a
victim is exposed to the hazard.
Integrating human behavior and
response issues into fire safety
management of facilities
For many fire safety engineers, integrating
human factors issues into engineered fire
safety design consists of incorporating fire
detector activation times and travel times in a
computer model, sometimes with safety fac-
tors, and developing an available safe egress
time (Proulx, 1995). However, as discussed
throughout this paper, delays are inherent in
human response to a fire. Therefore, designs
should consider delays prior to occupants
beginning to evacuate, delays during evacua-
tion, and the potential for some people not to
evacuate on their own. The extent to which
Table II Human response to carbon monoxide
CCO (ppm) Time (min)
200 120-180
800 45
3,200 10-15
3,200 30
6,900 1-2
12,800 0.1 (2-3 breaths)
12,800 1-3
309
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
one should address these factors depends on
the facility and the characteristics of people
expected to live at, work in, visit, or otherwise
use the facility.
One approach would be to consider the
human factors as part of a life safety risk
assessment, wherein the variables are in-
cluded in probability distributions, and a
quantitative risk-to-life value is determined
using stochastic methods (Beck and Yung,
1995; Beck, 1997; Magnusson et al., 1995;
Magnusson, 1997). Another approach would
be to modify various performance or accep-
tance criteria by using subjectively or
objectively developed uncertainty and varia-
bility factors (Magnusson et al., 1995;
Meacham, 1997). This is common practice in
deterministically developed designs.
Those responsible for the fire safety man-
agement plan, however, may not need to
perform any detailed risk or hazard assess-
ments. Rather, it may be possible to simply
determine the design assumptions and con-
ditions, verify whether those assumptions and
conditions are valid for the facility, make
adjustments to fire safety systems and prac-
tices where necessary, and maintain the
facility fire safety management plan according
to the assumptions and conditions. The
following suggestions are aimed at accounting
for and integrating various human behavior
and response factors into the fire safety
management plan.
Human response to alarm signals
As noted previously, people have difficulty
recognizing fire alarm signals as such, espe-
cially non-voice signals. The degree to which
people will have problems will be related, in
part, to the facility. In an apartment building,
bells or electronic signals may have a better
chance of being associated with a fire alarm as
such sounds are not normal in that environ-
ment. This assumes that the building-wide
alarm can be distinguished from single-station
CT (ppm-min) Effects
24,000-36,000 Mild headache
36,000 Mild headache
32,000-48,000 Dizziness
96,000 Death possible
6,900-13,800 Dizziness
1,280 Unconsciousness
12,800-38,400 Death
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
smoke detectors (in individual apartments),
microwave oven alarms, alarm clocks, and
similar ``normal'' alarm signals. In medical or
industrial facilities, where bells or electronic
signals may be used for other purposes, the
distinction will be more difficult. If multiple
non-voice signals are used in a facility,
periodic reminders (memos) or drills could be
used to help occupants (employees) maintain
a needed familiarity with the signal and with
the action to be taken on hearing it. The best
approach, where feasible, would be to sup-
plement the non-voice alarm with a voice
alarm system. In residential occupancies,
such as apartment buildings and hotels,
installation of a voice alarm system speaker in
each apartment or guest suite would be ideal.
People may also have difficulty hearing or
seeing an alarm signal. From a signaling
perspective, this problem is simple to test for
using a sound power meter or a light meter
respectively. For audible signals, the first step
is to determine the ambient and peak sound
power levels throughout the facility. The alarm
should then be sounded and verified as being
at least 15dBA above the ambient levels (or
peak levels if sustained for long periods of
time). For visual alarms, testing can begin by
visually evaluating the signals. If the device
cannot be seen directly, the light should still be
visible in all parts of a room. If the light cannot
be seen, or is dim, additional visual alarm
devices are likely required. Calculations for
determining audible and visual alarm signal
requirements can be found in the SFPE
Handbook (Schifiliti et al., 1995). As noted
earlier in this paper, factors such as occupant
age, physical condition, and medical condition
should be considered when selecting appro-
priate alarm signals and signal strengths.
