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Debunking Hayek’s

Road to Serfdom

Zak Brown
Introduction
The purpose of this multi-part series is to debunk the thesis put forward in
F.A. Hayek’s seminal work The Road to Serfdom; wherein, he suggests that
Western Civilization had been moving towards socialism and that this was
ultimately a road to destruction and servitude.
Much of what is said in regard to socialism today is merely a re-articulation
of what Hayek said so many decades ago. This is why it is imperative, as a
socialist, to completely dispel all the falsehoods he promotes so that we
can make clear what the legacy and mission of socialism really is. Some
might think this is a scholarly endeavor; revisiting works from the last
century for the purpose of some aggrandizing intellectual adventure.
Nothing could be farther from the truth. As my series will show, what
Hayek has said continues to be the battle-cry against all progressive and
revolutionary efforts throughout the world. Reactionaries of every stripe
come bearing the words of Hayek as though the future of liberation is
entirely doomed because one man made a few assertions over 50 years
ago. Perhaps this reveals the true depravity of the right-wing but
regardless we should take very seriously the effort to debunk the baseless
nonsense of Hayek so that the people can see through the ideological
garbage fed to them.
The series is separated into several parts, each composing 2 chapters or
more, therefore making the series as comprehensive as possible. Because
Hayek wrote so spaciously, the reader will find I seem to jump around from
point-to-point perhaps without much of a coherent line; however, this is
done so that every claim Hayek makes can be fully debunked. I will make
use of quotations from the text and any additional allusions will be sourced
and explained in references at the end.
Chapter 1: The Abandoned Road
What’s most interesting about Hayek’s opening chapter is that he does not
begin with a cursory explanation of the ideas he writes about (as many
writers on the subject do). Instead, he starts with many poetic appeals to
the sentiments of the presumably White European reader. This writing
strategy (if it could be called that) becomes more important as the book
goes on; however, it should be clear from the start his intentions for even
writing the book. He wants to invoke the romanticized memories of
‘Europe of old’ the tales of European glory, history, and ‘progress’. This is
really his primary strategy for criticizing socialism (which should be noted,
he lumps in with fascism as well) being that he wants to make it seem to
the reader to be ‘unauthentic’: not within the lineage of European progress
but as this foreign and externalized foe.
The title of the chapter ‘The Abandoned Road’ truly says it all. Hayek very
early makes the claim that this ‘road to serfdom’ which is the perceived
European progression towards socialism is an abandonment of those
prized principles long held in high regard throughout Europe.
“We are ready to accept almost any explanation…except one: that the
present state of the world may be the result of genuine error on our part
and that the pursuit of some of our most cherished ideals has apparently
produced results utterly different from those which we expected.” [1]
So what exactly was this ‘genuine error’? What was the road that was
abandoned? Hayek goes onto explain in the following pages.
“We are rapidly abandoning not the views merely of Cobden and Bright, of
Adam Smith and Hume, or even of Locke and Milton, but one of the salient
characteristics of Western civilization as it has grown from the foundations
laid by Christianity and the Greeks and Romans. Not merely nineteenth-
and eighteenth-century liberalism, but the basic individualism inherited by
us from Erasmus and Montaigne, from Cicero and Tacitus, Pericles and
Thucydides, is progressively relinquished.” [2]
Now the story becomes much more clear. In the mind of Hayek, the
acceptance of socialism and progressive ideals by some within Europe is
tantamount to the abolition of the whole history of European development
(which he clearly holds quite sacred).
Here we will make a few points:
1. As is perhaps already clear, Hayek is an idealist. And not even an
idealist in some sort of redeemable sense or the idealism of the hegelians.
All of history, according to Hayek, has been guided by ideas or as he refers
to it in his social context the “European thought”. Immediately anyone
familiar with dialectics or any materialist philosophy can identify the
problem. History is not some arena of ideas, a protracted conflict between
the thought of this people/region against this people/region each with its
own essential characteristics to be ‘discovered’ and utilized; rather, history
as explained by Marx is a history of class struggle. But what exactly does
this mean? It means that the primary locomotive of history is not the ideas
of people but their concrete social contradictions located in an existing
material framework namely in the mode of production. It was not the ‘ideal
of liberalism’ which did away with feudal Europe; it was the burgeoning
success of entrepreneurs, of petty capitalists become advanced capitalists,
who wrestled social power away from the feudal monarchies and absolutist
regimes. Hayek, here, can only see one half of the coin. He can somewhat
identify competing ideologies in the midst of social change but he cannot
identify the material forces upon which these ideologies are founded. What
spells death to capitalism, in Europe and around the world, is not some
‘genuine error’ or the ideals of a few progressives, it is the material force
of humanity in contradiction. The working class and oppressed peoples
seek to destroy capitalism and unleash their potential because of their
material condition as workers and as the oppressed. Integral to any
progressive ideology or ideal is the material foundation, perhaps
transcendent in some cases, that places a subject in the conditions to be
revolutionary. Ideas do not define history, social forces do, and it is true
that these social forces produce ideas and that these ideas act upon
material forces themselves, but this nuance is entirely absent from Hayek.
He is an idealist unable to comprehend the real motion and force of history
and society.
2. Hayek is a reactionary. Maybe obvious by now but worth emphasis.
What Hayek really wants to stress is a preservation of this “European
thought” and “Western Civilization”. He is a classic example of an
individual motivated entirely by his own privileged social location to the
defense of the old society; constantly making poetic and psuedo-
intellectual allusions to the ‘good ole days’. Despite this he is constantly
presenting himself as this novel individual fighting against the pervasive
sentiments of “totalitarianism” which plague the good wholesome
Christian Europe. A great and hardly believable charade, really. After the
first chapter it becomes questionable whether or not he is even a real
‘classical liberal’ or a psuedo-monarchist in liberal clothing. The prevailing
slogan of every reactionary is ‘this is a mistake’ because nothing is more
earth-shattering to a genuine reactionary than the prospect of social
change which is possibly the only thing intrinsic to the whole human
experience in history.
Hayek continues on the chapter with the expected defense of the
achievements of laissez-faire capitalism and the ‘free entrepreneur’. All of
which he claims has been constructive and beneficial to Europe and the
world as a whole:
“The result of this growth surpassed all expectations. Wherever the
barriers to the free exercise of human ingenuity were removed, man
became rapidly able to satisfy ever widening ranges of desire. And while
the rising standard soon led to the discovery of very dark spots in society,
spots which men were no longer willing to tolerate, there was probably no
class that did not substantially benefit from the general advance…the
working man in the Western world had reached a degree of material
comfort, security, and personal independence which a hundred years
before seemed scarcely possible.” [3]
In a phrase, capitalism is/was awesome because it advanced the
productive forces and made everyone feel good about their liberal values
handed down to them. Sure, there was some “dark spots” but overall
everything was greener on the other side.
Let’s make a few points:
1. Every epoch of human history has brought an advancement of the
productive forces. That is sort of how the accumulation of knowledge
works in regard to technology and the construction/improvement of
existing means. Hayek here gives too much credit to the advent of
something rather expected in the course of history. It’s true, however, that
capitalism did experience spectacular growth in regard to the Western
world. The circulation of capital meant profound investment in the
productive forces and the creation of nearly every human industry we
understand today. However, Hayek misses the internal contradictions of
capital accumulation as well as its conjuncture with existing social
formations outside of Europe. The ‘spectacular growth’ mentioned meant
the forcible movement of millions of rural laborers into the dark, cramped,
terrible industrial cities of Europe. Often where conditions were far worse
than even their ‘more backward’ mode of existence in the rural areas. Life
for the industrial proletariat at the beginning of capitalism was horrendous
(and continues to be for those exploited in our modern era) and perhaps
this is what Hayek means with his “dark spots” but even then his claims
are wild underestimates of the true human toll of this reckless and brutal
productive explosion. None of this begins to mention the parallel colonial
exploitation within what he terms ‘the New World’ as well as the ongoing
pillaging of Asia and Africa. In Hayek’s eyes its not whether the non-
Western world is peripheral but whether it exists at all as a functional
society worthy of respect.
2. Hayek’s contemplation of “free exercise” and “personal freedom” is of
course built upon the liberal social construction of the ‘free man’
(importantly not a ‘free woman’ as to Hayek and many intellectuals a
male-centric analysis is standard). It’s far too tempting at this point to
reiterate what Lenin said at the beginning of the 20th century: freedom for
who and to do what? It’s important to imagine the notion of ‘freedom’ as
being inextricably bound to a set parameter of ‘acceptable action’;
meaning that freedom can only exist within limits of action. Freedom,
within capitalism argued Lenin, was freedom for the slave owner; freedom
for the exploiter to do his exploiting [4]. Hayek, of course, would very
much disagree (not simply to the terminology employed as well) arguing
that in fact the freedom of capitalism is the freedom of entrepreneurship:
the endeavor of every ‘free man’ to pursue his own aspirations and ‘make
his own way’. For Hayek it’s not so much as describing capitalist society
but romanticizing it. A Marxist has no desire in romanticizing this or that.
Revolutionary science is about making clear what was previously hidden;
uncovering the contradictions within society which continue to drive our
social realm. Quite the opposite of what happens in the process of
bourgeois apologism such as that from Hayek. Nothing could provide a
greater contrast than a study of The Road to Serfdom wherein Hayek
makes sweeping claims regarding the moral character of capitalism
contrasted to what he calls “collectivism”; on the opposite hand, Marx a
century before Hayek in his seminal work Capital provides an objective
and abstract criticism of political economy, as a whole, as practiced by
bourgeois economists. Marx was dedicated to uncovering, for the people,
what had been previously hidden; the same mission we uphold today.
Before finishing our analysis of the first chapter we should visit the
primary phrase which captures so much attention from popular readers:
“socialism means slavery” [5]. Perhaps the most integral phrase to the
entire book, Hayek’s presentation of socialism as slavery makes clear the
bourgeois sentiment regarding even the possibility of liberation: absolute
terror.
However, one must ask, if socialism is slavery, what exactly is capitalism?
What is capitalism to the billions who live on less than two dollars a day?
What is capitalism millions of children who go hungry every night? What is
capitalism to the single mom working three jobs just to scrape by? What is
capitalism to the homeless man begging outside the Louis Vuitton store? If
capitalism really is freedom, then I cannot fathom what an unholy Hell
socialism must be.
But what really is socialism? Socialism is the political power of the working
class and oppressed peoples concretely realized. The incredible idea that
human need, potential, and progress is more important than making a
profit. Socialism is the audacious demand that everyone deserves a
meaningful existence not plagued by servitude and exploitation; an
opportunity to realize themselves and better humanity as a whole. What a
unimaginable terror socialism must be.
Now Hayek is right to claim that socialism means prohibition in some
cases. Some freedoms must be abolished. But just what sort of freedoms
does socialism abolish? The freedom to exploit; the freedom to oppress;
the freedom to discriminate against others; the freedom to exclude whole
swaths of the population; the freedom to dehumanize; the freedom to
objectifiy; the freedom to terrorize. All of these modern day ‘freedoms’
must be swept away for socialism to succeed. In this sense, I completely
agree with Hayek: socialism is slavery; an eternal slavery for those whose
only desire is to subjugate others.
In addition, some institutions and proliferated ideas must also be swept
away. Racism must be eliminated; sexism must be eliminated;
heteronormativity must be eliminated; patriarchy must be eliminated;
ableism must be eliminated; every form of conceivable oppression wherein
some group of people are subjugated to another must be done away with.
So in a sense, the old society along with its values must tossed into the
dustbin of history.
We are unapologetic in this regard and to Hayek what could be more
terrifying than the looming possibility of human liberation?
Chapter 2: The Great Utopia
Hayek opens chapter two with much of the same rhetoric merely
continued onto another page. It’s a distinct possibility the first two
chapters were written as an extended opening and only edited as separate
selections after the fact. Regardless, Hayek makes general claims
regarding the socialists desire to limit freedom and invokes utopian
socialists such as Saint-Simon to make the point. The allusion is quite
disingenuous considering modern and even most 19th century socialists
had little in common with the utopian speculation of Saint-Simon. His sort
of nonsense was heavily criticized for its clear failures by Engels in
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Perhaps Hayek never read Engels, or
more likely he was just drawing abject connections for the point of
defaming actual revolutionary theory.
Upon analyzing the democratic currents of socialism in the 19th century
(although he treats these breaks as continuities rather than scientific and
qualitative ruptures, as they were) he concludes that democracy is entirely
incompatible with socialism.
“Nobody saw more clearly than Tocqueville that democracy was an
essentially individualist institution stood in an irreconcilable conflict with
socialism…Democracy attaches all possible value to each man; socialism
makes each man a mere agent, a mere number. Democracy and socialism
have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference:
while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in
restraint and servitude” [6]
First, one must question the ‘individualism’ of a social system based upon
the quantitative accumulation of abstract social-value (money) wherein
ones entire existence depends on her ability to acquire more money.
Perhaps not the system most friendly to those who seek an individual
expression outside of what is accepted by the ruling class of capital
owners. Second, as Lenin noted, capitalism does have democracy,
democracy for the slave holder (as cited earlier). Every dollar has a vote,
almost literally. No money? Tough luck I suppose. It’s laughable to
conclude that a system of decision making where those with more wealth
have more influence could be anything but a functional tyranny.
Furthermore, what could be more dehumanizing (regarding cold
calculations, use of numbers, etc.) than the dictatorship of financial capital
that dominates our social system? Billions of jobs, thousands of homes,
endless livelihood rests on the speculative dance of numbers across a
spectacular screen. In the event those numbers show retraction, the
market crashes, and literally lives are ended. What sort of democracy is
that?
Hayek goes onto claim socialists very subtly challenged the common
understanding of ‘freedom’ to include “economic freedom”. However, one
can hardly call the historic challenge of ‘freedom’ something of a plot to
“lure” liberals into socialism, as Hayek contends [7]. Rather, redefining
‘freedom’ as it had been put forward before is something inherent to any
significant social movement. Even in the French Revolution, the Jacobins
wanted to challenge feudal understandings of ‘freedom’ as that provided
by God and mediated by the monarchy; they wanted to redefine freedom
to reinforce their own class interests. Therefore its not surprising that
socialists of the 19th and 20th centuries wanted to expand our
understanding of ‘freedom’ to include life-affirming freedoms such as that
to housing, a job, retirement security etc. Nonetheless, Hayek takes
particular issue with this expanded understanding of freedom (a very
common theme throughout the book, clearly):
“Freedom in this sense is, of course, merely another name for power or
wealth…The demand for new freedom was thus only another name for the
old demand for an equal distribution of wealth.” [8]
Once again we find Hayek attempting to draw connections between
socialism and old feudal doctrines of equality and utopian promises. There
is not much to dislike about socialism, unless of course you are a member
of the ruling class or one of their stooges, so Hayek goes about drawing as
many nightmarish connections as one can imagine. None of which are
particularly compelling and all of which can be easily proven wrong with a
rudimentary study of history and socialist theory. But Hayek’s dystopian
web only snowballs into a complete conflation of socialism with fascism:
“Observer after observer…has been impressed with the extraordinary
similarity in many respects of the conditions under ‘fascism’ and
‘communism’… ‘instead of being better, Stalinism is worse than fascism,
more ruthless, barbarous, unjust, immoral, anti-democratic, unredeemed
by any hope or scruple,’ and that it is ‘better described as superfascist’.”
[9]
Lenin correctly described fascism as actually being “capitalism in decay”
[10]. What does that mean precisely? Well, as the internal conradictions of
capitalism become more pronounced, throughout its development, the
ruling class makes considerable social concessions to the opportunists
among the working class in order to preserve capitalism as a whole.
Fascism is a classic example of class collaborationism dominated by the
bourgeoisie, not an example of socialism, wherein the working class and
oppressed peoples make up the dominant class in society. In fascism, the
ruling class is left largely intact, a few political enemies might be
expropriated, some popular concessions made, but capital still runs the
show without a question. This fundamental difference between fascism
and socialism is gone without mention in Hayek’s short appraisal. Once
again, conflating socialism with some other popularly undesirable system
is essentially his strategy throughout most of the book.
His remarks regarding ‘Stalinism’ are also quaint and expected. First, no
one in a genuine sense could have much love for the Stalin period within
the Soviet Union. Not as if there were not tremendous achievements by
the young socialist country, there certainly were; however, this period was
marked by crippling material desperation (as an isolated and
underdeveloped socialist center) and political turmoil as the world’s first
socialist country made bold steps into a future never traveled before.
Second, his referencing of ‘Stalinism’ is politically and historically empty.
As modern historians such as J. Arch Getty have shown, the Soviet Union
from 1928-1953 was hardly Stalin’s playground for his ‘evil’ desires [11].
Rather, the political landscape of the Soviet Union was complicated and
intricate down to the municipal apparatuses of the young Communist
Party. Political contradictions between landed classes, the new Bolsheviks,
and the old Bolsheviks gave rise to a plethora of antagonisms certainly
exacerbating any existing crises. Therefore, recent historical work has very
much admonished Stalin himself of the failures and controversies during
that period and instead given greater light to the whole administration of
the Communist Party and Soviet government especially at the local nodes.
This makes sense in regard to a Marxist study of history: the application of
historical materialism. Where attention is given not to individual ‘great
men of history’ but rather the broad social forces and their contradictions
which made such individuals manifest and drove the course of history.
Another contention is the way in which Hayek glosses over the relative
success of socialism and absolute failure of fascism. The Soviet Union went
from perhaps the most backward nation in Europe at the time of revolution
in 1917, to a world superpower rivaling industrial giants such as the United
States in 1945 [12]. Keep in mind that the first Five Year Plan began nearly
11 years after the revolution in 1928. The success of the socialist plan in
developing the productive forces of society is absolutely unprecedented
even by standards of the early Industrial Revolution. Fascist Italy and
Germany, on the other hand, were tin castles which floated only on
speculative war spending [13]. There economies were hardly sustainable
in the long-haul which is perhaps even a reason why the Nazis were so
eager to invade Poland after their series of expansions southward.
In another sphere, the young Soviet Union achieved monumental progress
in the social liberation of marginalized groups. Russia had always been a
prison house of nations, forcibly repressing dissident nationalities from the
independence and self-determination they deserved. The Soviet Union
established a formal body by which minority nationalities could express
their demands and achieve the recognition they deserved (although some
would rightly argue that even these measures did not go far enough); a
progressive achievement far ahead of any Western nation certainly the
ultra-nationalist and xenophobic fascists of Europe. Women were also fully
recognized members of Soviet society, equal in rights to their male
counterparts, and able to express themselves as ‘full humans’. And while
Black people in the United States were being hosed down by riot police,
segregated, and thrown in jail, racial discrimination in the Soviet Union
was completely abolished. Every man, woman, and child regardless of race
walked as equals in fellowship among the streets, something the United
States today still struggles to achieve.
Ultimately we could dedicate hours to disproving Hayek’s ridiculous
conflation between European fascism and Soviet socialism at the time but
we would only be exhausting ourselves. In the end, there is a very real
difference between the fascists and socialists of the time. The difference
lies between those who started the holocaust and those who ended it.
Hayek continues the chapter building off of his conflation made previously.
He explores avenues by which “Marxism has led to fascism” and all sorts
of similarly unfounded claims [14]. His only strand of evidence lies in the
fact that many of the prominent Nazis and fascists of the period were
previously socialists to some extent, as if this is some sort of little known
‘gotcha’ moment. Clearly, many fascist leaders were previously associated
with socialist movements. As stated earlier, fascists are the cream of
political opportunism; capitalizing on the energy of the masses for their
own intentions at preserving the status quo. In this sense, it’s no surprise
that leaders like Benito Mussolini fancied themselves socialists for a
period. However, any close study of the same leaders (e.g. Mussolini)
reveals a train of political opportunism, flopping sides, changing rhetoric,
and general appeasement. The fact many fascists considered themselves
socialists is no indictment of socialism but rather an insight into their own
opportunist strategy made possible by class collaboration.
In the following page, Hayek builds his argument by noting how, for
example, in the both Italy and Germany fascists and socialists “competed
for the support of the same type of mind” [15]. This has just the smallest
kernel of truth to it. In the early stages of the fascist movement in Europe,
both fascist corporatists and socialist unionists were indeed locked in a
struggle at the ballot box and most certainly at the workplace. Once again,
not surprising given the opportunist and psuedo-populist prose of the
fascists at the time. However, as time went on certainly this all changed.
The greatest support for fascism in Germany and Italy came not from the
working class, as we commonly understand it, but actually from arguably
‘lumpenized’ portions of the military apparatus. Unemployed soldiers from
the previous World War, feeling alienated and longing for pride again,
became the henchmen of both Hitler and Mussolini before and during their
respective regimes [16]. The communists and socialists found strength
among the working classes but were unable to fully capitalize in that
respect. Remember, after the fascist rise to power in both Germany and
Italy, it was the communists, socialists, and trade unionists who were
tossed in jail or the concentration camp first. Therefore, any competition
between fascists and socialists early on as indicative of the two being
“similar” in principle is absolute nonsense that any honest study of history
can easily dispel.
After making many similar and numerous claims in the following pages,
Hayek finally makes the summary points of his entire chapter:
“That democratic socialism, the great utopia of the last few generations, is
not only unachievable, but that to strive for it produces something so
utterly different that few of those who now wish it would be prepared to
accept the consequences, many will not believe the connection has been
laid bare in all its aspects.” [17]
Before addressing his final statement we should revisit his train of
argumentation, throughout the chapter, leading up to this point. First,
socialism was ‘authoritarian’ and undemocratic until some sly socialists
‘subtly’ changed the definition of freedom; all of which we showed was a
certain and blatant misrepresentation. Second, he conflates socialism with
fascism and makes a quip regarding the “superfascist” nature of
“Stalinism”; something that was easily and distinctly debunked through a
more holistic study of history. Finally, he finds refuge in the fact that at
some point fascists and socialists were in steep competition therefore
indicating we must be “similar” at least in principle. Although, once again,
he is proven wrong simply by revisiting the historical period with an eye
towards the developing social contradictions between the evolving classes
in Europe just prior to World War II. Hayek’s final conclusion? “Democratic
socialism” is a utopian fantasy and unattainable because of his previously
established (false) premises and subsequent (fallacious) conclusions.
1. Socialism, if it is actually socialism in the way described by Marxists
over the previous centuries, must be a “democratic socialism”. Not in the
parliamentary sense or in the bourgeois sense of the “representative
democracy” but an organic democracy for the people. If socialism is not
guided by the people with the interests of the people then it is simply not
socialism by its very cardinal traits.
2. Socialism is only as “utopian” as we consider the scientific advancement
of humanity to be “utopian”. Certainly, one hundred years ago the idea of
humans landing on the moon was out of the question, “utopian” even.
Now we seem to parade around the galaxy as if it were our own cosmic
backyard. The primary edifice of any reactionary is an implausible mistrust
of the future. Anything which transcends the fundamental contradictions
of our present society must be considered totally ‘unattainable’ or else the
entire fabric of our totality would disintegrate. People around the world are
constantly informed by the bourgeois media, theorists, and popular culture
that “this is the best we got”. But like peasants under the Hapsburg
dynasty during the French Revolution, we can look clearly upon examples
to the contrary and know that this is not “the best we can have”. Looking
back at socialist experiments only reaffirms our desire to make the future
more than plausible but actualize the success we know from collective
experience is attainable.
That is the ‘revolutionary optimism’ which is the existential enemy of
reactionary charlatans like F. A. Hayek; those individuals who spend their
days deriding the achievements of the masses and doubting the possibility
of any substantive liberation. We already know that a better future is
possible; not only is it possible it is certain with the concerted effort of the
masses in a way hardly conceived by ruling class stooges such as Hayek
and his modern successors. If socialism is only a “Great Utopia” then
consider the past and present revolutionaries the real visionaries for the
whole of humanity progressing endlessly towards an absolute liberation of
all people everywhere.
Chapter 3: Individualism and Collectivism
The title of this chapter is in my own opinion quite a misnomer. In fact, Hayek spends
as little time as possible truly outlining what he considers to be “collectivism” or
“individualism” beyond a rudimentary appraisal in the first few pages. Most of the
chapter is spent detailing the tendency towards a ‘planned-economy’ in the West, the
reasoning behind it, and why this is bad. Regardless we will go about debunking
Hayek’s claims as they appear with special attention given to certain structural
arguments which give base to subsequent claims.

