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Contents
List of contributorsviii
Acknowledgementsxiii
1 Corruption and public administration 1

Adam Graycar
PART I PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ITS VULNERABILITIES
2 Trends and drivers of public administration in the twenty-first century 10

Zeger van der Wal
3 Typologies of anti-corruption frameworks 29

Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, Giulia Mugellini and Marlen Heide
4 Virtue and morality in public administration: values-driven leadership in

public-sector agencies 43
Michael Macaulay
5 Anti-corruption and its discontents: reforming reform 56

Michael Johnston
6 Dealing with the dark side of policy-making: corruption, malfeasance

and the volatility of policy mixes 67
Michael Howlett
7 Corruption of public officials by organised crime: understanding the

risks, and exploring the solutions 80
Russell G. Smith, Tony Oberman and Georgina Fuller
PART II CORRUPTION IN SECTORS
8 Redefining sectors: a more focussed approach to tackling corruption 98

Mark Pyman
9 Corruption and administration in healthcare 115
Taryn Vian
10 Corruption in the education sector 129

Stephen P. Heyneman
11 Corruption and administration in local government 139

Allan Yates
v
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910
vi Handbook on corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration
12 Curbing corruption in tax administration with enhanced risk mapping of

business processes 153
Tuan Minh Le and Beytullah Sarican
13 Corruption and administration in environmental protection 174

Rob White
14 Studying police integrity 185

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković
15 Prison corruption: an ecological framework 201

Andrew Goldsmith
16 Corruption in border administration 215

David Jancsics
PART III CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD
17 Features of corruption and anti-corruption work in China and India 227

Lina Vyas and Alfred M. Wu
18 Corruption in Lithuania: between institutions and perceptions 243

Eglė Butkevičienė, Eglė Vaidelytė and Vaidas Morkevičius
19 Public administration and corruption: a comparative case study of the

police services in Ghana and Uganda 255
Donna Harris and Mesharch Walto Katusiimeh
20 Corruption, organized crime and the public sector in Mexico 274

Bonnie J. Palifka
21 Public administration and integrity in South Africa: the case of the

National Prosecuting Authority 289
Marianne Camerer
22 Corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration in Ukraine 304

Thomas H. Speedy Rice, Alora Jiang and Artem Shaipov
23 Catharsis and reform: an Australian example of building institutional

integrity following systemic corruption 331
Ken Smith
24 Corruption and ethics in public administration in Croatia 345

Gordana Marčetić and Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička
25 Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe: lessons for other countries 360

Jon S.T. Quah
26 The Netherlands: an impression of corruption in a less corrupt country 377

Willeke Slingerland and Gjalt de Graaf
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Contents vii
PART IV RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
27 What works: global experiences in public administration 390

Anga R. Timilsina and Charlene Lui
28 Regulating conflicts of interest in public office 406

Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett
29 Whistleblowers counteracting institutional corruption in public administration 421

Marianna Fotaki
30 Criminological responses to corruption 434

Emile Kolthoff
31 Building ethical organisations: the importance of organisational integrity

systems449
Leo Huberts and André van Montfort
32 From anti-corruption to building integrity 463

Nikolas Kirby
Index483
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Contributors
Eglė Butkevičienė is Professor and Vice-Dean for Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences,
Arts and Humanities at Kaunas University of Technology. Her research interests include civil
society, civic participation and activism, public governance, public values and social innova-
tions. She is author of over 30 articles or chapters and co-author of three books.
Marianne Camerer is Senior Lecturer at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance,
University of Cape Town, where she teaches ethics, public leadership and governance. She is
a co-founder of the international non-governmental organization, Global Integrity.
Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett is Professor of Governance and Integrity at the University of Sussex
and Director of the Centre for the Study of Corruption.
Gjalt de Graaf is Full Professor of Public Administration and Head of the Department of
Political Science and Public Administration at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Marianna Fotaki is Professor of Business Ethics at the University of Warwick Business
School. She was Network Fellow (2014–15) at the Center for Ethics, Harvard University. She
has published over 70 articles on gender, inequalities and the marketization of public services
appearing in leading international journals.
Georgina Fuller is a former senior research analyst at the Australian Institute of Criminology
and is currently completing a PhD at Griffith University.
Andrew Goldsmith is Matthew Flinders Distinguished Professor of Criminology and Director
of the Centre for Crime Policy and Research, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. His
research interests include policing, organized crime, cybercrime and corruption.
Adam Graycar (editor) is Professor of Public Policy at the University of Adelaide and at
Griffith University, Australia. His previous professorial posts have included the National
University of Singapore, the Australian National University and Rutgers, the State University
of New Jersey. In 2010 he established the Transnational Research Institute on Corruption at
the Australian National University. He acquired extensive policy experience over 22 years in
the various senior-level posts he held in government in Australia, both in the federal and the
South Australian governments.
Donna Harris is Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the
Department of Economics, University of Oxford. Her background is in behavioural econom-
ics, development economics and social psychology. Her research focuses on understanding
individual and group decisions in different contexts, including corruption, education and pro-
and anti-social behaviour.
Marlen Heide is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Public Communication at the Università
della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland. Her research interest is in the field of transpar-
viii
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910
Contributors ix
ency studies, security and defence policy and anti-corruption. Besides her academic activities,
she works as an international consultant in the field of anti-corruption.
Stephen P. Heyneman is Professor Emeritus at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.
His current interests include the effect of education on social cohesion, education and religion,
and the economic and social cost of education corruption. He serves as Editor-in-Chief of the
International Journal of Educational Development.
Michael Howlett is Burnaby Mountain Professor and Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the
Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada. He special-
izes in public policy analysis, political economy and resource and environmental policy.
Leo Huberts is Emeritus Professor of Public Administration at the Department of Political
Science and Public Administration of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His main areas of
research concern systems of governance and power and the quality, integrity and ethics of
governance. He is author or editor of more than 20 books on influence on governmental policy,
power theory and measurement, police administration and integrity, public corruption and
fraud and on integrity management.
David Jancsics is Assistant Professor of Public Administration in the School of Public Affairs
at San Diego State University Imperial Valley Campus. His general fields of interest are cor-
ruption, informal practices and organizational deviance. His current research agenda focuses
on corruption in law enforcement agencies.
Alora Jiang is currently completing her juris doctorate at the Washington and Lee University
School of Law. She has worked with United States Agency for International Development’s
New Justice Project in Kyiv to strengthen educational standards and professional ethics in
Ukraine’s legal system. Alora holds a bachelor of arts in international relations from the
College of William and Mary.
Michael Johnston is the Charles A. Dana Professor Emeritus, Department of Political
Science, Colgate University in Hamilton, New York. He has written and edited several books
on corruption and reform, most recently (with Alina Mungiu-Pippidi) Transitions to Good
Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017).
Mesharch Walto Katusiimeh is Associate Professor, Department of Governance at Kabale
University in Uganda. His research interests are in public administration and governance as
well as politics of African development.
Nikolas Kirby is Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow in Philosophy and Public Policy
and Director of the Building Integrity Programme at the Blavatnik School of Government,
University of Oxford.
Emile Kolthoff is Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the Open University in
the Netherlands and Professor of Organized Crime at Avans University of Applied Sciences
in Den Bosch, Netherlands.
Sanja Kutnjak Ivković is Professor at the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State
University. She is the chair of the American Society of Criminology International Division and
a co-founder and co-chair of the Law and Society Association Collaborative Research Network
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x Handbook on corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration
on Lay Participation. She received the 2017 Mueller Award for Distinguished Contributions
to International Criminal Justice, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences International Section.
Her research focuses on comparative and international criminology, criminal justice and law.
Charlene Lui is Research and Knowledge Management Analyst for the United Nations
Development Programme’s Anti-Corruption for Peaceful and Inclusive Societies global
project.
Michael Macaulay is Professor of Public Administration at Victoria University of Wellington.
His research includes integrity, ethics and anti-corruption and he has worked with a range of
agencies around the world, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the
Council of Europe.
Gordana Marčetić is Full Professor at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of
Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. Her specializations are human potentials management
and ethics in public administration, civil and public service legislation and reforms of public
administration in post-socialist countries.
Tuan Minh Le is Lead Economist at the World Bank. He holds a PhD in public policy from
Harvard University. Prior to joining the World Bank, he worked as a consultant at the Public
Finance Group, Harvard University and was assistant professor of Economics at Suffolk
University.
Vaidas Morkevičius is Senior Researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences, Arts and
Humanities, Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania. His research interests include social
data analysis (applied statistics, qualitative data analysis and qualitative comparative analysis),
public and elite attitudes and behaviour, social stratification, political and media discourse.
Giulia Mugellini is a post-doctoral researcher at the Università della Svizzera italiana,
Lugano, Switzerland. Her research experience is centred on the measurement and analysis
of corruption and the evaluation of anti-corruption policies. She is a member of the United
Nations Task Force on Corruption Measurement and is one of the authors of the United
Nations Manual on Corruption Surveys.
Tony Oberman spent over 30 years working in law enforcement and national security, pre-
dominantly as an intelligence analyst with the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission.
Bonnie J. Palifka is an international expert in anti-corruption studies, Associate Professor in
the Department of Economics at the Tecnologico de Monterrey and Lecturer for Yale Summer
Online. She is the founder and organizer of the Academia against Corruption in the Americas
conference and has consulted for Transparency International and the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime.
Mark Pyman is a leading practitioner on countering corruption. His knowledge and expe-
rience comes from 11 years as Programme Director of Transparency International’s Global
Defence and Security Programme, working on military corruption reform in many countries,
followed by two years as International Commissioner on the Afghanistan Independent
Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. He now leads Curbing Corruption,
a public resource providing sector-by-sector corruption reforms.
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Contributors xi
Jon S.T. Quah is a retired professor of political science at the National University of Singapore
and an anti-corruption consultant based in Singapore. His most recent book is Combating
Asian Corruption: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies (2017).
Thomas H. Speedy Rice, Professor of Practice, Washington and Lee University School of
Law, is the 2017 recipient of the distinguished Sheik Tamim Bin Hamas Al Thani International
Anti-Corruption Excellence Award for Anti-Corruption Academic Research and Education, in
partnership with the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Center and the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime.
Beytullah Sarican is a tax policy and administration expert working with the World Bank,
where he works on domestic resource mobilization reforms. He holds a master’s degree in
economics and public administration from Columbia University, where he has also taught
as an assistant. Before joining the World Bank, he had worked at the Turkish Revenue
Administration and Audit Board for ten years where he held leadership roles in tax admin-
istration workstream, primarily on tax audit, risk analysis, automation of tax administration
functions and international tax issues.
Artem Shaipov serves as Legal Specialist and Task Leader on Legal Education Reform for
the United States Agency for International Development New Justice Program in Ukraine
implemented by Chemonics. Artem holds a master of laws from the University of Cambridge
and he is a member of the German Marshall Fund of the United States’ Policy Designers
Network.
Willeke Slingerland is Professor of Applied Research in Resilient Democracy at Saxion
University of Applied Sciences in the Netherlands. She is the Dutch national correspondent on
corruption issues for the European Commission. Her research expertise includes corruption,
fraud, money laundering and integrity and good governance.
Ken Smith is Dean and Chief Executive Officer of the Australia and New Zealand School
of Government. He previously headed a number of government departments in Queensland,
including the Department of the Premier and Cabinet. He is currently Enterprise Professor at
the University of Melbourne, and has held adjunct positions at a number of other universities.
Russell G. Smith is Principal Criminologist at the Australian Institute of Criminology and
a Professor in the College of Business, Government and Law at Flinders University.
Anga R. Timilsina is currently the United Nations Development Programme’s Global
Advisor on Anti-Corruption. He also leads its Anti-Corruption for Peaceful and Inclusive
Societies global project. He has provided policy and programme support on governance and
anti-corruption to more than 40 countries. Anga has edited, authored and co-authored more
than two dozen publications on a range of development topics including anti-corruption, gov-
ernance reforms, post-conflict reconstruction, gender, and climate change.
Eglė Vaidelytė is Associate Professor in Public Administration and Sociology as well as
Director of the political science, sociology and public governance study programmes at the
Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities, Kaunas University of Technology. Her
research interests include public governance, ethics and values in the public sector, philan-
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xii Handbook on corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration
thropy and civil society. She is the author of over 20 articles or chapters and editor as well as
co-author of three books.
Zeger van der Wal is Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore and
Professor by Special Appointment at Leiden University. He works on public leadership,
twenty-first-century skills and ethics and integrity management. He has (co-)authored over
100 publications and regularly consults for governments and keynotes at major conferences.
André van Montfort is Associate Professor in Public Administration at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam in the Netherlands. His research activities focus on the theme ‘quality of govern-
ance’, with special attention to the functioning of local integrity systems and legal protection
procedures. He serves as a substitute judge at a district court and as Chairman of the local
appeals committee of a large Dutch municipality.
Taryn Vian is Professor at the University of San Francisco and an expert in health systems
and anti-corruption in the health sector. She is co-editor of Anticorruption in the Health
Sector: Strategies for Transparency and Accountability (2010) and has published extensively
on corruption issues.
Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička is Assistant Professor at the Chair of Criminal Law, Faculty of
Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. Her specializations include political white-collar crimes,
international economic criminal law, corruption, peace and security.
Jean-Patrick Villeneuve is Associate Professor and Director of the Institute for Public
Communication at the Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland. He also holds
academic positions at the École nationale d’administration publique in Canada and at the
University of International Business and Economics in China. His research expertise is centred
on issues of accountability, transparency and anti-corruption. He works with various public
institutions at local, national and international levels. He is a member of the Open Government
Partnership’s Independent Expert Panel.
Lina Vyas is Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian and Policy Studies at the
Education University of Hong Kong. Her research interests include public human resource
management, public-sector reform, corruption and governance.
Rob White is Distinguished Professor of Criminology in the School of Social Sciences at the
University of Tasmania, Australia. He has published extensively in the areas of criminology,
youth studies and eco-justice, with his recent book Climate Change Criminology framing
global warming as a crime of ecocide.
Alfred M. Wu is Associate Professor in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at
National University of Singapore. His research interests include public-sector reform, central–
local fiscal relations, corruption and governance and social protection in Asia.
Allan Yates currently works within the Insurance Australia Group, providing specialist advice
on the risks associated with fraud and corruption. His previous experience in the prevention,
education and investigation of fraud and corruption spans different sectors within Australia
and the United Kingdom, including health, higher education and local government. Allan’s
PhD explores perceptions and experiences of corruption within the New South Wales local
government.
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Acknowledgements
Adam Graycar would like to thank Jacqui McCann for her great assistance with making the
logistics for the book work, and for her intellectual contribution in reading and commenting
on many of the chapters. Dr Samuel Ankamah from Griffith University assisted also with the
manuscript and Dr Adam Masters of the Australian National University provided helpful com-
ments as the project developed. The University of Adelaide and Griffith University provided
some support in the preparation of the manuscript.
xiii
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Adam Graycar - 9781789900910
1. Corruption and public administration
Adam Graycar
COSTS AND HARMS OF CORRUPTION
Governments exist to deliver value to their communities and to preside over, as Easton (1965)
put it, the “authoritative allocation of values”. Delivering value is highly contested politically,
but whatever ideologies prevail or the courses of action taken, they are underpinned by public
administration. Governments may choose to deliver goods and services, or they may choose
to regulate their delivery, or may leave them completely alone. They can choose to regulate
lightly or heavily, they may regulate the economy, health care, transport, communications,
teacher performance, water quality and on and on. If these things are delivered or regulated
according to ethical principles and underpinned by good public administration, then the com-
munity receives value. If they are tainted by corruption then the community is cheated.
All societies organize themselves to reflect legal, economic, political and social values.
Formal mechanisms of administration have been studied throughout history and there is
a continual search to find more responsive, more efficient and more effective forms of deliv-
ery. Whether the stakes are high or low, there are opportunities for those in administration
to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of the community. Research in public
policy explores better ways of developing and implementing desirable goals and objectives.
This research has no currency when corruption is present. Where there is a lack of integrity or
corruption then public administration is deficient and public value suffers.
Globally corruption costs governments and businesses trillions of dollars per year, it adds
substantially to costs of goods and services, but most importantly it damages policy objectives
and diminishes trust. The catalogue of harms caused by corruption is long. Among other
things, corruption hampers economic performance and growth; discourages investment;
distorts natural resource development; damages the environment; reduces tax revenue; dimin-
ishes quality of life; retards human development; distorts services; weakens judicial integrity
and the rule of law; and, of relevance in this book, leads to inefficient public administration.
Defining corruption is not always a fruitful exercise, as there are many nuances and inter-
pretations. In essence it involves trading in entrusted authority, and using one’s position to
distort outcomes in return for personal gain. It might involve doing wrong things in a public
office such as failing to do something that one should do, or doing something permissible, but
purposely doing it in an improper manner. Clear definitions are necessary for legal matters
relating to corruption and for prosecutions, but not absolutely necessary for improvements
in public administration. Definitions and discussion about definitions of corruption abound
in the literature (see, for example, de Speville 2010, Dobel 2002, Graycar and Prenzler 2013,
Heidenheimer and Johnston 2008, Heywood 2017, Johnston 2005, Klitgaard 1988, Kurer
2015, Mulgan 2012, Philp 2015, Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, Rotberg 2018, Treisman
2000).
Various estimates by the United Nations (2018), the World Economic Forum (2015) and the
World Bank (2018), KPMG (2017) and PWC (2019) are that each year corruption costs about
1
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910
2 Handbook on corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration
5 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) (about $3 trillion), and adds about 10 per
cent to the cost of doing business. Also about $1 trillion per year is paid in bribes while the
kleptocrats of this world skim or loot about $40 billion per year.
In an informative report the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that reducing cor-
ruption in one area alone, tax administration, could boost total tax revenues by $1 trillion more
than they are today, or 1¼ per cent of global GDP (IMF 2019, p.43). Furthermore, the gains
would be greater because lower corruption would raise economic growth, further boosting
revenues. The IMF conducted a cross-country comparison which confirms that government
revenues are significantly lower in countries perceived to be more corrupt. If these countries
improved their tax administration and reduced bureaucratic corruption by the same amount as
middle-ranked countries did between 1996 and 2017 the extra $1 trillion would be there.
Chapter 12 by Le and Sarican develops a roadmap for designing effective anti-corruption
programmes based on risk mapping of key tax administration functions. In taxation,
anti-corruption measures would ultimately boil down to reducing both the motives and oppor-
tunities for rent seeking.
A graphic in this IMF report headed “Corruption Leakages in the Public Sector” (p.42,
figure 2.3) is drawn to resemble a network of plumbing pipes, which show bureaucratically
devised leakages in the system including the following:
●● In state-owned companies (and obviously in general services) corrupt bureaucrats negoti-

ate poor contracts.
●● When a tax regime is being developed corrupt legislators give away tax exemptions and
investment incentives in exchange for bribes.
●● When that tax is being collected, corrupt tax administrators collude with taxpayers to let
them evade taxes.
●● In borrowing and grant arrangements, funds are diverted by corrupt bureaucrats.
●● In financial management there can be theft from unmonitored accounts and embezzlement
which is enabled by weak financial controls.
●● When budget choices need to be made about spending, decisions on investment projects
and subsidies are based on bribes and patronage.
●● When extrabudgetary funds and public enterprises are governed, there can be a lack of
controls, misappropriation of budget and conflicts of interest.
●● When procurement decisions are made, there can be bid rigging, overpricing, low-quality
products and services, padding of invoices, non-delivery of goods, etc.
●● When administering wages and pensions, ghost workers and ghost pensioners often appear.
Of course this is not standard in every bureaucracy, but it is real enough in many of the systems
in which the IMF deals. In rich countries the risks are there but the integrity base and the man-
agement processes and controls make examples like these the exception rather than the rule.
It is important to determine whether corruption is the norm, or whether it is usually an
exception. In some systems corruption is the pervasive custom. Citizens are shaken down
regularly by civil servants, some terribly poorly paid and hoping to make ends meet, and some
adequately paid, but opportunistic and greedy. Wheelers and dealers issue contracts to friends
and cronies, and support infrastructure projects that have little public value. Kleptocratic
leaders loot the state and use the treasury as their own piggy bank, often converting funds into
substantial assets in offshore countries (Chaikin and Sharman 2009, Sharman 2011).
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Corruption and public administration 3
Do these events happen all the time? Do the citizens just expect this as part of their everyday
routines? Or are these exceptional events? The first point of diagnosis in studying corruption is
to determine whether corrupt events are transgressions, or whether they are systemic. If trans-
gressions, the policy and management task is to stop them becoming systemic. If systemic,
the developmental process is to turn against corruption as the norm. This process is analysed
carefully by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi who argues that the challenge is to move from a situation
of bureaucratic particularism to ethical universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).
There is a long debate about whether corruption is caused by poor systems and exploitable
loopholes, or whether it is something that is more about the nature of political systems, and
whether things like democratic processes, transparent transactions and genuine representation
human rights are the norms (Mungiu-Pippidi 2020). If the task is to move from a system char-
acterized by particularism, solutions lie in the political arena and involve deep democratization
(Johnston 2014) and the development of virtuous circles in governance (Mungiu-Pippidi and
Johnston 2017). On the other hand if it is the control of transgressions then strengthening the
principal/agent relationship is one way forward.
The principal, the politician or minister delegates to the agent the task of implementing the
principal’s policies. The agent is a public servant who in Weberian terms occupies an office,
receives a salary and has certain authority and delegations and delivers as required. If an agent
makes discretionary decisions to benefit a client, and if the exchange is hidden, and if the agent
receives a payment, it is a corrupt exchange. This assumes that the principal is not corrupt, but
the agent may be. There are of course situations in which the principal is corrupt, and situations
in which both the principal and agent are corrupt and work in tandem. Sometimes the corrupt
event is limited and confined. Sometimes it becomes corrosive as others are drawn into the
web of corruption. There is a strong debate about whether developing better processes really
has an effect. Persson et al. (2019) argue that this has no impact on corruption control and that
collective action is the only way forward. However, where corruption is a transgression, where
it is outside the everyday expectations of citizens then building cultures of integrity, making
improvements in bureaucratic processes and compliance and enforcement do have a positive
impact on corruption.
NOT ALL CORRUPTION IS THE SAME
Dahlström and Lapuente’s excellent book on good governance (2017) opens by expressing
the view that governments of high quality act impartially, are non-corrupt and use resources
efficiently. They test empirically the components that make this work, and observe that even
where many favourable structures are in place, corruption, wasteful spending, rent seeking and
ineffectiveness still occur. Their argument is that if the interests, career paths and incentives
of politicians and bureaucrats are separate and not interdependent then appropriate checks and
balances are more likely.
Not all corruption is the same, and some places are more corrupt than others, whether they
be nation states, government departments or police stations. There are many types of corrupt
behaviour, and they operate differently in various sectors and places. Corruption also comes
in many forms. It is much more than just bribery, which is what comes to mind in most
discussions.
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Corruption includes many types of behaviour, such as bribery, extortion, cronyism, misuse
of information and abuse of discretion. These behaviours can take place by way of different
activities such as appointing personnel, procuring services, controlling and regulating activi-
ties such as issuing permits, licences and concessions, constructing things, etc. Many of these
occur concurrently in different sectors such as health, energy, tax administration, justice, etc.,
and in different places, such as regions, localities or specific workplaces. These concepts,
described elsewhere as TASP (types, activities, sectors, places), provide a framework for the
analysis of corrupt events in the public sector (Graycar 2015, Graycar and Sidebottom 2012).
Table 1.1 illustrates the framework.
Table 1.1 Corruption in different dispositions (TASP)
Type Activities Sectors Places

Bribery Issuing licences or permits or Agriculture Workplaces
Extortion concessions Construction Localities
Embezzlement Hiring people Customs and immigration Regions
Sexploitation Managing money Disaster relief Countries
Self-dealing Administering justice Education etc.
Abuse of discretion Buying things (procurement) Energy
Misuse of information Delivering programmes or services Environment and water
Creating or exploiting conflict Making things (construction/ Fisheries
of interest manufacturing) Forestry
Patronage/nepotism/cronyism/ Rebuilding things (after a disaster) Health
clientelism etc. Tax administration
etc. etc.
This book is very loosely organized around types, activities, sectors and places with the first
three parts covering these items, and the fourth exploring responses to corruption in public
administration.
There are major differences between corruption in rich countries and corruption in poor
countries. In poorer countries bribery and extortion feature prominently in studying corruption
types. In richer countries it is much more likely to be hiring friends or family, conflicts of
interest, misuse of information or misuse of discretion. This is the face of (principal/agent)
corruption in rich countries (Andersson 2008, Graycar 2016, Graycar and Monaghan 2015).
In addition to using TASP as an analytical tool it is useful to distinguish whether the corrupt
activity is a consensual activity or an activity in which one party feels extorted. Do two parties
come together to exploit the system to the mutual advantage of both, or is one party shaken
down by the other (“you won’t get the permit to which you are entitled unless you pay me
extra”)? We can distinguish corruption with theft, where the state loses money – fees, charges,
tax revenue, overpriced goods and services, etc. – from corruption without theft where manip-
ulation of process, fixing a contract for a crony, giving a job to a friend, demanding sexual
services for a decision are the characteristics. In these cases the state does not lose money. It
would have to give a contract anyway, or employ a person for the position.
There are risks posed by the outsourcing of government functions. In the late nineteenth
century many private functions were taken over by government such as fire fighting, police,
electricity, hospitals and some forms of transport to mention a few. Late in the twentieth
century the prevailing view was that government should steer and not row (Osborne and
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Gaebler 1995) and this became the basis for the New Public Management. In analysing these
trends Adam Masters (2019) argued that corruption was also outsourced, and with a series of
case studies demonstrated three types of outsourced corruption flowing from the outsourcing
of functions. These have ramifications for public administration. First, a power of the state
is outsourced and then abused by a private party entrusted with that power. Examples of this
occur when major procurement items in say defence or information technology are outsourced
to consultants to act on behalf of governments. It is really a case of corruption in contract man-
agement, a major part of public administration. A second model outlined by Masters is out-
sourcing as a form of patronage in which powerful groups and oligarchs become rich through
kickbacks and special deals for their inner circles. The civil servants are often out of the loop
as big decisions about allocation of power and resources are made outside government through
patronage networks. A third model involves agents deliberately engaged by governments to
act in a corrupt manner on the state’s behalf. One finds this in many conflict situations. In
Afghanistan for example the United States government paid warlords to keep supply chains
open and they did so by massive extortion of protection money, bribery and unaccountability,
all with the knowledge of the United States government (Kilcullen 2011). Cases like this are
really state support for outsourced corruption.
While corruption is studied extensively, other forms of poor behaviour contribute to less
than optimum functioning of government. Misconduct and maladministration make up a much
larger proportion of complaints to anti-corruption agencies than do allegations of corruption
(Kempf and Graycar 2018). Misconduct occurs when behavioural codes are violated, and these
could include bullying and harassment in the workplace, drug or alcohol abuse in the work-
place, victimization, poor attitude and even criminal activity such as assault in the workplace.
Misconduct is not necessarily less serious than corruption – its effects can be devastating, and
responses can come from both internal leadership and external referees.
Maladministration, on the other hand can result in poor programme outcomes, waste of
resources and abuse of office. Here public officials might not follow procedures, make incon-
sistent decisions regardless of evidence and spend public money without due diligence. There
is not necessarily a personal kickback to an official but to observers it looks corrupt, unethical
or just not right. When a building or a crane collapses because it has not been inspected prop-
erly, one has to determine whether the official who signed off was lazy, ignorant, or devious
and corrupt.
For a crime to occur, routine activity theory tells us that three elements are necessary:
a motivated offender, a target and the absence of a capable guardian (Clarke and Felson
2010). This principle applies equally to public corruption. If any one of these is missing there
is no corrupt event. Governance systems in modern states provide target-rich environments
for motivated offenders. The guardianship can often be complex, convoluted and incredibly
rule bound. However, in Australia (and by implication in other rich countries) experience has
shown that lecturing to public officials as though they are potentially corrupt or are criminally
inclined is both counter-productive and insulting. My colleague Adam Masters and I explored
ways of understanding malfeasance in public administration, especially in low-corruption
environments (Graycar and Masters 2018). In societies intolerant of corruption it is harder for
corruption to occur at the point of public service delivery. Integrity institutions and systems
exist to ensure that organizations perform as expected, and that reporting mechanisms enable
citizens to act as frontline watchdogs.
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Most aspects of public administration fall within the following five categories or functions:
●● delivery of services to the public;

●● financial management;
●● resource and service procurement;
●● human resource management, hiring people and managing them; and
●● issuing of licences, concessions and permits.
Working from actual case studies, for each of these we teased out how to increase the effort
required for officials to behave badly; increase the risk of being caught and reduce the rewards
of their behaviour; build and value integrity; and raise awareness (Graycar and Masters 2018).
Putting these into a matrix and using them in a workshop situation allows participants to focus
on their own specific agency situation, as well as developing general strategic approaches.
Potential actions are many and varied and can involve, among other things, be transparent
in transactions, reduce anonymity, audit finances, audit property, monitor contracts, keep
good-quality records, embed and project integrity, use high-standard human resource manage-
ment practices, assist compliance, neutralize peer pressure and have clear policies.
In an Australian example there was a severe integrity breakdown in a large government
department, the Department of Education and Training in the state of Victoria (IBAC 2017).
A small group of senior officials corruptly issued contracts, exhibited significant conflict of
interest and fostered a culture of harassment and bullying of potential whistle-blowers. There
was a culture of fear and intimidation as they captured the vision for the department and
overall exhibited many characteristics of misconduct, maladministration and corruption. The
department suffered significant reputational loss, as well as financial loss and loss of trust of
many stakeholders.
The department responded by issuing a blueprint for renewal which involved three lines of
defence (Victoria Department of Education and Training 2017):
●● First Line: A culture of integrity underpins everything we do.

●● Second Line: Smart systems and controls to oversee and guide our actions.
●● Third Line: Independent and robust assurance (audit).
Over 48 pages the report outlines, step by step, how these aspirational statements are to be
implemented and inculcated into the department’s culture. The strategy starts with employee
awareness and a values strategy. Values such as responsiveness, integrity, impartiality,
accountability, respect, human rights and leadership were to be rolled out one per month, by
way of posters, quick reference sheets, conversation guides, an e-learning module and the
distribution of values packs. The report goes through codes, frameworks and systems, and
implementation of aspirations such as standard values, investing in people, culture of respect
and integrity and setting tone at the top. This is all aimed at changing culture and putting
protective processes in place. This example highlights the complexity of the situation and the
complexity of the solutions.
This book outlines problems and solutions. It diagnoses situations, provides detailed anal-
ysis and proposes ways forward. The authors come from many countries and their experience
transcends many domains. The first point however is always an ideological point. Is corruption
a reflection of bad administration, or is corruption something deeply embedded in political
culture? A leading scholar, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, notes (2020) that public administration is
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

endogenous to, and not a cause of the quality of government. The ideal in corruption preven-
tion is to have the state separate from private interests and to be able to treat citizens equally
and impersonally. It is debateable whether this comes about through better management or
large-scale political processes. Mungiu-Pippidi (2020) points out that World Bank researchers
argue that solving governance with administrative or civil service reform is to confuse the
solution with the problem.
She shows that over time corruption has reduced with gains in human rights, transparency
and equality, rule of law, elimination of legal privileges, free universal elections, meritocratic
recruitment of civil servants and abolition of “offices for sale”. These and other instruments
of deep democratization took many decades of reform and are not quick fixes to deeply
entrenched problems. However, knowing one’s starting point is important. In a highly corrupt
society many administrative changes seem like band aid solutions. In considerably less corrupt
societies they can have a major impact in improving the quality of government.
Anyone with this handbook before them can choose to focus on chapters that seem relevant
to them at this moment. There are lessons to be learned from poor countries and rich countries.
The authors who have generously contributed to this book have looked both broadly and nar-
rowly, and lessons about the causes of corruption and means to prevent it are here to be shared.
REFERENCES
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Integrity 10 (3):193–214.
Chaikin, David, and Jason Sharman. 2009. Corruption and money laundering: a symbiotic relationship.
New York: Springer.
Clarke, Ronald V., and Marcus Felson. 2010. “The origins of the routine activity approach and situational
crime prevention”. In The origins of American criminology, edited by F. Cullen, C. Jonson, A. Myer
and F. Adler. New Brunswick: Transaction Press.
Dahlström, Carl, and Victor Lapuente. 2017. Organizing Leviathan: politicians, bureaucrats, and the
making of good government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Associates.
Dobel, J. Patrick. 2002. Public integrity. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Easton, David. 1965. A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Graycar, Adam. 2015. “Corruption: classification and analysis”. Policy and Society 34 (2):87–96.
Graycar, Adam. 2016. “Corruption and public value”. Public Integrity 18 (4):339–41.
Graycar, Adam, and Adam B. Masters. 2018. “Preventing malfeasance in low corruption environments:
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Graycar, Adam, and Olivia Monaghan. 2015. “Rich country corruption”. International Journal of Public
Administration 38:586–95.
Graycar, Adam, and Tim Prenzler. 2013. Understanding and preventing corruption. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
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Heidenheimer, Arnold J., and Michael Johnston, eds. 2008. Political corruption: concepts and contexts.
Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publications.
Heywood, Paul. 2017. “Rethinking corruption: hocus-pocus, locus and focus”. Slavonic and East
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searchQuery=dunham&wordsMode=0 (accessed 19 March 2020).
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-bribery.pdf (accessed 19 March 2020).
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2. Trends and drivers of public administration in
the twenty-first century
Zeger van der Wal
INTRODUCTION
The operating environment of public servants and public organizations is dynamic and
changes constantly. Unpredictable and ambiguous international events and power shifts, asser-
tive stakeholders challenging policy domestically, and rapid, volatile demographic, economic,
and technological changes affect this operating environment. A popular saying these days is
that public servants increasingly operate in a “VUCA world” (Johansen 2007), characterized
by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.
The VUCA operating environment that challenges traditional conceptions of public admin-
istration is the result of various, interrelated megatrends; reported extensively in a variety
of recent articles, books, and reports from governments and consulting firms (Dickinson
and Sullivan 2014; Dickinson et al. 2019; Dobbs et al. 2015; Gratton 2011; KPMG 2013;
Needham and Mangan 2016; ‘t Hart 2014; Van der Wal 2017a; Vielmetter and Sell 2014). The
trends identified by various governments, scholars, and consulting firms, such as political and
economic power shifts from the West to the East, the rise of the assertive stakeholder, fiscal
austerity and doing more with less, climate change and resource constraints, and demographic
challenges, show remarkable similarity and overlap (Van der Wal 2017a: 36). Moreover,
KPMG (2013: 8) asserts:
Global megatrends are highly interrelated. While the individual trends won’t play out to the same
degree in each country, the resulting consequences are inevitably interconnected and reinforce each
other in terms of impact. This relationship is evident when considering, for example, the nexus of
issues around changing demographics, resource stress and climate change [the same goes for rise of
the individual, enabling technology, and economic power shifts and interconnectedness].
This chapter focuses on eight global megatrends impacting public sectors around the world,
albeit differently according to economic and political context and stage of development,
providing facts, figures, and perspectives from a variety of sources (the typology of trends is
based on Van der Wal 2017a: 31–48).
GLOBAL TRENDS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
“All Is Networked”: Enabling Technology, Social Media, and Big Data
Obviously, a key overarching factor here is technological advancement. Rapid technological

evolutions of the past few decades have led to a world in which many gadgets that appeared
in science fiction movies in the 1980s and 1990s are now reality; in fact, they have even been
10
Zeger van der Wal - 9781789900910
Trends and drivers of public administration 11
surpassed. Indeed, it seems hard to imagine nowadays that smartphones didn’t even exist less
than a decade ago; the “global app” economy was estimated to be worth 151 billion USD in
2017. Smartphones with mobile internet are transforming the way we work, live, and commu-
nicate on a daily basis, and the 1,000-fold increase in speed of the mobile internet when 5G
replaces 4G around 2020 will accelerate this beyond imagination. Increasingly, we are living
in a “network society” (Castells and Cardoso 2006) that leads to global economic intercon-
nectedness, the fourth megatrend in this chapter.
By its very nature, technology accelerates the changes it sets in motion and exponentially
increases available data and information. In 1965, future Intel founder Gordon E. Moore
famously predicted that the capacity of microchips would double every two years. This
observation, dubbed “Moore’s Law”, was adjusted a decade later by Intel executive David
House to 18 months. It appears that the rate of growth will begin to slow (as chip capacity
is not infinite). However, one profound consequence of increasing computer processing and
storage capacity is an increase in the production of data, or the “creation of knowledge”. It is
estimated by companies like IBM that around 90 percent of the digital data in the world today
was created in just the past two years (Van der Wal 2017a: 37).
Indeed, much has been written about the implications of “big data” for business, govern-
ment, and society (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). Less explored are the potential
effects on public sectors, in areas such as the information-processing capabilities of systems
and managers, performance management information use (Meijer 2015; Moynihan 2010), and
public service delivery (Barber 2015). Already, the key issue facing public decision makers
is an overabundance rather than a shortage of relevant policy and performance data. Most
current public managers who are not heavily specialized in information technology lack even
a basic understanding of what this overabundance means, let alone possess the skillset and
mindset required to leverage these data.
Many citizens, particularly younger generations, already far outperform the existing stock
of public servants in this area. This fact, in conjunction with citizens’ increasing demands for
transparency in how governments use data to plan and justify their decision making, poses
immense pressure on public agencies and their leaders. One such threat is the increasing inci-
dence of cybersecurity threats, including the rise of “hacktivists” (RAND 2013).
“Great Expectations”: Individualism and Demands for Unlimited Transparency
A second trend, reinforced by technological advancements, is captured by labels like the “rise
of the individual” (KPMG 2013), “great expectations” (Needham and Mangan 2016), and
“individualism and value pluralism” (Vielmetter and Sell 2014). The thrust of this trend is that
technology and education have empowered individuals, and younger generations in particular,
with massive improvements in literacy (now at a global rate of 84 percent), participation of
women in the workforce, and a rapidly expanding middle class (KPMG 2013; UNDP 2013).
By 2030, the global middle class will double from around 30 to around 60 percent of the pop-
ulation, with 80 percent residing in the developing world, particularly Asia (Brookings 2010;
Mahbubani 2013).
This increasingly empowered, vocal, participatory, and critical middle class, armed with
high-speed, internet-powered smartphones, will keep governments on their toes, or ultimately
remove them from power. This dynamic is particularly prominent in more hierarchical and
authoritative cultures and regimes – think of the Arab Spring in 2011 or Occupy Central

in Hong Kong in 2014 and 2019 – where social media plays a role in three key dynamics:
organizing protests, shaping the narrative, and putting pressure on the international community
(KPMG 2013).
Such dynamics will fundamentally change the way in which regimes and the public servants
that represent them have to interact, communicate, and collaborate with stakeholders and cit-
izens. In short, governments need to become “more open, more innovative, more responsive,
and smarter” (Deloitte 2010: 38). Are “great expectations” a hype? No, events that have been
unfolding for some time now rather point at a steady decrease of the self-evidence of (tradi-
tional) authority, with the backlashes and defensive responses of authoritarian regimes being
a natural reaction.
“Forever Young”: Demographics, Fertility, and Ageing
A third cluster of trends related to individuals has to do with demographic dynamics. Birth
rates throughout the developed world are going down and individuals are ageing. It is esti-
mated that in 2030, 13 percent of the world’s population will be aged 65 or above, compared
with 8 percent today; by 2050, one in five persons will be elderly (INIA 2013). Population
ageing is mainly caused by two factors. First, birth rates over time have on average declined
from 37 per 1,000 in the 1950s to 24 in the 1990s, and are projected to fall to 16 per 1,000 by
2035 (UNDP 2013). The United States (US) is a notable exception to most developed coun-
tries as its population is still expected to increase for decades to come.
However, as the vast majority of new births takes place among immigrants, this trend poses
its own political and policy-related problems (in a sense, many European countries face an
exaggerated version of this problem as their “indigenous” population is ageing and shrinking
even more rapidly, exacerbated by recent waves of refugees). Second, individuals are living
longer. The European Union, Australia, the US, China, Japan, Korea, and Russia are expected
to see a dramatic increase in the number of 65+ year olds and 80+ year olds between now
and 2040 when most of these countries will peak (Rodrigues et al. 2012; UNDP 2011). To
illustrate: 174 million people in Europe and North America are now aged 65 years or older,
40 million people more than 20 years ago. And increasing and accelerating improvements in
healthcare technology will push up this number to heights that are hard to predict today. Will
elderly be “forever young” (Dickinson et al. 2019) just a few decades from now?
Interestingly, the developing world shows a completely different dynamic. Ninety percent
of the global youth lives in developing countries (KPMG 2013), and a rapidly developing
country such as India is estimated to add 1 million people to its labour force every month
between now and 2030 (ADB 2011). It goes without saying that the implications for gov-
ernments across the world are immense. Clearly, the developed world has already started to
fundamentally rethink its pension systems, elderly care arrangements, housing, and overall
fiscal policies, and how and by whom these should be financed and delivered (Alford and
O’Flynn 2012; KPMG 2013). In a way, this process was aided and accelerated by the global
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. However, in the developing world the key issue is achieving
economic growth levels that allow the economy to absorb ever growing numbers of youths
looking for jobs, in conjunction with upgrading the educational backgrounds and skills needed
for twenty-first-century jobs. This struggle is experienced by many countries across Africa,
Asia, and Latin America (and increasingly, Southern Europe as well).