Behavioral response to fire
One of the reasons that people delay in
responding to an alarm signal, even after they
have identified it as such, is that they are
uncertain if the alarm is ``real''. To avoid
delays of this type, fire safety management
plans should include efforts to reduce false
and nuisance alarms. This can be done by
utilizing new technology, by systematically
cleaning and maintaining detection devices,
and by carefully taking parts of a detection
system off line during times of construction,
heavy dust, or production of other non-fire
contaminants. When the latter is done, steps
should be taken to ensure the system is placed
310
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
back on line when work is completed, and
that some type of fire watch is in place while
the system is off line.
People also delay because they do not
believe the information they are given by
alarm systems. In such cases, it is useful and
helpful to have fire wardens (in appropriate
occupancies) and to drill at least once a year.
If fire wardens are used, they should be
people in positions of respect, especially in
business and industrial occupancies. This is
necessary so that if word is given to evacuate
the building, the orders are followed by all
employees without the need for the employee
to gain the approval of his or her supervisor.
Fire safety management plans should be
developed with an understanding of depen-
dencies and affiliations that may exist
between occupants of a facility. Familial
affiliations are clear in residential facilities, as
are medical dependencies in health care
occupancies. There are also teacher-student
affiliations in schools. However, there may be
familial affiliations in such facilities as stores,
malls, restaurants, and places of assembly,
where one member of a family may not leave
without another, even under worsening con-
ditions. If these affiliations are recognized,
training of fire wardens can be improved.
Overall, one of the most important factors
in successfully addressing human behavior
and response in the fire safety management
plan is to provide people with information.
Written instructions for emergencies, well-
trained fire wardens, and well-conducted fire
drills are useful mechanisms for accomplish-
ing this. The more relevant information that
people have at their disposal, the better
decisions they will normally make. This
applies not only during emergency situations,
when occupants, employees, and visitors need
to be notified of the emergency, but during
normal operations as well. If maintenance
staff, for example, understand the importance
of maintaining fire safety systems, and of not
blocking egress paths, the likelihood of unin-
tended consequences from a fire emergency
diminishes.
Summary
Fire safety engineers may be unaccustomed to
considering human behavior and response
factors in their analyses and designs due to
routine application of prescriptive-based
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
regulations. However, these factors are im-
portant, as they impact the time required for
people to recognize a fire alarm as an
indication of a fire threat, for people to decide
to evacuate, for emergency service to rescue
people, and for fire effects to impact people.
Recognizing these factors in a fire safety
management plan is also important, as the
building's fire safety systems can be tested
and evaluated with these factors in mind. In
addition, information and training can be
provided to help facilitate fire prevention and
timely and orderly emergency egress. Human
behavior and response factors pertinent to life
safety hazard assessments and fire safety
management plans have been provided, as
well as references for various response criteria,
and suggested methods for addressing these
factors. Although significant research and
development is yet required to readily quan-
tify and integrate human factors issues into
engineered fire safety design on a widespread
basis, the present state of knowledge provides
useful information for enhancing current fire
safety management plans.
Note
1 Material in this section, as well as in the sections
Behavioral Response to Fire and Physiological
Response to Fire Effects, is excerpted from Chapter
8 of Custer and Meacham (1997), and is used with
permission.
References
Babrauskas, V. (1979), Full-scale Burning of Upholstered
Chairs, Technical Note 1103, National Bureau of
Standards.
Beck, V.R. (1997), ``Performance-based fire engineering
design and its application in Australia'', Proceedings
of the 5th International Symposium on Fire Safety
Science, ISBN 4-9900625-5-5, IAFSS, pp. 23-40.
Beck, V.R. and Yung, D. (1995), ``Building fire safety risk
analysis'', SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, Section 5, Chapter 11, SFPE/National
Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.
Berl, W.G. and Halpin, B.M. (1979), ``Human fatalities in
unwanted fires'', Fire Journal, September.
Berry, C.H. (1978), ``Will your smoke detector wake you?'',
Fire Journal, Vol. 72, p. 105.
BOCA (1993), The BOCA National Building Code 1993,
Building Officials and Code Administrators Interna-
tional.
Breen, D.E. (1985), ``False fire alarms in college
dormitories: the problem revisited'', Journal of Fire
Protection Engineering, Vol. 3 No. 3, Society of Fire
Protection Engineers, Boston, MA.
311
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
Breen, D.E. (1990), ``Toward more reliable residential
smoke detection systems'', Journal of Fire Protection
Engineering, Vol. 2 No. 1, Society of Fire Protection
Engineers, Boston, MA, pp. 1-10.
