CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
(FINALS)

GROUP 5 MEMBERS:

DAOAS, WINZUM
ESMERIA, CIELO MARIE
FRONDA, VIC
MISLANG, JESSA
NATIVIDAD, ELIJAH
ROXAS, JOHN DERRICK
SITCHON, ALEXON

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE TITLE PAGE

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS ……………………………………………. 1
2. CoTesCUP v. Secretary of Education …………………………………. 2
3. Santiago v. COMELEC …………………………………………………. 6
4. Lambino v. COMELEC ………………………………………………….. 7

II. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

5. Republic of the Philippines v. Peoples Republic of China …………… 8
6. Republic v. Ermita ………………………………………………………… 12
7. Magallona v. Ermita ………………………………………………………. 13
8. Soriano v. Laguardia ……………………………………………………… 15
9. Lawyers League v. Aquino ……………………………………………….. 16
10. Tañada v. Angara …………………………………………………………. 17
11. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff …………………………………………………..… 18
12. Bayan v. Zamora ………………………………………………………..… 19
13. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP ……………………………………. 20

III. CITIZENSHIP
14. Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigrations …………………….. 21
15. Djumantan v. Domingo …………………………………………………… 23
16. Poe v. COMELEC …………………………………………………………. 25
17. In re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter No. 914………………………………… 27
18. Co v. HRET ………………………………………………………………… 29
19. Bengson v. HRET ………………………………………………………….. 30
20. Tecson v. COMELEC …………………………………………………….. 32
21. Mercado v. Manzano ……………………………………………………… 34
22. Republic v. De la Rosa ……………………………………………………. 35
23. Republic v. Huang Te Fu …………………………………………………. 36
24. Maquiling v. COMELEC ………………………………………………....... 37
25. Frivaldo v. COMELEC …………………………………………………….. 38
26. Labo v. COMELEC ………………………………………………………… 39
27. Yu v. Defensor-Santiago ………………………………………………….. 40
28. Frivaldo v. COMELEC …………………………………………………….. 41

IV. STATE IMMUNITY

29. Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund ……………………………………………… 42
30. Arigo v. Swift ………………………………………………………………... 43
31. HUDCC v. Roque ………………………………………………………….. 46

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CASE TITLE PAGE

32. City of Bacolod v. PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC. ……………………. 48
33. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA …………….. 49
34. Garcia v. Chief of Staff …………………………………………………… 51
35. Callado v. IRRI ……………………………………………………………. 52
36. Merit v. Gov’t of the Philippines …………………………………………. 54
37. Ministerio v. City of Cebu ………………………………………………… 55
38. Republic v. Purisima ……………………………………………………… 56
39. PNR v. IAC ………………………………………………………………… 57
40. ATO v. Ramos …………………………………………………………….. 58
41. Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte ……………………………………… 59
42. UP v. Dizon ………………………………………………………………… 60
43. GSIS v. Group Management Corp. ……………………………………… 62
44. Makati v. CA ……………………………………………………………….. 64
45. Hagonoy v. Dumdum …………………………………………………...... 65

V. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

46. Oposa v. Factora, Jr. ……………………………………………………… 66
47. Villavicencio v. Lukban ……………………………………………………. 69
48. Petitioner Organization v. Executive Secretary ………………………… 70
49. Jaworski v. PAGCOR …………………………………………………...... 72
50. Gerochi v. DOE ……………………………………………………………. 74
51. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato ………………………………………………… 75
52. Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC ……………………………….. 76
53. Millajes v. Ranada ………………………………………………………… 77
54. Agustin v. Edu …………………………………………………………....... 78
55. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion …………………………………………… 79
56. Bayan Muna v. Romulo …………………………………………………… 80
57. Imbong v. Ochoa ………………………………………………………….. 81
58. Tecson v. COMELEC ……………………………………………………… 83
59. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montaño ……………………. 84
60. PT&T Co. v. NLRC ………………………………………………………… 85
61. Paje v. Casiño ……………………………………………………………… 86
62. Cudia v. PMA ………………………………………………………………. 87
63. UP v. Judge Ayson ………………………………………………………… 89
64. PRC v. De Guzman ……………………………………………………….. 91
65. Ondoy v. Ignacio …………………………………………………………… 93
66. PRRRM v. Pulgar ………………………………………………………….. 94
67. Austria v. NLRC ……………………………………………………………. 95
68. UCCP v. Branford United Church of Christ, Inc. ……………………….. 97

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CASE TITLE PAGE

69. Imbong v. Ochoa …………………………………………………………. 99
70. Celdran v. People of the Philippines …………………………………….
100
71. Gudani v. Senga …………………………………………………………. 102
72. Espina v. Exec. Sec. Zamora …………………………………………….
105
73. Betoy v. BOD, NPC …..…………………………………………………….
106
74. Judge Dadole v. COA ……………………………………………………..
107
75. Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commissioners, COA ……......
108
76. Pamatong v. COMELEC ………………………………………………….
109
77. Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato ……………………………………………..
110

VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS

78. Fort Bonifacio Dev. Corp. v. CIR ………………………………………..
111
79. Saguguil v. People …………………………………………………………
112
80. Disomangcop v. Datumanong ……………………………………….......
113
81. Defesor-Santiago v. Guingona …………………………………………..
115
82. PHILJA v. Prado ……………………………………………………………
117
83. COMELEC v. Cruz ………………………………………………………..
118
84. Gonzales v. Office of the President …………………………………….. 119

VII. DELEGATION OF POWERS

85. ABAKADA v. Ermita ……………………………………………………….
121
86. David v. Arroyo ……………………………………………………………..
122
87. Phil Bar Association v. COMELEC ………………………………………
124
88. Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez ………………………. 125
89. Gerochi v. DOE ……………………………………………………………. 127
90. Chavez v. Romulo …………………………………………………………
129
91. People v. Dacuycuy ………………………………………………………..
130

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 92. BOC Employees Association v. Teves …………………………………..
131

VIII. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

93. Aldaba v. COMELEC……………………………………………………….
94. Baguilat v. Alvarez…………………………………………………………..
95. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC……………………………………………..
96. Lico v. COMELEC…………………………………………………………..
97. Aquino v. COMELEC……………………………………………………….
98. Aldaba v. COMELEC………………………………………………………..
99. Navarro v. Ermita…………………………………………………………….
100. Jalosjos v. COMELEC……………………………………………………
101. Mitra v. COMELEC……………………………………………………….
102. Tagolino v. HRET………………………………………………………..
103. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC………………………………………
104. Aquino v. COMELEC……………………………………………………
105. Coquilla v. COMELEC…………………………………………………..
106. Abundo c. COMELEC……………………………………………………
107. PCA v. Gimenez………………………………………………………….
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CASE TITLE PAGE

108. Pobre v. Defensor Santiago…………………………………………

109. People v. Jalosjos…………………………………………………....
110. Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel…………………………………………
111. Trillanes v. Judge Castillo-Marigomen……………………………..
112. Liban v. Gordon………………………………………………………
113. Garcia v. Executive Secretary……………………………………….
114. Padilla v. Alvarez……………………………………………………..
115. Paredes v. Sandiganbayan………………………………………….
116. Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan……………………………..
117. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance…………………………………...
118. Brillantes v. COMELEC………………………………………………
119. Drilon v. De Venecia…………………………………………………
120. Arroyo v. De Venecia…………………………………………………

IX. POWER OF CONGRESS

121. People v. Silton………………………………………………………..
122. Sabio v. Gordon……………………………………………………….
123. Senate v. Ermita………………………………………………………
124. Gudani v. Senga………………………………………………………
125. Neri v. Senate………………………………………………………….
126. Balag v. Senate……………………………………………………….
127. Belgica v. Ochoa……………………………………………………..
128. Araullo v. Aquino III……………………………………………………
129. TESDA v. COA………………………………………………………..

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 130. COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla………………………...………
131. Mandanas v. Ochoa…………………………………………………….
132. Dela Cruz v. Ochoa……………………………………………………
133. Tan v. Del Rosario…………………………………………………….
134. Planters Products v. Fertiphil………………………………………….

X. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

135. Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos………………………………………….
136. Macalintal v. PET……………………………………………………….
137. Pimentel, Jr. v. Committee of Congress………………………………
138. Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo…………………………………………..
139. Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Sec……………………………………..
140. Funa v. Agra……………………………………………………………..
141. Republic v. Sandiganbayan……………………………………………
142. Estrada v. Desierto……………………………………………………..
143. Lagman v. Pimentel…………………………………………………….
144. Zabal v. President……………………………………………………….

XI. POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

145. Almario v. Exec. Sec……………………………………………………..
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CASE TITLE PAGE

146. Banda v. Ermita………………………………………………………
147. In re: Appointment of Valenzuela………………………………….
148. Pimentel v. Ermita……………………………………………………
149. De Castro v. JBC……………………………………………………
150. Domingo v. Rayala…………………………………………………..
151. Drilon v. Lim…………………………………………………………..
152. Banda v. Ermita……………………………………………………..
153. Pichay v. Office of Executive Sec………………………………….
154. DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees……………………………
155. Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board…………………
156. Ampatuan v. Puno……………………………………………………
157. Biraogo v. PTC……………………………………………………….
158. Kulayan v. Tan……………………………………………………….
159. Gonzales v. Abaya……………………………………………………
160. Sanlakas v. Exec. Sec……………………………………………….
161. David v. Arroyo……………………………………………………….
162. Lagman v. Exec. Sec………………………………………………..
163. IBP v. Zamora…………………………………………………………
164. Lacson v. Perez………………………………………………………
165. Lagman v. Pimentel………………………………………………….
166. Lagman v. Medialdea………………………………………………..
167. Gonzales v. Narvasa…………………………………………………
168. Marcoz v. Manglapuz…………………………………………………
169. Borja v. COMELEC………………………………………………….

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XII. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
170. Petitioner Organization v. Exec. Sec……………………………….
171. Villavert v. Desierto……………………………………………………
172. Ifurung v. Ombudsman……………………………………………….
173. Genuino v. De Lima……………………………………………………
174. PHAPI v. Medialdea…………………………………………………..
175. Chavez v. JBC…………………………………………………………
176. De Castro v. JBC………………………………………………………
177. Bengson v. Drilon……………………………………………………...
178. In re: Appointment of Valenzuela…………………………………….
179. In re: Request………………………………………………………….
180. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College…………………………………….
181. Caram v. Segui………………………………………………………..
182. Letter of Arevalo, Jr……………………………………………………
183. Apex Mining v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining………………….
184. Corona v. Senate………………………………………………………
185. Araullo v. Aquino III…………………………………………………….
186. CSC v. Moralde………………………………………………………..
187. Pagdangan v. CA……………………………………………………….
188. Labay v. Sandiganbayan………………………………………………
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CASE TITLE PAGE

189. Tan v. Barrios…………………………………………………………..
190. Gayo v. Verceles………………………………………………………
191. Re: 1989 Election of the IBP………………………………………….
192. Republic v. Sereno……………………………………………………
193. Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman………………………………..
194. People v. Gacott………………………………………………………
195. City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero………………………….
196. Linkaichong v. COMELEC……………………………………………
197. Malacora v. CA…………………………………………………………
198. In re: Problems of Delays…………………………………………….
199. Sps. Marcelo v. Judge Pichay………………………………………...

XIII. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

200. Brillantes v. Yorac……………………………………………………….
201. Funa v. COA…………………………………………………………….
202. Funa v. CSC……………………………………………………………..
203. Gaminde v. COA………………………………………………………

XIV. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

204. PAGCOR v. CA………………………………………………………….
205. CLA v. CA…………………………………………………………………
206. UP v. Regino……………………………………………………………..
207. DOH v. NLRC……………………………………………………………..
208. CSC v. CA…………………………………………………………………

XV. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

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 209. Geronimo v. Ramos……………………………………………………
210. BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC………………………………………….
211. GMA v. COMELEC……………………………………………………….
212. SWS v. COMELEC……………………………………………………….

XVI. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

213. Dela Llana v. COA………………………………………………………..
214. Yap v. COA………………………………………………………………
215. Pacete v. COA…………………………………………………………..
216. Albon v. Fernando………………………………………………………..
217. Funa v. MECO……………………………………………………………
218. Nacion v. COA……………………………………………………………
219. Philhealth v. COA………………………………………………………..
220. Bayani v. COA…………………………………………………………….
221. Geronimo v. COA………………………………………………………..
222. Fernando v.COA………………………………………………………….

XVII. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

223. Corona v. Senate…………………………………………………………
224. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives…………………………………
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225. Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman…………………………………….

226. Lastimosa v. Vasquez…………………………………………………..
227. Disini v. Sandiganbayan……………………………………………….

XVIII. ACADEMIC FREEDOM

228. University of San Agustin v. CA……………………………………….
229. Ateneo de Manila v. Capulong………………………………………..
230. University of San Carlos v. CA………………………………………..
231. UP Board of Regents v. CA……………………………………………
232. Cudia v. PMA……………………………………………………………
233. Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty………………………………………….

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 I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, et.al.
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

FACTS:

In accordance with the privatization program of the government, respondent

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of Manila Hotel. Two bidders vie to acquire the shares: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation (MHC), and Malaysian firm Renong Berhad. The Malaysian
firm outbids MHC during the public bidding. During the pending declaration of
Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, MHC sent a letter to GSIS and matched the
bid price of Renong Berhad. Petitioner also sent a manager’s check as a bid
security which the respondent refused to accept. Petitioner came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner claims that Manila Hotel has become part of the national patrimony and it
is covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art XII, of
the 1987 Constitution applies. Respondents claim that that is merely a statement of
principle and policy and is not a self-executing provision.

ISSUE:

Is the Sec. 10(2), Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution self-executing?

RULING:

Yes. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation is self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing.

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is non-self-executing in
nature because of the tenor of the first and third paragraph of the same section.
However, Court rules that a constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.

Additionally, the Court resolves that the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount,
and the supreme law of the nation. Thus, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by GSIS, lest the rules will be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.

Court rules that respondents cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares of
Manila Hotel to Malaysian corporation Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching
bid of petitioner to purchase the subject 51% of shares.

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 COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL
G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018

FACTS:
In 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, one hundred sixty
four (164) governments, including the Philippines, pledged to achieve, by 2015, the
following six (6) Education for All (EFA) goals: (1) expansion and improvement of
early childhood care and education; (2) universal access to complete free and
compulsory primary education of good quality; (3) equitable access to appropriate
learning and life skills program for youth and adult; (4) improvement of levels of adult
literacy, especially for women; (5) gender parity and equality in education; and (6)
improvement of all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring their excellence.
To be at par with international standards and in line with the country's
commitment in EFA 2015, the Philippine Congress passed the K to 12 Law. The K to
12 Law seeks to achieve, among others, the following objectives: (1) decongest the
curriculum; (2) prepare the students for higher education; (3) prepare the students
for the labor market; and (4) comply with global standards.
One of the salient features of the K to 12 Law is the expansion of basic
education from ten (10) years to thirteen (13) years, encompassing "at least one (1)
year of kindergarten education, six (6) years of elementary education, and six (6)
years of secondary education. Secondary education includes four (4) years of junior
high school and two (2) years of senior high school education.
DOLE, DepEd, TESDA and CHED issued the Joint Guidelines on the
Implementation of the Labor and Management Component of Republic Act No.
10533 (Joint Guidelines). The Joint Guidelines was issued to (a) ensure the
sustainability of private and public educational institutions; (b) protect the rights,
interests, and welfare of teaching and non-teaching personnel; and (c) optimize
employment retention or prevent, to the extent possible, displacement of faculty and
non-academic personnel in private and public HEIs during the transition from the
existing 10 years basic education cycle to the enhanced K to 12 basic education.
The K to 12 basic education was implemented in parts. Universal kindergarten
was offered starting School Year (SY) 2011-2012. In 2012, DepEd started
unclogging the BEC to conform to the K to 12 Curriculum. Thus, DO No. 31 was
issued setting forth policy guidelines in the implementation of the Grades 1 to 10 of
the K to 12 Curriculum. DO No. 31 provides that effective SY 2012-2013, the new K
to 12 BEC, which follows a spiral approach across subjects and uses the mother
tongue as a medium of instruction from Grades 1 to 3, shall be first implemented in
Grades 1 and 7 of all public elementary and secondary schools; and while private
schools are enjoined to do the same, they may further enhance the curriculum to suit
their school's vision/mission.

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ISSUE:
Does the K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31 and/or the Joint Guidelines
contravene provisions of the Philippine Constitution on the following?

a. establishing and maintaining a system of free elementary and high school

education and making elementary education compulsory for all children of
school age (Section 2[2], Article XIV);

b. the right to accessible and quality education at all levels and duty of the State
to make such education accessible to all (Section 1, Article XIV);

c. the primary duty of parents to rear and prepare their children (Section 2[2],
Article XIV);

d. the right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study (Section

5[3], Article XIV);

e. patriotism and nationalism (Sections 13 and 17, Article II, Section 3[1] and [2],
Article XIV);

f. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and as language of

instruction in the educational system (Section 6, Article XIV); and regional
languages as auxiliary media of instruction (Section 7, Article XIV);

g. academic freedom (Section 5[2], Article XIV); and

h. the right of labor to full protection (Section 18, Article II, Section 3, Article XIII
and Section 5[4], Article XIV)

RULING:
No. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

a. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the
Constitution when it made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory.
The Constitution is clear in making elementary education compulsory; and
the K to 12 Law and related issuances did not change this as, in fact, they
affirmed it. The Constitution did not curtail the legislature's power to determine
the extent of basic education. It only provided a minimum standard: that
elementary education be compulsory. By no means did the Constitution
foreclose the possibility that the legislature provides beyond the minimum set
by the Constitution.

b. The Senior High School Voucher program (subsidy given to those who will
enroll in non-DepEd schools) does not force students to enroll in private SHS.
It simply offers a viable alternative to both student and government — to the
student, a subsidized private education; and to the government, decongested
public schools. In conformity with the mandate of the Constitution, to promote

3

 and make quality education accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the
recognition of the State of the complementary roles of public and private
educational institutions in the educational system and the invaluable
contribution that the private schools have made and will make to education.
The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is the State's way of
tapping the resources of the private educational system in order to give
Filipinos equal access to quality education.

c. There is no conflict between the use of MT as a primary medium of instruction

and the right of parents in rearing their children.

While Section 12, Article II grants parents the primary right to rear and
educate their children, the State, as parens patriae, has the inherent right and
duty to support parents in the exercise of this constitutional right. In other
words, parents' authority and the State's duty are not mutually exclusive but
complement each other. In the matter of education, a parent is always the first
teacher. The inclusion in the K to 12 Program of the MT as a medium of
instruction and a subject in the early years of learning is, therefore, not
intended to curtail the parents' right but to complement and enhance the
same.

d. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right of the
senior high school students to choose their profession or course of study. The
senior high school curriculum is designed in such a way that students have
core subjects and thereafter, they may choose among four strands: 1)
Accountancy, Business and Management (ABM) Strand; 2) Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities and
Social Sciences (HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General Academic (GA) Strand.

e. The constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to be violated are non-self-

executing provisions. Section 6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of
Filipino as a medium of official communication is still subject to provisions of
law. Section 15 on arts and culture of Article XIV is not self-executory
because Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and
conservation of our cultural heritage. all sections in Article XIV pertaining to
arts and culture are all non-self-executing, which includes Section 14 on
Filipino national culture and Section 18 on access to cultural opportunities.
Section 17, Article II on giving priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports, and Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are
non-self-executing. Thus, the Court reiterates that these constitutional
provisions are only policies that may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws." The Court reiterates that they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.

f. There is no conflict between the use of the MT as a primary medium of

instruction and Section 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Sections 6 and 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

4

 SEC. 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it
shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and
other languages.

Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the
Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a
medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the
educational system.

SEC. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages

of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.

The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and
shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.

g. The Court does not agree with petitioners that their transfer to the secondary
level, as provided by the K to 12 Law and the assailed issuances, constitutes
a violation of their academic freedom. While the Court agrees, in principle,
that security of tenure is an important aspect of academic freedom — that the
freedom is only meaningful if the faculty members are assured that they are
free to pursue their academic endeavors without fear of reprisals — it is
likewise equally true that convergence of security of tenure and academic
freedom does not preclude the termination of a faculty member for a valid
cause.

h. The constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may

be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically
acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad
and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of
tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest
interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any
form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an
unimpeachable right to continued employment — a utopian notion, doubtless
— but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. It must be stressed
that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any
actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for
whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action
and judicial recognition.

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 Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with COMELEC which asked to amend the
constitution by lifting the term limits of elected public officials. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed petition for prohibition
against the Delfin petition on the grounds of certain arguments, one of them being:
“(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative”.

ISSUE:
(1) Would lifting the term limits of elected public officials be considered as an
amendment?
(2) Can the people directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution?

RULING:
(1) Lifting of the term limits of elected public officials is considered as a
revision.
Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides:

“Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed

by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.”

The Delfin petition does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of,
the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., :”It would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to
one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to
be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision
of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.”

(2) No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution was intended to include or
cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but, as
worded, it does not adequately cover such initiative. Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not a self-executing law. It requires the
intervention of the Congress.

6

 G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent

FACTS:

Raul Lambino, along with a group led by him, commenced gathered signatures
to amend the constitution through Peoples Initiative under Republic Act 6735. After
gathering 6,327,952 signatures, the Lambino group alleged that they gathered the
signatures of 12% of all registered voters, fulfilling the requirements set by Article 17
of the Constitution. They aimed to modify Sections 1-7 of Art 6, Sections 1-4 of Art 7,
and by adding an Art 18. The proposed changes would shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to a unicameral- parliamentary system. On August 31,
2006, the COMELEC denied their petition due to the absence of an enabling law
providing for a manner of amendment through People’s Initiative. COMELEC cited
Santiago v. Comelec which found RA 6735 to be inadequate to implement
amendment by people’s initiative. Various groups and individuals intervened, filing
pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino’s Group’s petition.

ISSUE:

Is the initiative petition filed by the Lambino group an amendment or a revision?

RULING:

The initiative petition by the Lambino group is a revision and not an amendment.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution set forth that amendments may be
proposed directly by the people through initiative. It required at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, to
support such a proposal. The qualitative test to determine if a proposal is an
amendment or revision, thus, requires application. The proposal of the Lambino
group seeks to change Article VI and shift from a bicameral-presidential form of
government to unicameral- parliamentary. Under the qualitative test, it is a revision
rather than an amendment. It requires a change in the structure of the government,
necessitating a change in other sectors of government. RA 6735, therefore, cannot
be used as a basis to support such a move. The petition is dismissed.

7

 II. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA
PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Permanent Court of Arbitration
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as The Philippines,
and the People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as the PRC, both lay
claims to a number of islands in the area internationally known as the South China
Sea. This dispute came to a boil in 2012 when the PRC and the Philippines both had
military vessels stand-off in Scarborough Shoal. After exhausting all diplomatic and
political avenues for a peaceful resolution to the territorial disputes, the Philippines
initiated the dispute resolution mechanism for special arbitration under ANNEX VII of
the UNCLOS in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
The Philippines served the PRC a Notification and Statement of Claim on
January 2013. The PRC responds by reiterating its position on the South China Sea
issues, returns the Notification, and rejects arbitration. The PRC’s deadline to
appoint a second member of the tribunal lapses and The Philippines request ITLOS
President Shunji Yanai to appoint the second member of the tribunal. Stanislaw
Pawlak (Poland) is appointed as the second member. The Philippines then requests
the ITLOs President to appoint the remaining members of the tribunal. The ITLOS
President appoints Jean-Pierre Cot (France), Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto (Sri Lanka)
and Alfred Soons (the Netherlands) to the tribunal. Pinto is further appointed
President of the arbitral tribunal. Ambassador Pinto elects to step down as President
and member of the tribunal. The Philippines requests the ITLOs President to fill the
vacancy. Thomas Mensah (Ghana), also a fomer President of ITLOS, was appointed
member and president of the arbitral tribunal.
The Philippines then amends its Statement of Claim by adding a request to
determine the status of Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC then prevents the rotation
and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin
Shoal). The Philippines writes to the Tribunal to appraise it of the PRC’s recent
actions. The issue being part of its National Interest, Vietnam sends a note verbale
to the tribunal, requesting to be furnished documents relating to the proceedings.
The Philippines agrees to Vietnam’s request and the documents are furnished to the
latter. The Philippines then directs the tribunal’s attention to the PRC’s extensive
reclamation on Johnson Reef and submits photographic evidence from Philippine
intelligence sources. China’s deadline to submit a Counter-Memorial then lapses.
Vietnam requests the Tribunal to furnish it with procedural documents, an action
supported by the Philippines. PRC’s position paper and other communication to the
tribunal lead to the issuance of Procedural Order No. 4 necessitating a hearing on
the question of jurisdiction. The Philippines informs the Court of the PRC’s
reclamation activities at various features in the South China Sea and the harm they
may cause to the marine environment. The Philippines further moves that the
hearing on the merits of the case be moved to the earliest possible date. Japan,

8

Indonesia and Thailand request to send observers for the proceedings. The
Philippines did not object and the same were granted. The Tribunal convened for the
hearing on jurisdiction and admissibility. The Hearing ends and 13 clarificatory
responses are requested from the Philippines on issues raised during the hearing.
The Philippines files its answers to the 13 questions. The Tribunal then appoints Mr.
Grant Boyes (Australia) as the Tribunal’s expert hydrographer to assist in technical
matters. The PRC’s deadline to comment on the Philippine response lapses without
action by the PRC. The PRC then publishes a paper on its non-acceptance and non-
participation in the proceedings. Singapore then requests observer status and the
same is granted. The Tribunal request additional information from the Philippines on
certain annexes on record and the Philippines provides the same. The Tribunal
renders an Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. The Philippines then seeks leave
to present Professors Clive Schofield and Kent Carpenter for expert examination.
The Embassies of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia all request
observer status in the hearing and the Philippines did not object to the same. The
hearings proceed with most observer parties present. The Philippine Agent then
submits it Final Submission in written form, reflecting three amendments. The PRC’s
deadline to file comments on the amendments lapse. The Tribunal decides it would
benefit from further evidence and clarification from independent experts, for which it
appoints Captain Gupreet Singh Singhota (UK) and Dr. Sebastian Ferse(Germany).
The Philippines approves the proposed appointments. The Philippines then submits
amicus curiae brief to the Tribunal regarding Itu Aba (Taiping Island). The Tribunal
then appoints two additional coral reef experts, Professor Peter Mumby (UK and
Australia) and Dr. Selina Ward (Australia). The Tribunal provides the parties with the
expert reports of said individuals. The Chinese Embassy in The Hague argues for
bilateral negotiation and consultation as the preferred mode of settling disputes. The
Tribunal finds it necessary to consult materials from the 1930’s, specifically
Bibliotheque National de France and the Archives Nationales dOutre-Mer (National
Overseas Archives), to gain a more complete picture as to the condition of the
features at that time. The Philippines comments on the materials and a further expert
report from Dr. Motavalli. The PRC sends a letter to the Tribunal on its indisputable
sovereignty on the Nansha Islands, including Itu Aba, as recorded in Geng Lu Bu
(Manual of Sea Routes), and the living conditions on there as proof of the feature
being an island. The Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands sends a note verbale
to the Tribunal requesting the Tribunal to show regard to the rights of Malaysia,
though it did not seek to intervene. It also submits maps preserving its claim, which
the Philippines says are untimely and without merit. The Tribunal advises that it
would issue its ruling on July 12.
ISSUES:
1) Are The PRC’s historic claims, the so called “Nine-Dash Line”, governed
by UNCLOS?
2) If so, are such claims consistent with UNCLOS?
3) Are the features claimed by the PRC above water in high tide?
4) Do the features claimed by the PRC generate a 12-nautical mile territorial
sea?
5) What are the legal classifications of the features claimed by the PRC?
6) Do the Spratly Islands collectively generate maritime zones?
7) Are the Chinese actions in the sea lawful under the Convention?

9

 8) Has the PRC violated the Philippines sovereign rights with respect to its
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf?
9) Does Scarborough Shoal fall under the traditional fishing grounds of the
Philippines?
10) Has the PRC’s reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven
features in the Spratly Islands caused severe harm to the coral reef
environment?
11) Are the actions of the PRC’s law enforcement vessels at Scarborough
Shoal in April and May 2012 lawful?
12) Has the PRC’s recent large-scale reclamation and construction at seven
features in the Spratly Islands since the commencement of the arbitration
aggravated the dispute between the parties?
13) Should the PRC respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under
the Convention and comply with its duties thereunder?

RULING:
The question of pre-existing rights was considered during the negotiations on
the creation of the Exclusive Economic Zones, and a number of states expressed
their view to preserve such in the new zone, which was rejected. The final text of the
Convention, however, gives other states only a limited right of access to fisheries in
the exclusive economic zone, and no rights to petroleum or mineral sources.
China’s claim under historic rights is, therefore, inconsistent with the
Convention. Such rights were extinguished at the time the Convention went in force,
since such rights do not conform to the Convention’s system of Maritime Zones.
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reef (North) and McKennan Reef are high tide features. Subi Reef, Hughes Reef,
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are, on the other hand, submerged
features during high tide in their natural condition. All the identified high tide features,
however, do not generate an exclusive economic zone or a territorial sea since such
features are legally classified as “rocks”.
Because Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are
submerged at high tide and are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of the
PRC, they form part of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines. The Convention is clear in allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines.
Under the Convention, therefore, the PRC’s activities in the South China Sea
violated the Philippines sovereign rights. The PRC had interfered with Philippine
petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine
vessels within its Exclusive Economic Zone, protected and failed to prevent Chinese
fishing vessels from fishing within the Philippine’s Exclusive Economic Zone at
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and constructed installations and artificial
islands at Mischief Reef without authorization from the Philippines.
The Spratly Islands do not generate maritime zones. The Tribunal concluded
that historical enterprises on said features do not constitute habitation, and thus
cannot be used as basis to declare such features as islands capable of sustaining
human activity. Only islands may generate maritime zones.

