The Well-Being of Children Philosophical and Social Scientific Approaches

Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf (Eds.
)
The Well-Being of Children
Philosophical and Social Scientific Approaches
Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf (Eds.)
The Well-Being
of Children
Philosophical and Social Scientific Approaches
Managing Editor: Anna Michalska
Language Editors: Sarah Hanagarth, P. Christian Adamski

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Copyright © 2015 Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf and chapters’ contributors

ISBN: 978-3-11-045051-4
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Contents
Acknowledgments IX
Preface X
List of Contributors XI
Gunter Graf & Gottfried Schweiger

Introduction: Conceptualizing Children’s Well-Being 1
Section I: Theories and Concepts of Children’s Well-Being
Gunter Graf
1 Conceptions of Childhood, Agency and the Well-Being of Children 20
1.1 Introduction 20
1.2 The Social Construction of Childhood 21
1.3 Children as Equals? 26
1.4 Agency and Well-being 29
1.5 Conclusion 31
References 32
Tatjana Višak
2 Does Welfare Trump Freedom? A Normative Evaluation of Contextualism
about how to Promote Welfare 34
2.1 Introduction 34
2.2 Childhood Obesity 34
2.3 Childhood Obesity as a Welfare Problem 36
2.4 Contextualism About How to Promote Welfare 39
2.5 Defending Contextualism in the Case of Childhood Obesity Prevention
Against a Normative Challenge 42
2.6 Is Childhood Obesity a Special Case? 44
2.7 Conclusion 46
References 46
Tim Moore
3 Keeping them in Mind 49
3.1 Introduction 49
3.2 Competing Conceptualisations and the Challenges of Researching
Children 49
3.3 My Study 53
3.4 Reflexivity as a Process Through Which Theoretical and Procedural
Challenges might be Navigated 53
3.5 Re-Considering Vulnerability and Incompetence Reflexively 54
3.5.1 The Influence of Vulnerable Conceptions 56
3.6 (Re)considering Vulnerability Reflexively 57
3.7 Negotiating Risks with Ethics Committees 57
3.7.1 Managing Researchers’ Vulnerabilities 58
3.7.2 Encouraging Conversations about Vulnerability and Children within the
Broader Research Field 58
3.7.3 Children’s Competence and Incompetence 59
3.8 Reconsidering Children’s Competence 60
3.8.1 Children’s Competence Greater than Suggested 62
3.8.2 The Influence of Incompetent Conceptions 63
3.9 (Re)considering Competence Reflexively 63
3.9.1 Being Aware of one’s own Theoretical, Ontological and Epistemological
Position 63
3.9.2 Considering Methodologies and Methods 64
3.9.3 Reflecting on Power 65
3.9.4 Considering Competence within the Field 65
References 66
Bill Gardner
4 The Developmental Capability Model of Child Well-Being 68
4.1 Development and Capabilities 68
4.2 Developmental Capability Well-Being and Justice 73
4.3 Implications for the Care of Children 79
4.4 Conclusion 81
References 81
Gottfried Schweiger
5 Justice and Children’s Well-Being and Well-Becoming 84
5.1 Introduction 84
5.2 The Goals of Justice: Well-Being and Well-Becoming 84
5.3 Choosing Dimensions of Well-Being and Well-Becoming and the
Currency of Justice 88
5.4 Pluralism and the Rule of Justice 92
5.5 Conclusions 94
References 95
Section II: Children Well-Being and Well-Becoming
Amy Clair
6 Conceptualising Child versus Adult Well-Being: Schooling
and Employment 98
6.1 Introduction 98
6.2 Engagement 99
6.2.1 Employee Engagement and Job Quality 99
6.2.2 School Engagement and Connectedness 101
6.3 The Happy-Productive Worker Hypothesis 103
6.4 A Brief Summary of Existing School/Subjective Well-Being
Research 105
6.5 Do Differences between Children and Adults Undermine this
Comparison? 106
6.6 Can this Comparison be Used to Influence Education Policy? 108
References 109
Alexander Bagattini
7 Male Circumcision and Children’s Interests 113
7.1 Introduction 113
7.2 Circumcision and the Bodily Integrity of the Child 115
7.3 Circumcision and Future Interests of the Child 117
7.3.1 Sexual Flourishing of the Future Adult 118
7.3.2 Autonomy 119
7.4 The Benefits of Circumcision 122
7.5 Conclusion 125
References 126
Mar Cabezas
8 Children’s Mental Well-Being and Education 129
8.1 Healthy Bodies and Healthy Minds: Why do Children Need Mental
Well-Being? 129
8.2 Some Changes in our Educational Systems: Three Promising
Attempts? 131
8.3 Psychology and Ethics in Mental Well-Being: Before a How You Need a
What 136
8.4 Conclusion 140
References 140
Matteo D’Emilione, Giovannina Giuliano & Paloma Vivaldi Vera
9 Will Children of Social Care Services Users be Future Users? Results of a
Pilot Research in Rome 142
9.1 Introduction 142
9.2 MACAD Rationale: How the Model Works and How it Could be
Developed 144
9.2.1 From the Capability Approach to Ecological Systems Theory: the Child at
the Centre of the Development Process 147
9.3 Families’ Capabilities and Children’s Well-being: Results of Empirical
Investigation 149
9.4 Policy-making and children’s well-being: lessons and concluding
remarks 156
References 159
List of Figures 161

List of Tables 162
Index 163
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, we would like to thank our colleagues who participated in the
workshop “The Well-Being of Children: Theory, Practice and Policy” – which was a
part of the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory 2013 – who have subsequently
contributed their chapters to this book. We learned a lot from the discussions in
Manchester and from reading our colleagues’ papers. Furthermore, we want to thank
our home institutions, the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research at the University of
Salzburg and the international research centre for social and ethical questions (ifz),
and their director, Clemens Sedmak. We are also grateful to the Austrian Science Fund
(FWF) for funding our research project “Social Justice and Child Poverty” (P 26480),
providing us with the opportunity to realize this book. We hope that our work is not
only a contribution to the academic discussion, but also helps to make the world a
better place for children.
Preface
The last few years have seen an increasing interest in the topic of well-being across
different disciplines. Questions of measurement and such regarding the normative
value of well-being for theories of justice have been widely discussed. Furthermore, it
has been acknowledged that these theoretical considerations interlink with questions
of policy design and political practice. Children are special in many aspects: it is a
widely shared understanding that children are not able to fully understand their
situation, that they are limited in their ability to make reasonable decisions about
themselves and their actions, that they do not always act in their best interest, that
they need the help and guidance of adults, and that they need special protection
from various harms and from making wrong choices. It is further well studied that
well-being during childhood has a significant influence on the entirety of a child’s
future life and adulthood. These factors make the well-being of children a topic of
importance but also one that is confronted with many conceptual, normative and
methodological difficulties that need to be addressed by different disciplines. As
such, the papers in our volume are divided into two sections: the first section consists
of papers that deal with conceptual issues and discuss how the well-being of children
can and should be grasped in a meaningful sense. The second part of the book deals
with practical issues, specific cases and social environments in which the well-being
and well-becoming of children is secured or endangered.
List of Contributors
Gunter Graf is a research fellow at the international research centre for social and
ethical questions (ifz) in Salzburg, and a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for
Ethics and Poverty Research (CEPR) of the University of Salzburg, where he works
on the project “Social Justice and Child Poverty”. He is also a temporary lecturer at
the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Cultural and Social Sciences of the
University of Salzburg. He mainly works in political and social philosophy, with a
focus on the capability approach and its relation to poverty and children. Email:
gunter.graf@sbg.ac.at
Gottfried Schweiger is a senior researcher at the Centre for Ethics and Poverty
Research, University of Salzburg, where he is the principal investigator of the project
“Social Justice and Child Poverty” (funded by the FWF Austrian Science Fund). He
has published on poverty, unemployment, recognition, social justice, tax justice, and
justice in professional sports. Email: gottfried.schweiger@sbg.ac.at
Alexander Bagattini is an assistant professor in Philosophy at the University of

Düsseldorf. His areas of research and teaching are in the ethical implications of
the concept of child well-being, children’s rights, philosophy of education and
environmental ethics. He is also the principal investigator in the interdisciplinary
research project ‟Child Well-Being as a Collective Interpretive Pattern” which
is funded by the BMBF (German Federal Ministry for Education and Research /
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung). Email: bagattini@phil-fak.uni-
duesseldorf.de
Mar Cabezas earned her PhD in philosophy from the University of Salamanca (2012)
and specialized in the role of emotions in moral reasoning. She has an M.A. in Human
Rights and is an expert in the Psychological Effects of Child Mistreatment (UNED,
2011). Currently, she is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Salzburg on the
project “Social Justice and Child Poverty”. Email: maria.cabezas@sbg.ac.at
Amy Clair is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford currently researching

health, housing and well-being. She recently completed her PhD in education and
child subjective well-being at the University of York. Email: amy.clair@sociology.
ox.ac.uk
Matteo D’Emilione, Giovanna Giuliano & Paloma Vivaldi Vera are researchers
at the Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers in Rome,
Department of Social Policy. Email: m.demilione@isfol.it
XII List of Contributors
William Gardner is a child psychologist and statistician. He is a senior research

scientist at the Research Institute of the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario. He
was previously professor of paediatrics, obstetrics & gynaecology, and community
health and epidemiology at Dalhousie University and professor of paediatrics,
psychology, and psychiatry at the Ohio State University. He has published extensively
on children’s mental health, on psychiatric measurement, and on research ethics.
His work has been supported by the US National Institutes of Health, the Agency for
Health Research and Quality, and the Canadian Institute for Health Research. Email:
william.p.gardner@gmail.com
Tim Moore is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Child Protection Studies
based at Australian Catholic University in Melbourne. He has conducted research
in the areas of homelessness, young caring, juvenile justice, out of home care and
Aboriginal youth. He has not only published extensively on these and related topics
but also helped design participatory processes, supporting children and young
people to actively shape, facilitate, evaluate and lead projects that directly impact on
their lives. Email: tim.Moore@acu.edu.au
Tatjana Višak is a postdoc researcher at Mannheim University, Germany. She was

previously a researcher and lecturer at various Dutch universities and at the Centre
for Human Bioethics of Monash University, Australia. Her research focuses on value
theory, normative theory and applied ethics. Email: tatjana.visak@gmail.com
Gunter Graf & Gottfried Schweiger
Introduction: Conceptualizing Children’s Well-Being
The chapters in this volume are concerned with the adequate conceptualization and
study of children’s well-being. Together, they do not present a coherent theory of
children’s well-being but rather show the many different perspectives from which it
can be approached. They are concerned with some of the key issues and problems
that need to be addressed but certainly not with all that there are. This volume does
not aim for completeness in regard to its main topic and it seems questionable if this
could ever be a goal worth aspiring for. Children’s well-being is a highly complex,
multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary issue, a multi-faceted concept that spans the
whole variety of children’s lives and the social contexts in which they are embedded.
It can be approached from different theoretical perspectives and conceptualized by
means of a variety of sources. Three of them which are often found in the literature
and which also have their place in this book are needs, rights and capabilities (Axford
2012). They accentuate different aspects of the well-being concept and have all been
recognized as important policy objectives in children’s services. However, their exact
meanings and relationships to each other are still the object of debate, even if it has
to be recognized that each of them has to play a role in a comprehensive theory on the
well-being of children.
As such, the main goal of this volume is to highlight a few issues connected to and
surrounding the well-being of children and the theorizing about it. The contribution
of philosophy to this research of children’s well-being is relatively new but growing
and we do hope that the philosophical chapters in this volume show that they are
promising. In this introduction we want to give not only an overview of the chapters
but also a short outline of some key issues in the recent discussions on children’s
well-being and how they are reflected in the course of this volume. These are first,
the aforementioned multidimensionality of children’s well-being and why it is best
approached from an interdisciplinary perspective that aims to incorporate knowledge
from different disciplines. A second issue is what is called the ecology of children’s
well-being and that children’s lives are surrounded and shaped by different types of
social environments (family, neighbourhood, political and legal system etc.). The
third issue is the interrelation of children’s well-being and well-becoming. Research
should not only be concerned with how children actually live but how this affects
their growing up and their later life without viewing children only as adults-to-be.
Finally, we want to discuss the relation between children’s well-being and ethics,
in the sense that well-being and well-becoming are always not only descriptive and
explanatory concepts but normative and prescriptive as well.
© 2015 Gunter Graf & Gottfried Schweiger

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
2 Introduction: Conceptualizing Children’s Well-Being
Multidimensionality and Interdisciplinarity
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the well-being of children.
Many academic contributions to the field have been made by a variety of disciplines
and it is acknowledged that these theoretical considerations interlink with questions
of policy design and political practice (Axford 2012). In fact, children’s well-being is
a concept that can now be found in many documents and is frequently discussed
in public debates about children (McAuley and Rose 2010). Today, while there is no
clear-cut and unanimous definition of its exact meaning and scope, one insight is
well-established, one which also finds support in this book: there are many aspects
that are of importance to a child’s life, and an adequate understanding of a child’s
well-being must be able to do justice to this multidimensionality (Ben-Arieh et al.
2014). Health, safety, social inclusion, material security, education and the child’s
satisfaction with life as a whole are a few examples of such aspects. These aspects are
frequently found in concepts of child well-being, and all have to be integrated and
acknowledged in their own right. This does not mean that it is of no value to study
or analyse just one or more selected domain(s); such studies can indeed be relevant
for many important purposes and in fact, practical constraints often limit the range
of studies and projects. But a comprehensive picture of the well-being of children
must include a variety of dimensions and set them in relation to each other. Such a
multidimensional approach, as we suggest it here, is intuitively plausible and fits well
with our considered judgements when evaluating the life of a child. This becomes
particularly clear when we think about it in terms of compensation. If a child, for
instance, has wealthy parents and a stable social network but a lack of mental health,
it would be inadequate and objectionable to argue that the high achievement in some
domains compensates the problems in another. In fact, the goal of achieving well-
being in such a case is tantamount to targeting the mental health issue, irrespective of
achievements in the other dimensions. Of course, this might be more easily achieved
if the social environment is supportive and if financial issues do not constitute a
barrier. But still, such examples show that there are good reasons that the different
elements of a child’s well-being should be valued individually and that one should be
careful with trade-offs between them or with attempts to reduce them to one single
measure for the sake of theoretical simplicity or easier policy recommendations. By
reducing the complexity, there is a risk of distorting our everyday experiences too
much, missing central aspects of social realities.
Furthermore, recognizing the multidimensionality and the different layers of well-
being brings to our attention the many connections and interdependencies between
the different domains that matter. In this way, a basis for a differentiated empirical
analysis can be provided, which can eventually have a direct impact on improving
the well-being of children and corresponding policy recommendations. On the one
hand, such an approach provides the framework for identifying those disadvantages
for well-being which have particularly “corrosive” effects in that they negatively
The Ecology of Children’s Well-Being 3
influence other domains of well-being and development. On the other, it points to

those elements of a child’s life which are likely to have ample positive impacts on the
child’s situation and which should therefore be fostered and secured with priority
(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). In this sense, a multidimensional approach to children’s
well-being can be considered an “analytical tool” necessary for an effective and
target-oriented social policy for children.
Amongst all these considerations, the perspective of the child herself must not be
forgotten (Alderson 2008). Often enough judgements about the well-being of children
are made by adults – parents, researchers, policy makers etc. – without considering
the voices of those who are the subject of the discourse: children. Here enters another
important aspect of the multidimensional nature of the well-being of children.
There are both objective and subjective dimensions that count and that provide
valuable insights. Objective dimensions refer to goods or states of a person which are
considered valuable without taking the person’s point of view into account, while
subjective ones rely on the perceptions and evaluations of the person in question
(Ben-Arieh 2010). It is still the subject of scholarly debate how objective and subjective
dimensions should be balanced against each other, an especially important question
in those circumstances in which they conflict. But some of the chapters of this book
strengthen the argument that children have to be involved in the conceptualization of
their well-being and that their points of view and experiences provide an irreducible
element of it. Well-being is always related to subjective well-being even if it should
not be reduced to it.
These few remarks already indicate that researching and theorizing about the
well-being of children should not be limited to one single discipline. The well-being
of children touches on many different facets of a child’s life and happens at the
intersection between individual agency and its cultural and social embeddedness.
Accordingly it must be approached from a variety of angles, combining different
sources of knowledge and ways of thinking. Due to different methodologies and
research paradigms, such an endeavour is challenging and not likely to lead to a clear
cut, coherent and complete theory. However, only constant interdisciplinary debate
will further deepen our understanding of the well-being of children and the ways it
can be improved, and this book should be read as one contribution to this overall aim.
The Ecology of Children’s Well-Being
Many researchers have looked at children and their development from a rather
individualistic perspective (James, Jenks, and Prout 1998). They have researched
and defined different stages of development, looked at those factors which
are beneficial or disadvantageous for the process of growing up, and have
differentiated between a variety of areas of development, e.g. physical, cognitive,
emotional and psychosocial. Of course it has been recognized for a long time that
there is an interaction between the individual child and his environment and that,
for example, close and loving relationships with parents or care-givers are an
important element of a child’s well-being and development. However, the wider
embeddedness of a child in different spheres, systems and norms of a society has
been neglected in the study of children until fairly recently. In the meanwhile this
has changed and one of the blooming fields of childhood studies relates to the
complex relationships between the individual child and the different social spheres
she is part of. Pioneered by Uri Bronfenbrenner (Bronfenbrenner 1979), such an
ecological model is now seen as the point of reference in the literature on the well-
being of children and has been developed further by many others (Aldgate 2010).
It is now acknowledged that we need to recognize a variety of layers and complex
social groupings and norms which all influence the individual child and which
have to be taken into account when theorizing her well-being. Among them are not
only the immediate environment and the close family which were traditionally in
the focus of research on children, but also the extended family, friendships and
peers, the neighbourhood, networks, the family’s social status and the state with its
systems and institutions. Furthermore, the culture within which a child grows up is
now critically analysed by scholars and many aspects of a society’s way of treating
its children, which have generally been taken for granted are now being challenged
and scrutinized. For example, social hierarchies based on age are critically reflected
and discourses emphasizing innocence, ignorance and vulnerability as “natural”
characteristics of children, justifying their weaker social positions, are questioned
(Mayall 2002). This shift in the approach towards the study of children, making
their ecology a central object of investigation, also becomes apparent if we look
at the scientific disciplines interested in children. While traditionally psychology
and biology were seen to provide the most important knowledge for understanding
a child’s life, development and learning, nowadays many other disciplines show
that they can contribute to our understanding of the lives of children. History,
anthropology, sociology and many more have put children and childhood on their
research agenda, asking their specific questions and addressing them with their
own methodologies and approaches. With this we do not want to suggest that
psychological and biological knowledge has become replaced or outdated or that
it may be neglected in the study of the well-being of children. In particular, many
insights of development psychology are still valid and are an important source of
knowledge. Rather we claim in line with recent developments that there are simply
more perspectives on children’s lives which are valuable, that children are always
social actors with particular places in the different systems of the society they are
part of and that it is therefore crucial to analyse childhood as a social phenomenon,
too. Such an approach widens our perspectives and points to the importance of
looking at children’s lives in combination with other variables of social analyses
such as class, gender, or ethnicity (James and Prout 1997). Accordingly, it becomes
clear that in a society, children live and grow up in highly diverse circumstances
Well-Being and Well-Becoming 5
which leads to the consequence that many authors state that it is better to talk about
“childhoods” in the plural. This insight gets further support if we approach the issue
from an international and cross-cultural point of view which confirms the variety
of manners in which childhood is recognized and institutionalized (Weisner 2014).
The role of an ecological perspective in the well-being of children is therefore
twofold. On the one hand it contributes on a conceptual level by pointing to the
many social and cultural constructions present in theorizing about children and
their families and by reminding us that individual development happens in a context
constituted by a variety of systems, norms and relationships. On the other, it is of
great importance for practical matters. There are many stakeholders in the child’s
environment that matter and individuals can only flourish if they are provided with
adequate conditions. Measures to improve the well-being of children must therefore
take the entire ecology of a child into account. It is essential that different systems
interact so that effective and lasting results can be achieved.
Well-Being and Well-Becoming
So far we have discussed child well-being as a multi-dimensional and ecological

concept. But it is furthermore a dynamic and developmental concept, closely
connected to well-becoming. Well-being refers to the actual state of a child,
while well-becoming is concerned with the transition from one state of being to
another. Obviously, childhood is a phase of constant change and development
– physiological, mental and social – and children will not be children for their
lifetime, but become adults (Aldgate et al. 2006). They are growing, developing
skills and self-relations; they learn to interact with others and how to behave
in different settings. Well-being demands that this process is one in which the
material, physical, and mental and emotional needs of the child are met, while
well-becoming demands that it happens in a way that supports that these needs
– which change and develop themselves – are also met in a later stage of life,
and possibly over the whole life course. Well-being and well-becoming are
connected through various biological, psychological and social channels and it is
reasonable to conceptualize the well-being of children in a way that includes their
well-becoming right from the beginning (Ben-Arieh et al. 2014). This implies that
it is not only essential to define certain developmental stages and benchmarks
that should be reached and operationalized to help guide policies and the work
with children, but also to develop an understanding of what is a worthy and good
adult life; a task that demands integrating knowledge from different disciplinary
perspectives, and from children and adults themselves.
Childhood heavily influences adulthood and the whole future life course
(Settersten Jr, McClelland, and Miao 2014). Nearly all the competencies and freedoms
that are valued in adulthood – such as being a productive member of society and
an engaged citizen, or being educated and autonomous – have to be grounded

and developed in childhood. Therefore there are very good reasons to guide the
interactions of children with their environment, enabling them to enjoy a variety of
freedoms in adulthood. In fact, it would be unjust to deprive children of a wide range
of support to acquire the relevant competencies through comprehensive measures in
social and family policy, education and health care. There is overwhelming evidence
that growing-up in ill-being – for example because of ill-health, maltreatment, neglect
or a lower socio-economic position – leads to ill-being in later life and is one major
reason for sustaining inequalities (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997). In fact, equality
of opportunity in many different areas is decided in childhood. But childhood is not
only a preparatory stage that one should be interested in because we want productive
adults who enjoy well-being. Childhood is of intrinsic value and valuable to children
qua children. A focus on the well-becoming of children and their future lives should
not be instrumentalised, ignoring the child’s current well-being. A good childhood is
certainly not to be judged only by looking at the outcomes in later life, but also by the
way children live as children, taking among other things their subjective experiences
and happiness into account. Especially participatory approaches and the shift to
focus on the subjective perspectives of children on their own lives appear promising
in this regard (Hill et al. 2004).
Children’s Lives and Justice
We have laid out a multi-dimensional, ecological concept of well-being in

relation to the well-becoming of children. But why should one – researchers,
social workers, policy makers – be interested in the well-being of children in
the first place? Are there reasons to prioritize it and to give it special attention
compared to other societal challenges? These questions cannot be answered by
interrogating the theoretical and empirical work on child well-being alone, but
they demand an ethical perspective (Archard and Macleod 2002). Implicitly,
we suppose, nearly all research on child well-being and practical work with
children is driven by such ethical convictions that parents, teachers, politicians
etc. owe children a good life and that it is morally bad if children suffer from
ill-being that is avoidable. The concepts of well-being and well-becoming
themselves are based on ethical assumptions about what is morally right and
good or just. Without such normative reasoning the definition of comprehensive
concepts of well-being and well-becoming would be impossible, because they
guide our understanding of what a good life for children should look like and
what adults and society as a whole should enable children to be, do and become
(Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011). This is a matter of justice for children and how the
institutions and the distribution of benefits and burdens should be designed
(Graf and Schweiger 2015, Macleod 2010). Children are special subjects of
Children’s Lives and Justice 7
justice and this care for children is driven by such interrelated concepts as
vulnerability, innocence and incompetence. They justify a particular concern
for children’s well-being and well-becoming and why paternalism – in a more
comprehensive way than it is justified towards adults – is the right way to fashion
the relationship between children, adults and institutions.
Every human being is vulnerable to physiological, psychological and social
harm and infringements. In this respect adults and children are very similar and the
question is in what respect children are more vulnerable, or vulnerable in a different
way (Dixon and Nussbaum 2012). The concept of childhood encompasses a wide range
of developmental stages and age groups, from newborns to adolescents, and the
vulnerability to certain dangers differs largely between them. Still, a very generalised
account can highlight several dimensions of children’s greater vulnerability. First, the
bodies and minds of children are “weaker” and less robust. Bodily injuries, mental
stress, maltreatment and exploitation can severely harm them (Trickett et al. 2011).
Second, children are less competent and have limited capacities in comparison to
adults. They have fewer abilities and opportunities to shape their lives – if they are
very young this is nearly impossible for them. Third, they are more dependent on
adults for their well-being and well-becoming and they are limited in their capacities
to protect themselves. This greater dependency that is certainly obvious for young
children and which declines over time as children grow older and become mature,
makes them more vulnerable. They are in an economically and socially weaker
position and their world is largely dominated by patterns and institutions that they
have no control over and which they can only influence to a small degree. Hence, it is
a common understanding that children are responsible for their well-being to a much
lesser extent than adults. They are born into a family, neighbourhood and society
which they have not chosen and from the very beginning they are influenced by these
social contexts.
Children are more vulnerable and incompetent than adults and are less
responsible for their well-being – these assumptions hold in general, despite there
being differences between children and the fact that many adults are also in similar
positions. Nonetheless, such assumptions may also be misused to treat children
wrongly and to suppress them, e.g. if children are treated as mere objects without
opportunities to be heard and to participate in decision-making processes. Hence, it
is important – and this will be shown several times in this volume – that children do
have certain competencies, that they have their own wishes and perceptions, and that
these need to be respected. Because of their position in a world that is full of potential
dangers for them, our concern for children is justified; the best way to address our
concern is to take care of children in a paternalistic manner. This means that their
well-being and well-becoming become the central focus and acquire a higher value
than the choices of children without downplaying them. This paternalism raises
the question of who is responsible for the well-being of children and to what extent
(Macleod 2007).
About the Chapters in this Volume
The papers in our volume are divided into two sections: the first section consists of
papers that deal with conceptual issues and discuss how the well-being of children
can and should be grasped in a meaningful sense. The second part of the book deals
with practical issues, specific cases and social environments in which the well-being
and well-becoming of children is secured or endangered.
The first chapter by Gunter Graf, “Conceptions of Childhood, Agency and the
Well-Being of Children” stems from the observation that different societies possess
diverse conceptions of childhood. They differ in their assessment of when it begins,
ends, how it should be divided and which dimensions are relevant when demarcating
it from adulthood. Therefore, the commonly held conviction that childhood and the
way we deal with children is a simple and natural fact of the way human beings
develop has been seriously challenged – childhood and the social norms we associate
with it are contingent and indeed the notion of the “social construction of childhood”
has become widespread in the social scientific literature. However, as Graf shows,
the importance and normative implications of these insights are still unclear and
there is considerable disagreement between different theoreticians about what
the considerable social component in any conception of childhood means for the
evaluation of the well-being of children and, from a moral point of view, the way
children are treated in modern western societies. While some argue that the focus
on protection and the stress of children’s vulnerability as key components of the way
a good childhood is conceived in many contemporary states constitutes clear moral
progress, others are sceptical and defend the view that children are one of the last
oppressed groups in need of liberation. In this chapter, Graf discusses some aspects
of these different approaches, focusing particularly on the role of children’s agency
for their well-being. In the first part the author engages with key texts of the sociology
of childhood and the social constructivist thesis of childhood. It will be shown
that children are indeed social agents influencing their own lives and those of the
persons in their environment in many ways and that power relations are an important
category in considering the relationship between children and adults. In the second
part, however, he argues that a strict interpretation of the mentioned sociological
thesis yields to a relativist position that must be refuted. Children are not small adults
and the way they perform their agency is crucially different from the agency of mature
adults. In particular, agency in the moral domain can only happen under certain
conditions and on the basis of certain competencies children usually lack or possess
to a lesser degree than adults. It is argued that such a concept of moral agency provides
a helpful guideline for understanding the crucial difference between children and
adults that holds in any cultural context, even if the specific demarcations may be
considerably different. In the concluding third section, Graf indicates that there are
good reasons that the two discussed approaches to children’s agency and their well-
being – a sociological one challenging many cultural assumptions in the treatment
About the Chapters in this Volume 9
of children, and a philosophical one focusing on the good of moral agency – should
engage seriously with the other in order to do justice to the complexities of childhood.
The second chapter by Tatjana Višak, “Does welfare trump freedom? A normative
evaluation of contextualism about how to promote welfare”, examines childhood
obesity as a welfare problem and defends contextualism when dealing with how to
prevent childhood obesity and thereby promoting child welfare. Contextualism is the
view that promoting welfare is not only – and perhaps not even primarily – a matter
of individual choice, but most importantly a matter of being situated in the right
social and physical context. The structure of the chapter is as follows: After a short
introduction, Višak introduces in section 2 the case of childhood obesity. In section 3
she points out that, according to all common accounts of welfare, childhood obesity
is a welfare problem. In section 4, she introduces contextualism in dealing with how
to promote welfare. In section 5, she defends contextualism as a way of preventing
childhood obesity against its major normative challenge, which is the criticism that
maintaining or creating the relevant contexts might diminish the child’s option
freedom. In section 6, she tentatively explores whether her defence of contextualism
generalizes to adults and to the prevention of other welfare problems. Thus, Višak
will not establish in her chapter the superiority of contextualism over individualism,
which is an empirical issue; instead, she illustrates what contextualism as an
empirical claim about how best to promote welfare amounts to. Furthermore, she
defends contextualism in the specific case of childhood obesity prevention against
a normative challenge and briefly explores whether this defence of contextualism
generalizes to other contexts.
Tim Moore presents in his contribution “Keeping them in Mind” a study which
provided a group of experienced researchers the opportunity to reflect on their
practice and the practice of research with children in Australia; to consider how
they understand children and childhood and how their research is underpinned and
influenced by the assumptions they hold. It asked researchers to consider how factors
in the research environment (i.e. funding bodies, ethics committees, the broader
academic field) influenced their research practice, for example the tensions that
they have encountered and how they navigated their way through the often complex
and “messy” world of children’s research. This chapter argues for and stresses the
importance of reflexive practice as an endeavour for the individual practitioner, for
teams of researchers and for the broader academic field within which research is
conducted. It provides a critical analysis of past and current practice. The premise is
that the way children are constructed by individual researchers and within the teams,
systems and academic fields within which they conduct research will ultimately
affect the type of research commissioned, the methodologies adopted and the level
of engagement children enjoy throughout the research process. Exploring notions of
vulnerability, competence and participation, the author will account for researchers’
approaches and the ethical, methodological and ideological challenges that emerge.
Finally, Moore presents a reflexive practice framework that might be used by future
children’s researchers to account for their theoretical assumptions and to ensure

methodological and ethical transparency. This framework encourages the active
participation of children not only in the design and implementation of research
activities but in reflexive practice activities and, ultimately, in the co‐construction of
new knowledge and theory.
In his chapter, “The Developmental Capability Model of Child Well-Being”, Bill
Gardner aims to rethink how the capability approach applies to children in light
of recent social scientific theorizing by James Heckman, who has recently adopted
capability language in his writing. Theorists of justice, including capability theorists,
have not sufficiently appreciated the importance of the fact that human capabilities
develop over time. Gardner argues that a developmental reconceptualization of
capabilities has significant implications for how we think about children’s well-being,
how we think about justice, and about how we should organize and carry out human
services for children in light of these conceptions of well-being and justice. Gardner
focuses on the concept of kernel capabilities, meaning that they are prerequisite to the
development of a wide range of other capabilities. For example, being able to manage
negative emotions is a capability that is essential to functioning in many contexts,
understanding the rules of chess is required for functioning in only a few. The
capability approach asserts that having capabilities creates a wide space of potential
functioning, which is one meaning of freedom. Failure to develop a kernel capability
would inhibit the development of many other capabilities. Preventable impairments
in kernel capabilities are thus restrictions of freedom and prima facie unjust. This
suggests that interpersonal comparisons of capabilities should include a focus on
kernel capabilities. Finally, Gardner also discusses the policy consequences of such a
commitment to reducing inequality in children’s developmental trajectories on kernel
capabilities in the area of paediatrics.
In the last chapter of the first part of this book, “Justice and Children’s Well-Being
and Well-Becoming”, Gottfried Schweiger examines the role that the concepts of well-
being and well-becoming can play in the design of a theory of justice for children. He
argues that well-being and well-becoming can serve as the ultimate goals of justice
for children, as they allow us to better understand the specific needs of children as
agents of justice and their embeddedness in certain social contexts, and they can
guide the selection of the currency of justice and the rule of their distribution. Drawing
from the critical theory of recognition of Axel Honneth and Amartya Sen’s capability
approach, Schweiger claims that the currency of justice should be those capabilities
and functionings that comprise the well-being and well-becoming of children. Such
a list does not have to be final but should be drafted based on the best empirical
evidence available, bearing in mind that children’s lives and futures are shaped by
the environments they live and grow up in and the different institutions and agents
they interact with. Ideally these allow children to be heard and involved, giving them
space to make their own choices; the goal should be to support and protect children’s
current well-being and to support them in their development into autonomous
adults with sufficient levels of well-being. Furthermore, Schweiger concludes that