So, while the overall global workforce will be shrinking, this process will be very unevenly
skewed towards the developed world. Beyond the obvious consequences for healthcare,
housing, and healthcare policies, public-sector organizations, in human resource management
terms, will witness unprecedented “star wars”: wars for talent between organizations to
prevent a much feared “leadership cliff” (Van der Wal 2017b; Vielmetter and Sell 2014: 108).
“Economic Interconnectedness”: Convergence, Contagion, and Regulation
Moving from megatrends in the individual domain to the global economic domain, a key issue
is how technology and the rise of the individual affect the nature, shape, and size of the global
economy, which in turn largely determines the agendas and playing fields of public adminis-
trations. KPMG (2013: 26) labels this trend “economic interconnectedness”. Free trade and
international investment have seen an immense surge just over the past decade: global trade
as share of gross domestic product (GDP) has increased from 40 percent in 1980 to about 60
percent in 2014 (Economist 2014; World Bank 2014). Moreover, global growth in trade is
expected to continue at about 5 percent annually between now and 2030 (HSBC 2015; KPMG
2013), with 80 percent of the current trade agreements in force having been introduced since
1990 (Arestis 2012). Mahbubani (2013) suggests that increasing economic interconnectedness
will also lead to a “great convergence” of cultural and political discourse, management think-
ing, and educational strategies across the globe and between the East and West in particular.
Again, there are stark differences between countries and regions here, as the next two
megatrends will show. In addition, as with most of the trends identified here, risks and oppor-
tunities go hand in hand, as KPMG (2013: 26) concludes:
There are also new challenges as economies are increasingly connected to risks beyond national
borders. These risks not only move quickly, they also defy the scope of national regulation, demand-
ing international cooperation. As the trend toward increased economic interconnectedness is expected
to continue, governments throughout the world will need to ensure that they have the policy frame-
works in place to capture the benefits of trade and manage the risks.
The global economic shocks caused by the bankruptcy of one large US bank in 2008 are
a case in point. In response to the crisis, countries around the world have introduced similar
economic regulations, showing regulatory convergence unthinkable before the crisis. In addi-
tion, Foroohar (2015, 2016), Stiglitz et al. (2015), and others have shown that the “enabling
technology” and “economic interconnectedness” this chapter discusses increasingly benefit
the top and bottom of the labour market rather than the entire population; in fact, the rise of the
middle class in many developing countries will go hand in hand with the decline of the tradi-
tional middle class in Western countries. This, in turn, has inspired recent waves of economic
populism and “neo-protectionism” in various developed economies, and the China–US trade
war in 2019. Time will tell whether this is just a blip in the continued economic globalization
of the past decades or whether economies will become more unbundled and detached in the
years to come.
Moreover, growth in some of the emerging economies that were predicted to dominate the
world economy just a decade ago – some of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa) for instance – has stalled dramatically in recent years. At the same time, global
interest rates seemed to have reached a historic low that has been perpetuated for an unusually
long period of time, with rates even being negative in large parts of the developed world where

low growth seems to be the new normal (Foroohar 2016). In an increasingly connected world,
penetrating new markers that are immune to these developments become increasingly hard, if
not impossible.
The impact on politics and policy are evident. Public leaders will play a key role in mitigat-
ing the protectionist and nationalist frustrations of citizens and advising their elected bosses
about how to best respond to such demands.
“More with Less”: Public Debt and Fiscal Pressures
One of the most profound public-sector trends in the developed world has been the massive
growth of public debt and the resulting fiscal pressures; just between 2007 and 2014, net debt
to GDP ratios in developed countries has ballooned from 46.3 percent to almost 80 percent
(IMF 2014). The demographic trends discussed earlier will only exacerbate public debt and
accompanying fiscal pressures, and the increasing demands of citizens from their governments
to “deliver” (Noordegraaf 2015; ‘t Hart 2014) will make it harder to postpone or mystify fiscal
decision making. In short, governments will permanently have to do “more with less”. In fact,
given the investments in capacity building that many of the other trends require to make public
sectors and their managers “future proof”, they will face severely constrained investment
potential.
In a way, this trend seems puzzling given the projections of growing global trade high-
lighted before. However, once again striking differences exist between countries. For instance,
Europe, the US, Australia, and Japan are growing modestly and will see their ageing-related
public expenditures alone increase by 4.4 percent of GDP between now and 2030 (IMF 2013).
In contrast, parts of the developing world, where most of the global growth will be achieved
in the next two decades, and where populations are much younger, will not see such dramatic
increases in public spending.
These observations bring us to the megatrend on global power shifts, including the much
discussed emergence of a “new Asian hemisphere” (Mahbubani 2008), the “rise of Asia”
(Vielmetter and Sell 2014), “Asian century” (Bice et al. 2018), “the silk highway” (Melbourne
School of Government 2013), or most provocatively, in the form of a book title, “When China
rules the world: the end of the Western world and the birth of a new global order” (Jacques
2009).
“Global Power Shifts”: The Asian Century and the Multi-Polar World
To start with, the estimate that 57 percent of global GDP will be generated by developing
countries in 2030 (OECD 2010), with the BRIC countries amounting to 36 percent (com-
pared to 18 now) and averaging annual growth rates of 8 percent (Roland Berger Strategy
Consultants 2011), are amazing facts as such. However, these numbers pale in comparison
with the economic rise of Asia, and China and India in particular. For example, just 35 years
ago, the US share of global national product in purchasing power parity terms was 25 percent
while that of China was 2.2 percent; by the end of 2014, the US share stood at 16.2 percent and
China at 16.4 percent (IMF 2014). This is the first time in 200 years that the largest economy in
the world has been non-Western (Mahbubani 2013: 17). The middle class in Asia is expected
to explode in less than a decade, from 500 million in 2015 to 1.75 billion people around 2020,
with China’s middle class expected to double to 1.1 billion people (Roland Berger Strategy

Consultants 2011). These are tectonic economic power shifts. Much of the economic growth,
trade, and traffic of goods and services in the next decades will take place on the new “silk
highway” (Melbourne School of Government 2013: 4).
It goes without saying that these economic shifts will lead to political, diplomatic, cultural,
educational, and military power shifts as well, many of which are occurring as we speak. For
instance, between now and 2020, acquisitions of foreign companies by Chinese firms are set
to quadruple (Wolf 2011). In early 2016, the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) took off, supported by various European countries but not joined by the US.
China will own 30 percent of the shares. AIIB is seen as an important tool for China to further
enlarge its influence and interests in the region. As we speak, one country after the other is
signing up to support and participate in AIIB while the US remains a staunch and increasingly
isolated adversary.
The US position provoked unusually sharp remarks from China’s finance minister Lou
Jiwei when outlining the AIIB proposal in 2015: “For decision-makers in the US, they really
have to be reminded that if they do not jump on the bandwagon of change in time, they will
soon be overrun by the bandwagon itself.” With new economic and political ties being forged
and broken faster than before and old powers moving up and down the global economic and
diplomatic food chain, the world is now more “multi-polar” than it has been in the past two
centuries (see Kaplan 2009).
Clearly, the impacts of these shifts for governments and public managers depend on their
locus and focus. However, I would challenge the notion that global economic trends and inter-
national developments only affect those working in foreign relations and trade departments.
In fact, it is likely that all public management work will internationalize and globalize in
the decades to come (cf. KPMG 2013; ‘t Hart 2014), whether public officials like it or not.
Governments in the West will increasingly have to get accustomed to a new normal in which
Asian (and to a lesser extent African and Latin American) forces are driving their agendas,
rather than the other way around.
For governments in Asia, and particularly in countries whose economic and political clout is
rapidly increasing, these developments imply that they have to facilitate their governments to
lead rather than follow, to create rather than obstruct global agendas, and to obtain and main-
tain the roles and capabilities their new status requires: “noblesse oblige”. An inward-looking
and protectionist mindset is the last thing that public sectors should develop, but this is exactly
what is happening in many parts of the world.
“Ultra-Urbanization”: Megacities as Nodes of Growth and Governance
In today’s world, just 600 cities house around 20 percent of the world’s population and gener-
ate 50 percent of global GDP (McKinsey Global Institute 2012). Emerging “megacities” are
sprawling out and expanding into autonomous centres of economic activity and governance,
with 80 percent of urbanization between now and 2030 taking place in Africa and Asia (UNDP
2013). In 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population will live in cities (compared to 50 percent
now), and more than 90 percent of the developed world will live in cities. Simultaneously,
the world’s population will grow by more than 1 billion (KPMG 2013), with obvious conse-
quences for economic development and disparity between rural and urban areas. In addition,
the number of so-called megacities with populations of over 10 million will double to around
40 in 2030. Such developments have immense consequences for infrastructure investment,

social inequality, crime, and liveability – with no change in policy, the number of people
living in slums will double from 1 billion today to 2 billion in 2030 – and pressures towards
sustainable development (KPMG 2013; OECD 2008).
Less resourced and developed “secondary” or second-tier cities (Storey 2014) are also
emerging. Indeed, in the coming decades, much of the economic development in developing
countries will happen here: China already has 135 such cities with populations between 1 and
10 million (Storey 2014). Increasingly, mayors and city managers of such cities take the stage
and drive policy and management agendas, often in competition with and at the displeasure of
national governments. Some observers suggest that policy innovations and experimentation,
and the creative leadership and collaborations they require, increasingly take place at the city
level. Others have speculated about what would happen If mayors ruled the world, as the
much hyped book by Benjamin Barber (2013) is titled (with the telling subtitle Dysfunctional
nations, rising cities).
Like most of the other megatrends, “ultra-urbanization” creates as many risks and threats as
opportunities. As cities increasingly attract populations and economic growth, but central gov-
ernments continue to hold and distribute the majority of government budgets, public servants
will have to bargain and broker. They will have to align “the resource demands of their juris-
dictional responsibilities, rights to revenue and incentives” and “formulate cross-jurisdictional
and cross-governmental planning forums and mechanisms that support integrated planning”
(KPMG 2013: 48).
“More from Less”: Resource Stress, Environmental Depletion, and Climate Change
In many ways, climate change and resource stress can be perceived as downsides of the
previous trends. As phrased by the Melbourne School of Government, we have to get “more
with less” (2013: 3). A recent ADB report (2013) predicts the “rise of Asia” alone means the
region’s oil consumption will double, natural gas consumption will triple, and coal consump-
tion will rise 81 percent by 2035. In turn, 75 to 80 percent of the costs of adaptation to climate
change will be shouldered by the developing world, with East Asia and the Pacific region
bearing most of these expenses (World Bank 2010).
Global warming has become the key frame in recent discussions about the environment but
still seems “far off” and far away to many public managers, although things are beginning to
shift after a historic global agreement to substantively cut back emissions was reached at the
COP21 meeting in Paris in December 2015. However, what is already directly and signifi-
cantly affecting their operating environments is the intertwined dynamics of environmental
depletion and resource scarcity.
For instance, as global energy consumption will increase by around 25 percent until 2030
and total annual water demand will increase more than 50 percent, even the most positive sce-
nario in terms of renewable energy use and technological advancement cannot prevent almost
half of the world’s population from living in “areas of high water stress” (Roland Berger
Strategy Consultants 2011). Global demand for food will rise while growth rates in global
agriculture will fall, exacerbated by the depletion of clean water needed to support increasing
agricultural efficiency. Raw materials such as indium and gallium, which are needed for the
technologies to mitigate the abovementioned developments, will most likely decrease (Roland
Berger Strategy Consultants 2011). Like many of the other trends discussed here, numerous
dynamics interrelate and accelerate each other, leading to immense challenges for govern-

ments in mitigating, planning for, and adapting to a world in which “more from less” will
coincide with “more with less”.
It is true that “technophiles” like Apple chief executive Tim Cook, Tesla chief executive
Elon Musk or New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman argue that ongoing technological
revolutions and advancements will help us in overcoming most of these problems. Indeed,
a hopeful sign is that investments in renewable energy and “clean tech” have gone up dramat-
ically in recent years, surpassing investments in fossil fuels for the first time ever in 2015, and
have continued to so ever since (NEO 2019).
However, for many governments, particularly those in underdeveloped settings, acquiring
– let alone leveraging – these technologies (if they can even deliver as promised), requires
massive upgrading of human capital and management development and training systems.
Even more important, they will require shifts in current attitudes towards organizational and
individual learning and cultures of experimentation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC AGENCIES AND PUBLIC

SERVANTS
As a result, public servants and organizations are faced with a “cascade” (Noordegraaf 2007)
of multi-faceted and contradictory demands which, in turn, result in complex public service
dilemmas. A key question here is to what extent public servants are actually able and capable
to affect – let alone drive – these dynamics. Often, they will feel as if these demands are simply
placed upon them by “higher powers” and “larger forces”, including political bosses and their
electoral pressures and promises, or international market and governance actors. Interesting
questions for teaching and research include: How can public servants move from default to
crafted mode (Gratton 2011)? How can they ensure they are “at the wheel” rather than “under
fire” (Noordegraaf 2004) and turn demands and dilemmas into opportunities?
Not all of these demands and dilemmas are necessarily unique or new. Indeed, the obser-
vation that “competing values” (Cameron and Quinn 1989: 32) and “competing logics”
(Noordegraaf 2015: 64) dominate organizational environments has been around for quite some
time. Various authors have addressed the “multiplicity” and “ambiguity” of public-sector set-
tings before (March and Olsen 1989; Brandsen and Pestoff 2006: 1). However, the magnitude
and interrelatedness of twenty-first-century trends and drivers mean that new demands and
dilemmas will be:
●● the norm rather than the exception;

●● mutually reinforcing and exacerbating (with decreasing predictability);
●● affecting all types of public managers rather than just those at the very top; and
●● affecting the nature and practice and not just the content of (public administration) work.
Vielmetter and Sell (2014: 141) use the concept of reinforcers in pointing out “powerful con-
sequences that result from – and are thus reinforced by – two or more megatrends in tandem.
The nature of these reinforcers is such that they are intimately linked and therefore overlap to
a degree.” Just as with the megatrends, their reinforcers show a remarkable overlap with future
challenges for public servants identified in various recent writings, with different authors
adding their own flavours, accents, and priorities (e.g., Dickinson et al. 2019; Needham and

Mangan 2016; ‘t Hart 2014; Van der Wal 2017a). Box 2.1 lists the key consequences and
challenges produced by global megatrends.
BOX 2.1 GLOBAL MEGATRENDS: CONSEQUENCES FOR

PUBLIC SERVANTS
1. Stakeholder dynamics, a multiplication of – more ambiguous – interests that must be
taken into consideration.
2. Collaborative modes of working in co-producing stakeholder networks requiring
power sharing, use of new media, and open innovation.
3. Power shifts away from traditional to new authorities, and more frequent and sudden
authority shifts from one leader or constituency to another.
4. Increased legitimacy and performance requirements towards an increasingly assertive,
savvy, and scrutinizing array of stakeholder networks.
5. New working practices, the emergence of new types of work, working, and workers
due to technological revolutions, changing attitudes towards work, and new genera-
tions of employees.
6. Pressures for smarter organizing and budgeting due to scarcity of talent and natural
resources and the use of advanced technology in an era of low growth and austerity.
7. Ethicization, a demand for the highest ethical standards from organizations and their
servants.
Source: Dickinson and Sullivan 2014; Needham and Mangan 2016; ‘t Hart 2014; Vielmetter and Sell 2014; Van
der Wal 2017a.
Clearly, this operating environment poses various challenges to public servants and organi-
zations. However, emerging developments also provide exciting opportunities for achieving
unprecedented levels of public service excellence, together with citizens and vanguards of
change from other sectors. In order to turn challenges into opportunities, twenty-first-century
public servants need to acquire and display a variety of skillsets and mindsets.
Why “Public” Servants Are Different
At the same time, the nature of what makes public servants and organizations “public” implies
that changes and reforms are by definition less radical and drastic than in corporate environ-
ments. Indeed, despite decades of discussing new types of public management and public man-
agers, one key aspect will always differentiate them from business managers. This key aspect
is their additional onus on upholding public values and interests, and safeguarding institutional
integrity without overstepping the politician’s comfort zone (Rhodes 2016; Terry 1995).
No matter how networked, multi-channelled, and innovative the operating environment
of twenty-first-century public servants becomes, or how many private sector-inspired tools,
techniques, and approaches they emulate, they will remain conservators and stewards of the
public interest (Watt 2012). Moreover, much of the discourse on private sector-oriented and
cross-sectoral network management seems to ignore how legal and constitutional responsibili-
ties and mandates of public servants have remained in place (Rosenbloom 2015; Van der Wal
2011). Indeed, many of the responsibilities and qualities of public servants are institutional
rather than transformational.

Stressing the uniqueness of these responsibilities and constraints, some have compared
public servants to “gardeners” who require time, patience, experience, and political aware-
ness. They are quiet servants who are in “for the long haul” and their craft is compromise
(Frederickson and Matkin 2007; ‘t Hart 2014). Terry even considers “the heroic or transforma-
tive model of leadership with the great man radically changing the organization and disdaining
its existing traditions, a threat to institutional integrity” (1995: 44).
Still, in recent years, a dazzling amount of scholarly articles and books as well as con-
sultancy reports and government documents discuss the future public-sector workforce.
According to such writings, “new style” public servants should be entrepreneurial and locally
minded, display interpersonal skills and commercial savvy, master collaboration and commu-
nication, and lead and manage change, deliver projects and programmes, redesign services,
and deliver them digitally (Dickinson et al. 2019; KPMG 2013; Needham and Mangan 2016;
Alford and O’Flynn 2012; ‘t Hart 2014; Van der Wal 2017a). They should have the ability
to operate in increasingly cross-sectoral, international, and co-producing networks in which
citizens manage alongside public servants rather than being managed by them.
A somewhat more fundamental, macro-level debate concerns the future of twenty-first-century
work (Gratton 2011). Issues discussed include the emergence of non-routine, spontaneous, and
teamwork, “remote” and “virtual” office settings, and the increase of simulation and experi-
mentation. Others emphasize “social media literacy” and big data analytical skills (Deiser and
Newton 2013), and the disruptive effects of technology and robotization on the future of work,
jobs, and job security (World Economic Forum 2016).
A contrasting perspective is offered by acclaimed political scientist Rod Rhodes (2016:
638), who recently suggested that in an era of networked governance public managers should
retreat from business-like skills and approaches to return to six classical qualities or adminis-
trative “crafts”. The six crafts he puts forward are counselling, stewardship, prudence, judge-
ment, diplomacy, and political nous, referred to by others as political savvy, political antennas,
or “political astuteness” (Hartley et al. 2015).
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PARADIGMS ACROSS TIME

Blending and Switching between Complementary Repertoires
Clearly, the abovementioned megatrends and their implications for public servants require
a multitude of different competencies, skills, and values in order for them to be affective in
the years to come. As argued above, however, not all of these are necessarily new. Moreover,
rather than arguing that the existing “stock” of public servants should simply be replaced by
a new generation of tech-savvy specialists (or even robots and algorithms as some argue1),
a more meaningful discussion concerns which repertoires of skills and values public servants
need to master and combine, to remain effective in the years to come. In order to do so, it is
useful to analyse how past repertoires, paradigms, and reforms have resulted in the current
state of affairs in terms of the demands on and required qualities of public servants.
Dozens of publications structure and sequence key chronological developments in the prac-
tice and theory of public administration, and define the characteristics of public servants (e.g.,
Lynn 2006; Noordegraaf 2015; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017). Over time, we can distinguish

three key ideal types of public servants that have emerged alongside changing views of the role
of government and concurrent reform movements.
Building on the recent work of ‘t Hart (2014) who speaks about “administrative crafts-
manship 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0”, it is important to stress that these three repertoires blend with and
complement each other in the daily life of public servants. Contrary to what is often suggested
by scholars and practitioners, these three types have not simply replaced each other over time:
it is not just “out with the old, in with the new”. In many ways, ideal type 1.0 still provides the
“foundational software” for the upgraded applications and features of types 2.0 and 3.0.
Type 1.0: The Traditional, Rule-Oriented Bureaucrat
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the practice of administration and the
function of public administrators began to professionalize as bureaucracies grew and became
more complex. Although some ancient kingdoms, dynasties, and rulers had long ago devel-
oped rather advanced practices of administering territories and institutions (see Rutgers 2005),
the common practice in most countries at the time was that one became a public servant by
chance or through nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. Two key influential thinkers here were
Woodrow Wilson, who later became president of the US, and German sociologist Max Weber.
In their pioneering texts they argued for a separate professional ethos and a set of core skills for
administrators to detach them from the political sphere (Weber 1921; Wilson 1887).
Weber outlined a set of principles for what became known as the ideal typical bureaucrat.
This traditional rule-oriented bureaucrat is loyal to political mandates, neutral in her views
of policies and programmes, impartial in executing and administering these policies and
programmes, and efficient and lawful in organizing and operating her agencies. She derives
her authority from in-depth domain knowledge and legal expertise. Weber’s thinking still very
much influences how government agencies operate and how public employees are trained
and recruited. Many public policies, programmes, services, and goods continue to be realized
through the key delivery mode associated with the ideal type 1.0: the hierarchical, formalized,
bureaucratic organization. The most commonly used label corresponding with this ideal type
is Weberian public administration or Traditional Public Administration.
Weber and his followers spoke of administrators, bureaucrats, or civil servants rather than
public managers or servants, labels primarily associated with the ideal type 2.0, as the next
section shows. At the same time, ideas on how early bureaucracies had to be organized were
also influenced by engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor, famous for his concept of “scientific
management” (1911: 7), which sought to improve the efficiency of factory operations in
rapidly industrializing societies. Although Taylor’s ideas were primarily oriented towards
the private sector, both he and Weber stressed operational efficiency and a belief in technical
expertise and “scientific” methods to manage operations and institutions.
Type 2.0: The “Business-Like”, Performance-Focused Manager
The ideal type 2.0 public manager is a “manager” in a more normative sense as she is supposed
to embody managerial, private sector-inspired tools, techniques, and values (Lynn 2006;
Noordegraaf 2015). This ideal type emerged in the early 1980s in Anglo-Saxon countries such
as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the US, as the introductory case suggests.
Conservative governments in these countries wanted public-sector organizations to emulate

practices of the private sector, which they considered superior to the increasingly bloated,
unaffordable, and sometimes dysfunctional public bureaucracies. In the 1990s and beyond,
governments across the globe pursued reforms that were fully or partly inspired by the notion
of “running government like a business”. A key text here was the bestselling book Reinventing
government by consultants David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992). They famously declared
government had to “steer rather than row” (1992: 25). In the years that followed, competition,
outsourcing, and privatization became key credos of many governments.
The type 2.0, business-like performance-focused manager first of all wants to deliver
value for money and produce measurable results; thinks in terms of “clients and customers”
rather than citizens; steers and oversees operations that have been outsourced to other actors;
and is expected to master managerial competencies rather than domain expertise. While the
Weberian quality of efficiency is still emphasized, effectiveness and accountability are more
important. Traditional Weberian values such as lawfulness, impartiality, expertise, and neu-
trality are not as emphasized, and in some ways are even associated with inert, conservative,
and dreary bureaucratic mindsets.
The key delivery modes associated with ideal type 2.0 are quasi-markets, contracts, and
public–private partnerships, considered to deliver cheaper, better, and more responsive public
services and goods. The dynamic mix of practices, views, and hypes corresponding with this
ideal type has become best known as the New Public Management or NPM, as coined by
Christopher Hood (1991) in a seminal article. NPM took shape very differently in various parts
of the world.
Type 3.0: The Networking, Relation-Focused Collaborator
The ideal type 3.0 public leader is first and foremost a networker and collaborator. She
operates in a context of “governance” rather than “government” (Rhodes 1996), in which
the public sector is no longer the but rather one of the actors co-creating, co-designing, and
co-producing services in horizontal and vertical networks. This ideal type emerged in the late
1990s and early 2000s alongside the realization that government could no longer “go it alone”
in tackling complex, transboundary policy problems, and that the market was not a panacea
either (Agranoff 2006; Alford and O’Flynn 2012; McGuire 2006). Civil society organizations
and non-governmental organizations gained legitimacy and became more powerful and
professionalized; citizens became increasingly assertive and educated; and businesses were
more concerned with their social and environmental impact. All these “stakeholders” started
to demand a place at the table in addressing as well as defining policy problems and solutions.
In this vein, the type 3.0, networking, relation-focused collaborator is a skilled negotiator,
communicator, enabler, and energizer who easily operates across sectors and issues while
realizing authority and credibility have to be earned time and again from various stakeholders.
Classical Weberian qualities are still important, but if emphasized too much, they may get in
the way of allowing innovative non-state initiatives to flourish. For a type 3.0 public leader,
the objective – the “what” – is leading, while the exact institutional or legislative configuration
through which this objective is met – the “how” – is contingent and flexible. A key framework
here is “public value”, as developed by Harvard Kennedy School professor Mark Moore
(1995, 2013), which takes as a starting point the ultimate mission that public agencies and their
managers try to achieve. In creating public value, public managers have to get constant buy-in

from different and dynamic “authorizing environments”, extending way beyond politicians
and voters alone.
As such, the key delivery modes associated with ideal type 3.0 are networks, partnerships,
and multi-sectoral collaborations with actors from a variety of sectors and jurisdictions. The
term most commonly used for this set of practices and norms is New Public Governance or
NPG, coined by Osborne (2010).
Figure 2.1 visualizes ideal types 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 as three interacting clusters of roles, com-
petencies, and values. Successful twenty-first-century public servants will be able to smartly
and astutely combine sometimes competing roles, competencies, and values depending on the
audience, issue, and context at hand, and add new ones as operating environments continue
to change.
Figure 2.1 Public servant 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0: three interacting modes
The ideal types were discussed chronologically, as each new ideal type is in some ways
a response to its predecessor’s shortcomings. However, in reality public-sector renewal is
a process of “recycling, alteration, and re-balancing”, according to the late Christopher Pollitt
(2011), a leading expert in our field. Indeed, neatly separating and sequencing the types with
start dates and end dates, as many textbooks and reports do, glosses over the hybrid realities in
which public servants simultaneously employ elements from all three types.

Van der Steen et al. (2015: 28) portray this hybrid reality of public servants as sedimentation
to indicate that effective public servants combine the various repertoires corresponding with
the three key paradigms in our field – traditional, “Weberian” public administration, NPM, and
NPG that emphasize horizontal collaboration – in complementary ways. In their prioritization,
such public managers are mindful of when repertoires come into or out of fashion, depending
on context, key events, and the government of the day. As an example, in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis in 2008, many governments re-emphasized the importance of a “strong
state” while pointing out the shortcomings of markets, with some even suggesting undoing
prior privatizations. Who would dare to display type 2.0 behaviour at that stage?
CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALITIES OF

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PUBLIC SERVANTS
The overall trends and demands detailed in this chapter all point towards the need for public
servants and agencies to become more adaptive, networked, communicative, entrepreneur-
ial, innovative, smart, and agile. These traits increasingly apply to all functions and roles.
However, some public servants will be more hardwired with these traits than others, or have
more ability or talent to quickly learn and adapt to their changing environments.
With this in mind, smart recruitment, training, and management-development practices
will become even more important than they already are. Across the globe, public sectors aim
to develop more strategic human resource management practices while future proofing their
leadership programmes and competency frameworks (e.g., ABD 2016; APS 2019). Such pro-
grammes and frameworks emphasize how practices and ideas from past decades will prove to
be relevant in new ways, and need not all be devalued and replaced (cf. Dickinson and Sullivan
2014: 54; Dickinson et al. 2019; Rhodes 2016).
In outlining key characteristics for twenty-first-century public servants, various new ques-
tions emerge. One thing is important for that journey to be a meaningful and successful one:
(aspiring) public servants need a serious voice and “agency” in shaping their own futures and
the future of the public-sector workforce, as studies from various countries show they feel left
out of that conversation so far (Dickinson et al. 2019; Needham and Mangan 2016; Van der
Wal 2017a).
Competencies and Values for Public Servants (from Traditional to New)
Which specific competencies and values are required to display these twenty-first-century
qualities? Based on the trends and demands discussed previously, Figure 2.2 provides an over-
view of traditional competencies and values and newer, increasingly necessary competencies
and values for public servants.
Are the Characteristics of Twenty-First-Century Public Servants Universal?
Will public servants be able to acquire and enact these characteristics, regardless of whether
they operate in the West, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the Pacific? It is
difficult to answer that question because no one knows how individual countries and regions

Figure 2.2 Traditional and new competencies and values for public servants
will continue to develop, how their public sectors will respond to megatrends, and whether
their responses will converge.
It is likely that public servants in liberal democratic environments will be more enabled to
create space for collaboration, open innovation, and genuine stakeholder participation and
crowd sourcing. Meanwhile, public managers in a context of traditional authority and respect
(or fear) of seniority, and of government in general, may have considerably more leeway
to swiftly execute much needed reforms and scale up and roll out large-scale innovations.
Such large-scale implementation and reform will also be more straightforward in centralized,
unitary systems than decentralized, federal systems, regardless of the specific political regime
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017).
Still, it is hard to imagine that countries and regimes will be able – and allowed – to isolate
themselves altogether from the trends and demands outlined in this report, given the speed
at which they travel in an interconnected, globalized world. Indeed, the daily work of public
servants in any jurisdiction, sector, or policy area will continue to internationalize in the years
to come. Even if they do, this may ultimately lead to suboptimal government performance.
Consistent good performance, in turn, ultimately provides the legitimacy for public servants in
any kind of system and regime.
NOTE
1. www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/10/could-robot-government-lead-better-current-politicians-ai/

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3. Typologies of anti-corruption frameworks
Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, Giulia Mugellini and Marlen Heide
INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon that involves different types of actors, activities and
behaviours.1 In the past decades, several corruption classifications have been proposed in order
to identify corrupt behaviours with similar mechanisms and attributes (Rose-Ackerman 1999;
Amundsen 1997; Beeri and Navot 2013; Morris 2011; Bussell 2015; Graycar 2015; Zhang
and Vargas-Hernández 2017; Gupta 2017; Jancsics 2019). These classification schemes,
however, have rarely been used to carve out suitable strategies for addressing different types
of corruption. Moreover, while providing a useful systematisation of common approaches to
countering corruption, existing classifications of anti-corruption interventions (Huberts 1998;
Brunetti and Weder 2003; McCusker 2006; Lange 2008; Dish et al. 2009; Lambsdorff 2009;
Blind 2011; Graycar 2015; Holmes 2015) are often unidimensional and do not reflect which
policy options are left unexplored or insufficiently applied.
This chapter categorises prevalent anti-corruption tools according to policy and corrup-
tion types. The resulting typology2 supports ongoing efforts to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of different approaches to countering corruption. It serves to identify suitable
anti-corruption interventions that consider both the policy problem (types of corruption) as
well as the adequate policy response (anti-corruption intervention). The work presented in this
chapter draws on a recent study conducted by Villeneuve, Mugellini and Heide (2019) which
links criminological classifications of corruption with theoretical categorisations of policy
tools.
COVERAGE AND AIM OF THE TYPOLOGY
The typology covers interventions targeted at administrative corruption. This specific type
of corruption is conventionally described in contrast to political corruption, which involves
elected public officials and mainly aims at influencing the formulation of laws, regulations
and policies, rather than their implementation (Gould 1991; Huberts 1998; Holmes 2015;
OECD 2015: 28).3 In the words of Zhang and Vargas-Hernández (2017: xiv), “administrative
corruption is the most widespread type of corruption and it is sometimes treated as a narrow
term of public corruption”. According to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
administrative corruption mainly entails: bribery of national public officials; bribery of foreign
public officials and officials of public international organisations; embezzlement, misappro-
priation or other diversion of property by a public official (theft of state assets or diversion of
state revenues); trading in influence; abuse of function; and illicit enrichment (UNODC 2004:
17−19). Other behaviours, such as favouritism, are not generally criminalised but could also
lead to corruption (Esadze 2013).
29
Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, Giulia Mugellini and Marlen Heide - 9781789900910
The typology outlined in this chapter considers different types of administrative corruption
as well as strategies to counter them. This classification is further embedded into a framework
of policy types and deals with the fundamental strategies applied to address corruption as
a policy problem.
To structure the typology, the authors followed a four-step methodology aimed at linking
existing policy tools to the characteristics of corruption and of anti-corruption practice. First,
they identified a classification of policy types (Howlett 2010) to form the core of the typology.
They then identified common anti-corruption tools – by reviewing toolkits, guidelines and
manuals developed by relevant supra-national donor agencies and non-governmental organisa-
tions4 and subsequently categorised them according to the policy type they represent. Finally,
each tool was categorised according to the mechanism of the policy intervention and the
type of corruption it seeks to address. The choice of focusing on anti-corruption mechanisms
addressed by international organisations acknowledges their leading role in creating the main
conventions against corruption and, as a consequence, in shaping strategies for prevention and
control. Focusing on their anti-corruption mechanisms provides an overview of the current
international framework in which national and local anti-corruption policies are embedded.
As a result of the above-mentioned methodological process, the typology of anti-corruption
policies is centred around three main dimensions:
a. type of policy tool;

b. mechanism of prevention/intervention; and
c. nature of administrative corruption (motivation and type of gain).
The paragraphs below describe the content of these three dimensions and provide examples
related to anti-corruption policies. See Table 3.1 for results.
DIMENSIONS OF THE TYPOLOGY
Type of Policy Tool
As the majority of anti-corruption efforts take the form of policy interventions, the field of
anti-corruption would benefit from a more interdisciplinary perspective considering public
policy studies. To do so, the typology presented herein draws on Howlett’s much cited typol-
ogy of policies (2010) presenting a variety of approaches to designing and implementing
policy interventions.
At its broadest level, Howlett (2010) distinguishes between four different types of policy:
1. Organisational implementation tools, “rely upon the use of government institutions and
personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process change” (Howlett 2010: 63).
2. Authoritative implementation tools, “primarily involving and relying on the ability of gov-
ernments to direct or steer targets in the directions they would prefer them to go through
the use of the real or perceived threat of state-enforced sanctions” (Howlett 2010: 83).
They exploit both “positive” mechanisms to encourage behaviours compliant with gov-
ernment goals (e.g., disclosure systems of assets and liabilities) and disciplinary measures
by preventing or discouraging corrupt behaviours (e.g., the loss of a job or civil or penal
sanctions).