10

 Scarborough Shoal had long been a traditional fishing ground for people from
the Philippines, the PRC and other countries. Scarborough Shoal, being a high tide
feature, generates a territorial sea. Its waters do not form part of the Exclusive
Economic Zone, and traditional fishing rights were not extinguished by the
Convention. The PRC had violated its duty to respect traditional fishing rights of the
Philippines by halting its access after May 2012.
The PRC has conducted large-scale reclamation and construction of artificial
islands in seven features in the Spratly Islands. These activities have caused severe
harm to the coral reef environment. Such activities violate the PRC’s obligations
under Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention to preserve and protect the marine
environment with respect to the fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species. Chinese fishermen engaged in damaging
harvesting techniques of endangered marine resources of which the PRC was aware
and for which it failed to fulfil their due diligence obligation under the Convention to
stop them.
Furthermore, PRC law-enforcement vessels repeatedly approached Philippine
vessels at high-speed and crossed ahead of them at close distances, creating a risk
for collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel. Such acts constitute
violations of the PRC’s obligations under the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) and Article 94 on the convention
concerning maritime safety.
In addition, the PRC also engaged in large-scale land reclamation and
construction activities since the commencement of the Arbitration proceedings. Such
proceedings do not seek to infringe on any of the parties’ rights, but to reconcile their
different understandings under the Law of the Sea. Since both the PRC and the
Philippines have accepted the Convention and all obligations therein, China should
respect the Philippines rights and fulfil its obligations thereto.

11

 Republic vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 170867 December 4, 2018

Facts:
On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service
Contract No. 38 for the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area known
as Camago-Malampaya located offshore northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the
area led to the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80
kilometers from the main island of Palawan and 30 kilometres from the platform.
On May 7, 2003, the Provincial Government of Palawan filed a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa to declare that the
Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir is part of the territorial jurisdiction of the
Province of Palawan and that the Provincial Government of Palawan was entitled to
receive 40% of the National Government's share in the proceeds of the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas project.
On December 16, 2005, the RTC decided Civil Case No. 3779 in favor of the
Province of Palawan. On February 16, 2006, the Republic challenged the RTC's
December 16, 2005 decision before the Court through a petition for review. On
September 1, 2009 and November 24, 2009, the cases were heard on oral
argument.

Issues: 1) does Palawan have territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya

project?
2) Is the Archipelagic Doctrine applicable of the said case?

Ruling:
1) No, the state owns the Camago-Malampaya reservoir noting that Palawan's
claim is grounded not on ownership but on a revenue sharing scheme Sec 7 Art 10
of the 1987 Constitution. There are no existing laws that include Camago-
Malampaya within the jurisdiction of Palawan, as defined in its organic law, it
comprises merely of islands and the project is located at the waters which form part
of internal waters of the Philippines, entitling the state as its owner.
2) No, Archipelagic Doctrine, as enunciated in the UNCLOS, pertains to the
sovereign state and not within the territory of LGU's water between and surrounding
its islands.

12

 PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS,
VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL
BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA
BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE,
VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON
ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER,
CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW,
MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON,
JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA,
NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING,
VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO
VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011

FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State which was an act
framing of convention zone in 1958 (UNCLOS). Thus, domestically, RA 3046
remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress
amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 compliant with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA
9522 is "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines".
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective
capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or legislators," as the case may be, assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s

13

sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions.
Respondent on the other hand, raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on
petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III,
preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add
that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
ISSUES:
Is RA 9522 unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. RA 9522 is constitutional. It is a statutory tool used to demarcate the country’s
maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine
territory.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], continuous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves. UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span
of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
RA 9522 was enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf.
The petitioners lacked factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violations. In fact, demarcation of baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zones. Such maritime delineation binds
the international community since delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was
necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the
Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and
it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space.

14

 SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA
G.R. NO. 164785. APRIL 29, 2009

FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner‘s remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:
Is Soriano‘s statements during the televised ―Ang Dating Daan part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioner‘s utterances on the viewers‘ fundamental rights as well as
petitioner‘s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‘s suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment.
Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcaster‘s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few,
if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
The SC ruled that ―Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said
that the analysis should be ―context basedǁ and found the utterances to be
obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time
of the show, and the ―G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the
utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the
uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context
that they were used.

15

The SC also said ―that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a ―form of
permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the
power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that ―it is a
sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul
of the free speech clause.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A.
LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 stating that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power, while on March
25, 1986, Proclamation No.3 was issued providing stating that the "new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." Three petitions were filed
thereafter by Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, People's Crusade for
Supremacy of the Constitution, and Councilor Clifton U. Ganay, all of which
questioning the legitimacy of the Aquino government. Atty. Lozano as counsel for
petitioners withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the
question by extra-judicial methods.
ISSUE:
Is the Aquino government legitimate?
RULING:
Yes. The Aquino government was a legitimate government, and the issue at hand is
not a justiciable matter but a matter which belongs to realm of politics where the
people are the judge.
The Court held that the government of President Corazon C. Aquino is not merely a
de facto government, but a de jure government. The community of nations has also
recognized its legitimacy. The people have accepted the Aquino government which
is in effective control of the entire country.

16

 WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, et al., petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

FACTS:
On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, Secretary of Department of Trade and
Industry and a representative of the Philippine government, signed in the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. By signing
the Final Act, the Philippines agreed to submit the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization that require the Philippines, among others, “to place nationals
and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products”. To that effect, the President ratified and submitted the same to the Senate
for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. Hence the
petitioner assailed the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos. (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods”.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Section 19, Art. II, and Sections 10 and 12, Art. XII, all
of the 1987 Philippines Constitution?
RULING:
No, the World Trade Organization does not violate the Sec.19 and Sections 10 and
12 of Article XII of the 1987 constitution.
Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. These
principles in Article II are not self-executing principles.
Additionally, the provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution is
enforceable only into the grants or rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. On
the other hand, the Constitution prejudices only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unjust. It is also in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises and it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity. In other words, the Constitution did
not deliberately pursue this policy.
Moreover, there is no basis that the World Trade Organization will wiped out all local
industries and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy. In fact, World

17

Trade Organization concede the need to protect countries that have weak
economies like the Philippines.
Hence, the court ruled in favor of the respondents. The petition dismissed.

RAMON, RUFFY et. al., petitioners, v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY
et. al., respondents
G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy, Prudente M. Francisco, and Andres Fortus were all part of the
Philippine Constabulary Garrison stationed in Mindoro. After some time, the
Japanese landed in Mindoro, Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of
surrendering, disbanded his company and formed a guerilla unit named Bolo Area.
Francisco and Fortus joined while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan also
joined later on. After some time, Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado effected a change in
command in the Bolo Area, Ruffy and fellow petitioners were relieved of their
position and duties. Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy’s place. Afterwards,
Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado was allegedly slain by the petitioners. The alleged
murder was what gave rise to this trial. Petitioners filed for prohibition, praying that
the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army desist from
further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners before that body.

ISSUES:
1. Were the petitioners still subject to Military Law at the time the offense was
committed which was during Japanese occupancy and the time of war?
2. Were the petitioners right in claiming that the Court Martial did not have the
jurisdiction to try them, and instead, the Supreme Court?

RULING:
1. Yes. Members of the Armed Forces are still under the National Defense Act,
Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation.

2. No. The Court Martial had jurisdiction since it is a method of the executive in
order to implement discipline and correction to the Army and members
thereof, which are under the Executive Branch. The act of unbecoming of an
officer and a gentleman is considered as defiance of the 95th Article of War
which held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they
were operating officers, which made them even more eligible for the military
court’s jurisdiction.

18

 BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN
BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F.
OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011

FACTS:
Then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement) between USA and the GRP. The Agreement aims
to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the GRP and USA from
frivolous harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals. The Ambassador told the Solicitor General that the exchange of diplomatic
notes constituted a legally binding agreement under the international law, and that
under the US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the
US Senate.

ISSUE:
Does the Agreement require concurrence of the Senate in order to be
effective?

RULING:
No. The Court discusses the doctrine of incorporation as expressed in Section
2, Article II of the Constitution wherein Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements" which
is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. An "exchange of
notes" as defined by the United Nations Treaty Collections, is a record of a routine
agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement
consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.
Senate concurrence is not required in this case.

19

 Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP
G.R No. 183591 October 14, 2008

Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their particular peace negotiating panels,
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD among the GRP and the MILF was
not to materialize, but upon the motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their
cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was led
by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of prior agreements between the
two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On
July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

Issue: Is there a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public

concern particularly Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution under a state policy of
full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest of Article II, Sec. 28 of
the 1987 Constitution including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160?

Ruling:
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7,
Article III of the Constitution is in fine balance with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of
the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of bureaucracy to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information requires that its complementary provision on public disclosure
derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable precautions or
limitations as may be provided by law. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,

20

and Republic Act No. 8371. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

III. CITIZENSHIP

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants, vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971

FACTS:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. Lau Yuen Yeung is a Chinese citizen residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching
Ping for a period of one month in the Philippines as she stated in the interrogation
made with her application. On March 13, 1961, she was permitted to come in the
Philippines and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire
on April 13, 1961. Lau Yuen Yeung said that she would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. On
January 25, 1962, she married with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung don’t know how to write either
Tagalog or English and she could not speak either English or Tagalog except for few
words only. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law also.
ISSUE:
Did Lau Yuen Yeung become a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen?
RULING:

21

Yes. On January 25, 1962, Lau Yuen Yeung was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen named Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 provides that:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what
should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but
she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of
age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the
Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership
of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the
principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc. In Philippine
jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that she may
herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons
enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her citizenship status
as a fact.

22

 DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 99358 30 January 1995

FACT:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May
17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the
Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children
with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear
that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the
hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner and her
two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,
Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them. As "guests," petitioner and her two
children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.In
1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section
13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration. Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On
the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. The CID
issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, the
Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her
the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian citizen and her
marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.

ISSUES:
1. Was Djumantan lawfully admitted in the country and did she lawfully acquire
her permanent residency?
2. Did the CID’s power to deport her already prescribed?

23

RULING:
1. No. There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's
entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained
through misinterpretation. Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez
disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary
visitor's visa and for permanent residency in violation of clause 1 of section
37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940. The civil status of an alien applicant for
admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise
of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration
authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to
have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another
woman.
2. Yes. The power to deport her already prescribed. The deportation of an alien
under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be
effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five
years after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec.
37[b]). Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when
Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the
country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of
her deportation on September 27, 1990. Therefore, CID has lost its power to
deport Djumantan.

24

 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live
Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.”
When she was 5 years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for
her adoption and her name was changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." (Grace Poe).
Grace Poe lived in the US and became a naturalized American citizen. Upon her
father’s death, Grace moved and resided back in the Philippines to accompany her
grieving mother. On May 24, 2005, Grace secured a Tax Identification Number, and
purchased a condominium. On February 14, 2006, she made a quick trip to US to
dispose some of her family’s remaining belongings. In March 2006, Grace’s husband
informed the US Postal Service of their abandonment of their address. On July 7,
2006, Grace took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines by virtue
of RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
On October 2012, Grace filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator, stating that she resided in the Philippines since 2006. On October 2015,
Grace filed her COC for Presidency, stating that she has been residing in the
Philippines since May 2005. Her filing for COC triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases.
ISSUE/S:
1. Does being a foundling confer a natural-born status and Filipino citizenship?
2. Did her repatriation under RA No. 9225 bestow upon her a natural-born
citizen status?
3. Did she meet the requirement of 10 years of residency?
RULING:

25

 1. Under Section 4, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, “Evidence must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence of
non-existence.” The question herein is whether Grace’s parents are Filipinos.
Given a statistical certainty that there is a 99% chance that a child born in the
province would be Filipino, and the fact that she exhibits typical Filipino
features, the Court is convinced that she and her parents are Filipinos.
Moreover, the framers of the 1935 Constitution did not include restrictive
language which would exclude foundlings as a class which are natural-born
citizens.
In terms of international law, foundlings are likewise citizens. Foundlings
follow the nationality of the place where they were found.
2. Having been a natural-born Filipino citizen, RA No. 9225 can be used for
Grace’s repatriation. In the case of Bengson III vs. HRET, it was explained
that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
It was also pointed out that there were only 2 categories of citizens in the
1987 Constitution: natural-born and naturalized. There is no third category for
repatriated citizens, because repatriation puts them in either one of the
categories, depending on their status before loss of citizenship.
3. Lastly, the Court ruled that Grace met the requirement of 10 years residency.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention
to abandon the old domicile. There was overwhelming evidence that Grace
met all of the requirements. Her declaration in her COC for Senator that she
started residing in the Philippines on 2006 was a misunderstanding on her
part.

26

 RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
BAR MATTER No. 914, October 1, 1999
FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union
on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. Ching, after
having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio
City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this
Court, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he
must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance with the
above resolution, Ching submitted the following documents: 1. Certification issued by
the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that
Ching is a certified public accountant; 2. Voter Certification issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and 3. Certification,
also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized
elections. When the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching
was one of the successful Bar examinees. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. He was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must

27

concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely:
(a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." The clause
"upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time
after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of
Justice to be three (3) years. Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.
ISSUE:
Did Ching elect Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time”?

RULING:
No, Ching did not elect his Philippine citizenship within a “reasonable time”.
Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.

28

 ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

FACTS:
Jose Ong Jr. was declared by the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
(HRET) as a natural-born Filipino citizen and was a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar. The congressional election for the 2nd district of Northern Samar was held.
The candidates were as follows: Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co (petitioners) and
Jose Ong Jr. (respondent). Ong won the elections and was made congressman.
Co and Balinquit (Co) filed a petition against Ong Jr. on the grounds that Ong Jr. was
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and that Ong Jr. was not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
Ong Jr. was born on 1948, to a natural-born in Laoang, Northern Samar to a Filipino
mother, and a father who became a Filipino citizen through naturalization in 1955.
Ong Jr. was a minor when his father took an Oath to become a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE/s:
1. Was Jose Ong Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen taking into account the
Constitution which was in effect the time of his birth?
2. Did Jose Ong Jr. elect Filipino as his citizenship?

RULING:
1. Yes. Ong Jr. was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Although petitioners
questioned the validity of the respondent’s citizenship through his father, this

29

 collateral approach cannot be done since the father is already dead.
Moreover, according to the HRET: “the citizenship of the father is relevant
only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when
he came of age. At that time when he came of age and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship.”
2. Yes. The Supreme Court cited jurisprudence which defines the process of
election as both formal and informal. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallares,
the Court held that in exercising one’s right to suffrage and the participation in
elections show a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
The issue in this case is about the citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz in view
of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States.
On March 17, 1994 respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On the other hand, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution.
The petitioner then filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:

30

Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Whether or not the HRET (House of Representative Electoral Tribunal) decision has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING:
1. Yes, Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same in the
manner provided by Commonwealth Act No. 63 which enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may reacquired by a former citizen: 1. By
naturalization 2. By repatriation 3. By direct act of congress.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to: desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II;service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time; marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and political
economic necessity. Repatriation therefore results in the recovery of the original
nationality.
Additionally, R.A. No. 2630 Sec 1. provides that any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Cruz then have already been taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
and registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,Pangasinan. Hence,
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
2. No, in accordance with the above provisions commonwealth act no 63 and RA NO
2630 SEC 1., House of Representative Electoral Tribunal does not commit grave
abuse of discretion. In fact, the court ruled that there is no such showing of grave
abuse of discretion in this case. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.

31

 Tecson v Comelec
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

FACTS:
Filipino Citizenship is one of the requirements enumerated by the 1987
Philippine Constitution in order for an individual to qualify for the highest office in the
land. Ronal Allan Kelly Poe filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
President of the Republic of the Philippines on December 31, 2003 under the
Koalisyonng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party for the forthcoming 2004 National
Election. In said document, respondent Poe represented himself to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen under the names of “Fernando Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan Poe”, his date of
birth cited as 20 August 1939 in Manila.
Petitioner Victorino X. Fornier in G.R. No. 161824 sought to compel the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Fernando Poe, hereinafter referred to as FPJ, on the basis of his material
misrepresentation of being a Filipino citizen in said document. In truth, according to
Fornier, FPJ is the child of foreigners, namely Bessie Kelly Poe, an American, and
Allan Poe, a Spanish subject by virtue of being the son of Spanish Citizen Lorenzo
Pou. Granted that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, such could not have been
transmitted to FPJ based on two facts. First, Allan F. Poe is under marriage contract
with a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Kelly Poe. Second, Allan F. Poe
only married Bessie Kelly a year after the birth of FPJ.
In support of his claim, petitioner Fornier presented before the Third Division
of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004 several documentary exhibits, 1) a copy of the
certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish
by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,

32

attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
In response, FPJ presented twenty-two documentary evidences, stating that
the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.
COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit on January 23, 2004. Fornier
filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004, which was denied by the
COMELEC En Banc on February 6, 2004. Petitioner then assailed said decision
before the Supreme Court on February 10, 2004, under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Procedure. The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824, also
prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any
other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.

ISSUE:
Is Ronald Allan Kelly Poe a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as FPJ, is a natural born Filipino citizen.
His grandfather Lorenzo Pou would have been granted Filipino citizenship by the
Philippine Bill in 1902. That citizenship would have extended to Allan F. Poe, father
of FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, under which regime FPJ was born, grants Filipino
citizenship to all people whose fathers are Filipino citizens. That would extend
Filipino citizenship to FPJ.

33

 Mercado vs. Manzano
G.R No. 135083 May 26, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Respondent was then declared the winning candidate; however, its proclamation
was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but
of the United States. In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code provides that persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.

Issue: is dual citizenship a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position?

Ruling:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is unfavorable is not dual
citizenship but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship
in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Therefore, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

34

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization. In an Order dated October
7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of
which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. On January 14,
1992, Frivaldo filed a “Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule” for the reason that
he was planning to participate in May 1992 elections. March 15 was the alleged date
of the deadline of filing of the certificate candidacy which was one day before the
scheduled hearing. The motion was granted wherein the hearing on the petition was
moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof
posted. Six days later after, Juan Frivaldo is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic
of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen. On the same day, he was allowed to take
his oath of allegiance before the respondent Judge.

ISSUE:

35

Whether or not the petitioner was to be duly re-admitted to his citizenship as Filipino.

RULING:
No, the Supreme court ruled that Juan Frivaldo is not to be declared a citizen
of the Philippines and is therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor
of the province of Sorsogon. He was ordered to vacate his office and to surrender
the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. The court found the following irregularities: a.) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; b.) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; c.)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and d.) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-
year waiting period

Republic v. Huang Te Fu
G.R No. 200983 March 18, 2015

FACTS:
On March 19, 2004, respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy – a citizen of the
Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a sworn Declaration of Intent to Become a Citizen
of the Philippines with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
On April 27, 2005, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial
court) a Petition for Naturalization. In the Petition he wrote that he is a Businessman
engaged in the manufacture of zipper, in which I have been connected since 1992,
and from which I derive an average monthly income of P15,000.00. However, he
cannot provide any proof for such claim.

ISSUES:
Did Huang Te Fu comply with all the requirements for naturalization?

RULING:
No. Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires applicants: (a) Must be of
good moral character; (b) Must have some know lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation.
Huang Te Fu did not comply with all the requirements for naturalization. One of the
most effective pieces of evidence to prove employment is a worker’s inclusion in the

36

payroll. With Huang Te Fu’s admission that he is not included in the company’s
payroll only reasonably infers that his alleged employment in his family’s zipper
business was contrived for the sole purpose of complying with the legal requirements
prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, if he is indeed employed
in the family’s business, his non-inclusion if the payroll may be construed as an
intent to evade taxes or to conceal the true nature of his employment and the
amount of salary or income which violates the first requirement for naturalization.
Moreover, respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the
August 2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen – which he did to secure the
seamless registration of the property in the name of his wife – is further proof of
respondent’s lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the constitutional
prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the
applicant to show
full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

FACTS:
Rommel Arnado y Cagoco was a natural born Filipino citizen, who underwent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America. Arnado applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of RA
9225. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced
his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing
the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. Afterwards, Arnado ran for the
position of municipal mayor in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
contending that he is a foreigner and not a resident of the area. He indicated that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing Philippines.
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes. Meanwhile, Casan Macode Maquiling,
another candidate for mayoralty who garnered the second number of highest votes,
intervened in the case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.
ISSUE:

37

Will Arnado’s continued use of US Passport constitute his loss of Philippine
citizenship?
RULING:
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. While
the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
he took. such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as
an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status
as a dual citizen.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time.The League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President,
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States. In his answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. Frivalido claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States.
ISSUE:

38

 Was Frivalido a Citizen of the Philippines at the time of the election?
RULING:
No, Frivalido was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of the election. If
he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, he should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid
repatriation. His claim that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual. It does not appear
that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions —
surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, respondents
G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989
FACTS:
Ramon Labo Jr. (Labo) was elected as mayor of Baguio City in 1988. Luis
Lardizabal, his rival, filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo, claiming that Labo
was an Australian citizen hence, must be disqualified from holding public office. The
Supreme Court found two administrative records regarding Labo’s citizenship: The
first was rendered by COMELEC, finding Labo to be a Filipino citizen; the second
was rendered by Chairman Miriam-Defensor Santiago and Commissioners Alano
and Geraldez of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation which found Labo
to be an Australian citizen, taking into account the statement of the Australian
Government.
Labo married an Australian citizen which, according to him granted him Australian
citizenship. However, in order to fulfill the necessary requirements to become a full
Australian citizen, He also took an Oath of Allegiance. He was subsequently
divorced due to the fact that the marriage was a bigamous one and therefore
assumed that by being divorced, he was reverted back to a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE/S:
1. Is Labo a Filipino citizen?

39

 2. Can Labo retain his public office?

RULING:
1. No. Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization
in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. Labo took an Oath of
Allegiance before Australia while renouncing all other allegiance, he swore
"to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian
citizen."

CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship

may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country,

2. No. Section 42 of the Local Government Code states that an elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines.

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN,
DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN
ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.

Facts:

On February 10,1978, Willie Yu is a Portuguese National who acquired

Philippine citizenship by naturalization. He applied for and was issued a renewed
Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy
notwithstanding of being naturalized citizen. However, his Portuguese passport
expired on July 20, 1986. On the other hand, he also declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed. By then, he was detained by the
CID for obtaining a Portuguese passport upon having a Filipino citizenship.
Moreover, Yu then filed a petition for habeas corpus. The Court en Banc, however
denied the petition. After that, he filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for
restraining order. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Additionally, he filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on

40

December 1988. Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO, the basis of
which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners on December 2, 1988.

On the other hand, the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible

period of three days from notice to explain and prove why he should still be
considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s act constitutes a renunciation which is acquired

through naturalization

Ruling: Yes, the court ruled that Yu’s act was considered as an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Upon acquiring
Philippine citizenship, he continued to be a Portuguese citizen by renewing his
Portuguese passport and declaring himself as a Portuguese commercial documents.
Thus, the court found that such acts are grossly inconsistent with the maintenance of
his Philippine citizenship. Hence, the decision of the court states:

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

FACTS:

Juan Frivaldo received the highest number of votes for the position of
governor in three consecutive elections. However, this court twice declared his
disqualification due to his alien citizenship. Petitioner Frivaldo, however, counters to
have reacquired his lost Philippine citizenship through repatriation.

Petitioner Lee, second placer in the most recent of said elections, argues,
however, that all votes received by petitioner Frivaldo should be considered void. He
further prays that the court declares him to have received the highest number of
votes; or that incumbent Vice Governor Oscar G. Deri should assume the position of
governor inasmuch as the ineligibility of petitioner Frivaldo has caused a permanent
vacancy.

ISSUES:

1) Is Juan Frivaldo’s repatriation valid and legal?

2) From when did Frivaldo reacquire Filipino citizenship?

41

RULING:

1) Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid as petitioner Lee can offer no proof to say

otherwise.
2) Frivaldo’s Filipino citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994.

IV. STATE IMMUNITY

Lasco vs. UN Revolving Fund

241 SCRA 681
Facts:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent,
the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE),
which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. In its Motion to
Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. On November
25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the
ground that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity.

Issue: are specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity?

Ruling:

42

 The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by
the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the
immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. This
is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states
that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character
to which the specialized agency is a party."

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST
REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES
Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA
P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON.
NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN,
PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V.
PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya,
GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A.
CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A.
EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A.
RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT
BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary,
pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN,
Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE,
Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL
JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant,

43

 Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA,
Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO,
Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN.
TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013
Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

FACTS:
On 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed as a world heritage site by (UNESCO) and was
declared as a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino. USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy. The US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, crew
liberty and maintenance to enter and exit the Philippines territorial waters. On
January 17, 2013, the ship ran aground on the Tubbataha reefs about 80 miles east
southeast of Palawan.

Petitioners contends that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of

the USS Guardian continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. Specifically,
petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No.
10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section
21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef
(Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore,
petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which
they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian;
(2) And if the waiver of state immunity applies in this case.

RULING:
1. Yes, they may be held liable. The alleged act or omission committed by USS
Guardian on TRNP while they were performing official military duties resulted
in the unfortunate grounding. The suit is deemed to be one against US itself
considering that the satisfaction of judgement against said officials will require
appropriation of funds and remedial actions by the US government. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
44

 During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through
the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to

enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

Therefore, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is

beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial
sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if
they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable
for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel
operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

2. No, it does not apply. The waiver of state immunity under VFA only pertains to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. The Court considered a
view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province
of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court also found unnecessary at this
point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a

45

 separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging
the same violation of an environmental law.

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL (HUDCC) v.

GONZALO ROQUE
G.R No. 203610 October 10, 2016

FACTS:
In 1978, the Republic, through the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), approached the respondents and asked them to sell a portion of the land at
government-dictated prices lower than the market value. The Republic was
supposed to use the land for President Marcos' National Government Center (NGC)
Project — his plan to bring together the various national government offices in one
venue for greater efficiency and to create additional areas for the expanding needs
of the central government and the people. After several public hearings, the
respondents agreed and signed deeds of absolute sale with the following conditions:
(a) their remaining properties will benefit from the increase in land value after the
construction of the NGC Project and (b) the government will return the sold
properties to them should the NGC Project not materialize.
The Republic did not take possession of all the land it had bought and so the
respondents continue to occupy portions of the sold properties. After several years,

46

informal settlers began to occupy parts of the land, and the respondents felt that the
Republic was reneging on its undertaking to develop the land into the NGC Project.
Hence, Gonzalo sent letters dated March 25, 1987, and September 23, 1988, to then
DPWH Secretary Vicente R. Jayme (Jayme) offering to buy back the properties.
Gonzalo received no response. The respondents' suspicion was confirmed in
December 2003. Armando A. De Castro (De Castro), then undersecretary of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), wrote a letter to
the respondents, requesting them to vacate all portions of the sold land that they
were still occupying, because the government would use the properties for socialized
housing pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9207.
Realizing that the Republic had completely abandoned its initial plan to use
the land for the NGC Project, in 2005, the respondents filed a complaint for the
annulment of the sale of the properties on the grounds of fraud, force, intimidation, or
undue influence. They also asserted their right to buy back the properties at the
same price at which they sold them since the Republic failed to develop the land
according to the original purpose for which it was "expropriated." Alternatively, they
asked for the payment of additional compensation in the amount of not less than
Five Million Pesos.
ISSUE:
Can the Republic invoke its immunity to suit?
RULING:
No. The Republic is not immune from suit in the present case. The Constitution
provides that the State may not be sued without its consent. Consent is given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent is given through a Statute while implied
consent is given when the State enters into a contract of commences litigation. In the
present case, the Republic entered into deeds of sale with the respondents to
construct the NGC Project on the lots sold. The latter agreed to the negotiated sale
on these alleged conditions: (a) that they will have the right to repurchase the
properties if the NGC Project does not push through; and (b) that the NGC Project
will increase the market value of their remaining properties.The State's failure to
abide by these conditions constitutes the State's implied waiver of its immunity. The
Court reiterates that the doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve to
perpetrate an injustice on a citizen. If we rule otherwise, we will be tolerating unfair
dealing in contract negotiation.

47

 THE CITY OF BACOLOD, et al.,
vs.
PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC.
G.R. No. 190289, January 17, 2018
FACTS:
Phuture Visions Incorporated applied with the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (P AGCOR) for an authority to operate bingo games, to which it was
issued a provisional Grant of Authority (GOA). Phuture likewise applied for the
renewal of its mayor’s permit with “professional services, band/entertainment
services”. Upon submission of requirements, Phuture was issued a “claim slip” for it
to claim the actual mayor’s permit. However, the City of Bacolod found discrepancies
in the submitted requirements, wherein the application form was notarized earlier
than the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation to reflect the company's primary
purpose for bingo operations. Aside from this, respondent failed to pay the
necessary permit fee/assessment fee under the applicable tax ordinances of the City
of Bacolod.
Without waiting for the release of the mayor's permit, Phuture started the operation
of its bingo outlet at SM Bacolod. This prompted the former City Legal Officer, Atty.
Allan Zamora, to issue a Closure Order dated March 2, 2007. Phuture claimed that

48

the closure is tainted with malice and bad faith and that City of Bacolod did not have
the legal authority to shut down said bingo operations, especially since PAGCOR
itself had already issued a provisional GOA in its favor. Petitioners contend that the
release of claim slip was mere oversight or human error in the City Government’s
employee.
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the City of Bacolod, which Phuture appealed.
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the court of origin to further investigate
whether, in the manner by which the closure of the bingo operations was effected,
Phuture was denied its proprietary right without due process of law, and to determine
if damages should be awarded.
Petitioners contend that hearing the action for damages effectively violates the City's
immunity from suit.
ISSUE:
Can the City of Bacolod be sued for damages?
RULING:
No. The City of Bacolod has not given its permission to be sued. The CA also erred
in adjudging subject business permit as having been issued by respondent City
Mayor in the performance of proprietary functions. The power to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's proprietary
function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a
governmental act (Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals).

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. petitioners, vs.

FRANCISO A. LAVA, respondents.
FACTS:
VMPSI alleges that Sec. 4 and 17 of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic
because it has an interest in more than one security agency. Respondent VMPSI
likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses
and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief
Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that "all private
security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any
PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located .
. ." As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it
allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
49

 A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief,
which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of
security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of
Metro Manila. Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing
VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services
rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging
said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum
of Agreement.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO
Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA made
similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license.
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership
to VMPSI when it requested one.
As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI’s license was expiring near to its
expiry date, VMPSI filed Civil Case in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135 against the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA. On the same day, the court issued a restraining order
enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license". The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a
"Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and
Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the case is
against the State which had not given consent thereto. VMPSI reiterated its
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA
had rejected payment of the penalty for its failure to submit its application for renewal
of its license and the requirements therefor within the prescribed period in Section
2(e) of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended by
P.D. 1919.

ISSUE:
Was VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA a suit against
the State without its consent?

RULING:
Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that,
being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily
governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially
in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public
respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and
compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the
same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents.

