Journey through

Epistemology

 What are the immediate objects of perception?

 How can we define knowledge?
 What is the ultimate source of knowledge- reason or experience?

Perception: the
Unit 1: Perception process by which
we become aware
of physical objects,
How do we perceive things? What is it that we including our own
perceive and how does it relate to the real world? body

We perceive mind-independent physical objects. These A direct

Mind-independent: able
objects have an existence in time and space and possess realist
to exist even if no mind is
certain qualities (shape, size, colour, smell etc.) that
there to perceive it
humans are able to perceive.

Criticism 1: But what about perceptual variation? If we directly

perceive objects exactly as they are, why is it that our perception of an
object can vary without the object itself changing? For example, when
I look at a shiny ‘brown’ table, it can appear to be many different
colours depending on the lighting conditions. In addition, the angles in
Bertrand Russell a rectangular table often appear not to be 90 degrees. But the table
itself has not changed in these instances. This suggests that what we
perceive is different to what actually exists.

Russell believes that we perceive mind-dependent sense data, which is caused by and reflects mind-independent
physical objects. It is this sense data that can varies when the table’s appearance changes; the table itself remains
the same. (More on indirect realism to come later.)

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 Maybe we don’t perceive objects exactly as they are, but this doesn’t mean we
don’t perceive them directly. Different conditions can mean we see objects in A direct
different ways, but it is still the objects themselves we perceive. realist
An How could our perception of objects be altered if there was no
indirect intermediate substance to be altered? If we perceive an object itself, it
realist seems unlikely that this perception could differ from the object in any
way.

Criticisms 2 & 3: Our senses also differ from reality in hallucinations (for
example, phantom limb syndrome) and illusions (for example, a pencil
appearing bent in a glass of water). In such instances, what I perceive does
not exist in the real world so I must be perceiving something that is purely
mental (sense-data). However, my experiences in hallucinations and
illusions are not distinguishable from veridical perception, so I must always Veridical:
be perceiving this ‘mental’ substance. truthful and
fitting with
reality
Response to the argument from
hallucination: Because
Response to the argument from illusion: There A direct
is nothing that actually is crooked when we see hallucinations are imaginary and not
real, they are not relevant to realist
a pencil in a glass of water, not even sense data.
Objects can possess relational properties that discussions of real world perception.
people perceive in illusions. In a similar way to Even if hallucinations are
how a town can have the relational property of indistinguishable from veridical
being in a north direction from a person perception to the person
standing in a certain place, a pencil has the experiencing them (this aspect of
relational property of appearing crooked in a the argument can also be doubted),
glass of water. You directly perceive the pencil this does not mean that
and its properties, but not every aspect of your hallucination and veridical
perception reflects the object’s physical perception must involve the same
properties. kind of immediate object of
perception.

An
indirect
In the ‘pencil in a glass of water’ illusion, what we perceive directly contradicts
realist the object’s true physical properties. A pencil cannot be both crooked and
straight. So when we perceive the pencil as crooked, we cannot be perceiving
the object directly, as we do not perceive all of its properties. We do not
perceive the ‘straightness’ of the pencil when we perceive the supposed
relational property of ‘appearing crooked in water’.

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 An Criticism 4: The time lag argument states that we cannot perceive physical
indirect objects directly because:
realist
It takes time for light waves, or sound waves, We can perceive objects such as
to reach our sense organs from physical distant stars after they cease to
objects. For example, we see the lightning exist. (In addition there is
and then hear the thunder, even though the always an extremely small time
light and the noise were given out at the lag when we perceive objects A direct
same time. that are close.) Respon
realist imme
argumen

An
indirect
realist

What with
I’m not s

An
indirect
realist

Sense-data:

1. Can ap
2. Only e
3. Is ‘priv

John
Locke

3
 Secondary Qualities are the ‘powers’ of objects that produce sensations in humans.

Sound Taste
Colour Smell

Secondary
Secondary qualities are mind-dependent and only exist in sense-data. The physical world contains primary
qualities only.

The external Your perception,

world, containing gained from sense
primary qualities data and made up of
only primary and
secondary qualities

Scepticism is the view that

our usual justifications for A
According to indirect realism, all we ever perceive
claiming our beliefs amount
is sense-data. But if we never perceive the
sceptic
to knowledge are inadequate.
physical objects, how do we know that physical
Raising doubts can test our
objects do exist? (This criticism attacks the realist
knowledge claims.
aspect of indirect realism.)

Response 1: There is a lack of perceptual choice surrounding our

experiences. For example, when I look up at a cloudy sky, I have no
control over what I see. I may will myself to see a purple sky, but this
does not alter the grey colour that I perceive. Our sense-data must
John therefore come from a source external to our minds.
Locke A
When we dream, we often appear to have sense experiences which we cannot
sceptic
control. But these experiences do not come from the physical world or from
any an external source.