Typologies of anti-corruption frameworks 31
3. Financial implementation tools mainly involving the transfer of treasure resources to or

from specific public actors in order to encourage them to perform some activity (financial
incentives) or to discourage them (financial costs) (Howlett 2010: 101).
4. Information-based implementation tools, relying on the use of information (knowledge and
data) available to governments to influence consumer and producer behaviour according to
government aims, and/or collect information in order to update their aims (Howlett 2010: 115).
The above-mentioned types of policies can be further broken down according to the nature of
the policy, whether substantive or procedural. Substantive policies concern “a set of alternative
arrangements potentially capable of resolving or addressing some aspect of a policy problem”
(Howlett 2011: 11). Procedural policies entail “a set of activities related to securing some level
of agreement among those charged with formulating, deciding upon, and administering that
alternative” (Howlett 2011: 11). These elements lead to the following classifications of policy
tools.
1.1. Substantive organisational implementation instruments refer to those affecting both the
production and consumption/distribution of goods and services in society. An additional
distinction can be made depending on the proximity of the policy tools to government and
the ability of government to control the effects of their utilisation. Therefore, organisational
substantive instruments can either be implemented through agencies and structures created and
controlled by government organisations (1.1.1. Direct use of government agencies and mech-
anisms), or through indirect or supra-national ones (1.1.2. Indirect use of government organ-
isations for policy purposes) by, for instance, providing human resources with appropriate
systems for preventing corruption risks while recruiting, hiring and retaining public officials.
Four-eyes mechanisms, such as assigning specific responsibilities to appropriate employees
for authorising transactions and activities, are an example of how to use internal governmental
resources to prevent corruption more indirectly.
1.2. Procedural organisational implementation instruments involve the use of organisational
resources of government (personnel, staffing, internal procedures, etc.) to alter or affect policy
processes to produce the needed result (Howlett 2010). These instruments are mainly linked
to the selection of appropriate actors and resources that can shape the operating context of the
governmental agencies in order to cope with potential corrupt behaviours. These instruments
include, for instance, the reorganisation of specific government agencies (e.g., decentralisa-
tion, staff rotation, etc.) (1.2.1. Institutional change), or the creation of specific agencies, task
forces, commissions (e.g., anti-corruption agencies, ad hoc anti-corruption task forces and
inquiries) (1.2.2. Creation of institution). According to Howlett (2010: 78), organisational
implementation tools are costly because they rely on government personnel mainly funded
through taxes.
2.1. Among substantive authoritative instruments we can find direct and indirect govern-
ment regulations (2.1.1 and 2.1.2) through which government “requires or proscribes certain
activities or behaviors… and does so through specially designated regulatory agencies” both
governmental and non-governmental (Howlett 2010: 79) (e.g., the development of codes of
ethics or oversight by government agencies) and market creation and maintenance (2.1.3),
such as partnerships against corruption that support enterprises not to enter into business with
corrupt partners or markets.

Table 3.1 Typology of anti-corruption policies
3. Nature of corruption
2. Mechanism of
1. Policy tool 3.1. Motivation for 3.2. Type of gain Examples of anti-corruption policies
prevention/intervention
corruption
Collusive Systems for recruitment, hiring and retention of public
Tangible gain (T.G.)
Changing the effort Extortionary officials
(↔Effort) Systems for promotion and retirement of public
Collusive Intangible gain (I.G.)
officials
1.1.1. Direct use of
Changing the risk/reward
government agencies/ Collusive T.G. & I.G. Corruption risk assessment
(↔Risk)
mechanisms for policy
Changing the incentives Assigning specific responsibilities to appropriate
purpose Collusive T.G. & I.G.
(↔Incentive) employees for authorising transactions and activities
Use of objective and predetermined criteria for
Raising awareness
Collusive T.G. & I.G. decisions to facilitate the subsequent verification of the
(Awareness)
correct application of the rules or procedures
1.1.2. Use of indirect
government organisations for ↔Effort Collusive T.G. & I.G. External controls
1.1. Substantive organisational instruments

policy purpose
↔Effort Collusive T.G. & I.G. Staff rotation
Leniency programmes and protection of reporting
1. Organisational implementation tools

↔Risk Collusive T.G. & I.G.
1.2.1. Institutional change persons
Collusive
Awareness T.G. & I.G. Training in ethics
Extortionary
instruments
Collusive
organisational
1.2. Procedural
↔Effort T.G. & I.G. Establishing anti-corruption body
1.2.2. Creation of institution Extortionary
Awareness Extortionary T.G. & I.G. Raising public awareness on anti-corruption bodies

2. Mechanism of
corruption
Disclosure systems of assets and liabilities, gifts and
Collusive T.G.
↔Effort benefits
Collusive I.G. Disclosure systems of conflict of interest
2.1.1./2.1.2. Direct and ↔Risk Collusive T.G. & I.G. Disciplinary measures
Indirect government Collusive T.G. & I.G. Oversight by government agencies such as Parliament,
regulation ↔Incentives ombudsman, supreme audit institution and the Anti-
Extortionary T.G. & I.G.
Corruption Agency through audits and investigations
Collusive T.G. & I.G.
Awareness Codes of conduct for public officials
Creation of partnering against corruption to avoid
↔Effort Extortionary T.G. & I.G.
2.1.3. Market creation and entering into business with corrupt partners or markets
maintenance Disseminating information on corrupt businesses or
2.1. Substantive authoritative instruments

Awareness Extortionary T.G. & I.G.
markets
Creating networks of experts to provide
↔Effort Extortionary T.G. & I.G.
2. Authoritative implementation tools

recommendations and develop memoranda of intent
2.2.1. Policy network
activation and mobilisation
Disseminating information on corrupt businesses or
tools Awareness Extortionary TG. & I.G.
instruments
authoritative
markets
2.2. Procedural

2. Mechanism of
corruption
Collusive T.G. Raising wages of civil servants, or implementing
Extortionary systems of bonus; favourable insurance and loan
guarantees for efficient civil servants, promoting
3.1.1 Positive financial bonus for efficient civil servants and vouchers for
↔Risk
incentives public services
Collusive I.G. Systems of promotion and careers; preferential
instruments
Extortionary procurement for institutions/businesses promoting
compliance
3.1. Substantive financial

3.1.2. Negative financial Collusive T.G. & I.G.
↔Risk Fines for civil servants
incentives
3.2.1. Policy network
3. Financial implementation tools

creation and mobilisation Awareness Extortionary T.G. & I.G. Funding research into anti-corruption
financial
tools
instruments
3.2. Procedural

2. Mechanism of
corruption
Collusive T.G. & I.G. Proactive disclosure through wall paintings of the
↔Effort Extortionary names of beneficiaries, and a summary of benefits
regarding services from every department
4.1.1. Information
↔Incentives (value Collusive T.G. & I.G. –
dissemination tools
integrity) Extortionary Administrative practices for requests and appeals
Collusive T.G. & I.G. –
Awareness
Extortionary Raising public awareness and education on corruption
instruments
↔Effort Collusive T.G. & I.G. (Anonymous) reporting of corruption
↔Incentives (value Extortionary T.G. & I.G Access to a single window system across government
4.1.2. Information and
integrity) departments to submit their complaints in writing
4.1. Substantive informational

knowledge collection tools
Promoting the contribution of the public to decision-
Awareness Extortionary T.G. & I.G.
making processes
↔Incentives (value Assigning specific responsibilities to appropriate
Collusive T.G. & I.G.
4.2.1. Information release integrity) employees for authorising transactions and activities
tools Collusive T.G. & I.G.
Awareness Administrative practices for requests and appeals
4. Information-based implementation tools

↔Effort Collusive T.G. & I.G. Censorship, official secrets act, privacy acts
instruments
4.2.2. Information release
prevention tools ↔Incentives (value
Extortionary T.G. & I.G. (Anonymous) external reporting of corruption
4.2. Procedural informational

integrity)

2.2. Procedural authoritative instruments are mainly related to policy network activation and
mobilisation (2.2.1) through the selection and activation of policy actor support (e.g., advisory
councils, networks of experts, etc.).
3.1. Substantive financial implementation tools concern “specific techniques of governance
involved in transferring treasure resources to or from other actors in order to encourage them
to undertake some desired activity through the provision of financial incentives, or to discour-
age them through the imposition of financial tools” (Howlett 2010: 101). They can be grouped
according to the type of incentives they exploit. Positive financial incentives (3.1.1) entail the
financial rewarding of compliant behaviours (e.g., whistle-blower bonuses and premiums)
but also an adequate system of remuneration. Negative financial incentives (3.1.2) concern
increasing the cost associated with non-compliant behaviours (e.g., fines or other financial
penalties).
3.2. Procedural financial implementation tools are “used to attempt to alter or control aspects
of the interest articulation and aggregation systems in contemporary states by creating or
encouraging the formation of associations and groups where this activity might not otherwise
occur, or by rewarding government friends and pushing enemies through various kinds of
payment schemes and penalties” (Howlett 2010: 107). These instruments are rarely used as
anti-corruption policy strategies. With regard to anti-corruption, governments could create
systems of associational rights for companies that avoid entering particularly corrupt busi-
ness areas, and financially support them in the organisation of events and in the creation and
maintenance of the group. Or, more indirectly, governments could fund scientific research into
anti-corruption.
4.1. Substantive government communication tools “rely on the use of information to directly
or indirectly affect the behaviour of those involved in the production, consumption and distri-
bution of different kind of goods and services in the society” (Howlett 2010: 116). Two main
categories can be distinguished: information dissemination tools (4.1.1) take advantage of per-
suasion and moral suasion schemes to convey specific messages and change behaviours (e.g.,
information campaigns to raise awareness among citizens on corrupt behaviours). Information
and knowledge collection tools (4.1.2) aim to collect evidence and data to understand the char-
acteristics of a given phenomenon and better inform policies. This information can be derived
from official data collected by national statistical agencies, or by developing ad hoc surveys
and polling in order to investigate specific issues among the population but also to determine
public opinion and agency performance. Specific data can also be collected through judicial
inquiries and executive commissions (Howlett 2010: 118−19).
4.2. Procedural information instruments aim to alter the behaviour of policy network members
either by releasing or withholding information. Information release tools (4.2.1) facilitate the
direct disclosure of information (e.g., through freedom of information and privacy laws) or
through consultative tools (e.g., public hearings and public disclosure of government inten-
tions). Information release prevention tools (4.2.2) aim to protect specific types of information
and government activities and are usually enforced through censorships, official secrets acts or
private acts. Information prevention could support anti-corruption efforts by e.g., guaranteeing
the anonymity of those reporting undue behaviour (whistle-blowers).

The review of toolkits, guidelines and manuals developed by relevant supra-national

donor agencies and non-governmental organisations revealed that half of the identified
anti-corruption policies are based on information-based implementation tools. Indeed, they
are relatively simple to implement, and their development involves fewer resources than other
more complex types of policy. Furthermore, technological developments have broadened the
range and types of information-based tools. Open data platforms are just one example of how
new technologies can be used to empower citizens towards the promotion of transparency and
anti-corruption.
The second most frequent type of anti-corruption policy involves substantive organisational
implementation tools. Almost one third of the identified policies concerns the direct use of
government agencies and mechanisms for policy purpose (e.g., e-governance, compliance
offices, risk analysis and due diligence systems, auditing systems and selection of personnel).
Institutional change, such as the implementation of anti-corruption training to civil servants,
better selection of personnel, etc., as well as the creation of new institutions are also frequently
applied.
Mechanism of Prevention/Intervention
The type of policy tool is also determined by the objective of the policy. Most broadly there
are two objectives of anti-corruption policies: prevention and intervention. Conventionally,
anti-corruption efforts focused on intervention or sanctioning, addressing corruption after it
occurred. Recent years have seen a shift towards corruption prevention, seeking to minimise
the occurrence of corruption through a variety of strategies.
Intervention strategies mainly involve changing risks and rewards, which means maximis-
ing the risk for public officials to engage in corruption and minimising the rewards. Examples
of policies applying this mechanism are auditing systems; the four-eyes principle; adequate
remuneration and pay scales; reporting by public officials of acts of corruption; disciplinary
measures and financial sanctions; etc.
Prevention strategies can take a variety of forms. Changing the effort refers to those policies
which increase the effort for engaging in corruption (e.g., monitoring and oversight; disclosure
systems; the timely reporting on revenue and expenditure; e-governance mechanisms; etc.),
or decrease the effort to detect and prevent corruption (Graycar and Masters 2018). Raising
awareness informs policies which increases public awareness and education on corruption;
promote public hearing with government officials; implement codes of conduct for public offi-
cials; raise public awareness on anti-corruption bodies; support the freedom to seek, receive,
publish and disseminate information concerning corruption and its restrictions; promote the
participation of society in the prevention of corruption; etc. (Graycar and Masters 2018).
Changing incentives concerns the use of “incentives or disincentives to act with or without
integrity” (Graycar and Masters 2018: 174). Policies exploiting this mechanism to prevent cor-
ruption are promoting the contribution of the public to decision-making oversight processes;
training in ethics; protection of reporting persons; etc.
Policies aiming to prevent corruption usually concern substantive organisational instru-
ments (with direct use of government agencies and mechanisms), procedural organisational
tools, financial implementation tools and information dissemination policies. If the function
of the policy is to detect corruption, substantive organisational tools (with use of indirect
government organisations) and information and knowledge collection tools are the most suit-

able. When the policy aims at repressing/eliminating corruption, authoritative implementation

tools are advocated. Furthermore, the function of the policy and the type of policy tool help
determine the type of implementing body and target population of the policy that should be
addressed. Organisational, authoritative and financial implementation tools are mainly linked
to top-down processes because they are initiated and implemented by governmental agencies
or other formal actors (e.g., business managers), through administrative transmission channels
(Lange 2008). Information-based tools are more linked to bottom-up mechanisms because
they exploit informal social/cultural transmission channels (Lange 2008) and are implemented
by actors outside formal institutions (e.g., individuals, civil society members, etc.) (Jancsics
2019).
The majority of the identified anti-corruption policies are based on the first mechanism
(e.g., monitoring and oversight and e-governance mechanisms), and second mechanism (e.g.,
adequate remuneration and pay scales, disciplinary measures and financial sanctions), while
changing incentives is the least addressed (e.g., training in ethics). This could be due, in part,
to the more long-term nature of the task.
Nature of Administrative Corruption and Type of Gain Involved in the Corruption

Transaction
The choice of policy tools should take into consideration the nature of administrative corrup-
tion and its dynamics. Corruption might be classified according to the type of gain involved
in the corrupt transaction as well as the principal’s or agent’s motivation for participating in
this transaction.
In relation to bribery and corruption, undue advantages and gains can be pecuniary or
non-pecuniary, tangible or intangible (UNODC, 2006: 3; OECD, 2007: 34). Pecuniary gains
are monetary gains, either cash or non-cash “payments”. Non-pecuniary gains are all those
advantages not involving direct exchange of money. Examples of tangible gains/advantages
are money, food and drinks, and sex. Examples of intangible gains/advantages are a loan,
favours, influence and relationships. Favouritism (involving intangible gains) is the least
addressed by existing anti-corruption best practices at international level. Bribery (entailing
tangible gain) is the most targeted. This might be due to the fact that bribery often involves
the practical exchange of money and gifts and such concrete gains can be more easily detected
and prevented than the mere exchange of favours. Furthermore, existing anti-corruption efforts
have been mainly tailored to developing countries, where types of corruption entailing tangible
gains are more frequent than in developed countries. This reinforces the need to understand
and address the features of corruption in prosperous and developed contexts (Graycar and
Monaghan 2015). As far as different policy tools can be used to address different types of
corruption, the analysis found the dimension related to the type of gain to be the most valuable
in obtaining a parsimonious version of the typology (see Table 3.1).
International anti-corruption efforts show a clear difference in the number of policies
targeting types of corruption with tangible and intangible gains. Types of corruption entail-
ing intangible gains should be mainly targeted by organisational implementation tools or
information-based policies. Types of corruption involving tangible gains, such as illicit enrich-
ment and embezzlement, should be mainly dealt with by authoritative implementation tools.
With regard to the motivation for engaging in corrupt practices, we can distinguish between
collusive and extortionary corruption (Ryvkin et al. 2017), elsewhere labelled as “greed”

versus “need” (Bauhr 2017; Jancsics 2019). Extortionary or coercive corruption concerns situ-
ations when citizens have to pay bribes for services they are entitled to receive (e.g., obtaining
a driver’s licence or a birth certificate, registering a property purchase, etc.) (Ryvkin et al.
2017). In these cases, the principal engages in the illegal act because of a specific need, because
corruption is “the only way to receive services or avoid abuses” (Jancsics 2019: 7). It has been
demonstrated that “procedural organisational implementation instruments” and “information
release prevention tools” involving external bottom-up monitoring, external whistleblowing
and generally speaking all policies entailing some sort of citizens’ engagement, are effective
in challenging this type of corruption (Jeffreys 2010; Apaza and Chang 2011; Ryvkin and
Serra 2016; Bauhr 2017; Björkman et al. 2017; Jancsics 2019). The principal is somehow
forced to participate in the illegal transaction but he or she would avoid it if there was an
alternative option. Similarly, introducing competition among public officials by allowing citi-
zens to access the service they need from any of the available offices can reduce extortionary
corruption (Ryvkin and Serra 2016). Finally, collusive corruption entails “greed mechanisms”
and occurs when a bribe is exchanged for the provision of a specific illegal advantage (good
or service) and both parties are eager to participate (e.g., the provision of a building permit
to an unqualified firm) (Ryvkin et al. 2017; Jancsics 2019). The use of indirect government
organisations and external top-down strategies addressed to the agent, such as intelligence
practices and disciplinary measures, are effective in this case because they increase the cost of
participating in the corrupt transaction (Zamboni and Litschig 2018; Jancsics 2019).
Several studies analysed also the effects of leniency (or asymmetric liability) on collusive
corruption; however, their results are contradictory (Bigoni et al. 2015; Engel et al. 2016;
Abbink and Wu 2017; Christofl et al. 2017; Buckenmaier et al. 2018). This type of policy pro-
vides legal immunity to either the agent or the principal in exchange for reporting the illegal
transaction. The decrease in collusive corruption is mainly driven by the fear of being betrayed
and reported (Mugellini et al. 2019). However, this mechanism works only when the social ties
between the parties are weak (Jancsics 2019).
CONCLUSION
The analysis of existing international frameworks for anti-corruption illustrates that the scope
of available policy options has not been fully addressed. While potentially highly relevant,
several types of policy tools do not yet have a concrete equivalent in anti-corruption policy
(e.g., market creation and maintenance; see Table 3.1).
Practitioners might use the insights from this chapter to develop novel ways of countering
corruption. Scholars can primarily benefit by thinking about anti-corruption efforts outside of
disciplinary silos and by identifying and tackling blind spots. Beyond its analytical insights,
the typology can also serve as a practical tool for developing and evaluating anti-corruption
efforts. It allows practitioners to strategise their policy around the corruption problem to be
addressed (notably tangible or intangible gains) or to evaluate the appropriateness of a chosen
strategy against several core factors (e.g., the function or requirements of a specific policy).
More generally, practitioners will find that the typology provides a comprehensive overview
of the most pertinent anti-corruption approaches and a straightforward method for distinguish-
ing between them.

The categories of the proposed typology are exhaustive in coverage of policy tools and
types of corruption but they are not mutually exclusive. This stems from the complexity of
corruption as a phenomenon. Perhaps the consequence is that this complexity is insufficiently
considered in existing anti-corruption tools. What might represent a weakness for academic
purposes can serve as a valuable asset for practitioners, since the typology allows them to
identify inconsistencies even within approaches that are policy standards. Considering the
frequent failure of anti-corruption initiatives (Persson et al. 2013), the typology might assist
in critically evaluating persistent assumptions and one-size-fits-all approaches proposed for
a complex social problem.
NOTES
1. This chapter builds upon an initial contribution published by the authors in the European Journal on
Criminal Policy and Research: Villeneuve et al. 2019.
2. The term typology refers to multidimensional conceptual classifications (Bailey 1994).
3. In addition to public institutions, administrative corruption can also involve quasi-private organi-
sations that have a strong link to the public sector, either because their mandate is dictated by the
state or because the state is the main shareholder. However, such public−private arrangements are
excluded, since they evoke types of corruption and require response mechanisms which are closer
to those for private-sector corruption (e.g., corruption in the private sector depends on the business
environment).
4. A total of 35 types of anti-corruption policies have been identified by reviewing the fol-
lowing publications: Independent Commission Against Corruption (European Union); ICAC
(2009), Public Sector Anti-Corruption Framework Manual. European Union Decentralised
Cooperation Programme; OECD (2003), Anti-Corruption Instruments and the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises; OECD (2010), Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics
and Compliance; OECD (2009), Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials; OECD (2016), Recommendation of the Council for Development Co-operation
Actors on Managing the Risk of Corruption; Transparency International (2002), Corruption
Fighters Toolkit: Civil Society Experiences and Emerging Strategies; Transparency International
(2013), Best Practices for Anti-Corruption Commissions; Transparency International (2015),
Together Against Corruption: Transparency International Strategy 2020; UNODC (2003), UN
Guide for Anti-Corruption Policies; UNODC (2004), The Global Programme Against Corruption
UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit; UNODC (2009), Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption; UNODC (2015), National Anti-Corruption Strategies: A Practical Guide for
Development and Implementation; UNDP (2011), Practitioners’ Guide: Capacity Assessment of
Anti-Corruption Agencies; UNDP (2014), Global Anti-Corruption Initiative (GAIN) Highlights of
the Key Achievements in 2014 (2014); UNDP (2015), User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption and
Anti-Corruption; UNDP (2017) Global Anti-Corruption Initiative (GAIN) 2014–2017; World Bank
(2006), Governance and Anti-Corruption: Ways to Enhance the World Bank’s Impact.
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4. Virtue and morality in public administration:
values-driven leadership in public-sector
agencies
Michael Macaulay
INTRODUCTION: THE CONTESTED VALUES OF CORRUPTION
In 2014, the then prime minister David Cameron hosted the United Kingdom (UK) gov-
ernment’s first international anti-corruption strategy. It was the culmination of many other
streams of work. Under Cameron, the Serious Organised Crime Agency had been reconfigured
as the National Crime Agency. The UK’s first ever national anti-corruption strategy had been
published; and now, the conference would host dignitaries from around the world in order to
showcase the leadership role that the UK was playing in the fight against global corruption.
It hadn’t always been like this. Only three years previously Cameron had rejected the find-
ings from Transparency International UK’s study in corruption within his own jurisdiction.
His subsequent championing of anti-corruption work, then, came as something of a surprise to
some, albeit one that was warmly welcomed as a progressive and constructive one.
Unfortunately, the conference itself is mainly remembered for one of Cameron’s most infa-
mous gaffes. A conversation that he was having with Queen Elizabeth II and others was caught
on camera, and subsequently broadcast, with him explaining that ‘we have some fantastically
corrupt countries here’ before declaring that ‘We’ve got Afghanistan and Nigeria, possibly the
two most corrupt countries in the world.’ Nobody interjected.1 The implication was obvious.
Corruption was something that happened elsewhere, in economically poorer nations, and was
not a UK problem.
Cameron’s argument was, very clearly, steeped in a number of value-laden assumptions,
which often permeate into discussions on corruption. Johnston’s (2005) Syndromes of
Corruption posits that all jurisdictions experience corrupt behaviour but that some enable and
industrialise it as influence marketing (see also Gluck and Macaulay, 2017). Others argue that
attacks on public values, which can be within legal norms, are themselves a form of ‘deep
corruption’ (Bozeman et al., 2018) while O’Connor and Fischer (2012) argue that trying to
impose the societal values of low-corruption countries onto high-corruption countries is an
ineffective driver of change. A number of different authors (e.g. Gregory, 2011) point out the
inherent value bias in many of the most commonly used anti-corruption and good governance
measures.
All of which point to challenges towards a values-driven leadership approach. Interestingly
these challenges are not unlike ones that have been discussed in other, non-corruption contexts.
Cameron’s remarks clearly point to an ‘othering’ approach to supposedly corrupt nations (it
happens there but not here), and the creation of us and them dichotomies goes back to the most
classic of work on public values. The distinction between public-sector and private-sector
values was being outlined over 40 years ago (Murray, 1975). It is a distinction that has never
43
Michael Macaulay - 9781789900910
really gone away, albeit one we now see more as a continuum than in opposition, with more
likelihood of value congruence across sectors than originally envisaged (see, for example,
Lyons et al., 2006; van der Wal et al., 2008; van der Wal and Huberts, 2008).
More recently, scholars such as Beck Jørgensen and Rutgers (2015) have offered a distinct
‘public values perspective’ that spans a number of these questions, and several others. In their
view, the public values perspective: ‘Concerns not a singular approach or conceptualisation,
but a diversity of approaches that are characterized by taking as their starting point the intrin-
sically normative nature of public administration and the attempt to bridge theoretical and
empirical perspectives on this issue’ (2015: 4). What is interesting with this perspective is
just how open-ended it is, allowing a multiplicity of views to be negotiated simultaneously.
Let’s turn to the nature of what a public value may be, and how they are frequently defined
and ascribed.
VALUES-BASED LEADERSHIP
Values-based (values-driven) leadership has become such a commonly accepted idea that there
is a specific academic journal dedicated to promulgating its message. The idea is inextricably
linked with ideas on ethical leadership (Lawton and Macaulay, 2009) and the behaviours that
spring from embodying positive values, which can be spread not only by individual leaders
but by organisations themselves. The importance of role modelling good behaviours, setting
expectations, etc. are all well attested (see, for example, Brown et al., 2019) and all seem to
rest on a bedrock of values. But what is a value?
For the purposes of this discussion we need to draw a very sharp distinction between public
values and public value. Although there are obvious links between the two, public value is
associated with the concept created by Mark Moore (1995) and subsequently used as a strate-
gic framework for public management (see, for example, Alford and O’Flynn, 2009). Public
values are the more general qualities that guide behaviour.
All values have some degree of inherent subjectivity. As Bozeman (2007) argues, any value
rests on a number of assumptions: (1) that it offers an evaluative judgement; (2) that it reflects
both cognitive and affective elements; (3) it is comparatively undynamic and fixed over a long
period of time; (4) it affects behaviour of both self and others; (5) conscious deliberation is key
to value changes; and (6) values are intrinsically linked to self and group identity.
This is the strong appeal of organisational values, of course: that they underpin and set the
tone for behaviour and standards within an agency; and drive the performance of people within
an organisation.
Difficulties arise, however, in the details of values-based approaches. Both the nebulous
nature of public values perspective, and the inherent subjectivity of Bozeman’s perspective,
do not necessarily lend themselves to easy implementation. Indeed, they only raise a number
of questions, including:
●● What values are to be driven?

●● What is the best way to operationalise such values?
●● Who selects and defines them (and by what process)?
●● How do we know when they have been met?
●● What do we do if they are not met?

Virtue and morality in public administration 45
Table 4.1 Purpose, principles and values of the New Zealand public sector
Purpose
Delivering results and services for citizens
Serving the government of the day and successive governments effectively and efficiently
Supporting continuity of democratic government
Principles Values
Political neutrality Impartial
Free and frank advice Accountable
Merit selection Behave with integrity
Openness Respectful
Stewardship Committed to service
There is no shortage of works that attempt to answer the first of these questions, and there are
myriad typologies available. To offer just a few examples: Molina and McKeown (2012) list
no less than 30 public administration values; Kernaghan (2003) outlined 32 different public
values, grouped into four specific types: ethical; democratic; professional; and people. Van
Wart (1998) crafted public values into five specific ‘clusters’, whereas in his classic 1991
treatise on New Public Management, Hood outlined three distinct groupings for public values.
Such typologies are reflected in practice. In the mid-1990s, the UK’s first incarnation of the
Committee on Standards in Public Life created the seven principles of public life (selflessness,
integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership) that still form the
bedrock for values across the public sector, both central and local.
The New Zealand public service has four key values (fair, impartial, responsible, trustwor-
thy) upon which nearly 20 different subvalues flow out. New Zealand’s new Public Service
Act, which is due to become law in 2020, seeks to promote a newly configured ‘spirit of
service’ across the New Zealand public service to act as a unifying value (Hughes, 2018; Scott
and Macaulay, 2020). Within the act there is a new set of values, which are a subdivision
of the purpose, principles and values of the New Zealand public sector (see Table 4.1). The
distinction between principles and values is not entirely clear, and the development of these
values will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
Identifying values, therefore, is not a very difficult task but what is problematic is the means
by which these selections are made (Fukumoto and Bozeman, 2019). The other key questions,
however, are even more complex. As scholars have pointed out, for example, there have been
conspicuously few attempts to measure the robustness or adherence to organisational values
(e.g. de Graaf et al., 2016). Perhaps more important is the question on who selects values to
begin with. Taking into account Bozeman’s perspective on the emotional resonance of values,
and their connectivity to identity, the shared construction of values is arguably crucial.
FROM VALUES TO VIRTUES IN CLASSICAL THINKING
The connection between values and virtues is intuitively obvious. If values are ‘a quality or
standard that guides behaviour and decision making’ (van der Wal, 2017: 31) then virtues are
connected with our moral choices: ‘Virtues are character traits which we need to live humanly
flourishingly lives’ (Oakley and Cocking, 2001: 18). Yet although virtue is embedded in
morality, it also arguably takes on similarities of competences: clusters of learned skills,

knowledge and technical efficiency. Virtues and competence both share a ‘fundamental prin-
ciple of demonstrating capability’ (Naquin and Holton, 2003: 25) that is sometimes codified
as seeking to do well while doing good.
Macaulay and Lawton (2006) explored the links between virtues and competencies, and
argued that the two concepts are closely intertwined: competencies embody certain virtues,
whereas virtues require competence in order to successfully implement them through virtuous
actions. Indeed, this convergence is increasingly reflected in modern literature, although it can
actually be traced back several centuries.
As far back as Aristotle the role of virtue has been to connect the twin worlds of the moral
and political life through the pursuit of the good. Predating ideas around competences by some
considerable margin, Aristotle (1947: 1103a, 1–10) defines virtue as an excellence (arête) that
can be divided into two types – intellectual and moral – reflecting man’s (and unfortunately
in this case, man was used gender-specifically) dual capacity for reason and ability expressing
his judgements through language.
But virtue cannot be understood unless by means of the telos: the end to which all forms of
life must attain. Man’s telos (again in the gendered sense) was eudaimonia, the good life. Over
the years, the term eudemonia has been translated in different ways, either as ‘happiness’,
‘bliss’ or even simply as ‘well-being’. The concept relates to Aristotle’s teleological belief that
something can only be understood and fulfilled once it has reached its natural end. The good
life can thus be recognised, understood and, most importantly, attained.
Virtue theory necessarily prioritises the good over the right, a distinction that remains
crucial to virtue ethics today (Mangini, 2000; Oakley and Cocking, 2001). From its earliest
inception (in the west at least), virtue has been inextricably linked with notions of the good
life: public virtues, therefore, are the means by which the public good can be enacted.
Once the proper telos was understood Aristotle identified the relevant virtues that enabled
man to meet it: courage, temperance, pride, good temper, friendliness and truthfulness. All of
these could be developed and cultivated in man by habitually practising virtuous actions.
The virtue of phronesis – practical wisdom – was especially important as it enabled many to
have genuinely political thought and also allowed him to evaluate the nature of other virtues:
‘Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the
same’ (1947: 1141b, 25–30).
Not only is virtue necessary for good governance, but it is also political in a broader sense,
as it cannot be cultivated or practised outside of the polis. Man can only achieve eudemonia
inside the polis because it is only this particular form of association that facilitates the devel-
opment of his human self. It is crucial here to remember that Aristotle is referring specifically
to male citizens: one of the reasons the polis is so important is that it has the requisite social
structure (with subordinate roles for women and, of course, slaves) to allow man the time to
practise virtuous actions. It is the self-sufficiency of the polis that allows moral and intellectual
development to take place (1988, 1326b: 30). In this sense, all virtues are intimately connected
to both public and political life.
In the Aristotelean sense, then, virtues are far more than values. They are the means to the
end of achieving the good life: the characteristics that enable man to live his telos. They are
also intrinsically political, because the good life for man cannot be outside the political realm.
They encompass a variety of skills and, crucially, the skill of judgement. In other words,
Aristotelean virtues are not far removed at all from the competences associated with public
leadership.