50

Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
(Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as
part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery
may be had against them in their private capacities.
The Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the PC Chief in relation
to the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test for the application
of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature
of the act.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.
In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC
Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize
the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services,
clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to
the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies.

MARIANO E. GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF and THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BOARD
and/or THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-20213, January 31, 1966

FACTS:
Garcia underwent a 10-month military training at camp Flordiablanca in
Pampanga, during which he suffered injuries. Garcia filed a complaint against the
Chief of Staff, Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board and or the Auditor General, under
Commonwealth Act 400, to claim money for his disability benefits.
The claim was denied with the Adjutant General stating that CA 400 had
already been repealed by CA 610. The Philippine Veterans Association and The
51

Chief of Staff of the AFP filed motions to dismiss the dispute, claiming that the court
had no jurisdiction. The lower court dismissed Garcia’s claim.

ISSUE/S:
Was the lower court right in dismissing Garcia’s claim?

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance did not have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a money claim against the government. The Court
held in the case of New Manila Lumber v. Republic that a claim for money, or
recovery thereof, against the government must be filed with the Auditor General. The
rationale behind this is that the State cannot be sued without its consent.
CA 327 states that:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other
than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall exact and decide
the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their
presentation.
Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in
the settlement of an account or claim, may within 30 days from receipt of
decision, take an appeal in writing to the Supreme Court, if appellant is a
private person or entity.

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995

ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner,

vs.
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, respondent.

Facts:
Ernesto Calladowas employed as a driver at the IRRI, figured in an accident
while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back.
He was later informed that a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager charged him with:
1.Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
2. Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure
of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery and

52

 3. Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Callado submitted an answer and defenses to the charges against him. IRRI
then issued a Notice of Termination to himon Dec 7, 1990
Callado filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. The IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys
immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620. It
also invoked its diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization
as validly subsisting as it made no waiver of such.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter cited an Order
issued by the IRRI to the effect that "in all cases of termination," IRRI then waives its
immunity, and considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in
resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in Callado’s appeal and, found that IRRI did not waive
its immunity. It ordered the decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint
dismissed.
Callado now seeks relief before the Court, arguing that the immunity of the
IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620 may not be invoked in the present case since such has been waived through
the Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation
to P.D. 1620.
ISSUE:
Did IRRI waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship?
RULING:
No, According to P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 Immunity from Legal Process. The
Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General
of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The Supreme Court justifies the constitutionality of the above mentioned law.
The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct
division of the IRRI, was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of waiver
in all cases arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI's letter to the
Labor Arbiter in the case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no intention of
waiving its immunity, at the very least, supplants any pronouncement of alleged
waiver issued in previous cases.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver
by its Director-General is the only way by which it may give up this immunity.The
dismissal of employees in such institute is optional on its part. Therefore, the petition
for certiorari is dismissed. No cost.

53

 Merrit v. Gov’t of the Phil
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
FACTS:
E. Merrit, while riding a motorcycle, was hit by an ambulance of the General
Hospital. He sustained severe injuries that rendered him unable to work. The
Philippine legislature then enacted ACT 2457, authorizing Merrit to file a suit against
the government of the Philippine Islands to exact its responsibility for the accident,
and to determine the amount of damages he is entitled to, if any. The Court of First
Instance found the accident to be due to the negligence of the ambulance driver. It
determined damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
In enacting Act 2457, did the government simply waive its immunity, or did it also
concede liability to Merrit?

RULING:

54

 Act 2457 simply waived the government’s immunity from suit. It is not an
admission of fault, but merely a submission to the court’s authority.

Ministerio vs. City of Cebu

40 SCRA 464
Facts:
Ministerio and company sought the payment of just compensation for a
registered lot before Court of First Instance of Cebu, in a complaint dated April 13,
1966., They alleged that in 1927, the National Government, through its authorized
representatives, took physical and material possession of the land and used it for a
road widening project. No just compensation was made to the landowners, and no
agreement to subsequently effect such was ever given. The National Government
invokes State Immunity, and prays that the complaint be dismissed due to a lack of
authorization to bring suit against the State. The lower court dismissed the petition.
This petition for certiorari asks the Court to review the decision.
Issue: Is the decision of the Court of First Instance, correct?
Ruling:

55

 No. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot result from
perpetration of injustice. If there was an observance of procedural regularity, giving
what is right to the petitioners given that their lot was accommodated for public use,
then petitioners would not be in sad plaint. Wherefore, the lower court’s decision
dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for
proceedings in accordance with law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, the Presiding Judge of the court of first
Instance of Manila (Branch VII), and YELLOW BALL FREIGHT LINES, INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977

FACTS:

On September 7, 1972, a motion to dismiss was filed by Rice and Corn

Administration in a pending civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from
an alleged breach of contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala and
defendant Rice and Corn Administration. Justice Bengzon in Mobil pointed out that
56

for the consent to be effective, it must come from the State acting through a duly
enacted statute. Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass
on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of
the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other
decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s decision is valid.

RULING:
NO, the provision of the Constitution Particularly Article XVI, Section 3 states that
“The State may not be sued without its consent." The consent, to be effective
though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed
out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and
Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was
clearly beyond the scope of his authority. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in
this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical
corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the
assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on
which such a right may be predicated. Even if such a principle does give rise to
problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage
in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability.”

PNR vs IAC
217 SCRA 401
FACTS:
A passenger bus, driven by Romeo Hughes, of Baliwag Transit, Inc. going to
Hagonoy, Bulacan from Manila while crossing the railroad crossing as Barrio
Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan got stalled and was hit by a passenger express train of
Philippine National Railways (PNR) operated by Honorio Cirbado bound for Manila.
The collision caused damages to the bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and
53 others suffered physical injuries. On one hand, Baliwag Transit alleging that the
negligence and imprudence of PNR and its locomotive engineer, Carbado, in
operating its train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaohores, signal lights,
flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train is the proximate cause
of the collision. On the other hand, PNR alleged that the collision was caused by the
negligence an imprudence of the bus driver, Hughes.

57

 PNR is purely government owned and controlled corporation duly registered
and existing virtue of Presidential Decree No. 741, with capacity to sue and be sued,
and is likewise engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by trains and
buses.
ISSUES:
Can PNR invoke the doctrine of state immunity?
RULING:
No. PNR though fully owned and controlled by the Government cannot invoke
state immunity. Even if not stipulated in the law governing the creation and
rehabilitation of PNR, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the capacity to
transact private business. Moreover, PNR is characterized as a private entity created
not to discharge a governmental function but, among other things, to operate a
transport service which is essentially a business concern, and thus barred from
invoking immunity from suit.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011

FACTS:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos owned a land in Baguio City. They have
discovered that a portion of this land was being used as part of the runway and
running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by Air Transportation Office
(ATO). Spouses Ramos and ATO agreed after negotiations to convey the affected
portion by deed of sale to the ATO, however ATO failed to pay despite repeated
verbal and written demands. The spouses filed an action for collection against the
ATO and some of its officials in the Regional Trial Court. ATO invoked that President
Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the Ramos’ affected
portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction

58

to entertain the action without the State’s consent because the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
ISSUE:
Could ATO be sued without the State’s consent?
RULING:
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized. In this case, the juridical character of ATO is an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that
was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Their actions
were propriety in nature.
Therefore, ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. Also, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim
for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the
proper expropriation proceedings

LEONARDO PALAFOX, petitioner, vs. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, THE

DISTRICT ENGINEER AND THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, respondent.
G.R. No. L-10659, January 31, 1958
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissed plaintiffs' claim against
the above appellees for damages arising from the death of their father Proceto
Palafox, who had been run over by a freight truck driven by Sabas Torralba. Torralba
was a chauffeur of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to the office of
the District Engineer; he drove the motor vehicle along the National Highway in
compliance with his duties as such. Prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence, Sabas Torralba pleaded guilty and was accordingly sentenced.
Having reserved their right to file civil action, the heirs subsequently began
these proceedings against the employer the province, the District Engineer, the
Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Torralba. Upon a motion to dismiss, the Hon. Fidel

59

Villaneuva, Judge, quashed the case against the defendants, except Sabas
Torralba.
ISSUE:
Is the Province of Ilocos Norte also liable for the death of Proceto Palafox?
RULING:
No. The municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the
performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their
governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments.
A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its
corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial
property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability
to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into,
may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or
agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to the
same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the
principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the
municipality is made liable to suits in the courts. Here we see that if the negligent
employee was engaged in the performance of governmental duties, as distinguished
from corporate or proprietary or business functions the government is not liable.
The construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities. The death
of Palafox - tragic and deplorable though as it may be – imposed on the province no
duty to pay monetary compensation. The reason for the exemption according to Mr.
Justice Story is that the Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve in all
its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and loses which would be
subversive of the public interest.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN,

RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO
S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO
DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012

FACTS:
The University of the Philippines entered into a General Construction
Agreement with Stern Builders Corporation for the construction of several buildings
in the UP Los Baños Campus in Laguna. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings to UP.
UP was able to pay 2 of these billings, but failed to do so on the last one due to the
60

disallowance of the Commission on Audit. When CoA lifted the disallowance, UP still
failed to pay so, Stern Builders sued UP.
RTC decided in favor of Stern Builders and ordered UP to pay the former.
Upon appeals to the RTC, CA, and the High Court, the decision became final. Stern
Builders filed a motion of execution with RTC. RTC granted this. The Sheriff of the
RTC served notices of garnishment to Development Bank (one of UP’s bank). The
funds were then ordered to be released by the RTC. UP filed with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE/S:
Did the RTC and CA err by allowing UP’s funds to be garnished?
RULING:
YES. The garnishment of UP’s funds was not valid, the funds being that of the
government.
The UP was founded on June 18, 1908 through Act 1870. Despite UP’s
establishment as a body corporate, UP remains to be a "chartered institution"
performing a legitimate government function. All the funds going into the possession
of UP, including any interest coming from the deposit of such funds in any bank,
constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the
COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character.
Therefore, UP’s funds could not be validly garnished.
The judgment rendered against UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. In the case of Municipality
of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, the Court held that there is a clear distinction
between Suability and Liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that
a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by
the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive
its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that
the defendant is liable.”
RTC and CA ignored the legal restrictions on trust funds of the Government
and its agencies and instrumentalities which were to be used to fulfill the purpose of
the trust funds EXCEPT upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of
the government agency which handles the funds.
Congress authorization was required before the judgment that rendered the
UP liable for moral and actual damages would be satisfied considering that such
monetary liabilities were not covered by the "appropriations earmarked for the said
project." The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

61

 GSIS vs GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP. et. al. (JUNE 8, 2011)
GR NO 167000 , GR NO 169971
FACTS:
Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation6 (LLDHC) was the registered
owner of seventy-eight (78) lots (subject lots), situated in Barrio Marigondon, Lapu-
Lapu City.
Subsequently, LLDHC and the GSIS entered into a Project and Loan
Agreement for the development of the subject lots. GSIS agreed to extend a Twenty-
Five Million Peso-loan to LLDHC, and in return, LLDHC will develop, subdivide, and
sell its lots to GSIS members. To secure the payment of the loan, LLDHC executed a
real estate mortgage over the subject lots in favor of GSIS. However, LLDHC failed

62

to fulfill its obligation as a result GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. As the only one
bidder in the public auction sale, GSIS acquired the subject lots and was able to
consolidate its ownership over the subject lots with the corresponding transfer
certificates of title issued in its name.
GMC offered to purchase on installments the subject lots from GSIS for
P1,100,000 with an area of 423,177 square meters. By then, GSIS accepted the
offer and executed a Deed of Conditional Sale. However, the GMC found out that
the measurement of the area was only 298,504 square meters. GMC then wrote to
GSIS to reduce the purchase price of the said subject lots. GSIS approved and
amend the Deed of Conditional Sale.
Moreover, LLDHC filed a complaint against GSIS before the Manila RTC
for the Annulment of Foreclosure with the Writ OF Mandatory injunction. On the
other hand, GMC also filed a complaint against GSIS for Specific Performance with
Damages before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. As a defense, GSIS submitted to the
court a Commission on Audit Memorandum dated April 3, 1989, disallowing in audit
the sale of the subject lots for "apparent inherent irregularities," and the sale price to
GMC being lower than GSIS’s purchase price at the public auction.
The RTC Lapu-Lapu City decision was in favor of GMC, which indicates that
GSIS should execute the final deed of sale and deliver certificates of 78 parcel of
lands, also to pay actual damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
Consequently, Manila RTC then rendered its decision, annulling the foreclosure by
the GSIS the mortgage of 78 parcel of lands, also cancelling the consolidated
certificates in the name of GSIS and change it to the name of GMC and ordering
GMC to pay the sum of P9,200,000 with interest of 12 percent, and so upon full
payment of GMC, GSIS should execute a proper release of discharge of mortgage.
Additionally, after the decision of Manila RTC,LLDHC used it as a means to
file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 2203-L, however, it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Afterwards,
several petitions were filed to appeal the judgment. After various years, the three
parties approached the Supreme Court, wherein GSIS seeks to reverse and set
aside the decision made on November 25, 2004 and January 20, 2005, and to annul
and set aside the March 1, 2004 and May 7 2004 orders from the Lapu-Lapu RTC in
Civil Case No. 2203-L. And, GMC seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision made
in September 23, 2005 and to annul and set aside the March 11, 2004 Lapu-Lapu
RTC decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the decision of the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429
constitutes a supervening event, which should be admitted as an exception to the
doctrine of finality of judgments.
2. Whether or not the September 23, 2005 Decision of the Special Nineteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 and GSIS’s Petition in
G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res judicata.

63

 3. Whether or not there is a legal and physical impossibility for GSIS to
comply with the March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 Orders of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in
Civil Case No. 2203-L.
4. Whether or not LLDHC and GSIS are guilty of forum shopping.
RULING:
The decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L has been
finalized on January 28 and Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 became final
on May 30, 1997 this means however that both courts does not affect each other’s
decision. Consequently, that there was no immediate dismissal of their cases before
they were heard by the respective courts, even if they have already had a rendered
decision. On the other hand, the Supreme Court considered the doctrine of “Finality
of Judgment,” which means that if the decisions are final and executed it cannot be
appealed, unless of circumstances that happen after the finalization, void judgments
and correction of clerical errors.
On the other hand,the decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in
167000 are barred by Res Judicata, which is one of the reasons why G.R. No.
167000 was denied. GSIS entered into a contract, then they are liable for their
irresponsibility. They are not immune from acting out the orders of the court.
Therefore, the SC ruled the petition in G.R. No. 167000 is DENIED and the
Decision dated November 25, 2004 and Resolution dated January 20, 2005 of the
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No.
169971 is GRANTED and the Decision dated September 23, 2005 of the Special
Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Makati v CA
190 SCRA 206
FACTS:
The Municipality of Makati filed Civil Case No. 13699, an action for eminent domain,
over the property of ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC
(ADFCCI). The municipality opened Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 with the PNB
Buendia Branch under its name containing P417,510.00 for payment to the
landowner, in accordance with Presidential Decree 42. After a hearing, a judge
appraised the property value as P5,291,666.00 and ordering petitioner to pay this
amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 earlier released to ADFCCI.

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ADFCCI moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, and garnishment of the
municipality’s PNB accounts, namely:

(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 —created exclusively for the expropriation of the
subject property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94, and;

(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory obligations and other purposes of
the municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.

The Municipality of Makati claimed only the first account may be garnished:

ISSUE:

Can Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 be garnished?

RULING:

No. Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 contains public funds of the Municipality of
Makati. It is established that government funds cannot be subject to levy and
execution, unless expressly provided for by law. Municipal properties cannot be
attached and sold at auction to satisfy its obligations. Municipal revenues from taxes
and other fees are reserved exclusively for its operational activities and functions,
and are exempt from execution. Unless the municipal council expressly allocates the
funds for such purpose, it cannot be used to satisfy such.

Hagonoy vs. Dumdum

March 22, 2010

Facts:
Lim Chao (Chao) filed a complaint against the Municipality of
Hagonoy,Bulacan for the collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint
alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the
delivery of motor vehicles. Such vehicles were apparently being needed to carry out

65

certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to
the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5, 820,000.00.

Despite the completion of the deliveries, however, the Municipality allegedly

did not heed Lim Chao’s claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full
payment of the said amount, with interest and damages. She also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the Municipality. The trial court
issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the claim on which the action had been brought was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written
contract or document that would show the supposed agreement they entered into
with respondent.

Additionaly, the Municipality filed a Motion to Dissolve or Discharge the Writ of

Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking, among others, immunity of the
state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation, it is immune
from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment.
Lim Chao counters that the Municipality’s claim of immunity from suit is negated by
the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power to
sue and be sued.

Issue:
Is the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of
Hagonoy valid?

Ruling:
No. When the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties through
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. The power of the court ends when
the judgment is rendered.

V. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,

66

 minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO
and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented
by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP
JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case are all minors duly represented by their parents.
The complaint was filed as a taxpayer’s class suit before the Regional Trial Court
against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Petitioners asseverate that they represent their generation as well as the future that
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of ecological balance and
have resulted to environmental hazards. Petitioners prayed for cancelation of all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs because
according to them it affects the health of our ecology and it is our right to have a
healthy environment. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the

67

ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question.

ISSUE/S:

1. Are the plaintiffs entitled to have a cause of action?

2. Can the SC review the complaint considering it is a political issue?

RULING:

1.) Yes. Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be
the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising
the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-
stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192
and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of
the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted. After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

2.) Yes.Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for
the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court
to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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 Villavicencio vs. Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

FACTS:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief
of Police, took custody of about 170 women who are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc at the night of October 25 without

69

the latter’s consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where
they were signed as laborers.
ISSUE:
Is the mayor of Manila, Justo Lukban authorized by law to deport the prostitutes
against their will?

RULING:
Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is
the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit
to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise
of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882].
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to
a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On
the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law
or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence. Furthermore, the
prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights as every other citizen. Their choice of profession
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite
uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate
themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of
their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished.

Petitioner-Organizations, namely: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA

SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN),
COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR), BUKLOD NG MALAYANG
MAGBUBUKID, PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA
(PAKISAMA), CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM, EMPOWERMENT AND
TRANSFORMATION (CARET), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKSK); Petitioner-Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE
LORETA ANN ROSALES; and Petitioner-Individuals, namely: VIRGILIO V.
DAVID, JOSE MARIE FAUSTINO, JOSE CONCEPCION, ROMEO
ROYANDOYAN, JOSE V. ROMERO, JR., ATTY. CAMILO L. SABIO, and ATTY.

70

 ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), and UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
(UCPB), Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012

FACTS:
In 1975, President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition
of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to
promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy. The Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank to United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
In 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961, the Coconut Industry Code,
which provided that surpluses from the Coconut Consumers Stabilization (CCS)
Fund and the Coconut Industry Development (CID) Fund collections, not used for
replanting and other authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of
stock of corporations, including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in
undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil industries. UCPB was to make such
investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut farmers. These
investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also
provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned by the
coconut farmers in their private capacities.

ISSUE:
Are the coco-levy funds public funds?

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the coco-levy funds were public funds. These funds
were raised pursuant to law to support proper governmental purpose. They were
also in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. The funds
sought to support the coconut industry. The declaration of P.D. 961 of the coco-levy
funds as private property of the farmers was void. Section 2 of PD 755 also ignored
the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds and raised through taxation, and since
taxes cannot be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private
properties. Thus, the Court declared both PDs unconstitutional.

71

 SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND
GAMES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004

FACTS:

72

 PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under
Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos where it
declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance
such as clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming
pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an
instrument denominated as "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming", which granted Sports and Games and
Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports
Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to
service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR,
appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and
fairness of the games.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition,
praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He
maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet.
He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D.
1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree
could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its
enactment the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international
network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under
any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section
10 of P.D. No. 1869.
ISSUE:
Did PAGCOR act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted authority to
sage to operate gambling activities in the internet?
RULING:
Yes, PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on
or shared its franchise to SAGE.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the
government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as
the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that
prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the
former grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations
and Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the
privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a
gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right

73

and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its
activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise
and strictly adhere to its terms and conditionalities.
A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the common
good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives are subject to the laws
of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of
the State to inquire how these privileges had been employed, and whether they have
been abused.

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST

CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES
GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), Respondents.
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007

74

FACTS:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist
Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) assail the Constitutionality of Republic Act 9136
known as the “"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the
Universal Charge. Their reason being that it is an undue delegation of the power of
taxation.
Section 34 states in part that the ERC will determine and then collect the
universal charge which will be managed by the PSALMP Corp. through the creation
of a special trust fund and shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the
following purposes: The payment of government debts; missionary electrification;
equalization of taxes applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy as well
as imported energy; an environmental charge which shall accrue to an
environmental fund to be solely used for watershed rehabilitation and management;
and a charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding 3
years.
ISSUE/S:
1. Is the Universal charge under Sec. 34 of EPIRA a tax?
2. Was there an undue delegation of the power of taxation to the ERC?
RULING:
1. No. The Universal charge under Sec. 34 of EPIRA is not a tax, but an
exaction in the exercise of the State's police power; public welfare is
promoted.
2. No. The Universal charge was enacted under the regulatory duties of the
ERC, it is not for the generation of revenue but merely an execution of the
State’s police power via regulation. The ERC in this case is only a specialized
administrative agency which is tasked with executing a subordinate legislation
issued by congress. It is worthy to note that the Court finds the EPIRA, read
and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards,
meaning it is not by any means unconstitutional.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

75

 The PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO on January
25,1995. The rental is 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually. Thirty percent of the net receipts was given to charity and the term
lease is for 8 years.

Additionally,PCSO must employ its own personnel and responsible for the
facilities. Immediately after the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the
equipment for P25 million. On Feb. 21, 1995, a petition was filed to declare ELA
invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner&apos’s
Contention.It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2 of Art.
9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has
become the law of the case.

Consequently, respondents replied that ELA is different from the Contract of

Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous
is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners
seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract

ISSUE:
WHETHER Whether or not the petitioners Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal
standing to sue?

RULING:

No. Stare Decisis cannot apply. Considering that no constitutional issues were
actually involved, the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest.On the other hand, law of the case cannot also
apply, since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the
law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law
and here no constitutional question is actually involved. Hence, petitioners had no
legal standing to sue.

Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization incorporated in 2003 which applied as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) 7941 of the Paryy-List System Act. It is

76

composed of men and women identifying as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans-
gendered (LGBT) individuals. It first applied for registration with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in 2006, but was denied for a lack of substantial member
base. On August 17, 2009 it applied again for COMELEC accreditation. It argued
that LGBT’s are a marginalized sector of society regularly subjected to exclusion,
discrimination and violence. COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed their petition on
moral grounds citing passages from the Bible and the Koran.
The COMELEC Law Department also argued that ANG LADLAD is contrary to
Articles 695 and 1306 of the Civil Code, and punishable under Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
Is Ang Ladlad LGBT Partylist qualified to register under the partylist
system?
RULING:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partylist is qualified to register under the partylist system.
Comelec’s citation of Bible and Koran verses in denying the group’s registration is
violative of the non-establishment clause laid out by Article 3 Section 5 of the
Constitution. The law provides for a secular definition of that clause. Comelec has
failed to present any proof exempting LGBT’s of their constitutionally vested right to
political participation.

Mijares vs. Ranada

455 SCRA 397

77

Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a legal judgement in their
favor against the estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos. The US District Court of
Hawaii granted them 1.9 Billion U.S. dollars in compensatory and exemplary
damages for tortuous violations of international law during the Marcos presidency.
This judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the
enforcement of the final judgment. The estate of Marcos however, filed a Motion to
Dismiss, alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court
of Makati dismissed the complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of
monetary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering
the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 million
Philippine pesos, which petitioners had not paid.

Issue: is the enforcement of a foreign judgment incapable of pecuniary estimation?

Ruling:
The enforcement of a foreign judgment is capable of pecuniary estimation.
There is a distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. An action in rem is when the foreign judgment is considered definite upon
the title. In action in personam, on the other hand, the foreign judgment is
presumptive of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
succeeding title. The party aggrieved by the foreign judgment, therefore, is entitled to
defend against the enforcement of such a decision in the local forum. It is essential
that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, so that local
courts will have the opportunity to determine its efficiency.

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.

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 HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner;
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense;
HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his
capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
G.R. No. L-49112 January 30, 2009

Facts:
Letter of Instruction No. 229 was issued by President Marcos which states that all
drivers of vehicles neither owners and users shall have a pair of early warning device
(EWD) in their cars. Petitioner assailed that the Letter of Instruction violated the
Constitution guarantee of due process against the respondents, the implementing
rules and regulations was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months.
Petitioner allege that EWD is not anymore necessary because vehicles already have
hazard lights that can be use as warning device. Also petitioner contended that the
Letter of Instruction violated the delegation of police power because it is deemed
harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will
become instant millionaires because of such law.

Issue:
Are the contentions of the Petitioner possessing merit?

Ruling:
The exercise of police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure
and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Therefore, petitioner’s
contentions are without merit. Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote
public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a
instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual
foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where
there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that
constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital
statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As
signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country
must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that “the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of
the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use
of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create
a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law.
Petitioner’s allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is
deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The
restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making
the said law immediately executory.
Secretary of Justice v Lantion

79

 G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000

FACTS:
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. Consequently, the Justice
Secretary designate and authorize a panel of attorneys to take charge of the case.
Mark Jiminez, through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting
for copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government and that he be
given enough time to comment on the extradition request. However, Justice
Secretary denied the request in conformity with the Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty stating that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of an extradition request.

ISSUE:
Is a citizen’s basic due process rights or uphold the government’s obligations under
a treaty?

RULING:
The human rights of person and the rights of the accused to due process
guaranteed in our Constitution shall take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in
our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law
in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution.

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN

BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner,
80

 vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F.
OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011

FACTS:
Then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement) between USA and the GRP. The Agreement aims
to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the GRP and USA from
frivolous harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals. The Ambassador told the Solicitor General that the exchange of diplomatic
notes constituted a legally binding agreement under the international law, and that
under the US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the
US Senate.

ISSUE:
Does the Agreement require concurrence of the Senate in order to be
effective?

RULING:
No. The Court discusses the doctrine of incorporation as expressed in Section
2, Article II of the Constitution wherein Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements" which
is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. An "exchange of
notes" as defined by the United Nations Treaty Collections, is a record of a routine
agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement
consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.
Senate concurrence is not required in this case.

81

 JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in
behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. A perusal of the
foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on that RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation
of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.
ISSUE
Is the RH law violative of Article II, Sec. 12 of the Constitution?
RULING:
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population
growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the
parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making.
By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and
barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the
marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution. Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a
private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they

82

would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo
the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive
unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right.
Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy
with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held
Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that
the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit
in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.

83

 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON AND FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., PETITIONERS,
VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (A.K.A.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) AND VICTORINO X. FORNIER, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 161434, March 03, 2004
FACTS:
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President. In his certificate of candidacy, he claimed
to be a natural-born citizen born August 20, 1939 in Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition against FPJ stating that he is not a natural-
born citizen because his mother was an American, and his father, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. For the sake of argument,
Fornier contended that even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Will identifying the legitimacy of FPJ be relevant?
RULING:
Yes. Not only because of the fact that it can strengthen (or weaken) FPJ’s
case, but also because the legitimacy and illegitimacy of children are issues that deal
with the family as a basic social unit.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states in part that The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.
Human biology is such that, as a scientific fact, the identity of the mother is
immediately known at birth, but that of the father is not. To manage this uncertainty
as well as preserve, protect and promote the family as a social institution, the law
steps in and creates certain strong presumptions as to paternity.

84

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Immediately after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted
to the death of their unborn child. Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and also a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union.
Consequently, Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for
paternity leave but his claims were denied for bereavement leave and other death
benefits which consist of the death and accident insurance. They presumed that the
express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his
unborn child?

RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.The Court highlighted that
bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid
to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss
arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of
38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child
was born alive but died subsequently.
On the other hand, the court also said that life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even
a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.

85

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997

FACTS:
On May 26, 1991, Grace de Guzman (Grace) entered into a marriage. After
some time, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) contracted her as
a probationary employee from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and July 19, 1991 to
August 8, 1991. On August 8, 1991, the company ended her employment, as per the
contract.

On September 2, 1991, PT&T again asked Grace to join the company, for a
probationary period of 150 days. In the job application the company required her to
fill up, she indicated her civil status to be single. PT&T discovered her
misrepresentations, and found that she also applied this to the reliever agreements
she signed June 10 and July 8 of that year. PT&T Baguio branch supervisor Delia M.
Oficial sent a Memorandum dated January 15, 1992 to Grace. It required her to
explain the discrepancy, and reminded her of the company policy against hiring
married women.

In a letter dated January 17, 1992, Grace explained her ignorance of the
company policy. She also stated that she did not deliberately hide her civil status.
PT&T was not convinced of her argument, and dismissed her from the company on
January 29, 2002. Grace then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with a claim for
non-payment of Cost of Living Allowance, before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City.

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando ruled Grace to

have been illegally dismissed, after she attained the status of regular employee. He
found her as having been discriminated upon due the marriage she contracted in
violation of company policy. He ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of back
wages and cost of living allowances.

PT&T appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. NLRC
upheld and modified the decision by imposing a three-month suspension on Grace
for the dishonest nature of her acts. PT&T appealed the NLRC decision, but was
denied. PT&T then filed a special civil action assailing the decisions of the Labor
Arbiter and NLRC.

ISSUE:
Is PT&T’s policy of not hiring married women lawful?

RULING:
No. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination of a
female employee by mere reason of her marriage. PT&T’s policy is also
contrary to good morals and public policy for depriving women of the right
to choose their civil status. It affords nothing but disrespect to the
institution of marriage.

86

 Paje vs. Casino
G.R No. 207267 February 3, 2015

Facts:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic,
Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy. Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of
legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon.
Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental
damage will happen if the power plant project is implemented and that the
respondents failed to submit with certain laws and rules governing to the issuance of
an ECC and amendments. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of
Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the
former attributing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the
determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the
scope of a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan while the latter claim that it is entitled to a
Writ of Kalikasan.

Issue: is the validity of an Environmental Compliance Certificate can be challenged

through a Writ of Kalikasan?

Ruling:
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged through a writ of Kalikasan
because such writ is principally established on an actual or threatened violation of
the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. A party who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities,
but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the rules. In the case no causal link or reasonable connection
was shown to the aforesaid second set of allegations.