But dream experiences are very different from real experiences. For example,
dreaming of being in a fire is a very different experience to actually being in a fire.
In dreams, there is often not coherence of the various senses (see below). Waking
life is more vivid, which suggests our waking perceptions caused by an external
source, as our minds are unable to produce such vivid experiences without
external stimulus.

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 Just because it appears that my sense-data is caused by an external stimulus, A
this does not mean that the external stimulus is a world of physical objects that sceptic
resemble my experiences. The external stimulus could be a Cartesian demon
deceiving me, or a super-computer plugged into my nerve endings.

Response 2: The coherence of various senses. The experience of one of my senses is

confirmed by my other senses. For example, when I touch an object, its dimensions
feel the same as they look. To become more certain that I have an apple in front of
me, I can see it, touch it, smell it and taste it. It seems unlikely that all of my senses
would be simultaneously fooled by an illusion.

All my senses could be simultaneously fooled by a deliberate effort of an evil A

demon, for instance. This Cartesian demon could produce an experience in which all sceptic
my senses cohere in the deception.

Response 3: An external world is the best hypothesis. I cannot prove whether mind-
independent physical objects exist and cause my sense-data, or whether the opposite is
true. But there is no reason why we should reject the first, more intuitive hypothesis.
The existence of a mind-independent external world better explains my perceptions.
Bertrand For example, if I forget about an apple and leave it in a drawer for a few weeks, when I
Russell
next open the drawer, I shall find a rotten apple. This suggests that the apple remained
in existence, rotting, whilst I was not perceiving it. This explanation is more plausible
than saying that the apple ceased to exist when I stopped perceiving it and then popped
back into existence as a rotten apple when I opened the drawer. Either scenario is
possible but we can make an inference to the best explanation, which is that an
external world exists.

Just because it is easier for me to explain my perceptions by saying that the A

external world does exist, it doesn’t mean that this hypothesis is true. There might
sceptic
be some simpler explanation for the rotting apple, which doesn’t involve mind-
independent physical objects, but which I cannot know.

Besides, even if there is a mind-independent physical world, seeing as we never

perceive it, how can I determine to what extent the real world resembles what I
perceive (my sense-data)? We have no way to externally compare our sensations to
real physical objects and so we cannot see how accurate our representations are.

Our sense experiences may not resemble the physical world. However, where there are
relations between objects in the ‘apparent space’ of our perceptions, similar relations occur
between objects in the ‘physical space’ of the mind-independent world. Properties that appear
the same in my perception (e.g. objects that seem to be the same colour) are in some way similar
in ‘physical space’. We cannot know what these similarities are. The relative positions of objects
in ‘physical space’ correspond to the relative positions of sense-data in ‘apparent space’. For
example, it takes more time to travel in ‘physical space’ to somewhere that appears in ‘apparent
space’ to be further away than it does to travel to somewhere that seems to be nearby. In a
similar way, we can know ‘real time’ as it is distinct from our ‘feeling of duration’, but we can
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know relative times (whether something happens before or after something else).
 The distinction between primary and secondary properties suggests the difference
between our sense-data and the external world. Primary qualities such as shape and
size exist in the physical world, but secondary qualities like colour and smell exist only
in mind-dependent perception.

Another problem for indirect realism is how mind-dependent objects (sense-data)

could be caused by mind-independent objects (physical objects). How does the causal
effect of sense-organs on the brain affect our conscious perception? How can
something physical and mind-independent possibly cause an idea in a mind? How
could nerve signals in the brain produce sensations of sound and colour?

Ok, so when you take a sceptical approach, indirect realism seems a bit shaky. But what
other theories are there about perception?

I came up with the theory of idealism. I believe that the immediate objects of
perception are mind-independent objects called ideas. Together these ideas comprise
the ‘physical’ objects that we perceive. All that exists are minds and their ideas,
sensations and thoughts. There is no mind-independent external world (an anti-realist
George
stance). In fact nothing exists that isn’t a mind or something mind-dependent. Berkeley

Wow! That seems like a very

radical theory! How on earth
can you justify the belief that
the real world doesn’t exist
independent of minds?

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I can argue against the primary-secondary quality distinction. Indirect realists have claimed
that perceptual variation in secondary qualities (e.g. colour) proves that they don’t have a
mind-independent existence. But perceptual variation can also be observed in what indirect
realists call primary qualities:

 Size: This can appear to vary when objects are observed from different distances. In
addition, an object will appear larger to a small animal than it does to a human.
 Shape: This seems to change when you look at an object from different angles (e.g. a
circular surface often appears to be elliptical). What looks smooth to the naked eye
appears rough and uneven under a microscope.
 Motion: We measure the speed of motion by how quickly our minds work. So
movements that seem fast to humans will appear slow to creatures that think much
quicker than us.

If the appearance of size, shape and motion are not constant in objects, these primary
qualities must be mind-dependent. We never perceive anything in an object that is neither a
primary nor a secondary quality. Therefore, as perceptual variation shows both of these
qualities to be mind-dependent, we must conclude that the objects of perception are
entirely mind-dependent.