A second classical concept of virtue is even more explicit about its association with skills
and competences. Machiavelli’s The Prince (Machiavelli 1994) outlines a very specific form
of virtue that is also linked with political life but has traditionally been seen as the antithesis
of the theory of the good. Its notoriety was gained in no small measure, however, precisely
because Machiavelli’s concept of virtù was equated with traditional ideas of Christian virtue.
Machiavelli’s reputation does not square with the historical figure that we know he was. As
Macaulay and Lawton (2006) show, he was a committed public servant, and a republican, who
constantly stressed the need to maintain the common good. Even his praise for historically
cruel figures such as Cesare Borgia was based on the perception that malicious acts ultimately
served the public good. Whereas this view is frequently deemed to be that the means justify the
ends, it is often forgotten that it was the ends that Machiavelli was primarily conceived with.
Although his work was not teleological in the same sense as Aristotle’s, he was nevertheless
focussed first and foremost on public outcomes. The notion of virtù itself was outlined as
a broad set of leadership skills (e.g. military prowess, diplomatic sensitivity, an understanding
of one’s subjects’ character, etc.). They are the skills of the virtuoso rather than the virtuous
(Macaulay and Lawton, 2006). Virtù was easily demonstrable and had clearly defined results.
Whatever the particular public good may be, Machiavelli’s virtù points towards the ways to
achieve it.
For both classical conceptions of virtue, therefore, we see distinct similarities. A priority of
the public good; an equation of virtue (or virtù) with skill and competence; and an ability to
connect them as means and ends.
VIRTUE AS ETHICAL COMPETENCE
Liberal traditions prioritise the right over the good: individuals have the right to choose which-
ever good life suits them best and both politics and public administration should be designed
to enable that right to be exercised as freely as possible. This prioritisation has seen the end of
teleological assumptions about the natural ends of human beings, and with it a decline in the
notion of virtue as a means of achieving the good life.
A more explicit attack within modern virtue theory is on managerialism – whether private
or public – and arguably against the notion of administration itself. MacIntyre (1985) criticised
bureaucratic managers, which he perceived as prioritising means over ends, simply concerning
themselves with efficiency and effectiveness rather than a more tangible public good. For
MacIntyre, managers are ‘seen by themselves, and by those who see them with the same eyes
as their own, as uncontested figures, who purport to restrict themselves to the realms in which
rational agreement is possible – that is, of course, from their point of view to the realm of fact,
the realm of means, the realm of measurable effectiveness’ (1985: 30).
MacIntyre links this critique with the concept of managerial knowledge, and in particular its
reliance on social science tools and techniques, although the social sciences are characterised
by ‘the absence of the discovery of any law-like generalisations whatsoever’ (MacIntyre,
1985: 88). The bureaucratic manager is thus a rather impotent figure, influencing their agen-
cies despite rather than because of their managerial expertise. In this sense, bureaucrats simply
cannot be virtuous.
MacIntyre’s perspective on the managerial character has been criticised for presenting
a caricature of the bureaucratic manager (Nash, 1995) whose assumptions are overturned by

a number of perspectives. Evidence on the importance of ethical leadership makes a mockery

of the characterisation of management behaviours as fundamentally amoral. Outcomes-based
approaches to strategy, including Moore’s conception of public value, show clearly that few
public managers prioritise means over ends.
Many different theoretical frameworks emphasise the importance of moral aspects of public
management. Public service motivation, for example, details the moral values that public serv-
ants hold dear, and display in their work. Bowman et al. (2004) outlined ethical competencies
as one of three essential elements of the ‘skills triangle’, alongside technical and leadership
competencies: these include moral reasoning, values management and prudent decision
making (Bowman et al., 2004: 21). Virtanen (2000) also included ethical competence as one
of his five key competencies for public managers. Indeed it is the competence that unites and
gives sense to all others: ‘[W]ithout ethical competence, public managers do not use their
political, professional, or task competence in right ways’ (Virtanen: 2000, 336).
Others have been more explicit in their attempt to define a new public virtue ethics. Cooper
(1987), for example, expands on MacIntyre’s to posit a model of administrative practice.
Cooper identifies three realms of practice – public interest, process and procedures, and
loyalty to colleagues – and lists their attendant internal goods. He then establishes the relevant
virtues that ‘must be consistent with agreed upon internal goods of the practice of public
administration’ (323). The problem here is that, as with any theory of the good, there will
always be the potential to criticise particular choices as somewhat arbitrary.
Macaulay and Lawton (2006) show that standards of conduct in UK local government were
identified by ethics officers as being closely associated with public virtue. Unlike Bowman et
al., however, these officers did not distinguish between a range of different types of compe-
tence but rather saw all their knowledge/skills/attributes imbued with a moral purpose.
Ellström (1997) distinguished competence from qualification, defining it as ‘the potential
capacity of an individual (or a collective) to successfully… handle certain situations or com-
plete a certain task or job’ (267). There is little here, arguably, to distinguish competence from
either of the classical traditions of virtue that we identified earlier.
Putting these ideas together we can see that values drive behaviour and choices; virtues
drive moral action. These can be translated into administrative practice through public service
motivation and ethical competence, although these are not the only means of putting values
and virtues into action. The chapter will now turn to three brief cases that highlight the oppor-
tunities and challenges of implementing a values and virtues approach.
CASE 1: VALUES-DRIVEN LEADERSHIP IN NEW ZEALAND

POLICE
Macaulay and Rowe (2019) offer a recent example of the co-creation of public values within
New Zealand Police. As a result of a Commission of Inquiry into police misconduct, New
Zealand Police was given a ten-year period (2007–17) to enact 47 different cultural change
recommendations (see also Rowe and Macaulay, 2018). Among these was a commitment to
foster a new set of police values, which had never previously been codified or articulated by
the agency. The values were unveiled in 2015 under the acronym PRIMED: Professionalism,
Respect, Integrity, commitment to Māori and the Treaty, Empathy, and valuing Diversity.

Indications are that, thus far, the values are well recognised with a substantial level of
adherence (see Rowe and Macaulay, 2018; Macaulay and Rowe, 2019). It is notable that the
creation of these values was not a top-down approach. The values themselves, and the meaning
behind them, were generated from groups of individuals using a specific story-telling and
narrative-building approach.
The values were generated throughout a series of workshops, which were deliberately run
to build up stories based on real-life experiences. They comprised eight groups, including
very senior leaders and other ranks below, in which each participant was asked to recount an
incident in their lives which had profoundly affected them, and had taught them the impor-
tance of a particular value. These stories were collated and each group then fed back one story
to the other groups, all of which were collected and collated to help inform the final values.
Participants were encouraged to tell stories about any aspects of their lives, not just their pro-
fessional careers, and importance was placed on being able to contextualise the value within
the narrative. From these workshops and the resulting discussions the PRIMED values were
codified.
The new police PRIMED values signal a change in perspective from a more traditional
view of policing to one that focuses on care and community work. In particular, the values
of ‘empathy’ and ‘valuing diversity’ are considered by New Zealand Police to be crucial in
creating a mind shift towards victim/centric policing (Macaulay and Rowe, 2019).
Perhaps more importantly the co-creation of values has enabled the principles that Bozeman
uses to define a value, to be brought to the fore. Although each of the values is open to subjec-
tive interpretation, the shared nature of these through the narrative-building workshops enables
a common understanding to be developed. Telling stories also develops a strong emotional
commitment, that can be transferred onto a broader commitment to the value itself. Perhaps
most obviously, the PRIMED values were the result of considered and conscious deliberation,
and are seen as the connective tissue towards a new sense of shared cultural identity. The cre-
ation of PRIMED values is therefore a useful example of one driver of value-driven cultural
change but, simultaneously, indicative of positive processes for values co-creation.
Tellingly, the PRIMED values have been embodied in many other areas of the New Zealand
Police. Recruitment has shifted towards much greater diversity in terms of both gender and
cultural backgrounds, although the extent to which this strategy is embedded is not yet able
to be seen. The values-based mind shift towards victim-centric policing is reflected in media
campaigns. Social media, print media and television advertising now ask the question ‘do you
care enough to be a cop?’ Various scenarios are built around this, including members of the
public stepping over homeless people on the street, or helping what appears to be a lost child.
Again, the impacts of this campaign are yet to be properly evaluated, but there is no doubt that
there is a sincere attempt to embed the values into public consciousness and therefore attract
a new more diverse range of recruits.
It might be noted that the previous police recruitment campaign used action-orientated
imagery, to denote policing as an exciting life of fighting crime. It used the strap line ‘get
better work stories’. This is a marked contrast to the new emphasis on care, and there is a clear
attempt to show that the police is as much concerned with social care as it is with law enforce-
ment. The PRIMED values have driven other cultural changes as well: new content in training
and development, and also new styles of training and development. Victim-led training is one
area that seems to embody the value of empathy.

It is tempting to hail the development and dissemination of PRIMED values as a complete

success but we must be relatively circumspect. The extent to which they will drive long-lasting
cultural change remains to be seen. But the use of narrative workshops, the deliberate empha-
sis on co-creation, the emotional resonance and also the connection with shared identity all
point towards a very positive process. If nothing else it demonstrates values-driven leadership
as an active rather than reactive (or even passive) experience.
CASE 2: VALUES-DRIVEN LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC SERVICE
As we saw earlier the New Zealand public service is currently looking to develop a new set of
public values,2 which is underpinned by a unifying ‘spirit of service’, whose aspirations have
been articulated by state services commissioner, Peter Hughes:
I really do believe in the ‘spirit of service’ that our New Zealand State Sector Act talks about. While,
perhaps it’s an old-fashioned word, I really do believe that it is a noble thing to choose to serve your
country and your fellow citizens, as your career. Like all public servants, like many of you in this
room, I chose to do that, myself, because I care, and I want to make a difference. We all do. I believe
that public service is something that we should acknowledge, celebrate and reward. (Hughes, 2018)
As Scott and Macaulay (2020) show, one of the reasons why the notion of the spirit of service
remains relatively broad is that its meaning has been co-created by senior public service
leaders. Although there are many antecedents to this, a series of senior leadership retreats
between that are still ongoing took a strong lead in fleshing out a shared understanding of
public values that is driving legislative change.
The retreats began in March 2014, when chief executives of 30 central government depart-
ments and those of three of the larger arms-length agencies attended a two-day event in rural
New Zealand. During the retreat the participants decided to begin to note down their commit-
ments to public service, and the people of New Zealand. Due to the perceived success of the
retreat, it has become a regular event, with leaders meeting four times a year and they appear
to have helped foster a sense of shared identity, which permeates the unifying idea of the spirit
of service. In 2016 this emerging identity was semi-codified further through the decision to
adopt a new name for the group: the State Sector Leadership Team (SSLT). It was further
reconfirmed that this group would continue to collaborate and co-create as a unified team to
lead across New Zealand’s public service. The initial manifesto was reinforced and reified,
evolving into a written ‘team charter’ that further ascribed specific behaviours by which the
group would abide.
In essence, then, we can see a co-creation of initial values, developing into a more virtue-like
approach. And despite the misgivings of authors such as MacIntyre it began with identifying
public goods and common ends – with a telos, so to speak. More interestingly still is that this
was not the language that was used to explain or make sense of the process – instead it was
regarded as an organic process.
These various activities have all helped to generate traction on the new Public Service Act
and on the emergence of the spirit of service more generally. SSLT has been a values-driven,
co-creative process. The retreats have enabled the SSLT to not only create a shared identity
but also a sense of shared ownership for public service: including its performance; improving
diversity and inclusion; talent management; and the management of data and digital service.

The values and virtues approach has only intensified throughout: once shared outcomes in the
above areas were identified, a leader and a working group were tasked with developing ways
forward.
Only time will tell as to how much further the SSLT will drive public service leadership
but all the indications are that it will continue. Since 2017, the retreats have spread to bring in
significantly more leaders from various levels of the public service through an annual Public
Service Leaders Summit. As Scott and Macaulay (2020) show, SSLT members have also
been steadfast that identifying as part of a leadership team has resulted in changed behaviours.
Furthermore, the development of a shared identity has crafted a shared language and signifiers,
including the name of the group itself.
Revisiting the newly minted New Zealand public service values we can clearly see the
influence of the SSLT’s leadership, particularly with the value ‘committed to service’, which
is essentially a restatement of the central premise that brought the SSLT together. The defi-
nition of this value includes a ‘commitment to improvement’, which has also been explicitly
articulated throughout the discussions of the SSLT during its retreats. It also contains a pledge
to continue to spread the ideas of co-creation and involve greater citizen and community par-
ticipation; bringing to life the very values that drove the leaders’ own thinking.
CASE 3: FROM VIRTUE TO VICE: A WARNING FROM PRESENT

HISTORY
Values-driven leadership, and the development of virtues that help attain this, inevitably
have a down side. As has been seen the essence of both of these points is that they are sub-
jective, which goes back to initial remarks that we saw with former UK prime minister David
Cameron. Few areas reveal the dangers of this subjectivity more than the field of corruption,
which is awash with means–ends dilemmas. Although it may seem intuitive that virtue is
a means of protecting against corruption (Potter, 2018), leading commentators are more likely
to emphasise the grey areas that have encouraged some commentators to discuss the ‘virtues
of corruption’ (Moyar, 2015).
At the risk of becoming overly political the nexus between values, virtues and corruption
is nowhere more evident than this moment in history with the fight against corruption than in
the ongoing impeachment of United States (US) president, Donald Trump. This section of the
chapter will offer some observations explaining how the current political saga embodies all of
the key elements that have already been identified at a theoretical level. The section will not,
however, speculate or try and evaluate the proceedings: few things age more quickly than live
political commentary. Nonetheless, the impeachment process is illustrative of how virtue is
portrayed and understood, and how it is intrinsically linked in with concepts of political virtue
and public value.
The most obvious way in which this manifests itself is that although the word is rarely used,
President Trump has been bombarded with attacks on his character since long before he even
announced his nomination. Talk of the sexual predilections against President Trump are even
more pronounced with nearly 30 women accusing him of sexual misconduct or inappropriate
behaviour; a number so significant that at least one major publication has accused the president
of being a sexual predator (Guardian, 2019; see also Levine and El-Faizy, 2019).

Attacks on the character of public leaders are nothing new, of course. There is currently
a wealth of media criticism of the leaders across the world. The UK prime minister Boris
Johnson is frequently chided for his alleged dishonesty, which has been traced back to his old
school reports and track record as a journalist, but also questions regarding his personal life.
The UK media frequently brings up Boris Johnson’s unwillingness (or inability) to explain
how many children he is father to, or who their mothers may be. As Pfiffner (2004) demon-
strates, even within a milieu of supposedly positive political campaigning, vast swathes of
critique of US presidents have, throughout history, focussed on character. And the opposite is
equally true, of course: character is frequently a focus of public, even global, praise.
What might be of greater consequence is the continuing personalisation of politics, that has
been documented all over the world (Karvonen, 2010; Langer, 2007; Langer and Sagarzazu,
2018). With the advent of new media channels, and increased access to information and/or
disinformation, this trend only continues to get stronger. President Trump’s revolutionary use
of Twitter, for example, has arguably exacerbated the sense of personal connection that has
been fostered with supporters and detractors alike.
Critique of character has, inevitably, spilled over into the broader public administration
arena. There are too many examples of myriad members of Trump’s staff being excoriated
on a deeply personal level: from Saturday Night Live’s initial lampooning of Sean Spicer as
a blowhard and a buffoon, through to current chief of staff, Mick Mulvaney, and attacks on his
honesty. Perhaps most obviously, President Trump himself regularly besmirches the virtue of
public officials who he deems to have crossed his path, even as they are testifying against him
during impeachment hearings. Trump’s attacks are live.
Focussing on character is, however, a surface-level approach. The nexus of corruption,
virtue and values is much deeper in this instance than simply character attacks. The impeach-
ment saga reflects the nature of all the key themes in this chapter.
To begin with, it is crucial to note that on either side of the argument is a shared telos – that
is public good of combatting corruption. What is open to question is who is striving to attain
this end, and who is trying to prevent it. At stake in the impeachment is whether or not Trump
tried to influence Ukraine to investigate a potential political rival, Joe Biden, by withholding
military aid. Trump and his defenders argue that he was acting to attack corruption. His oppo-
nents accuse him of using military aid as a bribe, and that whatever the intention of the action
may have been, requesting overseas interference into US elections is itself a corrupting act.
From either end of the spectrum, however, the telos is the same.
The second interesting point is that the means of achieving that telos can be both lauded
or derided depending on how one views the telos that was being aimed for. Trump portrays
his actions as morally just: like many authoritarian-leaning leaders he portrays himself as
strong, decisive, ready to make tough decisions and even more willing to act outside the rules
if necessary. In October 2019, the Trump administration even launched a proto-campaign
advertisement outlining these very virtues. Opponents, of course, portray a very different set
of virtues: cunning, perhaps, but also bullying, hectoring and ultimately self-serving. Clearly
those who are pro-impeachment characterise these virtues very differently. Such a difference
in perspective is to be expected, of course, but what the above also highlights is the further
distinction between virtú and virtue. Acting outside of agreed rules and norms, for example,
may not be seen as being particularly virtuous, but they are well within the skillset that makes
up a leader’s virtú.

Key to the whole debate, however, is the defining of democratic and national value. The
US constitution, with all its checks and balances, can be seen in one sense as a system for the
prevention of means/ends dilemmas. And this is where the battle of values of being fought.
The telos of corruption brings into light the powers of the respective branches of government,
and the boundaries within which (and between which) they can act.
CONCLUSION
This chapter, then, ends much as it began: by using the example of corruption to highlight
difficulties surrounding our use of values and virtue. We do not know how history will judge
either of the three cases outlined but we can see how they each reflect different components
of the discussion here.
In so doing it follows the path of other recent scholarship. Fukumoto and Bozeman (2019)
point out, for example, that despite many years of very constructive research there are still
important questions to be raised around public values: the way in which values are defined;
the intentions behind them; and the instruments that are used to enact and implement them.
Discussions around virtue will never fade, not only because discussion of character is such an
intrinsic feature of public discourse, but because agreement on the telos of the public good is
unlikely to be settled.
Yet despite their subjective nature neither values or virtues are due to go anywhere any time
soon. What the examples of the value-based leadership approach hopefully illustrate is that an
understanding of intersubjectivity can bring much needed concord (Macaulay, 2009).
The three cases highlight this interplay. Where values-driven leadership is a shared experi-
ence, it can lead to the mutual development of values and attendant virtues. In so doing there
does not have to be a single, commonly agreed definition, because the co-creation process
enables different subjective views to be aired and allows people to move through the spaces
in between these viewpoints. It also allows for the virtues of judgement and practical wisdom
to be enacted.
NOTES
1. The clip is still publicly available to watch on YouTube.
2. I am indebted to my friend and co-author associate professor Rodney Scott for his work on this
section of the chapter.
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5. Anti-corruption and its discontents: reforming
reform
Michael Johnston
THIRTY YEARS ON
After thirty years and more of agenda building, research, and activism the corruption control
movement seems to be running in place.1 Hard work by dedicated and often courageous people
and groups, at times working in daunting circumstances, has produced indifferent results at
best. Why is that the case, what lessons can we learn, and what might make reform more
effective?
The critical observations offered in this chapter come from a friend of, and active partic-
ipant in, the anti-corruption movement. I offer an argument for longer-term, more indirect,
more varied and context-sensitive, and above all more political approaches to corruption
control – approaches that do not so much supplant current reform ideas as seek to give them
stronger political backing and social foundations. Those reform scenarios are long, indirect,
and difficult in part because of the complexity and myriad forms of corruption – particularly
where it is entrenched – and partly because they point to the challenges of confronting injustice
and exploitation by political means. In those respects they emulate historical developments in
some societies that have been comparatively successful in checking corruption.
The reform movement has hardly been an utter failure. Corruption, for many years
a non-issue in academe, business, and international policy, now has a prominent place on the
global agenda. Any news search shows that it regularly appears as a serious issue. Annual cor-
ruption rankings continue to make headlines. Aid programs and investment decisions incor-
porate corruption as a prominent concern, and both would-be democratizers and anti-system
populists cite elite exploitation and misconduct as major grievances. That heightened state of
awareness is a significant reform accomplishment in its own right.
Positive results, however, are another matter. Success in specific agencies and locales does
come to light; the Hong Kong and Singapore reform sagas are familiar history. But clear-cut,
sustained reductions in corruption in larger-scale, socially diverse societies are few and hard
to document. Process-tracing evidence from the European Union’s ANTICORRP project
(Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston, 2017) points to several countries (Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia,
Georgia, South Korea, Taiwan, Uruguay) as having checked corruption to varying extents.
Rwanda and Botswana might be added to that list, although all such claims are open to dispute.
Those cases offer valuable lessons, but most are comparatively small societies and (with the
exception of Singapore and Rwanda) socially relatively homogeneous. Moreover, several (e.g.
Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Rwanda) owe recent progress more to the effects of system-shaking
crises than to any impact of the international reform movement. Indeed, Transparency
International, commenting on its own 2018 Corruption Perception Index, notes that “It reveals
that the continued failure of most countries to significantly control corruption is contributing
to a crisis in democracy around the world. While there are exceptions, the data shows that
56
Michael Johnston - 9781789900910
Anti-corruption and its discontents 57
despite some progress, most countries are failing to make serious inroads against corruption”
(Transparency International, 2018, emphasis in the original; see also Drapalova, 2019).
Possible explanations for these problems abound. Mainstream anti-corruption strategies
have not greatly evolved over time. They tend not to vary markedly, even across contrasting
societies. Now as in the early 1990s, anti-corruption recommendations emphasize deterrence
and punishment of what is assumed to be deviance on the part of specific people; references
to corruption as “embedded” are routine, but reforms aimed at the systemic power imbal-
ances that enable the few to abuse their powers and exploit ordinary citizens are few. Most
reform scenarios revolve around whole-country, top-down efforts deploying what amount
to crime-prevention and -detection techniques or improvements to administrative processes.
Dedicated anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are a frequent proposal, but in many cases seem to
have problematic track records. Transparency, accountability, and calls for something called
“political will” are parts of most conversations – even though corrupt systems often have no
shortage of political will, but rather lack countervailing political powers. Independent judi-
ciaries and news media, and support of unspecified sorts from civil society, are also routine
suggestions (see the historical discussion in Johnsøn, 2016: 40–6, 66). All are fine ideas
in themselves – if sometimes taking the form of slogans rather than detailed strategies and
tactics – and yet progress remains elusive. Indeed, some countries, including some affluent
established democracies, show signs of deterioration.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
The problem is not that those are bad ideas. Indeed, it has been hard to improve upon them. And
it would be unfair, again, to claim that nothing has evolved: less emphasis is given now to pri-
vatization, scaling back the state, and reliance upon markets in place of public institutions, and
there is greater understanding of the global nature of some corrupt processes. The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-Bribery Treaty, Group of States Against
Corruption, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, along with the venerable United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010, and perhaps
France’s new Sapin II, are bringing essential cross-border scope to the struggle. New ways
to measure corruption and assess the effects of reforms have emerged (U4 Anti-Corruption
Resource Centre, 2016). Still, when it comes to recommendations for specific countries, cor-
ruption fighters from the early 1990s would be little surprised by initiatives in 2019.
What are today’s most pressing reform dilemmas? None of the following is true of all
reformers everywhere, but there are several chronic difficulties.
Strategic Misconceptions
We still tend to treat corruption as essentially the same thing everywhere – usually, as bribery
or other quid pro quo dealings. It is often assumed to be a national attribute, best controlled via
national offensives, and to be most serious in developing societies. Even where corruption is
endemic or systemic, we deal with it largely as deviance – as a departure and/or deterioration
from some better state of affairs but one that can be controlled by addressing specific actions
and their perpetrators.

We have too often gotten history backwards, mistaking outcomes for causes, and have
turned it upside down, overstating the role of reform from above. As a result we misunderstand
how relatively low-corruption countries got to where they are today, and have placed far too
much faith in “best practices”.
Too little thought has been devoted to asking what the opposite of “corruption” might be,
what we seek, and how we might build support for it. Technocratic visions of “good govern-
ance”, and the principle of separating politics from administration, overlook the importance
of justice broadly understood. As a consequence, we have underemphasized the political and
social foundations required for sustaining positive changes. Moreover, we have been surprised
by populist resentments of exclusion – rightly seen by Warren (2004) as the essence of cor-
ruption in a democracy – that divert energy and attention from more focused reforms, and that
undermine trust in institutions and leaders working to improve the quality of government.
We have placed excessive faith in transparency – a laudable virtue, but as a corruption-control
approach, one that has problems. It addresses relatively little of what many citizens see as
corrupt, frequently strengthens the position of already influential interests, and can even make
corruption worse (Levine and Johnston, 2016). Transparency will accomplish little if citizens
do not “look in”, if they are not able to act upon what transparency reveals, and if they do not
feel safe in doing so.
We still have few useful ways of measuring corruption and the effects (if any) reforms
might have. As a result, it has been hard to develop and evaluate “targeted” reforms, to show
that reform is making progress, or to abandon what is not working or proves counterproduc-
tive (a major reason why anti-corruption thinking has evolved so slowly). Similarly, we often
overlook the value of “halfway” reforms, insisting instead on “zero tolerance” approaches that
waste scarce political opportunities and are bound to fail.
We have underestimated the collective action problems inherent in mobilizing support for
corruption control, expecting citizens to get behind reform as a public good without offering
them compelling reasons to do so. Challenging corruption can be a difficult and risky process;
moreover, some citizens might have at least a small stake in the status quo – or think they stand
to gain in the future. Others may fear that change is more likely to make life more difficult
than to produce significant improvements. A related problem has been equating “civil society”
with formal reform-oriented organizations prone to collective action problems all of their own.
Slogans and Shibboleths
Other recurring problems revolve around unexamined assumptions and ideas that need
rethinking.
One is the notion that corruption is the most important problem struggling societies face,
and must be directly confronted on an emergency basis. Corruption does great harm in such
societies, but there can be fundamental challenges – maintaining basic security and safety,
building workable state institutions, fighting famine and disease – that are more urgent. That
corruption may make those problems worse is hard to dispute, but directly confronting it – and
the powerful figures with a stake in it – in the absence of sound institutions and a measure
of personal security for citizens may well culminate in tragedy. We should try to recruit an
anti-corruption army but must avoid marching it over a cliff.
We frequently encounter the distinction between “grand” and so-called “petty” corruption.
This enduring notion has intuitive appeal: massive fraud in public works construction, and

small extortion payments to the police by merchants, are not the same thing. But precisely
what we gain from the grand versus petty distinction, particularly if it is invoked to minimize
the importance of the latter situations, has never been made clear. Indeed, it may obscure more
than it reveals: “petty” corruption helps keep poor people poor and the powerless vulnerable.
A sound civil society strategy might actually place extra emphasis upon “petty” corruption
(Matukhno, 2015). And what is and is not “petty”? The spark touching off Tunisia’s national
upheaval was police abuse of a young fruit seller in an open market and his subsequent public
suicide. The situation was mundane, the payments being extorted were small, and the official
and victim were relatively humble figures, but the impunity with which the local police abused
the young man suggests that they enjoyed the protection of – and may well have been corruptly
beholden to – higher-level officials. In any event, the consequences of those events were any-
thing but petty. Clearly the size and institutional level of corrupt dealings are worth thinking
about carefully, but we need a comparative framework that clarifies the significance of those
factors and incorporates other important variables.
Calls for “political will” as the foundation for reforms are hardy perennials. Few would
dispute that reform measures are likely to be more effective if backed by leaders at all levels,
but “will” is a matter of intentions and dispositions, and as such is fundamentally unknowable
until after the fact. We have all seen proclamations of “zero tolerance” that have come to
naught, and reform campaigns that were mostly for show – or, worse, aimed at jailing critics of
the regime. In the midst of reform there is no way to distinguish political will from the conse-
quences we hope it will produce. If anything, many societies suffer from an excess of political
will or, more precisely, from the weakness of institutions and forces that might otherwise
restrain it. Political will or its absence may illuminate post hoc assessments of anti-corruption
efforts, particularly if we break the general idea down into more specific sources of support,
opposition, and indifference. But calls for political will often skip over the political complexity
of corruption control. How do we know top-level political will would be decisive? Earnest
intentions can run headlong into historical constraints, a lack of resources, or entrenched
political opposition. Few would tell struggling societies to wait for a reform champion to
appear before doing anything about corruption; but even if one should appear, what happens
when she or he leaves the stage? A leader or regime might overcome obstacles by sheer force,
political or otherwise, but that sort of “will” can do immense damage and would hardly foster
anti-corruption strength in the rest of society. Indeed, if reforms fail, the political will argu-
ment may invite a process of blaming the victims: of course we gave Country X the right tools
and ideas, but leaders (or the people) there just wouldn’t see them through.
The real issue, then, is less one of elite “will” and more a matter of building sustained,
broad-based demand, coalitions, and political incentives for reform (Johnston, 2014). In the
end, if the term has any meaning at all the most productive “political will” may well flow from
the bottom upward.
WHAT MIGHT BE BETTER? REFORMING REFORM

Success in checking corruption will often be a long trek – even if there are periods of rapid
change (Rothstein, 2011) – via indirect routes. Immediate direct offensives, given the power
of entrenched interests, might bring harm to reform supporters and to society’s broader situ-
ation. Controlling corruption often has little to do with virtue or civic values, and much more

to do with amassing enough political clout to check abuses by the powerful. That process has
usually been contentious, deeply politicized, and driven by self-interest (Johnston, 2014: chs
1, 2). How then can we reform our reforms? Let us begin with two conceptual problems: the
reform movement’s tendency to get history backwards, at times standing it on its head, and the
need to recognize that corruption problems can differ in qualitative ways from one situation
to the next.
Things Are Not Always As They Seem
Two assumptions frequently shape anti-corruption efforts: that struggling societies can and
should emulate those that are apparently well governed today – usually, the affluent market
democracies that have seen themselves as leaders of reform – and that what should be emu-
lated about them is the array of institutions, laws, values, watchdogs, and other pro-integrity
attributes in place today. If high-corruption countries put “best practices” in place, the argu-
ment runs, they have their best chance to bring the problem under control.
But, setting aside the question of whether those leading countries have actually reduced
corruption as much as it may seem, that argument often gets history backward (this discussion
draws upon Johnston, 2014: ch. 2). Even if those countries are relatively successful now, the
forces and institutions that help check corruption today are not necessarily what launched
and enabled that process in the past. A free press, strong judiciary, a middle class and viable
civil society, sound bureaucracies, the rule of law, political legitimacy, and the like are rightly
seen as contributing to integrity. But at the time many societies began to draw effective limits
around power, few of those assets were in place and corruption control did not take the form
of dedicated efforts to erect those safeguards. More often, limits on rulers’ conduct were
laid down in the course of political contention over a variety of issues: who governs whom,
by what right and using what means, in pursuit of what goals, are among the core points of
contention. So is the question of whether, and how, people might protect themselves and their
own interests from exploitation and abuse. While corruption often featured in the language
and symbolism of contention (Peck, 1990), reform as a public good – “better government for
all” – had little to do with many of those struggles.
Many anti-corruption ideas and assets are more likely the outcomes of deeper developments
that helped define key roles and boundaries, not the initial causes of progress against the
problem. They emerged and were at least somewhat effective because they had sustained
political support grounded in self-interest – support from people and groups who may not
have had good-governance schemes in mind but who sought to end abuse and exploitation.
That good-government principles might well benefit today’s extensively corrupt societies may
well be true, but too often we attempt to jumpstart reform by starting, in effect, with outcomes
rather than causes – in effect, getting history backwards. When that happens, leaders and the
rule of law lack credibility, institutions will be short on legitimacy, and newly minted controls
will lack a supporting constituency with a vested interest in their effectiveness.2 We see var-
iations on that theme today: many countries already have most of the laws they need (even if
penalties need updating), have established an ACA, and have embarked on externally funded
governance projects – but few in society have a stake in their success, the power to demand
effective enforcement, and reasons to take a stand against entrenched corrupt interests.
Envisioning reform primarily as a series of national programs or projects implemented from
above, rather than in terms of challenging the powerful from below, is what I mean by turning

history upside down. Corruption is often regarded as a national attribute caused and shaped
by national characteristics and therefore best addressed via national-level policy and changes
– an outlook reinforced by our emphasis on statistical models analyzing one-dimensional
whole-country corruption scores. National attributes do matter: does a society have (for
example) a dominant public sector, an economy dependent upon mineral extraction, or deep
ethnic divisions? But actual corruption cases originate not in particular combinations of
national characteristics, but in niches such as relationships between specific procurement
officials and vendors, collusion among a ring of customs officials, or contradictory regulations
about the use of one budget line by a local education authority. National-level attributes may
facilitate or inhibit such connections, but resistance from below and political support for those
seeking to govern well can be critical too.
It will be argued, quite rightly, that contention scenarios assume a degree of liberty and
security or, at least, of political space; that they require an array of voices active in society;
and can be long term and risky as they unfold. But that does not mean reform must await
a high-profile reform “champion” or the arrival of liberal democracy (which, after all, will
bring corruption risks of its own). Isham et al. (2000) have shown that even in undemocratic
societies basic civil liberties – freedom to occasionally criticize the regime in public – are
linked to more effective use of aid. Basic political challenges – inter alia, fostering pluralism
and creating safe and valued political space (Johnston, 2014) – must often be addressed before
dedicated anti-corruption efforts can mobilize lasting support.
The notion that social pressure is essential to reform is widely recognized, but sometimes
in unproductive ways. Too often, efforts to “get civil society involved” focus on formal,
reform-oriented organizations, many of them donor-funded and operating in national capitals,
and around agendas focusing on corruption control as a public good. The collective action
problems inherent in that approach are clear and, often, decisive. The real strength of civil
society is more likely found in activities that may have little to do with public purposes, but
that help build lasting networks, leadership skills, and trust. During the critical early phases
of Spain’s successful transition to democracy, for example, there were not many autonomous
formal organizations (Torcal and Ramon Montero, 1999). What Spain did have, however,
were strong and widespread traditions of social activity in neighborhoods and among fami-
lies – activities that were a natural source of local leaders and that likely helped build mutual
trust (Johnston, 2009: 11). Much the same pattern was also seen in Portugal. Reformers might
do well to encourage and protect the formation of all manner of social networks – social
groups; organizations for women, students, farmers; labor unions, recreational and artistic
associations; and many more. Those groups and networks can develop deep social roots and
have many potential uses: in our possibly overoptimistic (Putnam, 2000) scenarios about civil
society in the United States, for example, community residents who want to clean up a park
usually do not organize a formal group for that sole purpose. Instead, neighbors, members of
fraternal groups, hiking enthusiasts, and others draw upon their own and shared networks and
get the job done. Various side benefits, such as free beer and a barbecue at the end of the day,
help make group cooperation all the more attractive. Few of those groups will have explicit
anti-corruption agendas, although some might take action against related grievances; but down
the road, all might contribute to networks of communication and trust useful for challenging
official exploitation.

Not Just a Singular Problem
A second conceptual roadblock is the implicit assumption that corruption is essentially the
same thing wherever it occurs – frequently, treated as synonymous with bribery. I write
“implicit” because few would state such ideas as positive propositions. Still, from the per-
sistent focus on whole-country corruption rankings to reform recommendations that vary
remarkably little across time and space, we have not given sufficient thought to the ways in
which corruption might vary qualitatively in light of contrasting histories and circumstances.
A great deal of corruption does occur in the form of bribery, for example, but we also see
political collusion, official theft, conflicts of interest, and various forms of money laundering.
And those are just examples of practices that are clearly illegal. Legal or “institutional” cor-
ruption (Thompson, 2018; Lessig, 2013), a range of fully legal political contributions, institu-
tional and state capture, and rents and privileges written into law (Stiglitz, 2012) have a more
disputed status vis-à-vis formal definitions of corruption, but trigger many citizens’ percep-
tions that their legitimate interests have been pushed aside by the influence of money (Sandel,
2012). In some societies corruption functions as a kind of alternative to violence (Huntington,
1968) while elsewhere – Mexico, for example, with the plata o plomo choices (Contreras,
2014) forced by drug cartels – the two are closely paired. Some corruption is a free-for-all,
undermining public order and disrupting markets, while elsewhere it is monopolized by top
figures and doled out as patronage – a means of control. In still others, corrupt collusion helps
unify ruling coalitions in the face of rising competitors, sustaining a de facto predictability
that can coexist with sustained economic growth. Elsewhere, the effects of corruption upon
economic development are devastating. Most forms of corruption are linked to power or
authority in a particular place, but some connections between wealth and power in affluent
market societies have a way of spreading into the global system via a range of “institutional
corruption” practices (Thompson, 2018; Lessig, 2013). Those sorts of contrasts (explored in
more detail in Johnston, 2014) have major implications for both the consequences and cures of
corruption, and yet they are seldom factored into corruption rankings or scenarios for reform.
What are the most important contrasts to understand? A few commonsense differences
come to mind: when citizens, farmers, and business people must assume they will be pressured
for corrupt payments in the course of a day or week, life differs from other places where cor-
ruption is rare. Some useful distinctions have emerged in the literature, such as that between
“need” and “greed” corruption (Bauhr, 2016). Graycar’s TASP framework (Type, Activities,
Sectors, Places) offers a useful way to map out occurrences and vulnerabilities (Graycar,
2015). But most typologies of corruption techniques categorize details of debatable impor-
tance, rather than analyzing deeper contrasts in incentives, stakes, opportunities, the social and
institutional setting, and consequences. We need to dig deeper. Improved typologies grounded
in theory about fundamental systemic contrasts, applicable to diverse cases, and specifying
the causal links between those differences and important observed contrasts, would do much
to focus reform efforts on essential issues, help us avoid making matters worse, and account
for the effects – if any – that our efforts produce. Any such schemes must take into account
the difficulties of measuring corruption and the ways those problems may differ from one
sort of situation to the next. Some attempts at such comparative frameworks have been made
(Wedeman, 1997; Johnston, 2005, 2014) but they are much in need of refinement.