87

 First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine
Military Academy
GR Number 211362 February 24, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with
honors as the class salutatorian,receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy
Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two
minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes.
The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and
transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia
incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Several days after, Cudia
was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code. Lying
that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his
4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class. Cudia
submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team
toconduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be
formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the
order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding
Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)

conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued
placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of
the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred
to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.
Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of
the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights
Violations.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Cudia in Utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he
violated the Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due
process, education, and property should be placed in the context of the
Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A
student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate
his private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA

88

 may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and
consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to
invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and
regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by
Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section
1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only to “settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the military,
especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

89

 UP vs. Ayson
G.R. No. 88386 August 17, 1989

FACTS:
The UP Board of Regents issued an order abolishing the University of the
Philippines College Baguio High School (UPCBHS) on the ground that such school
is not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school, among others, invoking in
their favor academic freedom.
The UPCBHS filed a petition for injunction with preliminary preventive
mandatory injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
invoking the right to quality education and free public secondary education before the
RTC Baguio presided by Judge Ayson (respondent Judge). The RTC granted the
petition and issued an order restraining the Board from implementing their decision
to phase out the UPCBHS.
Thus, this petition for certiorari. In the meantime, while the case is pending,
the SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the assailed order of the
respondent judge.

ISSUE:
Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such
as the University of the Philippines?

RULING:
No. secondary public education is not demandable. The University of the
Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No. 1870 [1908], as amended) to
provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary education. Section 2 of said
Act states that "the purpose of said University shall be to provide advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional
and technical training."
It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the University
of the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the
UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have not been
met.
It must be pointed out that UPCBHS was established subject to a number of
conditionalities: (1) it must be self-supporting; (2) it can serve as a feeder for the UP
at Baguio; (3) it can serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective
teachers. UPCBHS failing these conditions, the University can order its abolition on
academic grounds, specially where the purposes for which it was established was
not satisfied.

90

 Moreover, the reliance of UPCBHS on R.A. No. 6655 cannot be sustained.
The mandate of R.A. No. 6655 to provide free public secondary education is directed
to the government through the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
and not to institutions of higher learning like UP. As an institution of higher learning
enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for secondary
education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of its academic
freedom, Rep. Act No. 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein "shall be free
from payment of tuition and other school fees.
Therefore, UPCBHS do not have a clear legal right to UP secondary
education.

91

 PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN
HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO
PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN,
JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R. POLICARPIO, EDGARDO
T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO,
JOSE RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE
ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON,
LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER,
MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI,
BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A.
GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B.
BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D.
GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO,
VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA,
CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S.
GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ,
MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R.
TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J.
CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL,
FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S.
NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE
H. CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE,
EVELYN C. CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D.
DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V.
FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA,
RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS,
PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ,
MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.
G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

FACTS:
Respondents were all graduates of Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela
City, Metro Manila. They all passed the Physician Licensure Examination and
garnered unusually and exceptionally high scores in Biochemisrty and Obstetrics
and Gynecology. Eleven of them scored 100% in Bio-chem and ten got 100% in OB-
Gyne. None pf them scored a mark lower than 90%. Petitioner Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI£ to
investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity took place. They also asked Fr.
Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, to
conduct a statistical analysis of the results. Both results lead to the conclusion that
the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

92

 The PRC Board recommended their exams to be nullified. The appellate court
sustained the trial court's decision whereas they granted the petition for mandamus
to allow the respondents to take the physicians' oath and register them as
physicians. The court avers that they all passed the said examination.

ISSUE:
Did the appellate court commit an error in sustaining the judgment of the trial
court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?

RULING:
Yes. It was an error for the appellate court to grant the writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty. Under Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959, the Board is vested with
the power to conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for
examination or registration."
The Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject by a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. The regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect
the public from potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among
those who would practice medicine.
Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must
show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thus,
without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said
privilege without thwarting the legislative will of RA 2392 which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice of medicine.

93

 ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL
FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE
COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of
Labor, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980

FACTS:
The petitioner argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation,
the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of private
respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is
admitted that there was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was
sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion to dismiss based on the alleged
absence of an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that
subsequently, in the hearing of such claim private respondent submitted affidavits
executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased a
fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after
being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found
dead. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent
employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-
worker, was in the actual performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he
was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty."
ISSUE:
Should the claim for compensation be granted?
RULING:
Yes. The Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely
adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all
doubts in favor of the claimant. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission is not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even
at this late date, for private respondent and other employers to be reminded of the
high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme
of social justice and protection to labor. Further: "No other judicial attitude may be
expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated
the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is
easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if
deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy. Lastly, to
quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social
justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed

94

in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually
poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal
advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social
justice in these cases is not equality but protection.'

PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT (PRRM), Petitioner, vs.

VIRGILIO E. PULGAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010
FACTS:
Virgilio E. Pulgar was a manager in the Tayabas Bay Field Office (TBFO), a
branch of Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM). PRRM, through
Goyena Solis conducted an investigation due to certain in discrepancies in the
finances of TBFO.
Solis stated in her investigation report that part of the funds allotted to the
TBFO was either missing or not properly accounted for. It was also stated that some
of the receipts were fake.
Upon confronting Pulgar, he admitted to: 1.) Using funds intended for a
certain project in another project; 2.) falsification of certain receipts; and 3.) opening
a separate bank account under his name where a part of the funds still remains.
Pulgar claims that he did all of these with the intent of making operations run
smoothly.
According to PRMM, while investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went on leave
across several dates. After his last leave, he no longer returned to work. PRRM
found out afterwards that Pulgar filed a case for illegal dismissal.
According to Pulgar, he submitted a letter complaining that he was not: given
the right to confront Solis and defend himself, the letter was unanswered; he was
prohibited from entering the facility; and that his personal properties from his office
were placed in boxes and kept in storage. Hence, he filed a petition for illegal
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Should the petition of Pulgar be given merit under the policy of social justice
as found in Article 13 of the Constitution?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that while the Constitution is committed to the
policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of of the
workers. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less
privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the
worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.
95

 In the current case, Pulgar’s disclosures alone is enough grounds for a case
of Estafa against him. Pulgar’s petition cannot be given any merit be it due to the
circumstances nor under the policy of Social Justice since he acted towards his
employers with injustice.

AUSTRIA v. NLRC
GR No. 124382, 1999-08-16

FACTS:
Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the
Seventh-Day Adventists (hereinafter referred to as the “SDA”) is a religious
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law. It is represented in this
case by its officers. Austria, on the other hand, was a pastor of the SDA until 31
October 1991, when his services were terminated.
Austria received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of
duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer and duly
authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services. He
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Subsequently, the NLRC dismissed the complaint of Austria in a resolution
dated 23 January 1996. Austria seeks relief from the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed
by petitioner against the SDA?
2. Does the termination of the services of petitioner an ecclesiastical affair, and, as
such, involves the separation of church and state? and
3. Is such termination valid?
RULING:
The State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is
likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters. The case at bar does not
concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking
cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine,
creed, or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a
religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the
membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy of membership. Concrete examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs
to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations
of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with which
attached religious significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any
of the above cited examples.

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What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the
minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the
practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The grounds invoked for
petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which
enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. The reason for
petitioner’s dismissal from the service is not religious in nature.
Therefore, the SDA terminated the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its
management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit for the job.
As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take
cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in
consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.
Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees is
comprehensive.

97

 UCCP v. Branford United Church of Christ, Inc.

G.R. No. 171905 June 20, 2012

FACTS:
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious
corporation duly registered and existing under Philippine law. It is a confederation of
incorporated and unincorporated self-governing religious institutions. It is considered
to be the successor of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines, the Philippine
Methodist Church and the Evangelical Church in the Philippines.
Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), formerly Bradford Memorial
Church, is a similar but separate and distinct religious corporation. It was organized
at the turn of the 20th century, but incorporated only on December 14, 1979.
From May 23 to 25, 1945, three major churches convened to push for a
church union. These were the Evangelical Church, a federation of evangelical
churches operating in the Luzon area; the Philippine Methodist Church (a split from
the United Methodist-Episcopal Church) and the United Evangelical Church in the
Philippines, a federation of Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches operating in
the Visayas and Mindanao area. From this convention, the UCCP came into
existence. It was then registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
By these events, Bradford Evangelical Church became a constituent church of
UCCP. Through the years, however, several changes were instituted in UCCP. Most
of its local congregations and conferences registered as separate entities to gain
greater autonomy. BUCCI, in particular, gained a separate and distinct personality
from UCCP on December 14, 1979. It was registered under SEC. Reg. No. 90225,
and declared in its Articles of Incorporation to be a Protestant Congregation. Patricio
Ezra, Robert Schaare and Geronimo V. Nazareth were among its original
incorporators.
On June 21,1992, BUCCI issued a Church Resolution that disaffiliated itself
from UCCP, after being accused of encroaching upon the right of way of a church
belonging to Cebu Conference, Inc. (CCI). This resolution was made to retroact to
September 16, 1990. BUCCI then filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws, effecting its disaffiliation from UCCP. The SEC approved such on July 2,
1993.
Thereafter, UCCP filed a complaint/protest before the SEC for the
rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and Incorporation and Injunction. On March
8, 1994, UCCP filed an Amended Complaint/Protest abandoning the original

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Complaint/Protest. It also added BUCCI as a respondent, asking that BUCCI be
further disallowed from using BUCCI as its corporate name.
On January 27, 2004, the SEC en banc dismissed UCCP’s petition. It also
defended the right of BUCCI to disaffiliate itself from UCCP. It also pointed out that
since UCCP used BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over the property
subject to an unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before the RTC, it cannot now
deny it. It further found UCCP to be the improper party to question the amendments
made by BUCCI. Finally, the SEC affirmed BUCCI’s right to use that name.
UCCP filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
denied UCCP’s motion on June 17, 2005. UCCP appealed the decision. On 16
September 2005, UCCP also filed a motion to drop BUCCI as a respondent. The CA
denied UCCP’s petition.
Thereafter, UCCP appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:
1) Is the dispute a purely ecclesiastical affair?
2) Is BUCCI’s disaffiliation from UCCP valid?
3) Were the amendments for disaffiliation to BUCCI’s Articles of Incorporation
validly effected?
4) Is BUCCI’s continued use of its name prohibited by law?
5) Is BUCCI deceptively similar to UCCP?
6) Does UCCP have locus standi to question BUCCI’s Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws?
7) Is the CA’s decision justified?
RULING:
1) The dispute is not a purely ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is
one that only involves matters of doctrine, creed, or form of worship of a
church, and the power to adopt necessary rules and regulations and
enforce them. The fact that UCCP sought relief from a civil court renders
such assertion to be false.
2) UCCP and BUCCI are grantees of separate primary franchises. This
makes them juridical entities distinct and separate from each other. UCCP,
therefore, cannot compel BUCCI to return to its fold. Furthermore, it is
BUCCI’s legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate itself from
another religious corporation. BUCCI’s disaffiliation from UCCP is valid.
3) UCCP’s control and authority over its local churches is not supreme, as its
membership is voluntary and not perpetual. Under the law and UCCP
polity, therefore, the amendments for disaffiliation to BUCCI’s Articles of
Incorporation were validly effected.
4) BUCCI’s continued use of its name is not prohibited by law. BUCCI’s
church history gives it a better right to use that name. It has established its
acquisition of that name.
5) BUCCI is not deceptively similar to UCCP. Its name does not possess a
similarity, so as to mislead a person using ordinary care and
determination.
6) UCCP has no locus standi to question BUCCI’s Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws. UCCP, not being a member of BUCCI, is not the proper

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 party to question such document. Although it is affected by it, such is
admitted and accepted by UCCP in its establishment of its liberal
structure.
7) UCCP essentially brought the same issues for resolution before the Court,
as it did to the SEC and CA. Without an offer of further justification, a
reversal of the decisions is not warranted. The decision by the CA is
upheld.

Imbong vs. Ochoa

G.R No. 204829 April 8, 2014
Facts:
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines Inc., in
particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that the
status quo ante, the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law, must be
maintained. It explains, the instant Petition does not question contraception and
contraceptives. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No.
4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by
a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and
repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the
remotest areas of the country, is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The
State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and
the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.
Issue: Are Church dogmas considered basis as determination of the constitutionality
of the RH Law?
Ruling:
Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution: The separation of Church and
State shall be inviolable. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of
the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot
impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are
good for the country. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to
these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.

100

 Carlos Celdran Y Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines
G.R No. 220127, March 21, 2018

Facts:
Carlos Celdran was accused to have willfully and feloniously offended various
religious leaders during a church service in the Manila Cathedral, he displayed a
board bearing the word “DAMASO”. Celdran pleaded not guilty, but the prosecution
presented evidence anchored on testimonies regarding the incident. Cledran filed a
demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish all the
elements of the crime charged against him, and he also contested against the
constitutionality of Art. 133 of the RPC.

Issues:
(1.) Is Carlos Celdran guilty of the crime of offending the various religious leader as
provided under Art. 133 of the RPC?
(2) Is Art. 133 of the RPC is unconstitutional?

Ruling:
(1.) Yes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Celdran for the crime of
Offending the Religious Feeling as provided under Art. 133 of the RPC. The
elements of Offending the Religious Feeling as provided under Art. 133 of the RPC
are: (1) that the acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious
worship, or during the celebration of any religious ceremony and (2) that the acts be
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful, and the CA held that these
elements are present in the case at bar.
The first element is present considering that the incident was committed by the
petitioner Celdran during the celebration of a religious ceremony inside the Manila
Cathedral, a place devoted to religious worship, the second anniversary of the May
They Be One Bible Campaign, and the launching of the Hand Written Bible which
coincided with the feast day of Saint Gerome where many people from various
religions attended. The second element is also present. “Acts” as applied in Art. 133
may come in the form of words, overt behavior, deeds or anything which is knowingly

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performed by a person, symbolic or otherwise, and that it is not confined to merely
be limited to voluntary body movement guided to obtain a determined end.
“Notoriously offensive” as provided in Art. 133, is meant to mean those which causes
someone to feel resentful, upset or annoyed, and the offense is judged from the
point of view of the complainant and not the offender. In the case at bar, all of the
elements to apply Art.133 were indeed present.

(2) No. The Court of Appeals held that the attempts of those accused to have
violated a provision of law, to question the law’s constitutionality in order to escape
liability, should not be condone. The Judiciary works upon the presumption that Art.
133 of the RPC is valid and constitutional, and that there should be grave care and
considerate caution in confronting the constitutionality of a statute.

102

 Gudani vs. Senga
G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006

FACTS:
Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of
Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City.
Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public
hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and
the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation
between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano.
Among the high-ranking officials invited to the hearing are, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Senga, Gen. Gudani and Lt. Colonel
Balutan.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.)
464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her approval.

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office
of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the
Senate Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a
Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that such
directive was “in keeping with the time-honored principle of the Chain of Command;”
and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65
(Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of
their assignments.

ISSUE:

103

May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?

RULING:
The Court held that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by
virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Let it be
emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the
armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief
provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins
with the simple declaration that “the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines.” Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as
those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the
President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions
of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the
President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities
which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of
military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the
President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to
appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of
the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with
the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.
Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the
constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional
inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the

104

necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by
executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on
that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and
the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari
powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress
must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for
that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly
published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates
Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket
prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the
President’s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify
such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the
constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter of the dispute. It is only the
courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in
legislative inquiries.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to
arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on
the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the
duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the
Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

105

 REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO
AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO
PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS
(Secretary of Trade and Industry), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (Secretary of
National Economic and Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL
BUENAVENTURA (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA
(Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), Respondents.
G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010

FACTS:
President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law RA 8762 also known as the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed RA 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retails trade business.
RA 8762 allows them to do so under four categories. Petitioner lawmakers aver that
RA 8762 is unconstitutional for going against Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Is RA 8762 unconstitutional?

RULING:
No. RA 8762 did not go against Article II of the Constitution. Petitioners mainly
argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution. However, the provisions of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not
self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts.
Additionally, the Court further explained in that Article XII of the 1987
Constitution lays down the ideals of economic nationalism: (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and

106

concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to
adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires
the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or
interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.
ENRIQUE U. BETOY, Petitioner, vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 04, 2011
FACTS:
The EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the
electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). Pursuant to Section 48 of the EPIRA, a new National Power
Board of Directors (NPB) was created. pursuant to Section 77 of the EPIRA, the
Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR.On the other hand,
Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and employees
who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the
privatization of the assets of the NPC. Displaced or separated personnel as a result
of the privatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of the
manpower requirements of the privatized companies. Rule 33 of the IRR provided for
the coverage and the guidelines forthe separation benefits to be given to the
employees affected. Pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR,
the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that
all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated and shall be entitled to separation
benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125 which
created a transition team to manage and implement the separation program. As a
result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.
ISSUE:
Is Sec. 34 of the EPIRA constitutional?
RULING:
Yes. The Constitutionality of Section 34 of the EPIRA has already been
passed upon by this Court in Gerochi v. Department of Energy. In Gerochi, this
Court ruled that the Universal Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of
the State's police power. The Universal Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of
the country's electric power industry.
Petitioner argues that the imposition of a universal charge to address the
stranded debts and contract made by the government through the NCC-IPP
contracts or Power Utility-IPP contracts or simply the bilateral agreements or
contracts is an added burden to the electricity-consuming public on their monthly
power bills. It would mean that the electricity-consuming public will suffer in carrying

107

this burden for the errors committed by those in power who runs the affairs of the
State. This is an exorbitant display of State Power at the expense of its people.

HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (EXECUTIVE JUDGE, BRANCH

28), ULRIC R. CAÑETE (PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 25), AGUSTINE R.
VESTIL (PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 56), HON. MTC JUDGES TEMISTOCLES
M. BOHOLST (PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 1), VICENTE C. FANILAG (JUDGE
DESIGNATE, BRANCH 2), AND WILFREDO A. DAGATAN (PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 3), ALL OF MANDAUE CITY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
G.R. No. 125350, December 03, 2002
FACTS:
The RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. This further increased to P1,500 for
each judge.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM), an executive branch
under the Office of the President, issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55)
which states in part that additional allowances were to be set at a rate of P1,000 in
provinces and cities, and P700 in municipalities. Due to this, the Mandaue City
Auditor issued notices of disallowance to Judges Dadole et. al., herein petitioners,
reducing their allowance and asking them to reimburse amounts they received in
excess of P1000.
Judge Dadole et al. filed a complaint against the disallowance.
ISSUE/S:
Does LBC 55 infringe upon the local autonomy of Mandaue City?
RULING:
Yes. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that
the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the
scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units.
Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking
to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy
and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations.

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 Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of
RA 7160 of which is supposed to be the LBC 55’s legal basis. The DBM over-
stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a
prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other
words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

Province of Negros Occidental vs The commissioners

GR NO 182574

September 28, 2010

FACTS:

The sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed resolution no.

720-A allocating P4,000,000

of its retained earnings for health care insurance benefits and hospitalization
of the employees and officials of negros occidental. They granted Philam care after
having a bidding. The total premium payment is P3, 760,000 which was paid on Jan
25,1996. By then, the provincial auditor gave a notice of suspension of the premium
payment since it does not have president’s approval as provided in Ao 103, also, the
provincial auditor said that it violated the Salary Standardization Law. The petitioners
complied with post facto and and sent a letter of request. The president then directed
COA to lift suspension to only P100,000. Consequently, COA ignored and issued a
notice of disallowance. Petitioners appealed the disallowance to COA. However,
COA denied the appeal for lack of merit and the notice of disallowance amounted to
P3,760,000 is hereby affirmed and refund is hereby ordered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the

disallowance of P3,760,000 for health care insurance and hospitalization.

RULING:

Yes.The petitioners did not violate the rule of prior approval from the
President. AO 103 art 2 states that the prohibition applies only to government
offices/agencies, including GOCC as well as respective governing boards.

On the other hand, the petitioners payment of insurance premium is not

unlawful since it is allocated from their retained earnings. It is also a clear exercise of
it expense powers under the principle of fiscal anatomy of LGUS to allocate their
resources in their own priorities.

109

 Pamatong v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

FACTS:
Ely Chavez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President
of the Republic of the Philippines. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
however, declared him to be a nuisance candidate. It alleged that he had no
capability to run a national campaign.
Pamatong replied through a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, claiming an impairment of his right to “equal access to public service”, as
guaranteed by Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. He presents himself as
being constitutionally and legally qualified. He also claims being capable of running
a national campaign through the numerous national organizations under him.
ISSUES:
Is running for public office a constitutionally guaranteed right under Section
26, Article II of the Constitution?
RULING:
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution does not bestow a right to run for
office. It is not an enforceable right, being a non-self-executing provision. The
privilege to run for office is rightly subject to limitations, in order to ensure an orderly
and rational election. It is within the power of COMELEC to discern if an individual
has the capacity to exercise that privilege.

110

 Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato
G.R No. 92541 November 13, 1991

Facts:
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the
voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the
movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by
respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in
judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake
the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and
personal. On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of
the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting,
seventeen members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as
classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without
clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's
request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, on July 27,
1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the
voting slips of the members.
Issue: Is the right of access to official records as guaranteed by the Constitution
violated?
Ruling:
As may be gleaned from the decree PD 1986 creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it
is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no
valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his
private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting
in, the discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at
bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the
course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every
public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for
their official acts.

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 VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER,
REVENUE DISTRICT NO. 44, TAGUIG and PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012
FACTS:
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation bought a portion of Fort Bonifacio
reservation from the National Government. At the time of sale there was no Value
added tax to be applied, consequently FBDC did not pay any VAT.
On January 1, 1996, RA 7716 restructured the Value-Added Tax (VAT)
system, amending certain provisions of the old National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) and extending the coverage of VAT to real properties. FBDC claimed that it is
entitled to a transitional input tax credit pursuant to Section 105 of the old NIRC.
FBDC sold Global City lots and paid the corresponding VAT. It then realized
that its transitional input tax credit was not applied in computing its output VAT,
hence it filed with the BIR a claim for refund. The Court of Tax Appeals and the Court
of Appeals ruled against FBDC, citing Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, implementing
Section 105 of the Tax Code as amended by E.O. 273.

ISSUE/S:
Is the issuance of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in violation of the principle of separation of powers?
RULING:
Yes. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate,
which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law,
and should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law.

112

 Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter
cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the
basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of the term
"goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and
the Secretary of Finance as administrative bodies, to allow this would encroach upon
the legislative power of Congress.

Nieves Sanguiguit vs. People

G.R. No. 144054 June 30, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with eight counts of violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law. The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The instant case calls for a reexamination and modification, if not
abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere issuance of a check which is
subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of BP Blg. 22
regardless of the intent of the parties. Petitioner respectfully submits that it was not
the intention of the lawmaking body, to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto
a criminal offense already; there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, and
subject check should be issued to apply on account or for value.

ISSUE:
Can the Court delve into the policy behind or wisdom of B.P. 22?

RULING:
No. Under the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court cannot delve into
the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, matters of legislative
wisdom being within the domain of Congress. Even with the best of motives, the
Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot despite doubts inquire about
its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on the
prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have acted
with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and
evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are
proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to
correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

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 ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET
and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law. In
accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 426, entitled "Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the
Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes."
Nearly nine years later, then Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 whose subject is the “Creation of
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office.” Almost two years later, then President
Joseph E. Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999 entitled “An Act
Establishing An Engineering District In The First District Of The Province Of Lanao
Del Sur And Appropriating Funds Therefor.” Congress later passed Republic Act No.
9054, which contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government
and the retained areas of governance of the National Government.
Petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M. Dimalotang
(Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong,
seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999.
Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it
violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have the proper authority to grant such prayer?
2. If yes, then do the petitioners’ arguments have merit?

RULING:

114

 1. Yes. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of
judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for
the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be
ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must
have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have
been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on
the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises
a justiciable controversy. But in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition
questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not
review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only
on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave
abuse of discretion.28
2. R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional
grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the Autonomous Regional
Government (ARG) covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City,
one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A.
8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction
over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently
inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. E.O. 426 sought to implement the
transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District
Engineering Offices in each of the four (4) provinces. The office created under
D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of
E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have
been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs
counter to the provisions of E.O. 426.
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No.
8999 and rendered DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition
insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
let a writ of prohibition ISSUE commanding respondents to desist from implementing
R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur
comprising the City of Marawi and the municipalities within the First District of Lanao
del Sur. However, the petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against
respondents is DENIED.

115

 SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, Petitioners, v. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO
B. FERNAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS:

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding
officer, for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. On the agenda for the
day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of
Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20
to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The
following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with
the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority,
he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." During the discussion on who
should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and,
thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on
the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege
speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to
resolve the issue. the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the
subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had
been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUE:

Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

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RULING:

YES. The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was
it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings,
but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining

the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.

In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago,

a well-known constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the
Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
respondents.

117

 THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President,
BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity
as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
298 SCRA 756, November 11, 1993

FACTS:
The petitioners herein assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354. R.A. No.
7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
principal target of the petition states in part that all franking privileges authorized by
law are hereby repealed.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which
withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the
law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
The petitioners also allege that the draft of the bills is different from what was
enacted into law and as such, had irregularities.
ISSUE:
Can the Courts question the wisdom behind a particular legislation?
RULING:
No. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in
the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons.

118

 Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

COMELEC VS CONRADO CRUZ

GR NO 186616, November 20, 2009
FACTS:
When RA 9164 entitled “An Act providing for Synchronize Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections” was passed questions of constitutionality was
raised against Section 2 which states that” No barangay elective official shall serve
for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position provided that the term of
office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Hence, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Prior to the 2007 synchronized Barangay and SK elections, some of the
incumbent barangay officials of different barangays in Caloocan City filed with the
RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the
aforementioned provision, they claimed that it violated the equal protection clause of
the constitution in as much as the barangay official were singled out that their
consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 2 of RA 9164 violated the equal protection clause
of the constitution.
RULING:
No. Section 2 Article 3 of the Constitution states that “Nor shall any person be
denied of the equal protection of the laws”. This means that every person who are
similarly situated in one situation should be treated equally. The law can treat
brgy.officials differently from other local elective official because the constitution
itself provides a significant distinction between this elective official with respect to
length of term and term limitation. The constitution allows equal treatment.

119

 Gonzales v. OP

G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

FACTS:
In 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats,
robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before the Philippine National
Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza), and four others.
On August 26, 2008, the charge was dismissed for lack of evidence. The
Internal Affairs Service of the Philippine National Police, however, issued a
recommendation of dismissal against Mendoza and his co-accused for failure to
appear in three consecutive hearings for the complaints against them, despite the
issuance of a notice.
In the morning of August 23, 2010, dismissed Police Senior Inspector
Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza) flagged down a Hong Thai Tourist bus (TVU-799),
pretending to hitch a ride to Quirino Grandstand. Upon reaching Quirino Grandstand,
Mendoza announced to the passengers that they were being taken hostage.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, seven people were injured and
eight tourists from Hong Kong were left dead, along with Mendoza. An Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC),chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de
Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo,
was created to determine accountability for the incident. The Office of the
Ombudsman refused to participate in such Committee on the ground that it is an
independent Constitutional body.
The IIRC released its findings, and found EMILIO A. GONZALES III
(Gonzales) to be among those responsible. He was held to have committed serious
and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of the rules of the Ombudsman for
allowing the case of Mendoza to languish. The IIRC further referred to the Office of
the President (OP) for further administrative investigation and filing of charges, if
any. The OP instituted a Formal Charge against Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty
and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil
Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales filed his Answer thereto in due
time.

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 On October 29, 2010, Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon filed a
complaint before the Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the Ombudsman alleging
that Gonzales with "directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" under Section
3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was additionally charged
with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards. In a Joint Resolution dated February 17, 2011, which was
approved by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was
dismissed.
The OP later notified Gonzales that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference
relative to the administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011.
Gonzales heard news that the OP had already announced his suspension for one
year, and believed that the office already prejudged his case. He no longer attended
the scheduled conference, and instead filed an Objection to Proceedings. The OP
pushed through with the scheduled proceedings and found Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a betrayal of public trust. It meted
him the penalty of dismissal from service.

ISSUES:
1) Does the Office of the President have administrative jurisdiction a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor?
2) Was the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales justified?
RULING:
1) Yes, The Ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary authority over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. Under Section 8 of
Republic Act 6770, the President is granted the authority to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office after due process.

2) No. The Ombudsman Act only provides the authority to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman, not the President. The President acted
beyond his authority.

121

 ABAKADA vs. Ermita
469 SCRA 1
Facts:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et
al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality
of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use
or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following
conditions have been satisfied, to wit: That the President, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issue: Is there undue delegation of legislation power in violation of Article VI Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?
Ruling:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as
to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. The legislative does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of authority. A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves discretion as to
what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority

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or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to
which no valid objection can be made.

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H.

HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S.
MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,
Petitioners, v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON.
AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 171409, May 3, 2006
FACTS:
During the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power I,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine National
Police to suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. This
declaration sought to cancel all the previously allowed rallies and to disburse the
rallyists along EDSA.
Several arrests were made against alleged insurgents which included
individuals, party-lists and movements. Herein petitioners filed petitions questioning
the legality of the proclamation of President GMA since it doing so, it allegedly
violated the separation of powers and encroached upon the emergency power of
Congress.

ISSUE/S:
1.) Is Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 unconstitutional?
2.) Is Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 an encroachment on the legislature's
emergency powers?

RULING:
1.) Yes. In part. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees."

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 Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives."
2.) Yes. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress has the
sole power to declare the existence of a state of war and in times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy.

In issuing PP 1017, the Court ruled that such Proclamation does not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that
while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.

124

 Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986
FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which
calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the
constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of
the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional

“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in
1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacating the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed
and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office
and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their
standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos
vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and
prohibit the holding of the elections?

RULING:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of

125

an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986,
in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue
any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the
actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue
more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the
people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY;

COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL
R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C.
AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M.
MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B.
AUREADA and FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON; COUNCILORS: FE
LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL,
ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT,
DOMING AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.
G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994

FACTS:
President Carlos P. Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres, Quezon. On October 5, 1965, Executive Order No.
174 was issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, where the municipal district of
San Andres was officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515.
26 years later, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto
with the Regional Trial Court against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed
that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently
ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.
Municipality of San Narciso contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential
act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

126

 2 years later, the Municipality of San Andres filed a new a motion to dismiss
alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 442(d) of the law, reads:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.
Municipality of San Carlos contends that the above provision of law was inapplicable
to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE:
Was the creation of Municipality of San Andres, created by virtue of a
Presidential Decree, an usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers?