On the first page Hayek starts by noting confusion over what precisely socialism
entails. He claims that not only does it socialism imply a sense of justice and equality,
but also the means by which to arrive at such a society.

“In this sense, socialism means the abolition of private enterprise, of private
ownership of the means of production, and the creation of a system of “planned
economy” in which the entrepreneur working for profit is replaced by a central
planning body.” [1]

At the conceptual level, Hayek is absolutely correct. Socialism does require the
abolition of private entrepreneurship as well as the establishment of some “common
plan” of production (a la Marx). The extent by which we consider the central body to
be a direct replacement of the directing market forces or a scientific advancement in
the way the whole ‘system functions’ is still debated. However, it certainly cannot be
ignored that in the history of socialism centrally planned bodies have played a
strategic role in building up to socialism in the rational allocation of resources.

Hayek then returns to his previous tirade of claiming socialist have been arm-twisting
liberals into accepting socialism, “by far the most important species of collectivism”
[2]. Social justice, he argues, or at least the “current ideas of social justice”, requires
a conscious distributive program that the free market cannot sustain. Therefore,
socialists argue strongly in favor of the use of a central plan [3]. However, he
continues to drive home the fact that the liberal conception of “planning” within an
economy is very different than the socialist.
“’Planning’ owes its popularity largely to the fact that everybody desires, of course,
that we should handle our common problems as rationally as possible and that, in
doing so, we should use as much foresight as we can command. In this sense
everyone who is not a complete fatalist is a planner…But it is not in this sense that
our enthusiasts for a planned society now employ this term…According to modern
planners, and for their purposes, it is not sufficient to design the most rational
permanent framework within which various activities would be conducted by different
persons according to their individual plans. This liberal plan, according to them, is no
plan.” [4]

He uses the above premise to bridge into a discussion of whether a ‘central plan’ or
“liberal plan” is more preferable.