NO WAY OUT BUT THROUGH3
There is no neat formula or roadmap for more effective corruption control. “Toolkit” (other
than for highly specific administrative issues) collections of best practices typically oversim-
plify problems that may reflect deep-rooted political imbalances between the powerful few
and the vulnerable many, long-established relationships and expectations, and important con-
trasts emerging out of local history, social structure, economic fundamentals, and regional or
global influences. Indeed, until we trade whole-country perception ratings for tightly focused
and evidence-driven assessments of the quality of government that enable us to track detailed
changes in timely fashion (Johnston, 2010; see also the ERCAS Index of Public Integrity
outlined in Mungiu-Pippidi, 2016) we are unlikely to know very much about the scale of
problems we are addressing, where they originate, and whether reforms are having any effect.
At present, few reform claims along the lines of “do X and Y will happen” are credible. If, on
the other hand, we attempt to reduce the political imbalances noted just above, some notes of
caution must be kept in mind.
First, do no harm (Johnston, 2010): it is entirely possible, indeed all too easy, to do harm
in the name of doing good. Reforms that are premature and lack a solid base of political and
social support grounded in lasting interests may endanger citizens and groups vulnerable to
reprisals, but harm society as a whole if reform opportunities are lost or citizens, investors, and
aid partners conclude that reform efforts are futile. Meanwhile, corrupt operators may decide
that even a failed reform push means they had better take as much as they can in the short run,
and get better at covering their own tracks.
Trust and credibility are essential: Citizens have heard anti-corruption themes before, and
may well have seen them produce little positive change. Indeed, they may well have seen
corruption control used as a pretext for seizing power or for continued elite enrichment. In
post-conflict or deeply divided societies, citizens may distrust each other as much as corrupt
officials, intensifying collective action problems, and perceive self-proclaimed reformers as
yet another threatening influence. But listening to their specific grievances – not just corrup-
tion in general, but (for example) poor utility services, health systems devoid of personnel
and resources, police who work harder at collecting bribes than at protecting the public – can
identify issues in which many citizens could have a common stake. Demonstrating improve-
ments in those areas via widely published indicators and benchmarks can build the credibility
of reform, minimize collective action problems as citizens sense a personal stake in effective
controls, and foster trust in the more honest officials. It may be that such efforts should not
even mention corruption as such, but rather focus on a few key services and institutions
and improvement in demonstrable ways. In that connection, “working with civil society”
must involve the whole country, as much as possible, reaching beyond the orbit of familiar
non-governmental organizations and into local and regional social networks, and must proceed
with a realistic understanding of collective-action problems and how they arise.
Do what you do do well4: As noted, credibility is a primary challenge for reformers, particu-
larly where the rule of law is weak and political processes are dominated by powerful corrupt
operators. Particularly at the outset it would be better for reformers to attain modest goals
on a regular basis – and of course, to call attention to such accomplishments – than to attack
“the worst, first”, proclaiming massive anti-corruption offensives that will once again likely
amount to little. But “picking the low-hanging fruit” cannot become a permanent or default

approach. At some point entrenched corrupt figures will have to be confronted, but it is far
better to do so from a position of credibility and relative strength.
Establishing an ACA will not always be a wise idea, particularly in response to deeply
entrenched corrupt regimes and private interests. In the former instance the agency can be
vulnerable to capture from above (if indeed it was not set up as a mechanism of control from
the beginning). In the latter, it may be ineffective in the face of powerful business or military
figures, or malefactors backed by extensive networks, who abuse personal power to compro-
mise courts and law enforcement. The two most successful ACA stories are those of Hong
Kong (the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)) and Singapore (Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau), and ACAs are frequently proposed elsewhere. But both of
those places are small societies, well positioned by location and economic bases to capitalize
upon low-corruption reputations. Most other societies are considerably larger, more diverse,
and economically differentiated, and thus face different orders of challenges in corruption
control. It is also worth noting that neither Hong Kong nor Singapore is a democracy, which
means that the new ACAs would face little open opposition. By contrast, consider the ICAC of
New South Wales, Australia, an excellent organization that nonetheless has often had to deal
with loud accusations of favoritism by one political party or another.
In the end, the deep democratization argument brings us back to the main reason why cor-
ruption is worth worrying about, i.e. justice. Can people be governed – and, ideally, govern
themselves – in ways that are both effective and fair? Corruption is by no means the only reason
why societies, many of them outwardly successful, fall short of those ideals; significant reform
will scarcely put everything right. Still, the most effective way forward may be to begin, not
so much with corruption as a form of rule breaking, or with the process-oriented shortcomings
of public institutions – important though all those concerns undoubtedly are – and focus more
upon politics. We should ask who uses power to abuse citizens and society, and how they do
it: who can be mobilized in lasting ways to oppose corrupt operators, and what issues and
appeals will be most effective for energizing that mobilization while minimizing collective
action problems; and how the needs and aspirations of citizens can become a political force for
greater fairness and justice. That path toward better government will be long, contentious, and
marked by setbacks; where progress is made it will often be indirectly and as an outcome of
political clashes that may not focus directly on corruption. But it is a process that can emulate
events and deeper developments beginning long ago by some of today’s better governed soci-
eties. Many reformers are not comfortable with explicitly political strategies and tactics, but
the ideas sketched out here may help build a politically strong and sustainable anti-corruption
presence while enabling citizens to drive the process of reform in the course of pursuing and
defending their own interests.
NOTES
1. Parts of this chapter draw, in revised form, upon Johnston 2018.
2. Frederick Douglass put it best in 1857: “Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and
it never will.” Online at www.blackpast.org/1857-frederick-douglass-if-there-no-struggle-there-no
-progress#sthash.Orl1tuhb.dpuf (viewed March 30, 2017).
3. With apologies to Robert Frost…
4. That phrase was the title of a popular country music song recorded by Ned Miller in 1965.

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6. Dealing with the dark side of policy-making:
corruption, malfeasance and the volatility of
policy mixes
Michael Howlett
INTRODUCTION: PROFESSOR PANGLOSS AND THE

VOLATILITY OF POLICY DESIGNS
Current work on policy-making often adopts a Panglossian vision of the subject, viewing
policy-making activity as a well-intentioned effort on the part of governments to serve
the public interest by addressing problems in a dispassionate, technical way (Arestis and
Kitromilides 2010). Even those studies which insist on the political and power-based nature
of policy narratives and target constructions still hold out hope that evidence-based policy
solutions can still emerge from policy processes and be implemented effectively (Feldman
2018; Oliver and Pearce 2017).
Such thinking does a disservice to both policy studies and practice, however, by failing to
address head-on the possibilities that (a) policy-makers are driven by malicious or venal moti-
vations rather than socially beneficial or disinterested ones and (b) policy targets also have
proclivities and tendencies towards activities such as gaming, free-ridership and rent-seeking
that undermine effective policy-making (Feldman 2018; Hoppe 2017).
The degree to which such aspects of policy-making are possible in any particular context
can be said to influence the degree of “volatility” found in a policy arena, that is, the likelihood
or propensity of certain instruments and certain design situations to lead to the deployment
of instruments and tools which involve a high risk of failure. This can be contrasted to more
stable tools and mixes, and more stable contexts, in which emergent designs are more likely to
approximate the image often set out in the literature on the subject.
THE DARK SIDE OF POLICY-MAKING: DEALING WITH

MALICIOUSNESS AND WILLFUL IGNORANCE IN PUBLIC
POLICY-MAKING
The general problem of poor or self-interested behavior interfering or undermining efforts

to promote the public good, of course, is one of the oldest in studies of politics and public
administration (Saxonhouse 2015). These have outlined many aspects of these problems
which are policy relevant but are often ignored or downplayed in thinking and writing about
policy-making.
These problems range from the use of public authority to promote the interests of ethnic,
religious and other favored groups or specific sets of “clients” (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Goetz
2007) or penalize or punish others (Howlett 2017), rather than the public interest, to (mis)use
67
Michael Howlett - 9781789900910
Table 6.1 Problematic aspects of tool deployment by interest served
Key actors
Public agencies Regulated private Private actors
and public actors
Public Altruism and public good (beneficial program
design and delivery)
Interest served Private Corruption/clientelism/group/ethnic favoritism Gaming rules Gaming/crime fraud
policy to enrich or otherwise benefit policy-makers and administrators (Uribe 2014), and to use
policy to manipulate a variety of activities of target groups through, for example, vote-buying
or other forms of electoral pandering (Brancati 2014; Manor 2013) (see Table 6.1).
Although omnipresent in popular accounts and traditional and social media visions of
policy-making, these activities are generally absent from standard textbooks and other works
on policy-making (Anderson 1975; Howlett 2009; Weimer and Vining 1989) which often take
it as self-evident that policy-making and policies are developed in accordance with the best
evidence and practice in order to generate public value (Mintrom and Luetjens 2018; Moore
1994, 1995). While this is a noble thought, the evidence of corruption, collusion, clientelism
and other forms of “bad” policy-making behavior is all around us (Dahlström et al. 2012) and
is a pervasive trope in the popular media (Cappella and Jamieson 1996). And this behavior
extends beyond the activities of just policy-makers to the equally understudied phenomenon of
policy-taker perversion of even the noblest efforts at generating public value.
Both such behaviors should serve as cautionary notes for policy-makers and serve as
constraints which should be considered in articulating criteria for developing and evaluating
effective policy designs and dealing with the risks of policy failure (Peters et al. 2018; Taylor
et al. 2013, 2019). This is especially the case with designs which implicitly or explicitly rely
on goodwill and engaged, compliant, target group behavior for their effectiveness, such as
co-production, collaboration and other forms of voluntary regulation (Ansell et al. 2017). But
these also extend to all other forms of policy activity and instrument use, from the provision
of loans and subsidies to the creation of administrative rules and the provision of information
(Howlett 2019a). Policy designers concerned with the resiliency and robustness of their
designs (Howlett 2019b) need to anticipate such behavior and take steps in their designs to
prevent its occurrence or channel it towards the public good (Schultze 1977; Blanc 2018).
The Problems of Maliciousness and Willful Ignorance
The fact that false, biased or misleading information enters into political discussions and
policy deliberations is not new and the policy sciences have always recognized the limits or
bounds of knowledge in policy-making (Simon 1967, 1978; Jones 2002). Similarly, the idea
that policy problems are at least in part socially constructed and the nature of policy problems,
solutions and targets are biased in various ways is also an old insight (Schneider and Ingram
1993, 1998; Foucault 1979; Lemke 2000). Both of these components of policy-making and
their impact on policy work and analysis have been a steady subject of debate and interest in
the field for decades (Fischer 1987; Fischer and Forester 1993).
Nevertheless, with respect to the role of knowledge or the epistemologies of policy-making
and policy analysis, policy scientists have always viewed themselves as following a mode of
“speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979); that is, assembling and presenting verifiable

Dealing with the dark side of policy-making 69
facts and evidence about what works and what does not to policy-makers, taking steps to
offset biases and overcome limitations on knowledge in so doing. Epistemologically speak-
ing, the underlying theory of knowledge behind the mainstream policy sciences, existing as
a pre-supposition for much analysis and deliberation, has always been a “realist” one; that
is, a stance towards the world in which it is assumed that “evidence” objectively exists and
can be marshaled by careful study and analysis to address specific kinds of policy problems.
Generations of policy scholars have advanced, applied, and refined rational or instrumental
models and approaches to policy-making that interpret the policy-making process based on
the principal assumption that all policy participants are able to distinguish fact from fiction,
even if conflicts over meaning and strategy are endemic to the politics of policy-making (Tribe
1972; Goodin 1980; Saward 1992; Hawkesworth 1992).
This approach has always acknowledged the limits of cognition, or the social and ontological
“boundedness” of rationality, but has rarely dealt with the perpetual desire of self-interested
parties, from decision-makers to policy targets, to hijack, distort or otherwise reorient public
processes towards their ends and goals (Jones 2002; Habermas 1974).
The former concern, relating to the difficulties of predicting accurately all possible courses
of action and their implications, has led policy scientists to deal with both actual uncertainty
or a true lack of knowledge about future states of affairs (Manski 2011, 2013; Morgan and
Henrion 1990) as well as with a related but different epistemological concern: ignorance on
the part of policy-makers or targets. Both are considered to be major sources of policy failure
even when policies are well intentioned and evidence-based (Bovens and t’Hart 1996; Howlett
2012).
The policy sciences are well prepared to deal with the second issue of a lack of knowledge
representing a correctable deficiency in existing knowledge. This, it is commonly argued, can
be ameliorated by careful knowledge transmission and persistent education activities directed
either towards policy-makers who may be ignorant, for example, of the latest science on an
issue such as climate change, or of policy targets who likewise may not know about a program
or subsidy for which they are eligible. In fact some scholars have characterized the work of
policy analysis as a whole in precisely these terms, that is, as involving principally the effort to
generate and disseminate as much policy-relevant knowledge as possible, ensuring decisions
are taken which are fully cognizant of all “known-knowns” (Hawkesworth 1992; Chow and
Sarin 2002). The first concern, on the other hand, is related to the limits or bounds of knowl-
edge which policy-makers need to be cognizant of in assessing policy options and determining
specific courses of action (March 1978; Forester 1984; Jones 2001, 2002). These are the
“unknown-unknowns” so famously described by former United States Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld in his ruminations of what led to the policy fiasco of the invasion of Iraq.
The one epistemological effort aims to transform ignorance by the injection of knowledge,
converting inappropriate and incorrect knowledge into more reliable evidence which can
better inform the actions of policy-makers and -takers. And in the second, the recognition of
the boundedness of knowledge is seen not as an excuse not to undertake good faith efforts at
better empirical description and analysis of the social world and the impact of specific kinds of
government interventions within it, but rather as a warning to all parties of the imperfect nature
of knowledge, the difficulties involved in predicting the future, and the need to hedge reason
against uncertainty and act in a prudential or precautionary fashion if the public interest is to
be served (Dunn 1991; Van der Sluijs 2005; Manski 2011).

Table 6.2 The epistemology of maliciousness
Extent of knowledge of policy problems and solutions

High Low
Instrumental rationality/reason Ignorance
Policy problem: boundedness, Policy problem: propensity for
Nature of knowledge uncertainty avoidable policy failure, blame
For the public good
utilization Solutions: more and better Solutions: enhanced education,
analysis, prudence better knowledge dissemination
and transmission
Maliciousness Willful ignorance
Policy problem: high private Policy problem: high propensity
value, low or negative public for avoidable policy failure
For particular gain value
Solutions: transparency Solutions: suppression, legal
and accountability, legal proscription
proscription
Source: Perl et al. 2018.
Both these fixes, however, assume that the end of policy-making is to serve the public inter-
est and enhance public value (Mintrom and Luetjens 2018; Moore 1995) and that what can
be thought of as errors of omission and commission in policy-making are unintentional, with
all participants amenable to learning and carefully considered action. Although studied much
less frequently, of course, a more Machiavellian stance towards the policy process exists, in
which a much more malicious intent informs policy deliberations and actions (Goodin 1980;
Riker 1986; Saward 1992; Schultz 2017). As highlighted by many studies of corruption and
clientelism in government decision-making (Scott 1969; Treisman 2007), for example, this
stance towards knowledge is an alternative to prudential reason which utilizes certain types of
evidence and facts while ignoring others in promoting and disseminating self-interested policy
alternatives. In such efforts, lies and mis-statements and appeals to emotional and cultural
stereotypes and attribution of false motives to rivals and targets are quite common (Goodin
1980; Maor 2015; Perl et al. 2018).
Maliciousness also motivates a fourth policy-making stance, the analogue of “classical”
unintentional ignorance to evidence, which is “willful” or intentional ignorance, the phenom-
enon of burying one’s head in the sand or purposely ignoring existing evidence and persisting
with false beliefs (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008). This has come to the fore in contemporary
policy-making and commentary around the Trump, Orbán and other recent neo-nationalist
administrations in Europe, North America and elsewhere (Richey 2017; Oliver and Wood
2014; Pasek et al. 2015; Del Vicario et al. 2017; Perl et al. 2018).
Whether such actions are taken for the personal enrichment of proponents or for evil pur-
poses such as the elimination, oppression or exploitation of rival groups or ethnicities, malice
in this sense is a rival epistemological stance to the policy analytical orthodoxy. It is one in
which instrumental reason is still present in policy-making but is exercised in the individual or
group self-interest rather than for that of the public (see Table 6.2).
Like ignorance, the malicious use of knowledge to manipulate policy processes is also
anathema to traditional policy science, not only on moral grounds, since it typically replaces
the public interest with the private as the chief criterion for policy adoption, but also on epis-
temological ones as it undermines the ability of analysts to accurately describe and convey an

objective appraisal of costs and benefits to policy-makers in that interest. Such actions have
been studied from time to time – such as when policy actors spin and misinform policy-making
by introducing inaccurate information into policy debates and deliberations as happened in the
1960s and 1970s around tobacco control and more recently around global warming (Oreskes
and Conway 2011) – but not systematically.
Dealing with the Adverse Behavior of Policy-Takers
Most of the concerns raised above, when they have been examined, have been analyzed in
the case of policy-makers. But there is a large second area of concern which also exists: that
related to the adverse or malicious behavior of policy-“takers”. This issue also has to do with
mendacity and/or Machiavellian behavior on the part of policy-takers, a subject often glossed
over in studies of policy compliance and “target behavior” (Howlett 2018).
Here the idea commonly found in the policy literature is that the only real issue in policy
compliance is merely a matter of “getting incentives (and disincentives) right” (Howlett
2018). This not only ignores aspects involved in the social and political construction of targets
highlighted above (Schneider and Ingram 1990a, 1990b), but also minimizes the complex
behaviors which go into compliance, most notably considerations of legitimacy, but also
related to cupidity, trust and other social and individual behavioral characteristics as well as
the operation of a wide variety of descriptive and injunctive social norms (Howlett 2019a;
Bamberg and Moser 2007; Thomas et al. 2016).
Not the least of the problems with this view is that it has a notion of policy-takers as static
targets who do not try, or at least do not try very hard, to evade policies or even to profit from
them (Howlett 2019a; Braithwaite 2003; Marion and Muehlegger 2007). Such activities on
the part of policy-takers, however, are key in determining the success of various government
initiatives ranging from tobacco control to bus fare evasion (Delbosc and Currie 2016; Kulick
et al. 2016) and should be “designed for” in the sense that determined non-compliance and
gaming should be taken into account in designing policies, along with many other such behav-
iors, such as free-ridership, fraud and misrepresentation (Harring 2016). As it stands, these
are often thought of as purely “implementation” issues and left up to administrators to deal
with rather than forming an essential component of policy formulation and design (Doig and
Johnson 2001; Kuhn and Siciliani 2013).
DEALING WITH VOLATILITY IN POLICY DESIGNS
It is well recognized that even when policies are designed with a clear evidentiary basis in
a model formulation process so that they are well suited to the issues and concerns of the con-
temporary era, they may still fail over time if they do not adapt to changing circumstances and
concerns as policy implementation proceeds and the policy is put into action (Nair and Howlett
2016; Bennett and Lemoine 2014a, 2014b).
This suggests a need to be able to design and adopt policies featuring some level of
agility and flexibility in their components and processes. In more turbulent circumstances,
for example, where policy ideas and actors change frequently (Howlett and Ramesh 1998),
policies must be designed to be flexible. In practice, this means policies and policy-making
require additional and redundant resources and capabilities which allow them to change

Table 6.3 Tool volatility and design alternatives
Tool type Flaw Perverse results Solutions

Procedural tools
Organization Public failure/corruption/ Diversion of public Accountability/transparency/etc.
state-owned enterprises resources to private Anti-corruption bureaus
contracting aims/end Blockchain bidding and procurement/contracting
Co-production clientelism records
Fraud squads
Authority Regulatory gaming/capture Diversion of public Careful design, monitoring and learning
Bribes and kick-backs ends to private Whistleblower laws
Sunset laws
Merit appointments
Conflict of interest laws
Treasure Gaming/fraud Diversion of public Complete contracts, careful subsidy/tax design
resources to private Monitoring and verification/enforcement/
inspections
Nodality Diversion of individual/group Private gain More carefully targeted messages
message for private ends, e.g. Truth in advertising laws
propaganda or blackmail
course as conditions change, including feedback mechanisms and procedures for automatic
or semi-automatic adjustment (Pierson 1992, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Jacobs and
Weaver 2015).1
This is also true of what is needed to deal with volatility in policy mixes. That is, when
policy tools are utilized which are subject to gaming, fraud or misrepresentation, for example,
additional resources are required to build in the accountability, monitoring and auditing func-
tions required for such mixes to operate effectively (Blanc 2018).
In general there are several causes of policy volatility which can be situated in the rela-
tionships which exist between well- and other-intentioned policy behavior on the part of
policy-makers and policy-takers. These take different forms, however, depending on the
policy tools involved. Hence most perversions of the public interest such as corruption are
organizational in nature and can be cured through a combination of organizational and regu-
latory activity such as the creation of anti-corruption agencies and the development of more
effective financial and recruitment controls, including limits of party funding and government
contracting and procurement activity (Graycar 2015; Graycar and Prenzler 2013; Phillips and
Levasseur 2004).
Other perversions have a more quasi-governmental aspect and affect other policy tools such
as authority-based (regulatory) ones or financial instruments. These range from more prosaic
forms of regulatory capture (Levine and Forrence 1990) to the gaming of regulations and
sophisticated swindles and abuses of government treasury and tax largesse (Doig and Johnson
2001; Raghunandan 2018). These require the use of careful monitoring of policies and regula-
tory behavior and the use of acts such as the Federal Advisory Commission Act in the United
States or various lobbyist registries controlling regulator–regulatee interactions through
enhanced mandatory transparency (Chari et al. 2007; Carpenter and Moss 2013; Karty 2002).
Incomplete contracts and poor procurement practices, for example, can allow government
procedures and rules to be gamed at the public expense and require better legal construction
and design (Scott and Triantis 2005).

As Table 6.3 shows, designs based on nodality and nudges and/or treasure resources (e.g.
those most closely associated with “modern” collaborative governance) are always highly
volatile as incentives are ripe for cheating and gaming and protections are often low. Therefore
there is a need to “design in” correctives such as accountability mechanisms, verification and
monitoring plans and the like right at the outset in order to ensure these are locked in and left
in place as the program or policy matures (Plaček et al. 2018; Vine and Sathaye 1999). Other
designs based on authority or regulation tend to decline over time (capture/corruption). Again
this can be controlled for right at the start through the use of procedural devices such as sunset
clauses and term limits, conflict of interest rules, ethics commissioners and similar kinds of
administrative procedures (McCubbins et al. 1987).
There is a need to assess risks of failure right at the outset (Falco 2017; Taylor et al. 2019).
The bottom line however is that while all designs are susceptible to gaming and corruption,
not all are as volatile as others. That is, volatility is (1) not always at the same point in time
(creation versus after some time), (2) not always manifested in the same way and (3) requires
different ways to correct for problems. Market mixes are always vulnerable and highly volatile
and require constant monitoring. Regulatory or organizational alternatives are also vulnerable
but less volatile or more inert; mainly requiring control over the long term to avoid capture
and corruption.
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR RESILIENCE AND ROBUSTNESS

IN POLICY DESIGNS
Recent studies of policy design have established insights, which are often lambasted but
which can reduce volatility if used properly, into the question of what makes a policy design
“sticky” or more likely to remain in place over the long term. Path dependency, for example, is
a well-known phenomenon in social processes (Arthur 1989; Arthur et al. 1988; David 1985;
David and Parker 1986; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995, 1990) which has been applied with
effect in the policy sciences in order to understand the construction and maintenance of policy
trajectories – that is, how initial policy actions remain more or less in effect over a long period
of time, often being reinforced and made more difficult to change (“locked in”) by the passage
of time (Greener 2005; Cox 2004; Deeg 2001). Although much of the literature on path
dependency and lock-in focuses on questions around (sub)optimality and (in)effectiveness of
policy mixes which have evolved in this way (Peters et al. 2018; Howlett and Rayner 2013;
Río 2010), these studies also reveal several lessons that can be drawn for resilient and robust
policy designs in general and more specifically in the case of highly volatile ones.
That is, mixes that emerge over long stretches of time as a result of earlier policy decisions
and layering thus often face the situation in which even when the initial logic of a mix may
have been clear at the outset, it can gradually transform into a degenerative or incoherent mix
over time (Bode 2006; Hacker 2005). These kinds of “unintentional” mixes can be contrasted
with “smarter” designs which involve creating new sets of tools specifically intended to over-
come or avoid the problems associated with path-dependent layering processes. A key element
in such smarter designs involves including procedural tools such as periodic reviews and
sunset provisions which can enhance resilience and robustness (Gunningham et al. 1998; Kiss
et al. 2013). This is less a concern for how policy mixes might evolve over time in an uninten-
tional fashion as new elements are added to old mixes in successive rounds of policy-making,

and how these may be corrected, but more towards the intentional introduction of additional
elements into a policy mix either at the outset or in a delayed or stages fashion. In either case
the focus is on a process envisioned from the outset, and carried out in a clear and intentional
way (Justen et al. 2014; Taeihagh et al. 2013), so that new elements become “locked in” to an
initial design (Howlett 2019a).
On a substantive level, “robust” policies are those which incorporate some slack, allowing
room for adjustments as conditions change. Robust policies, as in the case of a bridge or
building, need to be “overdesigned” or “overengineered” in order to allow for a greater range
of effective, thus “robust”, responses across contexts and time. This is well illustrated in the
case of crisis and disaster management where, in order to be able to survive crises, systems and
organizations require redundancy, back-up systems, and a greater use of materials than would
normally be necessary for efficiency in a technical sense (Lai 2012). Organizations which
are too lean (Radnor and Boaden 2004) may eliminate elements that could be useful when
circumstances change, thus restricting the ability of an organization to respond to surprises
(Room 2013b).
Resilience, on the other hand, requires the ability to alter and adapt policies on the fly – to
improvise effectively. This can involve, for example, building into a policy a range of “auto-
matic stabilizers” such as welfare payments or unemployment insurance payments which
increase in the event of an economic downturn, maintaining some level of spending and saving
despite a general economic contraction or removing some funds from investment availability
during boom times (Salamon 2002). Policy designs that contain both a substantive component
– a set of alternative arrangements thought to be potentially capable of resolving or addressing
some aspect of a policy problem – as well as a procedural component – a set of activities
related to maintaining some level of agreement among those charged with formulating, decid-
ing and administering a policy and control over target behavior are more resilient than those
which lack them.
Ensuring policy robustness and resilience in the face of maliciousness requires the inclusion
of procedures which allow responses to surprises – including non-compliance by policy targets
– to be improvised and implemented in an effective way as they occur (Room 2013a, 2013b).
This includes, for example, built-in policy reviews, and mechanisms for outside evaluation
and control including provisions for future public hearings and information access, disclosure
and dissemination which allow significant adjustments to changing circumstances to occur
(Lang 2016).
NOTE
1. Recognition of this need is in strong opposition to many ideas about policy-making which equate
better designs with efficiency, implying the allocation of only the minimum amount of resources
possible, and which also often emphasize routinization and the replication of standard operating
procedures and program elements in order to ensure consistency in program delivery (Moxey et al.
1999; Cole and Grossman 1999). It requires clearer thinking about what exactly sequencing means,
how it occurs in policy-making and how it can best be managed to ensure resilient and robust poli-
cies are created and remain in effect.

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7. Corruption of public officials by organised
crime: understanding the risks, and exploring
the solutions
Russell G. Smith, Tony Oberman and Georgina Fuller
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the involvement of serious and organised crime groups in corrupting
public officials. Based on a comprehensive review of international literature, it seeks to iden-
tify the nature of organised crime involvement in public-sector corruption, the associated risk
factors and best-practice responses and prevention strategies.
Corruption affecting the public sector is a covert and pernicious criminal activity that has
been defined as: ‘[a] public official… acting for personal gain, [violating] the norms of public
office and [harming] the interests of the public to benefit a third party who rewards [the public
official] for access to goods or services which [they] would not otherwise obtain’ (Philp 2006:
45). The United Nations Convention Against Corruption does not define corruption (UN
2004a) but instead defines conduct and activities considered to be corrupt, such as bribery of
domestic and foreign public officials or officials from international organisations, diversion
of public property by public officials and bribery and embezzlement in the private sector
(Sharman & Chaikin 2009).
Public officials are particularly at risk of being invited to act corruptly because they have
access to extensive collections of confidential and personal information, and can provide ben-
efits, or discount liabilities, to members of the public. This makes them attractive to members
of organised crime groups as targets of corruption. The United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime outlines the essential components of an organised crime group
as being a structured group, comprising three or more persons, existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aim of committing serious criminal offences in order to obtain some
financial or material benefit (UN 2004b).
There are a number of dimensions to organised crime involvement in public-sector corrup-
tion. Key among these are the patterns of the relationship, or its continuity and whether cor-
ruption is sporadic or systemic. Sporadic or isolated incidents of corruption are usually carried
out by individuals when an opportunity arises that can be exploited. Sporadic or isolated
instances of corruption usually target lower-level actors where organised crime participation is
less sophisticated than in longer-running cases. Systemic – or what has been called symbiotic
– corruption is usually ongoing and forms part of a pattern of offending by organised crime
groups. It involves collective action by group members, even where the leaders are rarely
directly involved. Systematic public-sector corruption generally involves more sophisticated
groups seeking to minimise the risk of detection by acting in a planned manner.
Another dimension concerns the level of the public sector targeted. Buscaglia and van Dijk
(2003) identified five levels of public-sector infiltration by organised crime groups. The first
80
Russell G. Smith, Tony Oberman and Georgina Fuller - 9781789900910
Corruption of public officials by organised crime 81
level involves sporadic acts of bribery or the abuse of public office by organised crime at
lower levels of government. The second involves frequent corruption by putting low-ranking
state officials on the organised criminal payroll. The third is when organised crime infiltrates
the managerial domain of public agencies in an attempt, for example, to bias the hiring of
state personnel in order to favour particular criminal groups. The fourth level of infiltration is
direct compromise of the heads of agencies responsible for fighting organised crime-related
activities such as drug enforcement agencies. Finally, the fifth level entails capture of the
state’s policies by criminal groups that are then able to bias lawmaking, law enforcement and
judicial decisions. This fifth type of state infiltration often involves high-level officials such as
senators, ministers or even presidents (Buscaglia & van Dijk 2003: 23–4).
The degree of systematic involvement of organised crime in corruption, and the impetus for
this, is the third dimension of public-sector corruption. Corruption may be opportunistic, or
it may be strategically planned and developed by organised crime groups. Opportunistic cor-
ruption often occurs when there is a motivation for illegal behaviour and the risk of detection
is low. Smith (2014), for example, illustrates how individuals, including public officials, are
recruited to participate in corrupt activities by organised crime groups.
On occasions, public officials may not only facilitate and assist criminal conduct by
organised crime, but may actively participate in serious illegality. The European Commission
explored this in 2010 and provided examples that included police officers who ran their own
prostitution rings or drug-distribution networks, politicians who covertly controlled compa-
nies engaged in criminal behaviour and cases where criminals had accumulated sufficient
legitimate power to participate directly in local politics – known as state capture (Gounev &
Bezlov 2010).
Organised crime groups are attracted to public-sector information and services because, in
many cases, they permit their illicit activities to remain undetected and beyond the reach of
law enforcement. In Australia, for example, in June 2013, the Australian Commission for Law
Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) found that three Australian Customs and Border Protection
officials had been involved in the importation of illicit drugs and precursors, by ensuring that
drug couriers were not intercepted or screened on arrival at Sydney International Airport and
manipulating rosters so that other corrupt officials were present at specific times (ACLEI
2013). In another case in 2009, a New South Wales police analyst was found guilty of passing
confidential information to associates who were members of an Outlaw Motor Cycle Gang
(OMCG) (Arlington 2010).
PRIOR RESEARCH
The relationship between public-sector corruption and organised crime has received consider-
able attention in Europe and the United States (US) (Gounev & Bezlov 2010; Buscaglia & van
Dijk 2003; Holmes 2008; Wang 2013; Transparency International 2010; Muravska, Hughes &
Pyman 2011; Savona & Berlusconi 2015). Both Europe and the Americas have had a lengthy
history of interventions that have led to the discovery of organised crime group involvement
in corruption.
In 2002, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) commissioned a study
of 40 organised criminal groups across 16 countries and one region. The study was conducted
by the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) in an attempt both to build the

knowledge base on organised crime groups and to develop a comparative framework for stud-
ying the phenomenon. The CICP sent detailed questionnaires to a selected number of United
Nations member states believed to have the capacity to assist and the information necessary to
be useful to the study. Each of the 16 participating countries was asked to complete the ques-
tionnaire and provide an analytical overview of the three most prominent organised criminal
groups in their country.
The use of corruption by the groups studied and the degree of political influence they
exerted were two of the relevant variables examined. Regarding corruption, it was found that:
In just under half of the groups (18 cases), corruption was essential to the primary activity of the
criminal group. In just under one third of the groups (12 cases), the groups made use of corruption
occasionally. In the remaining instances (10 cases), there was evidence of little or no corruption.
Perhaps most significant is the degree to which, in the overall majority of cases, corruption is a key
element for the undertaking of organized crime activities and that three quarters of the groups use
corruption occasionally or regularly. (UNODC 2002: 25)
In respect of political influence, it was found that:
In just under half of the surveyed groups, respondents regarded there to be no evidence of any
political influence. However one third of the groups were said to have political influence at the local
or regional level (14 cases). In 7 cases the organized crime groups in question was regarded to have
some influence at national level in the country of intervention and in five cases to have some influence
in a country or countries outside of the one where the respondent recorded their activities. In only
five cases did a respondent regard political influence to cross more than one category, for example,
occurring at local regional and national level (1 case) or at a national level and abroad (3 cases) or at
all three levels of government (1 case). (UNODC 2002: 26)
Global circumstances have changed considerably in the ensuing years, with the growth of
terrorism, the influence of global financial crises, the availability of new technologies and
increased human trafficking. In addition, the results only reflect the subjective assessments of
the responding agencies in the countries surveyed. Nonetheless, although these results were
drawn from a wide range of countries with varying organised crime group problems, they do
provide some empirical indication of how these groups used corruption and political influence
at the time the report was prepared.
In 2003, the UNODC conducted another study to identify and isolate the factors influenc-
ing the growth of public-sector corruption involving organised crime (Buscaglia & van Dijk
2003). Qualitative and quantitative information was obtained for a large sample of countries
and territories, representing worldwide diversity stratified by levels of socio-economic
development. Data on corruption mostly related to the street- and medium-level corruption
an average citizen faces in his or her dealings with public agencies, excluding high-level or
‘grand’ corruption. Data on organised crime included indicators of five core activities (traf-
ficking in persons, firearms, stolen cars and cigarettes, as well as fraud) and four secondary
factors (costs for business, extent of the informal economy as a proportion of gross domestic
product, violence and money laundering).
The study’s objective was to explore and verify empirically the links between organised
crime and its main economic, administrative, legal/judicial and political causes. Statistical
analysis confirmed a very strong association between the index for levels of organised crime
and the index for public-sector corruption. ‘The results indicated that independence and

integrity of the judiciary was the most important predictor of the extent of organized crime.
Independently of this, the extent of organized crime was higher in countries where the police
were less effective. Finally, organized crime was more prevalent in less affluent countries,
independently of the two other factors’ (Buscaglia & van Dijk 2003: 13). Based on the
evidence examined, the study found that organised crime and corruption prosper in an envi-
ronment of bad governance. It was observed that ‘rampant corruption offers opportunities for
organised crime that are readily exploited by emerging criminal groups. When organised crime
acquires a dominant position, corruption within the public sector is bound to grow’ (Buscaglia
& van Dijk 2003: 22–3). The study also argued that ‘insufficiencies in the area of economic
and financial regulation and poor legal-judicial infrastructures are among the many aspects
of governance that appear to be relevant to crime control’ (Buscaglia & van Dijk 2003: 32).
Research undertaken on behalf of the European Commission has documented the extent
of corruption in European nations. Of particular relevance to the present chapter is a study
commissioned by the European Commission (2006) that explored the opinions of European
Union (EU) citizens on organised cross-border crime and corruption. More than half of the
citizens of the EU as a whole believed that most corruption in their country was caused by
organised crime (54%). Italy had the highest number of respondents convinced of the link
between corruption and organised crime (70%). Two thirds of citizens in Lithuania (67%) and
Slovenia (67%) shared that view; on the other hand, the majority of citizens in the Republic
of Cyprus (54%), the Czech Republic (52%) and Finland (51%) did not agree that there was
a link between corruption and organised crime in their country.
In 2010, the European Commission contracted the Centre for the Study of Democracy to
analyse the links between organised crime and corruption in much greater depth. The broad
objective of this study was to identify and analyse the links between organised crime and
corruption, using supporting empirical evidence on the extent of the linkage between the two
phenomena in EU member states (Gounev & Bezlov 2010). The study involved statistical and
literary analysis, as well as interviews and fieldwork in six countries: the Netherlands, Greece,
Italy, Bulgaria, France and Spain.
The analysis confirmed the hypothesis that a statistically strong relationship was found to
exist between organised crime and corruption. Further analysis revealed that effective gov-
ernment and institutions had an even stronger impact on corruption than on organised crime;
effective government institutions also had a strong impact on organised crime levels. The
model found a statistically significant relationship between general economic indicators (gross
domestic product per capita in Purchasing Power Standards), corruption and organised crime.
In addition, the analysis showed that the relationship between money laundering and most
types of institutional corruption was very strong. Law-enforcement institutions were most
directly affected, while the customs agencies of most EU countries were seriously affected,
particularly involving human trafficking. The EU institution least affected by organised crime
was the judiciary (Gounev & Bezlov 2010).
AREAS OF RISK
What then are the areas of the public sector that are most at risk of corruption by members of
organised crime groups?