RULING:
No. Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code effects that municipal
districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code was submitted.
The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative
laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.

127

 ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES
GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), Respondents.
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist
Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original
action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, imposing the Universal
Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement
the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the
Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the
respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds that the universal
charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented
under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from
all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a
legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete
discretionary legislative authority, the ERC is also empowered to approve and
determine where the funds collected should be used, and the imposition of the
Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to

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taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be
heard and represented.
ISSUE:
Is there undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC?
RULING:
NO. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters
falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. The EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of
the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of
the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains
the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation,
transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to
privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter. Finally,
every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed
to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a
pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are
unconstitutional and void.

129

 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL
HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE
PNP, et al., Respondents.
G.R. NO. 157036, June 9, 2004

FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members
of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert
the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to
suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence
(PTCFOR). Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the
assailed Guidelines.
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner with a PTCFOR
requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines; this was denied. Thus, he filed a petition
against herein respondents claiming that under the principle of separation of powers,
only Congress can withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR,
President Arroyo and respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and
arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess the legislative power.
ISSUE:
Did the PNP Chief have the authority to issue the guidelines?
RULING:
Yes. It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government
are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent departments.
The power to make laws (legislative power) is vested in Congress. Congress may
not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body

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or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the
principle that delegata potestas non potest delegari delegated power may not be
delegated.
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief
succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s
licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the
issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance
with law.

People vs Dacuycuy
170 SCRA 90 (1989)
FACTS:

Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 ( Magna Carta

for Public School Teachers). They also charged about the constitutionality of Sec 32
which states that “ be punished by a fine of not less that 100 pesos nor not more
than 1000 pesos or by imprisonment in the discretion of the court “. Of said RA on
the grounds that it imposes and unusual punishment and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a
matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 6 is valid and constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power?

RULING:
Section 6 is not valid. The duration of the penalty for the period of
imprisonment was left to the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a
legislative department. The exercise of thw judicial power is not an attempt to use
legislative power or to prescribe or create a law but is an instance of the
administrative of justice and application of laws to the facts of particular cases.
Therefore, Section 6 violates the separation of rules of power and it constitute non
delegation of legislative power.

131

 BOC Employees Association v. Teves

G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

FACTS:

On January 25, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed Republic Act
(RA) 9335 into law. It aimed to increase the collection efficiency of the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). It created a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to
encourage employees of the agencies to exceed their targets. It covered all officials
and employees, with at least six months of service in the agencies.

The Boards were given the duty of crafting policies 1) defining the manner for
the allocation and release of the fund and 2) setting the criteria for the removal of
underperforming officials and employees from service.

Additionally, the Boards were authorized to 1) terminate personnel according

to the set criteria, 2) prescribe the manner of performance evaluation, 3) issue rules
and regulations relevant to its tasks, and 4) submit annual reports to Congress.

The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) now presents this

case to declare RA 9335 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
unconstitutional for effectively being a bill of attainder.

ISSUE:

Is RA 9335 a bill of attainder, as defined by Article III Section 22 of the 1987

Constitution?

RULING:

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 No, RA 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder punishes without the
benefit of a trial. The law in question does not lead to such situation. It is a
democratic process that merely lays rules for the termination of a BIR or BOC
employee, and the consequences of such termination.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Joker P. Arroyo contends that Republic Act No. 8240 was
railroaded through the House of Representatives when Deputy Speaker Raul Daza
allegedly ignored his question when Daza asked whether or not there were
objections to the motion. Rep. Arroyo asked “What is that, Mr. Speaker?” and the
Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved.

Petitioners further alleged that there was a disregard of Rule XIX, §112 and
Rule XVII, §103 of the Rules of the House which require that the Chair should state a
motion and ask for the individual votes of the members, and not just merely ask
whether there was any objection to the motion.

ISSUE:

Was R.A. No. 8240 railroaded?

RULING:

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 No. The allegations were not true and the Act was not railroaded.

Apparently, the Daza did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the
Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to ask if there was any objections. Hearing
none, he declared the report approved and brought down the gavel.

With regards to the charge of disregard of Rule XIX and Rule XVII, the
practice in cases involving the approval of a conference committee report is for the
Chair simply to ask if there are objections to the motion for approval of the report.
This practice is well-established and is as much a part of parliamentary law as the
formal rules of the House.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al. v. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al

594 SCRA 743 (2009)

FACTS:
In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to respondent
then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the
Commission on Appointment (CA). However, no report or recommendation was
proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a
report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned the filing
by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party
with at least 20 members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one seat
in the CA.
Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a
letter claiming that the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation. The Senator avers that political parties
PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the
political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA.
The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised
Senator Madrigal that CA has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a
member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election
of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them. Villar
further explained that instructions have been given to transmit the original copies of
Senator Madrigal‘s letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the
Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.

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 Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA‘s action, filed a petition with the Supreme
Court for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate
President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA. The Court consolidated the petitions
filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper.

RULING:
The first petition, has been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal
Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition
is withdrawn. As for the second petition, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that
she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not
in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the
CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer
on her its locus standi.
Senator Madrigal‘s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of
Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that
prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court.
Senator Villar‘s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken. Issues involving the
deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be lodged before
the respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court.
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents
to the Commission on Appointments (CA).

135

 G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

Facts of the Case:

On October 17, 1988, then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam
Defensor-Santiago (Santiago) approved the application for legalization of stay of 32
aliens. These aliens arrived after January 1, 1984, for which their legalization is
disallowed by Executive Order No. 324.
A petition was filed at the Sandiganbayan against Santiago for the legalization. Her
arrest was ordered and her bail set at P15,000. As she was recuperating from
injuries incurred from a vehicular accident, the Sandiganbayan granted her
provisional liberty until her condition improved. Saintiago later filed a petition for
certiorari to stop the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with her case. She
concurrently filed a motion before the Sandiganbayan to defer the proceedings. The
Court dismissed her petition for certiorari. It also directed the Sandiganbayan to reset
Santiago’s arraignment no later than five days from receipt of the order.
The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) later filed a motion
to admit 32 amended informations against Santiago. The SC directed the
Ombudsman and the OSP to consolidate the informations filed. The prosecution

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later filed a motion to preventively suspend Santiago. The Sandiganbayan
suspended Santiago as Senator for 90 days.
Issue:
Can the Sandiganbayan preventively suspend a Senator?
Ruling:
Yes. Section 14 of Republic Act 3019 expressly provides the Sandiganbayan
with the power to suspend any incumbent public officer under prosecution for a valid
information. Segovia v Sandiganbayan has already put the validity of such provision
at rest. Bayot v Sandiganbayan has also established that such act by the
Sandiganbayan is not a penalty as it is promulgated as a result of judicial
proceedings.

G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017

ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD,
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, AND SENATOR LEILA M. DE
LIMA, PETITIONERS, VS. CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AS REPRESENTED BY HOUSE SPEAKER PANTALEON
D. ALVAREZ, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 231694
FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, BISHOP EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S.
IÑIGUEZ, BISHOP BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP ANTONIO R. TOBIAS, MO.
ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH BULANGIS AND CASSANDRA D. DELURIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE
SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AQUILINO "KOKO"
PIMENTEL III, PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND PANTALEON
D. ALVAREZ, SPEAKER, HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
The consolidated petitions assail the refusal of Congress to convene in Joint
Session in order to deliberate upon President Duterte’s Proclamation of Martial Law
and suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

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 According to Duterte, Proclamation 216, which declared a state of Martial Law
and the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, stemmed from a series of
unfortunate events and attacks directed against civilians and government authorities.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives, in their respective chambers, did
not oppose said Proclamation. The House of Representatives also proposed a joint
session of Congress; the proposal was rejected after debates.
Petitioners contend that under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, Congress must convene in joint session in order to deliberate on the
Proclamation of Martial and that said convening is mandatory, not discretionary.
Respondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to
"vote jointly," except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE/S:
Is it mandatory for Congress to be in joint session in order to review a
declaration of Martial Law?

RULING:
No. By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the
Congress. is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

138

 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was
denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

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 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing
of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

RULING:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming
elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the
party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties
or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well- defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

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 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to
their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN,

AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ,
GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN,
RODOLFO E. PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO& JONATHAN
DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND AS LEGITIMATE
MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA
(ATING KOOP PARTY LIST), Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST
REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T. RIMAS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

FACTS:

Ating Koop was declared as one of the winning party-list groups on December
8, 2010. It earned a seat at the House of Representatives, with petitioner Atty. Isidro
Q. Lico as its party-list representative. On May 14, 2011, Ating Koop introduced
amendments to its constitution, which cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members. On Dember 5, 2011, the Interim Central Committee of Ating Koop
expelled Lico for disloyalty. There were allegations of graft and corruption, and Lico’s
refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement. The Lico group held a special meeting
in Cebu City, while the Rimas group held a Special National Convention in
Paranaque City.

The Rimas group filed a Petition with COMELEC praying that Lico be ordered
to vacate his office and to nullify the meeting that happened in Cebu. COMELEC
Second Division upheld the expulsion of Lico and declared Roberto Mascarina, the

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elected representative during the Paranaque meeting, as the duly qualified nominee
of the party-list group.

ISSUE:
Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the
House of Representatives from his party-list organization?

RULING:
No. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives,
the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the
winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of
the House of Representatives.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-
list group – petitioner Lico took his oath and he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction
over the disqualification case. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

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 VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA,
and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010
FACTS:
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter by
creating a separate legislative district for the city; before its lapse the province of
Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts.
The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is
no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a
Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected
population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Petitioners, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for
failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress’ use of
projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom
of the legislative.
ISSUE/S:
Can a legislative district for the city of Malolos be established?

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RULING:
No. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district,
the city must have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand."
In the present case, projection of the expected population of Malolos was
based on a certificate issued by Regional Director Miranda of the NSO. The Court
held that he has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate
assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In
addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In
any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a
legislative district only in the "immediately following election" after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City on 20 March
1995. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino specified that he has been a resident of
the said district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, together with Mateo Bedon,

Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition
praying that Aquino be disqualified on the ground that the he lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman. Under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the residence qualification should be for a period not less than one year
preceding the day of the election.

Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1

year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed
the petition and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547
votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

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 Move Makati again filed a motion of reconsideration with the COMELEC to
which the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission has resolved the issue. The COMELEC found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

ISSUE:
Is “residency” in the certificate of candidacy supposed to be interpreted as
“domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral
district?

RULING:

Yes. The term “residence” has always been understood as identical with
“domicile”.
The framers of the Constitution intended the word “residence” to have the
same meaning of domicile. The place “where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home,” where a person, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, in other words, his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of election law.

However, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was
running in.
The Supreme Court agreed with the COMELEC’s contention that Aquino should
prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence in the
legislative district where he intended to run.

145

G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,

Facts of the Case:

Romel Jalosjos (Romel) was born on October 26, 1973 in Quezon City. He
migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old. On November 28, 2008,
aged 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo Jr., in
Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days later, he took an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September
1, 2009, he renounced his Australian citizenship through the execution of a sworn
renunciation provided by Republic Act (RA) 9225.
Since his return, Romel acquired a residential property in the village where he
lived, as well as a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He also
registered as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but Barangay Captain Dan Erasmo Sr.
(Erasmo) opposed it. The Election Registration Board approved Romel’s application
and included his name in the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC’s) voter list for
precinct 0051Fof Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Erasmo then filed a petition before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim in Ipil for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the

146

official voter’s list.The MCTC denied the petition. He appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), but it affirmed the MCTC.
On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 election. Erasmo filed a
petition to deny or cancel Romel’s COC for material misrepresentation, particularly
with regard to the requirements of RA 9225, and the one-year residency requirement
of the Local Government Code.
After a hearing, the COMELE Second Division found Romel compliant with
the citizenship requirement. However, it ruled that he failed to prove sufficient proof
of bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On
appeal, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Division decision.
Issue:
Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by ruling that Romel failed to prove his bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay?
Ruling:
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by ruling that Romel failed to prove his bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay. Romel, by renouncing his Australian
citizenship and reacquiring his Filipino citizenship, evidently intended to change his
domicile for good. The issuance of a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration forfeited his right to live in Australia. He has
also lived in no other place but Zamboanga Sibugay. By these facts, he has
sufficiently established Zamboanga Sibugay as his domicile.

147

G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,

Facts of the Case:

Romel Jalosjos (Romel) was born on October 26, 1973 in Quezon City. He
migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old. On November 28, 2008,
aged 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo Jr., in
Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days later, he took an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September
1, 2009, he renounced his Australian citizenship through the execution of a sworn
renunciation provided by Republic Act (RA) 9225.
Since his return, Romel acquired a residential property in the village where he
lived, as well as a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He also
registered as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but Barangay Captain Dan Erasmo Sr.
(Erasmo) opposed it. The Election Registration Board approved Romel’s application
and included his name in the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC’s) voter list for
precinct 0051Fof Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Erasmo then filed a petition before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim in Ipil for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the
official voter’s list.The MCTC denied the petition. He appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), but it affirmed the MCTC.

148

 On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 election. Erasmo filed a
petition to deny or cancel Romel’s COC for material misrepresentation, particularly
with regard to the requirements of RA 9225, and the one-year residency requirement
of the Local Government Code.
After a hearing, the COMELE Second Division found Romel compliant with
the citizenship requirement. However, it ruled that he failed to prove sufficient proof
of bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On
appeal, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Division decision.
Issue:
Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by ruling that Romel failed to prove his bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay?
Ruling:
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by ruling that Romel failed to prove his bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay. Romel, by renouncing his Australian
citizenship and reacquiring his Filipino citizenship, evidently intended to change his
domicile for good. The issuance of a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration forfeited his right to live in Australia. He has
also lived in no other place but Zamboanga Sibugay. By these facts, he has
sufficiently established Zamboanga Sibugay as his domicile.

149

 Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
248 SCRA 300

FACTS:
Imelda established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. She then taught in Leyte Chinese School in Tacloban.
In 1952, she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and
was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in
1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel Manila. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood"

150

in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived
at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the one year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

RULING:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The
court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons: (1) A minor follows domicile of her
parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her
father brought them to Leyte; (2) Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue; (3) A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium; (4) Assuming that
Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country
clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary

residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May
11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

151

 MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,
Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201716, January 08, 2013
FACTS:
Abelardo Abundo Sr. vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes for 4 succsesive regular elections; he won in 2 of these. In the 2004
electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed
as winner one Jose Torres; Abundo protested this and was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoral contest by which he assumed office starting from 2006
and ending after a period of 1 year and 1 month.
In the May 10, 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each other
once again. Upon Abundo’s filing of a Certificate of Candidacy, Torres opposed.
Torres stated that Abundo would be violating the three-consecutive term limit rule.
The RTC ruled in favor of Torres, finding Abundo to have served three
consecutive terms from 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term; this decision was affirmed by
COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Is Abundo disqualified from running for office having allegedly served three
consecutive terms?

152

RULING:
No. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule,
is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b)
of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which
states in part that the three terms must be consecutive. The intention behind the
three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political power"
and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position", but
also to "enhance the people’s freedom of choice."
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares
that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor
should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case
from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

A.C. NO. 7399 : August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-

SANTIAGO, Respondent.

Facts of the Case:

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Santiago) delivered a speech on the Senate
floor as follows:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
Antero J. Pobre (Pobre) deems such statements disrespectful to Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the Court. Pobre asks that Santiago be disbarred and
meted other disciplinary measures. Santiago, through her counsel, does not deny
having made the statement. The speech, according to her, was made to bring out
controversial anomalies in governance into the open. She further claims
parliamentary immunity, as provided by Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution.

153

Issue:
Is Senator Santiago’s speech covered by parliamentary immunity?
Ruling:
Yes. Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part
that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although the
Senator made an implied admission by not denying having made the statement, she
cannot be made liable for it.

TRILLANES IV v. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN
G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018

FACTS:
Senator Antonio Trillanes (Trillanes) through a Senate Resolution directed the
Senate's Committee on Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to
investigate, in aid of legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-
storey Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey
Makati City Hall Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and
related anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials.

At the Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee (SBRS) hearing, former Makati

Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped former Vice
President Jejomar Binay (VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350-hectare
estate in Barangay Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda
Binay. Trillanes averred that private respondent thereafter claimed “absolute
ownership” of the estate.
Trillanes admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly
during gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and
in reply to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim over the
estate, he expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the documents,
private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of
the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.

154

 On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages
against petitioner for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media
from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his repeated accusations that private
respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay. Private respondent alleged that he is a
legitimate businessman and his reputation was severely tarnished as shown by the
steep drop in the stock prices of his publicly listed companies. He averred that
petitioner’s accusations were defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him,
and malicious as they were intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He
sought to recover P4 Million as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees in the amount of P500,000.00.
In petitioner Trillanes’ Answer with Motion to Dismiss, he raised the following
Special and Affirmative Defenses: (1) he argued that his statements are protected by
his constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of expression and
of the press; and (2) his statements, having been made in the course of the
performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity
under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s statements are covered by his parliamentary
immunity under Article VI, Section 11 0f the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

No. Section 11 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that:

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof”.

Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private

respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called
Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary
and committee hearings in the Senate. With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident
that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section
11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any
speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken
in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully contended

155

that they were made in the official discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as
a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process.
Therefore, Trillanes’ media statements are not covered by parliamentary
immunity under Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M.

VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.

G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

FACTS:

The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) was created by an Act of Congress after
the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its adherence to the Convention of
Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armies in the Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). The PNRC
succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was in existence since
1917.

The Constitutionality of Republic Act 95 or the PNRC Charter was put in question
when respondent Richard J. Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors. He averred that "the
office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." Since he declared that PNRC was
not a government institution, the Court further declared void the PNRC Charter as it
was a private corporation created by Congress, which was against Article XII, Sec.
16 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE:
156

 Is PNRC a private corporation and is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. PNRC may be considered as a National Society.

A National Society shares a unique character. It is a protected component of

the Red Cross movement, especially in times of armed conflict. National societies
are organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in
contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. The auxiliary status of a
Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and
a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation
with the authorities, which means a link with the State.

Also under the Constitution is our State’s adoption of generally accepted

principles of international law. Thus, the Constitutional provision must be read in
harmony with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution.

POWERS OF THE CONGRESS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA

G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 paragraph

2 of the Revised Penal Code before the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City. The
respondents were being surveyed by the police for wandering at night and soliciting
male customers. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on the
ground that the provision of the RPC was vague and violates the equal protection
clause. Their petition was granted and declared Article 202 paragraph 2 of the RPC
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Is Article 202 paragraph 2 of the RPC unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. Article 202 paragraph 2 of the RPC is constitutional because the Legislature has
the power to define crimes and prescribe their penalties. Police power is one of the
inherent powers of the State, an aspect of which is to maintain social order through

157

law-making. The respondents cannot contend that the legislature did not inform the
citizens with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit because the
Philippines follows ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
doctrine.

158

 G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO, petitioner,
J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator,
vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and
the HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-
ENRILE, in his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR,
Senate President, SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On February 28, 1986, President Corazon Aquino declared Executive Order 1
which established the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). The
goal of the PCGG was to recover the ill-gotten wealth by then President Marcos and
his associates. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its knowledge.”
On February 20, 2006 Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced a
Senate Resolution directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by several Philippine agencies due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG and his Commissioners were invited
by the Senate as one of the resource persons to deliberate on said Senate
Resolution; he declined and at the same time invoked Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1.
Said provision’s constitutionality was questioned since it went against the power of
Congress to conduct legislative inquiry.
ISSUE/S: Is Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 unconstitutional?
RULING:
Yes. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate
or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. The Congress’ power of inquiry is broad. It covers
everything which concerns the administration of current laws as well as proposed or
future statues. This extends to government agencies created by Congress as well as
their officers. PCGG is no exception.

159

 B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F.
BALUTANPetitioners,

Vs.

LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-
TRIAL JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL
PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERALCOURT-
MARTIAL, PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIALRespondents.

Facts of the Case:

THE Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, invited several senior leaders of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to appear at a public hearing. They were to testify on the “Hello Garci” scandal that
was prominent at the time. AFP Chief of Staff Lt./Gen. Generoso S. Senga (Senga)
did not testify, under order of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA). PGMA
also issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials from the executive branch,
including the military, from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.
On the day of the Senate hearing, however, B/Gen. Francisco V. Gudani
(Gudani)and Lt. Col. Alexander F. Balutan (Balutan) still testified before the Senate.
This prompted Senga to direct Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the
Provost Marshal General (OPMG) for investigation. The following day, Gudani took
his compulsory retirement from military service. After investigation, the OPMG
recommended that Gudani and Balutan be charged with violation of Article of War
65, willfully disobeying a superior.
Issue:
1) Can the President prevent a member of the military from testifying before
Congress?
2) Can members of the military still be compelled to attend Congressional
hearings, despite disallowance by the President?

Ruling:
1) Yes. The President can do so as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
Ruling to the contrary would unduly diminish the Presidential prerogative in
that role.
2) Yes, provided that they first seek judicial relief. The Constitution
recognizes the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
However, it also recognizes Presidential prerogative as commander in
chief of the armed forces.

160

 161

 Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
G.R.No. 180643 4September2008
Facts:
On September 26, 2007, Neri, appeared before the respondent committees
and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband
Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein
unveiled that when he was presented by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to
approve the project, he informed PGMA of the shot and she initiated him not to
accept the bribe. However when he was surveyed further on PGMA’s and
petitioner’s discussions linking to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: 1)
whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project, 2) whether or not PGMA directed
him to prioritize it, 3) whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it. The petitioner
did not appear before the respondent committees upon instructions of the President
invoking executive privilege. He explicated that the questions asked of him are
enclosed by executive privilege. He was mentioned in disdain of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would
appear and give his testament.

Issue: Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in

our legal system?

Ruling:
Yes, presidential communications privilege is essential to the maneuver of
government and inseparably fixed in the separation of powers under the constitution.
The constitutional disability found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive
privilege granted by the President to executive officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does
not apply in this case. In this case, it was the President herself, through executive
secretary Ermita, who raised executive privilege on a particular matter involving an
executive agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3
questions asked. If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential
communications when invoked by the President on a matter obviously within the
domain of the Executive, the said presumption orders that the same be renowned.

162

 BALAG v. SENATE
G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018

Facts: On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III, a first year law
student of the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing
conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university. On
September 19, 2017, SR No. 504, was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri
condemning the death of Horacio III and directing the appropriate Senate Committee
to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those responsible
accountable.
On September 20, 2017, SR No. 510, entitled: "A Resolution Directing the
Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the
Recent Death of Horacio Tomas Castillo III Allegedly Due to Hazing-Related
Activities" was filed by Senator Paolo Benigno Aquino IV. Senator Villanueva
repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again, invoked his right against self-
incrimination. Petitioner reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted because
he had already answered the question regarding his membership in the AJ
Fraternity. Senator Villanueva replied that petitioner's contempt would remain.
Senator Lacson added that he had numerous opportunities to answer the questions
of the committee but he refused to do so. Thus, petitioner was placed under the
custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.
Issue: Whether respondent Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion
in conducting the legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt.
Ruling: The petition is moot and academic. The existence of an actual case or
controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the court's exercise of its power of
adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible
or ripe for judicial resolution. In the negative, a justiciable controversy must neither
be conjectural nor moot and academic. There must be a definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who have adverse legal
interests. In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its
legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively
exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant
witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate
immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules
and the constitutional rights of the said witness.

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 BELGICA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R No. 208493 November 19, 2013

FACTS:

In July of 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was
spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20
dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate
recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted
into Napoles‘ private accounts.

Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints

were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies,
and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a
three-year audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to
2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of
the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the
application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate
implementing agencies and several government-owned- and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).

Due to the controversy, several petitions were filed by various individuals all
questioning the constitutionality of the “Prok Barrel System”.

ISSUES:

A. Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on...
1. separation of powers

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2. non-delegability of legislative power
3. checks and balances
4. accountability
5. political dynasties
6. local autonomy

B. Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

Whether of not the phrases:
(1) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

RULING:

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special
Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special
Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4,
paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate
in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”,
in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards
this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also
points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal

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practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment.

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must
be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held
by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a)
setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund
would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears
as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items
of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations
Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
“budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly
point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which
may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This
setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate
a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

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The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
“limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in
more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends
the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: “...[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their
own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him
to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational
proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s
post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter
largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect,
said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994).
The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far- flung

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rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former.
To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that
LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that
have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the
principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the
phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other
purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position
that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,]
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the

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restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which
arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche
authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as
a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is
too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they
are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

169

 MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, et al., Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, et al. , Respondents.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III was seated at the Malacanang, he noticed
the slow growth of the economy. The World Bank advised the administration that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Florencio “Butch” Abad, then Budget Secretary,
came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The
DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up and avoid the complicated process in the
funding of government projects. DAP operates as follows: it enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects, instead of waiting for
next year’s appropriation. If a certain government project is being undertaken slowly
by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive
and said funds will then be re-allotted to other priority projects.
The case at bar is a consolidation of nine (9) cases assailing the
constitutionality of DAP. It also questioned the constitutionality of National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541.

ISSUE:
Are DAP and NBC No. 541 constitutional?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held DAP and NBC No. 541 as unconstitutional.
The two laws are in violation of Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, and the doctrine of separation of powers for the following
reasons:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies,
and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year is
NOT IN COMPLIANCE with the statutory definition of savings contained in
the General Appropriations Act; and
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive violates the doctrine
of separation of powers of the three branches of the government.

170

 TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(TESDA) vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO
A. VILLAR; COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.; AND
COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN BUENAVENTURA

G.R. No. 196418 February 10, 2015

FACTS:

Technical Education and Skills Development Authority is an agency

attached to Department of Labor and Employment under Republic Act 7796.
The Secretary of DOLE issued an Administrative Order authorizing the
payment of healthcare and maintenance allowance of P5,000 to all officials
and employees of DOLE including its bureaus and attached agencies. Upon
the post-audit of the Commission on Audit, the Administrative Ordered issued
by the Secretary of DOLE was created without legal basis.

ISSUE:

Are the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act self-executory?

RULING:

No. The provisions of the General Appropriations Act are not self-executory.
As stated in Article IV Section 29 paragraph 1 of the 1987 constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. Thus, the authority to approve the grant of
allowances and other benefits to government employees are subject to the
approval of the President. In this case, the release and payment of the
healthcare maintenance allowance benefits was without the President’s
approval thus, rightfully disallowed.

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 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO, COMELEC COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-
PADILLA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., respondents.
G. R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
FACTS:
Congress passed R.A. No. 8189 or the “Voter’s Registration Act of 1996”
which provided for the modernization of the voting process by use of technology.
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which approved, in principle, the Voter’s
Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS) which envisioned a
computerized database system for the May 2004 elections.
COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and
installations of information technology equipment and services for the VRIS Project.
Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to
participate as one of the bidders; it subsequently won the bidding with the amount of
P6.588 Billion Pesos. COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the notice of award
to Photokina to which it accepted.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress
for the COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that
the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued
by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
Photokina filed a petition compelling COMELEC to formalize the contract.
ISSUE/S:
Can Photokina compel COMELEC to formalize the contract considering
that its bid exceeded the amount appropriated by Congress?
RULING:
No. Section 46 of the Administrative Code provides that “No contract involving
the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation
therefor” x x x. Section 47 of the same Code provides that “No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or
authorized unless x x x funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that
the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is
available for expenditure on account thereof x x x”.
Only Congress has the power to allow the withdrawal of public money from
the public funds for a public purpose.

172

 G.R. No. 219683

HON. JONATHAN A. DELA CRUZ and HON. GUSTA VO S. TAMBUNTING, as

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and as
Taxpayers, Petitioners
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., in his capacity as the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, in his capacity as the
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as the
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; and
HON. ROSALIA V. DE LEON, in her capacity as the NATIONAL TREASURER,
Respondents

Facts of the Case:

The Land Transportation Office (LTO) formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate
Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and
new vehicle registrants. On February 20, 2013, the DOTC published in newspapers
of general circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor
vehicle license plates for the MVPSP. JKG Power Plates (JKG) offered the lowest
bid for the project.
The Notice of Award was given to JKG. Contract signing, however, was not
immediately undertaken. Despite this, however, the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) issued a Notice to Proceed to JKG. The DOTC
directed JKG to make the delivery within seven days.
A week later,the contract for the MVPSP was signed. A few weeks later, the Senate
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation for the reported delays in the release of
license plates, stickers and tags by the LTO. The Commmission on Audit (COA)
followed with the issuance of three Audit Observation Memoranda, then a Notice of
Suspensions. Eventually, COA also issued a Notice of Disallowance for the
advanced payment to JKG.
The herein petitioners now question the implementation of the MVPSP using funds
appropriated for 2014.
Issue:
1) Was there and appropriation for the MVPSP in the 2014 General
Appropriations Act?
2) IS the use of funds appropriated under the 2014 General Appropriations Act
for the MVPSP constitutional?

Ruling:

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 1) Yes. The 2014 General Appropriations Act provided P4,843,757,000 for
the MVLPS. This is inclusive of the P2,489,600,100 that LTO asked to be
appropriated for the project.
2) Yes. Goh v Bayron established that to be valid, an appropriation only
needs to specify a specific amount and a specific purpose. Motor vehicle
registration naturally and logically includes plate-making, since plate-
making is an integral part of the registration process.

174

 Tan v Del Rosario
237 SCRA 324
Facts:
Two consolidated cases assail the rationality of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as
well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to
said law. Petitioners suggest that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it supposedly
violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
1. Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
2. Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
3. Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners resisted that public respondents surpassed their rule-making
authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner opposes
that the title of HB 34314, antecedent of RA 7496, is lacking for being merely
entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No.
109289) when the full text of the title really reads, An Act Adopting the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The
Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal
Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process. The
Solicitor General adopts the position taken by public respondents. The Court has
given due course to both petitions.

Issues: 1) is the tax law unconstitutional for violating due process?