“The question is whether for this purpose it is better that the holder of coercive power
should confine himself in general to creating conditions under which the knowledge
and initiative of individuals are given best scope so that they can plan more
successfully; or whether a rational utilization of our resources requires central
direction and organization of all our activities according to some consciously
constructed ‘blueprint’.” [5]

Let’s start with a few points.

1. Capitalism is an anarchy of production. Not in the proverbial or preferable sense of


a relatively ‘horizontal’ system of some equitable nature. The allocation of resources
is arguably done ‘irrationally’ according to the maxim of “production for use”.
Moreover, capitalist production and distribution is hardly able to account for its own
internal contradictions which are in a constant flux causing the crises we so regularly
experience. The argument in favor of “planning the economy”, from socialists at least,
is not so much from a conceptual fetishism of “reason” and “rationality” but a more
historic understanding of how capitalism actually functions. Socialism requires the
concrete advancement of productive forces in a direction to enhance overall
scientific-technical knowledge of our own productive capacities. To put it briefly,
socialism needs ‘planning’ because the anarchic nature of the market makes
prolonged and effective development of the productive forces towards communism
impossible.

2. Capitalism has paved the way to socialist planning. Lenin once noted the necessity
of developing certain capitalist methods as to progress in our own understanding of
directing economic activity. Was he correct? Arguably Wal-Mart has done more to
advance our own understanding of real-time consumer data, streamlining distribution,
logistics, and technical discrepancies than any Soviet planner. The fact of the matter
is that under monopoly capitalism (imperialism) much of the world economy is
already collectively planned by a small network of massive corporations. The fantasy
world of millions of mom-and-pop shops competing for those beloved customers is
long past us. Only a handful of transnational firms maintain the concrete economic
gravity which keeps capital circulating and the whole system in check. The world
economy is already planned the question is planned for who?

3. Planning is not just for the obvious purposes. Developing the productive forces,
while being very important, is not the only component of socialism nor is it arguably
the most important. Transforming the relations of production, the ways in which
people relate to each other in the course of production, takes primacy in the
construction of socialism (in our understanding, at least). Planning the economy
allows us to transform these relations by eliminating certain elements of bourgeois
society from the course of the labor process. For example, through planning the
economy, labor no longer becomes a commodity to be bought and sold (rather, the
time-selling of labor-power to the capitalist by the worker). Unemployment,
homelessness, and hunger are no longer weapons to be used against the working
class. The oppressed and exploited are able to concretely seize upon their own
economic conditions and draft up a plan which empowers them and their own class
position. This is the sort of subtleties to planning which Hayek completely glosses
over and arguably even some technocratic proponents of planning to some extent or
another.
4. The “creating conditions under which the knowledge and initiative of individuals are
given best scope so that they can plan more successfully” is simply an advanced
euphemism for refining the existing capitalist legal structure; formalizing the relations
of production, relations of exploitation, so that they might become more ‘efficient’ and
‘seamless’ in their progression. All this talk about the ‘initiative of individuals’ might as
well be rhetoric from the holy gospel of the Free Market. In modern capitalism, even
in early competitive capitalism, this “initiative of the individual” is negligible.
Capitalists themselves are only stand-in functionaries, “conductors”, to the train of
capital circulation; they are a necessity, but they themselves are certainly not and
neither is their initiative. What Hayek is concretely referencing here is the
formalization of the social division of labor, the legal establishment of capitalist
superiority and the supremacy of their relations of production, to an even greater
extent than is already experienced.

All of this “planning” talk and the question of ‘individuality’ rather rhetorically posed by
Hayek at the beginning of the chapter only becomes more empty as the book drags
on. What sort of plan can even be posed by that of the proletariat; members of the
exploited class and not the exploiter class? What sort of plan gives the oppressed
and exploited the same ‘individual initiative’ and social significance that is afforded to
the bourgeoisie? Only a “plan” which involves the complete abolition of capitalism,
imperialism, and every other system of oppression which keeps the people in one
chain or another.

The idea that a worker could empower herself through an “individual plan”, the liberal
sort that Hayek makes mention of, is absolutely laughable. What is she to plan?
Today I will get exploited, when I am done being exploited I will reproduce my bodily
capacities, then I will go tomorrow and get exploited etc. etc. Only the most detached
and academic nonsense could possibly conjure a situation where the great mass of
people are empowered by such empty “individual plans”. These plans are actually
component parts of the collective myth of “success”. Something so rare that every
time it occurs the ruling class must hoist such an example up high for the whole
social formation to witness and then place it safely into a museum display for
generations to pass-by (in the words of Althusser). What is this individual plan, this
hope of “success”, to the homeless man outside the Chanel store? How about the
children growing up in New York’s public housing? What is it to those single mothers
grinding out an existence deep in Compton?

Such an individual plan only makes sense if you are in fact the “individual” in
question; a holder of capital, an exploiter, someone who wields the economic
mechanisms of our society as a weapon against the working class. Only then does
the plan that Hayek and others speak of have any relevance.

Ultimately, Hayek ends this chapter with one final appeal to the ‘decent sentiments’ of
his readers.

“The idea of complete centralization of economic activity still appalls most people, not
only because of the stupendous difficulty of the task, but even more because of the
horror inspired by the idea of everything being directed from a single center.” [6]

Perhaps unknown to Hayek, everything is directed from a “single center”: the


amorphous composition of this fluttering phenomenon we call capital from which all
things relate and to a great extent are determined. More troubling is how not only
does all economic activity stem from the ‘center’ but also moves towards a central
‘goal’. This goal being the acquisition of a profit, the reproduction of the circuit of
capital, wherein the cycle starts again and the endless drive to accumulate is
extended. Therefore Hayek’s appeal to the individuality of his readers against this
boogeyman of a ‘planned-economy’ retains its own despicable irony. Nothing could
be more damaging to the individual and her expression than the burgeoning march of
capital and history has constantly demonstrated this.

The question of socialism then is not one of ‘individualism or collectivism’, or myself


and the ‘others’, but really a fundamental question of the social self. Should we, as
workers but more importantly as people, command our own production or not?
Should we satisfy our own needs and desires or not? Do we want to be oppressed or
self-determined? This might seem to be a massive simplification of the socialist
demand but quite honestly this is the kernel at play: do we affirm ourselves or not?

Socialism is not the negation of individuality to the credit of collectivity but instead the
realization of individuality through the affirmation of ourselves.
Chapter 4: The “Inevitability” of Planning
Hayek starts the chapter with a very critical indictment of the Marxist method. As
shown in earlier chapters, Hayek promotes a sort of idealism at the loss of a
materialist conception of history. Meaning that he decidedly believes ideas are the
driving force of history rather than material practices which is what Marxists highlight
in opposition to his sort of idealism.

He specifically notes how the trend towards the concentration of capital (monopoly
capitalism) is not an inherent process of capitalism but rather a sort of ‘self-fulfilling
prophecy’ to the credit of (nominally) socialist ideas.

“The tendency towards monopoly and planning is not the result of any ‘objective
facts’ beyond our control but the product of opinions fostered and propagated for half
a century until they have come to dominate all our policy.” [7]

A tempting possibility for the liberal to ponder but simply not true for a number of
reasons. First, experience generally precedes theory. When we encounter a
phenomena we seek to describe and recognize the phenomena with a whole sort of
significations. However, what is important to note is that the phenomena did exist at
least phenomenologically (bear with me) to the point at which it was discerned. There
is some deep philosophical discussion to be had as to the construction of certain
‘events’ (e.g. the concentration of capital) however we can remain fairly historically
certain these did not occur simply because of the “opinions” of some nominal
progressive policy makers. We can even explain this phenomena and provide cross-
cultural examples using the Marxist method.

To explain why capital concentrates (“tendency towards monopoly”) quite briefly we


should note the process is inherent to the accumulation of capital itself. Production is
driven by the socially necessary labor time. Capitalists who are able to enhance the
productivity of their labor process therefore lower the necessary labor time in the
production of a commodity (usually through expanding productive means e.g.
equipment, machines, etc.) and therefore are able to acquire more of the market.
These larger capitalists then acquire the assets of smaller capitalists and again
expand their own production. Eventually, smaller capitalists are forced into retreat
from these monopolized markets and “crowd into spheres of production which
Modern Industry has only sporadically or incompletely got hold of” which is where we
find most ‘small businesses’ today [8].

Therefore, history has shown the concentration of capital to be an objectively certain


process of capitalism and to our analysis quite ‘inevitable’ and independent of any
idealist notions of change.

Hayek, to his credit, does not simply ignore this knowledge nor give up his original
assertion. In fact, he takes our materialist conception of history and the concentration
of capital to bat in the following pages.

“The alleged technological cause of the growth of monopoly is the superiority of the
large firm over the small…The most comprehensive study of the facts…arrives at the
conclusion that the view according to which the greater efficiency of large scale
production is the cause of the disappearance of competition ‘finds scant support in
any evidence that is now at hand’” [9]

Hayek then cites a prominent economic report at his time detailing how the
concentration of capital was due to “collusive agreement and promoted by public
policies” [10].

There is a bit of truth to be found in Hayek’s assertion so it’s important to take our
time analyzing the selected material.

First, the study he utilizes was, even at the time, ill-equipped for any real
comprehensive and comparative analysis of firms. The Temporary National Economic
Committee which he cites only analyzed the relative success of “large-firms” to
“small-firms” in select markets. Ignoring the fact of course that even Marx admitted
there were certain markets wherein small capitalists could take refuge. These
markets are where the “competition rages” where the consumer base is more
important than the disciplined productivity of a “large-firm”. However, the analysis
given is almost laughably one-sided. Where is the analysis of small capitalists in the
steel industry, or the oil industry, or the textile industry? That is where the large
productive capacity of monopoly capitalists comes to full fruition as they sweep
smaller competition through sheer force. More modern economic analysis has
shown, perhaps intuitively so, that larger-firms are always better equipped in
competition with smaller capitalists. The reason is even more expanded than that
initially provided by Marx with the socially necessary labor time being commanded by
larger capitalists. In addition to their ability to discipline productivity, monopoly
capitalists can negotiate preferable finance deals, acquire more specialized labor-
power, and invest more capital into labor-power reproduction. All of which gives them
a substantial edge over small capitalists, no mater how driven, innovative, or
enterprising they are. Big money beats small money in big fields.

On an off point, Hayek also argues that if concentration were inevitable we should
have seen it occur faster in the older industrial nations such as England but instead it
occurred most noticeably in the United States. However, this makes perfect sense
from the analysis provided by Marxists. The concentration of capital is hardly
mechanical but certainly determined more by the rate and liquidity of accumulation
than the duration of development. The tremendous amount of foreign investment
from Europe into fresh markets within the US allowed for the remarkable expansion
of industrial capitalists as they gobbled up stakes. Smaller capitalists in the US
unable to secure that bountiful investment faded very quickly and left the most
lucrative markets to a handful of ultra-wealthy massive firms which only grew quicker.
The situation in England was starkly different with no real spatial ‘room-for-growth’
and only trickling foreign investment; industrial capital had a very uphill climb which
explains why the concentration took so much longer to advance (although now its
certainly apparent the process wasn’t fatally hindered). A more modern example
would be the explosion of monopoly firms within India which only very recently began
industrializing. India, like all other growing industrial powers today, has the whole
world market of foreign investment and liquidity to quickly develop capitalism and all
the processes therein.
Second, the presence of “collusive agreements” between big capitalists and the state
is hardly any surprise to a Marxist. After all, the bourgeois state is the bourgeois state
it is there to serve the bourgoeisie. None of which casts doubt on the truth-value of
the Marxist method. If anything, our understanding of history and society is only
reaffirmed by the presence of such collusion. Some might then ask is the
concentration of capital a consequence of internal contradictions within accumulation
or the simple subservience of the state to the bourgeoisie? For our purposes with
debunking Hayek here, it really makes no difference. Both processes are arguably
equally intrinsic to capitalism therefore it makes no difference how it occurs,
concentration of capital is imminent.

However, for point of technical clarification we should note that this concentration is
likely reinforced by both processes but principally through the internal contradictions
in accumulation. Even without the collusion between big capitalists and their state
actors, monopolies would spring up in markets for the reasons already given. Yet, the
bourgeois state in capitalism has always acted to develop and protect capitalism
without any real exception to be noted (even in the case of “picking losers” the action
extends the social whole). It should be expected that the superstructure would act
back upon the base to help resolve those contradictions which might impede overall
development.

Hayek goes onto make several claims to the superiority of competitive markets and
the price system as opposed to a planned-economy. However, we should not spend
too much time on these claims in specific as much more accomplished experts in
these fields have disproved so much of Hayek’s assertions.