An
Primary qualities can be objective. For example, although different observers (e.g. a
indirect
mouse and an elephant) may judge size differently, by subconsciously comparing
realist an object’s size to the observer’s own size, something that measures 10cm will
always measure 10cm. Similarly, although the speed may be experienced
differently by different observers, who will be able to think different numbers of
thoughts within that time, something travelling at 10 mph will always take an hour
to travel 10 miles.

But primary qualities must be mind-dependent because you can’t conceive of them
on their own, without any secondary qualities. For example, it is impossible to
imagine a colourless odourless silent apple. What could matter be when stripped of
its secondary qualities?

An
indirect This is just a limitation of the human imagination, not of the external world. Just
because I cannot conceive of something does not mean that it cannot exist.
realist

It is impossible to think of an object existing as mind-independent and unperceived by

anyone. You may, for example, try to think of an unperceived tree by imagining it in an
isolated area. However, by picturing such a tree, you are conceiving of it. This is my
Master Argument and it proves that no mind-independent object can exist.

An
But a thought is not the same as its contents. The thought of an unperceived
indirect tree may not exist, but this has no bearing on whether an actual physical
realist unperceived tree can exist.

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 But a thought is the same as the object it concerns, because nothing exists but ideas.

An That is only true if you already accept idealism; your argument is circular.
indirect Wait a minute... If my sensations aren’t caused by physical objects,
realist what does cause them?

Since nothing exists but minds and ideas, there are 3 possibilities for what could cause my
perceptions:

1. Ideas? These couldn’t cause my perceptions because ideas are passive.

2. My mind? This couldn’t cause my perceptions because if it did, I would be able to
control my sensations.
3. Another mind? This must be what causes my perceptions. Given the complexity and
regularity of my perceptions, only God’s mind would be powerful enough to create
them. So God must produce sense impressions in me (therefore must exist).

An Issue 1 with Idealism: Can God be used to play the role he does? It seems
indirect impossible that God could have the same perceptual experiences as me. God doesn’t
experience sensations such as pain, so how can I feel them?
realist
The ideas in God’s mind exist as a part of his understanding, rather than as perceptions. God
understands the concept of pain, so he can put it into our minds without feeling it Himself.

But why would a benevolent God will me to feel pain? Besides, the ordinary objects of my
perception change, so how could they come from God’s mind, which is unchanging and eternal?

All the objects of my perception have always existed in God’s mind, but I only perceive
them when God wills me too.

An Issue 2 with Idealism: It can lead to solipsism. If everything I

perceive is mind-dependent, do I have reason to think that Solipsism: The view that
indirect all that can be known to
anything exists other than my mind?
realist exist is my own mind

Because I am aware of myself as a mind, I can conceive a notion of what a mind is. It is
therefore possible that other minds exist. I’ve already explained above why God’s mind must
exist, so something does exist beyond my mind. The existence of any other minds is a matter
of inference.

An
Issue 3 with Idealism: It cannot secure objective space and time. For there to be
indirect objective space and time, there must be something mind-independent. In addition, it
realist appears that, according to idealism, no two people ever perceive one and same object
(for example, one and the same tree). When two people seem to look at a tree, each
perceives their own separate ‘tree’ idea.

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 Two people can, in a way, perceive one and the same tree; we both perceive a copy of
the ‘tree’ idea in God’s mind. As for objective time and space, these are regularities in the
relations between what we experience. These regularities exist in the mind of God.

An Issue 4 with Idealism: It does not give an adequate account of illusions and
indirect hallucinations. How can idealism explain illusions? In the example of the pencil in a
realist glass of water, there must be an idea that corresponds to this illusion.

In an ‘illusion’, you aren’t misperceiving. As there are no mind-independent objects, there is

no distinction between appearance and reality. What we see is what exists. We do not
want to say the pencil is crooked because it wouldn’t appear so in normal conditions. But
this is merely a problem with language. We can say the pencil is crooked when placed in a
glass of water because the pencil is not a physical object, but merely an idea of a pencil, and
this idea is crooked.

An
What about dreams and hallucinations? Although they are a products of the
indirect imagination (usually these are voluntary), hallucinations are involuntary, just like
realist perception.

There are two ways we can distinguish between perception and hallucinations:

 Hallucinations are usually dim, irregular and confused, unlike ordinary perception.
 Even when hallucinations are vivid and clear, they are not coherently connected with
the rest of our perceptions.

An But both of these criteria mark a difference in degree, whilst the difference
indirect between hallucinations and perception is a difference in kind.
realist
This is true, but my criteria are only supposed to give an idea of how we can tell
the difference between our perception and hallucinations. The real difference
between hallucinations and perception is that ideas in perception originate in
the mind of God, but hallucinations do not. This is a difference in kind.