justice for children, if it wants to be comprehensive, should incorporate a pluralism
of rules of distribution that are applied to the certain capabilities and functionings
that are important for the well-being and well-becoming of children. The tripartite
differentiation of David Miller can provide a good starting point in this matter, and
one that concurs with the main assumption of the recognition approach that children
have a claim for the experience of all three forms of recognition – care, esteem
and respect. Such rules also reflect the developmental dimension of justice that is
expressed in its orientation on the well-being and well-becoming of children. The
rules themselves – sufficiency, equality and desert – are of importance for children
and express their moral and political status.
The second part of the book is opened by a contribution of Amy Clair,
“Conceptualising Child versus Adult Well-Being: Schooling and Employment”. She
investigates the differences between the well-being of children and that of adults,
focusing on the comparison between the effects of schooling on the well-being of
children and employment on the well-being of adults. Research has identified ways
in which employment quality and experiences are related to the well-being of adults.
For example the happy-productive worker hypothesis has been used to demonstrate a
relationship between subjective well-being and productivity, while other research has
found a relationship between employment quality and subjective well-being which
gave the unexpected result that, contrary to common belief, poor employment can
be more detrimental to an individual’s subjective well-being than unemployment.
Clair examines whether such hypotheses can be used in relation to children’s
experiences of school. And if so, can they be used to justify increased interest in the
effects of schooling on children beyond educational attainment to broader well-being
measures at a time when political discourse regarding education is heavily focused on
standards? Clair gives an overview of findings from a range of secondary, quantitative
data sources regarding the relationship between schools and child subjective well-
being, primarily using multilevel modelling. These findings will then be discussed in
relation to the existing knowledge regarding adult well-being and employment, and
in relation to the difficulties associated with measuring the well-being of children as
opposed to adults. Using data from 7 year-olds, analysis so far shows a significant
relationship between the school a child attends and the level of subjective well-being
that they report. However, the results also show a negative relationship between
subjective well-being and attainment at this age, which can potentially be seen as
evidence that the happy-productive worker hypothesis does not apply to children in
school ‘producing’ good examination results. However, it seems likely that this will
vary with age as the importance of educational attainment increases, and so further
analysis will investigate this alongside other characteristics.
Alexander Bagattini discusses in his chapter “Male Circumcision and Children’s
Interests” one of the sensitive topics in recent public discussions about children’s
well-being and well-becoming. The main aim in his paper is to draw attention to
the different facets of children’s interests and to how they are related to parental
prerogatives in the case of circumcision. Endorsing the liberal standard, he argues
that parents should in general decide what is in the best interest of their children;
however, as parents may fail to interpret the best interest of their children, sometimes
children must be protected against what parents think best for them. Consequently,
Bagattini endorses the following claim: by default, parents have the right to decide
what is in the best interest of their offspring, which entails having the right to overrule
children’s opinions about their own interests. It entails further that this overruling
authority of parents can be overridden itself if there is conclusive evidence or if there
are fundamental normative reasons for the claim that parents do not act in the best
interest of their child. Starting out from this perspective, Bagattini follows Joseph
Mazor in that children’s interests in bodily integrity and sexual flourishing (as adults)
can be overridden by parental prerogatives in circumcision and in other cases, as long
as unreasonable risks for the child are ruled out. Bagattini’s main worry concerning
circumcision is that it undermines autonomy as a precondition for permanent bodily
modifications. Autonomy is a general and absolute good in the sense that all take part
in it and that there is no way of relativizing it. True enough: the liberal standard (in
education) is part of our liberal tradition. Moral egalitarianism is, however, part of
this tradition as well, and is incompatible with excluding persons from equal rights
like the right to exercise their autonomy (in medical as well as in other contexts). Yet
if children are circumcised before they can make up their own mind on the matter,
they will never have the chance to take a stance, which, in turn, means excluding
the persons children are supposed to become from having equal rights. As Bagattini
points out in the last part of his chapter, he does not see any putative benefits having
the normative force to override this violation of children’s interests.
Mar Cabezas’ contribution “Children’s Mental Well-Being and Education” analyses
how a holistic approach to health as more than the lack of physical diseases, including
mental and social well-being, has led to the need to question the standard curricula
offered by public schools, especially if mental health is recognised as a children’s right.
Given the high demand by teachers, psychologists, social workers along with other
experts with respect to depression, aggressiveness, demotivation etc. among children
and young adolescents, three different kinds of programmes have been established
during the last two decades: a) emotional intelligence programmes, b) cognitive and
positive psychology programmes, and c) social and creativity education programmes.
These three main general attempts to include psychological education programs
in schools will be summarised briefly as well as their main thesis, strengths and
achievements concerning children’s mental well-being. In the last section, their main
limits and risks will be considered, shedding some light on the institutional challenges
that they still have to face in order to be universally established. The question concerning
their normative assumptions when applied to children will be addressed in particular.
An excessive euphoric attitude toward their promising results is at risk of putting the
ethical education of children in the hands of a non-normative scientific discipline.
Psychological programmes do in fact offer valuable tools for achieving some ethical
goals that affect social interaction and individual well-being. In applying them to
children, however, if the moral assumptions are not made explicitly, and are discussed
and interiorized by children, these could become ambivalent tools. As a result, if western
societies assume a culture of human rights which rejects cruelty and violence, and if
our goal is ensuring children’s mental well-being, then we should not forget to integrate
philosophical and moral education with emotional and psychological training in order
to ensure that children and adolescents are provided with the means to achieve self-
realization, and mental and social well-being in democratic societies.
“Will Children of Social Care Services Users be Future Users?” is the title of the
last chapter of this book, written by Matteo D’Emilione, Giovanna Giuliano and Paloma
Vivaldi Vera. Family is the core place where identity processes are developed, and for
this reason, its role is particularly relevant during early childhood development; for
example when parents devote time, personal care and support to the well-being of
their children, they perform activities which are crucial for the development of their
cognitive, language and social skills. Serious crises and persistent adversity, such as
poverty, have an impact on the whole family and can disturb the functioning of a
family system with ripple effects to all members and their relationships. In a poor
and deprived condition, families can become dysfunctional and risk factors can
become multiple, compromising the life and the well-being of the most vulnerable.
D’Emilione, Giuliano and Vivaldi present results of a primary data collection survey
on the poverty of people who benefit from social care services in Rome, with a specific
focus on households with children. The chapter by D’Emilione, Giuliano and Vivaldi
is based on an original model of multidimensional analysis of poverty that considers a
broad set of life domains (house, community, health, emotions, knowledge, income).
This model, called MACaD (Multidimensional Analysis of Capability Deprivation)
has been developed within the theoretical framework of the Capability Approach (A.
Sen, M. Nussbaum) and is focused on the measurement of the degree of individually
achieved functionings in each life domain with respect to the possession of tangible
and intangible goods according to a specific multidimensional index. To answer the
question of how the well-being of children can become a matter of policy and political
practice, the results of their survey are useful for two main reasons: first, a significant
share of children living in deprived households could become potential social care
services users; secondly, contrary to what one might expect (the authors point out
again that all the households of the survey are beneficiaries of social services for
different reasons), a significant proportion of children are living in households which
are able to enter a process of social inclusion. Specifically, deprived households in the
sample live in a situation of low income, in a poor community situation (households
with few social relations, poor family connectedness, living in relatively depressed
urban areas) and low agency achievement. Using a multidimensional analysis, it is
therefore possible to focus on those dimensions in which the households are mostly
deprived, and to develop policies which can respond more specifically to their needs.
Lessons Learned: The Future of Well-Being
At this stage, we would like to briefly comment on some insights we, as philosophers
interested in the moral and political status of children, gained from the debates
present in this book, but also were we see the prospects of further developing an
interdisciplinary approach to the well-being of children, with a focus on philosophy
and the social sciences. In particular, there are four interrelated points which attracted
our attention and which have to be taken into account when dealing with the issue
at hand. They can be found, in different forms and at different levels in many of the
contributions to this book, constituting, as we read it, general results from our joint
project.
First, the interdisciplinary study on the well-being of children is in need of a
high degree of conceptual clarity if it wants to lead to valuable outcomes. The current
debates, however, do not always come up to this standard and there is the real danger
that representatives of different backgrounds and traditions talk at cross-purposes
even if they have the sincere interest to collaborate. Basic concepts such as needs,
rights, autonomy, agency or paternalism are used differently across disciplines,
generating misunderstandings and communication barriers. Here, philosophy,
as we understand it, can be of additional value since one of its main tasks is to
get the concepts right. At the same time, it has to acknowledge that a theory of the
well-being of children has to do justice to the complexities of the reality and that
idealizing too much might lead to an account which does not fit the needs of the real
world. Misunderstandings between different disciplines might lead to two different
consequences, which are both detrimental to the gain of knowledge. On the one hand,
people might disagree about a certain account or dimension of well-being just because
they understand the used language differently, while there is, at a deeper analysis no
dissent at all. On the other, conceptual confusions might also hide disagreements
and sometimes contested issues only arouse if concepts, which appear to have the
same meanings, get scrutinized, leading to the result that it becomes clear that there
are, in fact, incompatible views to be discussed. As a consequence, attempts to foster
interdisciplinary exchange must always be aware of these conceptual difficulties and
be very clear about the positions they are defending.
Second, any researcher and policy maker has to acknowledge that the well-being
of children is a thick concept, embracing normative and descriptive features which
cannot be neatly separated. There is no value free approach to the well-being of
children, and every concept has to face a plenty of normative challenges. Empirical
knowledge alone cannot tell which dimensions are crucial, how they should be
weighed against each other or if there are dimensions which are of universal value.
When developing an account of well-being, a researcher should therefore be aware of
his assumptions and make them explicit. As we all know, questions of value often are
difficult to resolve and therefore it is also likely that every concept of the well-being
of children be a contested one. However, the respective debates will certainly profit
Lessons Learned: The Future of Well-Being 15
if it is made clear from the outset that defining the well-being of children connects to
value questions and that it is impossible to reach a “neutral” understanding of the
term. To be clear, empirical knowledge has a great part to play and it would also be a
fruitless endeavor to address the issue as a purely theoretical matter detached from
the empirical world, as some philosophers think it is the right way to do ethical theory.
But it seems that the ethical dimension of the concept has been neglected in many
disciplines concerned with the study of the well-being of children and it is time for
a change in this regard. From the philosophical discussion one can also learn in this
respect, that the domain of the normative is certainly not beyond rational scrutiny or
a simple matter of taste, as it sometimes seems to be assumed by researchers outside
of philosophy. Rather, also in this field arguments can be put forward and a rational
discourse cultivated which can lead to reasoned outcomes for the sake of everyone
affected.
Third, and following from the former considerations, we want to suggest
that a comprehensive discussion of the concept of children’s well-being will lead
inevitably to questions which are at the heart of political and social philosophy.
As the contributions in this book show, there are overwhelming reasons for well-
being research to go beyond a narrow focus on the individual child and only her
most immediate context and to take many different layers of her environment – her
ecology – into account. But if this step is taken and the enormous role a child’s social
context plays in conceptualizing her well-being acknowledged, researchers will be
confronted with issues of justice, inequalities and disadvantage. In most of today’s
societies children’s effective chances to live a life in well-being and well-becoming
are unequally distributed. The social position they are born into determines to a high
degree the levels of well-being they will enjoy, which translate, on an aggregate level
at least, to disadvantages positions in adulthood. The concept of well-being certainly
is a valuable one for unmasking this situation and there are good reasons to think
that it could play an essential part in a critical theory about disadvantage, poverty
and social exclusion. Also in this respect the philosophical arguments and social
scientific research have the potential to act together for fleshing out the details of
such an account, which could be the subject of research attempts in the future. Again,
these considerations show how important it is to combine normative reasoning with
empirical knowledge and that philosophical and social scientific approaches to the
well-being of children should be seen as allies, not only in the gathering of knowledge
and the construction of theories but in the pursuit of making our world a better place.
This point brings us to a fourth issue, which is central for many chapters of this
book. As important as it is to theorize about the well-being of children and to develop
a critical normative perspective, one must not forget to translate the often abstract
debates into concrete policies and measures which can make a real difference for
the affected children and their families. There is a need to develop support programs
which effectively improve the well-being of children, paying attention to the concrete
contexts they are living. At the same time, it is important that a society keeps in mind
that it is often its basic structure which produces structural injustices to the detriment
of specific groups of children. Also concerning this matter, concrete improvements
have to be aimed for. Naturally, it is not the sole responsibility of researchers to work
towards the realization of more effective policies. However, they also have a part to
play and a responsibility to develop theories which are able to guide the respective
processes.
These four points represent only a small selection of insights and impulses we
got from the interdisciplinary dialogue we started. However, they were certainly
important for our understanding of the book’s topic and we hope that they clarify
why we are convinced that it is essential to continue the research on the well-being of
children for both theoretical and practical purposes.
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Section I: Theories and Concepts of Children's Well-
Being
Gunter Graf
1 Conceptions of Childhood, Agency and the Well-
Being of Children1
1.1 Introduction
Historical, ethnological and social scientific research shows that different societies
possess diverse conceptions of childhood. They differ in their assessment of when
it begins, ends, how it should be divided and which dimensions are relevant when
demarcating it from adulthood. Therefore, the often held conviction that childhood
and the way we deal with children is a simple and natural fact of the way human
beings develop has been seriously challenged – childhood and the social norms we
associate with it are contingent and indeed the notion of the “social construction of
childhood” has become widespread in the social scientific literature, particular in
the influential field called “sociology of childhood”. However, the importance and
normative implications of these insights are still unclear and there is considerable
disagreement among theoreticians about what the strong social component in any
conception of childhood means for the evaluation of the well-being of children and,
from a moral point of view, the way children are treated in modern western societies.
While some argue that the focus on protection and the emphasis of children’s
vulnerability as key components of the way a good childhood is conceived in many
contemporary states constitutes clear moral progress, others are sceptical and defend
the view that children are one of the last oppressed groups in need of liberation.
In this contribution, some aspects of these different approaches will be discussed,
particularly focusing on the role of children’s agency for their well-being. In the first
section I engage with key texts of the aforementioned sociology of childhood and
the related social constructivist thesis of childhood. It will be shown that children
are indeed social agents influencing their own lives and those of the persons in their
environment in many ways and that power relations are an important category in
considering the relationship between children and adults. In the second section,
however, it will be argued that a strict interpretation of some of the typical claims
sociologists of childhood make yield to radical and untenable consequences that
must be refuted. Children are not small adults, a view that is usually also defended in
the sociology of childhood, and they should not, with few exceptions, have an adult-
like right to authority over their own circumstances. The way (most) children perform
their agency is importantly different from the agency of mature adults, something
that should be seen as relevant from a moral point of view. In the third, concluding
1 This research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Project: P 26480-G15.
© 2015 Gunter Graf

The Social Construction of Childhood 21
section, it will be indicated that a more modest interpretation of the mentioned

sociological view of childhood adds important dimensions to the discussion regarding
the moral status of children, which are often overlooked in theories of political and
social philosophy. Particularly if philosophers want to engage with pressing problems
of the real world, contribute to the improvement of children’s lives and help develop
a comprehensive concept of the well-being of children, there are clear merits and
helpful insights provided by a child-centred perspective as defended in the sociology
of childhood.
1.2 The Social Construction of Childhood
Thinking about children in the context of political philosophy is often characterized

by some basic and commonsensical assumptions about children (see Cohen 1980,
Archard 2004, Sen 2007). It is taken for granted, for example, that children are
vulnerable beings progressing with adult help through stages needed to turn them
into mature and autonomous adults. They are contrasted, as a group, with adults and
described as weaker, less knowledgeable and incompetent, all characteristics that
lead to their inability to make good decisions. As a consequence of these assessments
it is generally stated that protection and guidance are important concepts for doing
justice to the special status of children, and of course it is adults who have to provide
the relevant support. In any case, children’s decisions and actions are always seen as
suspicious from a prudent point of view. Due to their lack of development, knowledge
and stability of character, there is always the chance that they may do the wrong
things for the wrong reasons and therefore adult supervision is morally justified and
even required. In an important sense the adult point of view is thus privileged over
the child’s perspective, assuming also that main aspects of the well-being of children
should not be judged and defined by children themselves but by adult members of
society. Children just seem to know too little about life and the world they live in
to give their opinions too much weight. This does not mean, however, that children
should, according to this view, never be consulted or included in decision-making
processes, particularly in the private sphere or educational settings, since they have
to practice their abilities and become familiarized with situations of choice and
responsibilities. But their freedom and right to participation is a limited one: their
choices are respected as long as they conform to certain standards, which are defined
by adults. In other cases, they are regulated, modified or cancelled. But of course,
such interferences are considered to be in the best interest of the child and therefore
justified from a moral point of view since they secure the child’s well-being and
development of autonomy in the long run.
In this context it is interesting to note that there is little discussion in political
philosophy about the concept of childhood itself and the aforementioned
commonsensical assumptions made. In many cases, it is treated as a self-explaining,
22 Conceptions of Childhood, Agency and the Well-Being of Children
almost natural category in no need of particular explanation, and if insights are cited,
they come from developmental psychology in a Piagetian and Kohlbergian tradition
supporting the thesis that children should be best conceptualized via a process of
becoming, with adulthood as the normative benchmark (Rawls 1971, Noggle 2002).
This is in sharp contrast to other, increasingly popular and highly influential
approaches dedicated to the study of children. Particularly in so-called “childhood
studies” – and the related field of the “sociology of childhood” – a multidisciplinary
focus can be found, combining mainly anthropological, sociological, historical and
judicial knowledge about children (Jenks 1982, Mayall 2002, James/Prout 2005).
There, one of the main fields of critical inquiry concerns the concept of childhood, its
social dimension and the problematic features of many commonsensical assumptions
about children. And since many concepts and claims of these research efforts have
been very influential both in academia (not so much in philosophy, though) and in
policy making at various levels, it is worth asking the question how this discipline
conceives children, their agency and well-being and what philosophy could learn
from these insights. In particular, there are three important points of the sociology
of childhood that are of direct relevance for philosophical thinking about children:
the social constructivist thesis of childhood, power structures regulating children’s
lives and the emphasis on children’s agency (understood both in a social and a moral
sense). In the following I will briefly present these broad issues and try to outline
what is central to them. Since there have been many publications in this area over the
last three decades, my presentation of the central theses is rather general and cannot
discuss them in depth. However, it gives a fair account of them as they are currently
discussed in the literature.
Firstly, it should be noted that childhood is, according to many researchers in
the sociology of childhood, and to use a phrase frequently found in the literature,
“socially constructed” (Wyness 1999). This formulation emphasizes that the norms
and values associated with the early years of human life vary strongly between
different cultures as social scientific, ethnological and historical research clearly
shows. Childhood, therefore, is understood as a culturally variable, interpretive frame
for understanding a certain life period (James & Prout 2005, 3). And while no specific
norms and values connected to this institution seem to be of universal validity (or
so it is argued), as far as we know, all known societies have some understanding of
childhood as a structural component. Similar to the distinction between sex and
gender as introduced by feminist theory, the social construction thesis of childhood
seeks to draw attention to the social and normative content of the concept and show
that biological facts cannot adequately explain the way social roles are organized in
a given society. In the case of children, this means that biological immaturity and
childhood are two different things. To capture a central idea behind the motivation
of the social constructivist thesis, David Archard introduced the helpful distinction
between the concept of childhood and conceptions of childhood (Archard 2004, 27).
While the concept of childhood only requires that children are distinguished from
adults in respect of some unspecified set of attributes, in a conception of childhood

these attributes are specified. “In simple terms, to have a concept of ‘childhood’ is
to recognize that children differ interestingly from adults; to have a conception of
childhood is to have a view of what those interesting differences are” (Archard 2004,
27). And since there are theoretically and practically many ways these specifications
can be made, a variety of sometimes contradictory conceptions of childhoods
can be found – both around the globe and throughout history. They differ in their
assessment of when it begins, ends, how it should be divided and which dimensions
are relevant when demarcating it from adulthood (Qvortrup 2005). This finding about
the strong social component in any conception of childhood is generally connected
by sociologists of childhood to the further thesis that the way children are seen
and treated in a given society is changeable. Social relationships are not fixed by
biological, psychological and social laws but can be reconstituted on a different basis
– or reconstructed as it is often called – through various forms of social and political
struggle. And just as women took many years to overcome unjustified oppression
that was based on alleged biological “facts”, children are considered to be in need of
liberation and equal recognition. This constitutes an ongoing development that still
has far to go, even if children’s participation and involvement in different social and
political processes is on the agenda of many institutions and there are many projects
which try to give children a voice (Lansdown and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre
2001; Percy-Smith and Thomas 2010; Biggeri, Ballet, and Comim 2011).
A second and closely related theme discussed in the sociology of childhood
concerns the social status of children as a group, and again, many authors draw on
insights from feminism and gender studies and apply them to the case of children
(Mayall 2002, Alanen 2005). Authors such as Berry Mayall characterize children as
“a minority social group, whose wrongs need righting” (Mayall 2002, 9) and claim
that the marginalization of children is often justified in a very similar way as it has
happened in the case of women, only that generation has replaced gender as the
axis of distinction in an unequal power relationship. Fragility, vulnerability, a lack of
strength and inferiority in knowledge and working skills are in both cases categories
justifying these groups’ dependency on another, dominant one. The idea that children
are best described as a minority group is further sustained by the observation that
children hardly have the opportunities to organize themselves on an aggregate,
societal and political level (Qvortrup 1990, 84). Even if there have been changes in
the last 30 years, in most cases, children’s interests are still represented and defended
not by themselves but by adults speaking for them. Particularly in school, one of the
most important institutions in a child’s life, unequal power relations are obvious - not
just between a specific class and its teachers but more generally in that the institution
as a whole sets standards of normality and development that cannot be questioned
by the pupils (Mayall 1994, 3). Empirical investigations also show that children ‟see
themselves as a group vis-à-vis the adult group, and as a group whose rights are both
neglected and rejected” (Mayall, 2002, 21). This is a relationship recognized by almost
every age group, from five-year-olds to adolescents (Axford 2008, 6, Mayall 2002,
136). Furthermore, the poor quality of some services for children and the continued
prevalence of child poverty indicate the weak social position of children. But these
disadvantages, or so it is claimed, are first and foremost caused by the way we organize
our society including the norms that prevail and not by the “natural incompetencies”
of children.
The third topic I want to elaborate on is the notion of the agency of children to be
found in the relevant literature of the sociology of childhood. Here it is emphasized
that children have to be viewed both as social and as moral actors in their own right;
as people who are embedded in a certain social context and who both have and fulfil
socially ascribed responsibilities (Axford 2008, 6). This view gets contrasted with
a traditional account of children’s agency, which is characterized by passiveness,
vulnerability, incompleteness and incompetence. Children’s agency, as traditionally
conceived, is therefore a very narrow concept. In fact, the picture emerging from
traditional thinking about children is one which tends to emphasise what children are
not able to do compared to adults and what, as a consequence, should be prohibited for
children. Being blinded by such a narrow view of children’s agency, many sociologists
of childhood argue that children have been overlooked as important social actors by
researchers, policy makers and the general population for much of the 20th century
– a state which still persists today. Children have been considered as precious and
subject to high emotional attachments, but also as burdensome, in some sense even
“useless” (due to their lack of economic contribution) and as dependents in need
of being socialized, with school activity considered to be of preparatory value only
(Axford 2008, 6, Zelizer 1994).
However, a closer look at the empirical evidence suggests that children are
clearly social actors starting from a very early age (Ridge 2002, Alderson 2008). To
characterize them only as beings becoming such actors in the future misses crucially
important points. Children take part in and actively form family relationships
by defending their own points of view, expressing wishes, seeking justice and
demonstrating strong attachments and feelings. They negotiate with others (adults
and peers alike) and thereby influence relationships, decisions or the workings of a
set of social assumptions of constraints (Mayall, 2002, 21). In their interactions with
their peers they assume complex social roles, define codes of inclusion and exclusion
and have a clear idea about different social identities and ways to influence them.
Moreover, children participate in economically useful activities: not only do they buy
their own possessions but they work in different ways and settings (in home labor as
well as in different forms of the labor market) and see money as a means to autonomy,
independence and recognition by their peers (Liebel 2004). Besides these roles as
social actors, sociologists of childhood usually also argue – and this should be of
particular interest to political philosophers – that children should be seen as moral
agents as well, capable of understanding and negotiating complex moral issues in
their own lives and in interactions with others (Frankel 2012). They “confront issues
of justice, equal distribution and sharing. They respond to each other’s actions and
feelings, and meet approval or disapproval in their own actions”, as Mayall puts it
(Mayall, 2002, 88). In this context, the representatives of the sociology of childhood
usually indicate that traditional thinking about moral development, particularly
shaped by the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, has been seriously challenged and is now
widely regarded as too narrow a concept (Frankel 2012). As it is well known, Piaget
developed a universal, ordered stage approach to child development and argued in
the context of morality that certain cognitive abilities must be developed in order for
a child to understand why actions are right or wrong. This is the case because he saw
genuine moral judgements anchored in abstract reasoning, characterized by applying
formal moral principles to concrete situations, an idea later developed in detail by
Kohlberg. However, when acknowledging the social context within which each child
exists, and considering children’s everyday lives and experiences, there is clear
evidence that they possess considerable moral competencies from an early age that
must be acknowledged (Alderson 111–130), even if “the child as moral agent is one we
have been taught to find difficult, even a contradiction in terms” (Mayall, 2002, 87).
Here it is also interesting to note that young people find that adults routinely reject
or ignore their moral competence and participation rights. In other words, they are
not taken seriously for what they are and do. In any case, as a consequence of the
considerations by the sociologists of childhood and this new “competence paradigm”
(Hutchby/Moran-Ellis 1998, 6), one central and flourishing field of research and
policy implementations inspired by this strand of thinking about children concerns
children’s participation (Percy-Smith/Thomas 2010). There is a clear tendency to
assume that children from diverse social contexts have to be empowered and that
they should be put in a position where genuine participation is possible. This means
that children should be seen as equals in decision making processes, respecting
their points of view and giving them the control and power to defend their interests.
A general subordination to the allegedly higher competences of adults is rejected
(Alanen 2005).
In summary, central issues discussed in the recent sociology of childhood
literature on the concept of childhood seem to challenge basic assumptions held by
many political philosophers about the nature of childhood and the way a good society
should treat its children. Worse, there seems to be a serious accusation that many
ethical theories defending the idea of rational autonomy as a prerequisite for full
inclusion and participation give the theoretical justification for a society systematically
excluding and even oppressing and subordinating its children. Furthermore, it is
claimed that thinking about children, particularly in political contexts, has to include
children’s own accounts about their lives, values and circumstances. There is,
according to Mayall, an irreducible child standpoint with normative weight that needs
to be taken seriously and respected in its own right: “[…] those inhabiting childhood
have a particular take or standpoint on their status in relation to adult status […] a
child standpoint (analogous to a woman’s standpoint) is important for contributing
to a proper account of the social order” (Mayall, 2002, 8). To put it differently, most
theories in political philosophy are adult-centred and dismiss the child’s point of view
as relevant for political purposes, because children are considered – misleadingly, as
many sociologists of childhood argue – as incompetent and not in a position to decide
for themselves.
1.3 Children as Equals?
Without doubt, there are many ways different societies view and treat their children
and denying that conceptions of childhood are shaped by many contingent social
factors seems to be plainly wrong. Furthermore, it is also convincing to argue that
children are social actors, and indeed there is strong empirical evidence that they
possess considerable moral competencies starting from an early age (Goodwin
2002, Alderson 2008). But what follows from these insights, which are central to the
sociology of childhood for the moral and political status of children? Does this really
mean, as seems to be suggested by many child-centred researchers, that children
should be treated as the equals of adults in the sense that their point of view has the
same normative weight as that of adults? Should, consequently, their decisions and
actions have to be respected in the same way as those of mature fellow citizens? Or
in other words: do children have a right to authority over their own circumstances?
It seems to me that the answers to these questions have to be negative, and that
the arguments provided by sociologists of childhood are clearly insufficient to sustain
the conclusion that children have, as a rule, a right to participate on an equal basis
with adults in democratic decision-making. However, in a somewhat more modest
interpretation – that children have a right to be taken seriously and that their point
of view has to be respected and adequately taken into account when determining
their well-being – there is a lot political philosophy can learn from a systematic and
critical discussion of the concept of childhood (and the many existing conceptions) as
outlined in the preceding section. But before describing the relevant points in section
three, let me say a few words why and where the arguments in favour of the liberation
of children, understood in a strict sense, go wrong.
To begin with, it seems to be highly plausible – and this is also at the centre of
the criticized commonsensical thinking about children – to make the attribution of
some rights dependent on the possession of certain competencies. For example, it is
common to make a distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights, where liberty
rights are rights protecting free choices (voting, religious worship, speech, thought
association etc.) and welfare rights protect and promote fundamental elements of
human well-being (health, education, housing etc.) (Archard 2004, 91, Brighouse
2003). Liberty rights, which allow persons to act on their own judgments and to live
a life according to values they identify with, presuppose some abilities and skills
related to what can be termed “rational autonomy”, compromising inter alia elements
Children as Equals? 27
such as knowledge, experience, stability of character and the ability to assess the
consequences of one’s actions and to relate them with one’s identity in time. And in
these respects and as a matter of empirical fact, children, especially small ones, have
deficits compared to adults. Moral judgements, even if present in the daily interactions
of children to an astonishing extent, are therefore different from those of adults, still
developing and in need of further refinement. And even if political philosophers might
sometimes overrate the values of rationality and impartiality at the expense of moral
sentiments and attachments (as feminists frequently argue) it seems unacceptable
to state that they should play no role at all when assessing a person’s moral agency.
Furthermore, moral sentiments, too, do not appear from nowhere – they have to be
fostered and stimulated and are not unrelated to cognitive content. The possession of
a coherent conception of the good, and a moral standpoint from where one can live
a life one has reason to value are of high moral significance, and every human being
needs time to develop them. Here it is also crucial to note that the emphasis put on
the social construction of childhood has limits. Despite the profound differences in
the conceptions of childhood found in different social, cultural and historic contexts,
it must be acknowledged that there are some universal features characteristic of the
way humans develop during the first years of their lives and saying that children are
immature definitely has a content going beyond ideological assumptions.
All children, by virtue of their immaturity, have similar needs and limitations. Infants are depen-
dent on others for their physical care: for food, shelter, hygiene and safety. An abandoned infant
cannot survive for very long. Children also need emotional attachment and, as with their physi-
cal care, how and who forms emotional bonds with the young child can be subject to a great deal
of variation but the forming of strong emotional attachments to close caregivers is apparently a
universal feature of human society. […] the child can also be considered as socially and cultu-
rally immature. Children may not be born as blank slates, but teaching young humans the whole
range of cultural practices from how to eat their food to living ethically or morally is a shared
concern of all human societies. (Wells 2009, 2).
Furthermore, the acquisition of a variety of skills and abilities (e.g. walking, talking,
recognizing objects) proceeds according to standards with only small variations in
different cultures and social settings. Now, these points are certainly also relevant
when it comes to a person’s ability to make decisions for herself. Even if the mentioned
new “competence paradigm” in regards to children were true, there is clearly a need
to define different competence levels relevant for one’s ability of self-government.
Suggesting that children are, as a rule, equally competent as adults, just seems to be
wrong. Where these competence levels are located and how they have to be identified
is a difficult question and one that cannot be separated from the concrete cultural
and social background one is referring to. However, there are good arguments that
age is a good and overall fair measure for attributing different rights to people since
(a) there is a fairly strong correlation between age and competencies and (b) it is
manageable and difficult to manipulate which regulations according to competency
tests are not (Archard 2004, 85–91). Furthermore, the relationship between age and
certain competencies provides a strong case for limiting some cultural practices like
child marriage and female circumcision (the one of males is a more complicated case)
even if the children in question give their consent, since they pose a threat to children
eventually reaching a stage where genuine self-governance is possible (Feinberg
1980). A related point to note is that it does not follow from the factual varieties of
childhoods that they are of equal moral value. On the contrary, they point to the need
to compare them and to criticize questionable practices (Nussbaum 2000). In fact,
this is what sociologists of childhood try to do with many aspects of contemporary
childhoods in the western world, and in order to achieve this, a relativist position is
insufficient.
It seems also highly questionable that respecting the choices children make in
the same way as we normally do with adults would improve their overall level of well-
being, something implicit in much of the literature addressing the alleged low social
status of children. Historical evidence suggests that whenever experiments were
made restricting children as much as possible from adult and educational control,
the consequences were problematic. They developed to rather egocentric beings,
were extremely intolerant of the demands of adults and had difficulties respecting
rules conducive to a harmonious co-existence (Purdy 1992, 88–100). Psychological
and educational research also indicates that parental control combined with high
responsiveness to the child’s needs and the willingness to give reasons for establishing
rules, setting limits and giving (reasonable) punishments is generally the best way
for children to develop self-confidence, self-efficacy and an orientation towards
achievements in life (Purdy 1992, 100–106), valuable traits from the perspective of
most ethical theories.
In summary, giving children – individually or as a social group – a general and
comprehensive right to self-determination does not seem a congruent and defendable
idea from a moral point of view, even if there are some voices in the literature explicitly
defending it (Cohen 1980, Godwin 2011). But then one has to ask in what way the
claims and expressed preferences of children should be taken into account. Here, a
proposal made by Harry Brighouse is helpful (Brighouse 2003). He suggests that there
are basically two ways a child’s voice can be assessed, namely either authoritatively
or consultatively:
Someone’s view is regarded as authoritative when it is regarded as the view that must be taken
as deﬁning the person’s interests for the purpose of decision-making. […] By contrast, to regard
a view as consultative is to treat the person who expresses it as having a right to express her own
view of her own interests, but not to treat that expression as suﬃcient grounds for action, even if
only her interests are at stake (Brighouse 2003, 692–693).
Brighouse’s point is that while a competent adult’s views are authoritative with
respect to their interests (because they act from a mature conception of the good they
identify with and are normally better positioned than others to protect their own
Agency and Well-being 29
interests) the case of children is different, due to three different characteristics that
make them unique:
First, they are profoundly dependent on others for their well-being, because they cannot nego-
tiate the obstacles in the social world in such a way that their needs will be met. They are often
not the best available judges of what will promote their own welfare, or their future agency inte-
rests […]. Second, they are profoundly vulnerable to other people’s decisions, both because they
are dependent, and because they are raised, typically and for very good reasons, in families in
which adults unavoidably have quite extensive de facto power over what happens to children.
[…] Third, unlike other persons who are dependent and vulnerable, children have the capacity to
develop the capabilities to meet their own needs, those very needs for which they are dependent
on others. (Brighouse 2003, footnotes omitted).
In general terms, dependency, vulnerability and the ability to develop into

autonomous beings thus seem to be important categories in theorizing childhood and
in justifying paternalism. As a consequence, there is always a need to balance current
and future interests of children, and since in many cases they lack the knowledge and
abilities to make appropriate choices themselves, interference from adults who are in
an appropriate position to do this is justified. However, a further remark is necessary:
adults interfering with children’s perspectives and their decisions are only allowed
to do so if they have good reasons to discern the interests of the child and protect or
promote those interests with their actions. The power adults have over children must
not be exercised arbitrarily and has to take the children’s voice into account according
to their age and maturity.
1.4 Agency and Well-being
Liberating children from adult control, in a strict sense, seems to be too radical and
counterproductive an aim. But maybe the sociological view of childhood identified in
the first section of this paper should not be understood in such a narrow sense, even
if the rhetoric used points in this direction. It might rather be identified with the more
modest, reasonable and valuable claim that there is a need to take children of all age
groups seriously and to engage critically with the institution of childhood as it is de
facto practiced in developed as well as in developing countries. Then, there are clear
merits in this position that should also be taken seriously by any moral theory about
children which wants to engage with the real world, contribute to the improvement of
children’s lives and help us understand what child well-being means.
First, there is the insight that children have to be seen as equal in worth to all
other members of society. They are as children, and not just as the adults they will
become, worthy of equal respect. In combination with the insights provided by the
sociology of childhood concerning their complex and clearly existing (moral and
social) agency, this means that they have to be seen as serious conversation partners in
all matters affecting them. Their point of view has normative weight, even if it should
not be automatically taken to give a comprehensive and conclusive definition of their
interests and well-being. To suppose that they generally do not know because they
as a rule have nothing valuable to say about their circumstances, is false and morally
objectionable. Moral theories stressing the value of adult rationality and autonomy too
much are in danger of missing this point and reinforcing an undifferentiated picture
of children as incompetent – and indeed this is, in my opinion at least, happening in
vast fields of political philosophy.
Second, the sociology of childhood points to the many power structures regulating
and controlling children’s lives. Both in the private and in the public realm, children’s
lives are often heavily controlled and they often have no adequate opportunities to
exercise their agency in an appropriate way. The worry raised that institutions such
as schools actually still oppress many children and youths by applying strict rules
without enough space for critical thinking and deliberation is a real concern. These
observations become particularly salient when including the children’s perspectives
in a normative theory about childhood and conceding that they have normative
weight. Furthermore, the common argument that limitations of what children are
permitted to do are obviously justified by reference to their incompetencies has to
be scrutinized and examined in the context in question. General rules are difficult
to establish and in danger of leading to age-discrimination, that is, children are
deliberately and unjustifiably treated less favourably than adults.
Third, the child-centred sociological approaches indicate that social exclusion
is a normative key category for thinking about children as much as it is for adults.
Taking children seriously as social actors with significant moral competencies offers
also in this regard a valuable perspective that is easily lost when rational autonomy is
the focus of attention. Social exclusion applies equally to the child’s relation with his/
her peers where multiple forms of recognition and misrecognition happen concerning
the child’s position in regard to the “adult world”. Again, this does not mean that it is
morally demanded that children should participate without restriction in all activities
that are currently reserved for adults. However, restrictions are in need of justification
and in many cases it is necessary to balance different considerations. Easy answers
are generally not available even in fields such as work or sexual relationships, which
are often judged as uncompromisingly inappropriate for children.
Fourth, it must be emphasized that adults are only morally justified to “overrule”
children’s actions and decisions if they act in the child’s interests and are in a position
from where it is reasonable to assume that they can indeed contribute to the child’s
well-being and well-becoming better than the children themselves. If these conditions
are not fulfilled, paternalistic and controlling actions by adults are suspicious. There
are of course many situations and circumstances in which children do not have
attachment figures of the aforementioned kind. And while there are good reasons
to regret this situation and to claim that societies should be organized in a way
that this does not happen, the social reality is sometimes different. A moral theory
Conclusion 31
characterizing children primarily by their missing autonomy might lead to blind

spots in this regard. Take for example the phenomenon that more and more working
children in developing countries organize themselves in unions, fighting not for the
abolishment of child labour but for fair and non-exploitative forms of work and for
the chance to speak for themselves on an equal basis with all other stakeholders. In
such circumstances, it is almost cynical to talk about the need to place children under
adult control because this would further reinforce their already weak social position.
In such a situation, children are probably the best available judges of their interests,
and their considerable successes show that they are able to organize themselves and
to enforce their claims.
Fifth, the “social construction thesis”, while in my opinion highly problematic
in a radical interpretation, draws attention to a further aspect of many philosophical
theories about children and their well-being emerging from the missing discussion of
the concept of childhood itself. There is the danger that a primarily modern western
urban white middle-class notion of childhood is implicitly assumed to be the ideal
form, devaluating the way other cultures treat their children and integrate them into
the social life. While not directly and necessarily leading to a relativist position (as it
seems to be assumed by some proponents of the sociology of childhood), the existing
varieties in conceptions of childhood challenge some commonsensical assumptions
about children and their proper place in a good society.
1.5 Conclusion
There are many different conceptions of childhood to be found, both throughout

history and according to the geographical and cultural region one is looking at. One of
the great achievements of the sociology of childhood is that we are now aware of these
differences and that we know that children can fulfill varying social roles, determining
how their well-being can be conceptualized best. Their biological immaturity does
not lead automatically to the place that is attributed to them in modern western
societies, which is to a large extent characterized by institutions preparing children
for adulthood, without giving them considerable political and social power. Hence,
in this sense it is true that childhood is socially constructed and also the insight that
children are social and – in a certain interpretation – also moral agents is certainly
valid. However, one must be careful with hasty conclusions for moral theory. Even
if childhood is socially constructed, it is important to acknowledge that some
constructions might be more adequate than others. From the fact of diversity does
not immediately follow that all conceptions of childhood are of equal value. As I have
shown above there are e.g. good reasons to restrict a child’ right to authority over her
own circumstances due to considerations that are rooted in the way human beings
usually develop. On a general level, their vulnerability, incompetence and ability to
learn are important normative categories and it would be dangerous to argue them
away or to deconstruct them completely. However, it is true that often enough we as a

society neglect a critical examination of the way we have institutionalized childhood
and the many power structures that are, in many instances unjustifiably, governing
and regulating children’s lives and jeopardizing their well-being. Especially theories
in moral, social and political philosophy should be sensitive to these issues. They
have a duty to guide our actions towards a better and more just society for children
and too many generalizations for the sake of theoretical simplicity endanger this
endeavour. In this respect philosophy can indeed learn a lot from the current debates
in the sociology of childhood and there is a need to further engage with each other.
Indeed, this aspect of the discussion on the well-being of children also shows how
important an interdisciplinary approach is in order to do justice to the many facts
involved.
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Tatjana Višak
2 Does Welfare Trump Freedom? A Normative
Evaluation of Contextualism about how to Promote
Welfare
2.1 Introduction
Many of us in our various roles – perhaps as parents, citizens, consumers, teachers or

politicians – want children to be well off and are prepared to act in ways that promote
their welfare. Since we correctly conceive of childhood obesity as a pressing welfare
problem, we try to limit and prevent childhood obesity and thereby promote child
welfare.
In this contribution I will focus on the welfare problem of childhood obesity and
defend contextualism about how to prevent childhood obesity and thereby promote
child welfare. Contextualism is the view that promoting welfare is not only – and
perhaps not even primarily – a matter of individual choice, but importantly a matter
of being situated in the right social and physical context. In section 2, I will introduce
the case of childhood obesity. In section 3 I will point out that, according to all
common accounts of welfare, childhood obesity is a welfare problem. In section 4, I
will introduce contextualism about how to promote welfare. In section 5, I will defend
contextualism as a way of preventing childhood obesity against its major normative
challenge, which is the criticism that maintaining or creating the relevant contexts
might diminish the child’s option freedom. In chapter 6, I will tentatively explore
whether my defence of contextualism generalizes to adults and to the prevention of
other welfare problems.
Thus, I will not establish the superiority of contextualism above individualism
here, which is an empirical issue. Instead, I will illustrate what contextualism
amounts to as an empirical claim about how best to promote welfare. Furthermore, I
will defend contextualism in the specific case of childhood obesity prevention against
a normative challenge and briefly explore whether this defence of contextualism
generalizes to other contexts.
2.2 Childhood Obesity
According to the World Health Organization, Childhood obesity is one of the most
serious public health challenges of the 21st century. The prevalence of obesity has
increased at what the WHO considers an alarming rate:
© 2015 Tatjana Višak