For example, Paul Cockshott (PhD) and Allin Cottrell (PhD) in their published report
Economic Planning, Computers and Labor Values thoroughly demonstrated how an
entire economy could be planned more effectively than anything existing today using
real-time data feeds and labor-values in place of standard pricing [11].

Although Hayek does make several correct claims with regard to certain policy
makers suggesting a more “centralized” approach to developing capitalism (for
example, with the chartering of corporations in the United States). However, this does
not build his argument on behalf of his idealism nor to the credit of any ‘free market
system’. Rather, what he is highlighting is a conscious example of what was
mentioned earlier with regard to the superstructure intervening in the progression of
the base. What certain policy makers realized is that to effectively develop capitalism
and extend their own tentacles they have to overcome (or at least attempt to
overcome) the contradictions which riddle the ‘normal development of capitalism’.

This ‘conscious development’ of capitalism of course retains all of the exploitation


and oppression endemic to the system but in a very pragmatic and remarkably
“human” sense. Take for example the development of capitalism within China over
the past 30 years. No doubt, the Chinese mainland has developed their productive
capacity in a way rarely seen in history but has done so with a more clear ‘sense of
direction’. The Communist Party of China continually remarks that the development
of “market mechanism” will enhance the living standards of their massive population
even as they are submerged deeper into the workings of exploitation and circulation.
How is this possible?

To use a metaphor, it’s easier to paddle when everyone is on board. And that is
exactly how modern capitalist-imperialism has developed to later stages, by
reinforcing the idea that “everyone is on board”. Public-private joint ventures, public
development with private investment, private ecological initiatives, big capitalists
supporting the maintenance of smaller capitalists (think GE “community investment”)
etc. These are all conscious efforts by the ‘thoughtful’ (read: conscious capital)
elements of the capitalist class to maintain their own domination and advancement,
even if this means nominal concessions.

None of which builds upon Hayek’s argumentation. More than socialism, Hayek
misunderstands the reality of capitalism. All of his quaint rhetoric is nothing more than
a rosy fairy tale not even the capitalist class is willing to entertain. By observing the
actual development of capitalism we have discovered that the ability to change form
while deepening substance is the only chance capitalism has at prolonging its own
existence.

Public policy makers who advocate centralized development are not socialists. Not
even in the soft usage of the term. They are fundamentally the most profound capital
advocates in existence. More so than the charlatan spinsters such as Hayek and
other free market prophets. Arguably, FDR did more for capitalism than Adam Smith
ever could.
Chapter 5: Planning and Democracy
The point of this chapter is to prove that ‘planning’ could never fully satisfy the
desires of every individual ‘under the plan’ and is therefore insufficient in the realm of
social governance. In classic Hayek fashion, he makes a collection of assertions to
supplement this point although none of them are particularly convincing. Regardless
we will go about destroying every relevant assertion as it makes its appearance
through the text.

He begins with rhetoric very similar sounding to that of previous chapters (already
addressed).

“The common features of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever
dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organization of the labors of society
for a definite social goal.” [12] 100

Such as the production of commodities or the realization of a profit. Though, one


would be hard pressed to find Hayek admitting that capitalism could be anything but
a form of “collectivism” in and of itself. In addition, we should make very clear that
usage of terms such as “collectivism” is hardly founded in anything meaningful. The
usage of terms should be revealing to the reader, not concealing, and with such
vague terminology employed one can only imagine that Hayek has no intention of
“revealing” anything at all.

“The various kinds of collectivism…differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting


to organize the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end and in
refusing to recognize the autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals
are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which
we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable
manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism” [13] 100

Let’s make a few points, given as this is a rather central theme to the entire text.

1. As stated innumerable times Hayek makes an arbitrary distinction between the


variants of society he calls “collectivism” and whatever sort of society he would
consider capitalism. At the end of the day, all societies since the beginning of
civilization have at least one thing in common: they are class societies. So common
is this knowledge that when referring to “society” we are already referring to
something which is divided, stratified, and wholly separate from the “individual” and
to itself. Feudalism was a class society dominated by the feudal class: the monarch,
landed aristocracy, their vassals, the clergy, etc. Capitalism is a class society
dominated by the bourgeoisie: the industrial capitalists, bankers, investers,
businessman, their professionals, etc. Socialism is still a class society however it is
moving towards classlessness, or what we refer to as Communism. Ultimately, the
point to be made is that Hayek’s division is arbitrary and with a material conception of
history in mind, seems ridiculous.

2. What are these “autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are
supreme”? Once again we find Hayek taking vague refuge in the promise of some
not-yet-articulated humanism e.g. the banal conception of “individuality” as-being-
without. Apparently, one can only be an “individual” when one is in some mythical
social existence where everyone else does not matter. Furthermore, Hayek provides
no concrete reasoning as to why one could not be in these “autonomous zones”
while living in a socialist society; keep in mind, we define socialism only as what it
fundamentally is (a society on its way to classlessness).

3. Hayek’s usage of ‘totalitarian’ is also problematic. What makes something


totalitarian? Better yet, what makes socialism totalitarian? The idea of a planned-
economy? Forgetting that the capitalist economy is already planned by a handful of
corporations on behalf of the rich. The combined determination of society? Forgetting
that capitalism is collectively determined, by the ruling class, the owning class, for
their own purposes. The wrongly held belief that “hard work” will not be rewarded?
Because the hard work of single mothers, sweatshop workers, and child slaves is
surely rewarded in an equitable society such as capitalism. Often times it’s difficult to
even fathom the full regime of control exerted by capitalism onto the unaware
individual. Everything we do surrounds this all-powerful piece of paper which
represents everything material and representable. Our lives hang in the balance of
some numbers dancing across a screen. All of which only examines one narrow
dynamic of oppression in relation to capitalism; the full totality of which, including
those webs of oppression not entirely capitalist but integrated (such as patriarchy),
are hardly something we could ever measure. Yet, Hayek will go about claiming it is
the liberation from capitalism which is the true totalitarianism. What nonsense.

Hayek then argues that a planned-economy (at this point the reader should substitute
this phrase with ‘socialism’) is incompatible with human civilization because it
“presupposes, in short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the
different human values are allotted their due place” [14]. 101

Once again, Hayek demonstrates a very shallow understanding of human society as


a whole. First, morality, like culture, is constructed/created/conjured forth from the
host of material practices which sustain a society. While human society is best seen
as an “organic whole” (to account for the sheer intricacy and interrelation) Marx
draws a divergence between the base and superstructure, or the material practices
which fundamentally sustain the society (e.g. production) and the social practices
built around that (e.g. culture). This helps us account for the cross-cultural similarities
(but also differences) at points such as morality, values, etc. Importantly, we must
understand that the certain cultural understandings an individual possesses are not
some inescapable extension of her person (however material oppression can still be
built, quite easily, around culture as well) but constructions which can be augmented
and quite often are.

Therefore, we should not worry about balancing ‘essential’ human values from one
person to another to find the perfect formula for everyone. Values, like morality, are
socially conditioned and constructed and any socialist society would go about like
societies before it transforming these values accordingly.

However, this is not some cultish advertisement for social engineering. In fairness,
the engineering is already being done. Perhaps not in the way sci-fi fans would
imagine, however, the totality of human thought and behavior is constantly being
conditioned, molded, and reproduced by the cultural outputs which surround us.
Every television show, magazine, video game, song, and book is providing some sort
of social narrative; something more powerful and constructive than any futuristic or
sadistic mind-control nonsense. Even the way in which we speak is riddled with
implicated signifiers which exude a mode of ‘normalcy’ which defines how we
understand everything around us.

To put it quite simply, Hayek’s “different human values” are essentially humanistic
nonsense.

This does not mean socialism would require the same ‘regimes of control’ or that
individuals would not be free to explore “different human values” (if we understand
that they are indeed exploring and not emboddied). However, this exploration and
configuration would be entirely different in that the base of exploitation and material
oppression (the capitalist relations of production, patriarchy, national oppression, etc.)
would be eliminated. Therefore, the human values realized thereafter capitalism
might actually be considered human values in the full sense that they would no
longer be based on a system of exploitation but the subjective life-affirmation of that
individual.

Ultimately, no “complete moral code” is required for the planning of an economy,


success of socialism, or abolition of capitalism.

Hayek continues ranting about the lack of any such “complete moral code” and
extends upon the defeated arguments listed above until finally arriving at the
question of democracy with regard to economic planning.

Here he makes himself a home and begins a very long and terribly boring
explanation as to why democracy and central economic planning are incompatible.
His essential thesis through the pages is:

1. People do not really know what they want.


2. Their representatives cannot accurately represent them.
3. There can be no full agreement ergo someone is giving up something.
4. There is no real efficient way of dividing these democratic tasks to accomplish the
planning.
5. This ‘planning democracy’ gives way to ‘economic dictators’.

Allow us to go about debunking these vital points for the sake of brevity and a
concise explanation for the reader.

1. Hayek consistently makes usage of this idea of “limitless wants” as an impeding


factor in the effective planning of an economy, let alone the democratic method of
planning. However, he forgets (or simply ignores) that wants are not intrinsic but
given. There was no “limitless want” for computers before Microsoft or happy meals
before McDonald’s. A democratically planned-economy would not be entirely
concerned with these unrealized ‘wants’ which are surely a social construction. The
presentation of ‘new wants’ could come about organically through the free innovation
of anyone interested and later integrated, perhaps. The main concern of any
democratic planning body would be to satisfy the ‘needs’ of everyone concerned.
Such a task is far more feasible, predictable, and as mentioned earlier (refer to P.
Cockshott’s work) possible with current technology. Ultimately, if Wal-Mart and
McDonald’s can safely plan the demand of most consumers one would hope that the
collective intellectual, technological, and material resources of humanity could plan
and provide for their own physical needs.

2.This is more nonsense speculation on behalf of Hayek. He makes references to


failed reformist socialists in Western Europe but misses the point of their failure.
Working within the bourgeois forms of representation will certainly offer nothing
substantial to the oppressed and exploited. It is for this reason that “representatives”
and their bodies of “representation” will be of an entirely new type that satisfies the
organic desire of the masses. It is certainly arguable that even past experiences in
socialism (such as the USSR and PRC) overcame this obstacle through radical forms
of democracy which gave all power to the people.

3. Once again, more baseless assertions and speculation. When most of the useless
‘smoke and mirrors’ of capitalism is done away with, commodity production is
eliminated, and the masses are liberated its unlikely individuals will be distraught
over realizing their needs like some sort of Amazon shopping cart. The productive
capacity will be transformed to the point where everyone’s needs will be accounted
for certainly with room for satisfying those life-affirming cultural desires.

4. Bourgeois parliament or congress will have little in common with bodies of real
proletarian power. As previous socialist experiments have shown us, these bodies
are insufficient in their ability to both represent the real demands of the people and
efficiently deliver those demands. It would be entirely fruitless to speculate how tasks
might be divided in these democratic bodies however we work with the simple
knowledge that the liberated creativity of the masses will carry humanity through
these stages of socialism. What we should really be wary of is, is those who doubt
the potential of the masses. Such doubt and skepticism of the people usually breeds
the right-opportunism which eventually tanks real bodies of proletarian power.

5. It is doubtful that any “economic dictator” under socialism could be worse than
your average CEO today. In socialism, labor-power ceases to be a commodity that is
simply bought and sold between bidders (capitalists). The organized and collective
power of the workers stands a much better chance of mitigating any possible abuse
on behalf of some technical planning bureaucrat or authoritarian elected leader.
Furthermore, real socialism incorporates the shared administration of the planned-
economy by every willing individual which actively works to combat any possible
avenues of economic autocracy. Although nothing is given “for sure”, we work with
the combined experience of previous failed experiments and all that we understand
better now; ultimately, we must trust the possibility of our own liberation over the
certainty of our present oppression.