Customs and Border Control
Customs agencies of most countries have been found to be seriously affected by organised
crime. Research has found that customs officers are more likely to be involved in supporting
corrupt channels for consumer goods than in the smuggling of illegal goods like arms and
drugs, and that the most typical cross-border criminal networks deal with cigarettes, alcohol,
oil and oil products (Gounev & Bezlov 2010).
The Centre for the Study of Democracy’s report included numerous examples of organ-
ised crime groups being involved in corrupting customs officials in the EU. These included
customs officers concealing drug smuggling into London by failing to inspect drug mules
properly, or by making payments to a heroin trafficker in return for receipt of information on
heroin sales in the United Kingdom (UK); a corrupt customs officer at the Port of Antwerp
issuing false documentation in collusion with British alcohol smugglers in which the false
certificate stated that the goods had been exported to Belgium, when in fact they were sold
illegally in the UK; and a staff member at the Belgian Embassy in Sofia in 1996 issuing 250
visas to Bulgarian nationals, including many prostitutes, in return for payments from organised
crime group members who were part of a people-smuggling ring (Gounev & Bezlov 2010).
In Australia, the Department of Home Affairs manages Australian border security. The
illicit drug market in Australia generates lucrative profits (ACLEI 2013) and the Australian
border is a key entry and exit point for importers of illicit drugs and other commodities. In
2011, the department notified the Australian Integrity Commissioner of ten matters concerning
corruption within the border force staff, including an allegation that an individual suspected
by the Australian Federal Police of importing chemicals used to manufacture methampheta-
mine and ecstasy was in regular contact with officers at Sydney International Airport. These
officers had knowledge of law-enforcement techniques and the vulnerabilities of detection
processes. They also had access to the secure areas of the airport, police databases, recruitment
information and staffing rosters. The officers collaborated, using their knowledge of airport
processes to circumvent surveillance and interdiction systems and assisting in the importation
of illicit drugs from Thailand and Vietnam. The resulting police operation, Heritage, led to
the confiscation of approximately $273,000 worth of pseudoephedrine, cash and other assets
(ACLEI 2013).
Human Trafficking
A number of studies have documented the nature and extent of the involvement of corrupt
public officials in organised human trafficking (see Holmes 2009 for a review of the European
situation). Public officials can be directly involved in organised human trafficking by running
or consciously participating in trafficking operations or related activities, or indirectly
involved by collaborating with persons known or suspected to be victims of trafficking,
refusing to investigate allegations of trafficking, supporting legislation that is conducive to
trafficking or refusing to pass legislation designed to curb trafficking.
Defence and Security Personnel
In 2011, Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security programme published an

analysis of national defence and security establishments’ vulnerability to organised crime, and

the interaction between organised crime and corruption in post-conflict environments. The
authors explained that:
the erosion and breakdown of governance systems and democratic institutions, whether through
violent conflict or political crisis, akin to the collapse of the Soviet Union or the military coup–
military dictatorship cycle in Central and South America, enables the direct involvement of national
defence and security apparatuses in organised crime. An exacerbating factor is of course that state
defence and security forces possess not only a monopoly on, or at least highly privileged access to, the
means of violence, confidential information, and influential contacts… [but] the painful transition of
post-Communist countries from authoritarian regimes and autarchic economies, also featuring severe
economic depression, unemployment, and inflation, was accompanied by the transition of members
of the defence, security, and intelligence corps into organised crime. (Muravska et al. 2011: 22)
Prison Officials
In the US in January 2016, more than 50 Department of Corrections employees and inmates
of Georgia state prisons, together with individuals outside the prison system, were charged
with conspiring to commit wire fraud, conspiring to commit money laundering and accepting
bribes to smuggle contraband into Georgia prisons. Much of the alleged criminal activity was
committed inside Georgia state prisons and initiated by inmates. The offences were committed
through the use of mobile phones smuggled into prisons – in many cases with the assistance
of corrupt prison officers. It was alleged that, from 2014 to 2015, prison officers seized more
than 23,500 mobile phones from inside Georgia state prisons – many with internet access. On
a number of occasions the phones were smuggled into prisons by correctional officers or other
prison employees. It was also alleged that correctional officers had smuggled other contraband
like tobacco products and drugs into prisons, in exchange for bribes. The phones were used
within the prisons to run online fraud schemes, that resulted in victims providing funds to
associates located outside the prison system (United States Attorney’s Office 2016).
Natural Resources
Other research has explored the problem of the so-called ‘resource curse’, in which corrupt
public officials collaborate with political elites to exploit natural resources such as oil, gas or
minerals for personal gain. Global Witness (2012: 2) identified two forms of such corruption:
governments not making the rationale for choosing particular companies in the bidding process
clear and, in certain cases, appearing to allow some companies special or preferential access
to oil licences, and governments awarding oil licences to companies whose beneficial owners
remained undisclosed. In certain cases, grounds existed to suspect that some of the companies
may have been owned or controlled by government officials or their private-sector proxies.
Wildlife
A related area of organised crime involvement in corruption concerns wildlife trafficking.

The illegal wildlife trade came to prominence in 1998 with Operation Jungle Trade, when
the United States customs service and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service uncovered
a sophisticated smuggling ring selling illegally obtained animals and birds in several states
and in ten other countries throughout the world. The operation resulted in the seizure of 662

valuable endangered animals – the birds alone were worth over $600,000 – and the arrest of
40 traffickers and distributors of wildlife. Zimmerman (2003: 1673) noted the high level of
organised crime group involvement in these activities including corruption of public officials
in central government agencies.
Art and Antiquities
There is also considerable evidence of organised crime involvement in art and antiquities
crime (Hufnagel & Chappell 2019). Chappell and Polk (2011) found evidence of organised
crime group involvement in the corruption of public officials to allow the movement, on
a large scale, of stolen objects through China, Cambodia and Thailand. However, corruption
appears to be located primarily in the supply countries rather than recipient nations.
There have been no accounts that we know of corrupt officials concerned with the trade in cultural
heritage material in, for example, policing or customs agencies in such developed countries as the
United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia… On the other hand, there are several indications
of corruption… involving customs, police and military figures in the supply nations… Where there
appears to be consistent evidence, impressionistic to be sure, is in the customs services at the key
portals where the trade is moved onward to the ultimate supply destinations. (Chappell & Polk 2011:
249–50)
INDIVIDUAL ENABLERS AND RISK FACTORS
Over the last 20 years, a number of researchers have attempted to determine the enablers of,
and risk factors for, corruption (de Graaf & Huberts 2008). Enablers are those conditions
necessary for corruption to occur, while risk factors are conditions that increase the likelihood
it will occur.
Motivations and Benefits
Obtaining financial benefit is one of the most common motivations for public-sector cor-
ruption (ACLEI 2011). KPMG’s Global Profiles of the Fraudster (2016) showed that the
overriding motivations of fraud and corruption offenders were for personal financial gain and
greed (66%). Of the 750 surveyed, there were 125 perpetrators of corruption-type fraud who
showed features different from other forms of fraudulent activity. One was that corruption
tends to operate at a higher level in a company with 51 percent being executives compared
with 31 percent for other types of fraud. Corruption also was concentrated in the office of the
chief executive (26% compared with 15% for other types) (KPMG 2016). Other non-financial
benefits of corruption include receiving sexual services and increasing one’s sense of status or
power (Grabosky & Larmour 2000). ACLEI (2011) also found that corruption may be moti-
vated by conflicts of obligation or misplaced loyalty.
Demographics
Very little research has focused on the demographic characteristics of individuals who engage
in corrupt behaviour. KPMG (2016) report that 79 percent of fraudsters are men, although the

proportion of women is increasing. The overwhelming prevalence of male involvement in cor-

ruption may be due to the fact that women traditionally have lower rates of offending across all
crime types compared with men (AIC 2014) and that men have greater opportunities to offend
than women (Torgler & Valev 2004), with men occupying positions of power in organisations
where their influence is more sought after by organised crime groups. Alternatively, organised
crime groups may seek to target lower-level public officers with decision-making powers who
are often women.
Torgler and Valev (2004) examined the relationship between age and corruption using data
from the World Values Survey. The authors examined the extent to which people accept and
justify corrupt behaviour – specifically bribery – and found a strong effect for age, indicating
that older populations (those aged 35 years and above) were least likely to condone bribery.
They argued that this reflected the general decline in deviant behaviour demonstrated by the
age-crime curve and desistance theories (Hirschi & Gottfredson 2000; Torgler & Valev 2004).
Aside from age and gender, IBAC (2015) has identified other personal characteristics
associated with public-sector employees targeted by organised crime groups. These include
immaturity; low self-esteem; amorality and unethical behaviour; being prone to fantasising;
impulsiveness; lacking conscientiousness; and manipulative behaviour (IBAC 2015). In
addition, IBAC (2015) drew attention to environmental and lifestyle factors, including loss
of employment, accidents, personal injury and loneliness, as factors that may leave someone
vulnerable to the advances of organised crime groups.
Lifestyle
Anti-corruption agencies have increasingly focused on lifestyle risk factors to identify vulnera-
bilities to corruption by organised crime. The use of drugs, including steroids, by public-sector
employees is of particular concern. This can occur through employees coming into contact
with members of organised crime groups, making them susceptible to blackmail. The use
of illicit drugs may also reflect a tendency toward short-term, high-risk behaviour, which
may make offers of corruption more attractive (IBAC 2015). ACLEI (2011) noted the use of
steroids was of particular concern in organisations like the police, where physical fitness is an
integral component of the job. IBAC (2015) also found a rise in the number of investigations
of corruption by organised crime groups facilitated by or linked to a public-sector employee’s
involvement with gyms, steroid use and body image. Concerns of this nature are partly driven
by a shift in OMCG demographics toward younger members with similar interests in fitness
(IBAC 2015).
Personal Relationships
At its heart, the corruption of public-sector employees by organised crime groups involves
creating and compromising relationships (IBAC 2015). The relationship between public
officials and members of an organised crime group may be opportunistic or longer term, and
can be formed through associations with family members, peers or colleagues. IBAC noted
that pre-existing relationships may carry a particular risk of public-sector corruption. The
strong bonds between family members, friends and members of some communities are ripe
for exploitation because employees may feel loyal to, or responsible for, the wellbeing of these
individuals (IBAC 2015).

Relationships with organised crime groups can also be attractive to former defence person-
nel, particularly those with mental health problems caused by their military service. A recent
Australian media investigation found evidence that former high-ranking defence personnel
were joining OMCGs for social and emotional support from other gang members (Willacy
2016).
Social Media
Recent intelligence assessments and research have identified the risk that organised crime
groups could use information posted on social media to identify suitable public-sector targets
for corruption. In Australia, ACLEI’s Operation Heritage found that public officials share
‘common demographics, including school links, age and community ties’ with those involved
in criminal activity, thus providing opportunities for corruption (ACLEI 2014). IBAC also
reported that organised crime groups use social media to recruit individuals to act on their
behalf as couriers of drugs or precursor chemicals, and it is therefore logical that they will
expand their recruitment activities to target public-sector employees (IBAC 2015).
In the US, Operation Newscaster showed how social media could be misused to facilitate
public-sector corruption. In 2011, NewsOnAir, a fictitious media company, was established,
along with 12 fictitious reporters. The ‘reporters’ created false Facebook, LinkedIn and
Twitter profiles to friend more than 2,000 senior US defence and diplomatic officials and
collect intelligence for use in targeting government officials in the US and Israel. The group
behind the activity was thought to be based in Tehran (iSight Partners 2014).
Research conducted for the Canadian Department of Public Safety has explored how
organised crime groups use social media to communicate and facilitate their activities (Frank,
Cheng & Pun 2011). The study found that many organised crime groups in Canada maintained
an online social media presence, using this for ‘intimidation of other gangs and individuals,
committing fraud, and gang recruitment. Either by recruitment or gang subculture promotion,
social media can be used by criminal organisations to more effectively recruit and grow their
operations by reaching out to a wider audience’ (Frank et al. 2011: 17).
ORGANISATIONAL ENABLERS AND RISK FACTORS
Organisational enablers of public-sector corruption by organised crime groups can arise from
the nature of work that public officials conduct and lack of oversight and awareness of risks.
Opportunity
One case in the US saw 18 tax assessors arrested in connection with a corrupt scheme that cost
the city of New York over $40 million in lost revenue. The assessors had charged illegitimate
fees and accepted bribes in return for circumventing controls and reducing property taxes. The
investigation found a number of organisational factors that appeared to have contributed to,
or facilitated, the assessors’ corruption including a lack of agency oversight due to assessors
working autonomously and the complex nature of the property assessment process involved
that created opportunities to hide their corruption (Lagunes & Huang 2015). In response, the
US Department of Finance instituted organisational reforms, including reducing direct contact

between assessors and property owners, requiring assessors to submit financial disclosure
forms, and bolstering internal audit processes (Lagunes & Huang 2015).
Role within the Agency
Not all employees within an agency pose the same risk of corruption, even in high-risk sectors
like the police or customs. Some employees have greater power or influence that is attractive
and useful to organised crime groups. In Australia, Gorta (2006) surveyed 265 agencies and
584 public-sector employees to determine their understanding of corruption risks. It was found
that agencies tended to perform, on average, four high-risk functions relevant to corruption.
Larger organisations of more than 1,000 employees reported performing more high-risk
functions compared with smaller agencies. The two most common functions, performed by
approximately two thirds of the agencies surveyed, were receiving cash payments and regu-
larly dealing with the private sector (Gorta 2006).
Oversight
The level of agency oversight an official is subject to also varies depending on their role or
position. One study noted ‘some public officials and certain types of official transactions are
subject to the strictest scrutiny’ (Grabosky & Larmour 2000: 3). ACLEI listed a high level of
discretion, and low or ineffective supervision, as the two visible indicators associated with
opportunities for corruption (ACLEI 2011). Finally, Goel, Budak and Rajh (2015) noted that
increased transparency would make it more likely that offending employees would be caught
and sanctioned, and would therefore be less likely to respond to the overtures of organised
crime groups.
Risk Awareness
Combating lack of knowledge is one of the primary aims of anti-corruption agencies. Despite
this, IBAC has noted that many of the public-sector agencies consulted were unaware of the
threat of corruption. These agencies did not address the threats associated with organised
crime groups in their organisational risk assessments and were therefore not prepared to
prevent and detect corruption (IBAC 2015).
In Gorta’s (2006) study, respondents were asked to identify the main corruption risks facing
their organisation and whether they felt they were handling them. Common risks that organ-
isations faced and felt they were handling well included administering organisational funds
and/or bank accounts, handling confidential information, procurement and cash handling
(Gorta 2006). Other areas that organisations felt were a major risk but were not currently being
addressed were the use of email and the internet at work, the use of agency resources, materials
and equipment, tendering and contracting for services, record keeping and procurement (Gorta
2006). Although organisations were aware of and able to identify risk factors, they are often
unsure how best to address them.

ADDRESSING THE RISKS
Best-Practice Initiatives
Many of the initiatives developed to minimise risks of corruption in the public sector generally
are applicable to the specific risk of corruption initiated by, or involving, organised crime
groups. Although there is limited research that evaluates which commonly used strategies
are effective in preventing corruption, a number appear to be successful (McCusker 2006;
Larmour & Wolanin 2001; Graycar & Smith 2011; Hatchard 2014).
A number of initiatives have been developed to deal with the specific risks of organised
crime group involvement in the corruption of public officials. The UNODC made one of the
earliest attempts to develop a quantitative and qualitative basis for developing response strate-
gies. These included enacting legislative reforms, establishing specialised units against organ-
ised crime within the police or judiciary, establishing task forces within the criminal justice
system, improving resources for criminal justice administration, building public confidence
and trust in the criminal justice system through the involvement of civil society, enhancing
judicial independence and changing economic and financial policies to make corruption less
attractive to organised crime (Buscaglia & van Dijk 2003: 23–4).
Situational Approaches
Graycar and Sidebottom (2012) argued that corruption is similar to other forms of crime and,
therefore, by ‘increasing the perceived effort of crime, increasing the perceived risks, reducing
the anticipated rewards and removing excuses for crime, the opportunities for corruption may
be eliminated or reduced’ (Graycar & Sidebottom 2012: 396). Another approach to crime pre-
vention that has been applied in the context of preventing corruption within the public sector
involves the use of crime scripts analysis and the 5Is framework developed by Paul Ekblom
(2011). This approach provides crime-prevention practitioners with an evidence-based
framework and methodology for implementing a range of situational and offender-oriented
crime-prevention methods. This was used by Rowe, Akman, Smith and Tomison (2013)
to respond to corruption risks arising from tactical displacement, in which organised crime
groups target public servants to obtain strategic intelligence to help them avoid detection
and arrest. Rowe et al. (2013) applied the principles of crime script analysis, as developed by
Cornish (1994), and Ekblom’s 5Is approach to crime reduction to prevent corruption in police
and intelligence agencies.
Caneppele and Martocchia (2014) also used crime scripts analysis to understand how Italian
mafias are involved in corruption related to public procurement and public works in southern
Italy. The research was based on an analysis of 18 Italian judicial cases in Sicily, Calabria,
Apulia, Basilicata and Campania. The various stages of the contract-tendering process were
examined to determine how the mafia infiltrated public procurement processes. The mafia
were found to infiltrate the preliminary stages of tendering by using apparently ‘clean’ com-
panies as fronts during the tender process to evade anti-mafia controls. They did this passively
(parasitic infiltration) by requiring the payment of a percentage of the contract amount as
pizzo (protection money). They also bribed companies to assist them in winning tenders. The
authors recommended addressing such risks by crime-proofing legislation. The assumption is
that legislation can be criminogenic: the complexity of rules, the presence of overlapping or

gaps in the law, as well as specific provisions of law, can become unintentionally vulnerability
factors (Caneppele & Martocchia 2014: 298).
Another innovative response to procurement corruption involves what Ware, Moss, Campos
and Noone (2011) call Corruption Vulnerability Assessments (CVA). These are environmen-
tal impact assessments that aim to identify risks of corruption prior to the commencement of
public works programmes. The concept was explained as follows:
Like an environmental impact assessment, a CVA can be conducted prior to the onset of large devel-
opmental projects involving public procurement. A CVA is an intelligence driven assessment that
would determine the likelihood of corruption occurring in a planned project. It would examine the
environment in a particular country in terms of corruption vulnerabilities that might put funds at risk
prior to the onset of distribution. Upon its completion, project designers and international financial
institutions would have more information upon which to take graduated measures to ensure that
public money is used for the intended purposes. For example, if government officials or their families
have widespread holdings in private companies, a mandatory financial disclosure programme can be
installed to ensure that officials do not steer contracts to their own business entities. If project moni-
tors are active in a project, the results of the CVA will provide critical information for the monitor to
use in tailoring their monitoring protocol. (Ware et al. 2011: 105)
Employee-Vetting Procedures
The deliberate withholding of information by an employee, beginning during recruitment or

security assessment and continuing once the employee is hired, is referred to as ‘the enduring
lie’ (ACLEI 2014). When employees keep secrets from their employer, they become vulnera-
ble to blackmail and extortion (ACLEI 2014).
Agencies vet employees to mitigate the individual risk factors as arising from inappropriate
relationships or lifestyle factors. Screening allows potential employees to declare associations
that may leave them vulnerable to corruption by organised crime groups. By vetting individ-
uals during recruitment, vetting agencies seek to ensure that employees are suitable to access
information and will comply with acceptable standards for information management (AGSVA
2015).
Unfortunately, security-vetting procedures are not an absolute answer to corruption and
criminality. In Australia, for example, the Australian Institute of Criminology’s annual
censuses of internal fraud within Commonwealth entities (Jorna & Smith 2019) have found
a number of individuals who have perpetrated serious fraud had been security vetted, even
at the highest levels. In 2018, the Commonwealth revised its Protective Security Policy
Framework that now requires ongoing assessment of personnel concerning security risks
(Attorney-General’s Department 2018). It remains to be seen if this will address future risks of
corruption among public officials.
Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct are sets of rules or principles that outline what is expected of an organisa-
tion’s employees (Gordon & Miyake 2001). The UNODC’s model code of conduct for civil
servants is one example (UN 2004a). Well-defined organisational values can help to build
and sustain corruption resistance and codes of conduct move the focus away from a ‘few bad
apples’ and place the emphasis on ethical practice as a way to fight corruption (Gorta 2006;

Moss 2013). Generally, codes of conduct will only be effective in reducing corruption when
they form part of a broader ethics programme implemented across organisations.
Two studies that have explored how effective codes of conduct are in dealing with corrup-
tion have found mixed results (Beeri, Dayan, Vigoda-Gadot & Wener 2012; Cleek & Leonard
1998; Garcia-Sanchez, Rodriguez-Dominguez & Gallego-Alvarez 2011). In the first study,
a range of publicly available administrative data relating to 154 developing and developed
countries were sorted into two groups – countries with a public service code of ethics and those
with none (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2011). The data included information on a range of organi-
sational variables and the country’s corruption level was measured by the public perception of
the degree to which public power was exerted for individual gain. Multivariate data analysis
found that the existence of a code of ethics did not independently predict the level of corrup-
tion in developed or developing nations, when all other factors considered were constant.
Only two factors had an independent impact on corruption levels in developed nations – the
government's ideology and its stability.
In the second study, Beeri et al. (2012) found evidence that ethics programmes had some
impact on corruption at the local government level. The authors surveyed 108 employees of
a regional council in Israel both before, and after, the implementation of an ethics programme.
Twelve months after the ethics programme was implemented, surveyed staff reported that
the ethical climate of the council had improved significantly, suggesting that the ethics
programme may have had a positive impact on the perceived level of council corruption.
However, awareness of the code of ethics did not have any impact on staff perceptions of their
organisation’s general ethical climate. Beeri et al. (2012) explained this by suggesting that
codes may not be effective when implemented in isolation, but should be delivered as part of
a broader programme of activities aimed at preventing corruption and other unethical conduct.
Enhanced Auditing and Accountability Practices
Financial auditing is another way in which agencies can improve accountability and employee
oversight. Dye (2007: 8) argued that auditing is useful in combating corruption risks within
agencies, stating that ‘good financial reporting and auditing help reduce the misrepresentation
that hides fraudulent operations and misleads the reader’. The study by Lagunes and Huang
(2015) in New York found that improved financial auditing of employees, including the intro-
duction of a requirement to submit bank statements, made it more difficult for employees to
receive bribes or other financial benefits.
The New York Department of Investigation (DOI) operates under a charter that ‘empowers
the Department to investigate anything that might be fraudulent, corrupt or wasteful in City
government’ (Hearn 2011: 466). The DOI has a comprehensive strategy to disrupt and identify
corruption and ensure lasting systematic change in the agency’s culture, policy and practice,
to impede future corruption. This strategy encompasses two broad core functions: investiga-
tion and education. The DOI also identifies organisational vulnerabilities that could promote
corruption and mitigate them. Finally, the DOI monitors projects that may be susceptible
to corruption. In some cases, this has involved assigning a DOI employee to the project to
monitor it directly and report back to the DOI. Hearn (2011) reported that tips from monitors
have led to successful investigations of suspected corruption practices and subsequent arrests.

Addressing Social Media Risks
The risk of organised crime groups using social media to identify and groom public officials
for corruption can be addressed in a number of ways. Public officials need to be made aware
of the risks they face from social media and educated in how to minimise them. Policies
on the use of social media, such as that of the New South Wales Police Force (2011), can
provide effective models. Arguably, a willingness to adhere to social media policies should be
a requirement of obtaining a security clearance.
It may also be necessary to monitor staff use of social media regularly to detect potential
red flags for corruption and to implement measures to limit the ability of staff to engage in
high-risk activities online. In particular, it might be necessary to limit the posting of strategi-
cally important agency information on social media. Staff should also use social media sites
securely, with appropriate security and privacy settings. Ideally, personal and official use of
social media should be separate, and regular risk assessments should be undertaken.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of areas of the public sector appear to be particularly at risk of corruption by

members of organised crime groups. These include procurement, particularly in defence,
construction, planning and development and in the frontline agencies of police, customs
and border protection and other regulatory bodies. These agencies have extensive personal
data holdings and perform decision-making functions of value to organised crime groups.
In addition, agencies that manage border security in connection with illegal migration and
the movement of illicit substances across borders are particularly at risk as well as new or
‘boutique’ agencies that have yet to establish, implement or monitor effective anti-corruption
policies and practices.
Public-sector corruption by organised crime groups is also driven by individual factors
such as demographic and lifestyle characteristics, as well as the organisational environment
in which they operate. In these areas, particular risks arise from financial strain caused by
excessive lifestyle expenses or addictive behaviours such as drug abuse or gambling and the
failure to differentiate between workplace and private activities, particularly through blended
recreational activities and the use of social media.
In addition, individual characteristics including youth and naivety, older age and dis-
enchantment with the workplace, social isolation and lifestyle interests that coincide with
the interests of members of organised crime groups such as motorcycles, personal fitness,
tattooing and excessive alcohol and drug use, create serious risks of corruption taking place.
Personal and familial relationship with individuals associated with organised crime groups
can also provide opportunities for public officials to act corruptly in order to maintain such
relationships. Finally, fiscal demands on the public sector and the economic pressure to reduce
government staff numbers, which can give rise to stress, dissatisfaction, disillusionment or
resentment among workers, may make them vulnerable to corrupt approaches from members
of organised crime groups.
Many of the initiatives developed to minimise risks of corruption in the public sector gen-
erally can be applied to the specific risks of corruption initiated by, or involving, organised
crime groups. Generally, research has found that macro-level measures that seek to reduce

incentives and opportunities for corruption are most likely to be effective in reducing crim-
inality. Conventional anti-corruption approaches such as employee security vetting, staff
education and the implementation of codes of conduct are of limited benefit in addressing the
specific risks associated with organised crime group involvement in public-sector corruption.
Enhanced accountability, transparency and oversight, however, are likely to be beneficial.
Finally, the use of CVA may be effective in identifying risks of corruption before public works
programmes commence.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This chapter is based on research originally undertaken by the authors for the Australian
Institute of Criminology and is included in this volume with the permission of the Institute.
The findings have been revised and adapted for the present volume. The views expressed do
not necessarily reflect the policy position of the Australian government.
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8. Redefining sectors: a more focussed approach
to tackling corruption
Mark Pyman
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes a different approach to tackling corruption problems, grounded in

‘sectors’ rather than in public administration and national-level approaches. Reforms are more
likely to get traction when there is an identifiable community – like within a sector – who will
adapt generalised reforms to the particular circumstances of their profession and their sector.
A sector approach also enables anti-corruption efforts to be framed as one of the means to
achieving desired reforms within any given sector, rather than as a stand-alone ‘corruption
benefit’. The broader political and social environment will always be relevant, but by starting
with the sector as the prime element of context – in all its functional, cultural and political
detail – practitioners can thereby advance the depth of their analysis and plans. Showing that
reform is possible in one or two sectors also puts competitive pressure on the ministries that
don’t reform. This approach has the potential to open up a huge resource of sector-based com-
petence, shared knowledge and personal motivation.
Whilst making the case for sector approaches, this is not to say that the other approaches
are not needed. Civil service, judicial or fiduciary reforms may well be slower, messier and
less likely to succeed. But that can also mean that you need to have a two-handed strategy,
encouraging sectoral reformers to push ahead and be pioneers, while the others are not let
off the hook. For example, a health ministry reform will reach the boundary where general
administrative weaknesses, such as lack of budgetary transparency or civil service recruitment
constraints, limits their reform effort.
Each sector is defined broadly, both nationally and internationally. Nationally, it incorpo-
rates the relevant ministry, other related public agencies and entities, the local commercial
companies functioning in that sector, the sector professionals and their professional bodies,
sector regulators, sector oversight bodies and civil society organisations in the sector.
Internationally it comprises the global community of professionals in that sector, the interna-
tional companies operating in the sector and multilateral sector organisations (for example,
the World Health Organization (WHO) in the health sector). The international organisations,
both government and corporate, are considered as having a responsibility to contribute towards
curbing corruption in the sector.
Each application in a country uses a problem-driven approach, starting from a set of usual
sector-specific corruption issues, with extensive discussion to identify which of the problems
can realistically be tackled and to put forward options for reform strategies.
This approach is for professionals and citizens who want to solve their own problems:
doctors and patients that want to fix health corruption, engineers that want to fix construction
corruption, police and citizens who want to fix police-sector corruption. Yes, they need help
– hence the need for expertise and initiatives across the sector. Yes, it’s partial, because this
98
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Redefining sectors 99
approach does not promise to solve corruption either across the whole sector or across gov-
ernment, but that’s the nature of incremental change. It will also not work where there is zero
energy for reform. On the other hand, disaggregating and choosing the sector corruption issues
to tackle allows a measured approach to pick off problems as they can be feasibly tackled.
Sector strategies also have a place as the anchor of national anti-corruption strategies, as the
United Kingdom has done recently (HMG 2017).
Here’s a recent experience that is illustrative of a typical sector, health.
It is a summer’s day in 2018 and I am sitting opposite the minister for health in a mid-sized,
developed Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country.
Everyone in that room is familiar with the corruption in the country’s health system. We have
a good disaggregation of the corruption issues, an essential pre-condition for action (Heywood
2017). We have a thorough understanding of the all-important context: the daily experiences
of citizens, the political interests that impinge on health, the professional interests of doctors
and other trade bodies, the commercial interests of medical device manufacturers, the behav-
iour of regional authorities seeking preferential health facilities and the dynamics of politics at
the national level. In short, the analytical and contextual work has all been done. There is read-
iness and capability to take action and there is political will, with the minister really wanting
to improve the performance of the health sector and the prime minister strongly supportive.
On the minus side, much needed civil service reform is hopelessly stalled in Parliament,
the judicial system is constrained by a process that allows ten years of appeals and the major
stakeholder groups, notably the doctors, the medical device manufacturers and the regional
mayors, are politically more influential than the minister. Any single group of these could be
challenged, but the likelihood of success against them is low. Within the health system there
are multiple staff communities whose interests are not served by reform, even if only because
of the burden of additional work, and they are experienced in resisting reform.
After much discussion of the 30 or so health corruption issues, the most realistic strategy
seems to be a two-part one. First, to show the seriousness of intent by tackling two very public
corruption issues – patients who are waiting for an operation jump the queue by bribing the
surgeon, and doctors who claim to be available in the hospital but who are away at private
practice. Second, to tackle a narrow set of necessary structural improvements: simplified
management information, medicine stock management, introduction of clinical auditing and
stronger controls over outside health agencies.
This scenario has many positive aspects – the energy of the officials, the step-by-step
approach, the realism at what can/cannot be solved and the active involvement of the sector
regulators; certainly, more than situations where most of those in power are directly benefit-
ting from the corruption. The story nonetheless shows up three features often overlooked in
anti-corruption proposals: (1) those responsible have a very good understanding of the context,
they do not need any more analysis; (2) the discussion was fruitful largely because there was
a strong underlying structure (the typology of health corruption issues); and (3) getting to
a conclusion on the preferred strategy is a messy, detailed, political discussion of multiple
options and no easy preferences.
The story also reinforces a widely learnt lesson about bureaucracies: they are remarkably
hard to change. Evidence across many sectors and countries shows that 70 per cent of all
efforts to change organisations fail (e.g. Deloitte 2013).
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SECTORS: DEFINING THE FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURES OF

NATIONAL LIFE
Sectors are defined as the individual structures and functions through which national life
operates. Structures include the legislature, the judiciary and the civil service. Functions
include public functions, such as health, education, policing and public financial management;
economic functions, such as agriculture, telecommunications, mining, construction and ship-
ping; and the multiple public–private functions that span both public and private, such as sport,
infrastructure projects, tourism and land management (Heywood and Pyman 2018). A sector
comprises some or all of the following: one or more professions; a government ministry;
multiple government organisations and agencies; multiple commercial organisations and the
relevant industry associations; one or more multilateral organisations concerned with interna-
tional application; and a functional or market regulatory authority.
This is a deliberately broad definition, broader than the earlier proponents of sector-based
corruption reform (e.g. Spector 2005; Campos and Pradhan 2007) and broader than economist
definitions.
This type of broad sectoral approach is intended to be more detailed than national-level
approaches, yet broader than defining the sector as the relevant government ministry. It is
intended to respond to the sector focus proposed a decade ago by Mushtaq Khan:
‘For this reason, a study of interdependence should focus on specific sectoral questions because
interdependencies at a very broad level of aggregation often do not have clear policy responses. At
the highest level of aggregation (the developing country as a whole), there are so many interdependent
institutions and governance capabilities that are either weak or dysfunctional that policy effectiveness
would require too many difficult problems to be simultaneously fixed’ (Khan et al. 2010, p. 10).
Professions and Professional Associations
There is great functional complexity and correspondingly deep professional expertise in each
of the structures and functions of modern life. This is a core reason why one of the approaches
to reducing corruption needs to be at sector level. The technical issues and the incentive
structures in each sector are quite different, meaning that the safeguards and controls against
corruption are likely to be largely different between sectors.
Hidden therein is also a huge advantage to the sector approach: this approach allows a direct
appeal to the involvement of the particular professions involved in the sector – engineers,
doctors, nurses, judges, architects, and so forth – to help with fixing the problems, and to work
with their pride and professionalism. Such pride can be a major motivator of reform, however
corrupt the environment (Pyman 2017).
However, in other situations, the professions and their professional associations will be the
principal opponents of corruption reform; the doctors in the health ministry story discussed
above, for example. This does not invalidate the importance of working with the profes-
sions – large groups usually comprise groups with very different views – but it does serve as
a reminder of the necessity of a nuanced understanding of where the support is.
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Government Organisations, Commercial Organisations and the Relevant Industry

Associations
Today, almost every area of national life includes public elements, private elements and reg-
ulatory elements. For sure, some areas may be largely public (such as taxation and policing)
whilst others may be largely private (such as fisheries or tourism), but the co-mingling of
public and private is central to most areas of public policy today.
However, this binary division into private and public sectors has persisted. For example, the
formulation by Jeremy Pope (2000) of TI of the influential National Integrity System iden-
tified 11 pillars of integrity: legislature, executive, judiciary, auditor-general, ombudsman,
watchdog agencies, public service, media, civil society, private sector, international actors
(expanded to 13 pillars in 2012 with the inclusion of law enforcement agency and electoral
management body). This holistic concept of an integrity framework was advanced for its time
and is again a current concept today (OECD 2017). However, the pillars were unbalanced,
with a bias towards control/monitoring and away from effective functioning of mainstream
institutions. This bias perhaps reflects a particular perspective on corruption and business, in
which the dominant reform concept is that of controlling bad behaviour, rather than of improv-
ing the effectiveness of organisations: this perspective might have come from the influence
of lawyers, journalists and civil society in the initial development of the corruption narrative.
Multilateral Organisations and International Dimensions
Many sectors have international bodies that have expertise which is available for use by its
member states and to support them in their decision making: health has WHO and customs
has the World Customs Organization, for example. These multinational organisations have the
potential to play a major role in working internationally with governments and companies in
the sector to reduce corruption. Some are active in this role, others are not. Some have global
controlling authority over the sector, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,
whilst others are primarily representative, such as the International Maritime Organization in
shipping.
Besides working with these institutions, reform almost always has international dimensions.
There is a need to exchange knowledge about international companies in order to under-
stand their strengths and vulnerabilities. Proceeds of corruption are increasingly laundered
internationally.
Government Ministry and Regulatory Authority
Though it is not a formal part of the definition that a sector should have its own ministry and
minister, nor that it should have a regulatory authority, most sectors in a country are likely to
have both. The ministry, through the formal leadership of the minister, has major roles to play
in seeking to understand corruption risks and working to prevent and control corruption. The
regulatory authority has great scope to be active in controlling corruption, separate from any
anti-corruption agency.
Finally, the political environment and the nature of the polity is of course a major factor in
influencing corruption reform, but it does not define the sector. The fundamental Montesquieu
division of a modern state between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary may or may
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not be reflected in practice, but for the purpose of corruption reform we think of each of these
as just separate sectors with their own weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
A Working List of Sectors
Figure 8.1 lists a working list of 60 individual structures and functions through which national
life operates, relevant for corruption reform (CurbingCorruption 2019a). The list has been
grouped for ease of reference into a number of functional categories.
Clearly no list can be definitive, and the 60 listed in Figure 8.1 are above all a pragmatic
selection. In addition, three major activities – civil service, public procurement and local
government – do not fit neatly into the sector definition. For now, they are listed here as ‘hori-
zontal sectors’ because, though not naturally sectors, they form discrete activities and form the
traditional backbone of public administration.
Having clarified the sector, the next step is to provide much greater clarity and uniformity
on what are the ‘corruption issues’ in the sector.
Note: Each sector comprises some or all of the following: ministry, government organisations and agencies;
commercial organisations, relevant industry and professional associations; sector-related international and
multilateral organisations; functional or market regulatory authority; sector professions.
Figure 8.1 A working list of sectors
IDENTIFYING THE BASE SET OF SECTOR CORRUPTION ISSUES
People use a variety of terms for corruption problems, largely interchangeably. Common ones
are corruption issue, corruption problem, corruption type, corruption vulnerability, corruption
threat and corruption risk. In general, people use the variants containing ‘vulnerability’,
‘threat’ and ‘risk’ to point to possible manifestations as opposed to actual occurrence of cor-
ruption, or sometimes as more palatable synonyms. In this chapter we use the term ‘corruption
issue’, meaning a systemic, regulatory, institutional or other weakness that creates opportuni-
ties for corruption to occur, and regard all six terms as synonyms.
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Identifying and Codifying the Sector Corruption Issues
The core ‘content’ of the sector-specific approach lies in identifying the full range of corrup-
tion issues in that sector. That these are markedly different from one another is illustrated in
a nice analogy from Rothstein and Varraich (2017, p. 45): ‘Biologists classify hummingbirds,
hens, eagles and ostriches all as “birds” despite the fact that they are, to say the least, quite
different birds.’
For example, in the defence sector, Transparency International defines 29 distinct corrup-
tion issues (Pyman 2017). Through discussions with military officers, ministry staff, academ-
ics and civil society in multiple countries over several years, the list of issues had become
stable, even across very different national and political environments.
One way to make the first cut of the sector or sub-sector typology is to identify the likely
sector corruption issues within each of the basic sub-categories of policy, finance, human
resources, procurement and operations. The number of issues can at this point be as large
as it comes out to be. Then you can consider if some other set of system sub-categories for
that sector (like the ones from WHO, discussed above) might be more useful than the basic
sub-categories. Third, read the literature to see who else has outlined corruption issues for this
sector/sub-sector and merge them with your list; and, finally, bring the number of issues down
to between 20 and 50.
There could, of course, be an infinite number of corruption issues, disaggregated endlessly.
The author has found, however, that in practice having a list of issues that fits easily and
legibly on a single page is a powerful way to stimulate discussion and seems to cover most
of the scope for reform. This strikes a pragmatic balance between the desire for detail and
the practical problems of having too much choice. The founders of the ‘Balanced Scorecard’
made a similar point about pragmatism, which contributed to the rapid uptake of that concept
(Kaplan 2010).
The resulting listing of the corruption issues within any one sector is termed a ‘sector
typology’. The typology for the education sector as discussed here is shown in Figure 8.2
(CurbingCorruption 2019b).
Each issue in Figure 8.2 is expressed in an abbreviated way so that practitioners can see the
totality of the issues on a single page. Typologies for other sectors using this same codification
approach, and with more expansive explanations of each of the corruption issues, can be found
for defence, electricity and power, health, land and policing (CurbingCorruption 2019c). The
same approach can be applied to sub-sectors: within the health sector, for example, there have
been analyses of sub-sectors such as pharmaceuticals and maternal health.
The sub-headings as used in Figure 8.2 usually vary from sector to sector. In health, for
example, a good approach is to use the six major health systems building blocks as defined
by WHO (2007) and USAID (2017). These are: health system delivery, leadership and gov-
ernance, health workforce, medical products/vaccines and technologies, health financing and
health informatics. In another sector, a different set of categories will be appropriate (e.g. see
Masters (2015) and Graycar (2015) for an application to corruption reform in sport).
Context
Context is all-important. In this sector approach we deliberately separate that context into two
components: the context within that sector, and the broader context.
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Figure 8.2 Corruption typology: school education
In each sector the cultural, functional, economic and political contexts will be distinct.
For example, the culture that determines the nature of a favouritism issue in the education
ministry is likely to be different from the culture in the oil and gas ministry. Even where the
core process, like recruitment or procurement or policy making, is common across sectors, the
reform measures are likely to be different. This difference between sectors also likely relates
to ownership of the reforms. Reforms are more likely to get traction when there is an identi-
fiable community who will adapt generalised reforms to the particular circumstances of their
profession and their sector.
The second element of context, the broader political and social environment, will always be
relevant: reformers always need to be ‘thinking and working politically’ (Hudson et al. 2018).
But by starting with the sector as the prime element of context – in all its functional, cultural
and political detail – practitioners can thereby advance the depth of their analysis and plans.
These differences between sectors also provide some opportunity for clean working despite
a hostile broader political environment. For example, in mining, some of the better mining
companies are very corruption risk-averse and they take steps to ensure that their operations
are corruption-free, despite a broader political environment where corruption is the norm.
Out of this phase comes understanding of each of the corruption issues and what is involved
in tackling each one. But this is not yet close to representing a strategy. The most serious
corruption issues may be too hard or too infeasible to tackle; conversely, tackling the smallest
problems may have the most public impact, in giving people hope that at least some progress
may be possible. Hence, we come to the next two phases – making sense of the merits of
alternative priorities, and then thinking through alternative possible strategies.
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SENSE MAKING: USING A PROBLEM-DRIVEN APPROACH TO