Ruling:
No. The due process section may correctly be raised only when there is a
clear infringement of inherent or constitutional boundaries in the application of the
tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case. Uniformity of taxation,
similar to the idea of equal protection, merely necessitates that all subjects or objects
of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is relevant to attain
the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present
and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies similarly well to all those
fitting to the same class. What is seeming from the amendatory law is the legislative
intent to progressively shift the income tax system towards the scheduler method in

175

the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to uphold, by and large, the present
global handling on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification
to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

176

 PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., v. FERTIP
G.R. NO. 166006 : March 14, 2008

Facts: On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative
powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a
capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in
the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it
sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then
remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the
depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6, 689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to
January 24, 1986. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA
and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465
for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that
amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely
favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its
monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the
burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
Issue: Whether or not LOl 1465, being a law implemented for the purpose of
assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for benefiting a
foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership
in PPI constitutes a valid legislation.
Ruling: The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation.
We agree with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State
of its taxation power. The primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If... the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. The P10 levy under LOI No.
1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose.
All told, the RTC and the CA did not err in holding that the levy imposed under LOI
No. 1465 was not for a public purpose. LOI No. 1465 failed to comply with the public
purpose requirement for tax laws.

177

 ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010

FACTS:
The present petition was filed by Atty. Romulo V. Macalintal. The petition questions
the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, for Atty.
Macalintal, is an illegal progeny os Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which states that:
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
While Atty. Macalintal recognizes that the Supreme Court is “authorized to
promulgate its rules for the purpose,” he scraped the creation of a separate tribunal
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the mandate.
Since PET consists of members of the judiciary, Atty. Macalintal also avers that the
PET is in violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

ISSUE:
Is PET unconstitutional for its alleged violation of Section 4, Article VII and
Section 12, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution?

RULING:
No. PET was held as constitutional by the Supreme Court.
Reading the assailed constitutional provision in its plain meaning, it does not
specify the establishment of PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,
the creation thereof. Looking into the intent of the Constitutional Commission when
this provision was created, it can be seen that the exercise of the Court’s power to
judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making
power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret
it. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect under the doctrine of necessary implication i.e. including the creation of the
PET.

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 PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, although it
has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. The adoption of a separate seal, as well
as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was intended merely to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special
electoral court
In relation to petitioner’s assertion that PET is violative of Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution, the Court ruled otherwise. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. If the reasoning of petitioner is to be followed, all
Members of the Court sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would
violate the constitutional prohibition found in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same
manner, it is the Constitution itself which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same proscription.

179

 SENATOR AQUILINO O. PIMENTEL JR. vs JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS
TO CANVASS THE VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT IN
THE 10 MAY 2004 ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 163783 June 22, 2004
FACTS:
Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed a petition for prohibition nullifying the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress in determining the
authenticity of the certificates of canvass and preliminary canvass of the votes cast
for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 10 May 2004 elections on the
ground that the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of
its regular session, its term terminated and expired on the said day the said Twelfth
Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence. The petition
prays not only for prohibition but as well as directing the Joint Committee to cease
from conducting further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing.
ISSUE:
Is the legislative procedure or practice against to the existence and proceedings of
the Joint Committee in canvassing the votes of President and Vice-President in the
May 10, 2004 elections?
RULING:
No. Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the senate states that Senate
shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass
the votes for president and Vice President not later than thirty days after the day of
the elections in accordance with Section 4 of Article VII. The legislative functions of
the Twelfth Congress may have come to an end upon the adjournment of its regular
sessions, but this does not affect the non-legislative functions such as being the
National Board Canvassers.

180

 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
---------------------------------------
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
FACTS:
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada was involved in a corruption scandal after
Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the former of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords as well as kickbacks from jueteng (an illegal numbers
game) itself.
An impeachment trial was filed against him. Sometime after all the
controversies and rallies, Estrada resigned from his office. Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was then sworn in as President on the same day as Estrada’s
resignation from office. Estrada issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang for the sake of peace. He had also signed a letter which stated that he
cannot exercise the duties and obligations of a President and that by operation of the
Constitution the Vice President (Arroyo) shall be Acting President.
After his resignation from office, several cases were filed against him. Estrada
stated that he enjoyed immunity from suit since he is still the President and is merely
temporarily unable to discharge his duties and that Arroyo is only Acting President.
ISSUE/S:
Is Estrada only temporarily unable to act as President?
RULING:
No. Estrada is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that Congress has the authority to determine
whether or not the President is capable of discharging his duties.
Estrada transmitted to Congress that he was no longer able to perform his
duties and pertinent to the Constitution, the Vice President will become Acting
President, until such time that Estrada be able.
However, both Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions
supporting the assumption of office of Arroyo which signify their recognition of her
Presidency and that Estrada’s inability to act is no longer temporary.

181

 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 152154 July 15, 2003
Facts:
One of the primary trepidations of the Aquino Government in February 1986
was the retrieval of the mysterious or ill-gotten wealth supposedly collected by
former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Hence, the very first Executive Order delivered by then President
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ejection of the Marcoses
was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It fashioned the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of support
the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled
by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship." In all the supposed ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the
PCGG, this Court has gotten appropriate to set apart technicalities and formalities
that merely aid to interrupt or hinder judicious resolution. This Court favors to have
such cases fixed on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the
Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not plain legalisms or perfection of form,
should now be persistently and definitely pursued. Almost two decades have passed
since the government started its search for and return of such ill-gotten wealth. The
conclusive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long unsettled. If there is
proof of illegal attainment, accretion, embezzlement, deception or unlawful conduct,
let it be conveyed out now.
Issues: Did President Marcos commit prohibited and inhibited acts as a president
during his term of office?

Ruling:
Yes. It is established that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the
pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the
pre-trial of the case. Consequently, facts appealed in the petition and answer, as in
the case at bar, are believed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively,
who are not allowed to oppose them or afterwards take a position opposing to or
varying with such admissions.
The totality of $304,372.43 should be detained as the only recognized lawful
income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL), as requisite by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Further,
under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not obtain any
other payment from the Government or any of its sectors and instrumentalities.

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Similarly, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
obtain during his term any other remuneration from the Government or any other
cause. In fact, his administration of businesses, like the administration of basics to
accrue funds, was explicitly forbidden under the 1973 Constitution:
1. Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during
their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or
indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested
directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled
corporation.
2. Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as
counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government
owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary
benefit.
3. Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be
subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear
as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business,
or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other
disqualification as may be provided by law.
Respondents contend that petitioner was not able to form a prima facie case for
the penalization of the Swiss funds since it was unsuccessful to demonstrate the
essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the
Act is a penal statute, its provisions are obligatory and should thus be interpreted
firmly against the petitioner and copiously in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to institute the Marcoses other lawful income
or income from legally attained property for the presumption to apply because, as
between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if
there were such added foundations of lawful income. And if certainly there was such
other lawful income, respondents should have precisely specified the same in their
response. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was sufficient to specify
the acknowledged lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations delivers that, in determining prima
facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties
and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of amount to the known lawful income of such individuals. The
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL)
from which their net worth could be resolute. Their failure to file their SAL was in

183

itself a violation of law and to let them effectively attack the Republic for not
presenting their SAL would recompense them for their violation of the law.

184

 HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as SECRETARY, AND DIRECTOR
NILO L. ROSAS in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A. ICASIANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000

FACTS:
Dr. Icasiano was appointed as Division Superintendent, Division of Cityhools,
Quezon City, by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Petitioner Secretary Gloria
recommended to President Aquino that Dr. Icasiano be reassigned as
Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute ofience and Technology], to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro. The
President approved Secretary Goria’s recommendation. A copy of the
recommendation for Dr. Icasiano’s reassignment, as approved by the President, was
transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation. Director Rosas
informed Dr. Icasiano of his reassignment, where he requested Secretary Gloria to
reconsider. His request was denied. Dr. Icasiano filed the instant petition averring
that the reassignment is violative of his right to security of tenure because of the lack
of a period or any indication that it is only temporary.
Secretary Gloria theorize that the present petition is improper because the
same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.

ISSUE:
Is the subject petition violative of the doctrine of presidential immunity from
suit?

RULING:
No. The current petition does not violate the doctrine of presidential immunity
from suit.
First, the petition is directed to Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria and not to the
President. The questioned acts are those of Secretary Gloria’s and not the acts of
the President.
Second, even if the petition was directed to the President, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Dr. Icasiano
has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the
private respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure.

185

 Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be
violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot
be sustained.

186

 REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, EDGAR R.
ERICE, TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., GARY C. ALEJANO, AND
EMMANUELA. BILLONES vs.
SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER PANTALEON D.
ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, BUDGET SECRETARY BENJAMINE.
DIOKNO AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL REY LEONARDO GUERRERO
G.R. No. 235935 February 6, 2018
FACTS:
May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a
state of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole Mindanao for a period not exceeding 60 days due to the rebellion by
members of Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group. In May 25, 2017, following the 48-
hour period as stated in the Constitution, President Duterte submitted a Report to
Congress stating the reasons that pushed him to declare martial law in Mindanao.
The Congress approved the said proclamation. On July 18, 2017, President Duterte
requested the extension of martial law until December 2017. The Defense Secretary
recommended to the President the one-year extension of the martial law and
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus due to compelling reasons based on current
security assessment. The Congress approved the request of the President of
extending the martial law and suspension of writ of habeas corpus for a year more.
Thus, the petitioners filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of the extension of
martial law and suspension of writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Should the President be removed as party respondent?
RULING:
Yes. The President should be removed as party respondent because the President
enjoys the Presidential immunity from suit. According to jurisprudence, involving the
President in any litigation would degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President. It is also important to emphasize that the President should be free from
any form of distraction to enable him to fully perform his duties as the Head of the
State.

187

 MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL, THITING ESTOSO JACOSALEM, AND ODON S.
BANDIOLA, Petitioners,
v.
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND EDUARDO M.
AÑO, [SECRETARY] OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019
FACTS:
President Duterte declared that he would be closing off Boracay due to the
fact that it had become polluted due to the number of tourists who went there on a
regular basis. He officially ordered the shutdown of the island sometime in April,
2018.
Herein petitioners argued that the closure of Boracay affected their business
for the worse. They relied on tourists to keep them alive; with the tourists gone, they
were barely making enough to feed their families. Hence, they filed a petition praying
that all those responsible for the closure be stopped. Respondents argue that
President Duterte must be dropped as a respondent from the suit.
ISSUE/S:
May the President be impleaded in suit?
RULING:
No. As correctly pointed out by respondents, President Duterte must be
dropped as respondent in this case. The Court's pronouncement in Professor David
v. President Macapagal-Arroyo on the non-suability of an incumbent President
cannot be any clearer.
In the case of David the Court held that: Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he
can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.

188

 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela

AM No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The President contracted appointments of Hon. Mateo
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan
City, correspondingly. These arrangements were pondered, as it appeared to be
expressly forbidden by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution: Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety." The President, spoke to the JBC, demanded on May 4,
1998 the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the opening in view of the
90 days obligatory by the Constitution. In behalf of the JBC, CJ referred the answer
on May 6 that no meeting has been arranged after the May elections for the motive
that they seemingly did not part the same view projected by the JBC exposed by the
uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it seemed that the Justice
Secretary and the other members of the Council took stroke without waiting for the
CJ response. This provoked CJ to plea for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ
acknowledged a letter from the President in response of the May 6 letter where the
President conveyed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive
appointments, the whole article being entitled “EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that
appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows: Article
8 Sec 4"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof. “Article 8 Sec 9"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from the list of at least three
nominees prepared byte Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.”

Issues: Can the President fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4
and 9, during the appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15?

Ruling:
Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 merely mean that the “President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Article7 Sec15.Therefore, the President is neither obligatory to make appointments
to the courts nor permissible to do so. Similarly, the prevention on appointments
comes into consequence only once every six years. The Court also pointed out that
Article8 Sec4 and 9 should succeed over Article7 Sec15 as they may be deliberated
later terminologies of the people when they approved the Constitution. The Supreme
Court, in an en banc decision, affirmed the appointments engaged by the President
on March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta void. They are ordered to

189

cease and desist from clearing the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were
correspondingly appointed on the said date. They come within the process of the
exclusion on appointments. While the filling of judiciary vacancies is in the public
interest, there is no convincing motive to validate such appointment within the 2
months appointment ban. In opinion of Valenzuela’s oath taking, the legitimacy of the
letter of which was not verified from the Office of the Court Administrator, SC
repeated the standing exercise and processes in appointments to the Judiciary that
originals of all appointments are to be directed by the Office of the President to the
Office of the Chief Justice.

190

 PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
G.R. NO. 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the
Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity. Petitioner’s senators assailing the constitutionality of
the appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. EO 292, which devotes a chapter
to the President’s power of appointment.
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries while Congress is in session.
Ruling: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by
the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in
an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad
interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year.

191

 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS:

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its
existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does
not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in
the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,”
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article
VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII applies to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.

192

RULING:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The second, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

193

 MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Rogelio Rayala was an appointee by the President of the Philippines as the
Chairman of the NLRC. Meanwhile, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo was a Stenographic
Reporter III at the same office. Domingo filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). She supplied an affidavit containing her narration of
events to support her claim. She filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the
basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment. DOLE Secretary referred the
Complaint to the Office of the President (OP). The OP, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the
allegations. The Office of the President, having found that the allegations were true,
found Rayala guilty and DISMISSED him from his office.
Upon raising the appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed
by the OP. Instead of dismissal, it imposed the penalty of suspension for 1 year, as it
is the proper penalty stated in Administrative Order 250.
Domingo assailed the CA’s resolution. She argues that the power to remove
Rayala, who is a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President.

ISSUE:
Can the President use his power to remove appointees in the case at bar?

RULING:
No. The President cannot instantly remove Rayala from office.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC “shall hold office during
good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed
for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the
office.” It is evident that the power of the President to remove someone from office is
qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the OP found that
Rayala was guilty of the crime charged, the Chief Executive did not have unrestricted
discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such
offense. The imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative
offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension
of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Thus, it was error for the Office of
the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

194

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE
L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

FACTS:

Secretary of Justice, Franklin Drilon declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise

know as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances. The City of Manila filed a
petition for certiorari that revoked the Secretary’s decision for it followed the
procedure and requirements of enacting tax ordinance. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila also declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because it vests the Secretary of Justice the power to control local governments that
is in violation of the local autonomy as stated in the Constitution and the specific
provision that grants the President of the Philippines the power of supervision over
local government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional for it
grants the Secretary of Justice the power of control over local government in
violation of the principle of local autonomy.

RULING:

No. Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional because it

authorizes the Secretary of Justice to only review the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance. The Secretary of Justice only determined if the City of Manila
were performing their functions with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of
tax ordinances. An officer in control lays down the rules in doing of an act while an
officer in supervision merely sees if the rules laid down were followed. The act done
by the Secretary of Justice was merely supervision.

195

 ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, RADITO V. PADRIGANO,
JEAN R. DE MESA, LEAH P. DELA CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B.
CORDOBA, ALBERT BRILLANTES, GLORIA BISDA, JOVITA V. CONCEPCION,
TERESITA G. CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T. MALIWANAG, RICHARD ODERON,
CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA E. LAROCO,
CESAR ANDRA, FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA, FILOMENA A.
GALANG, JEAN PAUL MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO, JR., EDUARDO
FRIAS, REYNALDO O. ANDAL, NEPHTALIE IMPERIO, RUEL BALAGTAS,
VICTOR R. ORTIZ, FRANCISCO P. REYES, JR., ELISEO M. BALAGOT, JR.,
JOSE C. MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA, F.C. LADRERO, JR., NELSON
PADUA, MARCELA C. SAYAO, ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO,
JULIANA SUPLEO, MANUEL MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA BOBIS,
DANILO VARGAS, ROY-LEO C. PABLO, ALLAN VILLANUEVA, VICENTE R.
VELASCO, JR., IMELDA ERENO, FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL R. BASCO, E.
JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN, DOLORES M. AVIADO, MICHAEL P. LAPLANA,
GUILLERMO G. SORIANO, ALICE E. SOJO, ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA
SORIANO, FEDERICO RAMOS, JR., PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO L.
GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., ANTONIO GALO, A. SANCHEZ, SOL E.
TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. COCJIN, DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN MARIANO,
M.A. MALANUM, ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and JESUS MEL SAYO
v.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, The Director
General of the Philippine Information Agency and The National Treasurer
G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
FACTS:
Herein petitioners are employees and the representatives of employees at the
National Printing Office. They filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Exective
Order No. 378 which removed the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Petitioners
argue that it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers; and that Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners'
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE/S:
Can the President validly exercise control over the NPO?
RULING:
Yes. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
the President's constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and
by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive

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offices under existing statutes. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is
part of the Office of the Press Secretary, is part of the Office of the President.

HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

G.R. No. 181293 February 23, 2015
Facts:
The Toll Regulatory Board was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential
Decree No. 11121 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government,
the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. On
22 September 1993, PNCC entered into an agreement with PT Citra Lamtoro Gung
Persada (CITRA), a limited liability company organized and established under the
laws of the Republic of Indonesia, whereby the latter committed to provide PNCC
with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME project. The agreement was
supplemented on 14 February 1994 with a related undertaking on the part of CITRA.
CITRA was to provide a preliminary feasibility study on the Metro Manila Skyways
(MMS) project, a system of elevated roadway networks passing through the heart of
the Metropolitan Manila area. In order to accelerate the actual implementation of
both the MME and the MMS projects, PNCC and CITRA entered into a second
agreement. Through that agreement, CITRA committed to finance and undertake the
preparation, updating, and revalidation of previous studies on the construction,
operation, and maintenance of the projects. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed
Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement. The ASTOA
incorporated the amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to cover the
design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under
the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation replaced PSC in performing the operations
and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Pursuant to the
authority granted to him under Executive Order No. 49714 dated 24 January 2006,
Department of Transportation and Communications Secretary Leandro Mendoza
approved the ASTOA through the challenged Memorandum dated 20 July 2007.

Issues: Does TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility?

Ruling:
This matter has already been settled by the Court in Francisco, Jr. v. TRB,
102 which ruled thus:
It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to
Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a
qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll
facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC.
Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 and Section 4 of P.D. 1894 amply provide the
power to grant authority to operate toll facilities:
Section 3. Powers and Duties of the Board. – The Board shall have in addition to its
general powers of administration the following powers and duties:

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a. Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, to enter into
contracts in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with persons, natural or juridical,
for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll facilities such as but not
limited to national highways, roads, bridges, and public thoroughfares. Said contract
shall be open to citizens of the Philippines and/or to corporations or associations
qualified under the Constitution and authorized by law to engage in toll operations;
SECTION 4. The Toll Regulatory Board is hereby given jurisdiction and supervision
over the GRANTEE with respect to the Expressways, the toll facilities necessarily
appurtenant thereto and, subject to the provisions of Section 8 and 9 hereof, the toll
that the GRANTEE will charge the users thereof.

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 DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN v. RONALDO PUNO
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,[1] placing “the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat… and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency.” She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) “to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless… violence” in the named places. Administrative Order, “transferring”
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office
of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But,
due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued
Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the former, by “delegating” instead
of “transferring” supervision of the ARMM to the DILG PETITIONERS.
Issues: Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and Aos 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy
Ruling: We dismiss the petition. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. The DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or
operations of the ARMM. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only
a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed
forces to… prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution,… it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the
determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of
emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as
well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. OSG
also clearly explained the factual bases for the President’s decision to call out the
armed forces, as follows… the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to
prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Pacify the people’s
fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action.

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 JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI,
JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN.
JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM
and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of the Phil.
Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012
FACTS:
Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. The leader of the alleged
kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, who was linked with the known leaders of
Abu Sayyaf. Gov. Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of
armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to
surrounding areas of Patikul.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited
the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section
465 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which bestows on the Provincial
Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
Gov. Tan distributed the guidelines on the implementation of Proclamation 1-
09 which suspended all Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence
(PTCFORs). The said guidelines also allowed general searches and seizures in
designated checkpoints and chokepoints.
Petitioners Jamar M. Kulayan and other residents of Patikul, Sulu filed the
present petition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. They also claim that
the proclamation violated Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out
powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.

ISSUE:
Is declaring a State of Emergency and calling out the members of the AFP
within a provincial governor’s powers?

RULING:

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 No. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief Powers dictate that
they are exercised by one president.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. He is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces. The “call-out” power is exclusive and
constitutionally vested only to the President. A local chief executive exercises
operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day
operations. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission show that the framers
never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police
in emergency situations.
Governor Tan governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding, for this is exclusive only to the President. He also does not
have the authority to form his own citizen armies pursuant to Section 24, Article XVII
of the Constitution.
Governor Tan cannot justify Proclamation 1-09. He even arrogated unto
himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President, because as
the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."

201

 LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL
CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT.
JONNEL SANGGALANG vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity
as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO)
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
FACTS:
Some members of AFP abandoned their designated assignment places to
destabilize the government. They went to a Luxury Apartment in Makati, led by Navy
Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the
building. The Department of Justice filed a case of coup d’etat in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati against those members of the AFP who started the coup d’etat. The
RTC ruled that those members of AFP should not be charged before the military
tribunal for violations of the Articles of War but rather it will be absorbed and will be
in furtherance of the alleged coup d’etat. Instead of filing their answer, they filed a
petition for Prohibition on the ground that charging them with violation of the Articles
of War is not service-connected as determined by the RTC, hence they cannot
compel the military tribunal to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not those AFP members who were charged of coup d’etat before the
RTC should be charged before the military tribunal for violation of Articles of War.
RULING:
Yes. As exception to the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons
subject to military law who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper
civil court, where the civil court before the arraignment, has determined the offense
to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.
In this case, the decision of the RTC stating that Article 96 of the Articles of war as
not service-connected is null and void.

202

 SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,
v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO
ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
FACTS:
Sometime in 2003, around 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines marched and seized Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City; they all demanded the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes and PNP Chief Ebdane.
Arroyo issued a Proclamation declaring a state of rebellion and a General
Order directing the AFP and PNP to suppress said rebellion; petitions were filed
questioning the said orders.
ISSUE/S:
Does the President have the power to call out the military during a state of
rebellion?
RULING:
Yes. Article VII, Sec. 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
"sequence" of "graduated powers." From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the power to declare martial law. The President may validly call out the military
and the only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call
the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"

203

 REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C.
ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.
vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN
N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEF’ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR
G.R. NO. 231658, JULY 4, 2017
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On May 25, the president submitted a written
report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration, pursuant to
the requirements of the Constitution.
The report stated that the main basis of the declaration was the attack of the
Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an
affiliate of ISIS which was aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City. It
also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for
decades.
The present petition is a consolidation of petitions by Lagman, Cullamat, and
Mohamad. The aforementioned petitions assail Proclamation No. 216.
The Lagman Petition’s main contention is that, the president’s declaration has
no sufficient and factual basis – arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with
rebellion or invasion. Lagman also contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is
only mere propaganda, designed to create an appearance of capability for the Maute
group. The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was
refuted by several media networks and news articles because they turned out to be
false or untrue.
The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show
any acts of rebellion and invasion outside Marawi City, therefore Martial Law should
not be implemented in the whole of Mindanao.
The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a
remedy of last resort.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its consolidated comment and
contends that the court should only review Proclamation 216 under the lens of grave
abuse of discretion, and not on the correctness of facts.
The OSG also argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be
examined based on the facts/information that were available to the president at the
time he made the determination. Doing otherwise will impose an impossible standard
on the president’s exercise of discretion.
ISSUES:

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 Was there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President?

RULING:
YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the
President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The parameters in determining sufficient factual basis are as follows: 1) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must
concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is
actual rebellion or invasion.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be
limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to
ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court also held that the petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely
from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. The alleged false and/or inaccurate
statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false
data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not,
actual rebellion exists.

205

 RAMON A. GONZALES vs.
HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive
Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential
Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C.
BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-
JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of
appointments)
G.R. No. 140835 August 14, 2000
FACTS:
Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus questioning the constitutionality of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform that was created by President Estrada
through Executive Order No. 43. PCCR is mandated to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same. Gonzales further contends that PCCR is a public office that
only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner has a legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation
of Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform?
RULING:
No. A citizen acquires legal standing if he can establish that he suffered or is
threatened of injuries as a result of the illegal act of the government. On the other
hand, a tax payer acquires a legal standing to raise a constitutional question when
he can establish that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the law or the Constitution.

206

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,
IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President,
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS,
CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, Respondents.
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
FACTS:
When Ferdinand E. Marcos fell from power, he and his family were sentenced
to exile. Years later, on his deathbed, Marcos wished to return to the Philippines.
President Cory Aquino denied this as she felt that it would pose a threat to national
interest and would open old wounds.
ISSUE/S:
Can the President prevent the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what
are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty.

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 JJUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

G.R. Nos. 147036-37 April 10, 2012

Petitioner-Organizations, namely: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA

SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN),
COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR), BUKLOD NG MALAYANG
MAGBUBUKID, PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA
(PAKISAMA), CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM, EMPOWERMENT AND
TRANSFORMATION (CARET), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKSK); Petitioner-Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE
LORETA ANN ROSALES; and Petitioner-Individuals, namely: VIRGILIO V.
DAVID, JOSE MARIE FAUSTINO, JOSE CONCEPCION, ROMEO
ROYANDOYAN, JOSE V. ROMERO, JR., ATTY. CAMILO L. SABIO, and ATTY.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), and UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
(UCPB), Respondents.

G.R. No. 147811

TEODORO J. AMOR, representing the Peasant Alliance of Samar and Leyte

(PASALEY), DOMINGO C. ENCALLADO, representing Aniban ng Magsasaka at
Manggagawa sa Niyugan (AMMANI), and VIDAL M. PILIIN, representing the
Laguna Coalition, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK

Facts of the Case:

Congress enacted Republic Act 6260, which established the Coconut Investment
Fund (CIF). Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer CIF through the
Coconut Investment Company. The CIF was aimed at advancing opportunities for
coconut farmers.
The year after, President Marcos established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization
Fund (CCSF). It aimed to channel direct benefits to the coconut farmers from the
incentives they were paying. The CCSF was to be built up through the imposition of
a P15.00 levey on the first 100 kilograms of corpa resecada sold by each farmer.
The levy was to cease after a year, with the remaining amount reverting to the CIF.

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The year following, the President issued an Presidential Decree creating the
Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF). The Philippine Coconut Authority was
to give the initial P100 million funding, and thereafter a P0.20 per kilogram of the
collection of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was to replenish it. The
Philippine National Bank, a government owned bank, was to administer the CIDF.
In 1975, President Marcos approved the acquisition of 72.2% of the shares of stock
of First United Bank for the prompt and efficient realization of the credit policy of the
coconut industry. The year after, President Marcos enacted the Coconut Industry
Code, which codified and consolidated all laws relating to the coconut industry. In
November 2000, then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. (EO)
312, establishing the Sagip Niyugan Program to provide immediate supplement to
the income of coconut farmers. At the same time, the President also issued EO 313
creating an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (CTF). CTF
aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, the coconut industry and
related programs. EO’s 312 and 313 were later suspended by President Arroyo.
Issue:
1) Are the Rule 65 petitions the proper action?
2) Are (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c)
E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 unconstitutional?
Ruling:
1) Yes. Serious questions of law may be brought directly to the Court. In such case,
it is the right and the duty of the Court to look into the allegations, and if
warranted, uphold the Constitution. Additionally, matters of paramount
importance to the public gives the Court discretion to brush aside technical
procedures.
2) Yes. These violate Article IX-D, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. It deprives
the Commission on Audit of its authority to examine the uses of government
property and money. There is no legitimate reason as to why the funds should be
shielded from audit.

209

 VILLAVERT vs. DESIERTO
GR No. 133715 Feb 23, 2000
Facts:
An administrative charge for severe misconduct was filed against Villavert,
Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer
suggested the discharge of the incident. Though, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas
delivered a Memorandum ruling Villavert guilty of the charge. Therefore, this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of
RA 6770.
Issues: Are the conclusions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed
to the Supreme Court?

Ruling:
No. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which allows a plea to this
Court from results of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative punitive cases,
was stated violative of the prohibition in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a
law which upsurges the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its guidance and
permission. Furthermore, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure prevents appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, similar to the Office of the
Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Thus, appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be engaged to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43, as repeated in the succeeding case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.

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 IFURUNG v. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018
Facts: Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claim that
petitioner failed to appreciate the verba legis approach to constitutional construction;
and that, instead, petitioner resorted to an interpretation that was not only self-
serving but also devoid of basis and reason. Respondents contend that the ruling
in Gaminde where the rotational system of appointment of the CSC chairperson and
the commissioners was crucial to the determination of the start of Commissioner
Gaminde's term, does not apply to the Office of the Ombudsman where there are no
seven-five-three-year rotational intervals for the appointment. Moreover, the Office of
the Ombudsman is not a commission composed of a chairperson and several
commissioners; thus, whether the term of the first Ombudsman began on 2 February
1987 would be immaterial because the succeeding Ombudsman shall have a fresh
seven-year term.

Respondents maintain that the present petition seeks to unseat respondents from
public office; thus, the Tañada and Imbong rulings on which petitioner anchors his
petition would not apply since these cases do not involve an attack on a public
officer's title. Moreover, the present petition, which involves a collateral attack on the
respondents' title, should be dismissed for being an improper remedy. Respondents
emphasize that the proper remedy would have been a petition for quo
warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court to be initiated by the Solicitor General
or public prosecutor when directed by the President of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 11 in relation to Sections 8 and 10, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine
constitution and applicable jurisprudence.
Ruling: To justify his claim that a petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper
remedy to assail the validity of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner cites the ruling
in Tañada and Imbong that "certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioner, who claims to be a
taxpayer, asserts that there has been illegal disbursement of public funds in paying
the salaries of the respondents. As a concerned citizen, he avers that the issues in
this petition are of transcendental importance.

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 Genuino v De Lima
G.R. No. 197930 March 17, 2010

FACTS:

After the expiration of GMA’s term as President of the Republic of the

Philippines an her subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal
complaints were filed against her before the DOJ particularly plunder, malversation
and/or illegal use of OWWA funds, illegal use of public funds, graft and corruption,
violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and qualified theft. In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De
Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 against GMA pursuant to her authority under
DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA’s name in the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) watchlist.
On October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and
Violation of the OEC were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo.
Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-573
against GMA and Miguel Arroyo with a validity period of 60 days, unless sooner
terminated or otherwise extended.

ISSUE:
Is the DOJ authorize to issue Circular No. 41?