Bryan, J.L. (1991), unless otherwise noted, the discussion
in this section is based on Bryan, J.L. ``Human
behavior and fire'', Fire Protection Handbook, 17th
edition, National Fire Protection Association,
Quincy, MA.
Bryan, J.L. (1995), ``Behavioral response to fire and
smoke'', FPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engi-
neering, 2nd ed., National Fire Protection
Association, Quincy, MA.
Bukowski, R. and Jason, N.H. (1991), International Fire
Detection Literature Review and Technical Analysis,
National Fire Protection Research Foundation,
Quincy, MA.
Butler, H., Bowyer, A. and Kew, J. (1981), ``Locating fire
alarm sounders for audibility'', Building Services
Research and Information Association.
Cable, E.A. (1994), ``Cry wolf syndrome: radical changes
solve the false alarm problem'', Department of
Veterans' Affairs, Albany, NY, January.
Canter, D. (1990), ``Human behavior in fire'', Fires and
Human Behavior, 2nd ed., Fulton Publishers Ltd,
London.
Claudy, W.D. (1957), adapted from Claudy, W.D.
Respiratory Hazard of the Fire Services, National
Fire Protection Association, Boston, MA.
Conley, C.J. and Fahy, R.F. (1994), ``Who dies in fires in
the United States?'', NFPA Journal, May/June,
p. 103.
Custer, R.L.P. and Bright, R.G. (1974), Fire Detection:
State of the Art, National Bureau of Standards
Technical Note 839, Gaithersburg, MD.
Custer, R.L.P. and Meacham, B.J. (1997), Introduction to
Performance-Based Fire Safety, ISBN 0-87765-421-
2, Society of Fire Protection Engineers (published by
NFPA, Quincy, MA).
Custer, R.L.P. and Powell, P. (1989), Firesafety at NYNEX:
Your Piece of the Action.
Devir, J. (1997), Private communication between P.A.
Powell and J. Devir, GSA.
Fahy, R.F. and Proulx, G. (1995), ``Collective common
sense: a study of human behavior during the World
Trade Center evacuation'', NFPA Journal, March/
April, pp. 59-67.
Fahy, R. and Proulx, G. (1996), ``A study of occupant
behavior during the World Trade Center Evacua-
tion'', Proceedings of Interflam `96, the 7th
International Fire Science and Engineering Confer-
ence, Cambridge, Interscience Communications,
March 26-28, pp. 793-802.
Hartzell, G.E. (1986), ``Combustion products and their
effects on life safety'', Fire Protection Handbook,
16th ed., National Fire Protection Association,
Quincy, MA.
Hartzell, G.E. (Ed.) (1989), Advances in Combustion
Toxicology, Vol. 1, Technomic Publishing Company
Inc., p. 23.
Hartzell, G.E. (1991), ``Combustion products and their
effects on life safety'', Fire Protection Handbook,
17th ed., National Fire Protection Association,
Quincy, MA.
Huey, R.W., Buckley, D.S. and Lerner, N.D. (1994),
``Audible performance of smoke alarm sounds'',
 Integrating human behavior and response issues
Brian J. Meacham
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society 38th Annual Meeting, pp. 147-51.
Kahn, M.J. (1984), ``Human awakening and subsequent
identification of fire related cues'', Fire Technology,
Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 20-6.
Klem, T.J. (1987), ``97 die in arson fire at Dupont Plaza
Hotel'', Fire Journal, May/June, p. 79.
Magnusson, S.E. (1997), ``Risk assessment'', Proceedings
of the 5th International Symposium on Fire Safety
Science, ISBN 4-9900625-5-5, IAFSS, pp. 41-58.
Magnusson, S.E., Frantzich, H. and Harada, K. (1995),
``Fire safety design based on calculations: uncer-
tainty analysis and safety verification'', ISSN 1102-
8246, Report 3078, Lund University, Sweden.
Meacham, B.J. (1994a), ``International developments in
fire sensor technology'', Journal of Fire Protection
Engineering, Society of Fire Protection Engineers,
Boston, MA, Vol. 6 No. 2.
Meacham, B.J. (1994b), ``The use of artificial intelligence
techniques for signal discrimination in fire detection
systems'', Journal of Fire Protection Engineering,
Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Boston, MA,
Vol. 6 No. 3.