PRIORITISING CORRUPTION ISSUES
Meaningful discussion of open system problems such as corruption issues is not easy to facil-
itate or to guide towards conclusion. The big purpose of the sector typology presented above
is that it is can function as a powerful tool for encouraging deep discussion of the nature of
each of the corruption issues in that sector/country/region. It is easily comprehensible – just
one page. It is quickly and easily modified if there are local corruption issues that need to be
more visible in the typology.
There is a straightforward sequence of questions that relate to the assembly of issues: Which
are the most common corruption issues? Which have the most impact on service delivery?
Which are the costliest? Which cause the most distress with citizens? Which issues can be
most easily fixed? Do some have common solutions?
The underlying analytical approach for this discussion is that of sense making, which
is the process by which people give meaning to their collective experiences. The concept
was introduced in the 1970s by Weick (2001), as part of a movement that shifted thinking
about organisations away from decision making and towards how people’s understanding
drives organisation behaviour. It has been particularly influential in providing insights
into how organisations take action in uncertain or ambiguous situations. More recently the
subject has come up in the corruption reform literature in the guise of complexity thinking
and problem-driven analysis (e.g. Bridges and Woolcock 2017, as applied to World Bank
anti-corruption experience in Malawi).
Another sense-making approach to corruption reform is used by Klitgaard (1988, 2019),
under the title of ‘convening’. In this recent work with the International Monetary Fund,
he gives the example of working through the corruption issues with the leadership of the
Philippines in 2010 (see also Sidel 2014).
These typology discussions are not simply an analytical exercise. On the contrary, they have
the power to build a deep shared understanding on the most pressing corruption issues in the
sector. You use this discussion to reach agreement on the relative magnitude of each issue,
their relative political priority and feasibility and which ones to leave until later. This is how
you build shared knowledge across your sector leadership and stakeholders of the issues and
the priorities.
The author has experience of using this approach in many countries using a facilitated, open
format as part of a day-long leadership event. Once the group has determined that it is polit-
ically safe to talk about this subject, they usually then do so with clarity and perceptiveness.
Here is an example from the defence sector in an African nation. The leadership group, some
30 generals and top Ministry of Defence officials, discuss the defence typology page – 29
defence corruption issues in all – to identify the issues that should be taken most seriously.
After discussion, the group participants ‘vote’ to show their top five priorities. In this case
they are illicit control of the intelligence services, favouritism in pay and promotion, improper
tendering of contracts, improper disposal of military assets and disregard of corruption in any
country to which they are deployed. A similar exercise in an Asian country, based on the delib-
erations of 100 senior colonels, was equally explicit on the scale of the issues and their relative
priority for reform. They too voted on the top corruption issues, which proved to be the illicit
use of secret budgets, awarding contracts without competition and favouritism in pay and
promotion (Pyman 2017). In these two country cases the leadership group felt secure enough
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to vote openly on the issues. In more sensitive environments the voting is done by writing the
issues on closed paper slips, which the facilitator then collates.
A quite different application can be seen in a major analysis of corruption vulnerability in
the education sector in Afghanistan (MEC 2017). The typology shown in Figure 8.2 was used
as the basis for the analysis, which consisted of 540 interviews in the ministry and in schools
across the country. The result was that one particular issue was by far the most serious – the
nepotistic appointment of teachers across the country – in priority to other corruption problems
such as corruption in school construction.
OBJECTIVES, REFORM EXAMPLES AND POSSIBLE STRATEGIES
Let us pick up again the example of the health minister from the introduction. The minister
wants to move from analysis to strategy: ‘Should we tackle the political issues first, or the
technical weaknesses, or the easiest problems?’ ‘Should we be aggressive about reform or low
profile, broad or targeted?’ But the starting point is a little earlier: What is the objective of this
reform?
The answer might be obvious for a small project, like eliminating the unofficial payments
to officials for services that should be free. But on any larger scale, the objective needs some
thought and is often not obvious. The key point is that reducing corruption is usually not the
main objective. Many would assume this to be the core objective of an anti-corruption strat-
egy. But reducing corruption is more usually a means towards more widely desired policy
objectives, such as improving service delivery for citizens, rather than the desired end result
in itself. This is true both for nations at peace and for nations in states of conflict.
A recent analysis of national-level anti-corruption strategies from 41 middle-income
countries reinforces this point, identifying a curious array of objectives stated in the various
country strategies. These included the following: to improve service delivery; to improve
national reputation; to improve the nation’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index; to
strengthen democracy/transparency/integrity; to improve economic prosperity; to improve
economic competitiveness; to strengthen national security; to be aligned with international
anti-corruption standards; and to gain accession to the European Union (Pyman et al. 2017,
2018).
Gaining Insight into Other Reforms
Practitioners want to see examples of reforms used elsewhere in their sector. Not so that they
can absorb ‘best practice’ – because circumstances and context are always different – but to
give them ideas on which they can brainstorm the development of their own solutions. It is
hard to overstate the importance of this.
Professionals in many sectors learn by studying how others in their profession have tackled
problems in the past. In the military, for example, officers learn by studying past campaigns,
all the way back to the Greeks and the other ancient empires. It is nonsensical to think of this as
‘best practice’! For professionals in most sectors, corruption is a poorly understood phenome-
non, one that they had no experience of working with during their professional education and
training: as a result, they do not have the mental models of what could be used or how. This
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is why sector examples from elsewhere are so important, much more so than just in generic
prescriptions of ‘transparency’ or any other reform approach.
If you have not already done this exercise yourself, there is an extraordinary paucity of
reform stories. We do not really know why this should be so. There are multiple reasons for
not writing up progress, not least that progress is always partial, political and fragile. Partial
success is a poor, easily criticised narrative and it is so much easier to comment on the failure
cases (Boamah and Pyman 2019; Boamah 2019). On the other hand, a good example inspires
many. The success that the container company Maersk had in stopping the multitude of ciga-
rette and whisky payments that had to be made to officials as their ships come into port is one
such example. They had a clever mix of negotiation training of the key authority figures (the
ships’ captains), strengthening onshore resolution capability in local offices and an IT system
to track the gifts being given out (see Pyman 2019).
It also helps reformers to simplify the types of reform. Here are the eight reform categories
used by CurbingCorruption (2019d):
1. Functional reforms: improving institutions, public financial management, systems and

controls.
2. People-centred approaches: working directly with affected communities; building net-
works and coalitions of supporters.
3. Monitoring approaches: strengthen oversight groups and their independence,
whistleblowing.
4. Justice and rule of law approaches: prosecuting, raising confidence, improving laws.
5. Transparency reforms: making visible what others wish to keep hidden.
6. Integrity reforms: motivating, instilling pride and commitment.
7. Civil society and media approaches: creating space for external voices.
8. Incentives, economic theory and nudge approaches: aligning stakeholders, economics,
small changes.
Possible Strategies
Similarly, a limited palette of categories can be set out as the starting point for choosing strat-
egy options. It is not helpful to tell the minister or the reform group that there are an infinite
number of possible strategies. Options include the following:
1. Incremental reform 1: Multilateral organisations usually advise that you should choose
incremental change (e.g. European Commission 2017, p. 211). The research from sense
making also directs us towards recasting large problems into smaller ones. Weick (2001,
p. 427).. The current international community working with Myanmar are following such
an example (Chung 2019).
2. Incremental reform 2: Start with small changes so as to build momentum and credibility,
moving on to larger change projects if the first smaller ones go well and/or if opportunities
emerge for a sudden larger change. Academic research has identified this approach as the
more common route to success: ‘change will occur gradually and punctuated equilibria
will be the rule’ (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston 2017, p. 76).
3. Radical reform 1: But there are also powerful arguments for the opposite approach. When
there is a political dimension to the corruption issues and a political opening happens, you
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may have that one chance to make a significant change. This is especially the case when
there are large changes such as an election, or the disgrace of a major political figure, or
a national disaster aggravated by corruption. Similarly, if the anti-corruption messages are
part of the reason for coming into power, there is a need to show rapid change before the
electorate becomes disappointed.
4. Radical reform 2: There are also arguments for large-scale change when there is no major
political angle. Staff in large organisations can become expert at subverting change ini-
tiatives, whether in a global commercial organisation or in an Afghan ministry. Making
a large, sudden step change can be a smart way to avoid such subversion. This could be
on a micro scale, such as secret planning to remove the chief corruption perpetrator inside
a directorate, or on a larger scale such as cutting off large pieces of an unreformable min-
istry so that each can be tackled as more manageable chunks. The successful national-level
corruption reforms in Georgia and Estonia were both through large-scale, rapid change
(and against the advice of international organisations).
5. One-signature-issue strategy: A health example might be to tackle the way that people can
bribe their way to the top of a surgery waiting list. Success would be seen as a big result,
even if all the other bigger and harder issues are left untackled.
6. Using the language of ‘integrity’ rather than corruption: The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization defence sector anti-corruption initiative, for example, was branded ‘Building
Integrity’ from its start in 2007, despite the scope covering a tradition scope of corruption
reform (NATO 2019).
7. Media-centred strategy: Ignoring the media can be a strong predictor of failure. Research
on 471 corruption reform projects in Eastern Europe showed that strategies which do not
integrally involve the media had little impact (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, pp. 172–4).
8. Sector-monitoring strategy: Rather than tackle the substance of the issues directly, an
alternative strategy is to set up dedicated monitoring of the corruption reform in the sector.
Possibly using sector-specific non-governmental organisations (NGOs) specifically estab-
lished for the purpose: see, for example, the quarterly monitoring teams established by
the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee in Afghanistan to monitor progress in health,
education and the attorney general’s operations (MEC 2019).
It goes without saying that the possible strategy options depend markedly on the strength of
political support that the senior reformers have. If the minister has the strong support of the
prime minister, then more can be achieved than if their support is lukewarm or non-existent.
The Health Ministry example is one example, as have been some of the Afghanistan sectoral
reforms under President Ghani (e.g. Pyman and Kaakar 2018). On the other hand, reform is
still possible without ‘to-cover’, though it has to take different forms. Some of the defence
reform examples showed this effect, such as in the Ukraine security service in 2011, where the
reformers were rather precisely aware of what they could hope to change and what they could
not in their environment of minimal top-level support (Pyman 2017).
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INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION
In the introduction we made the point that the international organisations in the sectors, both
government and corporate, are considered as having a responsibility to contribute towards
curbing corruption in the sector.
What might we most want from international cooperation in sector corruption reform?
A strong answer would be if there could be a set of regulations and operating guidance that
more or less eliminates corruption from the sector. It would probably act by specifying what
the equivalent sector organisations at national level would need to follow and to see this
applied rigorously in every country in the world.
One possible example could be in relation to the problem of falsified and sub-standard
medicines in the health sector, where transnational cooperation might take a very strict
approach. Perhaps the most extreme example, and therefore perhaps an outlier, is civilian
aviation operations. There are corruption concerns in the aviation sector as a whole – related to
buying, selling and financing commercial aircraft, and in relation to the many related support
services (Control Risks 2018) – but there are very few in the sub-sector of civilian aviation
operations, the control of planes flying round the world. This lack of corruption is due not to
anti-corruption efforts but to an intense focus on safety. Aviation has a strong international
body (International Civil Aviation Organization) which sets the standards for all the equivalent
national organisations in all the countries of the United Nations. This body has a sophisticated
and directive approach to analysing and eliminating threats and hazards of whatever kind
from aviation operations (Civil Aviation Authority 2013). This aviation operations example
represents one end of the spectrum, where there are strong global rules which dictate how the
sector operates and those rules are strictly obeyed.
Below this are global organisations but without any regulatory mandate and a mixed interest
in curbing corruption.
●● Sectors where there is a recognised global body for the sector, but it does not ‘regulate’
nations. As a generality, none of these bodies have a strong voice on controlling corrup-
tion, though they can mostly point to anti-corruption initiatives. Examples include the
World Customs Organization for customs (2019), International Maritime Organization for
shipping (2019) and IIEP at UNESCO for the education sector (IIEP at UNESCO 2019).
Mostly these are small, narrowly focussed initiatives. Promisingly, WHO (2018) has a new
networking initiative for anti-corruption for the health sector.
●● Sectors where the international bodies are representative rather than authoritative, and/
or represent only a certain part of the sector. They too usually do not have a strong
voice on controlling corruption. Examples include the Geneva-based Centre for Security
Sector Governance collating good practices in police corruption reform and integrity
strengthening.
●● Organisations for local government sector reform, such as the Open Government part-
nership’s ‘Local’ programme, the Council of Europe’s Centre of Expertise for Local
Government Reform and United Nations Habitat (2006).
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Next is where there is no relevant multilateral body, but there are one or more multistakeholder
initiatives:
●● Some seek to set standards in specific components of the sector. E.g. the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in the oil/gas and mining sector with 52 nations
as members, and the Infrastructure Transparency Initiative in the construction sector.
●● Some seek to share good practice sharing rather than setting standards. E.g. the OECD
Water Governance Initiative sharing good practices in the sector, a sector-specific NGO,
water regulators and water companies (OECD 2019).
●● Some are tightly focussed on corruption reform in the sector. Examples include
Transparency International’s Defence and Security programme in the defence sector
(Transparency International Defence 2011, 2015a, 2015b, 2018), its programme in the
health sector and the Fisheries Industries Transparency Initiative (2019) in the fisheries
sector (CurbingCorruption 2019e).
Next is where there are academics, working individually or in small groups, on corruption
reform in particular sectors. Examples include Professor Vian in health, Professors Kutnjak
Ivkovic, Newburn and Prenzler on policing.
Lastly, there are the sectors where there is currently little or no focus on tackling corrup-
tion in the sector. Examples include agriculture, culture heritage and tourism, electricity and
power, religious organisations and telecommunications.
Besides the sector-specific entities above, the bilateral and multilateral aid organisations are
also active, with their own sector teams. Several of them have been active funders of some of
the above initiatives. But they also have work to do to improve in this sector space: most of
them have separated anti-corruption efforts out to ‘governance’ and hence removed the topic
from the mainstream sector teams. As a result, their depth of knowledge and their options to
develop sector-specific responses are not being developed as they might.
Finally, the other tool in the international community is the use of indices to indicate com-
parative progress or decline. A major advantage of the sector approach is that it is possible to
construct indices of how thoroughly each country’s sector has set itself up against corruption.
This is not yet commonplace, but enough work has been done to know that the methodology
can be sound and the results useful in practice. The defence sector has the most data and
a robust methodology – detailed comparative data on 130 countries in the Government Defence
Index and 165 companies in the Companies Defence Index (Transparency International 2015a,
2015b). These date from 2012 and Transparency International is currently carrying out the
third iteration of the two indices. Indices for other sectors, notably health and education, were
developed some years ago by Global Integrity. In the defence sector, these indices have been
having a significant effect in driving change in both the countries and the companies (Pyman
2017). These metrics, though, really need to be owned by independent entities, preferably
NGOs, as established multilateral organisations will not be keen to criticise member states.
OPTIMISM BIAS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We have all learnt to be modest when it comes to our hopes in tackling corruption. As one
of today’s most renowned anti-corruption researchers puts it, we are in the domain of ‘great
expectations and humble results’ (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, p. 207). The approach put forward in
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this chapter will not, and is not intended to, replace other approaches, such as national-level or
governance-focussed approaches. This sector approach may yet prove to have disadvantages
that we cannot yet see.
Nonetheless, perhaps confirming the eternal optimism bias of the committed practitioner,
this author is hopeful that the anti-corruption community, globally and locally, is in the process
of moving into a new phase. One vision is that each sector will develop an ecosystem of
anti-corruption and integrity entities: a vibrant network of professionals in the sector anchored
by some neutral body (like OECD’s Water Governance network), a strong industry grouping
in the sector (like the Marine Anti-Corruption Network in the shipping sector), a strong NGO
with sector expertise (like Transparency International Defence), a multicountry sector initia-
tive among enthusiast countries (like EITI in the extractives sector), a robust index that com-
pares all the countries and companies in that sector (like the two Transparency International
defence indices) and a global regulator/coordinator/standard setter for anti-corruption in the
sector housed in an established multilateral sector entity (no candidates have emerged yet).
What is not in doubt, I believe, is that there is a huge resource of sector-based competence,
knowledge and personal professional motivation that has yet to be applied to anti-corruption.
As those in each sector, both public and private groups, take the responsibility for corruption
in their sector and fixing the problems, anti-corruption efforts have the potential to grow dra-
matically larger than we have seen to date.
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9. Corruption and administration in healthcare
Taryn Vian
INTRODUCTION
Corruption affects all countries and all parts of the health system. In 42 of 109 countries
surveyed by Transparency International, more than 50 percent of respondents stated that the
health sector was corrupt or very corrupt (Mackey, Vian, & Kohler, 2018). Fraud and abuse
account for 3–10 percent of Medicare expenditures in the United States (US), with billions
of dollars lost each year (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012). For example, in West Africa, the top
five frequently reported corrupt practices include absenteeism, diversion of patients to private
facilities, procurement corruption, informal payments, and theft of medicines (Onwujekwe
et al., 2019). Corruption in public administration may involve private firms as well. In 2014,
the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline was heavily fined because its sales agents had
engaged in bribery to influence doctors’ prescribing practices (Barboza, 2016; Sullivan, 2018).
Corruption affects national and local governments, development banks, aid agencies, and
religious organizations, all of which are active in the health sector. It impedes progress toward
universal health coverage, an important strategy to achieve the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goal 3, ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all. All countries
and all health institutions need to consider how they can combat corruption.
CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION
Corruption has a profound effect on the health and well-being of populations, and on the
development of nations. It undermines health by limiting access to health services and finan-
cial protection, and reducing the quality of services. Studies have linked corruption with pop-
ulation health outcomes including infant, child, and maternal mortality, cancer deaths, motor
vehicle crash deaths, earthquake-related fatalities, anxiety, poor general health, and antibiotic
resistance (Ambraseys & Bilham, 2011; Collignon, Athukorala, Senanayake, & Khan, 2015;
Gillanders, 2016; Radin, 2009; Teik Hua, Noland, & Evans, 2010). Other effects of corruption
include lower patient satisfaction with care and eroded trust in the healthcare system (Habibov,
2016; Radin, 2013). Corruption’s effect on health, and the diversion of public resources for
health, undermines economic and social development (World Bank, 1993). The purpose of
this chapter is to analyze corruption in the health sector against the six core building blocks
advanced by the World Health Organization (WHO).
PATTERNS OF ABUSE AND CORRUPTION
Patterns of abuse of power and corruption in health systems vary depending on how the sector
is organized and financed. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
115
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identifies five categories of important actors in health systems: payers (public and private
insurance programs); regulators (ministry of health, medicine regulatory authority); suppliers
(companies from whom the government buys medicines and equipment); providers (hospitals,
health centers, individual or group physician practices); and patients/taxpayers (Couffinhal &
Frankowski, 2017). Integrity violations, including corruption and fraud, happen in the interac-
tions among these different stakeholders (Figure 9.1).
Source: Couffinhal and Frankowski, 2017.
Figure 9.1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development model of

integrity violations in the health sector
Intentional waste and integrity violations fall into three main areas:
1. Violations involving service delivery, payment, and coverage (including undue denial of
coverage, informal payments, overbilling or underprovision of care, and embezzlement);
2. Violations involving procurement and distribution systems (for example, bid-rigging,
kickbacks, other forms of corruption in the procurement and delivery of medicines,
medical supplies, and devices or durable medical equipment); and
3. Inappropriate business practices to secure a more favorable market position.
This last category encompasses undue influence exercised on legislators or other health
officials by industry representatives (for example, the pharmaceutical, tobacco, and food and
beverage industries) to shape public policies to favor commercial interests. Strategies and
influences from manufacturers that are detrimental to health have been called “corporate”
or “commercial” determinants of health (Hessari, Rusking, McKee, & Stuckler, 2019).
Corporations may lobby politicians to drop or reduce regulations on industry, such as blocking
efforts to tax sugar-sweetened beverages or increase the legal drinking age. Some forms of
lobbying are legal and regulated, but abusive practices are also present. Public officials may
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Corruption and administration in healthcare 117
receive economic offers to join companies after leaving government, so called “revolving door
corruption”.
At the facility level, occupational fraud affects many health institutions. In one study of
4,111 hospital workers, 27 percent admitted to taking supplies, 8 percent said they had taken
medicines, and up to 6 percent admitted to engaging in other forms of deviance, such as fal-
sifying time sheets or expense reports, or stealing equipment, in the past year (Wells, 2011).
Undertaken in a US hospital, this study highlights that corruption is a “crime of opportunity”
(Klitgaard, 1988). Although corruption may involve elites entangled in political corruption, it
also involves people who are tempted by an opportunity – a system that has few controls, a lot
of power vested in a few people, and little accountability. Since it is a systems problem, it is
important to take a health systems approach to controlling corruption.
APPLYING A HEALTH SYSTEMS VIEW
Corruption can affect public administration especially in areas of service delivery, human
resources management, medicines, information systems, financing, and governance. The
WHO has advanced a strategy to integrate anti-corruption efforts into work to strengthen
health systems towards universal health coverage (WHO, 2019a). Figure 9.2 shows how the
WHO strategy for anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability encompasses the six core
“building blocks” of the health system mentioned above. The vulnerabilities to corruption in
each of these building blocks is discussed below.
Source: Adapted from WHO, 2007 by the author.
Figure 9.2 A health systems approach to fighting corruption
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DELIVERY OF SERVICES
Service delivery includes the provision of personal and non-personal health services, including
promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, population health measures, referral systems,
and community engagement. Corruption risks in service delivery overlap with those of other
building blocks, and include misappropriation of medicines, equipment or cash (Kohler, Chang
Pico, Vian, & Mackey, 2018), fraudulent billing (Peixoto, Rocha, Nishijima, & Postali, 2012),
ghost workers1 and unjustified absenteeism (Belita, Mbindyo, & English, 2013), conflicts of
interest affecting management decisions and prescribing (Nguyen et al., 2018), informal pay-
ments (Khodamoradi, Ghaffari, Daryabeygi-Khotbehsara, Sajadi, & Majdzadeh, 2018), and
risks associated with dual job holding, that is, the practice of allowing staff to legally maintain
a private practice in addition to their public-sector job (Abera, Alemayehu, & Herrin, 2017).
The appearance of corruption at service delivery points is in some sense not the primary
problem, but rather the result of upstream issues such as industry influence on service delivery
policies, inadequate payment of health workers, combined with low risk of detection of corrup-
tion, poor incentives, and lack of clear policies, procedures, and oversight for accountability.
HUMAN RESOURCES FOR HEALTH
Currently, 43.5 million health workers are employed in 165 United Nations Member States
(WHO, 2016). Yet, many countries have inadequate numbers of health workers to meet
population health goals, and workers are inadequately compensated and undermotivated.
These pressures create risk for corruption problems such as ghost workers, occupational
fraud, and nepotism and favoritism affecting recruitment, assignment, transfer, and promotion
(Bertone, Martins, Pereira, Martineau, & Alonso-Garbayo, 2018). In countries like India and
Azerbaijan, unofficial systems for the sale of jobs also are a problem (Davis, 2004). High rates
of unexcused absence (“stealing time”) have been documented in many countries (Figure 9.3).
Medical education systems may also be corrupt, with admission bribery or students being
asked to pay for grades and diplomas (Paredes-Solis et al., 2011).
Policies such as dual job holding have the potential to reduce absenteeism and incentivize
staff, but must be carefully designed and monitored to assure that staff do not inappropriately
refer patients to their private practice or shirk public-sector duties (Hipgrave & Hort, 2014).
Absenteeism can be monitored through biometric attendance systems, but the roots of unau-
thorized absenteeism must also be addressed (Mukasa et al., 2019). These include unreliable
transportation, lack of adequate resources to work, and inadequate supervision.
To reduce risks of corruption in human resources, countries should prioritize merit-based
and fair selection and promotion systems, and transparency in all processes. This is important
both for medical schools as well as government agencies and health facilities. A rigorous
system for licensing and credentialing decisions is critical, as unqualified individuals can gain
access to service delivery positions if these systems are compromised through bribery or con-
flicts of interest. Finally, it is important to assure that health workers receive adequate pay and
have access to the tools and supplies they need to do their jobs. Low pay can be a reason for
workers engaging in corruption, and lack of medicines may lead to health workers requesting
informal payments. One way to measure adequacy of pay is to analyze the relative pay rates
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Note: Indicator definition: number of health professionals that are not off duty who are absent from the facility on an
unannounced visit as a share of ten randomly sampled workers. Health professionals doing fieldwork were counted
as present.
Source: Service Delivery Indicator Survey, World Bank in partnership with the African Economic Research
Consortium and the African Development Bank, www.sdindicators.org (accessed August 18, 2019).
Figure 9.3 Absence from health facility in eight African countries
of public health sector workers compared to the private sector. Private-sector data may be
available through a country’s bureau of statistics or department of labor.
MEDICINES AND TECHNOLOGY
The pharmaceutical industry is worth more than $1 trillion worldwide. Lack of transparency
and weak regulatory systems’ enforcement create risks of undue influence, fraud and abuse in
clinical trials, medicine registration, selection, procurement, and service delivery. Institutional
corruption in government regulatory agencies and procurement offices can allow for conflicts
of interest and collusion during the tendering processes, resulting in higher prices paid and
lower access to medicines (Anti-Corruption Action Centre, 2013). The potential for finan-
cial gain is a factor in theft of medicines from public warehouses: one carton of third-line
anti-retroviral medicines might be worth more than the annual salary of the worker loading
the delivery truck.
Corruption can cost lives by allowing the infiltration of substandard and falsified SF
medical products on the market. Over 13.6 percent of essential medicines tested in low- and
middle-income countries failed quality analysis overall, with regional prevalence of 18.7
percent in Africa and 13.7 percent in Asia (Ozawa et al., 2018). SF cause unnecessary mor-
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bidity and mortality, and can lead to anti-microbial resistance. In one study of 39 African
countries, 122,350 malaria deaths in children under five were associated with poor-quality
anti-malarial medicines, about 3.75 percent of all child deaths (Renschler, Walters, Newton,
& Laxminarayan, 2015).
Interventions in this building block include greater transparency and accountability, using
tools piloted through two WHO initiatives: the Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA)
and the Good Governance for Medicines (GGM) program. MeTA operated in seven countries
from 2008 to 2015. Countries applied a multistakeholder approach involving government,
private for-profit, and community-based stakeholders. MeTA found that regular policy
dialogue, coupled with capacity building for civil society organizations, helped to reinforce
government accountability, furthering access to medicine goals and reducing opportunities
for corruption (Paschke, Dimancesco, Vian, Kohler, & Forte, 2018). The GGM program
developed a transparency tool to assess public pharmaceutical systems (Baghdadi-Sabeti,
Cohen-Kohler, & Wondemagegnehu, 2009). This tool has been used in 32 countries to identify
gaps in transparency and target improvement efforts. To combat SF medicines, a multifaceted
strategy is needed including better data collection, cost-effective testing technologies, and
full implementation of the WHO “prevent, detect, and respond” regulatory framework for SF
medicines (Nayyar et al., 2019).
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Health information systems are critical to policy making and evidence-based treatment deci-
sions. Corruption can compromise the validity and confidentiality of data used to develop
health policies and clinical care guidelines, process claims, and grant access to health benefits.
Health insurance systems are susceptible to corruption in the form of false claims for reim-
bursement, kickbacks, and self-referrals (Rashidian, Joudaki, & Vian, 2012). Gee and Button
(2015) estimate the global average loss rate from healthcare fraud and abuse to be 6.19 percent
of total health expenditure, or $455 billion, per year. The recipient of care is usually not aware
of how much the insurance company is paying providers and so cannot provide a check on
improper expenditures.
Investing in data analytics, data mining (Joudaki et al., 2014), real-time audits, digital reg-
istration of patients, shared healthcare datasets, and information communication technology
are important steps in combating healthcare fraud. Transitioning to electronic government
(e-government) also has the potential to enhance government capacity, improve transparency,
and transform the relationship between government officials, citizens, and businesses. In
Bangladesh, the development of web-based tools and electronic information systems served
as an entry point for strengthening governance in Bangladesh’s procurement systems for
family-planning commodities and essential medicines, resulting in a 33–58 percent drop in
time to procure medicines, and savings of $6.4 million (Walkowiak, Hafner, & Putter, 2018).
Accurate and accessible information is essential for oversight and an important mechanism for
improving efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the procurement and distribution of
medicines.
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HEALTH FINANCING
Corruption risks in the budget process include misallocation of funds based on political pref-
erences, embezzlement, physician–pharma interactions influencing equipment purchases and
prescribing of medicines, and informal payments.
Misallocation of Funds/Embezzlement
Uncertainty and asymmetry of information in the health system make it difficult to determine
the “right” allocation of resources. People don’t know when they will get sick and may face
barriers in seeking care, making it difficult to predict demand and to detect if spending has
been influenced by corrupt transactions. In addition, health facilities may have categories of
expenditure that do not fit into existing public accounting codes. For example, coding knee
implant devices as “supplies” makes it difficult to monitor and/or detect diversion of this
expensive cost item.
Weak accounting systems create risk for embezzlement. The auditor general of Zambia
uncovered embezzlement of $1.7 million in the Ministry of Health in 2009 – eventually they
would document $5.7 million in lost funds, including $3 million of donor funding (Savedoff,
Glassman, & Madan, 2016; Usher, 2010). The corruption was complex and coordinated: 32
government officials were eventually suspended from their jobs, and investigators believe that
the corrupt scheme involved a high level of collusion: some of the faked documents had been
signed by ten different officials.
Budget transparency, stronger public financial management systems, and audit are strategies
to help prevent misallocation of funds and detect embezzlement. Budget transparency may
allow civil society organizations to apply data analytics to budget proposals and actual spend-
ing data, while public expenditure reforms can increase timely production of easy-to-read
budget reports. In addition, people should be aware of their entitlements and obligations under
the government healthcare system. They should know what services they are entitled to access
free of charge. Finally, government financial audit reports can help identify problem areas and
system weaknesses that need strengthening. Uptake of the recommendations in these reports
should be monitored by civil society. Advocacy may be needed to generate funding to support
capacity building in the area of financial management oversight.
Conflicts of Interest
Doctors are highly trained professionals with greater knowledge compared to patients: this
makes it hard for patients to evaluate the treatment choices made by doctors. Yet, many doctors
have conflicts of interest. In 2015, 48 percent of all physicians in the US received payments
from industry, totally $2.4 billion (Tringale et al., 2017). In addition, industry representatives
often have technical expertise that may exceed that of procurement or regulatory staff. These
staff may rely on industry representatives to help set specifications for the purchase of large
equipment items, and doctors may be reliant on pharmaceutical sales representatives for drug
information and continuing medical education. Such factors allow biased medical decision
making to continue.
Interventions to combat these problems include restrictions on conflicts of interest, reforms
to financing of continuing medical education, drug information centers and academic detail-
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ing, and open databases on industry payments. One study shows that policies limiting industry
gifts to physicians and regulating drug representatives’ access at 19 academic medical centers
resulted in an 8.7 percent decrease in relative market share for the promoted drugs (Larkin et
al., 2017). Governments should establish policies and guidelines limiting conflicts of interest
that can result in biased clinical decision making, including restricting physician financial
interest in ancillary services such as laboratories and pharmacies. Industry-sponsored continu-
ing medical education should be banned, or companies should be limited to contributing to an
unrestricted pool of funding for educational programs. Independent drug information centers
and academic detailing (an intervention involving a personal visit by a trained specialist to
health professionals to provide unbiased, evidence-based information on drug therapy) also
have been shown to counter problems of bias due to industry promotion (Wisniewski, Robert,
& Ball, 2014).
Informal Payments
An informal payment in healthcare services is defined as “a direct contribution, which is made

in addition to any contribution determined by the terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by
patients or others acting on their behalf, to healthcare providers for services that the patients
are entitled to” (Gaal, Belli, McKee, & Szocska, 2006). Rates of informal payments in the
health sector vary widely among countries: one review found rates from 3 to 80 percent, with
notably higher rates in Central Asia and Eastern Europe (Khodamoradi et al., 2018). Informal
payments have many causes, including ingrained cultural values of gift giving (see Box 9.1)
and coping mechanisms adopted by health workers in underfinanced systems (Horodnic,
Mazilu, & Oprea, 2018). Yet, payments also are sometimes extorted from patients and because
of their informal, unregulated nature can result in health inequities, catastrophic out-of-pocket
expenditures, and eroded trust and satisfaction with the healthcare system (Schaaf & Topp,
2019).
BOX 9.1 HEALTH-SECTOR CORRUPTION IN CHINA

Health-sector corruption in China includes bribery in procurement of medicines and med-
ical devices, illegal promotional activities influencing prescribing, and informal payments
(“red envelopes”) between patients and medical providers. One article reported that 1,088
doctors and 133 administrators from 73 hospitals in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province accepted
$3.34 million in bribes from pharmaceutical companies in 2013. GlaxoSmithKline paid
a $489 million fine for illegal promotional activities such as bribes for prescribing and
all-expense paid trips for medical professionals. While the majority of surveyed Chinese
patients consider “red envelope” payments as gifts to express gratitude or honor their care
giver, 25 percent said they made payments in response to hints from the provider, or be-
cause they feared they might otherwise get poor care. Corruption harms patients by increas-
ing financial barriers to access, promoting irrational use of medicines, and reducing quality
of care. Solutions attempted in China include the following:
• Regulating against the practice of “red envelopes”.