RULING:
The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art. 3
of the 1987 Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a restriction
on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a further
requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court
providing for the impairment.
To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment
which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the
President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to
carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed
to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid
administrative issuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation of
legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by

212

the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former
DOJ Secretary will disclose that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to
issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel through the
issuance of the WLOs and HDOs. Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of
E.O. No. 292 did not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the
constitutional right to travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the
Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the
power to investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are
basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not carry with it the power to
indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in performing its functions without
regard to constitutionally-protected rights. The curtailment of fundamental right,
which is what DOJ Circular No. 41 does, cannot be read into mentioned provision of
the law.
As such, it is compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete
and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to
promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being
confined to execution of laws. The DOJ is confined to filling in the gaps and the
necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted. Without a clear mandate
of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires.
To sum, DOJ Circular No. 41 does not have an enabling law where it could
have derived its authority to interfere with the exercise of the right to travel. Thus, the
said circular is unconstitutional.

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 PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (PHAPI)
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. RUSTICO JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. HON.
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents.
G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 (BP 702) was passed in 1994. It is “An Act
Prohibiting the Demand of Deposits or Advance Payments for the Confinement or
Treatment of Patients in Hospitals and Medical Clinics in Certain Cases”. BP 702
basically prohibits hospitals and medical clinics from asking deposits or advanced
payments from its patients before treatment of serious and emergency cases. It was
later amended by Republic Act No. 8344, which made it unlawful not only to
demand, but also to request, solicit, and accept any deposit or advance payment as
a prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency or serious cases. It
also allowed the transfer of patients to an appropriate hospital if the initial hospital
does not have the appropriate instruments to treat the patient. It was later amended
by R.A. No. 10932 which expanded the scope of “emergency care” to include
procedures administered to a woman in active labor.It also presumes liability against
the hospital, medical clinic, and the officials and employees involved, in cases where
the treatment results to death or permanent disability. It also mandates PhilHealth to
reimburse cost of basic emergency care and transportation services given by the
hospital to poor and indigent patients.
Petitioner PHAPI avers that R.A. No. 10932 is unconstitutional and violative of
substantive due process. PHAPI argues that the act imposes untenable duties to
doctors to actually prevent death or permanent disability. Petitioner avers that a
physician cannot ensure that there is a guarantee of achievement at the end of the
treatment, and that presumed liability is violative of due process. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the presumption of liability clause necessarily presumes that there
is, at all times, a causal connection between the injury and the acts or omissions
complained of, when in fact there is none. The causation between the injury and the
medical action are determinable only through the technical and scientific
competence of physicians and thus, cannot be presumed by law. Lastly, it also
emphasizes that costs of hospitals who treat patients not poor or indigent should
also be reimbursed by PhilHealth, lest it will be violative of the equal protection
clause.
Respondent Hon. Salvador Medialdea, Executive Secretary, and the Acting
Secretary of Department of Health, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seek to dismiss the instant petition for being procedurally infirm on the ground
that certiorari and prohibition are only proper against judicial, quasi-judicial, and
ministerial acts, and on the lack of justiciable controversy and locus standi.
ISSUES:

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 1. Are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proper to assail the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 10932?
2. Is direct resort to the Court proper?
3. Does petitioner, as an association of privately-owned hospitals, clinics and
other health facilities, satisfies the requisite legal standing?
.
RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously
or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution also defined judicial power as including not only the duty to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also, the duty to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. This is called the
“expanded jurisdiction” of the Court. Therefore, petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.

2. No. In The Diocese of Bacolod, instances where direct resort to the Court is
allowed are enumerated: (a) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when
the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) in cases of first
impression; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the
Supreme Court; (e) the time element or exigency in certain situations; (f) the
filed petition reviews an act of a constitutional organ; (g) when there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (h)
the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice,
or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.

In the present petition, PHAPI failed to present a prima facie challenge as to

be exceptionally compelling to justify its direct resort to the Court. The
allegations of the petitioner failed to meet the requirement of a prima facie
showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Congress. The Act,
thus, still enjoys the presumption of constitutionality which is respected by the
Court.

3. No. The petitioner has no legal standing. As a rule, a party is allowed to raise
a constitutional question when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In the present
case, the petitioner itself, is not a hospital, a medical facility, a medical
practitioner or employee, but only an association thereof. For PHAPI to fall
under the “third party exception” he should not only show that it stands to

215

 suffer direct injury, but also that it has been duly authorized.by its members to
represent them or sue in their behalf.

FRANCISCO CHAVES vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS

JOSEPH G. ESCUDER AND REP. NIEL C. TUPAS JR.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
Article VIII section 8 paragraph 1 of the Constitution states that Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and
a representative of the Congress as ex officio members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the Private sector. However, in 1994, the composition of the JBC
was altered. Instead of having seven members, an eighth member was added
because there were two representatives from Congress. Thus, petitioner questioned
the validity of the said circumstance. The respondents contend that if only one would
represent the Congress, it would deprive the other house of representation for
Congress is a Bicameral legislature.
ISSUE:
Is the eighth member of the Judicial and Bar Council violative of the Constitution?
RULING:
Yes. According to the rules of Statutory Construction, if the words of the statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and be
applied without the need of interpretation. The language of the Constitution is clear
and unambiguous, thus there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids. With regards to
the respondents’ contention, the Supreme Court ruled that “Congress” in the context
of JBC representation should be considered as one body.

216

 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
v.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
ARROYO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
FACTS:
Upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Puno, a vacancy opened in
the Judiciary 7 days after the Presidential Election. Congressman Defensor
requested that the JBC process nominations for the position of Chief Justice.
Controversy arose as according to petitioners this would be tantamount to a midnight
appointment which is prohibited in the Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
Can the President appoint the next Chief Justice given the circumstances?
RULING:
Yes. What is prohibited in the Constitution is the appointment to Executive
offices.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of
Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being
made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a
definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated
by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII
prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.

217

 In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M.
No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Facts of the Case:

On March 30, 1998, President Fidel Ramos signed the appointment papers of
Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Palcido Vallarta, judges of the Regional Trial
Courts In Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. The appointments, prima
facie, seem to be prohibited by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. This is the
prohibition against Presidential appointments, from two months immediately
preceding next presidential election until the end of his term.
Issue:
Does the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
apply to appointments for the judiciary?
Ruling:
Yes. While filling up vacancies in the judiciary is of public interest, there was no
showing of any compelling reason to make the appointments during the period of
ban.

218

 IN RE: REQUEST FOR CREATION OF A SPECIAL DIVISION
A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC January 21, 2002

Facts:
In her letter dated 8 January 2002, Mme. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) recommends the coterminous
appointments of: 1. Atty. Jose Benjamin M. Panganiban as Chief Judicial Staff
Officer (SG 25) in the Office of the PHILJA Chancellor; 2. Atty. Ma. Cristina M.
Cabrera as Executive Assistant V (SG 24) in the Office of the PHILJA Chancellor,
vice Atty. Panganiban; 3. Atty. Orlando B. Cariño as Supervising Judicial Staff
Officer (SG 23) in the Office of the PHILJA Vice-Chancellor; and 4. Atty. Zenaida C.
Pagaduan as Judicial Staff Officer VI (SG 22) in the Office of the PHILJA Executive
Secretary. However, in the Resolution of this Court dated 25 March 1993, certain
coterminous employees have been exempted by the Court from the aforesaid CSC
prohibition.
Issues: Were the appointments approved or disapproved?
Ruling:
The Court hereby: (a) approves the coterminous appointments of Atty. Jose
Benjamin M. Panganiban as Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) in the Office of the
Chancellor; and Atty. Ma. Cristina M. Cabrera as Executive Assistant V (SG 24) in
the Office of the PHILJA Chancellor, vice Atty. Jose Benjamin M. Panganiban; (b)
disapproves the appointment of Atty. Zenaida C. Pagaduan as Judicial Staff Officer
VI (SG 22) in the Office of the PHILJA Executive Secretary, pursuant to CSC MC No.
42, s 1991 and CSC MC No. 37, s 1992; and (c) declares that the exemption
provided for in the Resolution of 25 March 1993 applies only to the coterminous
appointments. The appointment of Atty. Orlando B. Cariño as Supervising Judicial
Staff Officer (SG 23) in the Office of the PHILJA Vice-Chancellor is disapproved.

219

 VIVARES v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Facts: Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both
minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St.
Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into
their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela)
on her Facebook profile. A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s
mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before
the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the
sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012, petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia,
joined the fray as an intervener. On March 28, 2012, defendants in Civil Case No.
CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in
issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students
from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance of
the TRO remained unresolved.
Issue: Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual
milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether
or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Ruling: The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right
to the truth and to informational privacy. It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to
exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights.

220

 Infant Julian Yusay Caram v. Segui
G.R. No. 193652

FACTS:
Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and
eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage.
After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children in Parañaque City.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital
and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby
Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby
Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was
“matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption,
wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a
Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that
the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality
on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made
Baby Julian a ward of the State.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ
of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

RULING:
The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not
proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this case.
As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v.
Pardico enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the
term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and,
That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.

221

 The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the
respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In
fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. was a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Petitioner wrote this request to seek exemption from IBP dues
amounting to P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005.
He posits that he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1952 until
1986 and maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years we was
working there because the law prohibits the practice of one’s profession while in
government service. He also avers that he migrated to the US in December 1986
until his retirement in 2003, therefore he cannot be assessed in those years.
Petitioner questions the IBP Board of Governor’s Policy on Non-Exemption in
the payment of annual member dues, regardless of whether or not they are engaged
in active or inactive practice. He argues that it is unconstitutional and violative of the
equal protection clause and due process clause.

ISSUE:
Does the Integrated Bar of the Philippines have the power to make its own
rules regarding membership dues?

RULING:
Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong to. Every member of the Bar is obliged to carry the weight of its
responsibilities, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty, to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar - which power required members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee
is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA

vs.

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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA"
BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS,
RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE
PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)
G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
FACTS:
Chief Justice Corona was the subject of an impeachment case initiated by the
House of Representatives. He was charged with violating the Constitution, betrayal
of public trust and graft and corruption. The trial was conducted by the Senate,
convening as an impeachment court.
ISSUE/S:
Is impeachment subject to justiciability?
RULING:
Yes. The Court has the power to determine whether a government branch or
instrumentality committed grave abuse of discretion during an Impeachment trial.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we
ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review
over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of
two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a
violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.

223

 G.R. No. 211077, August 15, 2018

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. GABRIEL MORALDE

G.R. No. 211318, August 15, 2018

PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Petitioner, v. GABRIEL MORALDE,

Facts of the Case:

Gabriel Moralde (Moralde) was employed as a Dental Aide in the Provincial Health
Office of Misamis Oriental (province). According to records of the province, Moralde
had a history of falsifying public documents by forging his immediate supervisor’s
signature on his Daily Time Record. The province also noted his track record of
“frequent absences” and “habitual tardiness”.
Moralde was eventually charged for the falsifications to his Daily Time Record. In a
written explanation, Moralde admitted not having worked during those months. The
Provincial Attorney noted Moralde’s previous and similar infractions. The former
recommended that the latter be dismissed from service.
While the administrative case against him was pending, and without knowledge of
provincial officials, Moralde went to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and filed an “application for retirement” under the “Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977”. The day after, Governor Antonio P. Calingin (Governor
Calingin) issued a Memorandum finding Moraldy guilty of Falsification of Public
Documents and dismissing him from service.
Moralde appealed before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), claiming a violation of
his right to due process. The GSIS alter informed Moralde of the approval of his
application for retirement. Moralde served no notice to the province or the CSC of
such approval. The appeal to the CSC was later resolved on the basis of Moralde’s
submissions, due to the failure of Governor Calingin to comment. The CSC ordered
Moralde’s reinstatement. Governor Oscar S. Moreno obeyed the order.
During all the time, Moralde kept silent on the fact that his retirement had already
teken effect years before. It was only when the Province was processing his papers
that the retirement was discovered. The Province appealed to the CSC for New Trial
and/or Modification of Judgement upon discovering how Moralde bypassed his
dismissal by retiring. It noted how Moralde had already received all his benefits from
the GSIS. Moralde opposed by claiming that what he received was his separation
benefits, which did not prevent him from questioning his dismissal. The CSC
dismissed the Province’s motion due to the judgment having reached finality.
Moralde then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals (CA)
questioning his reinstatement. He maintained that he never retired, but merely
received his separation pay. The CA ruled in favor of Moralde.

224

Issues:
Can the Court take notice of a final and executory judgement of the CSC?
Ruling:
No. Just as the losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, so
too does the winner have the right to enjoy finality of the resolution of the case. Such
is not a mere technicality, but an underlying consideration to protect the winning
party’s substantive rights.

225

 Pagdanganan v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 202678 September 05, 2018
Facts:
Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid Guaranty) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the insurance business. On November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through
Pagdanganan, a minority stockholder, filed a complaint for interpleader before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The complaint was filed because of the alleged
conflicting claims between Ma. Susana A.S. Madrigal, Ma. Ana A.S. Madrigal, and
Ma. Rosa A.S. Madrigal (collectively, the Madrigals), and Citibank N.A. Hongkong
(Citibank) over the shares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P. Madrigal.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-118329. In a letter dated May 15,
2008, the Insurance Commission informed newly elected President Vicente A.S.
Madrigal (Vicente) of the consequences of Solid Guaranty's failure to comply with the
minimum capitalization of P150, 000,000.00. On March 24, 2011, Pagdanganan
passed away; thus, counsel moved for the substitution of parties. On October 21,
2011, the Court of Appeals ordered the filing of comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration. A Vigorous Opposition was filed on December 5, 2011. While the
Motions were pending with the Court of Appeals, or on August 2, 2012, the Heirs of
Pagdanganan, Alfonso, and Citibank filed this Petition for Mandamus against the
Court of Appeals, the Madrigals, Mathilda, Vicente, Malasig, Ubano, Dela Cruz, and
Asido before this Court. They allege that the Court of Appeals committed inordinate
delay in resolving their Petition filed on July 11, 2008. They claimed that the Court of
Appeals' "continued inaction on the case is clearly a neglect of its judicial duties."

Issues: Is the petition moot and academic?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals has already rendered its Decision on February 8,
2013. It issued a Resolution dated March 10, 2014 on petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. CA-G.R. SP No.104291 has already been fully resolved by the
Court of Appeals

226

 LABAY v. SANDIGAN BAYAN
G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018
Facts: The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public
officials and private individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology
Resource Center (TRC), sought the release and transfer of his PDAF in the total
amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business Development Corporation (FDC),
which was led by its then president, herein petitioner Labay. However, upon field
verification conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects funded by
Rep. Cagas IV's PDAF were never implemented and were considered to be "ghost
projects. On April 4, 2017, petitioner Labay received copies of the Information’s filed
by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan. Immediately thereafter, on April 5,
2017, petitioner Labay filed an Extremely Urgent Motion of even date, arguing that
he is entitled to a reinvestigation of the case to prevent injustice against him brought
about by the wrongful filing of charges without affording him his right to a complete
preliminary investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Labay’s Motion for Reinvestigation.
Ruling: After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that
petitioner's constitutional right to due process was violated when he was not
furnished a copy of the complaint affidavit and its attachments during the preliminary
investigation. It is clear from the foregoing that an accused in a criminal case has the
right to be informed of the charges against him, to submit a counter affidavit, and to
have access to and examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. The
burden should not be placed on the accused since it is the State which has the
responsibility to use its resources for the proper implementation of the law. To rule
otherwise would effectively curtail the constitutionally protected rights of the people
to be secure with their life, liberty and property.

227

 Tan v Barrios
G.R. Nos. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

FACTS:
On 17 April 1975, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan, with 12
others, were arrested and charged before the Military Commission 1, for the crimes
of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm and for
the killing of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro
City. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, Pres. Marcos
withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was
retained in the military court.
All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp
Crame.
A decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military
Commission finding 5 of the accused guilty of murder, sentenced to suffer
imprisonment. A sixth accused was found guilty of both murder and illegal
possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
electrocution and 8 of the accused were acquitted. Habeas corpus petitions were
filed by prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes
and convicted by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial
rule. They were consolidated into Cruz vs. Enrile. The Supreme Court nullified the
proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees.
Fiscal Barrios filed two criminal cases against all the 15 original defendants in
Tan's case including those who had already died. William Tan et al. filed the petition
seeking the annulment of the criminal cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the re-prosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection
against double jeopardy?

RULING:
Yes. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the
petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of
absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be
allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners,
the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional

228

right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard
and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been
affirmed by this Court years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against
the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in
constitutional logic.
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not
yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final
sentences should not be disturbed by the State.

229

 LAZARO C. GAYO v. VIOLETA G. VERCELES

G.R. NO. 150477, February 28, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent migrated to the United States of America (USA) in 1977 with her
family to look for a better life. Respondent maintained her Filipino citizenship
despite her husband being granted an American citizenship. In 1993, she
returned to the Philippines for good, and was appointed Treasurer of the B.P.
Verceles Foundation the following year. In 1995, she was able to get registered
as a voter in Tubao, La Union. Respondent abandoned her status as lawful
permanent resident in November 5, 1997 for the purpose of filing her
candidacy for Mayor of Tubao. She even surrendered her Green Card to the
American Embassy in Manila. She would only go back to the USA to pay her
children occasional visits. She was proclaimed as duly-elected mayor in the
May 2001 elections.
Petitioner was also a candidate for Mayor in the 2001 elections. He filed a
petition for quo warranto and prayed that the respondent be declared
disqualified to hold the position of the Mayor of Tubao, La Union, and that he
be proclaimed as the winner. He asserts that Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code should be applied instead of Sec. 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code.
He asserts that the two laws are inconsistent because the LGC does not
provide for an exception for those who reacquired their Filipino citizenship.
ISSUE:
Are the two laws contradicting?
RULING:
No. The two laws can be read in harmony with each other. Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code was not repealed by the LGC of 1991. The repealing clause
of the LGC, Section 534, does not specifically mention a repeal of any provision of
the Omnibus Election Code. There was also no irreconcilable inconsistencies with
the two provisions. They are basically the same in the fact that they both provide that
permanent residents or immigrants to a foreign country are disqualified from running
for any local elective position. The difference lies only in the fact that Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides for an exception to the
disqualification. This does not make the two provisions inconsistent with each other.
The two provisions are in pari material which means they both relate to the same
subject matter. Laws in pari material are construed to be in harmony with each other.
It is therefore concluded that respondent was able to comply with the qualifications to
run for office.

230

 IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
FACTS:
The oath taking of the newly-elected officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines were disturbed by the reports of lawyers who witnessed or participated in
the proceeding that there were violations done in the IBP Laws. The election process
itself was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above
board. The main concern however of the Court was the alleged electioneering and
extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for
president of the IBP.
ISSUE:
Is there a violation in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by laws?
RULING:
Yes. Election held on June 1989 be declared annulled. The Court says that the much
coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that
electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political
character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering
for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the
IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession.

231

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
FACTS:
Maria Lourdes Sereno was employed as a member of the faculty of the UP
College of Law. While a faculty, she was also employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
Throughout her 20 years of employment, only 9 Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were filed. She was then appointed as an
Associate Justice; an impeachment complaint was filed against her.
ISSUE/S:
Can the Supreme Court assume jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto?

RULING:
Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that
the House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined
instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.
Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto involving person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not
been for disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, an
action for quo warranto tests the right of person to occupy public position. It is direct
proceeding assailing the title to public office.

232

 G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto
Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.

Facts of the Case:

A complaint was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against Arne
Strom and Grace Reyes (accused) for violation of the Anti Dummy Law. The
accused filed a motion to dismiss, caliming that the power to prosecute violations of
said law lie with the Anti-Dummy Board. The prosecution opposed, pointing out that
the Anti-Dummy Board had already been abolished. Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott
(Gacott) granted the motion to dismiss. Gacott claimed that the letter of
implementation relied on by the city fiscal is not that which is contemplated by the
Civil Code to effect the repeal of another law. The judge found the Prosecutor to
have no authority to bring the charges to court, and ordered the case quashed.
Issues:
Does a division of the Court have the power to dismiss a judge?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court declared in Circular No. 2-89 that decisions or resolutions of a
Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberation, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court.

233

 CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v. GUERRERO
G.R. Nos. 140743 &140745 September 17, 2009
Facts:
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation is the recorded proprietor of
two parcels of land. It suffered real estate tax liabilities on the held properties for the
tax years 1976 to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to resolve its negligent real estate tax
responsibilities, the City Government of Tagaytay offered the possessions for sale at
a public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was implemented in
approval of the City of Tagaytay and was congruently etched on the titles of the
properties. The City of Tagaytay filed a numberless petition for admission of new
certificates of title in its favor afore the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. RTC allowed
the petition. The TTTDC appealed to the CA. The subject assets were later acquired
by Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-Fernando for the sum equal
to the taxes and consequences due to the same. Temporarily, during the pendency
of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction
concerning the doubtful properties on the ground that the properties were not within
the dominion of the City of Tagaytay and therefore, outside its taxing authority. On
the other hand, the City of Tagaytay stated that grounded on its Charter, said
properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.

Issues: Is the City of Tagaytay liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on
the subject properties?

Ruling:
Yes. It is rudimentary that before the City of Tagaytay may tax a certain
property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its
authority. However, the failure of the city officials in this case to confirm if the
property is within its jurisdiction before imposing taxes on the same establishes
gross negligence. The carelessness of its officers in the presentation of their official
purposes gives upsurge to an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. Under the
doctrine of respondent superior, the City of Tagaytay is accountable for all the
essential and natural penalties of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable for
the tortious acts done by its agents who sold the properties to the Melencios
notwithstanding the clear order of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan from its
jurisdiction and moving the same to the Province of Batangas. Decision avowed with
modification.

234

 LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009

Facts: Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental.

Her rival Olivia Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification
case against Limkaichong. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that her
mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s
dad. During the pendency of the case, Election Day came, and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due hearing,
declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of
disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the
winner. This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation, filed a petition
before the Comelec.
Issue: Whether or not the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON
Comelec should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction
after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of
the House of Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and disqualification ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the Comelec of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET. The use of the word “sole” in Sec.17 Art. VI of the Constitution and
in Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the
electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to its members.

235

 RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN

A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 28, 2001

FACTS:
National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Arthur D. Lim
transmitted to the Court a Resolution saying that the IBP has received numerous
complaints from its members regarding serious delays in the decision of cases of the
Sandiganbayan. It asserted that Subreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94
must also be complied with by the Sandiganbayan. This circular requires all
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts to submit to the Supreme Court a bi-annual report, and to post, in
a conspicuous place within its premises, a monthly list of cases submitted for
decision.
The Court required Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
to comment on the letter of the IBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases
pending decision, or with motion for reconsideration pending resolution, indicating
the dates they were deemed submitted for decision or resolution. The report indicate
that the Sandiganbayan has a total of 415 cases for decision remaining undecided
and beyond the reglementary period to decide.
ISSUE:
1. What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must
decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction
2. Is Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the
Sandiganbayan?
RULING:
1. The law creating Sandiganbayan, Presidential Decree No. 1606, is clear on
this matter:

"Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases – As far as practicable, the

trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be
continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three
(3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision."

Also, Sandiganbayan promulgated its own ruled with the same reglementary
period as PD No. 1606.

2. Yes. Administrative Circular10-94 must also be applied to the Sandiganbayan.

Decision making is the primordial and most important duty of the member of
the bench. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their
failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants disciplinary

236

 sanction, including fine, suspension and even dismissal. Delays cannot be
sanctioned or tolerated especially in the anti-graft court, the showcase of the
nation's determination to succeed in its war against graft.

The Court directed to impose a penalty of Php 20,000.00 to Presiding Justice

Francis E. Garchitorena for inefficiency and gross neglect of duty. He was
further admonished of his functions as presiding Justice and from presiding in
any trial so he could focus on his decision writing. Lastly, Sandiganbyan was
orderd to comply with Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-94, effective
immediately.

237

 MALACORA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-51042 SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

FACTS:
This is a case about an appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals which modified the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch I, Butuan City. The case was submitted for decision on October 6,
1980. However, the period of eighteen months for deciding the case, as fixed by the
Constitution has already expired.

ISSUE:
Is the decision of the CA should be affirmed on the ground that the period of
eighteen months for deciding it, as fixed in section 11, Article X of the Constitution,
had already expired.

RULING:
The provision of Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and
should have been complied with immediately after the effectivity of the New
Constitution. This has always been my position, basically, on the legal principle that
all provisions of the Constitution which direct specific acts to be done, or prohibit
certain acts to be done, should be construed as mandatory. To construe them as
merely directory would be to thwart the intention of the Constitution which, its
command being of the highest order should, under no circumstance, be permitted if
they are the 'great ordinances' as Justice Holmes had caned the provisions of the
Constitution. The manifest purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the
disposition of cases, which always is a cause of injustice, under the familiar
aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied."

Paragraph 2 of Section 11 requires for the appealed decision to be deemed

affirmed and original special civil actions, dismissed, is that the applicable maximum
period has lapsed without the decision of the merits being rendered, because of
failure to act on the case and put it to a vote, not that it was put to a vote, but "the

238

necessary vote could not be had." This phrase would thus appear to be either a
mere surplusage or as merely descriptive of how a decision is reached in the
Supreme Court, where alone that phrase has application. It cannot apply to the Court
of Appeals, because there the necessary votes can always be had for a decision to
be reached, just like in the one-man Court of First Instance, as long as the Court
acts. What the Constitution has in and, therefore, is "inaction" on the part of the court
during the applicable period, as the reason or cause for the failure to render a
decision or resolution within the applicable period, not that "the necessary vote
cannot be had.

It seems to me crystal clear that the Constitution intends that aside from the
way an appealed decision, order or resolution is deemed affirmed because of lack of
necessary vote under Section 2 of Article X, the same effect is contemplated by
reason of the lapse of the period fixed without the case being decided on the merits.
If however, the maximum periods fixed in Section 11, which is the real core of said
provision, its heart and soul, as it were, may be disregarded, because the provision
is merely directory, We would be attributing to the framers of the Constitution, with all
their vision and wisdom, an act of colossal absurdity. They have inserted a new
provision which would have no different effect than what is already covered by
Section 2 of the same Article, thus rendering Section 11 a complete surplusage.
Only by holding that Section 11 is of mandatory character would such an absurdity
be avoided, as both Section 2 and Section 11 would each be given distinct Identity
achieving a common objective but through two different and separate ways: (1) the
necessary vote could not be had, under Section 2, and (2) the period fixed had
lapsed, under Section 11.

The express mention by Section 11 itself of exceptions to the automatic

affirmance of appealed decisions, orders or resolutions when not reversed or
modified within the prescribed period, namely, (1) cases where a qualified majority is
required and (2) appeals from judgment of conviction in c cases, which even after
the lapse of the fixed period may still be decided on the merits, clearly, means under
the maxim "expressio inius est exclusio alterius," that aside from the exceptions
expressly mentioned, all other cases may no longer be decided on the merits after
the lapse of the applicable maximum period. The appealed decision, order and
resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall then be so certified by the chief
magistrate of the court, as provided in the last part of paragraph 2 of Section 11.
Said provision would be rendered also useless by holding Section 11 merely
directory because the occasion for the certification will never arise. It will thus be
seen that the exceptions expressly mentioned in the provision and the certification
required thereby as just pointed out, argue most eloquently and convincingly in favor
of the mandatory character of Section 11 of Article X of the New Constitution.

239

 SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO vs.
JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 78, PARANAQUE CITY
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838 March 12, 2014
FACTS:
Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo were the plaintiffs of a prior case for
unlawful detainer against Spouses Magopoy. Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque
ordered the latter to vacate and surrender the possession of the subject property.
However, Spouses Magopoy re-entered the house and regained possession. Due to
this, Spouses Marcelo filed an action to cite Spouses Magopoy in contempt for
disobedience to lawful court process. Instead of resolving the case, Judge Pichay
further ordered the parties to file their comments and oppositions within 5 days from
the receipt of the order. It is emphasized that upon the expiration of the periods given
above, the court will resolve the pending incidents. Despite following the court’s
orders, Judge Pichay still failed to render judgment due to inaction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay
in the resolution of the pending incidents.
RULING:
Yes. The Court states that the Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously
observe the time periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their
adjudication. According to the Constitution, lower courts are given three months from
the date they deemed submitted for decision or resolution. On the other hand,
Supreme Court are given 24 months from the date of submission. Furthermore, in
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct For the Philippine Judiciary, it states
that Judges shall perform all judicial duties including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.

240

 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISIONS

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity

as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990
FACTS:
There was coup d' etat attempt in 1989 which led the President to establish a
fact-finding commission with Hilario B. Davide as the Chairman. Davide had to resign
as the Chairman of COMELEC and Yorac was placed in his stead. Brillantes
questioned the appointment since under the Constitution, no member of COMELEC
shall be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity. It was also argued that the
intrusion of the President was violative of the concept that COMELEC is an
independent Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE/S:
Does the President made by President violate COMELEC’s independence?
RULING:
Yes. It is unconstitutional.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the
discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its
own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The
choice of a temporary chairman comes under that discretion. Such discretion cannot
be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But
while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case,
so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

241

 DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE
III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191672 November 25, 2014

Facts:
On January 11, 2010, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed
Francisco T. Duque III (Duque) as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The designation was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on February 3,
2010.
On February 22, 2010, the President issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO
864). EO 864 included the chairman of the CSC in the Board of Trustees/Directors of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHILHEALTH), Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Issue:
Is the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Trustees/Directors of
GSIS, PHIL HEALTH, ECC and HDMF a violation of the constitutional prohibition on
holding multiple offices for members of the constitutional commissions?
Ruling:
Yes. The positions to which he was appointed have different unrelated
functions. The other functions may impair the independence of the CSC, for which
Duque has already been appointed Chariman. Additionally, the appointments would
also entitle Duque to additional compensation, which is disallowed by the
Constitution.

242

 GAMINDE v. COA
G.R. No. 140335 December 13, 2000
Facts:
Thelma Gaminde was selected by the President of the Philippines as
Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission on Appointments
and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on September 7,
1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for
elucidation on the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her appeal, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel pronounced that her term office will be terminated on
February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999. Trusting on said consultative opinion,
Gaminde continued in office after February 2, 1999. The General Counsel of COA
issued an outlook on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde
has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional intent.” Accordingly, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas
Felipe delivered a Notice of Disallowance, prohibiting in review the salaries and
payments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999.
Issues: Is the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2,
1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by
her?