Meacham, B.J. (1997), ``Identifying and addressing
uncertainty in fire protection engineering'',
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
Fire Research and Engineering, NIST, Gaithersburg,
MD, August.
Moore, W. (1988), ``When the fire alarm sounds, will
anyone leave the building?'', Fire Journal, Vol. 82
No. 1, pp. 54-6.
NFPA (1959), Operation School Burning, National Fire
Protection Association, p. 25.
NFPA (1991), Adapted from Tables 7-1E and 7-1F,
``Human behavior in fire'', Fire Protection Handbook,
17th ed., National Fire Protection Association,
Quincy, MA.
NFPA 72 (1993), National Fire Alarm Code, National Fire
Protection Association.
NIST (1991), Technical Reference Guide to HAZARD I,
Version 1.1, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, pp. 87-8.
Nober, E.H., Pierce, H., Well, A, Johnson, C.C. and Clifton,
C. (1981), ``Waking effectiveness of household
smoke and fire detection devices'', Fire Journal,
Vol. 75, p. 86.
Pate-Cornell, M.E. and Benito-Claudio, C.P. (1987),
``Warning systems: response models and optimiza-
tion'', Uncertainties in Risk Assessment, Risk
Management, and Decision Making, Plenum Press,
New York, NY, pp. 457-68.
Powell, P. (1997), ``Learning fire and life safety funda-
mentals'', Fire and Life Safety Educator, 2nd ed.,
International Fire Service Training Association,
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK.
Proulx, G. (1994a), ``Human response to fires'', Fire
Research News, National Research Council Canada,
Winter.
Proulx, G. (1994b), ``The time delay to start evacuating on
hearing a fire alarm'', Proceedings of the Human
312
Facilities
Volume 17 . Number 9/10 . 1999 . 303±312
Factors and Ergonomics Society 38th Annual
Meeting, pp. 811-15.
Proulx, G. (1995), ``Human factors in fires and fire safety
engineering'', SFPE Bulletin, Society of Fire Protec-
tion Engineers, Boston, MA, Winter, p. 15.
Proulx, G., Laroche, C. and Latour, J.C. (1995a),
``Audibility problems with fire alarms in apartment
buildings'', Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society 39th Annual Meeting.
Proulx, G., Latour, J. and MacLaurin, J. (1994), Housing
Evacuation of Mixed Abilities Occupants, National
Research Council Internal Report, No. 661, National
Research Council Canada, Ottawa, July.
Proulx, G., Latour, J., MacLaurin, J., Pineau, J., Hoffman, L.
and Laroche, C. (1995b), Housing Evacuation of
Mixed Abilities Occupants in Highrise Buildings,
National Research Council Report, No. 706,
National Research Council Canada, Ottawa,
Ontario, August.
Pryor, A.J., and Yuill, C.H. (1966), Mass Fire Life Hazard,
OCD Work Unit 2537A, Southwest Research
Institute, San Antonio, TX.
Schifiliti, R.P., Meacham, B.J. and Custer, R.L.P. (1995),
``Design of detection systems'', Section 4, Chapter 1,
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 2nd
ed., National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,
MA, pp. 4-1±4-29.
Shields, T.J. (Ed.) (1998), ``Integrating human factors into
engineered fire safety design'', Human Behaviour in
Fire: Proceedings of the 1st International Sympo-
sium, Fire SERT Centre, University of Ulster.
Wieczorek, C.J. and Dembsey, N.A. (1997), Engineering
Guide for Predicting First and Second Degree Skin
Burns, prepared for the SFPE Engineering Task
Group on Engineering Practices, SFPE, March.
(Brian J. Meacham is the research director
for the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
He holds an MSc degree in Fire Protection
Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic
Institute, and is currently working towards a
PhD in Risk and Public Policy at Clark
University, Worcester, Massachusetts. He is
a licensed professional engineer with over 14
years' experience in the USA and Europe.
He is the SFPE liaison to CIB W14, CIB
TG39 and ISO TC92, and a member of
several national and international commit-
tees. He has written over 50 publications in
the area of building fire safety analysis and
design. He is currently a co-principal in-
vestigator for a joint US National Science
foundation/service sector initiative entitled
``encouraging the use of risk concepts in
performance-based building and fire regu-
lation development''. He can be contacted
by email: bmeacham@sfpe.org)