Childhood Obesity 35
The problem is global and is steadily affecting many low- and middle-income countries, par-
ticularly in urban settings. […] Globally, in 2010 the number of overweight children under the
age of five is estimated to be over 42 million. Close to 35 million of these are living in developing
countries.
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2013), childhood obesity
has more than tripled in the past 30 years. The percentage of children aged 6–11 years
in the United States who were obese increased from 7% in 1980 to nearly 20% in 2008.
Similarly, the percentage of adolescents aged 12–19 years who were obese increased
from 5% to 18% over the same period. In 2008, more than one third of children and
adolescents in the United States were overweight or obese.
Childhood obesity is generally considered problematic, because of both immediate
and long-term negative health effects. Obese youths are more likely to have risk
factors for cardiovascular disease, such as high cholesterol or high blood pressure.
In a population-based sample of 5 to 17-year-olds, 70% of obese youth had at least
one risk factor for cardiovascular disease (Center for Disease Control and Prevention
2013). Obese adolescents are more likely to have pre-diabetes, a condition in which
blood glucose levels indicate a high risk for development of diabetes. Children and
adolescents who are obese are at greater risk for bone and joint problems. Obese
children and adolescents are likely to be obese as adults and are therefore more at
risk for adult health problems such as heart disease, type 2 diabetes, stroke, several
types of cancer, and osteoarthritis (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013).
Besides contributing to these illnesses, childhood obesity is strongly related
to depression. While it might be more difficult to diagnose child depression than
depression in adults, a survey of more than 1,500 9 to 10-year-olds found that 20%
of those who were obese often felt sad – compared to only 8% of their healthy-
weight peers. The relationship between childhood obesity and depression is
complex. Overweight and obesity indirectly contribute to depression in various
ways. For instance, overweight can lead to feelings of loneliness, isolation, or poor
self-esteem. But overweight can also be a symptom or consequence of depression.
Feelings of emptiness, which may be caused by depression, can make children
want to fill up on food, typically carbohydrates and chocolates. These stimulate
the release of chemicals that can make them feel better in the short run. So, many
of the overweight and obese children eat when they are stressed, tired, lonely, or
when something bad has happened. What is more, some depression medications
can cause weight gain.
Depression and obesity have many shared symptoms, including sleep problems,
sedentary behaviour, and unhealthy attitudes towards eating. These symptoms,
in turn, can aggravate overweight and either directly or indirectly also depression.
For instance, sleepiness makes one hungry, sedentary behaviour makes it harder to
control weight and the same holds for unhealthy attitudes towards eating.
36 Does Welfare Trump Freedom?
2.3 Childhood Obesity as a Welfare Problem
The field of ethics in which the development of accounts of welfare takes place is
value theory. Value theory addresses questions about what is valuable or good. In
particular, it explores what is intrinsically good, i.e. good not as a means but in and of
itself. Money, for instance, is usually considered an instrumental or extrinsic good. It
is not good in itself, but it is good for what it leads to. For instance, you can buy a coat
with it. Is the coat good in itself? Arguably, the coat is not good in itself either. It is good
for something else that it gives you: it prevents you from being cold in the winter. Is
being prevented from being cold in the winter good in itself? Perhaps it isn’t. Perhaps
the good thing about staying warm in the winter is that it prevents illnesses, such as
having a cold. Having a coat thus contributes to your health. Is being healthy a good
in itself? Some would argue that it is. Others would argue that it is not. Perhaps even
health is only instrumentally good. Perhaps being healthy is only good to the extent
that being healthy gives you pleasure and that being unhealthy causes suffering. Is
pleasure good in itself? Pleasure might well be good in itself, just like suffering might
be bad in itself. What the intrinsic goods are is a matter of controversy in value theory.
When talking about intrinsic goods, it is common to distinguish between what
is good for someone and what is a good simpliciter. A good of the first type is known
as a ‘prudential good’. This is what should be captured in an account of welfare. The
relationship between prudential goodness and a goodness simpliciter is controversial.
In value theory, it is common to distinguish talk about the individual’s ‘welfare’ or
‘prudential good’ from talk about what characterizes a good life. Perhaps a good life
requires more than only welfare. Here, we are concerned with welfare, since we are
to determine whether childhood obesity is a welfare problem. What, then, is good for
me?
One of the classical accounts of welfare is hedonism. Hedonism is a mental state
theory that defines welfare in terms of subjectively experienced pleasure and pain
or, more broadly, enjoyment and suffering (Bentham 1996 [1789]; Mill 1998 [1863];
Feldman 2006; 92009; Crisp 2006; Tännsjö 1998). A key insight of hedonism is that it
acknowledges the importance of one’s mental states as an aspect of welfare. But are
mental states the only aspect of welfare? Against hedonism, it has been argued that if
pleasant experiences were the only things that made our lives good for us, we would
be as well off as we could be on a machine or on drugs that gave us endless pleasant
experiences (Crisp 2006, Bradley 2008, Nozick 1974, Sumner 1996). That, however,
seems implausible.
One of the major rival accounts of welfare is preferentialism (Harsanyi 1982,
Griffin 1986, Sobel 2009, Wessels 2011, Birnbacher 2005, Gesang 2000, Crisp 2006).
According to preferentialism, having your preferences fulfilled is what is ultimately
good for you. On that account, having money, having a coat, being warm or being
healthy are not intrinsically good. Rather, they are only good to the extent that they
contribute to the satisfaction of your preferences. Happiness, as well, might be
Childhood Obesity as a Welfare Problem 37
prudentially good, because it is desired. A more intimate relationship between desire-

satisfaction and happiness is conceivable as well. The relevant notion of ‘desire’ might
be defined with recourse of the notion of happiness, such as: “We desire something if
and only if correctly and vividly imagining it, under certain conditions, would make
us happy.” (Wessels, 2011, 86). Furthermore, happiness might be defined in terms of
desire-fulfilment, such as: “Being in a situation in which one desires to be means that
one is happy.” (McNaughton 1953/54, Brandt 1966, Heathwood 2006).
The key insight behind preferentialism is that different things seem to promote
the welfare of different individuals. Preferentialism explains that this is due to their
different desires. This insight lets us explain why what is good for one individual may
be irrelevant or even harmful to the well-being of another – different preferences
explain why religious worship matters to the well-being of many believers but not to
most atheists, and why fertility matters to the welfare of those who want children but
is irrelevant to the welfare of those who don’t.
A major criticism against the desire account of welfare is that desiring things does
not make them good for us. It is rather the other way around: we desire what is good
for us (Crisp 2008. See also Aristotle (1984 [C4BCE], Metaphysics 1072a, tr. Ross): “[…]
desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire.”). Further, if desire-
satisfaction were all that mattered for our welfare, it seems that we ought to adjust
our desires constantly to the chances of fulfilment. This would certainly bring us more
desire-satisfaction. However, changing our desires whenever doing so would make it
easier to fulfil them seems to make us lose ourselves (Wessels 2011, 132; Barry 1989,
280).
The third group of the classical accounts of welfare are so-called ‘objective list
accounts’. Objective list accounts of welfare stipulate lists of items that are considered
to be intrinsically good for you. Typical proponents of objective list accounts hold
that well-being consists in the possession of certain basic goods that are beneficial
to all human beings regardless of what they desire or prefer (Moore 1903, Rawls 1971,
Nussbaum 1988, Sen 1993, Hausman 2012, Parfit 2011). The degree to which one
possesses those things determines one’s level of welfare. The things on that ‘objective
list’ might be health, wealth, friendship, or other items. Eudemonistic accounts of
welfare, such as Nussbaum’s capabilities account, conceive of welfare in terms of
‘nature fulfilment’. At some level, they might also present a list of items, the realization
of which is considered to be relevant for welfare. Eudemonistic accounts of welfare
and objective list accounts are typically classified as objectivist accounts of welfare
and contrasted with subjectivist accounts, such as hedonism and preferentialism.
However, that classification is highly unclear and controversial and should not bother
us here (Sumner 1995, Crisp 2008, section 4.3, Haybron 2008, 177-78).
The key insight of objective list theorists is that it seems counterintuitive to
base the notion of welfare solely on the individual’s own perspective, such as their
preferences. After all, people sometimes prefer what leaves them worse off. Adaptive
preferences shed light on this problem of preferences that leave one worse off (Elster
1982). Nussbaum (2001) gives examples of women in third-world countries who form
adaptive preferences to accept low pay, remain with abusive partners, and prepare
their daughters for marriage rather than education. These women are not getting
what is best for them and their daughters; in fact, the deformation of their preferences
is part of the injustice committed against them. In other cases, ignorance leads people
to prefer what harms them. In still other cases, people are aware that what they prefer
is bad for them, but lack the willpower to change their preferences – drug addiction
is a paradigm example.
A challenge for objective list accounts of welfare is determining what counts as
a primary good in an objective way. Why, for instance, is education good for me? It
seems that a justification of the goodness of education cannot avoid pointing out that
it ultimately leads to happiness, or to desire-satisfaction. Furthermore, listed items
are controversial. What if someone does not care about education and seems to be
perfectly happy without it? Some alleged objective accounts of welfare are really
about something else: they do not offer an account of prudential value. For instance,
a definition of welfare in terms of ‘living according to one’s excellences’ conflates
prudential value and perfectionist value. Perfectionist value is about how much one
lives up to certain standards of perfection (Sumner 1996, 78).
In sum, the three classical accounts of welfare are all based on some plausible
insights, but have some counterintuitive implications. These are not new. In recent
years, proponents of various theories proposed revisions in order to deal with alleged
counterintuitive implications. Recently, hybrid or combined accounts of welfare have
been proposed in order to combine promising aspects of different theories and avoid
their shortcomings (Wessels 2011, Heathwood 2006). The debate about the most
plausible account of welfare is ongoing.
We do not need to decide on which of these is the correct account of welfare in
order to see that childhood obesity negatively affects welfare. First of all, childhood
obesity affects health and health is important for welfare. According to hedonism,
health is extrinsically good for me to the extent that it gives me enjoyment and avoids
suffering. According to preferentialism, health is extrinsically good for me to the extent
that it helps me to get what I want. For instance, I might desire to be healthy or I might
desire to do things that I couldn’t do if I were ill, or I might desire to avoid discomfort
and pain. According to nature-fulfilment accounts of welfare, being healthy might be
part of what it means to flourish as a human being. On such accounts, as well as on
objective list accounts of welfare, health is not only extrinsically good for me, but an
aspect of what is intrinsically good for me. It is an aspect of my welfare.
Secondly, childhood obesity, due to its effects on health, might shorten lives and
that affects welfare as well. On the most prominent account of the harm of death,
known as the “deprivation view”, death is bad for us precisely to the extent that it
deprives us of the welfare that we would have experienced had we not died (Bradley
2009, Kagan 2012). That view entails that even if I die unexpectedly and painlessly
during my sleep and even if the state of being dead does not harm me, because I do
Contextualism About How to Promote Welfare 39
not experience anything, the fact that my life ends might still be bad for me. It is bad
for me if, and only if, my future life would have been good for me had I not died. Not
everyone accepts this view about the harm of death (Belshaw 2012, Singer 2011) and
those who accept it might accept it with various modifications (McMahan 1988), but I
believe that, roughly, this is the correct view about the harm of death.
Summing this up, I have sketched the most prominent accounts of welfare and
pointed out that on each of these accounts, childhood obesity is a welfare problem.
That is enough to establish that, if one cares about welfare, one should be concerned
about childhood obesity. I will now turn to introducing and defending a particular
approach regarding how to prevent childhood obesity and thus to promote welfare.
2.4 Contextualism About How to Promote Welfare
To what extent does human welfare depend on living in the right kind of environment?
Individualism about the pursuit of welfare is the view that welfare can best be
achieved by granting individuals a maximum amount of option freedom. The idea is
that when individuals are presented with a vast variety of options, they will choose
the way of life that suits them best and that best promotes their welfare. According
to this view, people should ideally experience conditions of maximally unbounded
and unburdened choice. Contextualism about the pursuit of welfare does not deny
that some amount of option freedom can be beneficial, but it holds that living in the
right kind of physical and social context serves people’s welfare best. It is the view
that people fare best “when the context constrains or guides their choices in certain
ways, beyond the minimums imposed by the unalterable facts of human existence”
(Haybron 2008, 263). The constraints that contextualists refer to “include both limits
and burdens on our choices” (Haybron 2008, 263).
It should be clear that contextualism is not in itself a normative view about what
ought to be done. It is an empirical view, based on empirical insights about what
actually affects people’s welfare. The relevant studies suggest that, just like non-
human animals, humans have certain needs that are best served in particular kinds
of environments. This is quite independent of what people think they need or what
people happen to pursue. For instance, numerous studies show that exposure to
greenery, such as plants and trees, promotes people’s physical and mental health,
even though they might not care about plants and might not be aware about their
effect (Haybron 2011). There might well be an evolutionary explanation for this effect.
Furthermore, the underlying studies suggest that people are not particularly apt in
knowing how well off they are and in promoting their own welfare (Haybron 2008,
225-250). Eating habits are a well-known example. We often choose to eat things that
do not promote our health and welfare. Unbounded choice is no guarantee at all that
we will choose what is good for us. Quite to the contrary: we often make choices that
leave us worse off.
In the following, I will illustrate the contextual influence on welfare by giving four
examples of environmental factors that influence childhood obesity. This is meant to
illustrate that some environments are conducive to childhood obesity, while others
facilitate obesity prevention.
a) Available food and food habits in family and school environment

What children eat depends primarily on what they are offered in their family and, to a
lesser degree, at school. The older the children are, the more other influences become
important, in particular if they eat outside and have the money and opportunity to buy
their own food. Nevertheless, the habits that they learn early on in their families, the
accompanied information concerning food choices and the examples of the parents and
caregivers as role models are likely to remain influential. Children develop a taste for
certain foods that they are exposed to and some foodstuffs, such as sugar and chocolate,
are even addictive. For these reasons, the social context of the child is obviously highly
influential. Many parents complain that their children do not like vegetables or even
that they do not like anything except for certain low nutrient foods, such as white
bread, white pasta and sugary snacks. I do not doubt that children can develop a taste
for these things and prefer them to more nutritious food, if they are given the choice.
Parents may feel that they harm their child when they decline to give them these foods.
They may fear that the child will refuse to eat anything else, or think that they benefit
the child by offering its preferred food. Perhaps the parents want to avoid conflict and
perhaps they remember their own satisfaction as a child when they were offered sugary
snacks. Parents might eat these things themselves, which makes it very difficult to deny
the children the same fun. Furthermore, children do not immediately become ill or
fat on such a diet. Once the children are habituated to sweet snacks and learn how to
successfully obtain them, it becomes even harder for the parents to change that habit.
Since, however, unhealthy food habits eventually show their negative effects on
the child’s welfare, family contexts that establish, maintain or support unhealthy
food habits do not benefit but harm the child. Since avoiding unhealthy food habits
is possible, spreading the required knowledge in the right way and at the right times
and places would prove to be highly beneficial.
b) Exposure to television
Television viewing is another major contextual influence on childhood obesity. On
average, according to data from a few years ago, 6 to 11-year-old American children
spend 28 hours and 2 to 3-year-olds even 32 hours per week in front of a TV. That
time is nearly entirely (97%) spent watching live TV (McDonough, 2009). 71% of
children aged 8-18 have a television in their bedroom (Rideout, Foehr, Roberts 2010).
In about two-thirds of households, the TV is “usually” on during meals (Rideout,
Foehr, Roberts 2010). In about half of households the TV is on “most” of the time
(Rideout, Foehr, Roberts 2010). Children with a TV in their bedroom spend an average
of nearly one and a half hours more viewing TV per day than kids without a TV in their
Contextualism About How to Promote Welfare 41
bedroom. Rules about watching TV do not exist in about half of the households with
7th to 12th-graders (Rideout, Foehr, Roberts 2010). Many parents actually encourage
their toddlers to watch television.
Overweight is more common among children who watch more TV. University of
Michigan researchers found that just being awake in a room with a TV on more than
two hours a day is a risk factor for being overweight for children between three and four
and a half years old (Rich et al 1998). TV viewing habits during childhood are related to
overweight in adulthood. In fact, among 3 to7-year-old children, TV time predicted their
body mass index even better than diet (Lumeng et al 2006). Watching TV contributes
to overweight in various ways. Most importantly, children watching TV are generally
inactive. In fact, while watching TV the metabolic rate seems to go even lower than
during rest. This means that a child burns fewer calories watching TV than just sitting
quietly doing nothing. Furthermore, just sitting quietly doing nothing is something that
healthy children tend not to do, when they are not in front of a screen. Besides being
inactive, many children tend to snack when watching TV. Finally, children are exposed
to a massive amount of TV ads promoting high-sugar, low-nutrient food and drinks,
which are specifically aimed at children (Viner, Cole 2005, Jago et al 2005, McGinnis JM,
Gootman JA, Kraak, 2006). Restricting TV time appeared to be successful in reducing
excess weight gain in preadolescents (Caballero 2004).
c) Access to nature
Another relevant environmental factor is the children’s access to nature. Time spent in
contact with the natural environment has been associated with better psychological
well-being (R. Kaplan, 1973), superior cognitive functioning (Cimprich, 1990; Hartig,
Mang, & Evans, 1991; Kuo, 2001; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995), fewer physical
ailments (E. O. Moore, 1981; West, 1986), and speedier recovery from illness (Ulrich,
1984; Verderber, 1986; Verderber & Reuman, 1987). Due to their greater plasticity or
vulnerability, exposure to nature may particularly affect children’s functioning and
welfare (Faber Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 2001, 2002; Faber Taylor, Wiley, Kuo, & Sullivan,
1998; Wells, 2000). Children’s preferred environments include a predominance of
natural elements (Korpela, 2002). For example, in a study in which urban children
aged 9 to 12 were asked to make a map or drawing of all their favourite places, 96%
of the illustrations were of outdoor places (Moore 1986). In spite of this, areas that
invite outdoor playing are vanishing. For instance in the UK, since the 1970’s the area
in which children may roam without supervision has decreased by almost 90% (Moss
2012). While only a generation ago more than half of the children regularly played in
nature, now it is less than one child in 10 (Moss 2012).
d) The role of food in emotional socializing

A final environmental aspect I would like to suggest here is the children’s socialization
with regard to dealing with emotions. As stated above, children’s way of dealing with
emotions affects their likelihood of becoming obese and their likelihood of becoming
depressed. Dealing with emotions in one way or other is something children learn.
Babies and toddlers tend to express their emotions, such as joy, sadness, fear or anger
very directly. Many adults feel uncomfortable with these expressions, in particular
in case of sadness and anger. Their immediate reaction to crying is often to make it
stop, the idea being that when the crying stops, the sadness stops. That, however, is
not necessarily the case. By stopping the expression of the emotion, adults tend not
to acknowledge the emotion out of fear that this would somehow sustain it. In case
of anger it makes sense to discourage certain expressions, for instance if they directly
or indirectly hurt others. Yet it would be better for the welfare of children if adults
supported them in recognizing and effectively dealing with their emotions, including
sadness and anger, rather than trying to do away with them. Instead, distraction by
offering food is a common strategy for making babies and young children stop crying.
Food of the high sugar, low nutrient variety is also used as a reward or consolation
in many social settings. It is also introduced as part of many emotionally laden social
rituals and interactions, thus contributing to emotional eating, overweight and
depression.
These observations about food choices and food habits, effects of television
viewing, access to nature and emotional socialization are meant to illustrate
contextualism. They suggest that the successful pursuit of happiness is not only – and
perhaps not primarily – an individual affair, but rather a matter of living in the right
social and physical context.
2.5 Defending Contextualism in the Case of Childhood Obesity

Prevention Against a Normative Challenge
Let us grant that contextualism is indeed the most effective way of tackling the
welfare problem of childhood obesity – does it mean that parents should throw the
TVs out of their children’s rooms? Should they switch off their own television in the
presence of their children and stick to rules concerning TV-viewing? Does it mean that
schools ought to ban junk food vending machines and to slow down the lifts in order
to encourage pupils to take the staircase?
Some might complain that this is problematic, because it diminishes the child’s
freedom. It is true that creating social and physical environments that help prevent
childhood obesity might not only create options for the child, such as ensuring access
to attractive parks and playgrounds in the neighbourhood. It might also diminish
options, such as the option of unlimited TV viewing. It might also make options
more costly, such as the option of taking the lift. Creating the right contexts might
include, but is not restricted to, what has become known as “nudging”. Nudging is
characterized by subtle contextual measures such as writing the healthy meal on top of
the menu list so that more people will order it, or placing the lift somewhat out of sight
in order to encourage taking the staircase. However, nudging measures per definition
DefendingContextualismintheCaseofChildhoodObesityPreventionAgainstaNormativeChallenge 43
do not affect the number and accessibility of the options. Choosing an unhealthy
meal and taking the lift are still equally available and equally unburdened options.
Contextualism, contrary to mere nudging, affects the number and accessibility of
(significant) options. Thus, contextualism might clearly limit the child’s freedom if
“freedom” is understood as “option freedom”. Is that a problem?
Caring for children per definition means caring for their welfare. A limitation of
the child’s option freedom harms the child only if it negatively affects its welfare.
According to all common accounts of welfare, option freedom is not intrinsically
good for the child. If option freedom is good at all, it is instrumentally good. While
having the option of unlimited TV viewing might give the child some enjoyment or
preference satisfaction in the short run, it is likely to stand in the way of these goods
in the long run, precisely because it might well contribute to childhood obesity and
the accompanying negative impacts on the child’s welfare. Furthermore, even in the
short run, it is not unlikely that other activities can be found that the child learns to
enjoy and desire at least as much. Thus, a limitation of the child’s option freedom in
this case is likely to promote the child’s welfare.
So far, I have assumed that option freedom as such is not an intrinsic good, but
some might argue that it is. One might conceive of option freedom as an aspect of
welfare. Perhaps it is an item on an objective list. If option freedom is an aspect of
welfare, limiting it may negatively affect the child’s welfare. Yet limiting the child’s
option freedom may still contribute positively to other aspects of its welfare. Benefits
with regard to these other aspects, such as health, are likely to outweigh the harms
with regard to option freedom. What is more, it is in fact unlikely that restricting
the child’s TV time is detrimental to the child’s option freedom overall. After all,
preventing childhood obesity and the accompanying mental and physical problems
is likely to have a positive effect on the child’s option freedom all things considered.
If option freedom is only instrumentally good, it may nevertheless be an important
or even indispensible means for achieving some intrinsic good. That intrinsic good
might be autonomy. Autonomy, one might argue, is good for the child, not only to the
extent that it promotes enjoyment or preference satisfaction, but in itself. Autonomy,
one might thus argue, is an aspect of welfare, perhaps an item on the objective list.
Alternatively, one might argue that even if autonomy is not intrinsically good for the
child, being autonomous is a good simpliciter. Option freedom might be considered
valuable not for its own sake, but as a means to, or aspect of, autonomy. In order
to assess that criticism, one needs to assess what autonomy is and how it relates
to option freedom. Furthermore, one needs to determine the value of autonomy as
compared to welfare. These are difficult tasks.
Fortunately, we can bracket these tasks for the time being, since we are concerned
here with the case of childhood obesity prevention. Limiting a child’s TV time does
not infringe with the child’s autonomy, simply because a child is not capable of an
autonomous choice on that matter. On any plausible account of autonomy, choosing
autonomously requires a certain awareness of one’s various options including their
consequences. If you ask a child whether it wants to drink a certain liquid, and it
wishes to do so, not knowing that the liquid contains some lethal poison, one cannot
say that the child autonomously chooses to drink the poison, or even to die. The
child is simply not capable of making an autonomous choice on that issue, because
it lacks an understanding of the relevant facts and their consequences. The same is
the case with regard to the choice concerning unlimited TV viewing. The child might
opt for unlimited TV viewing, but cannot assess the consequences of that choice, and
thus cannot choose autonomously. Autonomy is not an all-or-nothing matter. A child
might well autonomously choose whether to drink apple juice or orange juice and
whether to watch one children’s movie rather than another. So, even if autonomy
is prudentially good or a good simpliciter and even if option freedom is important
for autonomy in some way, it cannot be the case that providing an individual with
options that she lacks the capacity to assess increases her autonomy.
Considering all this, I conclude that the concern about the child’s option freedom
does not count against the maintenance and creation of the above-mentioned physical
and social contexts that facilitate obesity prevention and thereby promote the child’s
welfare.
2.6 Is Childhood Obesity a Special Case?
My defence of contextualism against the concern about limiting option freedom drew
on the fact that we are talking about children, who are not capable of autonomous
choice with regard to the relevant issues, such as whether or not to limit viewing
time. One might wonder whether contextualism, which might limit option freedom,
is defensible when adults are concerned. First of all, adults might be capable of
autonomous decisions regarding the relevant issues. Secondly, while some adults in
their specific roles – such as parents, teachers or politicians – might have special
duties to care about the welfare of children, the same can perhaps not be said about
responsibilities of adults for themselves or of adults for each other. A third potentially
relevant difference is that children are particularly dependent on the social and
physical contexts in which they find themselves, while adults seem to have greater
freedom to choose and to change contexts. This raises difficult normative issues
concerning the acceptability of limiting the option freedom of adults in order to
promote their welfare. I will not pursue these issues here, but want to point out a
possibility that seems least problematic. Adults – alone or in collectives – can, of
course, autonomously decide to maintain and create beneficial environments and
accept limits to their option freedom for the sake of improved welfare. Furthermore,
when we are individually or collectively considering changing the social and physical
environment of others, we can take into account that these changes – even if they
happen to increase option freedom – do not necessarily promote these individuals’
welfare.
Is Childhood Obesity a Special Case? 45
So, it seems morally unproblematic to autonomously limit one’s own option-

freedom for the sake of one’s own welfare. Furthermore, it seems morally right, when
influencing other people’s option freedom, to at least consider the effects on these
people’s welfare. One might thus consider the empirical question of whether and in
what circumstances increased option-freedom diminishes people’s welfare.
While this can be granted, the threat from Brave New World scenarios still looms
on the horizon: Is it morally acceptable to paternalistically limit people’s option-
freedom in order to promote their welfare?
First of all, in order to be an act of paternalism in the strong sense of the word,
those whose option freedom we limit paternalistically must possess the capacity
of making autonomous decisions on the relevant issue. Even for adults, empirical
studies raise doubts about their autonomy in a variety of cases. Food choices are a
well-known example. What is more, research suggests that the lack of autonomy in
certain situations cannot be fully remedied by providing information, since it is a
result of persistent cognitive and emotional biases (Haybron 2008, 225-250).
Secondly, I think that the attractiveness of limiting adults’ option freedom for the
sake of promoting their welfare depends a great deal on what exactly welfare consists
of. In my exploration of childhood obesity as a welfare problem, I sketched the common
accounts of welfare and mentioned that they all have counterintuitive implications.
None of these accounts of welfare seems to satisfactorily match our commonsense
understanding of welfare. Reverting to the commonsense understanding of welfare
is equally ineffectual, because there is no such thing as a coherent commonsense
understanding of welfare. If we had a plausible account of what really made an
individual’s life good for him or her, the resistance to limiting option-freedom for the
sake of welfare would lose at least some of its force. For instance, the fear of being
force-fed drugs that give one pleasant mental states is only relevant if welfare consists
in having pleasant mental states. That, however, is not a plausible account of welfare.
Thirdly, the fear that brainwashing might bring about the circumstance that I
were perfectly well off pursuing some meaningless activity can be taken away by the
reminder that the individual resulting from such brainwashing would not be me in
the relevant sense. Therefore, brainwashing would not make me better off. It would
rather exchange me (in the sense that matters) for someone else.
Last but not least, the attractiveness of limiting option-freedom for the sake of
welfare depends on what matters for a good life simpliciter, except for one’s own
welfare. Some might say: “Being well-off is fine, as far as it goes. But what about being
virtuous, achieving something, caring for others and making the world a better place?
Don’t these things matter as well? Welfarists believe that welfare is the sole ultimate
good. Achievement is valuable if it brings about welfare for oneself and others. Being
moral is a matter of bringing about welfare, for oneself and others. The details differ,
but that is what all welfarists agree about. Welfarists welcome limitations of option-
freedom for the sake of welfare. While I agree with the welfarist position, this is not
the place to defend it.
The attractiveness of the contextualist’s idea that welfare should trump freedom
in a variety of cases depends, among other things, on the relative value of welfare and
freedom, on empirical facts about the capacity for autonomous choice in the relevant
context, and on the plausibility of the underlying account of welfare.
2.7 Conclusion
I have applied contextualism about how to promote welfare in the case of childhood
obesity prevention and defended it against the normative concern that creating
and maintaining the right contexts may diminish the individual’s option-freedom. I
have argued that caring for a child means caring for its welfare and pointed out that
option-freedom is at best a means to welfare and should not trump it in this case. I
have also pointed out that an appeal to the importance of autonomy is not helpful.
After all, even if option-freedom is a prerequisite for autonomy, this is not a case
of limiting autonomy, because the child is incapable of autonomous choice on the
relevant issues. I have explored whether concern about limiting option freedom is a
plausible criticism against contextualism in cases that concern the welfare of adults.
The plausibility of this criticism depends on the relative value of welfare and freedom,
on empirical facts about the capacity for autonomous choice, and on the plausibility
of the underlying account of welfare.
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Tim Moore
3 Keeping them in Mind
3.1 Introduction
Over the past 30 years, a growing number of theorists have problematised long-
standing theories of childhood, arguing that they fail to fully account for children’s
lived experience, the part they play in shaping and being shaped by the worlds
around them, and their unique cultures and standpoints (Lee 1999, Corsaro 2005).
Theories have emerged that homogenise children’s experiences and either understate
or overstate their vulnerability, capacity and agency. This paper presents these
different (and often contradictory) conceptualisations and suggests that the process
of reflexivity might help researchers (and theorists, practitioners and others) account
for their approach and identify and respond to any challenges that arise.
This paper draws from my PhD study which invited 12 experienced children’s
researchers to reflect on their practice and how it was influenced by their own
experience, by the academic field in which they work, and the broader social and
cultural environments that shape what they know and how they know it.
3.2 Competing Conceptualisations and the Challenges of Rese-

arching Children
There is general consensus that childhood is a social construction which has been
conceptualised in different ways and at different times, both within the general
population and within academia (Alderson 2013). These conceptualisations have
been influenced by the social, cultural, political and economic contexts within
which children and childhood theorists exist and have evolved and devolved over
time (Corsaro 2005). Rather than moving seamlessly from one conceptualisation to
another, theorists and the community at large have often held aspects of different
conceptualisations at once: often with little consideration of how the contradictions
and limitations of different theories might best be negotiated (Cunningham and
Morpurgo 2007).
Most conceptualisations characterise childhood teleologically and as a period of
‘becoming’: a period of pre-humanity within which the child passively learns, grows
and develops towards adulthood (Qvotrup 2001). Children have commonly been seen
as a blank slate on which adults forge the child’s future character, knowledge and
worldview (Thane 1981). Children are thus passive recipients with little influence over
their development, let alone the worlds around them or the adults they encounter
(Cunningham 2005). Their value has generally related to them in the future: who they
will be and what part they will play (Archard 2004).
© 2015 Tim Moore

In many conceptions, childhood is seen as a period of innocence, naivety,

incompetence and vulnerability (Qvortrup 1994): a period during which the child
must be protected, educated and socialised so that they might become the best citizen
possible as they enter adulthood. Unable to reflect on their experience, to act in their
own best interests or to provide a perspective that is different to one that could be
more articulately offered by an adult, children have been largely seen but not heard
(Roche 1999).
Rather than seeing children as innocents, other conceptualisations have
suggested that children are born innately evil, or more likely, with a potential for
evil influenced by their nature, by exposure to adult knowledge, adult manipulation
or abuse, or adults’ neglect of their duty to provide children with idyllic childhoods
or with stern development of character and responsibility (Fawcett 2008). At other
points in time, children have been seen not as those who are corrupted but as those
who corrupt: gang members, cyberbullies, teen sex offenders, provocative Lolitas, or
rebels without a cause (Jackson and Scott 1999).
Adults have been held responsible for failing to provide children with these
priceless childhoods and the consequences that having troubled or troubling children
have for the society at large (Zelizer 1994). At times adults have been held responsible
as a collective, as a community, as a broad family network or, within Beck’s risk
society (Beck 1992), as individual parents. At others, children themselves have been
held accountable, particularly as they pass through the latter stage of childhood:
adolescence.
To varying degrees, troubling children have been held personally responsible
for their behaviours (particularly through the adolescent stages of their childhoods)
(Hobbs 1982), but the responses to their indiscretions have varied over time: they have
been harshly punished, fiercely protected, assertively educated and re-educated,
actively excluded, or violently removed from abusive or neglectful parents or
communities in the belief that someone else might do a better job and redress these
failings (Brendtro, Brokenleg, and Van Bockern 1990).
In reviewing the literature, I would argue that there have been 12 dominant
conceptions at play. I have summarised them in the table below.
Competing Conceptualisations and the Challenges of Researching Children 51
Table 3.1:
Construct Characteristics Vulnerability Competence Agency / Participation
1. The Evil Children are born Children are Children are not Children’s value is in
Child evil and need to have vulnerable to competent to act the future, influenced
evil educated and / immorality and in their own best by adults and
or punished out of poor adulthoods interests or in negatively influencing
them if innate evil is not ways that are not society. Children are
redressed antisocial passive recipients
2. The Child Children are born Children vulnerable Children are Children are passively
as an Empty without innate evil as a result of poor immature and influenced by adults
Vessel or innocence but parenting and incompetent and society – no real
passively acquire negative adult attention is paid to how
knowledge and involvement they influence or are
temperament agents within it
3. The Children are born Children are Children are Children are passively
Innocent Child innately innocent vulnerable when immature and influenced negatively
exposed to adult incompetent. by adults and society.
knowledge, Innocence and They have no agency
exploitation and naivety promoted
harm
4. The Childhood is a Children are Children are Child’s play and

Romantic Child preferred state vulnerable to competent in children’s cultures
and one that is lost corruption and to understanding are recognised. The
as they grow into their childhoods their worlds but influence they have
adulthood being stolen by not necessarily the on each other is
adults adult world within recognised but not on
which they live adults / community
5. The Children need to Children corrupted Children have their Childhood is

Evangelical be saved from the by employment, own natures but contextualised within
Child adult world around sexual abuse and these are non- families. Children’s
them and from maltreatment adult and of lesser rights are managed by
exploitation by adults. Great value adults who determine
concern for poor their participation
children
6. The Childhood marked Children are Children are Childhood scrutinised

Delinquent by potential evil vulnerable to unable to curb and controlled by adults
Child (external rather than delinquency influence of adults for the good of children.
internal) They have no positive
influence
7. The Studied Children shaped by Children are Children have The State is responsible
Child their environments vulnerable to poor developing for children and for
health, psychologicalcompetence but educating them. They
and educational less so than adults have little agency
outcomes
Table 3.1:continued
Construct Characteristics Vulnerability Competence Agency / Participation
8. The Children developing Children are Competency Children assimilate

Psychological within and as a at risk of poor is developed and accommodate
Child result of their outcomes, caustic from childhood knowledge and
interactions with the environments incompetence to competence through
environment and that lead to poor adult competence interacting with
others outcomes environment. They have
some agency
9. The Children socialised Children are at risk Increasing Increasing recognition

Socialising to take on the of poor outcomes recognition of agency although
Child conventional values throughout life of children’s not all socialisation
and norms through if not socialised competence theories recognise
social conditioning properly however children children’s influence
less competent than
adults
10. The Childhood as a Children are Children are Children are active
Agentic Child discrete period of vulnerable as a competent, agents influencing and
life in which children result of structures have their own being influenced by
make sense of their and entrenched knowledge and others and the worlds
worlds and interact power differentials can reflect on around them. Children
within it their place within are co-constructors
society
11. The Child Children are humans Children are Children are Children influence and
as the Holder and hold rights. vulnerable due competent but are influenced by the
of Rights to their relative less so than worlds around them.
immaturity and adults. They have They have a right to
incompetence – a developing participation – but
they have a right capacity to act often need adults to
to be protected, in their own best enable this to occur.
to have their interests but Children’s rights sit
developmental adults care-take alongside parental
needs met and their rights until rights (with some
to participate in they become clashes)
processes that adults
affect their lives
12. End of Delineation between Children are Children are Child-adult interactions
Childhood children and adults vulnerable to assumed to be are confused. Children
is blurred. Children being displaced, competent but heavily influenced by
are exposed to to being neglected may be required the media, by markets
adult knowledge by adults, to to do things and by others who act
and culture (often commodification that they are not to manipulate them.
to their detriment) and sexualisation prepared for / be Children have limited
and adults fail responsible for capacity to protect
to let go of their things out of their themselves from
engagement with control manipulation
‘childish’ activities
and cultures
My Study 53
3.3 My Study
In 2009-12, I conducted an exploratory qualitative study that provided a group of

experienced researchers the opportunity to reflect on their practice and the practice
of research with children in Australia; to consider how they understand children and
childhood, and how their research is underpinned and influenced by the assumptions
they hold.
The study asked 8 experienced children’s researchers to consider how factors in
the research environment influenced their research practice: which challenges have
they encountered and overcome in the often complex and ‘messy’ world of children’s
research?
The study included semi-structured interviews in which researchers were invited
to consider how they conceptualised children and the impacts that conceptualising
children in these ways influenced their research practice. Ultimately, my study posed
three questions:
–– What are the underlying assumptions, beliefs and values held by researchers
about children that underpin their research with children?
–– How do these assumptions, beliefs and values influence the broad research
process?
–– How might reflexive practice be used to understand, account for and help guide
the practice of research with children?
To place their reflections in context, researchers’ writing was also analysed in terms
of the key themes emerging from interviews. My study was therefore a reflexive one,
as it provided researchers an opportunity to reflect on practice and to consider how
their conceptualisations of childhood influenced their work.
3.4 Reflexivity as a Process Through Which Theoretical and Proce-

dural Challenges might be Navigated
The practice of research with children is primarily related to the development of knowledge,
but is also a political and social endeavour. Through the development of new theories
about who children are, what needs they have, what contributions they make, and how
they understand and respond to the world, children’s positioning is reconstructed, and
the ways that such theories influence practice are problematised and reoriented. But
reflexive theorists also argue that the practice of research and the theorising that follows
is also political and social, and is highly influenced by those managing that process and
those relationships, either to the benefit or detriment of children.
Reflexivity has been proffered as a process through which many of the ontological,
epistemological and axiological aspects of the self, of intersubjectivity and the
colonisation of knowledge can be uncovered, explored and accounted for. Some have
argued that it is a way of increasingly problematising self-knowledge, of monitoring

the self and the influence that one’s own biases, beliefs and personal experiences have
on qualitative methodologies and the creation of new knowledge (Rose 1997, Daley
2010). Although the concept is often used interchangeably with related concepts of
reflectivity and critical reflection, there has been a growing consensus that reflexivity
is more action-oriented and is characterised by an ongoing internal dialogue and
critical self-reflection through which the researcher’s positionality might be made
explicit and the impacts of this positionality be accounted for (Sultana 2007).
In the feminist domain, commentators have stressed the value of exploring how
one’s own gender but also their lived experience of sexism, of their socialisation of
gender roles, expectations, sexual expression and repression, and how this influences
the way that they understand the world and relate to others within it (England 1994).
In cultural studies, researchers are challenged to consider how their insiderness (or
outsiderness) influences the lens through which they investigate particular subjects,
how their own cultural values and histories shape the way they relate to subjects
and research participants and make meaning of the data they gather (Merriam et al.
2001). Other reflexive researchers, particularly those inspired by theorists such as
Pierre Bourdieu, attempt to turn the research lens back onto themselves and their
research practice: taking responsibility for their own situatedness within the research
process, and how their own biographies and experiences affect the settings within
which research is conducted, those who they engage in research activities and how
they interpret data and present findings. In these ways, reflexivity is presented as a
process through which the production of knowledge as independent of the researcher
and the research context is problematised (Guillemin and Gillam 2004).
Finally, reflexivity conducted at the team or academic field level has opened up
opportunities to unsettle entrenched commonsense views and truisms that pervade
what is known about particular subjects, and questions how these taken-for-granted
theories or ‘facts’ have been reinforced uncritically (Barry et al. 1999). Feminists,
for example, have used reflexivity to uncover the ways that predominantly male
academics perpetuated gender assumptions and stereotypes and controlled the
development of knew knowledge.
3.5 Re-Considering Vulnerability and Incompetence Reflexively
As illustrated in the table above, childhood has popularly been characterised

as a period marked by vulnerability. From this perspective, children as a group
are conceptualised as needing protection either from their own inherent evil or
innocence, from adults who exploit or maltreat them, or from systems and structures
that disempower them. A number of writers argue that these conceptions continue to
be played out in both popular and academic discourses. Such discourses promote the
need for adults as individuals (including parents, teachers, and children’s workers)
Re-Considering Vulnerability and Incompetence Reflexively 55
and collectives (including societies, child protection systems, and welfare sectors) to
intervene in children’s lives (Christensen and Prout 2002).
Participants in my study universally recognised that children experienced some
level of vulnerability and were reticent to adopt conceptions of childhood that
understated this reality. They echoed the sentiments of Balen et al. (2006, 32), who
observe that “failing to acknowledge childhood as a distinct phase in the life cycle,
albeit arguably socially constructed, where differential competencies, responsibilities
and vulnerabilities prevail, would be irresponsible”.
A number of researchers in my study reflected on how their own childhood
experiences, experiences as parents, and as teachers and youth workers influenced
their thinking. Three observed, for example, that their experiences as parents helped
shape, soften or realign their views on childhood vulnerability. On one hand, having
raised children through infancy they reflected that they were aware of how dependent
children could be and how they needed adults to keep them safe from harm. They
said that having children helped them appreciate the level of this dependence and
became increasingly aware of the protectiveness they had for their own children and,
as a result of this, for children more broadly. They reflected that although they had
come to parenting with a concept of children as resilient, this resilience was further
revealed through the observed experiences of their children and their children’s peers:
I always thought that kids were resilient but in having children it became clearer to me as to how
resilient they can be when given the right opportunities and chances. I don’t know that I could
have come to this view without having been surprised [by my children’s capacity to cope] (RF).
Researcher participants had varying views about the extent to which this vulnerability
was inherent in the child, in their relationship with adults, or within the systems and
structures in which they lived and negotiated the world.
Children’s vulnerability is often posited in terms of their physical weakness;
their lack of knowledge due to their limited education, experience and cognitive
capacity; and the ‘normal’ risks associated with being a child (Kelley, Mayall, and
Hood 1997). Researcher participants were generally appreciative of these limitations,
particularly when considering younger children. One, for example, talked about a
newborn relative of hers and its total reliance on its parents for food, stimulation and
protection. Although she acknowledged that this small child was interacting with its
parents, and ultimately affecting them, she recognised that its dependence on adults
in general and its parents in particular was significant. She observed that children’s
dependence afforded them adult intervention and concern.
Amongst the researcher participants, however, there was a strong view that by
universalising childhood, theorists have been unable to recognise that children of
different ages and stages have different vulnerabilities (and resiliencies), and that by
holding totalising assumptions about children and their ability to protect themselves
and manage the risks around them, children were often further marginalised and
oppressed. Researcher participants argued that researchers and theorists need to be

upfront about which children they were theorising about, and how children of different
ages, stages and experiences might have different needs and be conceptualised in
different ways.
Although there was agreement that children were often vulnerable as a result
of their relatively limited physical, neurological and experiential development, there
was also a view that much of their vulnerability emerged as a result of the way that
children are positioned within society. As such, it was argued that vulnerability was
inherent in both children and childhood.
In this regard, participants echoed the observations made by Lansdown (1994,
35), who observes that this structural vulnerability exists “because of [children’s]
total lack of political power and their lack of civil rights”. Lansdown (1994, 38) follows
by arguing that:
There is a tendency to rely too heavily on a presumption of children’s biological and psychologi-
cal vulnerability in developing our law, policy and practice, and insufficient focus on the extent
to which their lack of civil status creates that vulnerability.
However, some researcher participants argued that the relational aspect between
adults and children should not be overstated and that children’s agency should be
further appreciated when considering their positionality. A number gave examples of
how children managed, negotiated and rebelled against this positionality; noting that
through their play and in their interactions with adults more broadly, children had
some control over how adults might be let into their worlds, be provided with status
and recognition and ultimately whether they might be excluded. They stressed the
value of not only listening to children but also watching them as they interacted with
researchers during research activities, and reflecting on how children’s behaviour
might also give some insight into adult-child relations and the content being explored.
3.5.1 The Influence of Vulnerable Conceptions
When children are constructed as primarily vulnerable it becomes the responsibility

of adults, systems and the State to ‘protect’ them from further harm and negative
influence. Within many contexts, this has led to children being excluded from
decision-making processes, in civic activities and from mechanisms (including
research) through which they can co-produce new knowledge for fear that they
may be harmed through their participation or rendered more vulnerable as a result.
Ironically, this has meant that children have not been given opportunities to exercise
their human rights nor inform the communities, systems or services with which they
have engaged, sustaining them in vulnerable and oppressed positions.
(Re)considering Vulnerability Reflexively 57
Researchers in my study articulated a desire to redress this situation, particularly

in the research context, but argued that this was often difficult as they encountered
ethical tensions that they and others found difficult to navigate. Although they
believed that ethics processes often excluded children, they were wary about
removing them entirely, recognising that children were often vulnerable both
emotionally and politically and that this should be navigated on an individual basis.
They believed that it was important for individual researchers, research teams and
ethics committees to have an ongoing dialogue (with children, where possible) to
problematise their approaches to ethics and research and to create new opportunities
for ethical practice. In recognising that children were often vulnerable, researchers
argued for a better balance between children’s participation and protection within
the research context.
3.6 (Re)considering Vulnerability Reflexively
In their 2011 article, Jan Mason and her colleague Suzanne Hood reflect that research
is never apolitical and research with children is conducted within a context in which
the “political can no more be separated from the personal for children than for
adults” (Mason & Hood, 2011, p. 494). By promoting children’s agency, researcher
participants can challenge the social order through the process of renegotiation
of adult-child relations – whether they are engaged as participants or by treating
them as co-researchers. However, as others have observed, there is also a risk that
the research process can sustain children in disempowered positions and privilege
adultist assumptions about their competency, their vulnerability and their broad life
experience.
There was a view amongst researcher participants that reflexive practice
needed to begin from the early days of designing and planning research projects.
Firstly, researcher participants stressed the value of researchers (particularly those
new to the field) spending time reflecting on how they consider children and their
vulnerability. As seen, they advocated for conceptions of childhood that marked
children as competent and encouraged researchers to consider how they might ‘get
over’ limiting mindsets.
3.7 Negotiating Risks with Ethics Committees
In line with Bourdieu’s notions of reflexivity, researcher participants believed that

there was value in engaging in reflexive discussions within the broader academic
field, unpacking notions of vulnerability and collaboratively navigating the ethical
and methodological challenges that might arise. In particular, they stressed the value
of developing an ongoing dialogue with ethics committees.
Researcher participants were of the view that ethics committees generally held
conceptions of childhood that posed them as vulnerable and at risk of increased
vulnerability through the research process. As such, in considering practical ways
forward, they believed that further dialogue needed to be entered into with ethics
committees, particularly around understandings of vulnerability.
Rather than seeing ethics as being primarily procedural, and ethics committees as
gatekeepers whose sole role is to approve or disallow research, researcher participants
argued for a reconsideration of the ethics process, advocating strongly for processes
and procedures that responded to risk but allowed for children’s participation.
They believed that it was the role of researchers who held contradictory
conceptions of children and childhood vulnerability to work with ethics committees
to consider questions such as: ‘how might children’s exclusion from research further
disempower and exclude them?’ ‘How might vulnerabilities be understood within the
research context and appropriate steps be put into place to ensure that those which
become apparent are resolved at each point in the research process?’ And, ‘how might
other conceptualisations of children and childhood be understood and be used to
reframe ethical dilemmas and issues?’ For this to occur, they were of the view that
ethics committees needed to engage in reflexive activities with those working with
children and those with a good understanding of their lived experiences.
3.7.1 Managing Researchers’ Vulnerabilities
In addition to recognising and reflecting on the vulnerabilities that children may encounter
within the research process, a number of participants were of the view that it is important
for researchers to consider how the research experience affects them also. They, and other
writers, recognise that when entering the research process, researchers can often delve
into “unexpected and uncomfortable territory” (Davison, 2004, p. 381) where their own
emotional security might be affected. Coles and Neerosh Mudaly observe:
Qualitative research with vulnerable populations exposes researchers to a range of challenges

during the research process that may have an impact on the researcher. These include the rela-
tionship that develops between researcher and participant, the counsellor versus researcher
role, being empathic and sensitive to participant distress, and frequent exposure to participant
trauma during the research process. (2010, p. 60)
3.7.2 Encouraging Conversations about Vulnerability and Children within the