In the end, Hayek is simply casting doubt on the possibility of a ‘successful liberation’
by criticizing proletarian or progressive democracy. He is not, however, questioning
the actual predicament which is the exploitation and class struggle within capitalism.
The idea is not to have some perfect working blueprint of democracy within
socialism. One could argue that the Jacobins among other bourgeois radicals had
little understanding of how a bourgeois democracy ‘would actually work’ (as if we
could run computer models of liberation or something of the sort) when their
respective monarchies came to an end. The question is not whether democracy in
socialism “can work” the point is that it must work because what exists now is neither
democratic nor acceptable. When the masses come to power they will develop the
necessary apparatuses for the maintenance of their own dominance, similar to all
significant social revolutions of the past. Speculating upon technical specifics at this
point demonstrates nothing but cynicism on behalf of those who doubt the people.
Do we trust the future of liberation? If not we can always settle for our certain and
definite oppression within the status quo.
Chapter 6: Planning and the Rule of Law
As the title would suggest, Hayek begins chapter six by promoting what he
refers to as the ‘Rule of Law’. While many legal and political
interpretations exist of the ‘Rule of Law’, Hayek importantly draws
distinction between his version of this ‘Law’ and what he calls “arbitrary
government”. He goes onto provide a fairly concise explanation of what he
means at the most basic level:
“Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions
is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its
coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs
ont he basis of this knowledge.” [1]
Essentially, what Hayek is describing is more than simply the ‘rule of law’
in the strict legal sense (that all would be bound by some sort of ‘common
law’ established in some collective manner). He is describing the sort of
fundamental legality required in the course of market interaction. If we
refer to the orthodox understanding of Marxist political economy wherein
society and its institutions are loosely categorized as within the base or
superstructure, Hayek is highlighting the superstructural norms which act
back upon the base and its development. Specifically, the intermediary
power of the state both in the normal functioning of capital accumulation
as well as the resolution between contradictions among different elements
of the base.
He then makes his case against “planning of the collectivist kind” by
explaining how the two (planning and the Rule of Law) are in opposition.
“The planning authority cannot confine itself to providing opportunities for
unknown people to make whatever use of them they like…In the end
somebody’s views will have to decide whose interests are more important;
and these views must become part of the law of the land, a new distinction
of rank which the coercive apparatus of government imposes upon the
people.” [2]
He continues to expand upon his initial argument here, however, we
should make a few important points before continuing.
1. Hayek is constructing a few important false dichotomies to assist his
argumentation in this chapter. The first is that between the ‘neutrality’ of
the Rule of Law and this hypothetical “planning authority” (which he
conveniently substitutes for anything that is not his preferred model of
liberal governance). There is no such neutrality in the Rule of Law. The law
is established to maintain a certain social order. None of this analysis is
explicitly Marxist either. It is simply common knowledge that this
historically established ‘law’, whatever it may be, is politically composed
according to some material condition and/or ideological insight which is of
course considered publically understood. Therefore, it makes no sense to
draw distinction between the ‘Rule of Law’ and “somebody’s views” at
least when examined closer. The ‘law’ is “somebody’s views”. The
question we must then ask is whose? The views of the ruling class. The
views of the exploiters and oppressors, “the elites”, the reactionaries and
their allies (at least in the case of bourgeois society). The second
dichotomy he constructs, albeit this one being more subtle and nurtured
throughout the book, is the dichotomy between the “coercive apparatus of
government” and the coercive apparatus of private capital. Of course,
there is a distinction to be made and a very important distinction at that.
The distinction, however, is found in the social relations both are involved
in and to some level reproduce. Yet, both exist within the same totality of
capitalist-imperialism. More importantly, both to one degree or another,
through one form or another, reproduce the status quo and the social
order in which we all live. Therefore, to say on the one hand the “coercive
apparatus of government” is the boogeyman while the same function
performed by private industry is “liberty” or the “free exercise of
individuals” is nonsense. Both are coercive, however to different ends, but
oppressive nonetheless. If we are able to deconstruct this false dichotomy
we can truly realize the full scope of our own social involvement with
apparatuses which serve to deny us (and suppress the revolutionary
subject).
2. There is no conceivable reason that any socialist society would have to
limit the “opportunities” of individuals. In fact, even the failed socialist
experiments of the Soviet Union and China offered great ‘personal
freedom’ to everyone especially those marginalized by bourgeois society
(women, ethnic minorities, nationally oppressed, etc.). What sort of
“opportunities” could thus be limited by a socialist society, at least in the
world of Hayek? In actuality, what Hayek is referring to with his colorful
use of buzzwords like “opportunity” is the systematized exploitation of the
many by the few property holders. The “opportunity” for the capitalist to
extract surplus value from his workers and to hold this profit as a weapon
against the working class. The “opportunity” for the unemployed and
hungry worker to seek out destructive employment and exploitation
simply to reproduce his own livelihood (or what remains of it). If these are
the “opportunities” Hayek wants to preserve then we should question
what, if any, relevance his notion of “freedom” should pertain to the
common person.
3. We should not shy away from deciding whose “interests are more
important”. As communists, we have already made a profound statement
on this matter. The interests of the working class, of the masses, of the
oppressed and exploited, of the People should be defended and promoted
against their enemies: the ruling class, compradors, misogynists, racists,
chauvinists, homophobes, and transphobes. We should not ‘beat around
the bush’ on this issue. However, we should not a few important
theoretical points as well. First, the liberal ‘Rule of Law’ has already
decided whose interests are more important: the interests of the ruling
class and all those listed whom the Rule of Law actively protects. The
struggle is not a one way street. It is actively waged by all forces
concerned including those dominant ruling forces against the oppressed.
Furthermore, through the construction of a socialist society (a society on
the route to statelessness and classlessness) the distinction ‘between’
interests will gradually be closed. Classes will dissipate, nations will
dissipate, and the social relevance of ‘difference’ which necessitates the
opportunity-cost (as mentioned by Hayek) will be no more. Not as though
people will not ‘be different’, or have different life pursuits, or personal
interests, etc. however, these differences are not power relations in and of
themselves such as the differences between nations, classes, and genders
today.
As mentioned earlier, Hayek extends his argument onto the next page
specifically detailing what he believes the function of government serves
in promoting this Rule of Law. He argues the formal establishment of a
‘framework’ (which was debunked in the previous part) is merely
instrumental to free exercise of individuals (read: capitalists). Additionally,
he asserts that this social order allows us greater foresight and ‘results’
than “conscious control”:
“The argument is twofold; the first is economic…The state should confine
itself to establishing rules applying to general types of situations and
should allow individuals freedom in everything…because only the
individuals concerned in each instance can fully know these circumstances
and adapt their actions to them…The second, moral or political, argument
is even more directly relevant to the point under discussion. If the state is
precisely to foresee the incidence of its actions, it means that it can leave
those affected no choice…it is also the state which chooses between the
different ends…To be impartial means to have no answer to certain
questions…” [3]
As consistently shown when Hayek makes mention of “individuals” he is
speaking specifically of the capitalist class as personified in its most
ideological representation (the ‘enterprising individual’). The framework he
mentions is simply the status quo albeit perhaps an idealistically modified
version; however, this “framework” is still nothing more than the formal
legitimization and presentation of exploitative relations as something other
than themselves.
Beyond this Hayek makes a somewhat pragmatic appeal to the
‘decentralized’ action of the market. The individual, within her own
circumstances, should grasp the most correct route of action better than
some abstract planning authority. At the surface, this point seems
reasonable and there is a kernel of truth to what is being said (when
rearticulated away from liberal bourgeois sentiments). It’s true, the lowest
and most integrated sections of the masses often understand their own
circumstances better than anyone else. Furthermore, we would trust the
testimony of someone living in these circumstances over someone who is
not. Therefore, when drafting up any economic plan the concrete
experiences of the masses, the “individuals” within their own
circumstances, are given a special precedence over the abstract musings
of bureaucrats or officials. This is not a Utopian measure either but
actually how most economic plans in the Soviet Union and People’s
Republic of China were drawn up: from the bottom-up with special
consideration for the experiences of the masses.
However, any socialist economic plan must be a “common plan” (a la
Marx) and therefore not simply the accumulated demands of every
different individual. The plan must uniquely synthesize the needs, desires,
and experiences of the masses, the expertise of the planning authority, as
well as allot adequate resources for continuing productive development.
This is why we must remember that every individual works with an
‘imperfect knowledge’ of the social instance at hand. What the individual
‘doesn’t know’ can be supplemented by the synthesis of experience from
other individuals, productive units, and the planning authority itself. This
allows for the most “rational” allocation of resources. Therefore, the
‘common plan’ not only pragmatically establishes a conscious construction
of socialism but provides the ideological mechanisms for the continued
education of a ‘communist subject’.
The “moral” argument provided by Hayek is simply nonsense. The crux of
his argument being that ‘unconscious market mechanisms’ do not pick
‘winners and losers’ and therefore there is no risk of unfairly favoring party
over another. True, the market as a mediation of social relations is quite
different from mediation through fidelity, land, etc. in previous modes of
production but not without some inherent inequalities (to say the least).
What about favoring the capitalist class over the working class? What
about the prevalence of ‘bourgeois right’ over labor? What about the
unique qualities of ‘private property’ as dominant? There are endless
moral presuppositions taken within the capitalist market which forever
choose the capitalists (exploiters and oppressors) as favorable to those
they employ (exploit and oppress). Therefore, to make qualms with the
‘foresight of the state’ as being morally questionable is complete
nonsense. You must compare that plausibility with the current social order
if you mean to make any meaningful moral objection which Hayek cannot
do. As far as bias in “who” the State supports, we already clarified “whose
interests” would be dominant in a socialist society (with not a shred of
apologism therein). There is no such thing as an “impartial state” when
the very purpose of the state is the maintenance of a specific social order
(or the interests thereof).
Drawing distinction between the ‘impartial liberal state’ and the ‘moral
collectivist state’ Hayek then claims that Nazi Germany was an example of
a state ‘forcing’ morality [4]. The irony here is that the sort of ‘morality’
exuded by Nazi Germany was very characteristic of capitalist-imperialist
nations of the time. The entire sociopolitical presentation by the Nazis was
one focused on progress with respect for ‘upholding traditions’. The
traditional (conservative and capitalist) relations of production and social
values were promoted including a thick sense of national chauvinism and
masculinity (both in culture and production). What more could Hayek and
his contemporaries desire?
However, this is not the only comparison Hayek desperately draws
between socialists and Nazis. As stated many times before, this is a classic
tactic of liberals and apologists for capitalism. Why engage the merits of
socialist theory when you can draw vague comparisons to something
considered universally horrific? His comparison in the following pages
concerns the Nazi’s disregard for the German Rule of Law and demands for
“substantive justice” in and above the universal application of the law [5].
What he fails to mention is that even before these pseudo-populist pleas
by the Nazis, they were gaining significant traction as a political party
using the framework already established. It was only after the fact that the
Nazis could attempt to enforce this “substantive justice” they had in mind.
Although, we should once again stress that any similarities between the
Nazis and contemporary socialists are completely superficial at best; one
group wants to eliminate disparities and promote a meaningful equality,
the other wants to exploit existing inequalities to legitimize further
disparities (white supremacism). Even the means by which to achieve
these goals are entirely different and therefore any comparison between
the two is complete nonsense as was specifically outlined in the analysis of
previous chapters.
Nearing the end of the chapter, Hayek makes a case against using the
word “privilege” to describe private property (assumedly among other
features of the bourgeois legality). Once again he denounces what he
terms “substantive justice” as culpable for the disdain of property:
“The conflict between formal justice and formal equality before the law, on
the one hand, and the attempts to realize various ideals of substantive
justice and equality, on the other, also accounts for the widespread
confusion about the concept of “privilege” and its consequent abuse.To
mention only the most important instance of this abuse – the application
of the term “privilege” to property as such.” [6]
Before allowing him to begin his argument against the usage of the term
we should highlight briefly why this usage (of privilege) is so important. As
pointed out by Hayek, the established forms of law and ideas of “justice”
are in competition with those opposing forms of law and ideas of “justice”
which may or may not be revolutionary. In the case of Marxism and the
rising tide of social revolution, these new forms of law and justice offer a
meaningful challenge to the existing bourgeois order. The very ‘identity’
and characteristics of such ‘new forms’ are found in the very conflict they
materialize and extend with (and within) the status quo. Therefore, when
the term “privilege” is used to describe something such as property there
is a very important social space opened within discourse. Now, what was
previously legitimized or even upheld as virtuous is drawn into question as
something to be criticized such as the feudal privilege of the 19th century.
Bourgeois right being identified as “privilege” threatens the narrative as
presented by the liberals and thus Hayek immediately criticizes this usage
(especially against property) as an “abuse”.
“It would indeed be privilege if, for example, as has sometimes been the
case in the past, landed property were reserved to members of the
nobility. And it is privilege if, as is true in our time, the right to produce or
sell particular things is reserved to particular people designated by
authority. But to call private property as such, which all can acquire under
the same rules, a privilege, because only some succeed in acquiring it, is
depriving the word “privilege” of its meaning.” [7]
Already we see Hayek criticizing previous forms of privilege in his
comment towards the “members of the nobility”. However, he seems
unable to ‘connect-the-dots’ regarding institutionalized forms of privilege