Ruling:
The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as
selected by President Fidel V. Ramos, terminated on February 2, 1999. Though, she
worked as de-facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office of
the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is set in the 1987
Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
withthe consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

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 Thus, COA erred in cancelling in audit such salary and other emoluments.
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff are permitted to obtain their salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PAGCOR v. CA
202 SCRA 191
Facts:
On October 7, 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as
Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila
Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors
of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert
investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. The summary of
intelligence information claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy
betting as detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers of
PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as gunners on different occasions by
respondent. The two polygraph tests taken by the latter also yielded corroborative
and unfavorable results. On December 23, 1991, respondent Salas submitted a
letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, requesting
reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard, but the
same was denied. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, respondent
was not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired.
Issue: Is CSC Resolution No. 91-830has declared employees in casinos and related
services as confidential appointees by operation of law?
Ruling: Yes. In reversing the decision of the CSC, the Court of Appeals opined that
the provisions of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be
applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its
entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Prior to the passage of
the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when
a position may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when the President, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to
be primarily confidential; and, secondly, in the absence of such declaration, when by
the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be
gleaned from its questioned resolution wherein it stated that "the declaration of a
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position as primarily confidential if at all, merely exempts the position from the civil
service eligibility requirement."

Casino Labor Association v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 141020, 12 June 2008

FACTS:
The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition at bar
started with the consolidated cases filed by the petitioner labor union with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the cases for lack of
jurisdiction over the respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) and
the Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC), this was affirmed by the NLRC
and the SC with finality.
In a resolution, the court stated the following: “Any petitions brought against
private companies will have to be brought before the appropriate agency or office of
the Department of Labor and Employment.”
Based solely on that statement, petitioner filed a Manifestation with the NLRC
praying that the records of the consolidated cases be remanded to the Arbitration
Branch for proper prosecution and/or disposition thereof against private respondents.
NLRC granted the motion, but later reconsidered and denied with finality the
manifestation. Hence, this petition asserting that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in ignoring the mandate of the earlier resolution.

ISSUE:

Does NLRC has jurisdiction over the PAGCOR, the PCOC and the PSSC?

RULING:
In resolving the issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over
employer-employee relations in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC, the Third Division
made the definitive ruling that “there appears to be no question from the petition and
its annexes that the respondent corporations were created by an original charter.”
Furthermore, it is
well-settled that to determine the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be resorted to, but the same must be considered in its

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entirety. Hence, petitioner cannot merely view a portion of the 15 March 1989
Resolution in isolation for the purpose of asserting its position. The 23 January 1989
Resolution already ruled on the NLRC’s lack of jurisdiction over all the respondents
in the case- PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF

ECONOMICS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 88167, May 3, 1993

FACTS:
Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School
of Economics, was dismissed from his position after he was found guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination
questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod. He filed his appeal with the
UP Board of Regents, but was denied. This prompted him to seek relief from the
Merit Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree No. 1409. Under
Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative
cases involving officers and employees of the civil service."
The University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the MSB. The motion was denied. MSB acquitted Pamplina and ordered
his reinstatement with back wages. UP moved for reconsideration, but this was
denied.
UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which sustained the decision of
the MSB.
UP filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was also denied on the basis of
Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only one petition for reconsideration
shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.
UP was ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina to his former position without
change of status as permanent employee with back wages and salaries for the
period of his preventive suspension.
The present petition for certiorari was filed with the Court to seek the annulment of
the decision of the trial court and the orders of the Commission directing the
reinstatement of Pamplina.

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UP contends that under its charter, Act 1870, it enjoys not only academic freedom
but also institutional autonomy.

ISSUE:
Does the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the matter?

RULING:
Yes. The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate
jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil
Service.
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,
regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil
Service. Under the 1967 Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service. As a
mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil
Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was
created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil
Service, UP administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come
under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

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 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DR. JOSE N. RODRIGUEZ MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL) and CESAR J. VIARDO, M.D., in his capacity as Director of the Dr.
Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO L.
LINSANGAN and CEFERINO R. LAUR
G.R. No. 113212 December 29, 1995
FACTS:
Respondent Laur was a patient of Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital.
Upon discharge, he was employed at the DJRMH as a patient-assistant by then
Hospital Director Dr. Runez. Complaints for alarm, scandal, oral defamation, grave
threats, concealment of deadly weapon, violation of the code of ethics of policemen
were filed against Laur. Upon a finding of guilt, Laur was suspended for 60 days with
a warning that upon repetition would result to his outright dismissal. Again, Laur was
involved in a scandal involving mauling of Jake Bondoc. Because of this, Laur was
dismissed by the Chief of Hospital. Laur then filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Commission on the ground of illegal dismissal with additional claims.
The NLRC rendered a decision in favor of Laur.
ISSUE:
Do the National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction over contests relating
to the civil service?
RULING:
No. DJRMH is a government hospital, its employees are covered by Civil
Service rules and regulations and not by the Labor Code. Therefore, any controversy
concerning the relationship between the employees on the one hand and the
hospital's administration on the other, as is the case of private respondent, comes
under the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission.
As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission
administers the Civil Service Law. It is, therefore, the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the civil service. The discharge of this particular function was formerly
lodged in one of its offices, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which was
vested with the power, among others, "to hear and decide on appeal administrative
cases involving officials and employees of the civil service and its decision shall be

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final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be
appealed to the Commission".

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010
FACTS:
The Board of Directors of PCSO moved to appoint Sarsonas as assistant
Department Manager, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a resolution and
opposed this as Sarsonas did not meet the qualifications. This was appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the CSC’s decision insofar asit was violative of due
process and equal protection.
ISSUE/S:
Did the CA err in reversing the CSC?
RULING:
Yes. The Civil Service Commission is an independent Constitutional
Commission which is not to be subject to undue influence. The CSC is in charge of
making sure that persons who are to work in the government are duly qualified. The
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules)
explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought
before it.

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 THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),

Facts of the Case:

The May 2007 elections counted 15,950,900 votes for the partylist
representatives. In a resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declared
thirteen partylists as having won. Following the decisions in CIBAC v COMELEC and
Veterans v COMELEC, BUHAY, having received the most number of votes, was
entitled to two additional seats. BANAT questioned the formula used in coming up
with the seat allocation. It argued that Section 5 Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should be followed, with 20% of the seats of the House of Representatives given to
partylists. COMELEC denied the petition. BANAT filed for mandamus.
Issue:
1) Is Article 6 Section 5 (2) of the Constitution, providing that at least 20% of the
total seats of the House of Representatives be reserved for partylists,
mandatory?
2) Is the two percent qualifying threshold constitutional?
3) How should the partylist seats be allocated?
Ruling:
1) Yes. However, the ratio of partlist representatives has been left to the wisdom
of Congress to decide.
2) No. The threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of partylist seats. It frustrates the 20% ceiling allocated for
the membership of partylist representatives.
3) First, the maximum percentage should be multiplied to the difference of the
maximum seats and the guaranteed seats. Next, each partylist is ranked

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 according to the number of votes received. Then, seats are allocated to those
next in rank, until all seats have been distributed. Finally, the three-seat cap
rule is applied.

GMA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

Facts:
The five appeals before the Court put in subject the supposed
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 controlling the
broadcast and radio commercials of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to a cumulative total of one hundred twenty minutes and one
hundred eighty minutes, correspondingly. They oppose that such preventive rule on
allowable broadcast time disrupts freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.
Section 9 (a) offers for an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per
station airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

Issues: Is Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court detained that the assaulted rule on “aggregate-based” airtime
limits is irrational and random as it excessively limits and compels the skill of
candidates and political parties to reach out and connect with the people. Here, the
adverted motive for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits leveling the
playing field does not establish a convincing state attention which would validate
such a substantial limit on the liberty of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And,
this is particularly so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the nuisance of such a
prohibitive measure.

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 SWS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001
Facts: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-
profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter
processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information
including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen
(15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national
and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other
hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the
elections on May 14,2001

Issue : Whether or not §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional

abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

Ruling: This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of
such laws." is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at
least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because
the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes
such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." Praiseworthy as
these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such
speech creates the danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is
invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is
a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to

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be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA V. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, et al.
G.R. No. 180989 7 February 2012

FACTS:
This is a Petition in pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular
No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial transactions.
The rationale for the circular was, first to reaffirm the concept that fiscal
responsibility resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public
services and improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red
tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to
preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions.
As a taxpayer, Petitioner alleged that pre-audit duty on the part of the COA
cannot be lifted by mere circular, considering the pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
he claims that because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in the
government transactions have been committed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the constitutional duty of COA to conduct pre-audit before the
consummation of government transaction.

RULING:

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 It is not constitutional duty of the COA to conduct a pre-audit- The petitioner’s
allegations find no support in the Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. In
the said provision, it did not mention that it requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit
of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
reference to pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides
that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state
subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is
inadequate.
In such situation, the COA may adopt measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of pre-audit is not
mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. In accordance to
the constitutional pronouncement, COA has the exclusive authority to define the
scope of its audit and examination.
RAMON R. YAP, Petitioner, v. COMMISION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010
FACTS:
Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National
Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with
original charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors of Manila Gas
Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC, as Vice-President for Finance, while
remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to
honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various
allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate
Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Yap which were on the ground
that appellants appointment to MGC, in addition to his regular position as
Department Manager III of NDC, and the subsequent receipt of the questioned
allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the
proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution.
Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned
benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.

Petitioner’s appeal was denied by the Corporate Audit Office II, which affirmed the
MGC Corporate Auditor’s findings. Yap sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling
from respondent COA, arguing that his assignment to MGC was required by the
primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law, namely Executive
Order No. 284. Respondent COA denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the CAO II
ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as
prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, it also ruled that the said allowances and
reimbursements claimed by Yap failed to pass the test of public purpose requirement
of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to
petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC, but it is likewise
necessary that said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines, on the use of government funds, more specifically
on the public purpose requirement.

ISSUE:

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Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it used as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming the questioned
disallowances?
RULING:
No. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and
benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and
(b) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of public funds
means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of
right.
In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries
and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits
paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In
the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or
relevant to the fulfilment of the official duties and functions of the government officers
and employees.
Petitioners theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended
purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries
and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement is wrong.
That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and
employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently
at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.

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 FELIZARDO S. PACETE vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. L-25895 July 23, 1971
FACTS:
Felizardo Pacete was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato on August 1964 during recess of Congress
and immediately assumed his office. His appointment was only submitted to the
Commission on Appointments during the next session and was unanimously
confirmed. On February 1966, Secretary of Justice, through the Judicial
Superintendent advised Pacete to vacate his office as municipal judge on the ground
that his appointment had been by-passed. PAcete was informed that a day after the
confirmation of his appointment, Senator Rodolfo Guanzon filed a motion for
reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of Pacete as a municipal
judge. Because of this, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments notified
the Secretary of Justice which decided that the mere presentation of the letter
automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question. Pacete
decided to clarify the matter with the Commission on Appointments but COA did not
take any action. Furthermore, the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice
withheld Pacete’s salaries.
ISSUE:
Do the motion for reconsideration to a confirmation duly made which is not approved
have an effect of setting aside the prior confirmation?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court is committed to the principle that a mere motion for
reconsideration to a confirmation duly made which is not approved cannot have the
effect of setting aside such confirmation, a principle that is based not merely on the
express language of Rule 21, but a reflection of the settled interpretation of the
Commission on Appointments speaking through its Chairman. A confirmation duly

256

made is not nullified simply by a motion for reconsideration being filed, without its
being voted upon and approved. There must either be a rejection by the Commission
on Appointments or nonaction on its part. In this case, Pacete had instead in his
favor a unanimous vote of confirmation.

ANIANO A. ALBON, Petitioner, v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO, City Mayor of

Marikina, ENGR. ALFONSO ESPIRITO, City Engineer of Marikina, ENGR.
ANAKI MADERAL, Assistant City Engineer of Marikina, and NATIVIDAD
CABALQUINTO, City Treasurer of Marikina, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 148357, June 30, 2006
FACTS:
The City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and
repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was
undertaken by the city government,like other infrastructure projects relating to roads,
streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by the city. Aniano A. Albon filed a
case.
Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to
use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of
Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were
private property because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V.
Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not use public resources on them. In
undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional
proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes4 as well as Sections
335 and 336 of RA 71605 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner
further alleged that there was no appropriation for the project.
ISSUE/S:
Can Marikina validly use the funds?
RULING:
Yes. Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers
and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate
or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities,
including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their
residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities
include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities.

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PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
August 04, 2018

Facts:
On 2008, Philhealth CARAGA granted its officers, employees and contractors
various benefits, among others are: contractor's gift, special events gifts, project
completion incentive, nominal gift, and birthday gifts, amounting to
P49,874,228.02.On 2009, the Audit Team Leader (ATL) of Philhealth CARAGA
issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) Nos.09-005-501-(09) to 09-019-501-(09) on the
payment of benefits to officers, employees and contractors of Philhealth CARAGA in
the calendar year of 2009 in the total amount of P49,874,228.02.The reason for the
disallowance was the lack of approval from the Office of the President (OP) through
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as required under the laws, such
as: Section 6 of the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1597, Memorandum Order (M.O.)
No. 20 dated June 25, 2001, and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 103 dated August
31, 2004. COA Regional Director and Commission Proper affirmed.
Issues: Did the Commission on Audit commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the disallowance?
Ruling:
No, even if Philhealth CARAGA is exempted from Office of Compensation
and Position Classification under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6758, and enjoys fiscal
autonomy as enunciated under Section 16(n) of R.A. No. 7875, it does not
necessarily connote that Philhealth CARAGA's discretion on the matter of fixing
compensation and benefits are absolute. It must still conform to the standards laid
down by the rules as covered by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597.Furthermore, the
subject disallowance of Philhealth CARAGA pertain to additional benefits such as
contractor's gift, special events gifts, project completion incentive, nominal gift, and
birthday gifts, which are considered additional benefits and incentives that require
the recommendation of DBM and approval of the President .

258

 BAYANI F. FERNANDO v. COA EN BANC
GR No. 214910, February 13, 2018
Facts: On March 22, 2004, the MMDA conducted a public bidding for the Design
and Construction of Steel Pedestrian Bridges in various parts of Metro Manila, with
William L. Tan Construction (WLTC) emerging as the winning bidder. During the
construction, WLTC executed Deeds of Assignment for parts of the project to third-
party contractors. The MMDA also issued three suspension orders (SOs) to WLTC
on various dates, as well as the corresponding resume orders subsequently. On
January 29, 2009, the COA State Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance (NO) No.
09-001-TF-(04-06). The COA State Auditor held that the document] requested under
the NS remained not submitted. WLTC explained that this pertains to additional cost
of manpower and equipment due to increased deployment of labor and equipment to
expedite the completion of the project.
However, the COA Proper found that WLTC only needed to expedite the completion
of the project because it had long been overdue.
Issues: Whether the MMDA and/or its concerned officers can be held liable for the
liquidated damages and/or contract cost variance.
Ruling: We deny the petition. At the outset, we sustain petitioners' position that Ona,
as Project Manager, had the authority to issue the SOs and ROs, and to approve the
request for extension of contract time on behalf of the MMDA. Office Order No. 220,
series of 2003[31] issued by then MMDA Chairman Bayani F. Fernando, and which
designated Ona as Project Manager, has the general objective of ensuring the
proper implementation of the project We find that the authority to suspend
construction work and grant requests for contract time extension are necessarily
included in Ona's tasks. We take note of the practice in the construction industry
where the Project Manager exercises discretion on technical matters involving
construction work. Owners of the project are oftentimes not technically suited to
oversee the construction work; professional project managers are thus usually hired,
precisely to oversee the day-to-day operations on the construction site, exercise
professional judgment when expedient, and render his independent decision on
technical matters such as adjustments in cost and time.

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The liability of public officials who allowed the illegal expenditure or disbursement
stems from the general principle that public officers are stewards who must use
government resources efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically to avoid the
wastage of public funds.

MARIO M. GERONIMO V. COA

G.R. No. 2224163 December 4, 2018

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the DPWH, through the officials and then Secretary
Florante Soriquez, asked him to do several landscaping projects along Ayala
Boulevard, Padre Burgos St., Roxas Boulevard, Osmeña Highway and other major
thoroughfares within Metro Manila in connection with the 112th Inter Parliamentary
Union (IPU) Summit in Manila.
The parties involved did not execute any written contract due to time
constraint. Upon completion, Petitioner alleged that he incurred a total amount of
₱14,245,994.20. Despite such completion and several demands, DPWH failed to
pay Petitioner compensation for the services rendered. Hence, Petitioner filed a
Petition for Money claim before the Commission.
He attached in his Petition several letters and memoranda signed by the
officials of DPWH, as well as photographs of the completed projects to support his
claims. DPWH, on the other hand, denied the liability arguing that there was no
written contract between him and the department. It further argued that Petitioner
cannot claim compensation based on quantum meruit as there was no proof that the
landscaping projects have been completed in accordance with the approved plans
and specifications by the DPWH, and that the public benefited therefrom.
The Commission ruled that the principle of quantum meruit is applicable.
However, it still denied the Petition and ruled that the Petition lacks supporting
documents that would substantiate the project accomplishment and the
reasonableness of the cost thereof, pursuant to PD No. 1445 which requires the
submission of complete documents in claims against the government funds.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commission erred when it denied petitioner’s claim despite its finding
that DPWH’s liability in favor of petitioner exists.

RULING:
The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Commission erred when it denied the
Petition for Money Claim. The SC directed the Commission to determine and

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ascertain with dispatch, on a quantum meruit basis, the total compensation due to
petitioner.
Jurisprudence dictates that absence of written contracts would not necessarily
preclude that contractor from receiving payment for the services he or she has
rendered for the government. The Court further explained that denial of the
contractor’s claim would result in the government unjustly enriching itself. Justice
and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. Recovery on the
basis of quantum meruit was also allowed despite invalidity or absence of a written
contract between the contractor and the government agency.
The Commission’s findings that DPWH acknowledged the existence of its
obligation for the landscaping and beautification project should be treated with
utmost respect. The letters and memoranda presented by the Petitioner
unmistakably established DPWH’s recognition of the completion of the projects and
its liability therefor. These projects obviously redounded to the benefit of the public in
the form of uplifting the image of the country – albeit superficially – to the foreign
dignitaries who passed through these thoroughfares during the IPU Summit. It would
be unjust and inequitable if there is no compensation for the actual work performed
and services rendered by petitioner.
However, without any reasonable computation and supporting document,
such as receipts of materials procured for the projects, to justify the figures contained
therein, these summaries could only be considered a self-serving statements which
the Commission properly disregarded. According to the SC, the most judicious action
that the Commission should have taken is to require petitioner to submit additional
supporting evidence and/or employ whatever auditing technique is necessary to
determine the reasonable value of the services he rendered, and the market value of
the materials used in the subject landscaping projects.

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 BAYANI F. FERNANDO, petitioner, V. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 237938 and 237944-45, December 04, 2018

FACTS:
Petitioner Bayani Fernando was the Chairman of the Executive Committee of Metro
Manila Film Festival (MMFF) from 2002-2008.
The COA issued an Office Order No. 2009-602 authorizing the Fraud Audit and
Investigation Office to conduct a special audit on the disbursements of the Executive
Committee of the MMFF for the Calendar Years 2002-2008
The Fraud Audit and Investigation Office found that petitioner received the amount of
P1,000,000.00 on May 20, 2003, and another P1,000,000.00 on May 30, 2003 from
the Executive Commitee of the MMFF for the Special Projects/Activities of the Metro
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) sourced from the advertising sponsorship of
the MMFF for 2002 and 2003. Also, the COA found that petitioner received the
amount of P1,000,000.00 from the Executive Committee of the MMFF as
payment/release of funds for petitioner's cultural projects, which payment was
sourced from non-tax revenues of the said Executive Committee of the MMFF.
Afterwards, the COA issued three Notices of Disallowance against petitioner
covering the aforesaid amounts. In the NDs issued by COA, it made a common
observation that the amount of P1,000,000.00 paid to Petitioner by the MMFF
Executive Committee is disallowed because the check was encashed and was not
issued an Official Receipt by the Collecting officer of the MMDA, which constitutes
irregular transaction.
ISSUES:
1. Does the COA have jurisdiction over the funds of MMFF which is not a public
office?

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 2. Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it audited funds that are not public, having been sourced
from non-tax revenues?
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution provides for the COA's
audit jurisdiction, which includes "the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.

The Executive Committee of the MMFF was created pursuant to Proclamation

No. 1459. Considering the establishment and mechanism of the Executive
Committee of the MMFF, it is apparent that it is not a government-owned and
controlled corporation. However, the Court finds that the Executive Committee
is subject to COA jurisdiction, considering its administrative relationship to the
MMDA, a government agency tasked to perform administrative, coordinating
and policy-setting functions for the local government units in the Metropolitan
Manila area.

2. Yes. The funds of the Executive Committee are considered public funds. The
Executive Committee has two sources of funds:

a. The donations from the local government units comprising the

Metropolitan Manila covering the period of holding the MMFF from
December 25 to January 3; and
b. The non-tax revenues that come in the form of donations from private
entities.

As a committee under MMDA, a public office, this Court finds that both
sources of funds can properly be subject of COA's audit jurisdiction.

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 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA vs.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA"
BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS,
RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE
PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)
G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
A verified complaint of impeachment was filed against Chief Justice Renato
Corona charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust and graft and corruption. The complaint was transmitted to the Senate which
acted as an impeachment court. Corona, then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on the ground that the impeachment court proceeded to trial on the basis
of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is
constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out
the charges which do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts,
being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of
evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates
petitioner’s right to due process (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same
being the result of an illegal act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked to
assail matters arising from Impeachment proceedings.
RULING:

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No. The precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of
judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

V.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN
PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-
CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA,
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION
FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
FACTS:
Herein respondents filed an impeachment case against herein petitioner prior
to the opening of the 15th Congress. When Congress opened, the impeachment
complaint was transmitted to the House of Representatives. Subsequently another
one was filed and dealt with.
ISSUE/S:
Did the 2 complaints violate the 1-year bar rule?
RULING:
No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which
must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the

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filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral
of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of

Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE
ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and
HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

Facts:

Jessica Villacarlos Dayon filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and
administrative complaints for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct
against Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo (Illustrisimo). The Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, Arturo C. Mojica (Mojica), referred the case to the
Cebu Provincial Prosecutor for filing of the appropriate information. The case was
eventually assigned to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.Lastimosa
(Lastimosa).

Lastimosa conducted a preliminary investigation, where she found that only

acts of lasciviousness had actually been committed. Lastimosa filed information for
acts of lasciviousness against Illustrisimo, without permission from the provincial
prosecutor. Mojica subsequently inquired as to the status of the case referred.
Mojica found out that no charge of rape had been filed. He then ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor and Lastimosa to explain why they should not be cited in
contempt for “refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives” of the Office of the
Ombudsman. A hearing was set and Lastimosa filed her Answer.

It was later found out that two cases had been previously filed against the
same officials at the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. The cases were
based on Lastimosa and Kintanar’s refusal to file charges against Illustrisimo.

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Lastimosa and KIntanar were also placed under preventive suspension. Lastimosa
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court.

Issue:

Does the Ombudsman have disciplinary authority over Lastimosa?

Ruling:
Yes. The Ombudsman may discipline a public officer, if the evidence is strong. The
determination of the strength of the evidence lies with the Ombudsman. Deputy
Ombudsman had personal knowledge of the case. The attitude of Lastimosa towards
the criminal case against Illustrisimo also justifies their preventive suspension

DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 180564 JUNE 22, 2010

Facts:
On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini agreed into
an Immunity Agreement under which Disini assumed to attest for the Republic and
deliver its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they desired in its
case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District
Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International
Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin,
Herminio, as an executive in the latter's companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic
supposed that the Westinghouse agreement for the building of the Bataan Nuclear
Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been joined by
irregularities. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic assured that, separately from
the two Westinghouse cases, it would not force Disini to attest in any other national
or foreign proceeding conveyed by the Republic against Herminio. Disini obeyed with
his responsibility but 18 years later, upon the Republic's application, the
Sandiganbayan delivered a summons against Disini, compelling him to testify and
produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against
Herminio.
Issues: Did the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the
Immunity Agreement?

Ruling:
No. PCGG needs to achieve its responsibilities morally as Disini did. More
than anyone, the government should be reasonable. The language of Section 5,

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Executive Order 14 gives leeway to the PCGG in defining the degree of the criminal
protection it may award. It has preference to grant suitable altitudes of criminal
immunity dependent on the situation of the witness and his relative significance to
the trial of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even decide, as in this case, to
circumstances conveyed by the witness as adequate to persuade collaboration.
Believing in the Government's uprightness and loyalty, Disini contracted and fulfilled
his part of the bargain. Confidently, the principle of fair play, which is the spirit of due
process, should grip the Republic on to its promise. A contract is the law between
the parties; it cannot be inhibited except by their mutual consent.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 121940. December 4, 2001

Facts: On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
sold toa certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land. On February
19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Vda. de Caiquep,
TCT No. 436465 with the following encumbrance annotated at the back of the title:
This Deed of Absolute Sale is subject to the conditions enumerated below which
shall be permanent encumbrances on the property.
A day after the issuance of TCT No. 436465, Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject
lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. For being suspected as a subversive, Menez was detained for two years and
he hid for another 4 years after his release. In December of 1990, he discovered that
the subject TCT was missing. Menez filed a petition to replace the lost one and the
same was granted by the Court. On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San
Agustin, received a copy of the above cited decision. He claimed this was the first
time he became aware of the case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who,
according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant
of the property and the heir of Macaria
Issue: Whether or not the subject Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Menez which
was executed during the five-year prohibitory period was binding upon Agustin.
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment
of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, nor for the forfeiture of the lot in question.
Thus, the contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until
annulled in the proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. The said contract of

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sale is binding upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who
alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts
entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG

G.R. 99327 May 27, 1993

FACTS:
Aguila Legis, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites upon
neophytes. As a result thereof, one neophyte named Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a
first year law student, died of serious physical injuries. Another freshman student by
the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
Dean del Castillo created an investigating committee which was tasked to investigate
and submit a report regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. The respondent students were asked to submit their written statements but
failed to do so. In the meantime, they were placed in preventive suspension. The
investigating committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students
for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal
charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule
No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of
the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to
the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty
of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati
a temporary restraining order (TRO) since they are currently enrolled. Judge
Capulong, upon student’s appeal, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and
reinstate the said students.

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ISSUE:
Does a school acted within its rights in expelling students from its academic
community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards?
RULING:
YES. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure. The Supreme Court consistently
upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee enrolled in the College of Architecture, University

of San Carlos (USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of
the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete)
in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture
123. The following school year, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC.
Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student
were credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good
grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of
Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of
her overall academic performance to determine if she could graduate with honors.
She wrote the Council of Deans of the USC requesting that her grades of 5s in
Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her
grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports MECS and this letter was referred to the President of the USC for comment
and return to the MECS.

In the 3rd Indorsement, the President of the USC informed the MECS that the
university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course
would disqualify the student for honors and to deviate from that policy would mean
injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with
honors. She was furnished a copy of said indorsement but she did not ask for a
reconsideration.

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When the USC President was out of town, Lee wrote to the USC Registrar'
requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar referred her letter
to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th
indorsement. Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by
Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture
123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn).

Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that the change
of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting
class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the
submission of the class record.

The USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated with
the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without
honors.

Lee, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that she be
allowed to graduate, cum laude. Dean Satorre explained that the matter was held in
abeyance pending compliance with certain requirements of the MECS through the
memo of Mr. Bacalso. Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class
records, reported he could not produce the same. Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean
Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director asking for the revocation of the change
of grades of private respondent. The request was denied as there was no positive
proof of fraud.

Private respondent filed an action for mandamus with damages against petitioners
University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, asking that petitioners be compelled
to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in
Accounting, cum laude, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials
evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages and attorney's
fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The trial court rendered its decision in favour of
Lee.

ISSUE:

Can the Court compel the University of San Carlos to heed Lee’s requests?

RULING:

No. It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation.
This is part of academic freedom. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be
disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise.

In this case, a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if
he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. For an
incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the
period announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year,
it automatically becomes final. A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same

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category, as a "5" disqualifies a student from receiving honors. A candidate for
honors should have earned no less than 18 units per semester but a working student
should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from
honors. Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for
honors as academic achievements.

The change of grades of private respondent is not supported by the proper

documents, and thus open to question. Obviously, Lee employed undue and
improper pressure on the MECS authorities to approve the change of her grades to
remove all obstacle to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim that the change
of grades of the private respondent was attended with fraud is not entirely misplaced.
Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by
the private respondent.

The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying
the honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the
aforesaid change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of honors.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR

ROGER POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR.
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR.
FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and
MARICHU LAMBINO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY
WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE
G.R No. 134625 August 31, 1999
FACTS:
Arokiaswamy Celine was enrolled in University of the Philippines
Diliman for her doctoral program in Anthropology and was already a candidate
for graduation. Upon completion of the required units and dissertation, she
had her oral defense. After going over her paper, one of the panelists informed
the Dean that Celine committed plagiarism. The Dean requested for the
removal of her name in the official list of graduates but the request did not
reach the Board of Regents. Thus, Celine was able to graduate. The panelist
who informed of her plagiarism decided to file a case against her and
recommended for the withdrawal of her doctorate. The Board sided with the
panelist and decided to formally withdraw her doctorate degree. Celine sought
a request of reconsideration to the President of UP but was denied.
ISSUE:
Was Arokiaswamy Margaret Celine deprived of her Academic Freedom?
RULING:

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No. According to Article XIV of the Constitution, academic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning. As decided by the Supreme Court, the freedom
granted to institutions of higher learning comes with the authority of deciding who
can and who cannot study in it. Aside from that, institutions of higher learning can
also determine who can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. In
this case, the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, the
university certainly has the right to revoke or withdraw the said honor or distinction it
has.

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military

Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his
own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE
HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA,

and on her own behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FACTS:
Cudia was a graduating cadet of the Philippine Military Academy. He was
issued a delinquency report for being late to his class and was charged with
dishonesty due to the fact that he lied about the reason why he was late. He was
referred to the appropriate authorities who found it just to sanction him by putting him
on indefinite leave of absence for violating the Honor Code.
ISSUE/S:
Did the PMA violate his right to due process by putting him on indefinite leave
of absence?
RULING:

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 No. The PMA enjoys academic freedom.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities
and institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935,
1973, and 1987. The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed
in their academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.

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