Broader Research Field
Researcher participants highlighted the fact that often their views, values and
beliefs about children and vulnerability were different to, and sometimes opposed,
Negotiating Risks with Ethics Committees 59
those dominant in the academic field and within the broader community. They
had used a number of strategies to help navigate their way through the conflicts,
tensions and “roadblocks” (as one participant put it) that emerged as a result
of these differing perspectives, but argued that further conversation with key
stakeholders across fields would be of benefit. So too, they argued, was there
benefit in sharing their experiences with others who were new to the game and who
were encountering similar ontological and epistemological inconsistencies and
ethical and methodological dilemmas. One participant argued that those who were
working through these difficulties had an ethical and professional responsibility to
engage others in discussions, so that children were both protected from possible
and often unforeseen risks through their involvement or non-involvement in
research processes:
Yeah and that’s what we get, but I suppose that means that we frame research then as an
ethical responsibility to each other and that’s an ongoing – it’s beyond the ethics commit-
tee. That’s an ethical interaction with people and you can’t ethically stand by and not do
something. (SD)
3.7.3 Children’s Competence and Incompetence
The second aspect inherent in many of the conceptualisations of childhood relates

to children’s competence or incompetence. Participants in my study observed that
within society broadly, and within the academic field in particular, children are
still primarily and uncritically understood as being incompetent and unable to
reflect upon or articulate their experiences, needs or wishes. Such rhetoric reflects
strongly held views within early psychological and developmental theories that
assert that as children lack experience and cognitive capacity they are unable to
fully appreciate their situation, environments and life worlds. Participants, like
a number of key education, psychology and sociology theorists, challenged such
assertions, arguing that from a very young age children are able to observe the
world and to make critical judgments about these experiences. They argue that
exposure to behaviours, relationships and experiences have more influence on
children’s ability to reflect upon issues than their chronological age.
There are some things that I, as an adult, don’t fully understand because I haven’t been exposed
to them. Yes, I can use my experience to develop hypotheses but I’m not speaking from experi-
ence. It’s the same with children. They can talk about what they know, what they have thought
about and what they have observed – and they do it from a child’s standpoint. That’s what we
need to capture because ultimately it’s going to be different [to that of an adult’s experience].
There was consensus among the group, however, that such notions did not reflect
their experience or their ways of seeing children more broadly. One reflected:
I completely disagree. I vehemently disagree [with the idea that children and young people are
incompetent]. I just think that young people, both in their interviews and in their lives they
describe, seem to be incredibly able. And as I said before, I think I was just very surprised at
their ability to reflect on their lives and try and make narratives out of those that were clear to
them and to be able to look back and review things and look at them differently as they grew in
maturity. (DK)
Researcher participants’ views about children’s competence were often shaped

by their own experiences of childhood, through their tertiary education and from
their practice experiences, either prior to or as part of their research careers. Three
participants spoke about their childhoods and how they remember having in-depth
conversations with adults around them, and in feeling involved in decision-making
processes about matters that were important to them. These experiences shaped these
researcher participants’ views on children’s capacity and the value that children place
on these encounters. As one noted:
I think it was also my personal experiences as a child and a young person that made me absolu-
tely convinced that children are capable of knowing about their own lives – of having a say on
their own lives – even if they may not be in a position to make a decision, just as adults are often
not in a position to make a decision, but the children have to be part of that. (SB)
These researchers reflected that they drew from their own experiences of thinking
about, talking about and learning about complex issues while they were young. As
such their developing concept about childhood knowledge informed not only the way
they encountered children in the present but also opened up opportunities to reflect
on their own childhoods and how this influenced current practice.
Maybe I think in the course of working with the children [in research] one of the things that
started - struck me as I heard them say things or make sense of things I would start to ask myself
about: “Was I like that?” And, “Did I have that ability to verbalise things in this way because I
couldn’t connect with my own childhood?” I started to question that about myself and that’s
when I started to notice a lot more, because I think they’re sitting there and what is it that -
seemingly not very smart children were able to say things that were so poignant and so clear. It
revealed things about me, about my childhood, and that was informative as well. (NM)
For the participants who had worked with children in different contexts and
professions, their views were very much shaped by their practice experience with
children and the many conversations and interactions that they had shared.
3.8 Reconsidering Children’s Competence
As seen, many of the researcher participants were of the view that the way that
children experienced and understood the world was significantly different to adults.
Researcher participants challenged traditional understandings of knowledge,
Reconsidering Children’s Competence 61
knowledge development and epistemology, arguing that they were adultist, and that
these traditional understandings viewed adult knowledge as being more valid and
of greater value than that of children’s. Rather than dismissing children’s knowledge
as being non-adult knowledge, researcher participants argued that it held value for a
number of significant reasons. As one participant summarised:
What do I say about that? I say, as [children’s researcher] Mary Kellett says, that children are the
most competent commentators on their own lives. They know more about themselves. Adults are
people too. I mean, see what we ignore is that there are varying degrees of competence in adults.
I will speak out on things that I’m not competent on. It’s the responsibility of other people to
[scrutinise my input and determine its value]. (JM)
The implications of recognising children’s knowledge as being of value were discussed by

each of the researcher participants. They argued that the ways that children understood
and made meaning of their experiences was different but in no way less complex or
sophisticated than adults. They argued that children understood what it was like to be
a child and to experience the world as someone at that particular age and stage of life.
As a result of holding this view about children’s knowledge, researcher
participants described how they were reticent to perpetuate what they believed were
adultist observations about children and childhood, and spent some time considering
the implications for theory and practice. They argued that it was necessary for
those researching children to be clear as to whether they were reporting on their
observations about children’s experiences, or when they were reporting children’s
views about their experiences. In the latter case, they argued that the researcher must
spend time exploring the child’s inner world and present children’s thoughts within
the context of their own childhoods and their current experience. This, they believed,
required a level of self-monitoring and reflection and an articulation of how their
views influenced their practice being clearly acknowledged in their writing.
These views challenge the traditional notions of children as ‘human becomings’,
and recasts them as humans who may have different ways of making meaning about
and understanding the world, but whose knowledge is no less valid.
Participants also stressed the value of children’s observations about the world not
only because they illuminate children’s own experiences and considerations but also
because they could provide fresh insights about the nature of society and the place
of both children and adults within it. In her interview, for example, one researcher
drew from feminist standpoint theory and argued that, like women, children were an
oppressed and marginalised group who could reflect not only on their positioning but
also on the ways that adults interacted with each other and with children:
Standpoint theory gives us a lens through which we can understand children and to also under-
stand ourselves as understood by children. Like women have provided powerful observations
about being a woman and not being a man, children can tell us what it’s like to not be an adult,
what they think it’s like to be an adult and what it’s like to be someone who’s not yet an adult in
an adultist world. (JM)
Without the childhood researchers we wouldn’t have a theoretical basis for looking at children,
we wouldn’t... their goal of looking at children’s lives from children’s standpoint is so important
and I would actually think that some of the people who criticise don’t understand standpoint
theory or the importance of what they’re doing and in particular their work on generations. (JM)
3.8.1 Children’s Competence Greater than Suggested
Researcher participants challenged the view that universally children could not
grasp adult concepts or participate in discussions about topics often considered
incomprehensible to children (particularly as they moved into adolescence):
I think we often misjudge children’s capacity and competence either because we don’t provide
them opportunities to demonstrate their skills or knowledge or we involve them in activities that
don’t fit their needs or wishes. Because we’ve failed to explain a process or have been unclear
about our expectations children haven’t responded – and we see that as their lack of competence
in understanding rather than our incompetence in asking. (SB)
They argued that they could justify this position as a result of their experience and
success as researchers. They contended that those who were more ambivalent about
children’s competency were often so because they had not worked with children, nor
seen first-hand what children were capable of knowing and articulating.
Although they recognised that children were often more competent than adults
gave them credit for, most researcher participants were reluctant to suggest that
because certain children were competent in many domains of their lives that they
were competent in them all. What researcher participants did acknowledge was that
children’s reflective capacity did evolve and change but that this was no different to
adults:
It is true that children may not grasp particular concepts or ideas or, in fact, not have experi-
enced the things that are being researched. But that is no different to adults. Children often have
encountered and thought about many things – these are the things we should talk to them about
because until we get these insights, our theories of childhood are going to be limited (SB).
By doing so, researcher participants recognised that there were limits to what children
could understand and argued against placing children in positions where they were
asked to comment on things outside of their experience or to explain things that they
had not processed in the past. Although two of the researcher participants strongly
advocated the reflexive capacities of infants and young children and their capacity
to understand concepts such as research, consent and future harm, the group of
researcher participants as a whole were of the view that some children may not have
the cognitive capacity to understand what was being asked of them, or why and how
their involvement might affect them in the future.
(Re)considering Competence Reflexively 63
Lastly, researcher participants highlighted the flaws in the conceptual opposition

of childhood and adulthood inherent in many of the dominant paradigms relating
to childhood (Mason and Hood 2011). As Jenks (1982, 10) notes: “the child cannot be
imagined except in relation to an adult … it becomes impossible to produce a well
defined sense of the adult... without first positing the child.” Alongside this challenge
to children’s incompetency was a challenge to the notion that adults were always
competent and children were not. As one noted:
There are many things that I do not know, things that children know, a knowing that they are not
given credit for or opportunities to articulate. (AG)
3.8.2 The Influence of Incompetent Conceptions
When children are primarily cast as pre-human and incompetent, their exclusion
from community and from its processes is justified. Epistemologically, research
that is carried out by researchers whose work is underpinned by such assumptions
often relies on adults who are conduits of children’s knowledge: making comment
without engaging children directly. From an ethical point of view, children are often
considered unable to act in their own best interests and therefore rely on adults (most
often parents but others also) to agree to their participation and to determine how
they might be involved. This often has led to a situation where children are again
excluded when adults are reticent for children to participate – even when children are
keen to engage in research when given the choice.
3.9 (Re)considering Competence Reflexively
Considering and accounting for these ontological, epistemological and ethical

challenges was viewed as being imperative in research with children and deserving
of reflexive practice.
3.9.1 Being Aware of one’s own Theoretical, Ontological and Epistemological

Position
Researcher participants were of the view that one’s theoretical, ontological and
epistemological positions had a profound influence on how, why and who did
research with children, and what issues and experiences were explored and reported.
They believed that children’s competence should be recognised, but realised that this
view was not always supported by others. They argued that when academics were
hesitant about children’s capacity they should be upfront about this in their work. As
one participant said:
I suppose I try to be patient with that view [about children’s incompetence] that’s there because
I do understand it … [but] if in fact we don’t trust children’s accounts then we should be upfront
about that and not attempt to do it. I think if we do trust children’s accounts, this is not about
giving away our authority as researchers or as adults or as anything else, this is much more
about, you know, there’s that whole idea that you can share power and still retain your authority
[and credibility in an academic sense]. (AG)
Three of the participants believed that it was important, therefore, for researchers
working with children to account for their positions, particularly in relation to
children’s competence, i.e. their views about children’s ability to reflect upon and
articulate in a research context. They asserted that this was particularly important
when conducting qualitative research with children on topics not often considered
considerable by children. One made the point this way:
All I’m asking for is that [researchers become] … aware of what [their] theoretical constructs are,
because we all have theory. And the positivists aren’t always aware of the constructs and criticise
our work because they are working in a different theoretical space. (JM)
[My advice is to just] read carefully, to be aware of epistemology as well as methodology, where
they’re coming from ideologically, um to talk to other people and, you know, use that tool of
reflexivity to the utmost. Um, and to continue to question for the good of others. (JM)
3.9.2 Considering Methodologies and Methods
As Oakley (1995), Ansell (2001) and others have suggested previously, researcher
participants were mindful of the fact that what they perceived to be ‘child friendly’
practice and tools may not always be the best for children or best for the research.
Researcher participants in this study argued that in an attempt to be ‘child-friendly’,
researchers sometimes developed research methods that were overly simple and
lacked rigour. This was based on their assumptions about children’s capacity to use
existing research instruments, and the need for them to be activity-based and fun.
Researcher participants talked about the need to critically assess the methods that
they use with children – an assessment that could and maybe should be conducted
with children themselves. In addition to considering whether they are engaging
(which they believed was important), researcher participants suggested that they also
should be assessed on their ability to elicit children’s views sensitively, meaningfully
and rigorously, and to meet the research question itself. For those who had worked in
the area for some time, this assessment was an iterative process, where old methods
(Re)considering Competence Reflexively 65
were assessed and new methods developed to strengthen and improve practice. As
one participant noted:
It’s about how can we get this better and every time we do something now we’re finding we’re buil-
ding on what’s happened before, rather than starting again and that takes a little while I think. But
it definitely has advantages. We can be creative but we can ensure credibility at the same time. (AG)
Researcher participants believed that as a field, we need to be open to criticism and

feel open to criticise or challenge.
3.9.3 Reflecting on Power
In addition to considering what the most appropriate methods were for engaging
children, one participant proposed that it was important to use a political lens to
consider the broader forces at play in determining how research with children is
conducted. She writes in her PhD, for example:
Underlying this argument is an assumption regarding the fixed competencies children are seen
to possess which ignores the structural constraints and discursive resources both children and
adults bring to participatory practices. (Hartung, 2011)
3.9.4 Considering Competence within the Field
Recognising the relative immaturity of children’s research and the limited dialogue
related to the ethical use of methods that occurs at the institutional level, a number
of researcher participants called for more opportunities for children’s researchers to
come together to develop more responsive and appropriate protocols to help facilitate
ethical practice, rather than hinder it.
I think that to me the key is then in actually building networks of researchers who can share
ideas and experience and provide good training and good support for researchers who are going
to be going out and working with children so that in practice they know how to deal with those
really tricky things that arise when you’re in the field. (SB)
Do we need to keep pushing through the barriers? We do. We need to keep identifying what they
are and then getting success stories up basically and I think we need to look for opportunities
too: where we can come together like the think tank where I met you in Sydney, because it does
build our confidence about what we’re doing but it plugs us into other resources and opens the
picture up constantly all the time; have you thought about this, have you thought about that, is
this person able to... (AG)
In some institutions, groups of researchers working with children have started

discussing some of these ethical challenges and have reflected more broadly in practice.
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Bill Gardner
4 The Developmental Capability Model of Child
Well-Being
‟But, speaking generally, man is not meant to remain a child. He leaves childhood behind him at
the time ordained by nature; and this critical moment, short enough in itself, has far-reaching con-
sequences.” - Rousseau, Émile.
Capability theory is an important approach to understanding well-being, including

the well-being of children (Biggeri, Ballet, and Comim 2011). Amartya Sen developed
the capability approach to provide a characterisation of human well-being and
freedom that was richer than what was present in philosophical utilitarianism or
welfare economics.
The approach that will be used here, which is sometimes called the “capability approach,” sees
human life as a set of “doings and beings”–we may call them “functionings”–and it relates the
evaluation of the quality of life to the assessment of the capability to function. (Sen 1989)
Capabilities are what a person is able to be or do, that is, her potential for functioning.
In this essay, I want to rethink how the capability approach applies to children
in light of recent social scientific theorising by James Heckman (Conti and Heckman
2012; Heckman and Mosso 2014), who has recently adopted capability language in
his writing. Theorists of justice, including capability theorists, have not sufficiently
appreciated the importance of the fact that human capabilities develop over time.
I will show that a developmental reconceptualisation of capabilities has significant
implications for how we think about children’s well-being, how we think about
justice, and about how we should organise and carry out human services for children
in light of these conceptions of well-being and justice.
4.1 Development and Capabilities
Individual human capabilities develop. That is, they come into being over extended
periods of time as an unfolding of human biology in response to environmental
exposure, through deliberate processes of cultivation, and through unconscious
learning from experience. Capabilities develop across the human life span, but the
processes are most rapid in childhood. Indeed, the development of capabilities is the
primary functional task of childhood.
I will draw out the implications of a developmental perspective on capabilities
by discussing the recent work of James Heckman, who like Sen is a Nobel laureate in
economics. Heckman has recently refocused his career on the distillation of research
© 2015 Bill Gardner

Development and Capabilities 69
in child development into economic models for the developmental origins of human
capabilities. I speculate that there were several motivations for this change. The first
was the finding that controlling for cognitive ability measured in the teenage years
eliminates most wage gaps among groups of young adults, suggesting that labour
market outcomes are largely determined by capabilities fixed in childhood. Similarly,
job-training programmes that sought to remediate wage and employment gaps for
adults were largely ineffective.
Heckman was also, however, outspokenly critical of Herrnstein and Murray’s
argument in The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994) that a single factor of
generalised intelligence, measured by IQ and fixed by genetics, accounts for correlation
in test scores and social outcomes (Heckman 1995). Since then, Heckman has been
engaged in an intellectual programme that explains social inequality in terms of a multi-
dimensional account of human capabilities, that accurately reflects the contemporary
science of human development instead of reducing development to genetics, and that
points to how inequalities can be addressed through early intervention.
According to Heckman,
Skills are multiple in nature and encompass cognition, personality, preference parameters, as
well as health. Skills are capacities to act. They include some of the capabilities defined by Sen
and Nussbaum but focus on individual attributes and not aspects of society such as political
freedoms. (Heckman and Mosso 2014)
Capabilities are of (at least) two kinds: skills or powers of an individual, such as the
ability to speak a language, and opportunities afforded by an environment or society,
such as a right to free expression. The extension of rights to women, oppressed
races, and sexual minorities are emancipatory triumphs that expanded opportunity
capabilities and as such they have enormous consequences for children. Heckman
focuses on attributes of individuals in part because he wants to understand individual
variation in life outcomes. However, his theory does not discount the importance of
rights. Rather, his concern with individual developmental outcomes complements
and expands on the concerns of previous capability theorists.
Heckman’s list of capabilities varies slightly across publications, but is essentially
health, cognition, and personality (Conti and Heckman 2012).
Dimension Definition
Health Freedom from disabling injury, illness, or pain; capacity to achieve things with the
body.
Cognition Abilities in attention, memory, language, learning, reasoning, problem solving, and
decision making, sufficient to cope with life tasks.
Personality Social and emotional competence: Abilities to experience, express, and manage
emotions and the ability to establish positive and rewarding relationships with
others, sufficient to cope with life tasks.
70 The Developmental Capability Model of Child Well-Being
These are high-level dimensions or domains of capability, each of which includes

multiple discrete capabilities. Evidently, there are many other capabilities, so why
does he focus on these?
Heckman is carving the space of individual capabilities into the natural
dimensions of the space of individual differences among children as understood by
child developmentalists and paediatricians. I describe Heckman’s capabilities as
kernel capabilities, meaning that they are prerequisite to the development of a wide
space of other capabilities. Being able to manage negative emotions is a capability
that is essential to functioning in many contexts, understanding the rules of chess
is required for functioning in only a few. Kernel capabilities are important for two
reasons.
First, the normal life course in current developed societies can be divided loosely
into a series of familiar stages: e.g., intrauterine life, infancy, early childhood, middle
childhood, adolescence, and so on. These stages are bound by differences in biological
status, culture, and social institution. Kernel capabilities matter because individual
variation in these capabilities at early stages predict variation in capabilities and
functioning in later stages (Campbell et al. 2014). Heckman has used a variety of data
sets to show that employment and other outcomes are predicted not just by children’s
cognitive attributes, but also by social attributes.
[A] low-dimensional vector of cognitive and noncognitive skills explains a variety of labor market
and behavioral outcomes… Noncognitive skills strongly influence schooling decisions and also
affect wages, given schooling decisions. Schooling, employment, work experience, and choice of
occupation are affected by latent noncognitive and cognitive skills. We show that the same low-
dimensional vector of abilities… explains schooling choices, wages, employment, work experi-
ence, and choice of occupation [and] a wide variety of risky behaviors. (Heckman, Stixrud, and
Urzua 2006)
Heckman has followed many child developmentalists (Conti and Heckman 2013;
Moffitt et al. 2011) and emphasized the central role of personality and social
development (e.g., self-regulation, including turn-taking, cooperation, empathy,
and the ability to express one’s emotions) to function successfully, first in a school
environment and later in a work environment (Heckman and Kautz 2012). The point is
not that we need children to be docile in the classrooms, although they are certainly
at risk if they are disruptive. Rather, the construction of a skill occurs through and in
the context of social interactions: nurture from parents, tuition from teachers, and
play with peers. Children’s social skills enable them to participate successfully in
those interactions, being with others and learning from them is itself a critical skill
domain. Social development and personality traits had been ignored in the human
capital literature, which reduced that construct to cognitive skills. Interpersonal skills
were also ignored by Herrnstein and Murray and insufficiently discussed in previous
literature on children in the human capital approach.
Development and Capabilities 71
Children’s health was not featured in Heckman’s early work, presumably because
young adults show little variation in (relatively good) health. Nevertheless, health
outcomes are paediatric morbidity, risk factors, environmental exposures, and
acquisition of unhealthy behaviours lay a foundation for the adult acquisition of
chronic illness (Forrest and Riley 2004; N Halfon and Hochstein 2002; Neal Halfon
and Conway 2013). Similarly, childhood mental disorders also predict significant
social and educational attainment deficits in adulthood (Currie and Stabile 2006).
Children’s cognitive and non-cognitive abilities affect later health outcomes (Heckman
et al. 2014; Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010). Conversely, socio-economic disparities in
health are detectable from infancy onward (Braveman and Barclay 2009; Fletcher
and Wolfe 2013). It is reasonable to assume that these health differences influence
cognitive and personality development.
A primary reason why early stage variation in kernel capabilities predicts later
variation in capabilities and social outcomes is that kernel capabilities are prerequisite
to or components of many other more specialised capabilities. Obviously, primary
cognitive skills are requirements for learning advanced cognitive skills, in the way
that calculus requires algebra. But developing cognitive skills also has a less obvious
prerequisite in personality and social skills. Learning to read requires being able to
function in a classroom, which requires the development of social skills such as the
ability to control impulses or regulate negative emotions (Eisenberg, Valiente, and
Eggum 2011; High 2008).
Heckman models the development of capabilities as a dynamic process (Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach 2010). In contrast, the quantitative models underlying
Herrnstein and Murray modelled social outcomes such as economic success as an
additive function of genetic endowments and environmental factors. In light of
current science, this oversimplifies the biology. There is important evidence that the
effect of genes is not a simple lottery: how genes are expressed over the course of
development is affected by the environments (Caspi et al. 2010; Nisbett et al. 2012;
Shonkoff 2010). More importantly, Herrnstein and Murray’s and many other theorists’
models are static, that is, they model the outcome as the resultant of one-time inputs
from genes and the environment, as if humans were formed all at once.
Heckman’s econometric models, by contrast, are based on equations that track
the motion of children’s multi-dimensional capabilities from one developmental
stage to the next (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010). In each stage, children
gain capabilities by adapting to the challenges posed in that stage. Development is
therefore path-dependent: it extends across time and a child’s outcomes during an
early stage affect her outcomes in later stages.
Heckman and colleagues estimate these models using longitudinal data sets
that track children through multiple stages of development to adult outcomes.
They then estimate the relative effects of each early stage kernel capability on adult
outcomes and have thereby identified what they believe are sensitive periods for the
development of a specific capability. Based on his econometric results, Heckman
argues that intervening early – during infancy, if possible – is the most cost-effective
social policy to reduce poor adult outcomes (Heckman 2006).
It is more difficult to compensate for the effects of adverse environments on cognitive endow-
ments at later ages than it is at earlier ages. (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010)
It would be a significant mistake, however, to understand Heckman as claiming

that intervention during a sensitive period is sufficient to create successful adult
outcomes. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds who achieve compensatory
gains in a kernel capability through early intervention must still succeed in advancing
that capability during later stages. Without further social investment, they will likely
continue to face an adverse environment in those later stages. Sustaining interventions
to preserve early gains should follow early intervention.
One reason why capability development has sensitive periods is that children are
biologically and psychologically plastic during early stages of development (Heckman
2007). A second reason is that the capabilities acquired (or not) during early stages
in development affect children’s abilities to acquire new capabilities in future stages,
so an early developmental outcome can be amplified across the rest of the life span.
The amplification of early outcomes across later development exemplifies
the path-dependence of development. Success or failure in the acquisition of
capabilities during stage t changes the probabilities that a child will succeed or fail
when faced with new challenges in stage t+1. We can imagine a society in which a
child’s failure during stage t would lead society to mobilise resources during t+1 to
compensate and get the child back on the appropriate developmental path. This is
how physical growth works: children who fall behind their growth curve as a result of
temporary malnutrition exhibit accelerated ‘catch-up’ growth when proper nutrition
is restored. Heckman finds the opposite. Doing well in stage t positions a child to
take best advantage of opportunities for acquiring skills during stage t+1. So rather
than compensating for early disadvantages, later developmental stages often amplify
them. There are positive returns to talent, sometimes known as the “Matthew effect”
(Merton 1968), in which good things come to those who already have.
Higher levels of both cognitive and noncognitive skills raise the productivity of subsequent
investment [in those skills]. (Cunha and Heckman 2007)
Developmental research has established that disparities in kernel capabilities

begin early in life. This positive return to talent means that the trajectories of the
development of children’s capabilities can reveal a diverging pattern, with inequality
in capability increasing across stages.
In summary, Heckman’s account of capability development contrasts sharply
with that offered by Herrnstein and Murray. Herrnstein and Murray sought to explain
and, perhaps, justify current class and racial inequalities as a meritocracy based
on a single dimension of capability, general intelligence, which was determined by
Developmental Capability Well-Being and Justice 73
genetics and resistant to social intervention. Heckman believes that there are several
kernel capabilities driving adult outcomes. They are shaped in part by genetics, but
these capabilities are constructed through children’s own activity with adults and
peers in a multiple stage trajectory. Because of the importance of early sensitive
periods and the path-dependent quality of developmental processes, early individual
differences in capability can be amplified into large disparities in adult outcomes.
There is, however, promising evidence that well-targeted early interventions coupled
with sustaining interventions like high-quality schooling can remediate many of
these disparities.
4.2 Developmental Capability Well-Being and Justice
The developmental understanding of the capabilities described above has

implications for liberal and egalitarian conceptions of justice. To get a sense of this, I
will consider how Heckman’s empirical work might affect three liberal egalitarians: a
welfare economist, a Rawlsian, and a capability theorist.
By “an egalitarian welfare economist,” I mean someone who is, like Heckman,
concerned with the amount and distribution of the income and wealth produced in
the economy. She is likely to be concerned by the increasingly skewed distribution
of wealth and income (Piketty 2014) and the accompanying shift in political power
toward the hyper-wealthy financial elite (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Heckman would
respond to her concerns with an argument that inequality in wealth and income
is to a considerable degree determined by inequality in human capabilities and
those inequalities in capabilities result from inequitable trajectories of capability
development.
These inequalities are dramatic. Extensive data show that social variation in
health is present at birth and increases across childhood (Almond and Currie 2011;
Currie 2011; Fletcher and Wolfe 2013). David Autor finds that
cognitive skills are substantially rewarded in the labor market across all 22 economies. The
average wage premium corresponding to one “unit” (i.e., one standard deviation) increase in
measured cognitive skills is 18%. In addition, cognitive earnings premiums differ substantially
across countries… The United States stands out as having the highest measured return to skill,
with a premium of 28% per unit increment to cognitive ability. Concretely, comparing two U.S.
workers who are one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the population
average of cognitive ability, we would expect their full-time weekly earnings to differ by 50 to
60%. (Autor 2014)
However, because inequalities are built through an extended developmental process,

there are opportunities to intervene. Through cost-effective interventions, we can
create a new generation with a more equitable distribution of capabilities, and thereby
a more equitable distribution of welfare. The policy implication of the developmental
capabilities view is that instead of the (largely failed) project of redistributing

inequitable wealth and income, we should commit to the enhancement of children’s
capabilities so that fewer inequities arise. Enhancing children’s capabilities is a form
of “pre-distribution,” as opposed to re-distribution.
When we think of government’s effects on inequality, we think of redistribution – government

taxes and transfers that take from some and give to others. Yet many of the most important
changes have been in what might be called “pre-distribution” – the way in which the market
distributes its rewards in the first place. Policies… have all shifted in favour of those at the top,
especially the financial and non-financial executives who make up about six in 10 of the richest
0.1% of Americans. The moral of this story is that progressive reformers need to focus on market
reforms that encourage a more equal distribution of economic power and rewards even before
government collects taxes or pays out benefits. (Hacker 2011)
Now consider the position of a Rawlsian liberal, that is, someone whose primary
concern is that the basic institutions of society should be set up such that citizens
are free, equal, and live in a system of fair cooperation. One of the metrics that Rawls
used to measure equality was the levels of citizens’ “primary goods.” Many theorists
interpret primary goods as resources that citizens are entitled to.
However, I am not convinced that there is much difference between a
developmental capabilities approach and a Rawlsian ‘resourcist’ approach (Anderson
2010; Pogge 2010; Kelleher 2015). The list of these goods considerably overlaps with
many lists of capabilities, such as Nussbaum’s. Moreover, although primary goods are
commonly described as resources, one thinks of resources as discrete things that can
be straightforwardly transferred. This is the case with the primary goods of wealth
and income, but it hardly fits the last element on Rawls’s list of the classes of primary
goods:
(5) The social bases of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally
essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance
their ends with self-confidence. (Rawls 2001)
But having sufficiency in kernel capabilities is an important component of having

self-confidence in the ability to advance one’s end and having a sense of worth as a
person. Perhaps Rawls saw this, because his fifth class of primary goods is similar to
capability theorist Elizabeth Anderson’s norm of “democratic equality”:
To be capable of functioning as an equal citizen involves not just the ability to effectively exer-
cise specifically political rights, but also to participate in the various activities of civil society
more broadly, including participation in the economy. And functioning in these ways presup-
poses functioning as a human being. Consider, then, three aspects of individual functioning:
as a human being, as a participant in a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a
democratic state. (Anderson 1999)
The developmental capabilities model attempts to capture the childhood antecedents

and determinants of the capabilities that adults require to function effectively
in their social lives, in the economy, and as citizens. Kernel capabilities are also
important determinants of whether one has sufficient income and wealth. From
a developmental capabilities perspective, Rawls was mistaken to focus on primary
goods to the exclusion of capabilities. Kernel capabilities should be included in a list
of primary goods, that is, the “things that citizens need as free and equal persons
living a complete life” (Rawls 2001).
In Rawls’s scheme, a critical component of a system of fair cooperation is that
social positions should be open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
…fair equality of opportunity is said to require not merely that public offices and social positions
be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to obtain them. To specify
the idea of a fair chance we say: supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments,
those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin… In all parts
of society there are to be the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly moti-
vated and endowed. (Rawls 2001)
The developmental capability view should prompt a Rawlsian to rethink the notion
of “native endowments.” Rawls was not a meritocrat and he argued that it was unjust
that people should be rewarded or disadvantaged because of their random draws
from “the genetic lottery.” I agree. However, the developmental capability approach
clarifies that “native endowments” are socially constructed to a greater degree than
Rawls may have understood. Dissimilarity of talent is, to that degree, an outcome of
the system that reproduces society across the generations, not an exogenous fact.
The principle of fair equality of opportunity states that prospects should be similar
for those of equal talent and motivation. Heckman’s models indicate that “talent” is
endogenous to the system to a greater degree than genetic determinists believe. But a
developmental capability approach suggests that motivation may also be endogenous.
Positive returns to talent mean that at any given developmental stage, those who enter
the stage with greater capabilities have the expectation of achieving greater gains
in capability during that stage. So if there is a trade-off between effort to improve
capabilities and enjoying oneself – and this, at least, is how I experienced much of
how childhood – then returns to effort favour those who enter the stage with greater
capabilities. If so, then the motivation to acquire capabilities will be endogenous to
the system and would, rationally, be greater for those at the high end of the capability
distribution at early developmental stages. If so, it seems unfair to hold less talented
and less motivated children accountable for their lack of motivation.
Despite his metaphor of a “genetic lottery,” I believe that Rawls knew that talent
and motivation were largely endogenous.
…native endowments of various kinds (say, native intelligence and natural ability) are not fixed
natural assets with a constant capacity. They are merely potential and cannot come to fruition
apart from social conditions… Among what affects their realization are social attitudes of encou-
ragement and support, and institutions concerned with their early discipline and use. Not only
our conceptions of ourselves, and our aims and ambitions, but also our realized abilities and
talents, reflect our personal history, opportunities, and social position… (Rawls 2001)
In my view, Heckman’s dynamic modelling of the path-dependence of the

development of capabilities is the best current empirical account of how personal
history and opportunities determine our realised abilities. A full appreciation of how
capabilities develop should lead a Rawlsian to include the social institutions that
nurture children in the basic institutions of a just society. No other stance is consistent
with substantive and not merely formal fair equality of opportunity. Fair equality of
opportunity requires a commitment to social institutions that invest in children such
that each child has a fair opportunity to achieve sufficiency in kernel capabilities.
Finally, let’s consider the implications of the developmental capability view for
someone who is committed to Sen’s capability approach to well-being. Sen developed
the capability approach in part to answer the question of what egalitarians wanted to
equalise (Sen 1980). The answer was “capabilities.” Applying this answer to children,
egalitarians should seek to have children achieve a sufficiently high level of those
capabilities picked out as relevant to justice. The developmental capability helps
refine that goal in at least two ways.
First, attempts to measure children’s capability well-being should include
children’s kernel capabilities. There have been several lists of capabilities proposed,
including an influential list from Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2003). Her list proposes a set
of capabilities that are the essential ingredients of well-being, such as being alive or
having control over one’s body, and human rights, such as
being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with
respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. (Nussbaum 2003)
Measuring capabilities is challenging because the set of possible capabilities is very

large. Moreover, the time required to develop a specialised capability (for example,
the ability to play in a string quartet) will compete with the time required to develop
another (the ability to prove theorems in topology). Is someone with highly developed
skills in a narrow domain more or less capable than someone who is moderately
skilled in a range of domains? Such questions have no clear answers.
To develop a theory of justice that connects to social reality through empirical
science, we need to identify a tractable list of critical human capabilities. Further,
these capabilities must be essential to justice. Elizabeth Anderson notes that
Sen’s capability egalitarianism leaves open a large question, however. Which capabilities does
society have an obligation to equalize? Some people care about playing cards well, others about
enjoying luxury vacations in Tahiti. Must egalitarians, in the name of equal freedom, offer free
card-playing lessons and state subsidized vacations in exotic lands? Surely there are limits to
which capabilities citizens are obligated to provide one another. We should heed our first desi-
deratum, to identify particular goods within the space of equality that are of special egalitarian
concern. (Anderson 1999)
The developmental capability perspective identifies kernel capabilities should be