and class power within our own society. Being born into a propertied class
is indeed a privilege. Living off the exploitation of others is indeed a
privilege. Enjoying a decadent and wholly opulent lifestyle while others are
left to scrounge for an existence is indeed a privilege. How could it be
anything but? Hayek tries to dismiss this with his claim that, regarding
private property, “all can acquire under the same rules”. Some soft
socialists might even agree but then point out that not everyone will (for
systemic reasons). However, this appraisal does not go far enough. Not
every even “can” acquire private property no matter the hypothetical used
when comparing it to the actual functioning of capitalism. Capitalism (and
to a greater extent even, Imperialism) is built upon the social division of
labor. There are some who perform wage labor, there are some who
perform the lowest forms of wage labor, there are some who perform labor
outside the normal circulation of capial, and there are those who reap the
benefits. If everyone could acquire private property – if everyone could
estalish a means by which to exploit another – the entire system would fall
apart. The normal accumulation of capital requires a limited amount of
capitalists with a fluctuating body of labor-power to be employed. If
everyone had their “own means of production” (as grossly hypothetical as
this is growing), capitalism would cease to exist considering the entire
system is built upon the circulation of capital which requires exploitation
(in the most orthodox usage of the term). Theoretically speaking, if Hayek
were correct then capitalism would no longer exist.
On an entirely pragmatic level, Hayek speaks romantic nothing’s about the
advent of the “enterprising individual”. If we examine his statement
closely we find that no one plays under the “same rules”. No one is in the
same circumstances. No one’s livelihood is predominantly determined by
their ingenuity. No one stands a chance against the established
monopolists and the modern transnational capitalist class. Let’s provide a
quick example before moving on.
The GNI Per Capita in the United States is $ 53.670 while in Mexico it is $
9.940 [8]. Statistical analysis isn’t needed to deduce the average Mexican
is enjoying a whole lot less income than the average American. And for
what reason? Obviously, the combined and uneven development of
capitalism into imperialism over the last century. To put it plainly, the
monopolists of the Global North alongside the comprador bourgeoisie of
Mexico (among other peripheral and semi-peripheral nations) benefit from
the super-exploitation and/or specified underdevelopment of oppressed
nations. How does the “enterprising individual” stand against such forces?
It’s just utter nonsense and at the very least a disgusting romanticization
of the power relations at play in capitalism-imperialism.
Some apologists for capitalism might argue that the uneven plane
developed (and exacerbated) over the last few centuries is entirely due to
historically constituted systems prior to capitalism and those which persist
are due to a disinterest in “free markets” and the rule of law. There is a
reason we refer to such arguments as ‘apologism’; starting of course from
the presumption that modern neoliberal capitalism offers nothing but
benevolent and inclusive development for the whole of humanity. The
problem is that any such “disinterest” has also been socially developed in
opposition to the colonial and post-colonial (and neo-colonial) paradigm
established for the “developing world”. Wherein the Global North enriches
itself over the ‘selectively established’ markets within the Global South.
Corruption and a “disregard for the rule of law” is on one level a deceptive
appraisal and on the other hand a conveniently noted construction. First, it
is not as though this corruption is not beneficial for the ruling compradors
and the monopolists they stand in alliance with. Corrupt ministers,
regulators, and officials are cultivated parallel to these exploitative
relationships which provide no accountability, as a pretext to a nation with
no real sovereignty. Secondly, the international standard of law is enforced
by the Global North generally with selective intervention from more
transnational bodies. This means that the law which is “established” has
historically been imposed on developing nations as a condition of
continued development (read: neoliberalism). Therefore any such remark
which highlights the subjective phenomena internal to an oppressed
nation, without understanding its context as an oppressed nation, should
be entirely disregarded as a red herring.
Hayek finishes the chapter by restating arguments he made in previous
chapters regarding the incompatibility of “individual rights” with a planned
economy. He intensifies his rearticulation through examples of restricted
movement and communication within the Soviet Union and compares this
to the rhetoric of rather liberal “soft socialists” who commented on the
issue (not specifically the Soviet Union, but abstractly) [9]. Despite this
rather uninspiring mash-up of experience and rhetoric, Hayek finishes the
chapter in a different light:
“In this respect much more consistency is shown by the more numerous
reformers who, ever since the beginning of the socialist movement, have
attacked the ‘metaphysical’ idea of individual rights and insisted that in a
rationally ordered world there would be no individual rights but only
individual duties.” [10]
It’s somewhat humorous Hayek chooses to put metaphysical in quotation
as if the ideological imposition of “individual rights” could be anything but
an appeal to the metaphysical. Regardless, what he is actually describing
is a fundamental transformation in how individual rights are conceived as
being within the stage of socialist construction en route to communism.
Although, his description carries a negative connotation with it and his gut-
wrenching remarks on “individual duties” (you can almost imagine him
grimacing at the thought). The actual transformation is one which has
occurred several times throughout the history of human development and
understandably so within the future phase of socialism. For example,
during the middle ages the “rights” of the individual were starkly
determined by their relationship to the feudal order at the time
(specifically the Church); furthermore, the entire conception of the
“individual” was something rare outside the realm of atomized duty to the
familial-feudal order of production/reproduction. Following the formal
collapse of feudalism and shallow introduction of bourgeois ideals, this
concept of the “individual” and “his rights” were reshaped and conditioned
by new relations of production (this is a rather orthodox appraisal but
acceptable for the sake of brevity). Therefore, its only intuitive to think
that the whole network of ideas and understandings regarding “individual
rights” and how they function will transform in accordance with the new
communist relations of production following the construction of socialism.
This is not by any means a “bad thing” or something to be held in
contempt. Certainly any transformation which accompanies a world
historic shift towards liberation and equality cannot be worse than what
we have now, no? Obviously the reader can form her own thoughts on this
(now) hypothetical phenomena but understanding the historic
necessitation of such processes is important to forming a critical
understanding of even those detractors such as Hayek. However, it should
be stated as has been stated before that any conceivable loss of
“individual rights” would be those specifically of the oppressing class. The
“individual right” to discriminate; to exclude; to exploit; to dominate. All of
which would be necessarily done away with in transition to communism
and of course existing “rights” modified to satisfy the desires and needs of
the broad masses in their first taste of freedom.
Hayek wants his readers to feel an attachment to their values at hand.
God, freedom, country and the whole lot. We want our readers (and his) to
understand the concrete development of these values as values. We want
to illuminate these paths of development and the way in which they sit
now so that these inner-workings of power/property/and stratification
become as intelligible as possible. It is this intelligibility of our social
circumstances, the ways in which we relate to our material reality and
structures of domination, which allow for any meaningful agency to exist.
Only then can any critical understanding be formed. Only then can these
old values be tossed away; only then can new and emancipatory values be
formed.
Chapter 7: Economic Control and Totalitarianism
The crux of this chapter is not all too dissimilar from previous installments.
The point emphasized by Hayek is the centrality of “economic control” to
the whole social existence of the “individual”. He argues that any
pragmatic application of socialist planning must be ‘authoritarian’ in
nature and therefore engenders a totalitarian aspect to the whole concept;
wherein, the economic planner, the boogeyman of all liberal writings,
assumes absolute control over the livelihood of the common people. He
makes his case most explicitly in the first page of the chapter:
“Most planners who have seriously considered the practical aspects of
their task have little doubt that a directed economy must be run on more
or less dictatorial lines…power must rest in the hands of a commander-in-
chief whose actions must not be fettered by democratic procedure.” [11]
Let’s make a few points to fully demolish this conception.
1. As stated numerous times over, any comparison between this supposed
hypothetical economic tyranny must account for similar conditions within
the status quo. Hayek, of course, starts from the presumption of absence –
that there is no substantive economic tyranny already – and therefore
goes about drawing these colorful hypotheticals/doomsayings and all that
entails. Our current system is already characterized by a high-level of
centralism within the economic realm. The concentration of corporate
powers over the last century has relegated small businesses and petty
capital to markets where they are still somewhat competitive (a la Marx).
But even disregarding the centralism and heavy economic tyranny of our
contemporary era, we should recall this as being intrinsic to the historical
development of capitalism; even within the period of “competitive
capitalism” which was the primary study of orthodox Marxism in the 19th
century, the tendency towards monopolization and hostile market tactics
was apparent.
2. Capitalism itself is dependent upon this sort of economic “commander-
in-chief” and furthermore the entire attitudinal performances which follow
suit. As highlighted by Marx, capitalists (but not only capitalists, their
managerial heads as well) function as “stand-in’s” for the circulation of
capital. Those “directors” of the “mad” and speculative “dance” which
defines everything in the global circulation of value. These individuals are
indispensable to the very existence of capitalism; not they themselves as
in existing and unique ‘individuals’ but they themselves as a category of
social agents within the structure. The CEO’s, the corporate officers, the
stockholders, the managers, these people are inherent to the very
structural maintenance of the capitalist system and without them the
system cannot exist (at least not in a functional sense). Their position and
all of the decadence and excess is something which is absolutely
necessitated within the status quo and arguably any manifestation of
capitalism. Therefore, for Hayek to draw attention to a hypothetical
socialist “economic dictator” reflects only the highest levels of cognitive
dissonance and/or stinging hypocrisy. We already have economic dictators.
Those prized and revered “enterprising individuals” become the plutocrats
of a degenerate and merciless social system. They are the ones making
lucrative deals to enrich themselves and their cronies at the expense of
others. They are the ones sending unemployment notices and cutting
workers’ benefits. Quite literally, life and death hang upon their whims.
3. There is no conceivable reason that a planned socialist economy could
not incorporate a dynamic and fluid democratic process. The technology
which already exists enables working people to give their input on
circumstances pertaining to their livelihoods via social media, networking,
and instant messaging. How could this not be retooled or reorganized to
serve a constructive and socialist purpose? So that the same
communicative pathways could be used to enrich and empower everyday
people? The barrier to such constructive interaction is of course the
current economic regime of domination which is thoroughly a capitalist
phenomena. The idea that socialist planning is exclusively something of a
managerial task displays a clear lack of creativity and connection to the
masses which characterizes bourgeois academia. Something Hayek and
other liberal detractors display quite often.
He goes onto describe the ‘totalitarian nature’ of economic planning
concluding that one cannot separate the economic interactions from other
social interactions an individual engages in. To some extent we must agree
with Hayek here. There is far too much arbitrary separation performed
within the study of human interaction. Certainly, such separation of study
and analysis allows for more depth across the totality of engagements
however it could be argued this division also serves an ideological
purpose; to detach meaningful subjectivity from the cohesive web it exists
for purposes of limiting radical intelligibility. This, of course, is a matter for
another time and deserves an investigation in and of itself. Regardless,
Hayek’s point has a kernel of ‘truth’ but this kernel is buried under an
exhaustive array of ideological continuities, as the reader will find:
“The ultimate ends of the activities of reasonable beings are never
economic. Strictly speaking, there is no “economic motive” but only
economic factors conditioning our striving for other ends. What in ordinary
language is misleadingly called the “economic motive” means merely the
desire for general opportunity, the desire for power to achieved
unspecified ends.” [12]
What Hayek is implying here is something which has been presented by
Marxists for the last 150 years. The fact that everything within the sphere
of capitalism is mediated by its relationship to capital. The way in which
we relate to production/reproduction, as well as the contingencies of
circulation, is the predominant relationship which often defines our social
interactions as a whole. This is something explained to a far greater extent
in a previous article I have written specifically regarding the money-form
and its significance in everyday life.
Within the circuit of capital, the accumulation of money becomes an end in
and of itself. Take for example the fundamental expression we use to
delineate this process: M-C-M’ or money-capital-money (prime). The circuit
begins with money invested in the production of a commodity (purchasing
of constant capital and labor-power). This same commodity or
commodities are then sold and the value is transformed again into the
money-form but at a greater quantitive level than what was invested. If we
simplify this expression into its basic form, M-M’, we find that capitalism
relies on this basic process of turning less money into more money.
Intuitive as this might seem, it is something rather disregarded by
neoliberal economists and their predecessors such as Hayek. Why is this
disregarded by apologists of capitalism? Precisely for what it reveals about
the internal functioning of the system as cohesive whole. In some respect,
there is no “economic motive” precisely because this motive becomes the
undifferentiated mediation between all desires. The blind and often times
ruthless accumulation of capital becomes a ubiquitous feature of every
conceivable social interaction within capitalism. Money is piled up by the
monopolists and the transnational capitalist class who sit upon their
fortunes for really no other reason than to acquire more. The unapologetic
wealth of communication moguls like Carlos Slim is a prime example of
this. Hoarding this abstract social value – money – , is the immanent and
unending goal of the system. This works back to condition future
investment, labor-power, and everything within the realm of
consumption/production/reproduction.
Of course, Hayek bridges his original statements into a criticism of
economic planning as being totalitarian for the precise reason that nothing
is solely economic. Therefore, the economic planner holds a very unique
position of power over those who are being “planned for” or however that
relationship could be expressed. For Hayek, economic planning is not
merely a utility of the “common good” (although he argues this is also
despicable) but a regime of control in itself:
“The question raised by economic planning is, therefore, not merely
whether we shall be able to satisfy what we regard as our more or less
important needs in the way we prefer. It is whether it shall be we who
decide what is more, and what is less important for us, or whether this is
to be decided by the planner.” [13]