central to any such measure. The capability approach asserts that having capabilities
creates a wide space of potential functioning, which is one meaning of freedom.
Failure to develop a kernel capability would inhibit the development of many other
capabilities. Preventable impairments in kernel capabilities are thus restrictions of
freedom and prima facie unjust. This suggests that interpersonal comparisons of
capabilities should include a focus on kernel capabilities.
Some current efforts to measure children’s well-being from a capability perspective
have focused on capabilities that children themselves conceptualise and identify as
important (Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011). This is in contrast to the perspective taken by
Heckman, by most educators, and this essay, in which dimensions of capability are
selected because of their roles in children’s future lives, as judged by adults.
How can we justify the prescriptive view of capabilities adopted here? It will often
be true that some children will not value their health, cognitive skills, or social skills in
the manner than an adult will. But children have an interest in their future well-being
and the data are clear that their future capabilities, along with social outcomes that
are reasonable to value, depend on whether they are on trajectories toward acquiring
kernel capabilities. For this reason, standard lists of capability dimensions in well-
being measures (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009) include being educated, which I
interpret as meaning that one has acquired kernel cognitive abilities.
I take Biggeri’s and Mehrotra’s point that children’s own accounts of their well-
being should be included in capability measurements. Child-orientated accounts of
their well-being deserve careful consideration just as patient-orientated measures of
well-being matter in medicine (Epstein and Street 2011; Institute of Medicine 2001).
My view is that child-orientated measures of well-being complement rather than
compete a more traditional adult-prescriptive view of what capabilities are valuable
for children.
Second, the developmental capabilities approach identifies a policy of early
intervention as a strategy to reduce inequality in capabilities. Specifically, egalitarians
should study human development with the goal of understanding and then changing
the institutions that promote inequity in developmental trajectories. If the metric
of equality is capability, reducing inequality of trajectories in the development of
capabilities is far more important than redistribution.
Redistribution is important to a welfare economist because, as Nicholas Kaldor
argued, questions of how the economy is organised to produce are separable from
questions of how that production should be distributed (Kaldor 1939). In Kaldor’s
view, economists should always argue for more efficient schemes that increase
production, regardless of their distributional consequences, because any injustice in

distribution can be corrected through redistribution after the fact.
In all cases, therefore, where a certain policy leads to an increase in physical productivity, and
thus of aggregate real income, the economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the ques-
tion of the comparability of individual satisfactions; since in all such cases it is possible to make
everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people better off without making
anybody worse off. (Kaldor 1939)
For a welfarist, inequalities of capability resulting from unequal trajectories pose

substantial challenges for creating just societies. But they are not insurmountable,
because resources can be transferred to compensate individuals with impaired
capabilities.
However, the production and distribution of capabilities are one and the same
process. I can’t transfer my health, intelligence, or personality to you. As Coast points
out for health,
…the production of health cannot be separated into separate technical and allocative questions;
allocation happens simultaneously with production, and cannot be compensated within its own
evaluative space. (Coast 2009)
Redistribution may still have some value for an egalitarian capability theorist, in that
redistributing resources among parents in generation k may lead to a more equitable
distribution of capabilities in generation k+1 by improving the developmental
trajectories of children who would otherwise be deprived. Whereas the welfarist
should seek to improve trajectories as a cost-effective means to equalising wealth
and income, the distribution of adult capabilities is an end-in-itself for an egalitarian
capability theorist. Because kernel capabilities can only be produced through an
extended developmental process, that process must be a central concern for the
capability theorist.
I conclude that equalising developmental trajectories should be a focal task for
each type of liberal egalitarian. As Heckman puts it,
The foundations for adult success and failure are laid down early in life. Children raised in disad-
vantaged environments start behind and usually stay behind throughout their lifetimes. Gaps in
cognitive and behavioral traits emerge very early. The risk of disease increases more rapidly with
age in disadvantaged populations. Inequality among families in early childhood environments is
a major producer of inequality in the capabilities that promote successful functioning in society.
In the absence of interventions to alter their trajectories, children growing up in disadvantage are
at increasing risk – both socioeconomic and biological (Conti and Heckman 2012).
Conversely, if we can reduce the number of children who grow up with insufficient
capabilities, we will reduce inequality in the next generation, relative to the
counterfactual of current policy and practise.
Implications for the Care of Children 79
4.3 Implications for the Care of Children
Let’s briefly consider some of the policy consequences of a commitment to reducing

inequality in children’s developmental trajectories on kernel capabilities. As a child
psychologist and professor of paediatrics, my interest in the concept of children’s
well-being is motivated by a need to rethink the goals of children’s health care.
Paediatricians are the caring professionals who most commonly see children in the
critical years of infancy, toddlerhood, and early childhood. Currently, paediatric care
is primarily structured as an acute care system delivering short-term therapies in
response to injuries or illnesses.
Paediatrics should also, however, take responsibility for medical services
advancing children’s physical, cognitive, and behavioural development – that
is, the kernel capabilities critical to childhood – so as to provide the foundation
for adult capabilities and well-being (Gardner and Kelleher 2014). We envision
paediatric care organised as Learning Health Care System (LHCS) that continuously
gather data, evaluate it, and implement change to improve outcomes and save costs
(National Research Council 2012; Greene, Reid, and Larson 2012). A paediatric LHCS
should
evaluate pediatric care on how well it prevents the onset of chronic illness and builds capabili-
ties for adult flourishing. The pediatric LHCS should therefore focus on preventative medicine
and child development. Developmental research has shown that the acquisition of health and
robust adult capabilities depends not just on childhood physical health and cognitive develop-
ment, but also on development of social behaviors that promote learning, self-regulation, work-
place success, and healthy adult relationships. (Gardner and Kelleher 2014)
The capability approach requires a shift from a focus on acute care to a mode of
care that seeks to detect children whose trajectories on kernel capabilities predict
substantial restrictions in adult capabilities. Paediatric health systems should track
the well-being of children using the capability dimensions and assess children’s
trajectories on these dimensions. To achieve equity in adult capabilities, the health
system should be accountable for the developmental trajectories of populations
of kids and should evaluate the success of their practise on whether they improve
these capabilities. The literature on childhood resiliency finds that some children
develop successfully despite severely adverse circumstances, while others are highly
vulnerable (Cicchetti 2013). By focusing on variation in developmental trajectories,
the developmental capability approach individualises the concerns of justice. Sen
pointed out that a disabled person may find it hard to function well even with an
equal share of resources if he lacks the capability to convert resources into well-being
(Sen 1992). Similarly, the resources invested in the health, education, and social
development of a child must be titrated according to an assessment of the child’s
current trajectory.
To realise paediatric LHCSs, we will need new technology for measuring

child outcomes. These systems must measure and track children’s progress on
multidimensional indicators across the child’s lifespan. The Developmental
Capabilities approach can provide a conceptual schema for the assessment of
children’s trajectories and the measurements of children’s health and well-being.
Evaluating care this way would change the kinds of care that are delivered. Paediatric
health systems attending to developmental trajectories would increase their focus on
preventative care. Where children are on trajectories toward insufficient capabilities,
and where effective interventions exist, paediatricians would either act to improve
the trajectory or seek to engage the family with the non-medical service that could
best deliver help.
The kernel capabilities emphasise sufficiency in cognition and personality, as
well as physical health. To advance this holistic understanding of health, child health
providers should substantially increase their behavioural health services, helping
both children and parents to get care. Because trajectories depend on social and
environmental factors as well as capabilities, health systems will also need to assess
and address the social determinants of child capabilities in the communities of their
patients. Children’s hospitals should, for example, be part of the fight for lead paint
removal, better policing, and access to low cost housing for the populations they
serve.
To deliver care that addresses the spectrum of kernel capabilities, paediatricians
must connect with and collaborate with all the other professionals and institutions
with responsibility for the development and well-being of children. Paediatric health
systems will need to share data and coordinate care with schools, social services
agencies, juvenile justice, and other institutions that interact with children and
families. Cross-agency collaboration benefits children by coordinating interventions
across the settings of children’s lives and by providing seamless transitions for
children and families across the preschool, school, and early adulthood boundaries.
It also enables child service agencies to set benchmarks and target care to address
overall child well-being, rather than just health-specific or school-specific outcomes.
The commitment to achieving equitable capabilities for all children can provide a
common mission for these diverse agencies.
Committing paediatrics to the improvement of children’s developing capabilities
expands the podiatric mission and requires reorganisation of paediatric health care
systems. This cannot be implemented or sustained without changes in health system
organisation. Health care systems in the US and Canada are largely funded through
payment systems that favour acute care and a focus on delivering procedures instead
of improving developmental trajectories. Payment reforms must be devised that would
support health systems in tracking patients for years as they traverse developmental
stages and that make them accountable for improving capabilities and trajectories.
Conclusion 81
4.4 Conclusion
Large populations of children in the developed world do not achieve sufficiency in

health, cognition, and sociality, contributing to growing inequality in diverse social
outcomes. If we accept the view that capabilities develop across the lifespan, and
we believe that capabilities are what we want to equalise, then achieving convergent
trajectories becomes a critical task for an egalitarian. Much theorising has been
devoted to justifying schemes for the redistribution of goods. A developmental
understanding of capabilities indicates that designing institutions promoting the
equitable well-being of children is a more important task, where children’s well-being
includes being on a trajectory to sufficient development of their kernel capabilities.
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Gottfried Schweiger
5 Justice and Children’s Well-Being and
Well-Becoming1
5.1 Introduction
Most theorists of justice would agree that they have to specify two things: the currency of
justice – which goods should be shared – and the rule of justice – how those goods should
be shared. I like to add three more things that every theory of justice should say something
about: the social context in which those goods should be shared, the basic features of
the agents of justice, and the ultimate goal of justice. If one wants to design a theory of
justice for children, all of those five questions should be answered and I suppose they
will be answered in at least slightly but decisively different ways than they are answered
in relation to justice for fully grown and healthy adults. I will not explore the possibility of
trade-offs between justice for children and justice for adults and how such conflicts can
be resolved. My main claim in this chapter is concerned with the role that the concepts of
well-being and well-becoming can play in answering those questions and in the design of
a theory of justice for children. As I want to show, well-being and well-becoming can serve
as the ultimate goals of justice, as they allow us to better understand the specific needs of
children as agents of justice and their embeddedness in certain social contexts, and they
can guide the selection of the currency of justice and the rule of their distribution. The
answers I want to sketch in this chapter are developed from the perspective of a certain
theoretical framework which I want to call the recognition approach (Schweiger 2012;
Schweiger 2013). This approach is nowadays most often connected to the seminal works of
Axel Honneth and its central assumption is that the proper experience of recognition and
the protection from misrecognition – I prefer the notion of disrespect – is the fundamental
claim of justice of all human beings (Honneth 1996; Honneth 2012). I view recognition and
well-being and well-becoming as being intertwined in many ways and argue that a focus
on the latter is well suited to guide the design and implementation of justice for children.
The goals to protect the well-being and well-becoming of children and to protect their
ability to experience recognition converge.
5.2 The Goals of Justice: Well-Being and Well-Becoming
The ultimate goals of justice for children are their well-being and well-becoming (Graf
and Schweiger 2015). Or to put it differently: a social context should be just, because
© 2015 Gottfried Schweiger

The Goals of Justice: Well-Being and Well-Becoming 85
this protects the well-being and well-becoming of children. This claim does not imply
that under the conditions of justice the well-being and well-becoming of children
cannot be hurt and violated in other ways, for example by sickness, accidents or
natural disasters. It also does not mean that justice prescribes all interpersonal
interactions between children and adults and among children. A social context
can be just, but the people within in it can still act immorally and hurt each other
intentionally or by accident. Justice does not regulate all actions happening within a
social context but is concerned with its institutional framework and that framework
should be designed in a way in which it is best suited to protect the well-being and
well-becoming of children.
Such an orientation on well-being and well-becoming has not been spelled out in
detail within the recognition approach, so I want to make at least a few remarks on
why I think this is a route worth following. In a nutshell, a society is just insofar as
it protects the ability of its members to experience those forms of proper recognition
that are needed for their identity building and the realization of their autonomy. So,
the recognition approach has a strong focus on autonomy and personal freedom –
which it shares with many other theories of justice like the capability approach –
and is concerned with their intersubjective and social conditions. This implies well-
being and well-becoming in at least two important ways: First, autonomy is part of
any conceptualization and realization of well-being and well-becoming. Second, they
are concerned with these intersubjective conditions which the recognition approach
views as important. Justice is not only concerned with autonomy but with its social
embedding and its individual realization in a social context and in interaction with
others. Well-being, well-becoming and autonomy – in the understanding of the
recognition approach as personal self-realization and the realization of those life
plans that one values – are all intertwined ecological concepts in the sense that they
refer to the wider social embeddedness of human beings and their dependency on
other humans and institutions. In a narrow sense, recognition is a part of well-being
and well-becoming, but in a wider sense the three forms and modes of recognition that
Honneth distinguishes – care, respect, social esteem – can be interpreted to describe
what humans need for their well-being and well-becoming. So far the recognition
approach has mainly focussed on adults and dealt with childhood primarily as an
important preparatory stage, in which the experience of recognition is necessary for an
individual to develop positive self-relations and to become an autonomous member of
society. But justice for children goes beyond that scope and has to ask what children
are entitled to as children as well. This is far more and entirely different than being
able to realize themselves because self-realization and autonomy – as the recognition
approach rightfully claims – only develop during childhood. The developmental
perspective that conceptualizes justice for children from the envisaged product of an
autonomous adult has to be integrated into a wider understanding of the actual well-
being of children that they are entitled to. So the focus I choose here follows from
the ‘nature’ of childhood and is an expansion of the current focus on the forms and
86 Justice and Children’s Well-Being and Well-Becoming
modes of recognition that are demanded by justice for adults to also look at those
dimensions which are important for children.
I understand the well-being and well-becoming of children as multidimensional,
comprising of subjective and objective dimensions (Axford 2012). They are therefore
not only concerned with the subjective satisfaction or happiness, although these
are certainly of importance. Furthermore well-being and well-becoming and their
different dimensions are context-sensitive and context-transcending alike, meaning
that they have to be determined always within a certain context, but they also have a
universal core that reflects central features shared among all children. For example,
shelter and clothing are important for all children because they are all sensitive
and vulnerable beings, but social and environmental factors also heavily influence
which shelter and clothing is needed and how it influences their well-being and well-
becoming. Before I go into more detail on which dimensions of well-being and well-
becoming should be distinguished and how they specify the currency of justice, I
want to examine three points: the relation between well-being and well-becoming,
their relation to autonomy and freedom, and their relation to the position of children
as particularly vulnerable beings.
Well-being refers to the current state of a person while well-becoming refers to the
development from one state to another over time. Well-becoming can happen from a
state of ill-being to one of well-being, or from a state of well-being to another one of
well-being. I think it is important to stress that justice should be concerned with both
and that neither sees children only as adults-to-be nor neglects that most children
will become adults. Also, well-becoming does not only relate to the development
from a child into an adult although it is reasonable to view this transition as being
of particular importance. Humans are developing throughout their entire life and
well-being and well-becoming are interrelated in every phase of it. The influence of
behavioural patterns and environmental factors on later health, or the influence of the
participation in the labour market on the socio-economic position after retirement,
are both examples of this entanglement (Mortimer and Shanahan 2003). Furthermore,
the relation between well-being and well-becoming is not straightforward in the way
that well-being necessarily enables well-becoming, and both can come into conflict
with each other. For example, obligatory education can lower the subjective well-
being of a child although it is necessary for its well-being and enhances the chance
of well-being as an adult. In this case, most would suggest that the reduction in well-
being is justified by the favourable results in adulthood. But think of the case in which
a child grows up in severe poverty and through this develops certain resilience skills
that ultimately let her become a successful and rich entrepreneur. The hardship of
poverty is not justified because of this favourable result, and this certainly should
not justify the adoption of a policy in which all children have to grow up poor so
that they can become resilient and hardened. First, in most cases poverty does not
have such favourable results but rather negative ones (Eamon 2001). Second, it seems
reasonable to apply a certain threshold of well-being that must be reached, and that
The Goals of Justice: Well-Being and Well-Becoming 87
falling under that threshold cannot be justified by any kinds of latter gains. Third, the
preferences of the child have to be taken into account and it seems unlikely, though
not impossible that it would choose to grow up in poverty just for the small chance
of becoming rich someday (especially if the chance of being rich in later life is much
higher if one is already born rich, so it would be reasonable to choose to be born rich
rather than poor). But the line between a justified lowering of well-being in order to
influence well-becoming and an unjustified one is not always easy to draw. And the
causality between certain actions and external factors and the later well-being or ill-
being is also often murky. Despite these difficulties, the evidence is overwhelming
that childhood is a particular phase of development that has significant influence on
the whole life course. The research is substantial and growing on the short and long-
term effects of different living conditions, environmental factors and behavioural
patterns and how these effects are transmitted. For that reason, justice cannot be only
concerned with how children actually live but has to ask how this shapes the future
prospects of those children. A society that aims to be just will strive for conditions
that take into account the whole life course, so that justice for children connects with
justice for adults.
Most theories of justice – as well as those of morality – place a high value on
autonomy and personal freedom. A just society should also be a free one, in the
sense that it allows and protects the autonomy of its member to the greatest possible
degree and leaves ample room for them to pursue and realize their own goals and life
plans. To design justice for children with an orientation towards their well-being and
well-becoming appears to come into conflict with the goal of autonomy in two ways:
first, children are allowed less autonomy compared to adults in the sense that their
cognitive skills and capacities are insufficient and still developing and that they are to
a greater degree dependent on adults in order to make good choices. As such, justice
for children will demand to limit the autonomy and personal freedom of children
and be paternalistic in many ways. Second, well-being and well-becoming can be
severely hurt by autonomous choices that a just society should still allow or even
protect to make, for example, unhealthy life style choices like dangerous activities
and sports. There are cases in which actions that endanger one’s own well-being and
well-becoming are even morally good, for example to help others. As I will argue,
autonomy is also important in the design of justice for children with an orientation
towards their well-being and well-becoming although it is reasonably limited. As I
have said, autonomy, the ability to make own choices and to realize one’s self, is itself
an important dimension of the well-being and well-becoming of nearly all humans,
and also for children. So to say that the goal of justice is the protection of the well-
being and well-becoming of children does not rule out that autonomy has a place in it
and that it is demanded by justice to give autonomy space to unfold. Furthermore, it
is true that autonomy is a developing ability and that especially very young children
are dependent on the guidance and care of adults, but it is also true that children
have their own wishes and preferences and that they value their autonomy even at
young ages. So it is also important for justice to give children the opportunity to make
their own choices, even if this is limited by adults to protect their safety, their current
and future well-being. But this autonomy is limited insofar as there are good reasons
to interfere because it can be rightfully assumed that they do not have the ability to
assess the effects of their choices. Again, it is not possible to draw the line here all
too easily, and rules based on age limits are only a decent and workable though still
imperfect approximation. Also, the orientation on well-becoming includes that one
highly valuable goal of justice for children is that they grow up in an environment
that allows and supports them to become autonomous beings when they are adults.
The third issue I want to discuss is the relation of well-being and well-becoming
and the vulnerability of children. All humans are vulnerable and in danger of being
hurt, but children are so to a greater extent and in need of the protection of others.
This is clear for very young children, and the vulnerability wanes over time although
it never disappears. This greater vulnerability is also reflected by an orientation
towards well-being and well-becoming. It places the physiological, psychological
and social needs of children at the centre of attention and develops from here what
children are entitled to and what society owes to them in order to grow-up healthily
and protected from needless harm and suffering. Therefore, to protect the well-being
and well-becoming of children implies first and foremost to protect them from being
harmed and to design the institutions in ways that are sensitive to the different phases
of childhood. But the vulnerability of children not only refers to their current state but
also to their future and well-becoming. As already mentioned, there is overwhelming
evidence that different forms of harm and hardship during childhood have long-lasting
and severe consequences. This also means that children are not only vulnerable as
children but that their future well-being is also vulnerable to violation. Again, this
implies that protecting children is important, in order to protect adults.
In conclusion, well-being and well-becoming can serve as comprehensive goals
for the design of justice, taking into account central features of childhood and the
particular status of children. It is therefore rooted in the peculiar ‘nature’ of children
as agents of justice.
5.3 Choosing Dimensions of Well-Being and Well-Becoming and

the Currency of Justice
I will now turn my attention to choosing the currency of justice for children,
which I will develop from my understanding of well-being and well-becoming as
multidimensional. A currency of justice should satisfy at least two criteria: it should
capture the important differences between persons, and it should be distributional.
This implies that differences that are important to the well-being and well-becoming
of individuals but cannot be influenced by the societal framework and set of
institutions are not adequate subjects of justice and should not be used to determine
Choosing Dimensions of Well-Being and Well-Becoming and the Currency of Justice 89
its currency. I do not wish to explore here the deep and sophisticated debate on the
currency of justice, but rather sketch out why capabilities and functionings appear
to be the right choice if one is concerned with justice for children (Anderson 2010).
Capabilities and functionings have the advantage of being sensitive to differences in
the usage of goods and resources and they are sensitive to discrimination and other
injustices that affect the conversion of resources into capabilities and functionings.
A theory of justice for children should be concerned with what they are actually able
to do and be. Capabilities and functionings are ends, whereas resources or goods
are means and, therefore, a focus on capabilities and functionings is able to directly
compare differences in what ultimately matters: the well-being and well-becoming of
children. For children, resources are also very often only of indirect importance and
mediated through their care-givers and other institutions. Income, wealth and voting
rights for example are of no direct use for small children but do heavily affect their
well-being and well-becoming. A capability approach seems more suited to capture
these dependencies. But what capabilities and functionings are qualified to serve
for comparisons in well-being and well-becoming and should be specified as the
currency of justice? Before I explore this question, I want to begin by asking whether
the currency of justice for children should be capabilities or functionings or both.
Most capability theorists prefer capabilities over functionings because of the
high value of autonomy and choice. Within the broader setting of political liberalism,
such authors like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum argue that people should have
central capabilities but it should be left to their own choice whether or not they want
to realize them as functionings (Nussbaum 2011). An example that is often used is
that of the capability to be well nourished, which certainly is a central one, but that
people should still have the option to fast and if one chooses to do so and therefore
does not realize the functioning of being well nourished this does not poses a problem
of justice. This argument has plenty of force but it also has its limitations that are
well acknowledged by capability theorists: first, the problem of adaptive preferences
which can not only lead people to adapt to unjust circumstances and the deprivation
of even central capabilities, but also effects whether people want to realize certain
capabilities as functionings (Khader 2009). Think of a society in which women have
the right to vote and all necessary access to do so safely but most decline because of
their ideological conviction that women are not capable of political decision-making.
Most would agree that justice should also be concerned with such an issue and one
should not be satisfied with simply providing the capability to vote but to make the
participation of women actually happen. It is also the functioning that counts. In the
case of children, a focus on functionings is further supported by the abovementioned
limited capacity to act autonomously and rationally. Children do not just need the
capability to have education, but should realize it and acquire the functioning of
being educated because this is relevant for their current and their future well-being.
The same goes for other important capabilities such as being healthy, being socially
included or having shelter, nourishment and clothing. Another practical reason why
functionings are of importance is that they are measurable – at least a lot more easily
than capabilities – and comparable (Alkire 2008).
There is also a fluent passage between capabilities and functionings and they
both have a certain plasticity. There are many stages between having the capability to
be well nourished to the realization of the functioning to be well nourished, and both
can be satisfied in various ways. Having this capability can mean having immediate
access to food that is in the refrigerator, it can mean having access to a supermarket
and having the funds to buy food there; to be well nourished can mean to have just
eaten one’s favourite sandwich, or it can refer to a person who is actually hungry
because she has not eaten for a few hours but is healthy and in general has enough
to eat, and good meals. On closer inspection, the boundary between capabilities and
functionings becomes less clear. These arguments support my view that they are
both of importance for well-being and well-becoming and that a theory of justice for
children does not need to make a general decision on which one is more important.
Rather, if a set or list of capabilities and functionings is chosen it has to be made
explicit whether and for whom the benchmark is a capability or a functioning. For
example, for an eight-year-old child’s education should be interpreted in terms of a
clearly defined functioning – the eight-year-old should actually go to school – while
for a sixteen-year-old it could be interpreted in terms of a capability – a sixteen-year-
old should have the opportunity to go to school but is also free to choose a training on
the job to become a plumber.
But how to choose the dimensions of well-being and well-becoming that should
be used as the currency of justice? I support a pragmatic and empirically informed
approach as it was used by Mario Biggeri and his colleagues, who distinguish
eighteen dimensions of children’s well-being following expert opinions, in relation to
existing lists and conventions, and a participatory process with children (Biggeri and
Mehrotra 2011). Still, no method to select capabilities and functionings will be perfect
and no list will be exhaustive. Justice should inform and guide the societal framework
and the design of its institutions and for that it is neither necessary to draft a full
list out of theory, nor can empirical evidence be enough, but has to be interpreted
before the normative goals of justice. If we want to design justice in the context of the
education system, a more refined and tailored list of capabilities and functionings is
needed than if justice is discussed on the level of a whole society. In particular I want
to highlight four points that seem crucial:
1. First, the selection of capabilities and functionings has to be context-sensitive in
the sense that it reflects the context in which the child grows up and lives. The
functioning to be socially included is important for all children, but there are
crucial differences for example between developed welfare states and developing
countries, and justice should reflect those differences in that it neither demands
too little nor too much. This demands also an ‘ecological perspective’ on
children’s well-being and well-becoming and how they are influenced by the
different environments – as important conversion factors – in which children are
Choosing Dimensions of Well-Being and Well-Becoming and the Currency of Justice 91
embedded. Choosing capabilities and functionings without taking into account

the social embedding of children could also lead to an overly individualistic
approach.
2. Second, the capabilities and functionings have to be developmental-sensitive,
which means that they have to account for the particular phase of childhood
and the different developmental stages of children. As previously mentioned,
autonomy becomes more important as children grow older, implying a shift from
a focus on functionings to a focus on capabilities, for example when it comes to
choices of education or their social inclusion. It is also needed to define successive
development goals that should be reached over time and that can be monitored.
For the developmental perspective, the concept of evolving capabilities and
functionings appears well-suited (Ballet, Biggeri, and Comim 2011). They should
allow us to capture the well-being and the influence on the future well-becoming
in the sense of providing children with those capabilities and functionings that
lead to having certain important capabilities and functionings in later life.
3. Third, children should be included when it comes to choosing the capabilities
and functionings of being heard and being able to participate are of certain
importance. While the first one is a methodological issue, the second one refers
to the place of participation and autonomy in a list of central capabilities and
functionings of children. For adults it is not questionable that these are of utmost
importance and that a just society strives for them, but this is also true for
children. They are entitled to the possibility to make choices for themselves to a
certain extent and to act as citizens with rights and duties.
4. Fourth, the subjective dimension of well-being has to be reflected at least partly
by the selection of capabilities and functionings. This is a tricky and controversial
claim because subjective well-being is something that can be influenced by so
many factors that can and should not be controlled by the institutional setting of
a society. A child can be unhappy because she does not get the birthday present
that she wished for, or feels rejected because she got a bad grade on a test or
because she had an accident that means staying in hospital for a few days. All
these influences pose no violation of justice but can significantly reduce subjective
well-being. Why then not leave justice to be concerned only with capabilities and
functionings that can be measured objectively as Elizabeth Anderson argues, for
example (Anderson 2010)? I see three reasons here: on the one hand, subjective
well-being is not completely random; its relation to objective dimensions of
well-being are well known and studied (Aldgate et al. 2006). As such, subjective
well-being can and is heavily influenced by capabilities and functionings that
fall within the realm of justice, and it appears to be a valuable information to
know how a certain implementation of justice, a policy or a distributional pattern
influences the subjective well-being of children and how they feel about it. On
the other hand, objective well-being and well-becoming is also influenced by the
subjective well-being. Children need love, care and personal attention as well
as needing positive self-relations and feelings and experiences of happiness in

order to develop those objectively measurable capabilities and functionings. But,
finally, subjective well-being is not only valuable as a means to support justice
but in itself, for the individual as well as for society as a whole. A society in
which every child has secured access to all capabilities and functionings that are
necessary for their objective well-being and well-becoming but in which despite
that most or a significant portion of children have a constantly low subjective
well-being and feel sad, rejected, lonely or unloved and cared for, cannot be
deemed just,’ but rather fails those children.
In conclusion, the currency of justice should be those capabilities and functionings

that comprise the well-being and well-becoming of children. Such a list does not
have to be final but should be drafted based on the best empirical evidence available,
bearing in mind that children’s lives and futures are shaped by the environments in
which they live and grow up and the different institutions and agents they interact
with, with children being heard and involved, giving them space to make their own
choices and with the goal in mind to support and protect their current well-being and
to develop into autonomous adults and members of society, who also enjoy a state of
well-being.
5.4 Pluralism and the Rule of Justice
David Miller has argued that rather than specifying one rule or principle of justice, a
tripartite approach is more reasonable (Miller 1999). He distinguishes the principles
of need – which can be interpreted as sufficiency –, of desert, and of equality and
grounds them in the different types of social relations in which people participate.
The principle of need should be applied in such relations as the family and solidaristic
communities, the principle of desert is the right one to follow in such instrumental
associations as in the market, and the principle of equality is important for the
realm of citizenship. These three share certain similarities, although developed from
a different perspective, with the tripartite of the three modes of recognition – care,
esteem and respect – that can also serve as the basis for a pluralistic approach to the
rule of justice. In contrast to such a pluralistic approach, most capability theorists
follow a sufficietarian route and are concerned only with the minimum floor of justice
(Robeyns 2005). Furthermore, it is not clear if and how Miller’s considerations are
applicable to children. In this section I want to argue that such pluralism is indeed a
reasonable approach, but that this pluralism is not primarily rooted in the different
social relations in which children participate but foremost in the different kinds of
capabilities and functionings they are entitled to.
I will pick out just three types of capabilities and functionings that are relevant to
justice: to be healthy, to be able to realize one’s own choices, and to not be exploited.
Pluralism and the Rule of Justice 93
All three subdomains and thresholds have to be specified in order to be applicable

to guide the design of an institutional framework, but for my purpose I will discuss
them only on a very abstract level. First, all children are entitled to certain capabilities
and functionings without differences and the functioning – not only the capability
– of not being exploited is one of these. Here the rule of equality should be followed
and it cannot be superseded by the specific context in which a child participates.
Every child should realize this functioning whether in the context of her family and
friendships, in those of her school or in any other one. Second, also the capability
or functioning of being healthy is not context-sensitive in the sense that the social
context can determine how it should be distributed among children. But other
differences are of importance, for example maturity and age, influences that cannot
be societally controlled or where this control comes into serious conflict with other
claims of justice, and the limitation of resources and knowledge. This means that
older children should be allowed to risk their health if they wish to do so (risky sports,
unhealthy eating patterns etc.) and the functioning of being healthy converts into the
capability to be healthy, it also implies that such differences in health that result from
accidents or genetic variation are not unjust and that claims of justice are restricted
by the health status that is actually possible to achieve by a reasonable allocation of
resources (it is not reasonable to invest all resources into research on one very rare
and painful disease if that leaves no resources to cure less severe diseases). So, in
general terms the functioning of being healthy should be the target which justice
should aim for and which should guide the design of the institutional framework;
every child is equally entitled to health. But on closer inspection it becomes clear
that the rule of equality also implies a rule of sufficiency: every child is entitled to
sufficient resources and conversion factors to be healthy (e.g. health care, health
literacy, healthy food and space for exercise and play). Third, the capability or
functioning to realize one’s own choices cannot be granted to all children equally
because it is very likely that different choices and their realization are in conflict with
each other. Furthermore, some choices are very likely never to be realized because the
child has not the sufficient resources, capacities or due to other limitations. So why
view this capability as an important one to begin with? On the one hand, there is no
doubt that the capability to realize one’s own goal is of importance for the well-being
of children, because a life of continuous failure and rejection is not a good one and
also negatively influences other important capabilities and functionings. On the other
hand, within the notion of capabilities and functionings themselves, the importance
of realizing one’s own goal is inherent: a capability is exactly the ability to realize a
functioning if one wishes to do so and this personal freedom is highly valued. In this
regard, the capability to realize one’s own goal is embedded and an important part of
such other capabilities and functionings as autonomy, mental health, participation
and inclusion, or – more specifically – leisure activities and friendships. A society
in which children’s capabilities and functionings were adequately protected but in
which they are unable to realize those goals and choices they value, would be unjust
because it would not be a free society. Take for example grades in school that a child
wants to achieve. It would seem unjust to grade all children equally if they display a
difference in effort and achievements, and also the idea of sufficiency seems odd in
that case, considering that there is no certain threshold of grades that all children
are entitled to. If a child wants to get a certain grade she has to achieve it, in the
interpretation that she deserves that grade. Such an idea of desert on the level of
grading is embedded in the idea that all children should reach a sufficient level of
education – again not only the capability – and that this sufficiency also serves the
idea of a comprehensive equality of opportunity in later life. The importance of the
idea of desert lies also in that the development of positive self-relations such as self-
esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect is to some part dependent on the experience
of social esteem for the realization of one’s own choices and for being responsible for
them (Honneth 1996). This differentiating character of desert is an important part of
autonomy in general and also capabilities and functionings. In regard to children, this
rule of justice may appear of less importance than for adults, where desert plays an
important role in the justification of the distribution of income, wealth and positions.
But also during childhood and for the well-being of children, some capabilities and
functionings imply that they have to be deserved and that the institutional framework
should be designed in that way that they are distributed accordingly. However, as
previously mentioned, this is not bound to a specific social context and desert may be
the right rule to be applied in private and public life alike.
In conclusion, justice for children that wants to be comprehensive will incorporate
a pluralism of rules of distribution that are applied to the certain capabilities and
functionings that are important for the well-being and well-becoming of children.
I have argued that the tripartite differentiation of David Miller can provide a good
starting point, and one that concurs with the main assumption of the recognition
approach that children have a claim for the experience of all three forms of recognition
– care, esteem and respect. Such rules also reflect the developmental dimension of
justice that is expressed in its orientation on the well-being and well-becoming of
children. The rules themselves – sufficiency, equality and desert – are of importance
for children and express their moral and political status.
5.5 Conclusions
Well-being and well-becoming of children are highly complex and multi-dimensional

concepts, which pose difficulties on the theoretical and practical level of their
implementation in policies and the design of the institutional framework of a society.
Still, they possess significant normative force, not only but especially in the context of
childhood. Children are neither the fully rational and autonomous beings that regular
theories of justice have in mind nor are they only adults-to-be and fully irrational and
helpless without their own preferences and ideas of a good life. In this paper I have
References 95
only been able to present a brief and in many aspects insufficient and incomplete
sketch of how well-being and well-becoming can guide the conceptualization of
justice for children. Such a theory will also be non-ideal in the sense that it has to
be context-sensitive and to incorporate the best available empirical and theoretical
knowledge about how children’s well-being and well-becoming is influenced by
themselves and the various environments in which they grow up and live in. This
knowledge – which I had no opportunity to discuss here – is also not fully coherent
and conclusive and has to be interpreted before the normative idea of a just society
and its goals.
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Section II: Children's Well-Being and Well-Becoming
Amy Clair
6 Conceptualising Child versus Adult Well-Being:
Schooling and Employment
6.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to provide a case for the greater consideration of children’s
well-being in education policy by presenting a discussion of adult and child
subjective well-being in relation to the comparable experiences of employment and
education, focusing on evidence predominantly from the UK (notably England) and
USA. It is argued that, while there is undoubtedly greater variation in employment
than schooling, the established relationship between subjective well-being and
employment can be transferred to education, and therefore be used to justify interest
in education on the basis that work and school represent the main institutions
that people engage with at these different stages of their lives. Schooling and
education are an enormous part of childhood (Willms, 2003; Suldo et al., 2006);
while employment dominates adult life, at least until retirement age (Harter et al.,
2002). Although adults are not compelled to engage in employment in the same way
that children are required to participate in education of some sort (for the majority
this takes the form of attending a school), for most adults employment for financial
reasons is nonetheless essential.
There has been quite considerable interest in the influence of employment on
adult subjective well-being (and vice versa) (Wright and Cropanzano, 2000; Lucas
and Diener, 2003; Wright, 2006) but research investigating children’s subjective
well-being has tended to focus on family influences, neglecting the role of schools
(Suldo et al., 2006). Where educational influences on children’s subjective well-
being are considered, it tends to be because of an overarching interest in improving
educational attainment, i.e. an interest in their well-becoming, rather than any
interest in improving children’s well-being in the present (Karatzias et al., 2002). The
focus on well-becoming in relation to education makes this comparison particularly
interesting, as it reflects the emphasis placed on successfully transitioning to
employment in adulthood.
The research regarding subjective well-being in relation to employment has
facilitated arguments for improving working conditions on the grounds that both
the employee and employer benefit (Cropanzano and Wright, 1999). As such, the
comparability of employment and education for adults and children is of interest
because it may provide an opportunity to argue more successfully for improved
working conditions for children, i.e. a greater consideration of their wider well-being
when creating and enforcing education policies than is currently the case. As such,
this paper does not argue for the promotion of subjective well-being over academic
© 2015 Amy Clair

Engagement 99
achievement, instead arguing that the two go hand-in-hand (Best, 2008), and that if
politicians are to take academic achievement as seriously as they often claim to (e.g.
Gov.uk, 2012) then they also need to consider the impact of policy on subjective well-
being.
In this paper children are considered as those under age 18 (as in the UNCRC) and
therefore employment is being compared to compulsory education. The definition of
subjective well-being used is that outlined by Diener (1984) and Veenhoven (2008),
i.e. that subjective well-being comprises an affective/emotional component (both
positive and negative) and a cognitive component (life satisfaction).
6.2 Engagement
The paper begins by discussing the engagement with employment and school
literature in order to highlight evidence showing similarities between children’s
relationships with school and adult relationships with employment.
6.2.1 Employee Engagement and Job Quality
Employee engagement relates to “a positive affective/motivational reaction towards

the job that is characterised by vigour, dedication, and absorption” (Xanthopoulou
et al., 2009, 184; also Bakker and Demerouti, 2008) and is considered to have
physical, emotional and cognitive components. Recent research has suggested that
engagement with employment is significant for a number of important outcomes
aside from, although likely to be related to, productivity such as health (Butterworth
et al., 2011).
Research conducted by Gallup (Harter and Agrawal, 2011) found that, contrary
to the common belief that employment is always preferable to unemployment in
terms of the impact on a persons’ subjective well-being, those in poor quality jobs
and who are disconnected from their work report lower well-being than those who
are unemployed. Controlling for a range of demographic factors, they found that
54% of disengaged workers reported themselves as struggling compared to 28% of
engaged workers and 49% of unemployed respondents (Harter and Agrawal, 2011.).
Only 42% of disengaged workers reported thriving compared to 71% engaged workers
and 48% unemployed people (Harter and Agrawal, 2011, n.p.). Engaged workers were
described in the research as “involved in and enthusiastic about their work” (Harter
and Agrawal, 2011) while those who were not engaged were less likely to put in
additional effort. Those who are “actively disengaged are emotionally disconnected
from their work and workplace and jeopardise the performance of their teams” (Harter
and Agrawal, 2011). This is relevant as it suggests that engagement is likely to lead to
children persisting with school and schoolwork and learning more. An alternative
100 Conceptualising Child versus Adult Well-Being: Schooling and Employment
definition of work engagement is a “positive, fulfilling, work-related state of mind”

(Bakker and Demerouti, 2008, 209).
These findings were similar to those in a longitudinal study conducted in
Australia. Butterworth et al. (2011) found that “the psychological aspects of work
are strongly associated with health outcomes” ( 1) with people in poor quality
jobs reporting poorer mental health than those who were unemployed or not
economically active. Similarly, those who moved from unemployment to poor
quality employment displayed worsening mental health compared to those who
remained unemployed (Butterworth et al., 2011). In this study, job quality was
measured in terms of job demands and complexity, job control, and perceived job
security, all of which, with the likely exception of job security, are transferrable to
children in schools. Children are typically not able to withdraw from schooling in
the same way as adults are able to withdraw, even temporarily, from employment to
find more suitable work.
Evidence suggests that one important contributor to feelings of engagement is
the way in which employees are managed (Harter and Agrawal, 2011). Also felt to
be important are employee personal (e.g. resiliency and ability to manage difficult
situations) and job (e.g. feedback, training and support) resources, especially
in stressful or difficult times (Bakker and Demerouti, 2008), such as at times of
assessment if considering children in schools. These resources can vary within
jobs, across time for example, as well as across jobs depending on their qualities
and requirements (Xanthopoulou et al., 2009), and as such could plausibly be
extended to consider children in schools by considering, for example, teacher-
pupil relationships which are known to be affected by policy (Reay and Wiliam,
1999).
Similarly to the results found regarding positive affect and productivity
discussed above, Bakker and Demerouti (2008, 210) found that “engaged employees
have high energy and self-efficacy”, potentially making them more effective in their
work. However, they stress that being an engaged employee is not the same as being
a workaholic; engaged employees go above and beyond in their work because they
want to and enjoy it, rather than feeling compelled to. Importantly, workaholism
does not share the positive relationship with productivity that engagement does
(Bakker and Demerouti, 2008) and so encouraging workaholic tendencies in
children will not improve their well-being or academic achievement in the same
way as encouraging engagement. This positive engagement effect is also thought
to be ‘contagious’ within the workplace, spreading positive behaviours among
staff (Bakker and Demerouti, 2008) and improving performance across employees
(Xanthopoulou et al., 2009). Similarly, engagement and positivity has been found to
be contagious between managers and employees suggesting that teacher subjective
well-being may be important for child subjective well-being (Bakker and Demerouti,
2008). Therefore, engagement is associated with behaviours and traits beneficial
for children in schools.
Engagement 101
6.2.2 School Engagement and Connectedness
School engagement is a “multidimensional construct” (Fredricks et al., 2004, 60)

often conceptualised as having three components (although not all are included
in all studies). Behavioural engagement relates to participation in school-related
activities, such as completing work but particularly extra-curricular activities,
behaviour in class and school more generally, such as obeying school rules (Willms,
2003; Fredricks et al., 2004; Fredricks et al., 2005). Emotional engagement relates
to affective reactions to the different aspects of schooling, such as classmates,
teachers and the school as a whole (Fredricks et al., 2004). Cognitive engagement
relates to a child’s commitment to and investment in educational success and the
level of effort that they are prepared to give (Fredricks et al., 2004; Fredricks et
al., 2005).
School engagement has been of interest because it is considered to be policy
salient (Finn and Rock, 1997; Fredricks et al., 2005) but interest often focuses
on its potential to reduce negative educational outcomes, particularly drop-out
and low academic achievement (Willms, 2003; Fredricks et al., 2004; Fredricks
et al., 2005; Southcott et al., 2013). Indeed, engagement is often considered a
predictor of achievement, however there is evidence to suggest that the causality
in the relationship is potentially the reverse, poor achievement may encourage
disengagement from schools, rather than the other way around (Willms, 2003).
The association between engagement in education and achievement is particularly
important in an educational environment such as that in England where children,
it has been argued, are exposed to feelings of academic failure at a very early
age in part due to the proliferation of standardised testing (Reay and Wiliam,
1999; Connor, 2001; Locker and Cropley, 2004). This is important because early
engagement is associated with later engagement, and engaged students are more
likely to enjoy learning and continue learning later in life (Finn and Rock, 1987;
Fullarton, 2002). Lack of positive feedback in schools is thought to be a cause of
disengagement, as is a discipline policy that is harsh or perceived to be unfair
(Willms, 2003; Fredricks et al., 2004). As suggested above regarding the evidence
of managers on work engagement, teacher support has been found to influence
all aspects of school engagement (Fredricks et al., 2004). As such, the concept of
engagement is applicable to both children in schools and adults in employment.
As engagement with employment varies for adults, it has been found that
school engagement varies depending on the task and setting (e.g. which class
the child is in) (Fredricks et al., 2004). The level of each type of engagement
may vary, for example, a child may be behaviourally engaged in that they attend
the required classes and complete the minimum amount of work, known as
“procedural engagement” (Nystrand and Gamoran, 1991, 262) or they may be
engaged to the extent that they attend classes but also engage in additional classes
and extracurricular activities, that is they may be engaged in a “substantive”
(Nystrand and Gamoran, 1991, 262) way (Fredricks et al., 2004). Engagement may
vary within students across classes and different aspects of school, especially
as children get older and have different teachers for different subjects, or even
within classes depending on the activity at that time (Nystrand and Gamoran,
1991; Fullarton, 2002; Fredricks et al., 2004). Measurement of engagement quite
often focuses on narrow definitions such as engagement in extracurricular
activities (e.g. Fullarton, 2002) which limits child engagement to the level they
can afford to participate and what is available to them in the school that they
happen to attend, and is arguably “not sufficiently sensitive to the nature and
meaning of the activities to the individual” (Finn and Rock, 1997, 231). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Fullarton (2002) found that wealthier schools and students had
higher levels of engagement.
However, as well as being limited by the number of extracurricular activities
available to them, it is also likely that government education policy limits school
engagement by prioritising learning in the form of memorisation of information
for recall in paper and pencil assessments, as such limiting understanding
in order to prioritise often shallow displays of knowledge, as evidenced by the
removal of coursework from many GCSEs in recent policy changes (Nystrand and
Gamoran, 1991; Goldstein, 2001; Fredricks et al., 2004; Barker, 2008). Nystrand
and Gamoran (1991, 262) argue that this is important as “significant academic
achievement is not possible without sustained, substantive engagement, which
transcends procedural engagement” while such an effect may also mean that
research examining the relationship between behavioural engagement and
achievement may overestimate the association as such assessments only test
basic engagement (Nystrand and Gamoran, 1991; Fredricks et al., 2004).
A similar concept to school engagement is that of school connectedness.
Connectedness to school, also known as social membership or belonging,
relates to “perception[s] of safety, belonging, respect, and feeling cared for at
school” (McNeely, 2005, 289). It is therefore arguably very similar to the concept
of emotional engagement, although it is typically discussed as a precursor to
engagement. As with engagement, connectedness is thought to, and has been
shown to, improve academic outcomes and reduce engagement in risk behaviours
(McNeely et al., 2002; McNeely and Falci, 2004; McNeely, 2005). Connectedness
has multiple definitions and is constructed of several different components:
“belonging, social support, and engagement” (McNeely and Falci, 2004, 5). As well
as feeling connectedness to school itself, children may also feel connectedness to
their peers, known as “unconventional connectedness” (McNeely and Falci, 2004,
4) the effect of which on behaviour, etc. depends on the behaviour of the peer
group. Similarly to engagement, severe punishment in schools is associated with
lower school connectedness (McNeely et al., 2002).
The Happy-Productive Worker Hypothesis 103
6.3 The Happy-Productive Worker Hypothesis
As the concept of engagement has been found to be applicable to both children and
adults, it is relevant for the purpose of this paper to investigate another of the dominant
concepts in this area of the management field that can be applied to children: the
happy-productive worker hypothesis.
There has been a great deal of interest in the happy-productive worker hypothesis
(Wright and Cropanzano, 2000; Lucas and Diener, 2003; Wright, 2006) which
suggests that ‘happier’ workers will be more productive and perform better than
those who are less happy (Wright and Cropanzano, 2000). The way happiness has
been operationalised in such research has varied, developing initially from research
into the effects of boredom, happiness has been frequently considered as job
satisfaction. More recently, happiness in this context has regularly been considered
as subjective well-being, or components of subjective well-being (Wright, 2006), as
it came to be recognised that job satisfaction is not equivalent to happiness (Wright
and Cropanzano, 2000). Similarly, productivity has also had varying definitions,
depending on the type of work and reflecting both subjective and objective measures
of productivity (Lucas and Diener, 2003; Xanthopoulou et al., 2009).
The happy-productive worker hypothesis is of interest to both employers and
employees alike, as employers are interested in ways of improving productivity and
staff retention, therefore avoiding the costs of training new staff (Harter et al., 2002;
Lucas and Diener, 2003; Wright, 2006). Likewise, employees benefit as they have
been able to argue for improvements in their working lives stating “that increased
pay and working conditions will be repaid in subsequent performance” (Wright and
Staw, 1999b, 31). A link between subjective well-being and productivity seems likely
due to the evidence that positive affect “is strongly associated with feeling energetic
and active” (Lucas and Diener, 2003, 39). The following sections briefly discuss the
existing evidence relating to the happy-productive worker hypothesis.
The happy-productive worker hypothesis has typically “been operationalized
by correlating employee self-ratings of job satisfaction with supervisory ratings of
performance” (Wright and Cropanzano, 2000, 84), resulting in a range of correlations
and significance levels, with some going so far as to say that “decades of research
have failed to show a close link between job satisfaction and performance” (Wright
and Staw, 1999, 1). The low correlations found in some research may be attributed
to the use of a single-item rather than the composite measure of job satisfaction,
often at the organisation level (Judge et al., 2001). However, more recent research
that has used measures of subjective well-being, particularly affective aspects, has
had more consistent and significant findings at the individual level, suggesting that
this conception of the happy-productive worker hypothesis is supported by evidence,
including from longitudinal studies (Cropanzo and Wright, 1999; Wright et al. 2002).
These studies found that “well-being did account for a significant proportion of
the variance in composite performance” (Wright et al., 2002, 149; also Harter et al.,
2002). It is thought, however, that the relationship between subjective well-being and
productivity is curvilinear, rather than linear, with declining returns for increasing
subjective well-being after a certain point (Mishra and Smyth, 2012).
There have been a number of potential reasons suggested for the relationship
between positive subjective well-being and work performance. One is the halo effect
which suggests that, rather than happy people being more productive, the happy-
productive worker hypothesis instead reflects the fact that happy people are simply
perceived more positively by others, thus potentially undermining the argument
for improved working conditions (Staw et al., 1993). However, Wright and Staw
(1999a) argue that if halo effects were the cause of the happy-productive relationship
this would not undermine evidence of its existence, it would still be the case that
positive affect led to improved performance by many measures. Findings from Staw
and Barsade (1993) undermine the halo effect argument, suggesting that the happy-
productive worker hypothesis cannot be dismissed in this way.
Another explanation is the effect of affective state on mental performance. For
example, depressed people have been found to “demonstrate poorer recall of difficult
(high-effort) material and no loss in recall from low effort materials” (Harter et al.,
2002, 5), while positive affect is associated with improved creativity and greater
problem solving (Staw and Barsade, 1993; Staw et al., 1994). Similarly, it has been
suggested that those who have high positive affect are more likely to attempt difficult
tasks and persist at tasks for longer (Wright and Staw, 1999) and that affective states
cause behaviours that either improve or hamper performance behaviours (Cropanzano
and Wright, 1999). There has been some suggestion that increased negative affect or
depression may be associated with improved decision making, however research
does not support this, instead finding better decision making among those with high
positive affect (Staw and Barsade, 1993). The suggestion and evidence that positive
affect is associated with greater performance and persistence should be of real interest
to education policy makers as well as employers.
Instead of arguing for improved conditions, the happy-productive worker
hypothesis could be used to argue that employers could improve productivity by
making hiring decisions based on the positive affect levels of applicants (Cropanzano
and Wright, 1999). This presumably would not be an option for schools, however
evidence suggests that the benefits of selection based on affective well-being would
reduce over time if effort was not made to maintain or improve positive affect
(Cropanzano and Wright, 1999; Xanthopoulou et al., 2009). This is because positive
affect has been found to be influenced by the work environment, and so cannot
be considered as simply an individual characteristic (Xanthopoulou et al., 2009).
This argument highlights the likely importance of school environment to children’s
subjective well-being and the importance of its role in policymaking considerations.
A Brief Summary of Existing School/Subjective Well-Being Research 105
6.4 A Brief Summary of Existing School/Subjective Well-Being

Research
The research discussed above has highlighted a number of ways in which it may
be possible to improve or better understand the subjective well-being of children
in schools through considering evidence relating to employment, particularly
the happy-productive worker hypothesis. The existing research investigating
relationships between school and aspects of subjective well-being has suggested
a relationship between child subjective well-being and school perceptions and
feelings, as well as showing that having good relationships with teachers is
related to overall life satisfaction (Suldo et al., 2006). Similarly, research in the
UK conducted by The Children’s Society (2012) has confirmed the importance of
schools to the subjective well-being of children. Existing research has demonstrated
a relationship between life satisfaction and satisfaction with school, while there is
a lack of coherence regarding the relationship between subjective well-being and
academic achievement (Suldo et al., 2006). However, this has often been conducted
at the macro level and cross-country variation seems plausible given the different
attitudes to and associated pressures regarding achievement in different nations.
Despite the existence of this previous research, further investigation is necessary,
not only for the reasons mentioned above. Research has tended to investigate the
influence of subjective well-being and school satisfaction on academic achievement
in order solely to improve academic outcomes (Huebner and McCullough, 2000;
Karatzias et al., 2002). While this is important, and avenues to improve academic
achievement should be explored, this approach neglects children’s well-being in
favour of their well-becoming, reduces them to passive agents, and neglects the
responsibility to ensure that education policies and approaches not just improve
academic achievement, but nurture the whole child and ensure that no harm is
caused in the pursuit of improved achievement (Brennan and White, 2007; Best,
2008). This is especially pertinent given the lack of negotiating power children have
in regards to how they are taught.
A study that in some way bridges the two issues of employment and schooling
is a study by Cotton et al. (2002) which applied the happy-productive worker
hypothesis to a sample of university students. They found a possible link between
courses that had little opportunity for originality and higher levels of stress, and a
strong relationship between academic achievement, measured as GPA (Grade Point
Average), and a measure of satisfaction (based on job satisfaction approaches)
mediated by their work environment (operationalised as demands and control)
(Cotton et al., 2002).
6.5 Do Differences between Children and Adults Undermine this

Comparison?
There are, however, a number of factors that suggest a difference between children
and adults which could potentially be used to undermine the comparison between
school and employment as discussed in this paper. The following section gives a very
brief overview.
Children are almost universally considered to be incompetent compared to
adults, who, it is argued are rational and sensible, and on this basis children
are “systematically denied the dignity and status of adults” (Harris, 1982, 35; also
Archard and Macleod, 2002). Their lives are subject to considerably more control than
adults, and that control is exercised by adults, often with the suggestion that it is in
their best interests not least because treating children as adults is potentially cruel
(Harris, 1982). Children were previously often considered as simply the property of
their parents, or people whose identity was subsumed by that of their parents, rather
than people to whom their parents had an obligation to care (Archard and Macleod,
2002). This approach has meant that children have received comparatively little
consideration or involvement in things that affect their lives compared to adults, as
highlighted by the changes in education policy discussed here.
In recent years the neglect of children in research and theoretical literature has
started to reverse, with greater attention paid to children in their own right (Qvortrup,
1993; Archard and Macleod, 2002; Ben-Arieh and Frønes, 2011). This has led to the
recognition of children as rights holders and almost universal rejection of the idea of
children as property, at least in principle (Noggle, 2002; Brennan and White, 2007).
It has also been argued that the distinction between children and adults is in fact a
distinction between the competent and incompetent (Harris, 1982). The incompetent
child versus competent adult argument is undermined by the existence of adults
making irrational decisions, such as smoking, and the extension of adult freedoms
to all that reach adulthood regardless of their competence and capacity. As Harris
(1982) argued ‟Bold, quick, ingenious, forward and capable young people are by
no means a rarity, neither, unfortunately, are dull-witted, incompetent adults” (37).
Similarly, Noggle (2002) has argued that the differences between adults and children
are more complex and nuanced. For example, the status of children in regards to
their parents is special as parents maintain authority over children even when they
have reached stages where they can be considered competent, and may even be
more able themselves. Instead, treating children as equals to adults may offer some
protection from abuse and exploitation by adults. The most severe way in which the
adult control of children is exemplified is the enforcement of compulsory school (or
equivalent) attendance, with enforced standards of compliance and topics of study
at the control of the Department for Education (Harris, 1982). These tendencies have
encouraged viewing children as adults in the making, and therefore to focus on their
well-becoming as opposed to their well-being in a way that is not the case for adults,
Do Differences between Children and Adults Undermine this Comparison? 107
allowing education policy decisions that have negative consequences children in the
present (Archard and Macleod, 2002).
As such, it is not acceptable to ignore the potential impacts of schooling on
children. Rights of children, particularly not to experience harm, are not meaningfully
different from equivalent adult rights, but the difficulty for them is having the ability
to act to protect their rights (Brennan and White, 2007). In this sense they have the
same rights as adults but a different set of capabilities with regards to them (Sen,
1993). This difference is pertinent to the application of the happy-productive worker
hypothesis to children in schools. Wright and Staw (1999b) argue that employees
have “implicitly drawn on the [happy-productive] thesis in contract negotiations,
often arguing that increased pay and working conditions will be repaid in subsequent
performance” (31), while the same argument can be made for children in schools,
their relative lack of power compared to adults means that they are not in a position
to do so. As such, responsibility must fall to others to argue for them.
If, as the evidence discussed above suggests, poor quality employment is worse
than unemployment, is it plausible to argue that poor quality education is worse
than no education? The importance of obtaining at least a minimum level of literacy
and numeracy means that the comparison here is less direct. The known negative
effects of certain education policies on children, for example, on their subjective
well-being, their self-worth and self-confidence (Reay and Wiliam, 1999, for example)
cannot be used to justify not participating in education. Obviously the more desirable
alternative is to ensure that education does not have, or at least minimises, such
negative effects and research suggests that this is possible. But this means taking
into account the broader impact of education at a time when standards are promoted
above all else. Much like being seen to be serious about tackling crime, politicians of
recent years have striven to be seen as serious about ensuring educational standards.
With arguably few notable exceptions, for example the Every Child Matters agenda
(although this paid little attention to subjective well-being), this has meant a narrow
focus on academic achievement measured by success in standardised tests, ironically
ignoring the evidence of a positive relationship between the subjective well-being of
children and their achievement in education (Kirkcaldy et al., 2004).
Much is often made of the well-being and well-becoming distinction between
children and adults. While it is true that policy and research tends to focus on well-
becoming for children to a greater extent than for adults (for example, research
into adult engagement with employment does not include reducing engagement
in risk behaviours as one of its desired outcomes, as is often the case for the study
of engagement in schools) there are well-becoming considerations for adults in
employment, for example, forgoing income in the present in order to have a decent
pension or considering future career prospects when deciding where to work. The
main difference between well-becoming considerations for children and adults is,
arguably, the ability of adults to be involved in that compromise. If adults decide that
children are not able to evaluate this compromise themselves then the obligation
should fall on adults to ensure that the right balance is struck, that well-being does
not suffer excessively to the detriment of well-becoming.
These are just some examples regarding the difference between adults and
children and employment and school. However, none of the differences undermine
the argument that it is important to give children in schools the same consideration
that we give adults in employment.
6.6 Can this Comparison be Used to Influence Education Policy?
As education in the UK, particularly England, has become increasingly centralised,

with the Secretary of State acquiring increasing powers in the past few decades,
education has become more and more politicised (Chitty, 2009). This has led to
competition between political parties about who takes education, often meaning
academic attainment, most seriously, and who is doing the most to improve it.
However, this has not meant who can do the most to improve examination results,
as too much improvement is interpreted by some to be the result of grade inflation or
the results of negative practices by schools, for example teaching to the test, rather
than genuine improvement (Barker, 2008; Gov.uk, 2012). As such, there has been an
intense focus among politicians in recent years on appearing to take a hard line on
educational achievement and perceived low standards, resulting in the pursuit of
greater standardised testing, competition and comparison between schools, setting
and streaming, and changing GCSE and A-level assessments to ensure that they are
not becoming ‘too easy’ (Chitty, 2009; Gov.uk, 2012). However, these changes have
taken a narrow approach to educational success and attainment and it is debatable
whether improved academic achievement is the result of this focus, instead the effects
of these changes on achievement are at best not clear, while there is evidence that
they have created a school environment which has clear negative effects on children’s
subjective well-being (Reay and Wiliam, 1999; Connor, 2001; Connor, 2003; Locker
and Cropley, 2004; Barker, 2008). This suggests that appearing to promote educational
achievement is the reality, and this is done by pursuing ideologically driven policies
which encourage and reward procedural learning and engagement (Tomlinson, 1994;
Tomlinson, 2005; Barker, 2008). This has also had the effect of reducing teacher
morale and job satisfaction, likely to have a knock-on effect on the children that they
teach (Evans, 2000; NUT, 2013).
A new approach would encourage substantive engagement and learning,
promoting new knowledge and an enjoyment of learning beyond the ability to recall
facts and information but would require a significant shift in policy, away from the
direction that has been dominant since the 1988 Education Reform Act. This seems
unlikely as what little interest there was in the effect of schooling on child well-being
from the government has diminished under the current coalition government who
have, for example, removed assessment of pupil well-being from Ofsted criteria
References 109
considering it a “peripheral issue” (Harrison, 2010, n.p.). But Harter et al. (2002) have
argued that “The ability of the workplace to prevent mental illness and to promote well-
being is compatible with the mission of the public’s health, as outlined by the surgeon
general” (206), then the workplace of the child, the school, should be considered
seriously in relation to children’s subjective well-being. Huebner and McCullough
(2000, 331) have emphasised “that school experiences may be a significant source of
stress and decreased quality of life for a significant number of high school students”
(Huebner and McCullough, 2000, 331) while the evidence discussed above in relation
to employment for adults stresses that the school environment as shaped by policy is
likely to be a key factor in the subjective well-being of young people. This relationship
is likely to become increasingly important given the recent publications showing
high levels of mental health issues and declining subjective well-being among young
people (Mindfull, 2013; The Children’s Society, 2013; YouGov, 2013) which is likely to
be costly in the long-term (as well as being important in the present) both individually
and more broadly (Cummins et al, 2009; Proctor et al, 2010).
It should be noted that while this paper argues for considering children in schools
in a way that is equivalent to adults in employment, that is not to say that the way adults
in employment are considered or treated is ideal. It is acknowledged that there are
still many shortcomings in this regard, for example the recent concern in the UK of the
use of zero-hours contracts and their effects on employees (CIPD, 2013; The Guardian,
2013). However, it is hoped that by highlighting the evidence from employment which
demonstrates a link between subjective well-being, engagement and productivity and
the parallels between employment and schooling, a shift in policy towards greater
consideration of children’s subjective well-being can be encouraged.
Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research
Council (grant reference ES/I009124/1). The author would like to thank Professor
Kathleen Kiernan for her advice while working on this paper.
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Alexander Bagattini
7 Male Circumcision and Children’s Interests
7.1 Introduction
Male circumcision has, contrary to female circumcision, long been seen as a

rather unproblematic procedure. However, nowadays male circumcision has
increasingly become the focus of law and morals. In 2013 in particular, a huge
number of philosophical papers, special issues and volumes were published
on the topic. What had happened? Two events in 2012 are of major importance:
the first one is the debate about the verdict of the Cologne county court in
Germany, which claimed that the circumcision of a four-year-old boy had been
illegal (according to German law) because the procedure had not been medically
necessary. Meanwhile, the German Government discharged the verdict of the
Cologne judges and rendered a new law in December 2012, according to which
male circumcision is left to parental discretion (German Penal Code, §1631, d) if it
is carried out under medically proper conditions. The other event was the release
of a technical report and a policy statement of the task force on circumcision
of the American Association of Pediatrics (AAP) in September 2012 (AAP 2012).
According to the AAP, circumcision is not recommended as a standard procedure,
yet the last word in this regard is left to the parents. In both cases (the new German
law and the survey of the AAP) a position is taken that might not be utterly new
but that is defended in the light of the latest scientific evidence.
This position entails two claims: the first claim is what David Archard calls
the liberal standard according to which parents only forego their right to make
decisions on behalf of their children if they do not act in the best interest of their
offspring (Archard 2004). The second claim is: contrary to female circumcision,
male circumcision does not violate a child’s best interests. If both claims are true,
it follows that circumcision should be left to parental discretion. This position has
been held by the Benetars (Benetar & Benetar 2003) and has been defended quite
recently by Joseph Mazor (2013). Most opponents of male circumcision question the
second claim. While some authors argue that circumcision conflicts with a child’s
interest in bodily integrity (Davis 2013, Lang 2013, Ungar-Sargon 2013, Hodges &
Svoboda & Van Howe 2002), others address an assumed conflict of circumcision with
future goods, such as the future person’s personal autonomy (Svoboda 2013, Ungar-
Sargon 2013). The guiding question of this paper is whether circumcision violates
children’s best interests and should, therefore, be banned. The first two parts of this
paper will basically focus on arguments by Joseph Mazor and by his critics. I will
argue that Mazor succeeds in his defence of circumcision in the case of children’s
interests in bodily integrity and sexual flourishing, but fails to properly address the
© 2015 Alexander Bagattini

child’s interest in autonomy.1 The third part will address some arguments that are
related to the question of whether circumcision leads to benefits that might justify
the procedure, even if the autonomy condition is violated.
Before proceeding with the general argument of this paper, some terminological
points have to be made: first, this paper deals with male circumcision only. Yet for the
sake of brevity I will use the general term ‘circumcision’. If I mention cases of female
circumcision (female genital mutilation) I will make it explicit. Second, there are
clear medical indications for circumcision such as pathological phimosis (Lissauer
& Clayden 2011). This paper deals with cases of circumcision where there is no such
indication. I will briefly consider if putative medical benefits (like an improved
standard of hygiene) justify circumcision, but my main focus will be on non-therapeutic
circumcision. Third, non-therapeutic circumcision is often conflated with religious
circumcision (Earp 2013, De Wispelaere & Weinstock 2014); this is a failure as there
are other motives for the performance of circumcision (Glick 2006). Furthermore, any
argument pro or contra circumcision should not depend on the question of whether
the parents want it for religious motives. If circumcision is morally right or wrong,
then it is morally right or wrong anyway. This concerns religious and non-religious
motives alike. Fourth, I will assume what David Archard calls the “liberal standard”.
This means I will take it for granted that parents are typically in the best position to
make decisions on behalf of the interests of their children and that parents forego this
right when they do not act in the best interests of their offspring.2 I will, fifth, assume
what can be called a sufficitarian conception of children’s best interests. This is why
I interpret as the ‘best’ in the notion ‘best interest’ not in the sense of a maximum
requirement but, rather, in the sense that parents have to provide an adequate
upbringing for their children. This entails that parental interests might legitimately
trump children’s interests as long as the latter are sufficiently represented.3
In the following I am going to discuss several interests of children that might
trump parental interests in circumcision. If there are such interests, the state should
guard children’s interests, even against parental prerogatives. I will start with
1 As I will argue in part 2.2, there is an interest of the person the child is supposed to become to make
his own decisions about modifications of his body.
2 As I point out in a forthcoming paper, the liberal standard entails that the burden of proof for any
claim against the parents (that parents do not act in the best interest of their children) is on the side of
the claimant. In this forthcoming paper I raise the question if the burden of proof should be challen-
ged, at least in specific medical contexts. But I defend that the burden of proof should be kept intact,
as it is a part of the liberal tradition in education. (Bagattini, forthcoming)
3 To give an example: children have an interest in education, while parents have an interest in their
careers or in leisure time. According to the sufficitarian account of children’s best interests, parents
have to ensure an adequate but not a maximum level of education for their offspring. If this level is
reached, there is no further moral duty of the parents to victimize leisure time or job opportunities on
behalf of the education of their children.
Circumcision and the Bodily Integrity of the Child 115
children’s interest in their bodily integrity and then proceed with children’s interest
in future goods like sexual flourishing and autonomy. In the third part of the paper
I will raise the question of whether there are any putative benefits that might justify
circumcision.
7.2 Circumcision and the Bodily Integrity of the Child
Children have, like all persons, an interest in their bodily integrity. Is this interest
a proper candidate to override parental prerogatives in the case of circumcision?
Sometimes this interest in bodily integrity can be overridden if more fundamental
interests, for example the child’s health, are at risk. In such cases it seems to
be legitimate to make decisions in the child’s best interest, even if this entails
interventions in the child’s bodily integrity. Consider the case of tooth decay where
medical treatment is unavoidable for a child’s health. In this case, like in analogue
cases, medical treatment which entails an intervention in the child’s bodily integrity
seems to be justified because it is in the child’s best interest. Furthermore, in the case
of tooth decay there should be medical treatment for children even if it is not in the
interest of the parents.4 It is important to note that this is a logical claim about the
conditions when interventions with the bodily integrity of the child are justified,
namely that the medical necessity of the intervention is indicated. In other words: the
medical necessity of any intervention I in the bodily integrity of a child is considered
a sufficient condition for I. This part of the story seems to be rather uncontroversial. It
is still compatible with other justifications for interventions with the bodily integrity
of a child, for example non-therapeutic male circumcision which is per definitionem
medically not necessary.
However, in their 2012 verdict the Cologne judges made a much stronger claim,
namely that the circumcision of a four year old boy was illegal because it was not
medically necessary. This is obviously equivalent to claiming that medical necessity
is a necessary condition for any legitimate intervention in the bodily integrity of a
child. We may call this the medicalized notion of children’s best interests (Conrad
2007). It is feasible to distinguish weak and strong medicalization; while weak
medicalization allows for other criteria than medical ones, strong medicalization
does not. The claim of the Cologne judges is clearly a claim in the ‘only if’-form, which
means that they make use of the concept of medicalization in its strong meaning.
Note now that proponents of circumcision typically do not deny the feasibility of
4 The parents might decide against any form of medical treatment analogue to the notorious cases of
blood transfusion for the children of Jehova’s Witnesses.
weak medicalization.5 What they actually argue against is that we should allow for
strongly medicalized standards of children’s best interests.
Joseph Mazor, for example, refutes the claim of the Cologne judges by giving a
counterexample, namely the correction of cleft upper lips. In many cases this surgery
is carried out for aesthetic reasons. It is, by that token, analogue to cases like the
correction of protruding ears or breaches. There might be a medical indication for
those surgeries in some cases, but in many cases they are carried out for non-medical
reasons. In this way the example of the correction of cleft upper lips functions as an
intuition pump. The basic idea is already known from the Benetars 2003 paper: if we
ban circumcision because it is medically unnecessary, then we would have to ban many
other interventions that we intuitively endorse (Benetar & Benetar 2003). However,
banning surgeries like the correction of cleft upper lips seems to be counterintuitive.
Hence the conclusion is: if we do not want to create counterintuitive consequences, we
should allow parents to decide whether their children should be circumcised.6 This
conclusion has been refuted by other authors (Lang 2013, Hodges & Svoboda & Van
Howe 2013, Svoboda 2003). We can distinguish at least two arguments: one refutes
the analogy between circumcision and the correction of cleft upper lips because of the
alleged greater medical risks of circumcision, the other claims that Mazor understates
the moral weight of surgeries like the correction of cleft upper lips.
David P. Lang, for example, argues that Mazor does not properly address the risks
of circumcision. His main point is that the latter does not distinguish between the
Jewish traditions of milah and brit periah. While in the former case only the tip of the
prepuce is removed, in the latter case the complete prepuce is removed (Lang 2013,
429). According to Lang, there are considerable risks in the case of periah that are
understated by Mazor. He cites, for example, the work of Paul Fleiss who points out
that the prepuce is an extremely complex tissue and not just, so to say, a negligible
piece of skin (Fleiss 1997). This has been stated by other authors as well; in their well-
known paper “The Prepuce”, C. J. Cold and T. R. Taylor discuss a plethora of functions
of the prepuce and its somatosensory innervation with different nerve endings (Cold
and Taylor 1999, 37). Many authors, not only Lang, think therefore that the removal
of the prepuce bears unjustifiable risks (Svoboda & Van Howe 2013, Svoboda 2003,
Hodges & Svoboda & Van Howe 2003, Fox & Thomson 2004, Cold & Taylor, 1999),
yet there are studies that point in a different direction. Krieger, Metha, Bayley et
al. point out that the loss of the prepuce is not necessarily related to a loss of vital
functions of the penis (Krieger, Metha, Bayley et al. 2008). Other studies point in the
5 This means, for example, that proponents of circumcision like the Benetars or Mazor could accept
forced blood transfusion for the children of Jehova’s Witnesses.
6 In his argument Mazor uses the language of rights. According to Mazor, there is no right (of child-
ren) to bodily integrity that trumps parental prerogatives in the case of circumcision (compare Mazor
2013).
Circumcision and Future Interests of the Child 117
same direction; if circumcision is carried out under medically proper conditions, the
risks of the procedure seem to be as low as with any other medical procedure (AAP
2012, BMA 2006). Hence we are confronted with a controversial debate concerning
the medical risks of circumcision. This makes it difficult, in my opinion, to cite this
evidence in ethical arguments pro or contra circumcision. In other words: taking the
medical status quo, I am sceptical that we can rebut the analogy between circumcision
and other medical procedures like the correction of cleft upper lips for an argument
against circumcision.
Other authors, like Eliyahu Ungar-Sargon, point out that Mazor understates the
moral weight of surgeries like the correction of cleft upper lips. According to Ungar-
Sargon, the correction of cleft upper lips has, as any other surgery for minors, to
meet the following criteria: first, it must not be possible to achieve the benefits of
the procedure in a less dramatic way, second, delay until the child is autonomous
has to be ruled out, and third, the procedure must not impair the normal functions
of the child’s body. For the moment I want to express my main concern about his
criteria, namely that they entail standards for children’s well-being that are hardly
compatible with liberal values. His third criterion, for example, clearly expresses a
strongly medicalized notion of children’s best interests. If we do not want physicians
(as experts concerning the normal functions of human bodies) to have the authority
over medical treatment for children in any case, Ungar-Sargon’s third criterion does
not seem to be applicable.
To summarize: if we consider children’s interests in their bodily integrity per se,
there is no direct argument for a violation of children’s best interests in the case of
circumcision. As I pointed out, the medical evidence at hand is not strong enough
for any conclusive argument that circumcision violates children’s best interests.
Furthermore, I think that Mazor is right in rejecting a strongly medicalized standard
for children’s best interests. The situation might change if new evidence (concerning
the risks of circumcision) is available, but for now, any claim against parental
prerogatives in the case of circumcision is in need of justification – as long as we
consider children’s interest in their bodily integrity only.
7.3 Circumcision and Future Interests of the Child
There is a strong bias towards the future good when people talk about children’s
best interests. This means that people typically endorse that it is morally tenable
to subordinate children’s current interests (say playing) in relation to children’s
interests in their future (say education). This perspective on children’s interests leads
to the problem that children might be considered mere instruments of the normative
view of adults, namely what they think children should be like as future persons. Yet
the subordination thesis has at least some prima facie plausibility. Some goods are
vital for flourishing adult lives and it is highly unlikely that these can be achieved
without any cost on the side of current interests. This restricts the scope of parental
prerogatives as well. Consider the well-known Wisconsin vs Yoder case where the
US Supreme Court stated that public schooling is inevitable for Amish children.
When future goods, such as education, are concerned, there are normative limits for
parental prerogatives. Are there any future goods that pose such limits on parental
prerogatives in the case of circumcision? In the following I will take it for granted that
children have an interest in sexual flourishing when they become adults and that they
want to make their own decisions about their lives. I will consider both goods in turn
and discuss the question of whether they impose limits on parental prerogatives in
the case of circumcision.
7.3.1 Sexual Flourishing of the Future Adult
Let us consider another argument by Mazor in which he deals with the impact of
circumcision on the sexual sensitivity of the young man. One of the reasons that
most people endorse when they reject female circumcision7 is that it leads to vital
limitations of sexuality in the adult lives of circumcised girls. While some authors
claim that this holds for male circumcision as well (Hodges & Svoboda & Van Howe
2002, Cold & Taylor 1999), Mazor rejects this claim. His argument starts with the
assumption that the reduction of sexual sensitivity (and by that token of sexual
pleasure) in the male penis is only moderate for circumcised men. If the procedure
is carried out under medically proper conditions, the loss of sexual pleasure is only
moderate for adult men. By ‘moderate’ Mazor means a reduction, as he says, “in the
neighborhood of 10%” (Mazor 2013, 424), and backs his assumption with two empirical
studies (Kim & Pang 2007, Payne et al. 2007). There are studies that give us another
impression, namely that there are much higher risks for the sexual functioning and
sexual pleasure of adult circumcised men. Yet for the sake of argument I will follow
Mazor’s assumption that circumcision bears only the risk of a moderate loss of sexual
pleasure for adult men. Still one might wonder if this is compatible with children’s
best interests if we consider sexual flourishing (of adults) a vital part of such interests.
Mazor asks us to imagine the following thought experiment: “Imagine that there is an
operation that has some negligible health benefits for a child but that also moderately
reduces the pleasure the child obtains from eating sweet foods. Further, imagine that
7 The common expression “female genital mutilation”, which is usually used instead of female cir-
cumcision, entails that the procedure is considered as a violation of children’s rights. Interestingly,
there is a strong bias to consider female circumcision as a crime (violation of children’s rights), while
this is not so for male circumcision. This has been critically remarked, for example, by S. K. Hellsten
(Hellsten 2004).
this operation can only be carried out in childhood. How should we think about the
permissibility of this operation?” (Mazor 2013, 424).
Mazor concedes that a full-blooded elimination of the child’s ability to sense
sweetness would harm the child’s best interests. Yet he stresses the point that it does
not seem unreasonable to assume that “moderately reducing the child’s ability to enjoy
sweets would be beneficial given that it might reasonably be thought to induce the
child to consume fewer sweets.” (Mazor 2013, 424). In the same way, Mazor argues that
it is not unreasonable “to believe that a moderate reduction would lead to behavioral
changes (e. g. less emphasis on sexual pursuits relative to other pursuits) and that
some parents could see these behavioral changes as beneficial.” (Mazor 2013, 424).
The point that Mazor wants to stress is, in my view, that the talk about sexual pleasure
is value laden. People might, as he puts it, reasonably disagree about the value of
sexual pleasure (Mazor 2013). It seems to me that Mazor has a point. If we want to keep
in touch with the core idea of liberalism – the acceptance of value pluralism – then
we should allow for disagreement about what matters for children’s best interests.
Further, if we endorse what I called the sufficitarian conception of children’s best
interests, then there is space for disagreement in cases where capabilities of children
are in play. Although of course, according to the maximum conception of children’s
best interests parents would have the duty to ensure that their children enjoy the
maximum or full capability. The all-decisive question seems to be what we mean by
‘moderate’ reduction of sexual pleasure. There is some vagueness in the term that is
not adequately captured by Mazor’s assumption that circumcision leads to a roughly
10% loss of sexual pleasure. After all, it is not clear if pleasure belongs to the category
of fully quantifiable aspects of human nature.
Furthermore, Mazor’s claim that circumcision leads to only a moderate loss of
sexual pleasure is far from being uncontroversial. As already mentioned in part 1 of this
paper, different studies come to the conclusion that circumcision bears considerable
health risks – entailing a loss of sexual sensitivity or even sexual dysfunction (such
as erectile dysfunction) (Money & Davidson 1983, Frisch et al. 2011, Goldman 1999).
Yet if we keep the liberal standard in mind, the burden of proof for restrictions of
parental prerogatives is on the side of the claimants. This means that opponents of
circumcision need to back up their claims sufficiently. As controversy is still going on,
Mazor is successful with his plea for circumcision in the case of a reduction of sexual
pleasure until conclusive evidence is at hand that circumcision violates children’s
best interests.
7.3.2 Autonomy
Medical treatment must never be done without respecting the autonomy of the patient.
This means that medical treatment is only eligible to be carried out on persons if they
consent to it. As a matter of fact, children are not capable of giving their consent. This
is at least true when we speak about babies and very young children and if we speak
about informed consent. This confinement is feasible because circumcision is usually
carried out on very young children or babies, meaning that circumcision is usually
carried out before children can give informed consent to the procedure. In such cases,
parents have to give their proxy consent to render the medical procedure in question
eligible. It is an implication of the liberal standard that parents have the right to make
such decisions on behalf of their children. Why not in the case of circumcision? Critics
answer: because it is irreversible (Ungar-Sargon 2013, Svoboda 2013). This is why the
decision should be postponed until the child reaches an age when he is old enough
to give his consent. Interestingly, this suggestion was made by a group of dissident
representatives of the German Bundestag before the actual law was passed (DB 2012).
In this alternative draft to §1631d8, circumcision was supposed be allowed, but not
before the child reaches the age of 14. However, another law was passed, according
to which parents are allowed to give their proxy consent in the case of circumcision.
Mazor is clearly in favour of this legislation, as he backs it up with the following
argument: in the case of maths education we do not think that children are in the
position to make autonomous decisions on this matter. Furthermore, we do not
think we should wait until the child is old enough to make his or her own decision
(about whether he or she wants to learn maths). It seems implausible to wait until
the child is old enough because the costs for learning maths are considerably higher
for the concerned adult person. Similarly, in the case of circumcision the costs of the
procedure are considerably higher for the adult person, as the medical risks are higher
for adults than for children. As it seems, no one would claim that children have a right
not to learn maths if they do not want to. This is analogous to the fact that children
do not have a right to wait with circumcision until they are old enough to consent to
it (see Mazor 2013, 422).
As in the case of the child’s interest in bodily integrity, Mazor uses an analogous
argument. However, in the autonomy case, the argument is not as convincing as it is in
the bodily integrity case. As Ungar-Sargon remarks, permanent “body modifications
like circumcision are irreversible in a way that education is not.” (Ungar-Sargon 2013,
2). What is the problem with irreversibility? I think that Ungar-Sargon wants to stress
the point that education, like maths education, still allows the child to make its own
decisions in the matter as a grown-up. For example, the child is not ‘doomed’ to
become a mathematician because it has learned maths in school. Contrary to that, the
circumcised boy is not able to make other decisions on the matter. His opportunities
are, so to speak, fixed. It is helpful to introduce Matthew Clayton’s distinction
between autonomy as an end state and autonomy as a precondition (Clayton 2006).
8 § 1631d of the German Civil Code subsumes circumcision under the general custody of the parents if
it is carried out under medically proper conditions. This means that according to German law, parents
are free to decide in favour of circumcision for their children.
On the one hand, autonomy as an end state refers to the full history of how a person
has become an autonomous agent. Autonomy as a precondition means, on the other
hand, that a person makes his/her own decisions about vital matters in his/her life.
Clayton uses this distinction against the background of a Rawlsian conception of
public justification (or public reason constraint). The basic idea is that autonomy as a
precondition is a necessary part of any just allocation beneath free and equal persons
(Rawls 2001). It seems to me that Ungar-Sargon makes a similar point when he
distinguishes education from circumcision by means of the notion of irreversibility.
To see this it is helpful to consider a possible reply by Mazor to Ungar-Sargon’s
objection. Mazor might answer that in the case of maths education, opportunities are
fixed as well. For example, the child is not able to erase its acquired knowledge. In
other words, if any legitimate form of parenting requires autonomy as a precondition,
why is maths education any better than circumcision? I am not sure if this is what
Ungar-Sargon has in mind, but Clayton would clearly answer that maths education
meets the public reason condition, while circumcision does not. If we want a fair
allocation (amongst free and equal persons) of chances, opportunities and basic
liberties in society, then we have to find what Rawls calls an ‘overlapping consensus’.
This consensus has to be reasonable yet independent from any comprehensive
doctrines. This is what distinguishes basic education (to which maths education
belongs) from circumcision. While the former is part of what is in everyone’s interest,
the latter is in the interest of persons with a specific world view. But if this is true,
then no one should be forced into this world view because this would mean not
treating this person as being free and equal. In my opinion this is a compelling line of
argument that puts some pressure on the proponents of circumcision. The following
question comes to mind: why can one not wait with ‘real’ (invasive) circumcision
until the boy reaches an age when he can consent to it? Would it not be possible
to introduce a proxy ritual (like baptism) instead of circumcision until this day?9 In
my opinion the burden of proof is on the side of the proponents of circumcision. If
they are not ready to give a sensible answer to this question (and this answer has to
entail why being circumcised belongs to the basic liberties of persons), circumcision
should be postponed until the young man is old enough to make up his own mind on
the matter. I have some sympathy for the suggestion of the dissidents of the German
Bundestag, who suggested the age of 14. In my opinion this is a proper age for consent
in medical contexts, as we already use it. This way waiting with circumcision until the
boy is aged 14 would be consistent with our current medical practice.
To summarize: children’s interests are not clearly violated in the sense of bodily
integrity. It is not entirely clear whether their interests in the sense of future sexual
flourishing are violated or not, but for now it seems that circumcision does not
9 Clayton is famous for arguing against even the legitimacy of baptism because he takes it to be a form
of illegitimate comprehensive enrolment. (Clayton 2006)
considerably hamper sexual flourishing. However, it does violate children’s interests