To which he summarizes on the following page:
“Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can
be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends.”
[14]
Hayek is absolutely correct. He provides fantastic reasoning for any
socialist or radical to work consciously towards the abolition of capitalism-
imperialism. Confused? Consider this; we are already living within a
planned economy. Not only are we living within a planned economy
currently, but humanity has resided within this economy for the last two
centuries and gradually more of the globe has been brought into the same
sphere. Furthermore, we are not dealing with a single totalitarian plan, the
coercive desires of some unitary despotic force, instead we contend with a
network of totalitarian plans which define our very existence. The
transnational capitalist class, the monopolists, their allies within the
comprador strata, command our lives from the heights of the global
economy. They promise us shared prosperity, freedom, peace, and
“general opportunity”. But what has this given us? Slavery; subjugation;
starvation; genocide; environmental catastrophe; a spectacle of “success”.
Hayek is absolutely correct, economic planning engenders a powerful
network of control. We are being controlled by the ruling class who are
planning this economy for the enrichment of themselves and their allies,
at the incredible and immeasurable loss towards the rest of humanity.
Understanding all of this, we find the most profound case for the struggle
to socialism. Overthrowing the transnational ruling class seems to be the
only way to progress forward ontologically from a state of subjugation to
any conceivable sense of an emancipating existence. At the most basic
level, socialism hopes to establish relations of production, the way in which
people relate to the means of production and to each other, which are not
based upon the exploitation of one by another. Wherein, economic
planning becomes no longer a network of ‘competing plans’ for the
domination of the earth and humanity but a coherent and dynamic step
towards enriching the social body. Where production no longer serves the
purpose of obsolesce, decadence, or bourgeois taste, but the needs and
desires of the ‘common person’. Where food is not grown to make money,
but to nourish the bodies and minds of everyone. Where education is not a
privileged and exclusive ‘means-to-an-end’ but an inclusive space for
general advancement. These are just some of the many feats socialism
hopes to accomplish and it is not as though the technological and/or
productive capacities are not present. In fact, the productive apparatuses
now could well suffice the basic human needs of everyone on the planet.
However, capitalism (and the current degenerate form, imperialism) is
built upon a rigid and systemic social division which transcends the
internal divisions of nations into the realm of oppressed and oppressor
blocs. At its most basic level, capitalism is founded upon exclusion,
exploitation, and a ubiquitous domination (which is too often more
apparent than not).
The struggle for socialism is not an ethical imperative based on some lofty
or liberal notions from a university. It is found embedded within the
experiences of the oppressed and exploited (recall as Marx noted the
seeds of destruction, the end of capitalism, lie within the very internal
contradictions it cultivates). Their intimate understanding of their own
social circumstances including the alienation which is pervasive in every
engagement. It’s a dynamic struggle not only for such advanced notions
but also the most existential dilemmas including that of material
existence; the struggle for survival, the struggle to eat and be free, the
struggle to resist the destruction of themselves and their planet.
Something Hayek cannot seem to comprehend.
“If they want to plan, they must control the entry into the different trades
and occupations, or the terms of remuneration, or both. In almost all
known instances of planning, the establishment of such controls and
restrictions was among the first measures taken…The “freedom of choice”
would be purely fictitious…” [15]
Here Hayek makes another irrelevant and non-unique point. If socialism
came about, surely occupational entry would be strictly planned and any
freedom of choice on behalf of the student/worker nullified!
Quite the opposite, in fact. At the risk of sounding crudely humanistic,
everyone seems to have different interests which guide them towards
different fields of study. Within socialism, education (‘higher education’
especially) would be widely available and entirely free for the individual to
cultivate herself. The dynamic and humanly inclusive nature of socialist
(read: emancipated) education would allow those most dedicated to
whatever particular field to devote themselves to that study. Producing not
only well-qualified and ‘technical’ professionals, but also workers who were
truly invested in their field and not simply there for the money as so many
are today. Furthermore, the Leninist conception of ‘polytechnic schools’
would be introduced but obviously in a modified and parallel form to
reflect the transformed values within socialism. Individuals could then
cross-train in disciplines as the financial burden of education would cease
to persist and would finally be regimented to the full-use of society.
Will some people “have” to do certain jobs? Absolutely. Or at least for the
early period. But this is something which is incomparable to the
stratification which exists in our current system of capitalism-imperialism.
Wherein education is held as a weapon to be used against the masses
rather than their fulfillment. Whole swaths of society are left with nothing
to do but the most menial, difficult, and low-paying work simply because
of the social division of labor established within capitalism. We live in a
society where many children are born with almost no opportunity other
than to be subjects of minimum wage or the prison-industrial complex.
This would no longer be the case in socialism therefore any speculation as
to “occupational quotas” and the like is merely fussing for the sake of
apologism. And that is all Hayek and his allies really have in this discursive
realm, speculation. For they cannot way the observed injustices of
capitalism against any concrete alternative such as socialism, they can
only speculate from the presumptive notion of ‘absence’ wherein the
current system is a perfectly quaint model for society. Socialism does not
speculate. Socialism empowers the working people and oppressed of
every sort and variety. Any “reasonable individual” would conclude let’s
first overthrow our oppressors than consider whether or not freedom is as
bad as some say.
“In their wishful belief that there is really no longer an economic problem
people have been confirmed by irresponsible talk about “potential plenty”
– which, if it were a fact, would indeed mean that there is no economic
problem which makes the choice inevitable…the claim that a planned
economy would produce a substantially larger output than the competitive
system is being progressively abandoned…they advocate planning no
longer because of its superior productivity but because it will enable us to
secure a more just and equitable distribution of wealth. This is, indeed, the
only argument for planning which can be seriously pressed.” [16]
His argument here has been at the very least empirically denied. Looking
even narrowly at the failed socialist endeavors of the last century we see
quite easily the pragmatic superiority of socialist planning to the “anarchy
of the market” (a la Lenin). In fact, the Soviet Union from 1928 to the mid
1950s experienced some of the most unprecedented economic growth in
human history. Going from a “backwards” semi-feudal predicament to
rivaling the industrial output of global superpower such as the United
States. The particularities of this development is simply a matter for
another time as there is plenty of criticism to be made regarding the route
of socialist construction taken. However, what cannot be denied is the
plain efficacy of socialist planning (even loosely “socialist” and flawed
planning) to exceed the growth experienced by the traditional
development of capitalism. In respect to today’s circumstances, the
technical knowledge accumulated would enable socialist planning to enter
into realms never experienced in previous experiments; wherein, the
technological capacity for real-time data feeds and razor-sharp logistics
open up previous impossibilities with respect to planning an entire
economy. Socialist theorists such as Paul Cockshott have even drawn up
models wherein the economy could be planned quite efficiently using
labor-values instead of a ‘socialist accounting’ like what was utilized in the
Soviet Union (and modeled by other nations).
Put plainly, a socialist economy could easily surpass the productive output
of any neoliberal model (functioning or otherwise). What about this
question of “potential plenty”? With respect to Hayek’s speculation, at the
time of his writing there was likely not the full understanding of global
development or how resources could be allocated to suffice for the entire
world. This is not the same today. Already we have significant evidence to
believe that there is plenty of food, fresh water, and basic necessities to
accommodate the entire world, even at the rate of current population
growth. Any inconsistencies could likely be corrected with a redirection of
intermediary resources to fulfilling those needs which are more imperative
than superfluous consumer goods (finer electronics, niche commodities,
etc.). Although we are venturing once more into grounds which are more
speculative than concrete. What is important to understand is that even
the most bourgeois commentators will admit that the systemic inequality
we confront is one of our own making not the immutable restrictions of an
external force (e.g. nature). Therefore it’s not too presumptive to think
that a socialist economy wherein the world’s technical expertise is at the
disposal of liberation could overcome the incredible material inequality
and depravity we confront daily. The question is not one of objective
factors impeding the progressive growth and enrichment of humanity but
those subjective factors primarily those of power relations which keep the
many subjugated to the few.
“The economic freedom which is the prerequisite of any other freedom
cannot be the freedom from economic care which the socialists promise us
and which can be obtained only be relieving the individual at the same
time of the necessity and of the power of choice…” [17]
What power of choice is wielded by the unemployed as they stand in a
soup line? What power of choice is wielded by the single mother working
double shifts to feed her children? What power of choice is wielded when
both options vote for the oppressor? There is always this convenient
appeal to the “individual power of choice” within the rhetoric of Hayek but
never a concrete application of such. He prefers to keep this as abstract as
possible so as not to rouse suspicion that everything he is saying is just a
colorful romanticization. Perhaps worse than romanticizing these capitalist
social relations, he actively obscures the domination at play. The average
person has no relative power which can overcome the forces of her
oppressor. Therein lies the ruse of it all. This “power of choice” is the
choice between routes which have been preconceived as dead-ends. The
spaces for substantive action against oppression are always those which
are carved from the web and not apparent from within it. Therefore any
“individual choice” which is readily presented by the oppressor should be
held with incredible skepticism.
To paraphrase so many revolutionaries before, what sort of “economic
freedom” is enjoyed by the hungry and homeless?
This turns the entire chapter upon itself. By setting out to show socialism
could only be a dismal totalitarianism he has instead highlighted the
totalitarianism we confront daily as subjects within capitalism-imperialism.
The networks of control have never been more apparent. Our socialist
theory is no longer the frightful speculation of old theorists but a legacy of
practice/knowledge constituted over centuries by revolutionaries the world
over.
Capitalism is, on a fundamental level, a system of control. Socialism is the
opportunity by which the controlled can challenge their domination. And
the practical understanding for socialism to succeed has never been
stronger.
Chapter 8: Who, Whom?
The title for this chapter is a direct allusion to Lenin’s famous statement.
To paraphrase, freedom by who, for whom? Drawing distinctly upon this
historical example (which he confronts directly later in the chapter) Hayek
sets out to actually identify and respond to many of the criticisms leveled
against capitalism. Hedged squarely within the book and derailing an awful
multi-chapter train of homogeneous babbling this chapter is a much-
needed breath of fresh air. Obviously, still riddled with liberal apologism,
falsehoods, and general inconsistencies Hayek does not stray too far from
the well-traveled paths. However, the actual discussion of capitalism and
pending criticisms makes this chapter a much more fulfilling read than the
others.
He begins by criticizing what he considers the socialist disdain for
“blindness”; as in the perceived impartiality of the free market system. He
likens this “blindness” to the greek virtues of objectivity and principled
detachment, making comparisons between competition in the market and
“justice”:
“Although competition and justice may have little else in common, it is as
much a commendation of competition as of justice that it is no respecter
of persons. That it is impossible to foretell who will be the lucky ones and
whom disaster will strike, that rewards and penalties are not shared out
according to somebody’s views about the merits or demerits of different
people but depend on their capacity and their luck…” [18]
The reader is almost baffled by the sheer denial displayed by Hayek, but
we will dissect this selection (as it is critical to the development of the
chapter) in the usual form.
1. There is some truth to the idea that capitalism is “no respecter of
persons”. As shown before, even those who seem intimately connected to
the operation of the system are easily replaced by another “director” of
identical functionality. But this isn’t really a reason to engage in some sick
admiration of a crookedly “impartial” system. For there are many points of
obvious ‘structural bias’ which characterize any experience with capitalism
even the most unaware and passive engagements. Furthermore, what is
there really to celebrate in human liquidity? Capital commands everything
within capitalism. Certainly there is no doubt there. However, when did
such subjugation of the ‘human experience’ to mediation via abstract
social functions become admirable? Even the platonic rhetoric of “justice”
is coherent in a different light than that shed on the free markets. It is this
desperate attempt by classical liberalism to eliminate the deviant
subjectivity within any social space which even characterizes the
archetype of classical liberals today. Their interpretation is the only one
visible therefore these “impersonal market factors” really do seem blind!
2. Saying capitalism is “no respecter of persons” is both false and true.
Arguably more false and obviously so than true, even. At the most basic
level of his premises we find Hayek to be promoting falsehoods.
Continuous statistical evidence explains that children who are born poor
are more likely to be poor. While children who are born more wealthy or
with greater relation to property, generally succeed in similar ways. How
shocking! Granted this is something that Hayek notes in the following
pages (although tries to shrug it off academically) but nevertheless we
should criticize his quiet assertion of blatant falsehoods. Clearly certain
personal qualities are very much respected within capitalism and trying to
rub that away with an appeal to platonic virtues is just nonsense.
3. On another very basic level we should note the very active repression
which is omitted by Hayek. Anyone engaged in radical challenging of the
status quo has been a historical target for blacklisting, police terrorism,
and general and often state sponsored aggression. Quite obviously,
“somebody’s views” matter a great deal in the realm of the repressive
state apparatus and only so because they had somehow escaped the
trappings of the ideological apparatuses (which are arguably far more
pervasive). Ask anyone who has been made an object of aggression by
this exploitative system whether or not your ‘individual views’ are
significant.
None of this even begins to analyze the cultural implications of late
capitalism. The media usage of images to construct narratives on
otherized bodies (such as the middle east, russia, “socialism” etc.),
criminalization, sexualization, objectification, etc. Truly, and with respect to
“persons” there is an infinite array of “respect” shown to be explored.
As referenced earlier, Hayek opens the next page by appealing to the
popular sentiments of inequality. He bites some of what he had written