in terms of autonomy, since children cannot give informed consent, but only as far as
autonomy is concerned can one clearly state that children’s best interests are violated
by circumcision. Some proponents of circumcision might not be too impressed by this
deontological line of argument. They might point out that some higher goods are only
accessible when we sacrifice autonomy at least to some degree. In the remaining part
of the paper, I will explore some of these consequentialist arguments.
7.4 The Benefits of Circumcision
Are there any health benefits that might justify circumcision, even if it is a violation
of autonomy as a precondition? For a long time it has been assumed, for example,
that circumcision is good because it improves male hygiene. As Frisch et al. pointed
out in a recent study, there is no direct relation between circumcision and the
hygiene status of men. In countries where running water is accessible there is no
considerable difference between circumcised and non-circumcised men concerning
their hygiene (Frisch et al. 2011), yet there is considerable evidence that circumcision
protects against several infectious diseases. Several studies provide evidence that
circumcision protects against urinary tract infections (AAP 2012, Jagannath et al.
2012). However, this benefit of circumcision is primarily measurable for boys with
specific anatomical defects, (Jagannath et al. 2012) and it is another question how
decisive those benefits are for boys in the absence of those defects. Furthermore, even
if there are some benefits in the case of urinary tract infections, it is far from clear that
they justify medical intervention. Consequentialists might argue that the cost-benefit
balance (between the benefits and costs of circumcision) has to be analysed first,
while deontologists might stress that even medical benefits are only overriding when
they are essential (e.g. life-saving). The same seems to be true for the case of penile
cancer. There is evidence that circumcision has a protective effect against penile cancer
(Larke et al. 2011), but as penile cancer is rare and circumcision entails risks, it should
not be recommended as a general practice. Nor would this benefit justify overriding
autonomy as a precondition. Sometimes public-health benefits (rather than individual
health benefits of the concerned person) are considered overriding reasons in favour
of the performance of circumcision. For example, some studies seem to establish that
circumcision helps to prevent the risk of HIV infections. A widely recognized meta-
analysis of the Cochrane Collaboration yielded that circumcision leads to a relative
decrease of 38-66% of HIV in high risk populations (Siegfried et al. 2009) and that
circumcision is the most cost-effective means at hands to contain HIV pandemics
(Uthman et al. 2010). Yet the main problem with this analysis is that it focuses on
the situation in Africa only, which is why it has already been doubted that the same
result can be expected in developed countries (Kim et al. 2010). Furthermore, it has
The Benefits of Circumcision 123
been pointed out that ethical concerns have been marginalized in favour of medical
and economic reasons (Fox & Thomson 2010, Hodges & Svoboda & Van Howe 2002).
To summarize: I am sceptical that there is any valid argument for circumcision
based on health benefits. Either it is not clear that the same results cannot be reached
in other, less invasive and risky ways or it is not clear if the costs of circumcision
are definitely outweighed by its benefits. Hence in my opinion the health benefits of
circumcision are not sufficient for overriding autonomy as a precondition condition.
Other arguments for circumcision deal with putative indirect benefits of
circumcision. There is certainly a risk of stigmatization for children in specific cultural
backgrounds if they are not circumcised. In this case the benefit of circumcision would
be to spare the child the painful isolation in its social group, which may be devastating
for its proper development. (When I speak of proper development, what I have in
mind is the formation of a stable identity, as there is a strong connection between
the child’s attachment (Bowlby 1990) to its close social environment – especially the
parents – and its formation of a stable identity. Because the latter is vital for the child’s
proper development, interventions in the social environment of the child should only
be made when the child’s best interests are at risk.) Several authors (for example
Benetar & Benetar 2003, De Wispelaere & Weinstock 2014) have claimed that (in
light of current medical evidence), cultural considerations should be decisive for the
question of whether circumcision should be performed. (The Benetars mention two
studies: Lawler et al. 1991 and Ganiats et al. 1991. Compare Benetar & Benetar 2003).
Other authors add the point that critics of circumcision often tend to a medicalized
notion of the benefits and costs of circumcision, while many parents endorse differing
values (Sheldon 2003). Those values are often incommensurable with medical values,
which in turn complicates a cost-benefit-analysis of circumcision. The question is how
to balance medical risks against the cultural benefits of circumcision. The problem of
incommensurability comes in because medical values are descriptive, while cultural
values are often prescriptive. This is especially true for religious values. Furthermore,
it seems difficult to reliably predict how shame and stigmatization may affect the
child’s later life and how this might justify a violation of the autonomy-condition.
In my opinion there are two reasons why there is no valid argument for the
performance of circumcision on the basis of cultural considerations.
First, if we accept a wholeheartedly liberal conception of parental prerogatives, it
becomes difficult to criticize any rituals that are applied to children. To begin with: we
do not accept female circumcision (female genital mutilation) because it is expected
to lead to devastating effects on the sexual capabilities of grown women (Nussbaum
1999, 200010). Yet if we want to argue that parents should have the right to decide
if circumcision is performed on their children because this is part of the cultural
10 The WHO distinguishes four types of female genital mutilation (WHO 1997). As Nussbaum points
out, even the weakest type 1 of female genital mutilation impairs female sexuality.
background of the parents, then we end up with a slippery slope concerning any
confinements of parental prerogatives. How is this point related to the stigmatization
argument? Consider the case of female genital mutilation where the child herself
wants the procedure. Let us further assume that the child wants the procedure due
to peer pressure. I take it for granted that circumcision would be wrong in this case,
even if there were a stigmatizing effect of not being circumcised. Sometimes we
expect that practices have to change, especially when these practices conflict with
basic rights. Hence if circumcision is morally wrong because it violates the autonomy-
condition (according to which constant bodily modifications are only legitimate if the
concerned person decides for it freely), then the risk of stigmatization cannot count
as a reason against restricting parental prerogatives. It cannot count as a reason in
this respect because autonomy is overriding. If religious practices are incompatible
with autonomy, then those practices have to change. The second reason why cultural
considerations do not establish that the performance of circumcision is justified
is derived from the requirement to consistently interpret our practice. In medical
contexts we already make use of a medicalized notion of children’s interests. This
is not to say that medical contexts are completely ignorant to the cultural features
of patients. However, such features are not considered sufficient, for example, for
refusing life-saving treatment for children. The well-known and abovementioned
case of Jehova’s Witnesses, who want to refuse life-saving blood transfusions for their
children, exemplifies this point. To summarize, the risk of social stigmatization is no
reason for (or against) circumcision. As I have already argued, circumcision directly
conflicts with one of the core values of liberal society: autonomy. In the case of social
stigmatization we should think about how to help children deal with it and how to
convince the parents that the practice of circumcision violates the interests of their
child. In any case, it is certainly an unconvincing line of argument to derive any
sort of prerogatives from the threat of stigmatization, and this is true for the case of
circumcision as well.
It is sometimes argued that banning circumcision would bear the risk that parents
will take their children to untrained providers of the procedure (AAP 2012). The worry
is that banning circumcision could lead to some sort of ‘circumcision-tourism’ to other
countries where circumcision is allowed. However, this line of argument is vulnerable
for the same kind of reasons as the stigmatization-argument. If we allow circumcision
because otherwise we would have to expect that parents would take their children
to medical charlatans or to countries with worse medical standards, this would hold
for other procedures as well. Yet this line of argument would hardly be accepted in
the case of female circumcision. Hence the threat of ‘circumcision-tourism’ is not a
relevant normative reason on the account of circumcision. On the face of it, there
might be space for the following line of argument that acting in the best interest of the
child requires saving the child from unprofessional medical interventions. Banning
circumcision would lead to more children suffering from the effects of unprofessional
medical interventions; therefore, banning circumcision would violate children’s best
Conclusion 125
interests. As I have already pointed out, this argument is a failure, as it obliterates

an important premise, namely that some practices violate children’s best interests as
well. And problematic effects of morally critical practices do not justify such practices,
as the case of female circumcision demonstrates.
7.5 Conclusion
Circumcision is one of the most common, probably the most common, medical
procedure worldwide (Doyle 2005). Maybe this fact, combined with our liberal
conception of parenthood, the liberal standard, explains to a certain extent why
circumcision has so long been considered a relatively innocent part of parental
prerogatives. It is remarkable how, for example, most German media responded to
the Cologne 2012 verdict on circumcision. Many articles focused on the situation
of Jewish and Muslim communities in Germany. Far fewer articles considered the
issue of whether children’s rights or children’s interests are in any way violated by
the performance of circumcision. Yet the question of whether the performance of
circumcision violates children’s interests entered the public domain. It is certainly
one of the merits of the Cologne verdict that the performance of circumcision is no
longer considered something that belongs to the private sphere, without any public
regulation. Whatever you think on the matter, finally there is new legislation on the
topic (§1631, d, German Penal Code) in Germany. As I have already argued, I am not
happy with this legislation, as it does not pay proper tribute to children’s interests.
Nonetheless, suboptimal legislation is in any case better than none. Furthermore, it
is far from being clear that moral concerns about the legitimacy of circumcision are
already sufficient for legal intervention in this practice; legal interventions always
have to take account of the interests of all concerned persons as well as of the interests
of the state.
My main aim in this paper is to draw attention to the different facets of children’s
interests and to how they are related to parental prerogatives in the case of circumcision.
As I endorse the liberal standard, I believe that parents should in general decide what
is in the best interest of their children. Yet as parents can fail in interpreting the best
interest of their children, sometimes children must be protected against what parents
think best for their children. Consequently I endorse the following claim: by default
parents have the right to decide what is in the best interest of their offspring. This
entails that parents have the right to overrule children’s opinions about their own
interests. It entails further that this overruling authority of parents can be overridden
itself if there is conclusive evidence or if there are fundamental normative reasons for
the claim that parents do not act in the best interest of their child.
Starting out from this perspective, I followed Joseph Mazor in that children’s
interests in bodily integrity and sexual flourishing (as adults) can be overridden by
parental prerogatives in circumcision and in other cases, as long as unreasonable
risks for the child are ruled out. My main worry concerning circumcision is that it
undermines autonomy as a precondition for permanent bodily modifications.
Autonomy is a general and absolute good in the sense that all take part in it and that
there is no way of relativizing it. True enough, the liberal standard (in education) is
part of our liberal tradition, but moral egalitarianism is also part of this tradition. And
moral egalitarianism is incompatible with excluding persons from equal rights such
as the right to exercise their autonomy (in medical as well as in other contexts). Yet if
children are circumcised before they can make up their own mind on the matter, they
will never have the chance to take a stance. And this means to exclude the persons
the children are supposed to become from having equal rights. As I pointed out in the
last part of the paper, I do not see that there are any putative benefits that have the
normative force to override this violation of children’s interests.
Let me end by distinguishing between what I am saying and what not. I am arguing
that circumcision is in conflict with essential values of the liberal tradition, i.e. with
autonomy as a precondition (in the case of irreversible bodily modifications). Hence
I defend the thesis that circumcision is morally objectionable. I do not conclude on
a legal level that circumcision should be forbidden or anything in this direction. In
order to make this claim, more would have to be said about the complicated triad of
children’s parental and societal interests and how they should be implemented in the
law. However, this would clearly exceed the scope of this paper.
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Mar Cabezas
8 Children’s Mental Well-Being and Education1
8.1 Healthy Bodies and Healthy Minds: Why do Children Need

Mental Well-Being?
Health has been defined, from the last sixty years on, in an extensive sense, referring
not only to the lack of diseases, but also to well-being. In fact, as it is well known, the
World Health Organization defines health as a “state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (Official
Record of the World Health Organization, 2, 100). In turn, well-being is not understood
just as a lack of discomfort, but as a positive balance between negative and positive
emotions, moods, thoughts and circumstances.
This definition of health can surely be criticised in many ways, for it is too wide
to be accomplished, especially if one thinks of the idea of a complete state of well-
being. Concerning children and adolescents, how do we measure when it is complete
and when not? And in general terms, how do we establish a difference between
diseases, a lack of capacity or a syndrome? Is there an upper limit in relation to
how much well-being is needed to accomplish the required complete state? Would
there still be some kind of hierarchy, or should every element involved in health be
treated simultaneously? This definition takes for granted that the boundary between
a pathological state and a healthy state is clear, when in many cases it is fuzzy and
socially constructed.
However, beyond all the potential problems and despite its vagueness, it is still
functional. In fact, the assumption of this extended idea of health as well-being
shows 1) the recognition of the – in some ways – artificial nature of the boundary
between body and mind, and 2) the fact that we have understood that mental or
psychological well-being is not simply achieved by suppressing negative input, or
suppressing psychological suffering, anxiety, etc., but generating positive thoughts,
coping styles and emotions. In other words, the WHO’s notion of health as well-being
tacitly assumes that we have realized that negative and positive emotions and moods
are not a continuum so that diminishing our negative emotions and thoughts does not
directly mean an increase in our positive ones (Zaccagnini, 2010, 64). On the contrary,
(mental) well-being requires an extra effort.
Hence, if one accepts health as a right for children and if one accepts that well-
being is more than being able to survive and not suffering any kind of disease,
then implicitly it means that we as western societies have decided that personal
development is also important for children. And, as a result of it, if health is
© 2015 Mar Cabezas

130 Children’s Mental Well-Being and Education
understood as well-being, both physical and mental, as well as social, then it

seems fair for our institutions to have the obligation to provide the tools to ensure
the development of these areas and to take care of children’s physical and mental
health.
This is clear if we look at what has been done in the public sphere in relation
to children’s physical well-being. We have health care systems, vaccine systems,
children learn at school about the function of their organs and their body, they learn
– and are encouraged to follow – some minimum hygienic routines, such as hand
washing to avoid infections and, what is more, they are provided with specific time
to develop and improve their physical well-being through specific hours of sport
and physical education. In fact, these have been part of the school curriculum for
a long time. Along with this, schools canteens are regularly improving their quality
in order to offer healthy menus adapted to children’s nutritional needs, so that the
care of children’s physical health in public institutions goes beyond the individual
cases when they need to go hospitals, providing the necessary information, education
and habits. Thus, children have other chances to be and become physically healthy –
beyond the habits their families may have.
However, when it comes to mental health or mental well-being, the picture
drastically changes. No one thinks that a child’s autonomy is being overrun when
she is encouraged to brush her teeth or when she is told to wash an apple before
eating it. However, we tend to become suspicious if a public institution suggests any
habit of mental health. The idea that mental well-being does not need to be supported
and taught is simply not realistic. If one lets something grow without any kind of
guidance, it can turn out to be as risky as building a highway without traffic signals.
One could surely survive and drive on that highway, but the probability of having
accidents will be higher than the probability you would have if some traffic signals
had been established and you had been taught how to read them.
Indeed, the result of putting children’s mental well-being in the hands
of hazard is highly evident in western societies today. The number of children
treated for psychological and behavioural disorders has increased over the
last decades. In the UK, more than 20% of adolescents aged 11-19 have tried to
harm themselves2. In the US between 20% and 16% of children were bullied by
peers, and 6% of the surveyed teenagers admitted to have suffered cyberbullying
(Finkelhor et al., 2000). Less than a decade later the percentage of teenagers
bullied at school had increased to 28% (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010, 207), which
implies the use of aggression by some of them as a way of interacting and also
the increase of suicidal ideations from the victims’ side. In this sense, it is not
surprising that “pessimism is fast becoming the typical way our children look at
2 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7365192.stm and the Anorexia, Bulimia & Care Organisati-

on: http://www.anorexiabulimiacare.org.uk/
Some Changes in our Educational Systems: Three Promising Attempts? 131
the world” (Seligman, 2007, 7). Maybe we should wonder what we are actively or
passively doing wrong which allows some children and adolescents to collapse
into themselves like that.
Even if we only want healthy children in the physical narrow sense of the term, that
is, children with no physical diseases, at some point we would also need to provide
mental education to children, for the truth is that we are not compartmentalized
beings: the way we think has an impact in our health. Think about the psychosomatic
syndromes, the addictions, the connection between stress and dermatitis, depression
and the weakening of the body’s immune system, or the defensive/aggressive styles
of thinking and heart diseases.
Hence, as far as our physical well-being is influenced by our mental one, it seems
reasonable that we should see mental education as a key to children’s complete well-
being.
8.2 Some Changes in our Educational Systems: Three Promising

Attempts?
At this point the question is what has been done so far in this respect. Over the last two
decades many experts in psychology, pedagogy and education have claimed that our
educational system should respond to children’s new needs and provide them with
tools for their mental well-being. If our goal is ensuring children’s well-being in order
to avoid the luck factor and minimise the weight of the families they are born in, then
it means that we want more than well-informed children with nurtured bodies. We
want children who can develop their own talents, overcome adversity and, to some
extent, live the life they want to for themselves. Many, and most notably Kenneth
Robison, criticize the obsolete way in which our traditional educational system is
built and how it creates an arena contrary in many senses to children’s well-being, for
it was not conceived to provide the tools to flourish, but to get good grades. The fact
that schools are built like factories as a consequence of industrialism is commonly
critiqued (Robinson & Aronica, 2009), following 19th-century assumptions that do not
reflect the real world children are living in today, even less the future world where
they will have to apply their knowledge and skills. In short, unless a child is prompted
to become an expert in a certain field, in her adult life she would probably never need
to use the set theory’s mathematic rules, but each and every child at some point of
their lives will have to face a loss, will have to manage anger, frustration, anxiety
or anguish, or simply they will have to interact with groups of people they do not
particularly like. We are not seriously taught – beyond the common sense sayings
– how to cope with rejection or how to build healthy self-esteem. In this same line,
beyond the promotion of competition, the United Nations insists in its conventions
related to children’s rights on the importance of providing a holistic and balanced

education in peaceful and respectful societies.3
At the same time, the interest in emotional intelligence, creativity and positive
psychology in the last two decades has generated a waterfall of data, surveys and
methods, whose spirit is to improve children’s mental well-being and well-becoming.
In what follows I will briefly expose the three main general attempts to include
psychological education programs in school, as well as their main thesis and
achievements concerning children’s mental well-being.
These three big attempts are focused on different abilities depending on what
is considered crucial to develop and ensure children’s mental well-being and also
well-becoming. Obviously the prevention programmes focused on a concrete risk will
not be taken into account here, for they are establish to prevent potential harmful
situations and not to generate a complete state of mental well-being.
Probably the most successful ones with children and adolescents would be a)
emotional education programmes, b) cognitive programmes, and c) social and
creativity education programmes.
a) Emotional education programmes. These programmes are based on a great number

of empirical studies on emotional intelligence and its different applications since the
successful work developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990) in the early 90s. They are
focused on developing children’s and adolescents’ emotional competence, that is, the
recognition of emotions when they occur, the skill of recognising emotions in others
and the ability to regulate one’s own moods, given the fact that the development of
emotional intelligence skills is positively connected to healthier behaviour, which
improves children’s relations and well-being (Weissberg & O’Brien, 2004).
The first skill not only increases self-knowledge, it also gives children the time to
reflect on what they are feeling and how whatever they are going through makes them
feel, which is highly relevant when it comes to interaction and potential aggressiveness.
There many different styles of application in schools, from the recognition of emotions
in facial expressions and drawings to the reading of specifically created tales which
adapted to different children’s levels, where the main task is not to remember the
narrative sequence, but to explain a character’s actions. This kind of self-knowledge
is important because often, children cannot give a name to what they are going
through. In fact, it is very common for them to react with anger when they actually
feel sad, given the frustration and the lack of abilities to solve certain circumstances
that simply do not make them feel well.
3 See for instance the article 29 of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child:
“Children’s education should develop each child’s personality, talents and abilities to the fullest. It
should encourage children to respect others, human rights and their own and other cultures. It should
also help them learn to live peacefully, protect the environment and respect other people.”
The second skill is strongly connected to empathy and its application in schools,
based on the positive correlation between subjective well-being and positive
interpersonal relationships (Rubin 1999). The development of the ability to put
yourself in someone else’s shoes (empathy), or at least to understand how this person
feels in his own shoes (cognitive empathy) opens a door to improving communication
and understanding. Practising this skill seems to help reduce the use of aggression,
the intention of manipulation, increase the will to help others, reduce passivity
toward others’ suffering, and diminish discrimination.This is especially interesting in
cases of violence between peers (Hoffman, 1987), simply because at those moments
the aggressive person is not thinking about someone else’s suffering, but about his
own situation (Mehrabian, 1996).
The third skill these programmes work with, emotional regulation, deals with
the ability to face adversity with humour, to change one’s mood, to avoid reacting in
exaggerated manners, etc. (Salovey, 2001). In short, it deals with the reflection on our
feelings and moods. Besides, this seems to have a direct impact on children’s mental
well-being, for children whose parents are depressed or conflictive usually lack these
kinds of abilities too; it seems that providing them with more adaptive strategies
could give them better chances of reversing the lottery factor and the negative tools
passed on to them by their parents.
b) Cognitive programmes. Although many of these programmes are hybrids and

may combine tools and methods from different approaches, another second general
category of programmes could consist of those using a cognitive approach and
positive psychology. These programmes try to restructure the negative way the child
thinks about what happens to her, so that those thoughts will not generate a negative
emotion. That is, the main scope of these kinds of programmes is to make children
aware of the intermediate step between what happens to them and their emotional
reaction. To be conscious of the difference between what you think and how you
feel – and the feedback between them – ease to change ruminations, negative,
pessimistic, self-centred, and dramatic thinking styles into more realistic and positive
ones. In this sense these programmes are based on identifying the mental pattern we
normally follow, the style of our inner dialogue, to identify all those assumptions and
generalizations that will not help the children and could become a slippery slope
to future depressions. “At school age”, affirms Seligman, “children begin to think
about the causal skein of the world. They develop theories about why they succeed
and why they fail. They develop theories about what, if anything, they can do to turn
failure into success” (Seligman, 2007, 12). Assuming that the way we think about a
problem is the key question, these cognitive programmes are focused on avoiding
learnt helplessness in children and improving their resilience.
Obviously, the negative ones are not pathological styles per se. One could live
with them perfectly well, but one’s well-being would probably be very limited. The
use of negative thinking styles as a child put you on the edge of becoming depressed
once you have to face adversity in the future. In other words, as some studies show,
optimistic mental styles work as protectors for children, both in the present and the
future.4 As M. Seligman brilliantly explains, the goal of cognitive programmes is
“psychological immunization”(2007, 5). Analogically to physical health, the goal is
not to ensure that children will never face a problem or suffer, but that they will be
vaccinated to overcome it the best way possible.
c) Social and creativity education. Lastly, there is another growing group of

programmes, many times related to the first one, that are centred on the role of art
and creativity. These programmes of creative and social education try to enlighten
children’s curiosity and encourage them to explore their own talents through different
activities that simultaneously improve their interpersonal skills. Many times painting,
music or theatre are used as a tool to learn something else, to interact with other
children, to improve their self-esteem, their ability to see things differently, to push
their limits and avoid learned helplessness, and to put themselves in someone else’s
shoes. The idea is to connect art with emotional and social skills in order to improve
children’s mental and social well-being. One of the many programs established in
the last years is the Australian Songroom, a programme that develops disadvantaged
children’s resilience through music5.
These three interrelated attempts to improve children’s mental well-being in
schools through new educative programmes share positive results in improving
children’s behaviour and self-reported well-being. The three of them try to change
emotional repression into emotional regulation in order to turn the current tendency
of having “crystal glass” children into mentally flexible children.
However, there are some limitations that may play against them as well as some
challenges that these attempts still have to face. Some of the main obstacles against
these attempts are related to how they are done.
Firstly, although they are successful programmes with respect to the results that
those children achieve, they are not successful in an institutional sense. If we look
at our education systems, cognitive, emotional, social and creative programmes are
not included in the official public school curricula, for they are still not universally
accepted as part of that minimum that a child should learn in her school years. As a
result of this lack of consensus, they are neither established transversally during the
entire educational process, nor are they sufficiently coordinated. Hence, the lack of
coordination of all these programmes even at a national level and their short extent
mean that they – along with their positive results – are not likely to be to maintained
in a long-term perspective, thus reducing their potential positive impact on children
and the development of their complete mental and social well-being. Having too many
4 See Scheier & Carver (1987) and Sánchez & Méndez (2009).
5 See http://www.songroom.org.au
experiments, too many programmes and lacking essential institutional agreements

neither favours children, nor does it make these programmes completely credible in
the public eye. Besides, the fact that they are often part of research projects means
that the duration does not depend on the children’s needs, but rather on what is
needed to compare the results of the methods through time, which also implies having
control groups not following the programmes, as experimental procedure requires.
This leads to another question, namely whether children should be part of these
new attempts or whether we should wait to apply them until a general consensus is
achieved. Analogically to the fact that we do not allow the food industry to test their
new creations in children’s canteens before they have passed all the quality controls,
maybe social, creativity and emotional intelligence programmes – elaborated and
sometimes also applied by researchers – should not be applied in school until they
are proven to reduce aggressiveness, instead of being applied in order to make sure
that they are successful.
Secondly, although schools demand these kinds of educational programmes and
perceive the need for some solutions in this respect, as it has previously been said,
the fast proliferation of surveys, tests and their direct application in schools may not
be playing in their favour. The fact that the method a child will receive in this area will
depend on the approach the professionals support (behavioural psychology, cognitive
psychology, positive psychology, emotional intelligence, mindfulness, etc.) does not
help to establish some minimum bases of what should be done in public institutions
with respect to children’s mental well-being. As a result, the information a child will
receive in this area will depend on the school’s interest and the programmes they are
offered. This is probably due to the youth of these emotional and positive approaches.
At the same time, psychology as a science is also a very young discipline, so that
these programmes have also to face the difficulty of meeting the requirements we
sometimes expect.
Thirdly, they entail other problems concerning teachers. Teachers, in turn, should
also acquire the required skills to apply them and improve children’s mental well-
being, or at least not to hurt it. To make the results of these programmes long-lasting,
the techniques applied in them – such as positive talking, positive reinforcement, no
generalizations and personal judgements toward the students – should be adopted
transversally by every teacher, regardless of the subject they are teaching. Otherwise,
they will not be so different from the traditional temporal prevention programmes
and extra activities that a school may provide. In this sense, a serious debate between
institutions, researchers and teachers should be the first step in order to ensure
children’s mental well-being in schools in a positive sense, beyond the pathological
one (a lack of mental diseases). As some authors defend, “the paediatrician’s biological
child has nothing to do with the psychologist’s scientific child” (Cyrulnic, 2009, 7),
which entails a serious problem if one defends a holistic view of children’s well-being.
However, these programmes imply other philosophical problems and challenges
one should be aware of.
8.3 Psychology and Ethics in Mental Well-Being: Before a How

You Need a What
One of the reasons why these programmes are not completely successful may lie in
the euphoric way they have been established. The euphoria with which emotional,
social and creativity programmes have been developed and applied, as if they were
the new panacea, is at risk of playing a role against them and losing the perspective
needed with respect to their limits and assumptions when applied to children.
Teachers, psychologists, social workers along with other experts demand some
answers with respect to depression, aggression, demotivation etc., among children
and young adolescents. However, the main answers have forgotten one side of the
problem, i. e., the ethical one. If some children and adolescences feel miserable,
act irresponsibly or use violence to solve problems, it is not only a question of
behaviour and psychology, but also a question of ethics and values, of autonomy
and responsibility, which seem to be two ignored ingredients of mental well-being
programmes.
Why and when have we decided that children’s mental well-being should
only be in the hands of psychologists? The defenders of the emotional intelligence
approaches normally quote Aristotle as a mentor for their purpose when he stated:
“to become angry belongs to everyone and is an easy thing, as is also giving and
spending money; but to whom [one ought to do so], how much, when, for the sake
of what, and how – these no longer belong to everyone nor are easy” (Aristotle, 2011,
40). However, deciding how we should get angry is not a psychological question, but
rather a normative one, a question of values (Nussbaum, 2001). It entails an idea of
what we consider good, tolerable, acceptable and fair toward others. It is a question
of moral reciprocity (Ignatieff, 1999), not a technical one. Psychology, as a science, is
a formal knowledge: it only tells you how to achieve something, but it does not tell
you where you should go or what you should achieve. Firstly you need to know what
you should do (normativity). Secondly, you can explore what methods are the best to
get there (psychology). If children are only taught the second part without making any
explicit reference to the first one or if they are taught unconnectedly, they lose part of
the picture. They are two faces on the same coin, both needed for children’s holistic
mental well-being. Hence, to turn psychologists into the new priests may also be a
mistake if we want to ensure that we have autonomous generations, if we accept that
autonomy is basic for mental well-being.
The purpose of these programmes is a question of values and actually these
programmes are carried out whilst taking some values for granted. But this is
something that we should make explicit, for they are not applied as aseptic methods.
To teach children the cognitive, behavioural and emotional ways that lead us to
behave in a non-violent way does not say anything about the fact that we believe
that we should respect other people. But in fact these programmes are constructed
assuming a culture of human rights, which is not openly mentioned. When they
Psychology and Ethics in Mental Well-Being: Before a How You Need a What 137
teach to solve problems “ecologically” – meaning by this without causing any

harm to others or to oneself as one of the key rules – they are tacitly assuming
a human rights ethic. Psychology and these programmes do not help children
be autonomous if they do not tell them that they assume certain values as non-
negotiable; for instance, that violence is not allowed under any circumstance as
a way to solve problems with classmates. Hence, children’s mental well-being will
again be in someone else’s hands if they are not simultaneously taught to develop
some ethical and critical thinking.
If the values we assume and encourage to improve children’s mental well-being
are not openly specified, discussed and eventually internalized by them, a child or
a teenager from a conflictive area, such as Ceuta,6 may lack the tools to distinguish
between the release and well-being he experiences in a creativity programme where
he can develop his talents, socialize and deliver his daily tensions, and a meeting
of young members of a fundamentalist cell where he is also encouraged, where his
self-esteem is boosted and where he can easily feel part of a group. As a consequence,
critical tools are also essential for children’s mental well-being in order to avoid
manipulation and to teach them to take care of their own mental well-being and well-
becoming. If we want to teach children to regulate their emotional states, to be less
aggressive toward peers etc., it means that we have decided that it is better to live in a
society where other human beings are respected. But if this essential statement is not
made openly and publicly in connection to the emotional intelligence programme,
then we will be teaching how to obtain certain results by applying certain methods
which could be used to either generate better relationships or to manipulate others in
a more sophisticated way.
Additionally, if a teenager with family problems ends up using violence toward
a peer at school, seeing him as a scapegoat, and has the chance to start training his
emotional intelligence skills as previously suggested, he would probably be less
aggressive and may give up violence as a tool to interact with others. However, this
does not mean that he feels better or that his well-being is restored, nor that he has
solved the conflicts that led him to use violence. It may be true that positive states
of mind make us more benevolent towards others and less aggressive. Teaching
children to generate positive states of mind without making any reference to why the
others deserve respect could lead to children acting correctly because it is convenient
for them, because they have understood that violence disadvantages them in the
interpersonal arena, but not due to any recognition towards others, which may not be
the goal of complete mental well-being.
6 Ceuta, a Spanish territory in Morocco, has recently been the perfect scenario – due to the intercul-
tural conflicts and the negative socio-economical environment – to recruit and train teenagers under
18 to commit suicide attacks for the Syrian jihadist movement. See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-22999619.
In short, emotional intelligence needs a moral criterion. Think now about the
first trained skill; learning to recognise emotional reactions. However, imagine that
you find yourself reacting with disgust when you see at a friend’s party that he has
invited a gipsy couple. You may be able to realise that you have a strong reaction
and to identify disgust without confusing it with anger. You may know perfectly well
that disgust implies a fear of being contaminated by the input that generated the
reaction and that for that reason you avoid interacting with them. You may then be
conscious of your xenophobic reaction, but this alone does not imply that you will
change or that you would review your own beliefs, unless your moral criteria tell
you that this is a non-tolerable belief.
Likewise, you will not be prompted to empathize with someone if firstly you
do not consider her as an equal on some level, if you are not minimally concerned
about what happens to the other person. Without an ethical education, without a
debate on moral criteria, one child can end up like Huckleberry Finn after letting
his slave friend scape, namely without knowing why he has acted against what he
considered the best decision and why he has felt that he could not deliver his Afro-
American friend to the local authorities.
Finally, think now about the cognitive and positive psychology programmes.
Surely it is fundamental to know the different ways in which our minds interpret
reality and the different mental maps and coping styles. Probably this will reinforce
our critical sense and will help us see things differently before coming to a
conclusion, especially once we are adults. However, with respect to children, if we
just teach and practice the positive and optimistic mental maps without making
any reference to values we could be reinforcing both good and wrong goals. If one
just makes children see how biased the generalisation of “I will never be able to
succeed, I always fail at everything I try” is, without saying anything else about the
content, we will be encouraging a music student to practise the new piano lesson,
and a juvenile offender who failed in his last attempt to steal at the grocery to try
again.
Likewise, many of these programmes are focused on being able to distinguish
the environmental input, our thoughts about it and our emotional reaction, that is,
what happens, and how we evaluate it with respect to our expectations, goals, etc.
This is positive as long as it can teach children that it is not the others’ behaviour
that annoys you, but your expectations toward them and your desire to be treated
differently. However, this can be dangerous if a child has self-esteem problems and
does not feel she deserves to be treated well. If children lack a criterion of what
should not be acceptable, it may turn out to be a subtle way of maintaining the
status quo. In short, sending the message that is not the others who make you
suffer, but your thoughts about a given situation will of course diminish anxiety
and anger and will make a child feel relieved. It will surely help her not to dramatize
in certain circumstances, but when applied to others, it can be detrimental, creating
very conformist children and adults. If your ballet teacher treats your group with
Psychology and Ethics in Mental Well-Being: Before a How You Need a What 139
rude manners, insults the girls who learn slower and even humiliate your friends,
and one of the girls – lacking positive coping styles – cries and tells her mother
what normally happens at ballet classes, probably the school will be aware of
the teaching methods of the ballet teacher and will do something about it. On
the contrary, if all the girls are trained to generate their own positive moods, to
change negative thoughts into positive ones and to be optimistic, they will probably
not complain about the teacher and, as a result, we may not be helping them –
as children in particular in asymmetrically vulnerable situations – to recognise a
problem or a potential harmful interaction, not even being aware of the unfairness
that they are being exposed to, which is another kind of helplessness. Of course,
optimism will protect them, but they will be tolerating behaviour in interpersonal
relationships that should not be tolerated and could end up becoming used to living
with those kinds of relations. In this sense, the development of self-esteem and
optimism should also be connected to the idea of what you deserve, and not only to
lifeguard mental styles.
The same would happen if a child who lives in an abusive family environment
was trained with these patterns. We may be putting that child in an even more
invisible place, especially for those children living in borderline private situations
that are neither criminal nor positive for children. Luckily, that child would have
an emotional outlet through optimism, creativity and humour if she is part of one
of those programmes, but this is only a temporary lifeguard, not the guarantee
for children’s complete mental well-being. Cognitive psychologists tend to quote
Epictetus’ words as a role model when he wrote that “men are disturbed not by
the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things. (…) When we are
impeded, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves – that is,
our opinions” (Epictetus, 2005, 8). However, they tend to forget that Epictetus was
a slave, an adult and a stoic with no intention of fighting for his rights as a human
being. Basically, he was speaking a different moral language when compared to the
current human rights culture. Someone should confirm to that child that the situation
she is living in is simply wrong and that she deserves otherwise. In other words,
the optimistic patterns are indeed useful in stressful and emergency situations as
protective lifeguards, but we cannot forget to give children the tools to recognise a
broken ship and the tools for building safe ones as adults. Mental well-being has to
do with being able to recognise, change or escape from a hurtful situation and not
only to mentally survive it. The reformulation of negative experiences or irreversible
situations thanks to positive mental coping styles may be good for SOS situations
and also as a way of providing some perspective to highly demanding children who
can easily feel frustrated, but we should be aware of the fact that pushing too much
in one direction only can end in turning tyrannical, unhappy children into passive
conformist ones, swinging from one extreme to another.
8.4 Conclusion
If children’s mental well-being is understood in positive terms, beyond a lack of

pathologies, discomfort or anguish, then mental education should also be seen in
positive terms, beyond ensuring the lack of suffering and negative patterns, making
explicit and also cultivating the values that contribute to generating children’s mental
well-being. Thus, moral, philosophical and emotional (or psychological) education
should be planned in an interconnected way, combining the key structure and the
contents of mental well-being. If we believe that democratic, respectful societies are
better for humans’ well-being, we cannot forget to offer children an holistic education
in that direction. Hence attitudes but also moral character should be part of those
education plans in order to make children autonomous and responsible and, as a
consequence, to provide them with all the tools needed to achieve complete mental
well-being.
References
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Hoffman, Martin L. 1987: “The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment” in Empathy
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Matteo D’Emilione, Giovannina Giuliano & Paloma Vivaldi Vera
9 Will Children of Social Care Services Users be
Future Users? Results of a Pilot Research in Rome
“What opportunities children have today and will have tomorrow, in line with what they can be
reasonably expected to want, is a matter of public policy and social programmes” (A. Sen, 2006)
9.1 Introduction
Ahid emigrated from Egypt almost 20 years ago. He is an occasional worker in the
construction industry, passionate about philosophy. He told us that one day the eldest
of his five daughters expressed the desire to have a school diary. Ahid would have
done anything for his children’s happiness, but he could not find anything for less
than 15 Euros, a sum he couldn’t afford. Later he found a diary that cost 7 Euros; it
was not like the classic school notebook, but, he thought, would do just the same.
We do not know whether his daughter liked the notebook, what we know is that Ahid
is a father who tries to satisfy his children’s needs. We don’t know how this kind of
father’s attention may have affected the child’s well-being (if not by asking the child
himself), but we believe that parents’ actions and perceptions can be a good proxy for
understanding the type of family environment children live in and how beneficial it
is to their well-being.
This paper illustrates some results of a primary data collection survey on the
poverty of social care services users in a district of Rome, with a specific focus
on households with children1. The research is based on an original model of
multidimensional analysis of poverty that considers a broad set of life domains
(house, community, health, emotions, knowledge, income). This model, called
MACaD (Multidimensional Analysis of Capability Deprivation) was developed
within the theoretical framework of the Capability Approach (A. Sen, 1979, 1997, 2007
and M. Nussbaum, 2000, 2011) and is focused on the measurement of the degree of
individually achieved functioning in each life domain with respect to the possession
of tangible and intangible goods according to a specific multidimensional index2.
The aim is then to understand whether through a multidimensional analysis of the
individuals/parents’ deprivation degree in terms of capabilities, it is possible to
1 The survey was developed in full cooperation with local administration, according to a specific
agreement between our organisation (ISFOL) and the Social Services Department of District 10.
2 “Multidimensional approach to an analysis of individual deprivation: the M.a.c.a.d. model and the
results of empirical investigation”, Forum for social economics, forthcoming.
© 2015 Matteo D’Emilione, Giovannina Giuliano & Paloma Vivaldi Vera