earlier and concludes its not all that “unreasonable” to consider reducing
the social inequality so as to let the “blindness” of the market do its
magic. However, he offers no concrete application of such liberal
equalizing and leads that to the romantic speculation of the reader. In
reality, there is no liberal route of equalizing which is not simply a
rearrangement of the analytic sticks, so to speak. The necessity of a social
division of labor renders any attempt, no matter how genuine, functionally
obsolete.
This doesn’t stop Hayek and he continues by noting the pronounced
freedom of the poor:
“The fact that the opportunities open to the poor in a competitive society
are much more restricted than those open to the rich does not make it less
true that in such a society the poor are much more free than person
commanding much greater material comfort in a different type of society.”
[19]
This is quite ridiculous even at a cursory examination. So, for whatever
mystical reason, someone who is poor within capitalism is more free than
someone who is more wealthy in a socialist society? Makes no sense at all.
Unless of course you can magically monetize or in some way materialize
the “individual freedom” expressed in being sold like a commodity within
the ‘competitive markets’.
Hayek tries to argue the reasoning is, is that the poor can “get rich” too!
However, as referenced above, this is not even statistically the case. Even
if it were, it does not in any way justify the constructed inequalities within
capitalism-imperialism which perpetuate all hosts of exploitative and
dominating relations of production. More or less, the liberal rhetoric here is
trying to explain ‘softly’ the rigid inequalities in capitalism as being not as
bad as they seem. And even if they are bad, look there is this mean old
hypothetical socialism where your mystical “individual freedom” is entirely
non-existent! Hardly a compelling argument to the seasoned reader but
certainly a favorite of bourgeois propagandists who dedicate themselves
to dispelling any idea of liberation. Again, we should ask ourselves what
the local homeless, unemployed, or hungry would have to say regarding
this.
Now Hayek ventures into territory which is very dangerous to his narrative
of our constituted social systems. He tries to address the point leveled by
many socialists (including myself) as to the fact that socialism is merely a
transfer of power from the exploiting class to the exploited:
“To believe that the power which is thus conferred on the state is merely
transferred to it from others is erroneous. It is a power which is newly
created and which in a competitive society nobody possesses.” [20]
Absolutely false. Here we must smash the liberal narrative in its entirety.
As stated by many, the relative power a CEO holds far outweighs that of
almost any elected bourgeois official. If economic control confers
significant social power, and the modern capitalist class wields this power,
its only logical that these people would constitute the formal ‘ruling class’.
This is not even a stretch within bourgeois social theory.
Furthermore, we should question the historical understanding held by
Hayek if this is his actual argumentation. How does he go about to explain
the introduction of bourgeois society following the collapse of feudalism?
How was that anything but a fundamental transfer of power from one class
(the monarchy, aristocrats) to another (the bourgeoisie) as delineated in a
series of correlated events and processes (French Revolution, market
reforms, the Enlightenment etc.)? In fact, providing a coherent
understanding of history without some rudimentary knowledge of power
and its squabbling seems almost impossible. The greatest moments in
history are concerned with analyzing these dramatic transformations in
power relations which have come to shape everything we understand
about the world today. Depleting the historic arsenal of this analytic model
is truly just debilitating the historical endeavor, not even that which is
particularly Marxist. It shows quite plainly the lengths to which liberalism
will reach simply to stifle dissent.
Conceptually speaking, socialism would constitute a ‘new power’ being
developed from the internal contradictions of capitalism. However, this is
not some uniquely original power which has been constructed from
nothing. It contains within itself a long history of practice-theory-practice
or simply the method by which all theory is refined and made intelligible:
history. This history can be found within the very spaces capitalism renders
as necessary, the workplace, the family home, daily interactions,
consumption etc. Therefore, while this new power is new in the “world
historic” sense of the term, it is not new to the aggregate experience of
humanity. What is “new”, at least to most of the globe, is a fundamental
rupture in the existence of capitalism wherein all power is transferred from
the exploiters to the exploited: the most profound and arguably only
precondition for the establishment of a genuine socialism.
Hayek tries to support his claim with an abstract point on the relative
weakness of a “rich man” to the “lowest state functionary”. The real-life
implications of the comparison are laughable. Apparently the wealthiest
and most elite commercial executives of North America are less significant
than the lowest most menial county functionary because of undefined
(certainly unrefined) “reasons”. Nothing more should even be said on the
issue. However the argumentative importance is apparent. Here, Hayek is
dichotomizing two fields of almost equal inquiry. On one hand, the plain
and apparent exploitation within the private market. On the other, the
subtle and more structured legitimization and sustainment of that
exploitation within the state apparatuses. A dichotomy which is subtle but
no less important for the epistemic structuring of Hayek’s arguments
wherein the state is always the quintessential boogeyman.
He extends this argument into its logical conclusion, if it involves ‘the
state’ it must instantly be ‘bad’:
“There will be no economic or social questions that would not be political
questions in the sense that their solution will depend exclusively on who
wields the coercive power, on whose are the views that will prevail on all
occasions.[21]
The personal is political. Not only is the personal political, there is a certain
level of personal politic which covers nearly every private engagement
imaginable; making it possible to conceive of almost any relationship,
event, or engagement as being thoroughly political (or arguably
politicized). It is not as though once the economy comes under socialist
planning suddenly most questions also become political questions; this is
already the case now, and to an equal extent wherein the limitations of
bourgeois legality have yet to find a resting point.
The real question is, what ‘sort’ of political question is being asked, and to
whom? Is it a question of liberation or exploitation? Of constructive growth
or structured impediment? Is it wielded by the class of oppressors or the
oppressed themselves? These are the fundamental questions we must ask
when confronting this realm of the socio-economic ‘political question’.
As mentioned earlier, this is precisely what Lenin was doing nearly a
hundred years ago when asked about the “question of freedom” within the
Soviet Union. Freedom for who, over whom? Freedom to do what, to
whom? We cannot escape the overwhelming importance of contextualizing
power as a relationship and not an object of passive manipulation. Class
power is exerted, forcefully, over the scope of society in such a way that
all things are brought into its orbit (such as in bourgeois society today).
Lenin understood that nothing can ever be left out of this context,
including freedom. Instead we should analyze what sorts of “freedom” an
emancipated society can enjoy in contrast to that of the status quo;
understanding the issue systemically is the only path forward in analysis.
Hayek answers this point by Lenin by recounting what he calls a necessity
of “politics over economics”. What he means is that this sort of
understanding put forward by Marxists (among other socialists) requires a
dominating presence of politics in social life, interrupting the relative
autonomy of economic subjects. Rather idealistic on his part considering
the already intimate relationship between the economic and political
sphere, even with bourgeois society. It’s no surprise that those most
friendly to the monopolists and transnational capitalists reach the heights
of bourgeois political structures. Although the relationship may not seem
as pronounced as in socialism (where the relationship is really totalized
into a cohesive structure), the economic is still uniquely political within
capitalism. The difference is that, for the most part, the apparatuses of the
state work back upon the ‘competitive system’ to ensure its own longevity
and correct internal contradictions. Take for example the number of
bailouts witnessed over the past decade between international and
national central banks, as well as “rescue packages” designed to correct
inconsistencies and stagnation in growth of key industries. It’s not as
though the monopolists were sitting peacefully when the evil government
rescue package came down into their coffers. They were actively involved
in the drafting of such packages as a “private-public joint endeavor” to
“save economic vitality”.
The difference between these phenomena in capitalism and socialism, is
that in capitalism it is understood as a ‘symptom’ of degeneration; an
exception to the rule, rather than the rule itself, indulged only for the sake
of survival. However, this could not be any more false. There is a long
history of ‘joint operation’ between the dichotomized spheres which took
place long before any formal constitution of Keynesian economics (the
“other boogeyman” of classical liberalism). Realizing this as it is, we see
Lenin’s claims (and our own) to be instructive and descriptive rather than
some political cynicism. Understanding the nuance of class rule, and how
in fact we go about securing this rule for the purpose of liberation, is
absolutely invaluable to our struggle. Therefore, we can speak plainly on
matters perhaps considered controversial by Hayek or contemporary
liberal political philosophers. Socialism is the institutionalized power of the
exploited and oppressed, wielded against their exploiters and oppressors,
for the purpose of worldwide emancipation.
Hayek then addresses the issue of “socialist remuneration” as it was
termed. Essentially, how would someone be remunerated for their labor
within socialism? Hayek of course chooses the route of least resistance
and addresses the old slogan by unionists of every worker receiving the
“full value of her labor”. This is an outdated and obsolete slogan for a few
reasons. First, because the ‘full value’ of any specific labor is very difficult
to neatly quantitize and then prepare for remuneration with respect to the
whole process of labor. Second, labor, as referenced previously, occurs
always in a network of production (if it is socially necessary) and very
rarely so in the performatively “individual” sense. How can we measure
one person’s labor against another within the same process? It would be
very difficult, at the very least. Third, and as Marx points out, there must
always be some reserve from the ‘full-value’ taken for purposes of broader
advancement and security (emergency resources, infrastructure, security,
etc.). He does not note taxes, and this is very critical to the Marxist
understanding as it still provides an exclusive measure by which we can be
gone with the bourgeois instruments of growth. Regardless, any productive
society must keep some sort of surplus if it hopes to keep secure in its own
advance therefore this old slogan has been retired from any substantive
usage.
What has replaced it is a call for a more deserving form of equality than
some quasi-bourgeois workerist entitlement. Every person should receive
according to their need (desire), and perform according to their ability
(capacity), with respect to inconsistencies in the early stages of socialism.
Beyond the obvious differences, there is a very important theoretical
rupture between the old slogan and what we utilize now. Before, the
primary relation in the realm of the abstract worker was the “full value of
her labor”, now this “labor” is balanced by her capacity and primary
respect is shown to her desires. It is not liberating to simply envelope
everyone into the petty bourgeois “personhood” of full and independent
value. We must instead crush these institutions as promoting an alienating
form of being that all individuals are forced into. Our newer slogan is more
ambiguous in its concrete application but this ambiguity is empowering to
the masses before it is limiting. It leaves the door open to this “freely
associated development” which the masses must carve from the web of
speculation into a real historical legacy. Beyond that the primary mediation
within socialism is indeed “social” and not capital or abstract labor; such
social mediation must be fully overcome if socialism is to have any
meaningful existence.
“It is because successful planning requires the creation of a common view
on the essential values that the restriction of our freedom with regard to
material things touches so directly on our spiritual freedom.” [22]
Quite a loaded statement but one fitting for the end of the chapter. Once
again he returns to discussing this creation of a universal set of “essential
values” that will necessarily restrict individual freedom to the point which
even “spiritual freedom” is offended. His view is consistently idealistic and
cannot touch the descriptive power of historical materialism. What he is
referring to with his set of “essential values” is really those subordinate
values which exist in our current society. The secondary aspect of the
contradiction already within full play. The historically developed and
refined values of the oppressed which find animation in the most peculiar
of social spaces. These are the values which will be constituted as “ruling”
during the establishment of socialism.
To put it quite simply, the class rule of the oppressed will be characterized
in a instrumentally similar (yet qualitatively different) fashion to that of the
status quo; wherein the values of some are suppressed so that the values
of others can prevail. However, this takes a very different form within
socialism. In socialism, the “values” being suppressed are those of the
world historic enemies of the People: the values of misogynists, racists,
transphobes, heterosexists, and all manner of oppressive personas. Those
which prevail would be those of liberation, of solidarity and mutual
respect, of inclusive and egalitarian methods of production/reproduction
and organization. Who could oppose such a future?
“Essential values” are not necessary for the functioning of socialism. What
is necessary is the class rule of the oppressed. What they take with them
is the accumulation of sociopolitical and moral experiences which define
their action and “worldview” as it fits. This is the closest thing to any
“essential values” that Hayek refers to but at the same time very
unfamiliar. For the dominating presence is no longer the all-present
spectre of capital, but the intimate and unique interrelations between
humans themselves. This directness and historic opportunity of free
development offers pathways to routes of “liberty” never experienced
before and perhaps that which will define whole new modes of thought
and existence. So much that any speculative condemnation of “essential
values” should be disregarded as the apologism it is.
When we deal with this issue of “socialism” we are not setting out on an
object of study similar to other sciences. There is no anthropological
endeavor which can unravel the mysteries of socialism. There is no
political economist who can interpret a few sources, splice a few statistics,
and arrive at some holistic model of such. We are dealing with something
that is explicitly historical. Carrying along with it a long legacy of theory,
practice, and even failure. Contained within the halls of socialism are of
course those remnants of bourgeois society which in themselves reflect
the historical accumulation of “progress” by humanity; that ubiquitous
sum of all struggles which pervades all “received meaning” in our lives but
never without a mask of immanence. But as for the concrete and uniquely
“human” experience of socialism, we still remain quite novices. And this is
not something to be frowned upon. What it means is that we have a long
road to pave before us and to construct this universe which remains the
only frontier still worth exploring.
What we do know is certainly structural. To recall Lenin, whose knowledge
began this chapter and whose knowledge still informs us today, the
question is not of what but by who and towards whom. We answer
unapologetically and to the great despair of reactionaries in every corner
of the world: Socialism is power by the masses, for the masses, over the
material and social circumstances which dominate their lives. Anything
more is at best speculative, anything less is nothing at all.

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