Introduction 143
effectively identify potentially hazardous situations for children. At the same time,
we are well aware of how important it is to detect not only the so-called ‘risk factors’
connected to specific family or child characteristics (disability/longstanding
illness, depression, longstanding poverty etc), but also promoting and protective
factors (parents’ higher qualification level, social support, safe neighbourhood).
This perspective takes into account the insights of some interesting studies which
have demonstrated that the exposure of children to multiple risk factors can impact
significantly on a number of results in terms of well-being and development of
the child (Jones, Gutman, Platt 2013). Furthermore, we wish to contribute to the
debate on how to measure multiple risks. As pointed out by R. Sabates and S. Dex in
‘Multiple risk factors in young children’s development’:
“While there are discussions in the literature about how best to measure some individual risk
factors, there are fewer considerations of how to measure multiple risks” (6).
The title of this paper therefore raises a provocative question that probably cannot be
given a precise answer, but which could be useful in stimulating an accurate reflection
on the future of children living in disadvantaged conditions, and the determinants of
their well-being.
To begin with, we must take into account the pressing nature of issues like
the exposure of children to severe deprivation and social exclusion in Italy.
According to UNICEF (Innocenti Report Card n.11, 2013), Italy is at the bottom
of the list of advanced economies with regard to four out of five dimensions of
children’s well-being: material well-being, health and safety, education, housing
and environment3. The situation has significantly worsened compared to the
same survey conducted in 2007 (Innocenti Report Card 7, 2007). Consistently with
the UNICEF evidence, the latest data from ISTAT (the Italian National Statistics
Institute) describe a situation in which families with children are more exposed
in terms of relative poverty and are at risk of poverty and social exclusion (the
potential poor): more than 16% of families with two children are poor in relative
terms (13.5% of those with one child), over 40% of single-parent families and 46%
of those with three or more children are at risk of poverty. Obviously, a low degree
of education as well as unemployment are the two aspects that have the greatest
impact in determining these situations.
Although our survey is very context-specific and focuses on a specific target
population (social care services users), it represents a good starting point to capture
(dynamic) aspects of people’s lives, which are otherwise difficult to detect. The focus
on households with children represents a development of our work, since we realized
3 The study ranks 29 developed countries according to the overall well-being of their children.
144 Will Children of Social Care Services Users be Future Users?
that almost 60% of our sample is composed of families with at least one child and
almost 30% of the families with children are single-mother households.
From here the intention is to understand more thoroughly the differences
between households with children and those without children, and what implications
this might have in terms of policy intervention at local level. Moreover, as will be
shown below, it allows us to face three fundamentally related issues regarding
people’s well-being (or deprivation): “the recognition of the fundamental diversity
of human beings” (Sen, 1979); the heterogeneity of situations, even in very select
groups of people; the different ways people react (or don’t react) to difficulties.
The paper is divided into three sections: the first one presents our Macad model and
how it can be used in the analysis of the environment a child lives in; the second one
focuses on the context in which the field survey has been developed and some of the
results obtained; the last one tries to suggest how local policy can enhance the well-
being of families with children.
9.2 MACAD Rationale: How the Model Works and How it Could be
Developed
Our model is based on the operationalization of the concept of functioning defined

as “a state of being and doing” (Sen, A.K., 1993). This ‘state’ refers to an individual
condition lived in a given time and characterized by a system of actions and
relationships affected by cognitive, psychological and physical aspects. It refers
to the perception of a problem and the way the individual deals with it. As a matter
of fact, measuring capabilities means being able to measure the real freedom of
people to choose between different functionings (or, in other words, between
different kinds of lifestyles): in order to have a complete set of information on the
substantive freedom and opportunities of individuals we needed a more specific
survey that was complex to run, considering its direct relation to the concept of
freedom.
With regard to the selection of the list of individual life domains, we took into
account the perspectives of both Sen and Nussbaum and chose not only those most
directly linked to basic needs (food, health, housing, income, education), but also to
thought, emotions, affiliation, etc. The choice of life domains was based on a broad
literature review and on our experience over the years, which demonstrated that the
selected domains were appropriate for our specific target group4.
4 It is worth noting that in the first pilot project conducted in 2010, at the end of the questionnaire,
respondents were asked to assign a weight to each life domain according to its importance in leading
a decent life.
MACAD Rationale: How the Model Works and How it Could be Developed 145
The following list describes the life domains considered and their definition in
terms of capabilities:
1. Living in a house: being able to manage the house and bear costs, cleaning it
and keeping it in order
2. Generating income: being able to manage and improve income sources
3. Being part of a community: being able to have a good relationship with the
environment, maintaining relationships with friends and neighbours and
participating in community life
4. Developing skills, improving education: being able to improve one’s
educational and/or professional level, having the improvement of one’s education
level as a life goal and being able to implement actions that are consistent with
this goal
5. Being healthy: being able to take care of one’s own health, avoiding risk-taking
behaviour.
6. Expressing emotions: general psychological well-being, ability to express
positive and negative emotions, being empathic, being able to cope with
difficulties and manage stress, self-efficacy perception.5
Each life domain is described by two types of indicators:

a. status indicators that represent the availability of tangible and intangible resources
and the availability of conversion factors6;
b. functioning indicators that represent the degree of vitality of a functioning (between
the two extreme polarities of ‘achieved’ and ‘not-achieved’).
Furthermore, the central role that agency plays in determining the full achievement
of a functioning should be stressed. As Croker and Robeyns (2010) highlight, citing
some passages of A. K. Sen’s book Development as Freedom:
With the concept of agency, however, Sen (1999: 11,53, 281) signals an “agent-oriented view”
in which individuals and groups should decide these matters for themselves, “effectively shape
their own destiny and help each other” (Sen 1999: 11), and be “active participant[s] in change,
rather than...passive and docile recipient[s] of instructions or of dispensed assistance”. (Sen 1999:
281)
5 Our interest in subjective factors such as emotions, effectiveness, self-respect was inspired by Nuss-
baum and the OPHI work that identified five ‘missing dimensions’ (quality of work, empowerment,
physical security, ability to live without shame, psychological well-being). For more information:
www.ophi.org.uk
6 Those factors that influence the relation between the possession of a good and the achievement of
certain functionings (Crocker and Robeyns 2009, p. 68).
Thus, according to our model, assessing the level of deprivation in terms of capabilities
means not only detecting whether an individual lives in a disadvantaged area/
neighbourhood (according to his/her perception about crimes or pollution), but also
whether he/she has tried to solve the perceived problems, alone or with other people.
The concept of agency, as defined by Sen, is a useful ‘tool’ in order to understand such
a process.
Our model is based on a multidimensional index which takes into account binary
variables (‘1’ means deprivation; ‘0’ means no deprivation) that contribute to building
the two types of indicators already mentioned7: status and functioning indicators.
The general index consists of 28 status indicators and 20 functioning indicators
(see Annex A). The interactions between these two types of indicators generate four
different living conditions (fig.1) represented by four quadrants (A, B, C, D).
Figure 9.1: ‘Living conditions in a capabilities space’
7 The index is intended to highlight several poverty dimensions and is based on the “counting ap-
proach” (Atkinson 2003), developed among others by Alkire and Foster (2007) and Bossert, Chakra-
varty and D’Ambrosio (2009).
MACAD Rationale: How the Model Works and How it Could be Developed 147
The vertical axis represents the level of functioning achievement and the horizontal
axis represents the availability of goods and conversion factors:
1. Quadrant A. Individuals have material and intangible resources in order to cope
with difficulties. It means that social care services users could have the resources
to come out from a social exclusion situation;
2. Quadrant B. Individuals are depressed in terms of availability of commodities
but not in terms of functionings. It means that, as an example, if adverse or
unexpected events (illness, divorce, loss of income, etc.) occur they can cope with
it in a positive way;
3. Quadrant C. Individuals are depressed both in terms of functionings and
availability of commodities and conversion factors. This is the worst condition
where individuals lack of any type of resources, with fewer opportunities to
change their social exclusion condition;
4. Quadrant D. Individuals are depressed in terms of functionings but not in terms
of availability of commodities. It means that no material deprivation and a low
agency level could coexist.
9.2.1 From the Capability Approach to Ecological Systems Theory: the Child at the
Centre of the Development Process
In a survey on poverty and deprivation with a focus on households with children, it is

of fundamental importance to understand which are the effective resources available,
what is the quality of close family relationships and what type of social relationships
the family has, in order to draw attention to the protective and risk factors to which
the child is potentially exposed.
Indeed, serious and persistent existential crises involve the entire family and, at
the same time, crucial family processes influence the recovery and resilience of all
members, their relationships and family unity. In some critical life events, such as
housing and economic difficulties following job loss of one or more members, the
large and emotional burden of a disabled or chronically sick family member, poverty
or immigration, what seems to be crucial is the quality of emotional ties and mutual
interconnections inside and outside the family.
The quality of close relationships within the family is the result of several factors,
among others: the ability to provide empathetic support, the way different roles are
perceived and played, rules and clear boundaries, the quality and quantity of time
spent together. But also the quality of relationships outside the family is connected to
a plurality of levels: the informal relationship network (family, friends, neighbours)
and the formal relationship network (school, social services, associations). These
internal and external relationships are highly interdependent: for example, the lack
of internal cohesion may be related to a lack of relationships with the outside and,
conversely, the quality of relationships that the family is able to establish with the
outside, seems to be an indicator of positive and supportive internal relationships.
In this regard, it is useful to briefly mention the main points of some of the
developmental theories which can support the idea of the importance for each
individual to live in a supportive environment, from childhood onwards. This promotes
maturity, a sense of security, ability to cope with difficult situations, resilience and
prevents psychopathology or social maladjustment.
Winnicott, one of the leading exponents of the theory of object relations, can
provide valuable support in this regard. He stresses the importance of having a good
enough mother in order to have a healthy development. To him the “good enough
mother” is a mother who adapts to meet an infant’s needs and can healthily dissipate
her adaptations from the results of her child’s frustrations and its ability to cope with
what it may perceive as her failures.
The “good-enough mother” (Winnicott, 1964) and a good-enough holding
environment contribute to ascertaining healthy development and this area of
experience promotes an infant’s ability to then enter into a relationship between itself
and its external world. Thus it is these environmental factors which can influence
an infant’s acquisition of a healthy mental well-being, but if these are not employed
during the early developmental stages, some form of psychopathology may occur
(Joshi, 2008).
Bowlby’s attachment theory builds on Winnicott’s theory and emphasizes the fact
that early relationships with caregivers play a major role in child development and
continue to influence social relationships throughout life. Bowlby devoted extensive
research to the concept of attachment, describing it as a “lasting psychological
connectedness between human beings” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 194). He shared the
psychoanalytic view that early experiences in childhood have an important influence
on development and behaviour later in life. Our early attachment styles are established
in childhood through the infant/caregiver relationship.
In addition to this, Bowlby believed that attachment had an evolutionary
component; it aids in survival. “The propensity to make strong emotional bonds to
particular individuals is a basic component of human nature” (Bowlby, 1988, 3).
But while these theories are based on the dyadic or triadic mother-father-child
relationship, over the past thirty years, many studies have been developed on the
conditions that foster human development, linking the evolution of the individual to a
progressively extended systemic dimension (intrapersonal, interpersonal, emotional,
environmental, historical, cultural, socio-political). Bronfenbrenner, was one of the
authors who most influenced the research on these issues, documenting the systemic
interconnections that link individual development with the social context he lives
in. His main thesis is that the possibilities for growth, development and well-being
do not depend on a single cause, but rather on a complex network of environmental
factors (micro-, meso-, exo-and macro-systems), which include individuals with their
Families’ Capabilities and Children’s Well-being: Results of Empirical Investigation 149
specific biological and psychological structure, environment, group, culture, society

(Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
This theoretical approach has many similarities with the A. Sen capability
approach (CA), which is the framework used to conduct this survey. According to
Sen, in fact, human beings are distinguished by three different dimensions: their
personal and structural characteristics, external circumstances (environment) they
encounter and their abilities to transform resources into functionings, which are
appropriate to build their well-being. To achieve functionings constituting well-
being, the individual must meet contexts that will give him a real freedom to grow
or to compensate for any shortfall. This is even more relevant for the child, who is
considered to be at the centre of a development process in close interaction with
other important agents such as family, school, etc. Such agents and the continuous
and dynamic interaction with the child re-shape the potential capability set and
can enhance (or restrict) the range of possible functionings for children (Biggeri,
Santi 2012). In fact, as Sen has underlined “while exercising your own choices
may be important enough for some types of freedoms, there are a great many other
freedoms that depend on the assistance and actions of others and the nature of
social arrangements” (2007, p.9).
This is why in this survey we will first analyse the microsystem, the small, immediate
environment the child lives in; any immediate relationships or organizations they
interact with, such as their family, school, neighbourhood. How these groups or
organizations interact with the child will have an effect on how the child grows; the
more encouraging and nurturing these relationships and places are, the better the
child will be able to develop.
9.3 Families’ Capabilities and Children’s Well-being: Results of

Empirical Investigation
Before going into details of the survey results, it is appropriate to highlight some
aspects of the context in which the survey was carried out. The survey took place
in Rome’s District n.10, a peripheral urban area with constant population growth
(230,000 inhabitants) and a foreign population which has doubled over the last
decade (from 5% in 2000 to 10% in 2010).
The District’s Social Care Services Department supports almost 2000 new
individuals and the staff is composed of 22 social workers who have approximately
100 new social service users each year. This figure is of great interest since the average
time of takeover is more than two years, thus stressing the social services system and
human resources dedicated to it. Again, almost 30% of the budgetary resources are
dedicated to interventions for children, however, they belong largely to the category
of what we can call ‘reactive programmes’ and only in a few cases to the category of
‘prevention programmes’. As a matter of fact, the most requested service is economic
assistance in order to deal with unexpected expenses (medical expenses, bills, rent/
mortgage), with an indicative annual per capita expenditure of just 200 euro.
During the survey, 570 valid assisted completion questionnaires were collected.
The questionnaire, consisting of 108 questions, was divided into six areas (one for
each life domain plus a registry) and was anonymous.
As already mentioned at the beginning of our paper, we try to analyse children’s
well-being indirectly, considering the parents’ perspective. In order to make our
analysis more complete and effective, we are going to develop the discussion in two
main directions: the first one, comparing the parents’ situation and the situation of
individuals without children (the two sub groups of our sample) according to our
model; the second one, taking into account some features of the local institutional
context in order to understand if and how institutions can affect parents’ well-being
and children’s well-being.
Some features of our (not representative) sample must be highlighted: as far as
the educational level is concerned, approximately 46% of surveyed parents have
a middle school level, 45% have a diploma (secondary school level) and about 9%
have a degree. The situation is not significantly different from respondents without
children, except for the fact that the latter have a much higher percentage of primary
school diplomas (over 20%). Therefore, along with a significant share of parents with
a particularly low education level, there are some parents with a high education level.
Again, according to our results, parents with a low education level are twice as likely
to be in the most deprived situation.
With regard to the parents’ employment status only 27% of respondents have
a permanent job (only 17% have a full-time job) and about 34% are unemployed.
Therefore, job insecurity and unemployment are two distinctive features of sampled
households. It is useful to present some evidence of the households’ material
deprivation: 70% of families with children cannot afford even a one-week vacation
during the year; 18% state having difficulties getting a balanced diet during the week;
18% state not being able to heat the house adequately; 78% state that their income is
not high enough to satisfy the household’s needs; nearly 60% would have difficulty
coping with an unexpected expense of €200.
Finally, with regard to health status, two significant aspects should be highlighted:
first, 80% of parents state that they are in good health (much higher than families with
no children, 52%); secondly, 26% of parents state that there is one family member
with health problems. Within the latter case, 10% are families with disabled children.
We are going to present now how our model and the multidimensional index can
help us represent and analyse the situation of families with and without children (see
fig.2).
Figure 9.2: ‘Social services users with children’
This figure represents the general situation of the families with children, all domains
considered. People are distributed over four quadrants representing four possible
conditions generated by our model as already explained in the previous paragraph.
The axes represent the mean values of the two categories of indicators considered
(status and functioning) and the individual’s situation gets worse when moving away
from the origin (0). The maximum values of deprivation both in terms of functioning
achievement and status are therefore represented by the extremes of the cartesian
axes (Y=16 and X=25).
As we can see in the next figure, the situation of individuals without children is
quite different.
As is made quite clear by the two figures is that the distribution of the two sub
groups is quite different: the share of individuals without children in quadrant
C (worst situation) is greater than the other group, and families with children in
quadrant A (best situation) are relatively more than the other category (43.8% -
29.6%). Although it may seem unexpected, we can therefore assume that families
with children are better off than those without children. This seems to be enhanced
by an additional aspect: the average degree of deprivation in terms of functioning
achievement is higher in the group of individuals without children. In the first case
the group is deprived on average in 8 indicators out of 16 (6 out of 16 in the second
Figure 9.3: ‘Social service users with no children’
group). As far as the status indicators are concerned, the situation appears almost the
same: the average is 11 in the first group and 10 in the second. We can argue that the
main difference between the two subgroups is determined by the level of functioning
achievement and then agency perhaps plays an important role in this. However, the
result that is more striking in absolute terms is the one regarding the 30% of families
with children exposed to multiple forms of capabilities deprivation.
What happens if we move from an aggregated picture to a disaggregated one by
decomposing our index? The next table shows the distribution of the two sub groups
for each domain considered:
Figure 9.4: ‘Aggregated and disaggregated distribution’

The content of the table allows us to develop a more complex analysis, showing the
difference between the general distribution and the disaggregated one: we can detect
the domains that most influence and affect the general distribution. As a matter of
fact, focusing the attention on quadrants A and C (where most of our sub groups are
concentrated) we can point out some peculiar aspects related to three dimensions:
living in a house, being part of a community and expressing emotions (some of the
most interesting results concerning the other three dimensions were reported at the
beginning of this chapter).
With regard to the domain ‘living in a house’, it is possible to point out how 38%
of the population (within the two sub groups) is placed in quadrant C. Thus, according
to our model, poor housing conditions are crucial in explaining deprivation of
individuals in greatest need. Two indicators explain this result: the type of ownership
of the house and the cost of rent or mortgage with respect to the available income. As
a matter of fact, most of the social services users in our survey live in rented houses or
pay a mortgage and have to spend more than 30% of their (low) income on affording
these expenses.
Concerning the domain ‘Being part of a community’, it is possible to highlight that
on average more than 30% of our sample is very deprived both in terms of functioning
indicators and status indicators. Most of the indicators developed within this domain
relate to the research field of neighbourhood effects on people’s well-being (also
children’s well-being) which takes into account issues like: child and family-related
institutions, social organization and interaction, normative environment and labour
and marriage markets (Pebley, Sastry 20038). According to our survey results,
less than a quarter of families with children claim to have little access to libraries,
theatres, cinemas, parks, etc. About 30% perceive as critical issues those related
to pollution, crime, noise, dirt and slightly less than 60% of families with children
cannot find a solution to these problems even though they would like to. With regard
to households’ social relationships, if almost 80% perceive their family environment
as positive and supportive, on the other side, 67% of households with children under
the age of 12 rarely or never spend time with their own family, neighbours and friends.
These figures reflect poor external relatedness, which could lead to social exclusion.
Regarding the domain ‘Expressing emotions’, although a significant share of
people is not severely deprived (more than 40% of respondents in each sub group
are in quadrant A), it is interesting to highlight that there is a marked difference in
the distribution of quadrant C. The group of individuals with no children is more
8 On the same subject see also: Coulton, Korbin, Su, ‘Measuring Neighborhood Context for young
children in an urban area’, American Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 24 n.1, 1996 – Sampson,
Morenoff, Rowley ‘Assessing ‘Neighborhood Effects’: social process and new directions in research’,
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002, 28: 443–78.
deprived than the one with children and this result, as will be seen more specifically,
is confirmed by almost all indicators considered.
This domain gives us information regarding the way parents perceive their well-
being (both in emotional terms – happiness, and in cognitive terms – life satisfaction),
what is their emotional state, their empathy level, how well-embedded they feel in
a positive and supportive social context, the internal cohesion of the family, how
much they believe they are able to control the world around them and to have clear
life goals, what is their level of perceived stress and their self-efficacy perception.
One aspect that is worth highlighting is the fact that, though in general the level of
deprivation in this domain is higher among people without children, in the empathy
indicator, this trend is inverted. In fact, families with children under the age of 12 are
more deprived (20.5%) than those without children (18.2%) in the aspect related to
the ability to tune into the moods of others, anticipate help demands and provide
help in difficult situations. Parental sensitivity and responsiveness are essential
to perceiving and evaluating children’s distress signs and being able to respond to
those needs in an appropriate manner. This will develop a secure base for a child
and a better adaptation to the social world. Reciprocity between parent and child,
which is built through empathy, actually favours the development of the child’s social
functions and supports learning.
Another important aspect concerns perceived stress in the past year: 79% of
families with children under the age of 18 have experienced a high level of stress. This
aspect has an inevitable impact on children who perceive their parents’ moods. It is in
stressful situations that empathy and sharing with children becomes crucial in order
to avoid them suffering as much as possible. In relation to this figure, we can explore
the emotional state of the respondent parent: 88.5% of parents with children under
the age of 12 state that in the last four weeks, they could not sleep because of worries,
they felt mostly unhappy and depressed and they felt that had lost confidence in
themselves. Although we cannot make any diagnostic inferences, we can certainly
say that long-term exposure to parents’ anxious and depressed moods makes the
child more vulnerable to the development of various diseases. Another aspect to
highlight is related to the perceived self-efficacy: 24% of parents with children under
the age of 18 (and 23.1% of parents with children under the age of 12) report feeling
unable to face difficulties/problems, to make decisions and to play an important role
in their lives.
If we now consider locus of control, which refers to the extent to which
individuals believe that they can control events that affect them, it can be seen that
42.4% of parents with children under the age of 12 state that their lives are largely
predetermined by fate. However, only 15% state they do not have clear life goals.
If, we now consider the measurement of well-being (expressed in its affective
component – happiness – and cognitive component – life satisfaction), we see how
in the last 4 weeks, 34% of parents of children under the age of 18 report being very
or quite unhappy and 50.5% state they are very or fairly dissatisfied with different
aspects of their lives (work, relationships with family members, etc.).
Paying attention to the most critical aspects related to families with children’s
situation within the three dimensions considered, we did not give proper emphasis
to the positive factors that can be found in the households surveyed. If we re-read
the results concerning the different indicators, it is possible to point out how most of
the parents have resources in terms of promotive and protective factors that can be
effectively exploited. Most of parents, regardless of low income-related issues, have a
clear life goal, do not have ‘risk behaviours’ (such as alcohol-related problems), take
care of their house and take care of their children.
9.4 Policy-making and children’s well-being: lessons and conclu-

ding remarks
One of the main objectives of our model is to show policy makers and social workers
how much heterogeneity of situations can be found even in a specific group of
individuals, such as ‘social care services users’. Alongside expected critical issues
such as economic difficulties, unemployment and low education level, there is a great
variety of situations and other issues to be taken into account. Thus, it makes it even
more difficult to imagine the ‘right’ policy intervention at national or local level9.
As pointed out in the previous chapters, MACAD allows setting priorities for
action to fight poverty and social exclusion: a aggregated and disaggregated multi-
dimensional perspective makes it possible to identify which different kinds of services
to deliver, according to services users needs. At the same time, the institutional
context has to be considered: financial and human resources available, investments
made and to be made, national and regional policy strategy to face pressing issues
like children’s poverty/well-being. As a matter of fact, to set the range of available
opportunities to families with children in our survey, to improve their condition (and,
indirectly, their children’s well-being), we should also consider external factors that
could affect the situation.
Let’s imagine a local policy maker interested in taking a decision to improve
the well-being of families with children in charge of the district social services
department. He should take a decision both on the basis of the information of our
survey (adopting a multidimensional approach) and on the current situation of the
local social services system.
The first issue to be considered is the significant number/volume of people
using social services with at least one child: almost 50% of the people who turn to
9 A comprehensive overview of policies aimed at children’s well-being and their effectiveness is
available in ‘Doing better for children’, OECD 2009
Policy-making and children’s well-being: lessons and concluding remarks 157
social services (60% of our sample). Some questions, therefore, have to be answered
by our policy maker: how many children are directly/indirectly affected by their
parents’ disadvantaged situation (and then potentially ‘at risk’)? How many of these
situations is the social services department able to follow effectively and what are the
‘operational tools’ available? In which life domain does the target population seem to
be more deprived? Regarding this last question, according to our survey, the priority
intervention areas coincide with some of the life domains considered, namely:
income generating, living in a house and being part of a community. We know that
the district’s social care services department has a very limited possibility of action
in the aforementioned domains, since it has no direct competence in housing and
labour market policies and it is quite complex to build a network with other local
departments or agencies (such as the public employment services).
Keeping in mind the question we asked at the beginning of our work and all
the issues already faced, the probability that a child of a social service user will
became a user himself, is determined by both the opportunities offered by his family
environment (microsystem) and the opportunities that national and local institutions
offer in order to assist and support disadvantaged families with children. There are of
course many other aspects to be taken into account with respect to this second issue
and we will focus on those that we consider most useful for the purposes of our work
and with respect to the available information. Two closely linked aspects have to be
considered: the scarcity of financial and human resources dedicated to social policies
at national and local level; the ‘sensitivity’ of resource distribution for social policies
to the electoral cycles, which greatly affects the ability to draft and plan effective
policies at both national and local level.
Finally, it is rather difficult to assess the ability of a system of social care services
to intercept all critical situations (service uptake capacity), in particular those that
relate to children. Yet, we believe that our model could represent a good ‘device’ to
identify and prevent those situations not only from the material point of view but also
with respect to other life dimensions. In this respect, dealing with households with
multiple needs (or ‘multiple risk factors’) often means being able to offer ‘multiple
answers’.
Annex ‘A’ : list of indicators
Domain Status Indicators Functioning Indicators
Living in a AB1- Type of home ownership (property, AB4 - Care of your own house
house mortgage, rent) and AB 1.1 - Weight AB6 – Perception of relevant
percentage of mortgage/rent on income issues regarding house
AB2 - Availability of services in house AB7 – Activation for resolution of
AB3 - Number of rooms in house a house problem
AB 5 - Presence of problems in house
Being part of a AM1 – Access to social infrastructure AM2 a)– Frequency in meeting
Community AM3 – Quality of family relationships relatives/friends
AM6 – Quality of relationships with people AM2 b) – Frequency in practice of
living in neighbourhood leisure/worship activities
AM4 – Presence of relevant issues/problems AM 5 – Activation in problem
in the neighbourhood of residence solving with respect to
neighbourhood
AM8 – Reasons to remain/
change area of residence
Generating GR1 – Burdensome costs to pay rent/ GR6 – Capacity to meet basic
Income mortgage/bills needs (one week on holiday/
GR2 – Moments in 2010 when it was very food/medical care/house
difficult to pay certain expenses heating)
GR3 – Making ends meet GR10 – Ability to upgrade own
GR4.1 –Bank account availability income with respect to needs
GR5 – Use of credit cards or similar GR12 – Propensity to save and/
or programme costs
Expressing E3 – Quality of life in last 4 weeks E1 – Emotional maturity
emotions E4 – Level of life satisfaction in different E2 – Level of happiness in last 4
domains in last four weeks weeks
E5 – Life satisfaction as a whole E8.2 – Contribution to
E6 – Help from others in certain situations implementation of change
E7 – Stress level in last year E9 – Self-efficacy and locus of
E12 – Level of autonomy and freedom to live control in last 4 weeks
the life one wants to live E11 – Clarity of life objectives
E14 – Opinion on role of fate in
personal life
Being healthy SA7 – Difficulties in coping with health SA1 – Perception of health status
problems SA2 – Risk behaviours
SA8 – Perceived level of health services in
area of residence
Developing Education level AC2 – Activate to improve
skills, AC1 – Usefulness of education knowledge
improving AC4 – Usefulness of having interests/hobbies AC 4.1 – Real chance to practice
education AC6– Goods owned by family hobbies
AC5 – Frequency of activities
useful for gaining knowledge
References 159
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List of Figures
Figure 9.1: ‘Living conditions in a capabilities space’ 146
Figure 9.2: ‘Social services users with children’ 151
Figure 9.3: ‘Social service users with no children’ 152
Figure 9.4: ‘Aggregated and disaggregated distribution’ 153
List of Tables
Table 3.1: 51
Index
agency 3, 8-9, 13-14, 20, 22, 24, 27, 29-30, 33, Heckman, James 82
49, 56-57, 95, 112, 145-147, 152, 159 Honneth, Axel 95
autonomy , 12, 14, 21, 24-26, 30-31, 33, 43-46, innocence 4, 7, 50, 54
85-89, 91, 93-95, 111, 113-115, 119-124, 126, Justice 2, 6-7, 9-11, 14-17, 21, 24-25, 32-33, 48,
130, 136 67-68, 73, 76, 79-81, 83-96, 126-127, 140
best interest , 12, 21, 33, 113-115, 124-125, 127 liberal standard 12, 113-114, 119-120, 125-126
capabilities 1, 10-11, 16-17, 29, 33, 37, 68-81, mental well-being 12-13, 129-137, 139-140, 148
83, 89-95, 107, 119, 123, 142, 144-146, 149, Miller, David 95
152, 159, 161 obesity 9, 34-36, 38-40, 42-47
Capability Approach 10, 13, 16, 32, 68, 75-77, 79, parents 2-4, 6, 12-13, 34, 40-42, 44, 50, 54-55,
81, 83, 85, 89, 95-96, 142, 147, 149 63, 70, 78, 80, 106, 113-116, 119-120,
childhood V, X, 4-9, 13, 17, 20-36, 38-50, 53-63, 123-126, 133, 142-143, 150, 155-157
66-71, 73, 75, 78-79, 81-83, 85, 87-88, 91, participation 9-10, 16, 21, 23, 25, 32-33, 56-58,
94, 98, 109, 112, 119, 126, 148, 159 63, 67, 74, 86, 89, 91, 93, 101, 112
circumcision 11-12, 28, 113-128 policy 1-3, 6, 10, 13-14, 16, 22, 24-25, 32-33, 56,
conceptions of childhood 8, 20, 22, 26-27, 31, 72-73, 77-79, 82-83, 86, 91, 95, 98-102,
55, 57-58 104, 106-111, 113, 142, 144, 156-157
development 3-5, 10, 13, 16-17, 21, 23, 25, 32-33, rights 1, 12-14, 16, 23, 25-27, 32-33, 56, 66-67,
35-36, 47, 49-50, 53-54, 56, 61, 68-73, 69, 74, 76, 89, 91, 106-107, 110, 116, 118,
76-77, 79-83, 86-87, 91, 94-96, 109-111, 124-128, 132, 136-137, 139-140, 160
123, 129-130, 132-134, 139-141, 143, 145, school VII, 11, 23-24, 40, 66, 70, 80, 82, 90,
147-149, 155, 159-160 93-94, 98-99, 101-102, 104-106, 108-112,
education 2, 6, 11-13, 26, 38, 55, 59-60, 66, 120, 130, 132-135, 137, 139, 142, 147,
79, 81-82, 86, 89-91, 94, 98-99, 101-102, 149-150
104-112, 114, 117-118, 120-121, 126, Sen, Amartya 33, 48, 83
129-132, 134, 138, 140, 143-145, 150, 156, social construction of childhood 8, 20-21, 27, 66
159 social well-being 12-13, 129, 134
Ethics 1, 9, 36, 47-48, 57-59, 66-67, 81, 126-128, sociology of childhood 8, 20-26, 29-32, 66
136, 140 subjective well-being 3, 11, 86, 91-92, 98-100,
family 1, 4, 6-7, 13, 16-17, 24, 40, 48, 50, 80, 82, 103-105, 107-112, 133
92-93, 98, 126, 137, 139, 142-143, 147-150, vulnerability 4, 7-9, 20, 23-24, 29, 31, 41, 49-50,
154-157, 159-160 54-58, 88
functionings 10-11, 13, 68, 89-94, 144-145, 147, well-becoming 1, 5-8, 10-11, 15, 30, 84-92,
149 94-95, 97-98, 105-108, 132, 137, 159
health 2, 6, 12-13, 26, 34-39, 43, 48, 66, 69, well-being 1-8, 10-17, 19-22, 26, 28-32, 37,
71, 73, 77-83, 86, 93, 99-100, 109-112, 115, 41, 46-48, 68, 73, 76-77, 79-81, 84-95,
118-119, 122-123, 127, 129-131, 134, 141-145, 97-100, 103-112, 117, 126, 129-137, 139-145,
150 148-150, 154-156, 159-160

The Well-Being of Children Philosophical and Social Scientific Approaches

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The Well-Being of Children Philosophical and Social Scientific Approaches

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Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf (Eds.

Philosophical and Social Scientific Approaches

Managing Editor: Anna Michalska

Language Editors: Sarah Hanagarth, P. Christian Adamski

Copyright © 2015 Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf and chapters’ contributors

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Managing Editor: Anna Michalska

Cover illustration: © Zurijetae

Gunter Graf & Gottfried Schweiger

Section I: Theories and Concepts of Children’s Well-Being

List of Figures 161

Alexander Bagattini is an assistant professor in Philosophy at the University of

Amy Clair is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford currently researching

William Gardner is a child psychologist and statistician. He is a senior research

Tatjana Višak is a postdoc researcher at Mannheim University, Germany. She was

© 2015 Gunter Graf & Gottfried Schweiger

Multidimensionality and Interdisciplinarity

influence other domains of well-being and development. On the other, it points to

The Ecology of Children’s Well-Being

Well-Being and Well-Becoming

So far we have discussed child well-being as a multi-dimensional and ecological

an engaged citizen, or being educated and autonomous – have to be grounded

Children’s Lives and Justice

We have laid out a multi-dimensional, ecological concept of well-being in

About the Chapters in this Volume

children’s researchers to account for their theoretical assumptions and to ensure

adults with sufficient levels of well-being. Furthermore, Schweiger concludes that

Lessons Learned: The Future of Well-Being

© 2015 Gunter Graf

section, it will be indicated that a more modest interpretation of the mentioned

1.2 The Social Construction of Childhood

Thinking about children in the context of political philosophy is often characterized

adults in respect of some unspecified set of attributes, in a conception of childhood

1.3 Children as Equals?

In general terms, dependency, vulnerability and the ability to develop into

1.4 Agency and Well-being

characterizing children primarily by their missing autonomy might lead to blind

There are many different conceptions of childhood to be found, both throughout

away or to deconstruct them completely. However, it is true that often enough we as a

Many of us in our various roles – perhaps as parents, citizens, consumers, teachers or

2.2 Childhood Obesity

© 2015 Tatjana Višak

2.3 Childhood Obesity as a Welfare Problem

prudentially good, because it is desired. A more intimate relationship between desire-

2.4 Contextualism About How to Promote Welfare

a) Available food and food habits in family and school environment

d) The role of food in emotional socializing

2.5 Defending Contextualism in the Case of Childhood Obesity

2.6 Is Childhood Obesity a Special Case?

So, it seems morally unproblematic to autonomously limit one’s own option-

3.2 Competing Conceptualisations and the Challenges of Rese-

© 2015 Tim Moore

In many conceptions, childhood is seen as a period of innocence, naivety,

4. The Childhood is a Children are Children are Child’s play and

5. The Children need to Children corrupted Children have their Childhood is

6. The Childhood marked Children are Children are Childhood scrutinised

Construct Characteristics Vulnerability Competence Agency / Participation

8. The Children developing Children are Competency Children assimilate

9. The Children socialised Children are at risk Increasing Increasing recognition

In 2009-12, I conducted an exploratory qualitative study that provided a group of

3.4 Reflexivity as a Process Through Which Theoretical and Proce-

argued that it is a way of increasingly problematising self-knowledge, of monitoring

3.5 Re-Considering Vulnerability and Incompetence Reflexively