• Establishing Patient Complaint Centers at top-level hospitals.
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• Increasing fines and criminal penalties for health procurement corruption.

• Implementing a National Reimbursement Drug List and Essential Drug List, and cen-
tralizing purchases of pharmaceuticals at the provincial level (rather than individual
hospitals).
• Required reporting and blacklisting of manufacturers or distributors involved in bribery.
These solutions have had mixed effects for several reasons. Taking a traditional, law en-
forcement approach to controlling informal payments ignores how the practice is rooted
in cultural traditions and affected by economic factors such as income of providers. Fines
imposed on firms engaged in bribery were too low to restrain bribery, and sometimes un-
fairly applied. Allowing individual provinces to update the Essential Drug List meant that
pharmaceutical firms had more opportunity to influence selection, and may have been in-
fluenced by bribes. Procuring medicines at the provincial level saved 30–46 percent, yet
corruption risks remain. Blacklisting requirements were poorly executed, and late data were
less useful.
These experiences with corruption reform show the need for more strategic and targeted
efforts to address upstream causes of corruption, including reducing pressure in the work-
place, increasing provider incomes, reforming hospital funding, and educating clinical staff
in professional ethics. In addition, the government must invest resources to fully implement
policies and address unintended effects.
Source: Sullivan, 2018; Barboza, 2016; Zhu, Wang, & Yang, 2018; Jianwei Shi et al., 2018.
Addressing informal payments requires systems-level reform to health-financing mechanisms

(e.g. increasing worker pay and/or pay-for-performance systems, allowing dual job holding
in the private sector, instituting formal fees), plus transparency in benefit entitlement. In
Armenia, the government was able to control informal payments in maternity care by intro-
ducing a voucher system. The voucher detailed the entitlement to services, and women were
allowed to seek care at any facility. The facility was then reimbursed by the government at
a set fee for the care. An evaluation showed that the reform reduced informal payments in rural
areas; however, in the capital city of Yerevan, informal payments continued, possibly because
the voucher reimbursement amount was not adjusted for the higher cost of care (Miller &
Vian, 2010). Krygyzstan and certain hospitals in Cambodia also were able to reduce informal
payments through systematic reforms addressing payment of workers, accountability, and
transparency. Building relationships between providers and community members based on
shared priorities, such as addressing lack of medicines, may shift power in ways that increase
trust and reduce extorted payments.
GOVERNANCE
Health governance ensures strategic policy frameworks that are supported by effective over-
sight, coalition building, regulation, system design, and accountability. Important governance
activities include developing and implementing health policies and facilitating productive
interactions among citizens, private organizations, and public officials. The health sector is
complicated, and corrupt actors take advantage of this complexity to hide their malfeasance.
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Increasing citizens’ understanding about how the sector is organized and financed can help
civil society to call attention to corruption risks.
Transparency is an important lever to control corruption in governance. Three pathways by
which transparency can be leveraged in the health sector include proactive dissemination of
information, requester model, and complaint mechanisms or whistleblowing.
Proactive dissemination of information refers to a government program to make information
available without anyone having to request it. A good example in the health sector is the US
Physician Payments Sunshine Act or the French Sunshine Act. These are public databases
maintained by government where pharmaceutical and device companies are required to dis-
close gifts or benefits given to providers. Using data from the first full year, US researchers
determined that manufacturers paid $1.9 million in 6,948 direct payments to gynecologic
oncologists in 2014, mostly related to educational events and consulting fees (Shalowitz,
Spillman, & Morgan, 2016). Open databases have the potential to deter physician–pharma
interactions, and can be used by institutions to monitor clinicians’ adherence to policies meant
to control conflicts of interest.
A second pathway to transparency is the requester model where government responds
to citizen requests for information through a Freedom of Information Act request or other
such mechanism. For example, reporters or a non-governmental organization could request
data on an official’s conflict-of-interest declarations, and records for how the official voted
on an expert committee to set treatment guidelines, then analyze possible correlations. The
requester model in Ukraine helped non-governmental organizations uncover procurement
corruption and launch investigations that resulted in the disqualification of corrupt bidders
(Anti-Corruption Action Centre, 2013). Subsequent reforms of the device procurement system
in Ukraine resulted in much greater supply of stents, which according to some reports may
have reduced cardiac deaths by 20 percent in affected regions (Bullough, 2018).
Finally, complaint mechanisms and whistleblowing facilitate transparency by calling atten-
tion to negligence and abuse that threaten the public interest. According to the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners, hotlines are one of the most effective measures for fraud control,
reducing losses by 50 percent or more (Tunley, Button, Shepherd, & Blackbourn, 2018). Yet,
at the same time, the website Curbing Corruption observes that whistleblowing mechanisms
may exist on paper only with inadequate whistleblower protections. The challenge is to make
them effective within the country context (CurbingCorruption, 2019).
CONCLUSION
We can fight corruption through specific detection strategies such as tracing embezzlement
or identifying ghost workers, or through broader prevention strategies like increasing trans-
parency and accountability, which may help limit discretion of officials and have a deterrent
effect.
With support from the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the
WHO is advancing work on strengthening anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability
in health systems in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria. One of their first efforts has been to enhance the
focus on anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability in assessment frameworks used in
health systems and universal health coverage work (WHO, 2019a). Their report, now available
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online, presents ways to measure risks of corruption using a health systems lens. The WHO
also sponsored a special issue of the journal Global Health Action (2020, Vol. 13, Supp. 1)
with academic and practitioner articles on corruption in the health sector, and has created
a Global Network on Anti-Corruption, Transparency, and Accountability in Health Systems
(WHO, 2019b).
Corruption is a problem of corrupt institutions, not only corrupt individuals. We need to
build capacity to analyze risks of corruption to set priorities. It is important to adapt interven-
tions such as complaint mechanisms or fraud control programs to the specific country context.
The goal should be to help everyone to recognize corruption as a barrier undermining the
social determinants of health, and preventing us from achieving the goal of universal health
coverage. To paraphrase Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, we need to control
corruption so that people have the freedom to live the kind of lives they want to live (Sen,
1999).
NOTE
1. A ghost worker appears on an employer’s payroll but does not actually work for the organization.
Someone creates the ghost worker’s record in the payroll system, and then intercepts and cashes the
paychecks intended for this (non-existent) person.
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utilizing situational crime prevention techniques and theory to enhance organizational resilience.
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a compendium of country case studies. Arlington, VA: Management Sciences for Health.
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Taryn Vian - 9781789900910

10. Corruption in the education sector
Stephen P. Heyneman
BACKGROUND
Corruption in the education sector differs from corruption in health care, police, courts, indus-
try, banking and agriculture in two respects. For the most part, the education sector involves
children and young adults. When for private gain, children and young adults bypass the rules
and official norms, the experience has ramifications for them as adults and for the wider
community to which they belong. Second, educational institutions are consciously constructed
as places where the official norms are supposed to apply. The official norms in education,
as in health (do no harm), are universal. They include fairness to all, entrance to elite forms
of training on the basis of achievement, and adherence to good behavior in classrooms,
cafeterias, playgrounds, hallways, toilets, in transportation to and from home and on school
outings (Heyneman, 2000). Schools are designed to be a microcosm of the good society. While
banking and agriculture have norms and expectations, in the education sector these norms and
expectations are key to the educational architecture. Hence, the implications of the education
sector’s corruption can be more serious.
The definition of education corruption derives from the more general set of corruption
issues. Like other areas, it includes the abuse of authority for material gain (Anechiarico
and Jacobs, 1996; Kalnins, 2001; Frimpong and Jacques, 1999). But because education is an
important public good, its professional standards include more than just material goods; hence
the definition of education corruption also includes the abuse of authority for professional
prestige as well as material gain.
WHY IS EDUCATION CORRUPTION IMPORTANT?
Since the time of Plato, it has generally been understood that a key ingredient in the making of
a nation/state is how it chooses its technical, commercial and political leaders. In general it is
agreed that no modern nation can be legitimate if leaders are selected on the basis of ascriptive
characteristics, the characteristics with which they are born – race, gender, social status. On the
other hand it is usual for families to try to protect and otherwise advantage their own children
and relatives. Every parent wishes success for his own child; every group wishes to see success
of children from their particular group. This is normal.
Schooling provides the mechanism through which these opposing influences can be
managed fairly. It is the common instrument employed by nations to ‘refresh’ their leadership.
Economists have tried to estimate the sacrifice to economic growth if there is substantial bias
in the selection of its leaders (Klitgaard, 1986). Some suggest that developing countries could
improve their gross domestic product/capita by 5 percent if they were to base the selection of
leaders upon merit as opposed to gender or social status (Piñera and Selowsky, 1981). By some
estimates, choosing leaders on the basis of merit would benefit developing countries three
129
Stephen P. Heyneman - 9781789900910
times more than would reducing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) trade restrictions on imports (Kirmani et al. 1984).
Success in schooling is one of the few background characteristics seen as necessary for
modern leadership. Although it is possible for leaders to emerge through experience, privi-
lege or good fortune, nevertheless, getting ahead in schooling is itself commonly treated as
essential.
But what if schooling itself is not fair? What if the public comes to believe that the provision
of schooling favors one social group? What if the public does not trust the judgment of teachers
on student performance? What would happen if the process of schooling had been corrupted?
The fact is that, in a democracy, the public takes a very active interest in the fairness of its
education system (Heyneman, 2010a; 2011; 2013). If the public does not trust the education
system to be fair, more than economic growth may be sacrificed. It might be said that current
leaders, whether in commerce, science or politics, had acquired their positions through priv-
ilege rather than achievement (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996; Frimpong and Jacques, 1999).
If the school system cannot be trusted, it may detract from a nation’s sense of social cohesion,
a principal ingredient of sustainable societies (Heyneman, 2000).
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN EDUCATION SYSTEM FREE OF

CORRUPTION
Free of corruption, a school system is characterized by an equality of educational opportunity,

fairness in the distribution of curricula (such as access to preparation for tertiary education)
and materials, fairness and transparency in the criteria for tertiary education selection, fairness
in the accreditation in which institutions are given license to operate, balance and generosity
in the treatment of less powerful citizens and geographical neighbors, maintenance of pro-
fessional conduct by those who administer educational institutions and who teach in them,
whether public or private.
Some elements of education corruption are identical to the corruption found in other sectors.
Procurement may be decided on the basis of secret bribes paid to administrators, similar to
construction projects in highways, ports, industry or hospitals. Taxation on property or income
may be changed because of private arrangements with public officials parallel to what may
occur in the commercial sector.1 Salaries may be paid to non-existent employees, with man-
agers pocketing the checks (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Hubbard, 2008), similar to what
may occur in other sectors such as the military where salary recurrent expenditures are a major
budget item. Public-sector budget allocations may be distorted by favoring sectors which
offer more opportunity for bribes and kickbacks. This advantages sectors heavy on capital
infrastructure (Jajkowiez and Drobiszova, 2015; Mauro, 1998; Delavallade, 2006). Permission
to operate may be granted to universities on the basis of secret payments to accreditation
authorities just as licensing may be granted to commercial enterprises on the basis of secret
payments to public officials (Heyneman, 2010a; 2011; 2013). In these instances, education
sector corruption is not significantly different from corruption in other sectors. Hence its gov-
erning authority are courts of law and normal legal structures.
But a large part of education sector corruption is particular to the sector and is not gov-
erned by legislation and courts. These elements concern the corruption of professional ethics
(Braxton and Bayer, 1999, p. 137) and may include: accepting of material gifts in exchange

Corruption in the education sector 131
for positive grades, assessments or selection to specialized programs, assigning grades on the
basis of a student’s race, social class or other ascriptive characteristics, insisting on a student’s
adopting of an instructor’s values or philosophy,2 disclosing student confidential information,
sexually or otherwise exploiting, harassing or discriminating against particular students,3
adopting text or other educational materials on the basis of bribes from manufacturers, forcing
students to purchase materials copyrighted by the instructor4 and utilizing school property for
personal profit.5
Definitions of faculty misconduct may differ from one country to another. In some it is
common for teachers to accept payment for allowing students to proceed to the next grade. This
is particularly common in Latin America (Heyneman, 2004). In some countries it is common
for teachers to offer after-school tutoring for a price, and to suggest that students might fail
if they do not pay for after-school tutoring (Dawson, 2009). In some countries, faculty may
operate a ‘private’ school in after-school hours, hence using public property for private gain.
In some instances, a school administrator or university rector may rent school property, or use
it for manufacturing or agriculture commerce and not report the income (Heyneman, 2000).
Where misconduct constitutes a criminal offence it can be judged through the criminal
court system. But professional misconduct must be judged by the profession itself, as in law
or medicine. A teacher bias against a certain category of student, payments for a grade and
plagiarism in research publications are examples where adjudication has to be done through
strong professional boards with the authority to fine and dismiss. In essence, the range of cor-
ruption in the education sector is quite diverse. It may be helpful for us to concentrate on one
specific aspect: the act of a higher education student bribing a department head for admission
to a program or a teacher to obtain a specific grade.
BRIBERY: ONE ASPECT OF EDUCATION CORRUPTION
In one way or another education-sector corruption is universal, but some forms are common
in some parts of the world and unknown in others (Heyneman, 2010a; 2014b). Though gate
keepers to scarce goods may generate the temptation to use the allocation function for private
gain, education bribery is common in the former Soviet Union, South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa, but not in OECD countries (Transparency International, 2005; 2013; Heyneman,
2004). For example, in a survey of university students, 76 percent in Moldova said they would
cheat on an examination if they would not get caught, and 80 percent in Bulgaria admitted that
they would not feel bad if they cheated. Thirty-six percent of the university students surveyed
in Serbia believed that faculty would change a grade for a price and 45 percent believed that
students could pay to gain admission to their university. Sixty-four percent of the surveyed
students at the National State University in Kyrgyzstan thought that their university was ‘brib-
able’. When displayed by subject of study, the fields with the highest probability of accepting
bribes were in law, economics and management (Heyneman, 2007a).
Education Bribery and General Corruption in the Public Sector
It is suggested that bribery thrives where salaries are inadequate (Chene, 2009; New Republic,
2015; de Graaf, 2007; Gov.UK, 2015). And to be sure, the association between low salaries
and bribery is reasonable to assume. But although low salaries may increase the pressure

on individuals to bypass professional standards, it does not negate the need for professional
standards. It is also the case that bribery is higher in those fields in which salaries are higher
to begin with (Heyneman, 2004; Heyneman et al., 2008) and where labor market prospects for
graduates are higher (Teixeira and Roacha, 2006; Hrabak et al., 2004; Kerkvliet, 1994; Nowell
and Laufer, 1997).
It is also suggested that bribery thrives where professional institutions and sanctions are
weak, where regulations are not transparent and where there is a culture of permission (Heath
et al., 2016). In countries where these elements accurately describe the public sector generally,
corruption in the education sector follows (Patico, 2002; Transparency International, 2013).
When a great effort was made in Georgia to root out corruption in the police, investments were
made in new police stations made of glass walls. This was to illustrate that the public was
welcome to see what was going on inside. Simultaneously, an effort was made to shift univer-
sity admission mechanisms away from face-to-face oral exams to a standardized examination
with practice questions widely distributed in rural areas. Results were parallel: the public
began to perceive the police differently and children of the poor and from rural areas began to
enter universities in large numbers (Heyneman, 2009).
How Are Education Bribes Paid? What Actually Happens?
Professors may let students know the ‘price’ for a particular grade and prices for entry to
particular graduate programs are circulated anonymously, occasionally on social media.
Payments can be made by leaving cash-filled envelopes on faculty desks; the admission’s
office may have a particular person with the informal assignment of collecting envelopes.
Librarians collect bribes to keep required readings available for students who pass envelopes
to them. Student housing is allocated by departments and because many universities are situ-
ated in high-priced cities having access to student housing is a tradable commodity. Although
courses may be completed, signatures are required for the granting of course credits and for
degrees. Signatures are withheld until an envelope appears (Heyneman, 2004).
In 2006 support was received to privately interview faculty members in Kazakhstan,
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Among the questions asked concerned whether they had participated
in an act of bribery and, if so, how did it make them feel? Although some were clearly nervous
about the question, only three (out of 111) respondents refused to allow a tape recording of
their answers.
One senior professor at Tbilisi State University in Georgia laid out what he considered the
recent history of bribery at his university:
Admissions were a way to make money, huge money. But once inside the university, corruption
depended upon the department. It was worse in law and business and economics. No one in his right
mind would study math or physics if he is corrupt. If you go into math or physics there is no work, no
jobs, so we get only highly motivated students. (Heyneman, 2007b, p. 313)6
One professor from East Kazakhstan University recalled his experience:
When I was a student I did not know what corruption was. But then I got to Almaty [the capital] and
I found out. When I wrote my thesis I faced many difficulties. It took me seven years to defend my
thesis. I had to go back again and again and again to get the signature of the committee chair. I did
not pay but I know that it would have been expedited if I had paid a bribe. (Heyneman, 2007b, p. 313)

The worst occasions of ‘moral terrorism’ occur when a faculty colleague or senior adminis-
trators request that a grade is changed for a particular student. From Tbilisi State University,
for instance, one faculty member related the following: ‘The worst are my colleagues who
put pressure on me… and the worst are colleagues who were our former teachers… even the
dean puts pressure… It makes me feel pretty bad… the most corrupt are the most influential.
It is very difficult’ (Heyneman, 2007b, p. 313). And an example from a young female faculty
member at East Kazakhstan State:
Once the dean called me about a grade for a daughter of the vice rector. The vice rector had been
removed from his position and was in the hospital. The dean said that the vice rector had already
suffered and let’s not make him suffer any more, so give his daughter a good grade. After I gave her
a good grade, I suffered.
Many faculty members described participating in an act of bribery as making them ‘feel ter-
rible’. Several ended up in tears and the interview had to be postponed. One woman said that
bribery made her ‘feel violated’. But then others had rationalizations. One faculty member said
that when she changed a grade she knew ‘someone had benefited’. ‘I did something good for
someone else even though I suffered.’ Another said:
For a while I had a firm position about changing grades. But I was making a lot of enemies. Now I try
to meet the requests half way. I still make the student study, but I will give him a good grade. I will
give a student an easy assignment to complete and then give him/her a good grade. I get phone calls
and direct requests. On the inside I know I am not doing the right thing. (Heyneman, 2007b, p. 314)
Reforms such as standardized examinations have helped to reduce the level of corruption in
admissions. One faculty member at Tbilisi State said that: ‘Because of standardized exams…
many things have changed. Students from rural areas and poor homes are more numerous.
When bribery was necessary to enter the university, these students had no chance to enter.’
The problem is not that bribery can be overcome with new innovations, but that it can
re-emerge once techniques to bypass new safeguards are found. One pointed out that: ‘After
two years, each college student takes an internal exam designed by the ministry of education.
For the first several years it operated fairly. But now it too has become corrupted. Cell phones
and cheat sheets are allowed into the test for a price’ (Heyneman, 2007b, p. 314).
Adverse Effects of Higher Education Bribery
That education corruption has adverse consequences has never been in doubt but some
have pointed out that not all consequences are adverse. Sociologists have noted that cultural
and traditional customs such as honoring one’s teacher with a gift of appreciation may be
misinterpreted (Patico, 2002). These have had to be redefined so that a line can be drawn
between what constitutes corruption and what constitutes normal social behavior (Heyneman,
2010b). Others have suggested that payments to teachers and health workers may help them
advance in social status (Morris and Polese, 2016). Some have argued that corruption can be
efficiency-improving in those instances where prices (tuition, fees or wages) are distorted by
regulation or lags in application, though this point of view has been challenged when consum-
ers have to reapply continuously for permits and licenses (Ahlin and Bose, 2007). Efficiency
goals fail if a university acquires a reputation for having faculty or administrators who accept

bribes for entry, grades or graduation. The power of a university with this reputation will suffer
from labor market challenges. This is particularly the case with private enterprises which draw
on international labor markets. Some too have argued that the perception of corruption is not
the same as actual corruption and that the differences may be significant (Charron, 2016).
In doing research on higher education corruption in Central Asia we were able to estimate
the effect on private and social economic returns to education investment.7 If students purchase
grades they have less incentive to learn the material. Advancement is less associated with
knowledge and the acquisition of skill than wealth and the ability to pay for ‘achievement’.
The private and social returns to education are degraded. The signaling function of a degree
is also reduced. Completion of education cannot be closely linked to the ability of a student
if entry into programs and high grades are for sale. The employer does not know whether the
student completed the program and did well because h/she was a high-ability, low-cost student
or because h/she acquired grades illegally or unfairly. Even if an individual student is free of
corruption but has attended an institution with corruption reduced, the value of the degree is
reduced. An employer with a choice of candidates reduces the risk of hiring an unproductive
employee by avoiding graduates of corrupt institutions and programs and only hiring students
from institutions or departments with a reputation for honesty. For this employer to hire
a student from a corrupt program, the student would have to accept a significantly lower salary
and prove his/her economic value to the employer through on-the-job experience over time.
Corruption at the undergraduate level affects the probability that a student may obtain
a graduate degree. Graduate programs, particularly in universities situated in OECD countries,
discount applicants from institutions in which corruption is perceived as common. Applicants
from corrupt programs are less likely to be selected because grades and test scores do not
represent their ability to do graduate work.
Corruption adversely affects the relative ability of higher education to keep people out of
poverty over their working lifetime. This effect is evident in all regions but is most pronounced
in the Europe and Central Asia region. Corruption in higher education changes the ability of
education to maintain employment and increase income. The cost to a student who attends
a university characterized by a high level of corruption is equivalent to sacrificing the eco-
nomic impact of higher education quality.
RESPONSES TO HIGHER EDUCATION CORRUPTION
Honesty in higher education depends on the strength of professional character within individ-
uals and institutions. Even in the most adverse environments, where bribery and competition
for personal advantage is the norm, there are numerous resisters who refuse to participate
(Heyneman, 2009). However, resisters acting as individuals are not sufficient. Fortunately
there are three categories of pressure on higher education institutions which may help lower
the risk of a corruption culture becoming endemic (Heyneman, 2017).
The first is the shift away from having universities provide professional licenses to practice
in the professions. Because bribery tends to be greater in the highly rewarded professions of
medicine, law and economics (Kerkvliet, 1994; Hrabak et al., 2004; Heyneman, 2017) and
because the existence of for-profit universities is close to universal, continuing to have all
universities provide the license to practice exposes the public to unqualified pilots, architects
and doctors. Having a professional institution, such as a bar or medical association, award the

license to practice lowers the risk to the public. In turn, this lowers the demand to bribe univer-
sity faculty by students who need a license to practice a profession (Heyneman and Lee, 2013).
The second is the influence of international organizations and international norms in the
comparing of degrees and programs of training. Among the most well known is the Bologna
Process in which universities in the 28 countries of Eastern and Central Europe aspire to
be recognized as the equivalent of university programs in Western Europe. If not carefully
monitored the criteria for equivalence, for instance between a program at East Kazakhstan
State University and the London School of Economics, could lead to a decline in the latter’s
value. This tends to place new demands on the Bologna Process by reason of the high stakes
involved. And it offers the opportunity to insert the necessary criteria of ‘equivalence’ to
incentivize applicant institutions (Maricik, 2009; Bergan, 2009; Sahlberg, 2009; Heyneman
and Skinner, 2014).
The third influence is that of international competition for excellence. Universities are under
a great deal of pressure to bring themselves up to international standards. Much has been
written about the various systems of ranking the quality of universities, but one side effect
of international ranking has been relatively unnoticed and that is how broad the demand is
to change behavior within local institutions. One characteristic of world-class universities is
that,8 in whatever country they are situated, all address the issue of corruption directly in their
advertisements. Perhaps most importantly, the University of Tokyo, Harvard and the London
School of Economics all showcase what they do to combat corruption. World-class universi-
ties assume that corruption exists, including at their institutions, and all specify in detail the
countermeasures they are actively taking. Universities in countries where corruption is highest
tend to ignore the problem. They do not mention anything about it in their advertisements
on the grounds that there is no evidence that they have a corruption problem. World-class
universities take the position that they could be guilty of the problem and that is why they are
combatting it (Heyneman, 2014a).
There are many influences on universities which may counteract the tendency to accept the
normalcy of bribes and unprofessional standards, but the following may be the most powerful:
the professionalization of the licensing process, the pressure to be compared to universities in
other parts of the world and competition for world-class status.
NOTES
1. The distinction between non-profit and for-profit educational institutions is not clear in many parts
of the world. What in some cases would be treated as legitimate cost recovery might in other cases
be categorized as taxable income (Heyneman et al., 2008; Heyneman and Skinner, 2014).
2. This latter issue tends to be true of education systems in OECD countries.
3. Sexual harassment in classrooms may be more common in Sub-Saharan Africa than other regions
(Bakari and Leach, 2009; Collins, 2009).
4. Common in the Europe and Central Asia region: faculty will not allow students to sit for a final
exam without showing proof of purchase of the faculty member’s publication.
5. Examples: using a public classroom to operate a private for-profit school or selling student products
for personal profit.
6. Mathematics and sciences were popular subjects of study in the Soviet Union. When labor markets
were administered by the state, there was no unemployment. However, once labor markets were
freed and industry was privatized, the economic returns to studying traditional subjects collapsed
(Heyneman, 2000).

7. Adapted from Heyneman et al., 2008.

8. ‘World class’ is defined as those universities which appear on the list distributed by the Times
Education Supplement of the best in the world (Heyneman, 2014a).
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international perspective. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
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International.

11. Corruption and administration in local
government
Allan Yates
INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores particularism, as a form of administrative corruption that is relatively

underconsidered, yet potentially extensive within the local government sector in New South
Wales, Australia. Within the context of corruption, this chapter examines what particularism
is and why it is a challenging practice to identify and govern. It goes on to explore how poten-
tially widespread particularism is within the New South Wales local government, yet how
potentially interwoven it is within the fabric of culture and practice.
Particularism is a form of behaviour that ‘covers all personnel decisions in the working
life of an employee, such as recruitment, selection, promotion and rewards, and circumvents
objective or standard procedures’ (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 2). Similar, albeit more specific
terms, such as nepotism and cronyism, feature interchangeably within the literature on corrup-
tion. Pope (2000, p. 197) refers to nepotism as a practice where a person in a position of power
or influence favours a member of his or her family, usually to obtain a job, while cronyism
covers situations where a preference is ‘given to friends and colleagues’. The determinants
of each are analogous and are referred to within this chapter as particularism. If a council
culture is based on particularism, the appointment and advancement of personnel is based on
connections rather than merit (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017, p. 9). In the local government setting,
the outcome of such decisions might not necessarily be in accordance with the best interests of
the council and the community it serves.
‘SAME SAME’, BUT DIFFERENT
Bribery, nepotism and cronyism feature heavily in the discourse of corruption, as forms
of corruption, or examples of corrupt practices (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 14; Mulgan, 2012,
p. 25), but each is vastly different in its composition. Corruption is often considered to be
synonymous with bribery (Johnston, 2005, p. 6). Zimring and Johnson (2005, p. 802) refer to
acts such as bribery as being ‘crude and visible’ and distinctly different to ‘subtle and hidden
abuses’, such as conflict of interest and particularism, which they term the ‘dark figure of
corruption’ (Zimring & Johnson, 2005, p. 802). The authors contend that there is a ‘larger
proportion of corrupt acts in complex and developed societies than in less developed nations’,
which they attribute to ‘the adaptive tendency to hide higher-status offending in developed
nations’ (Zimring & Johnson, 2005, pp. 802–3). The subtle, hidden and complex nature of
corrupt activities, such as particularism, make it less easy to designate as ‘corrupt’. Unlike
bribery, particularism does not have an immediate exchange (Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 141)
or an immediate economic benefit (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 165). Many countries leg-
139
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islate against some acts of corruption, such as bribery, but do not legislate against acts such
as conflict of interest and particularism (Graycar & Villa, 2011, pp. 435–6). Hence, they are
not illegal per se, and do not have obvious materialities. In this regard, anti-corruption efforts
need to be cognisant of the different ways in which corruption can manifest and to recognise
how the determinants of corrupt conduct differ. As argued by Heywood (2017, p. 28), ‘most
anti-corruption efforts are bound to fail unless we can find more effective ways of unpacking
the problem we are seeking to address’.
In this regard, it is worth heeding salient observations by Anechiarico (2009, p. 84), who
contends that ‘a notable failing of public administration has been reliance on the law enforce-
ment model for the control of corruption’. Any anti-corruption effort which follows the law
enforcement model is fraught in this regard. There are many practices and behaviours, which
might be construed as corrupt, that are not unlawful. However, they still fall within the defi-
nition of ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’, this being one of the most influential
definitions of corruption the world over (Transparency International, 2018). Hence, when one
seeks to understand more about the rich complexities associated with corruption – especially
within the local government setting, where the appointment, promotion and recruitment of
personnel is fundamental to the organisation’s overall success – there would arguably be
latent implications if an appointment decision is consciously influenced by an individual’s
preference or partiality. This would not necessarily be obvious or overt at the time of appoint-
ment or promotion. The appointment decision may seem innocuous or benign, as there are no
obvious detrimental or tangible materialities. There may be times when the appointee is not
an active party in the transaction as the decision is made wholly by the appointer. Within the
scholarly domain, the relationship between particularism, the informality of institutions and
higher organisational corruption is considered to be ‘theoretically underdeveloped, since the
precise mechanisms underlying the causal link between particularism and corruption have not
been fully understood’ (Rotondi & Stanca, 2015, p. 220). Even though particularism is consid-
ered to be prevalent within organisations, it is often deemed to be acceptable or legitimate by
employees (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 12).
Within the fields of research, policy and regulation, any anti-corruption response needs to
be cognisant of the degree of corruption risk: its potential consequences/implications and the
level of incidence/likelihood. Across the Asia Pacific region, 4 percent of people surveyed in
Australia reported paying a bribe for a public service, whereas in India, this figure is as high
as 69 percent (Transparency International, 2017, pp. 16–17). Hence, the likelihood of bribery
in Australia is low. In a study conducted in the Australian state of Victoria, only 4 percent of
respondents suspected it to be taking place and less than 1 percent have personally observed
it (Graycar, 2013, p. 2).
In contrast to the considered harms of particularism, half of all respondents (54%) within
the Victorian study considered that bribery was the corrupt act that had the most damaging
effects (Graycar, 2013, p. 15); hence, its perceived harms and implications are high. While it
was infrequently suspected or personally observed, the same study noted that hiring friends of
family for public-sector jobs (particularism) was commonplace (Graycar, 2013, p. 2); hence,
its likelihood is high, albeit the latent harms or implications seem to be dismissed or consid-
ered low. If anti-corruption efforts focus on ‘tangible’ forms of corruption, such as bribery,
this keeps the attention on easily designated practices, and off the more complex forms of cor-
ruption by employees who have a higher status or more influence (Kurczewski, 2004, p. 163).
The understanding of corruption therefore becomes reductionist, with anti-corruption efforts
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Corruption and administration in local government 141
only focusing on one aspect of a far greater phenomenon. They attend to forms of corruption
that might not be as commonplace, such as bribery, yet omit a focus on corrupt tendencies
that are more prevalent, but potentially more difficult to discern and then prosecute, such as
particularism. In other words, they may hit the broader target, but fall short of the mark. As
particularism is not well cogitated, it potentially becomes subsumed within the organisation’s
culture and practice, and may prevail regardless of formal rules, governance or anti-corruption
initiatives (Mishra, 2006, p. 341). For the local government sector, this has implications in
terms of maintaining public trust and delivering on the community’s expectations in a fair and
objective way.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA
New South Wales is Australia’s most populous state, and is home to nearly a third of the
nation’s population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Within Australia, there are three
tiers of government: federal government, state or territory government and local government.
State or territory governments define the powers of local government – or local councils as
they may also be referred – and their geographical boundaries (Australian Government, 2020).
Australia has six states and two mainland territories.
Within New South Wales, each council’s physical size and population density varies exten-
sively. The largest council area is Central Darling which covers 53,534 square kilometres, and
the smallest council area is Hunters Hill at 5.7 square kilometres (DLG NSW, 2013, p. 10).
Regional areas typically have a much smaller population than the densely populated metro-
politan areas, with Urana Shire Council having just over 1,000 residents and Blacktown City
Council having more than 312,000 residents, nearly 265 times as many (DLG NSW, 2013,
p. 10). The most densely populated local government areas are in and around Greater Sydney.
They account for just under two thirds of the state’s population and 78 percent of the state’s
total population growth (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). The majority of councils are
in and around the densely populated metropolis of Sydney.
In May 2016, the number of councils within New South Wales was reduced following
a process of reform. Many councils amalgamated which reduced the number of council entities
from 152 to 128 (NSW Government, 2017). While a novel development in the state of New
South Wales, the Australian states of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania have previously
experienced similar modalities of local government reform, with the main rationale being
economies of scale (Baker, 2003, pp. 119–20; May, 2003, pp. 89–96). Key to these changes
was the erasure of boundaries between former local government areas, which are defined by
the New South Wales state government (Australian Government, 2020), but also the merging
of staff and cultural/occupational models of practice. This is relevant to the study of corruption
in the administration of local government, as during any period of organisational change or
restructuring there is administrative disruption. The risk of corruption has the potential to
metastasise, creating weaknesses in the existing governance of controls which might have
previously limited or governed opportunities for corruption (ICAC NSW, 2017b, pp. 7–8).
In addition to the local government sector’s fragmented, heterogeneous composition,
councils are quite unique in the way they operate when compared to other public-sector
organisations (Dollery et al., 2003, pp. 3–4). Each council comprises of a pool of democrat-
ically elected members, but the day-to-day operations and administrative functions fall to
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each council’s general manager or chief executive officer to perform. It is within this realm of
administration that particularism is most prone, as the appointment and recruitment of person-
nel can be easily legitimised by key influencers and decision makers. It can become entwined
within administrative practices, and hidden behind the respected veneer of the democratically
elected council.
At the elected level of local government, the democratic election process provides oppo-
sition leaders with the opportunity to expose corrupt incumbents (Rose-Ackerman, 1999,
p. 142). Many well-regarded countries today have been the focus of political corruption at
one stage or another (Johnston, 2012, pp. 60–1), and the Australian context is no different.
However, when corruption is pursued against political elites, this becomes newsworthy, as
the ideology of ‘altruistic democracy’ is compromised (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 44).
Consequently, public ‘visibility’ of corruption in Australian local government is centred on the
elected officials, rendering public opinion with a perception that local government is a ‘hotbed
of corruption’ (Solomons, 2018). However, a celebrification of political or high-profile figure-
heads is not representative of public officials’ experiences with corruption. It is not indicative
of corruption within the local government sector, and the variety of ways in which it might
manifest. It potentially disregards the broader implications of pluralistic practices of corrup-
tion, and their interrelationships in various situations and structures (Clammer, 2012, p. 117).
Hitherto, corruption can, and does, materialise in different forms, yet the 8 million residents
of New South Wales are informed primarily about the handful of sensationalistic exam-
ples that attain newsworthy status. The sector is considered to be susceptible to corruption
(Anechiarico, 2009, p. 80; Klitgaard, 2000, p. 5), but much of what transpires is unknown, as
corruption is, by virtue of its very nature, a clandestine activity. More than 54,000 employees
work within the administrative realm of local government in New South Wales (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2017). They may, and do, experience different practices of corruption in
different ways (Yates & Graycar, 2020).
THE CASE FOR AUSTRALIA

Australia has an anti-corruption commission (ACA) within each of its six states. New South
Wales was the first Australian state to establish an ACA, in the form of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), created in 1989. The latest ACA to be established is
within the Northern Territory (Northern Territory Government, 2018) and the case in Australia
is currently being made for a Commonwealth Integrity Commission (Attorney General’s
Office, 2018).
The existence of particularism is slowly coming to the fore in the public sector of Australia.
In very recent years, surveys conducted by two of Australia’s ACAs have highlighted how
practices of corruption have been suspected and/or observed within both state and local gov-
ernment (IBAC VIC, 2017a, 2017b; ICAC SA, 2018). Within New South Wales, ‘partiality
and personal interest’ feature within the majority of complaints made about public-sector
agencies (ICAC NSW, 2018b, pp. 32–3). Noting that local government is the sector most
complained about to the ICAC, these observations demonstrate that particularism is palpable,
and a cause for concern by those who report their observations to the ICAC (ICAC NSW,
2018a, p. 19).
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If investigative reports are referred to as a means of examining how particularistic behav-

iours might take place, one recent example is featured within the ICAC’s report into fraudulent
practices at Botany Bay Council which amounted to more than $6 million (ICAC NSW,
2017a). The former Botany Bay Council was situated within the south-eastern suburbs of
Sydney and accommodated a population of nearly 42,000 residents (DLG NSW, 2013, p. 64).
The fraudulent practices investigated by the ICAC were perpetrated by the chief financial
officer and others, and had taken place over a period of nearly two decades. In their final
report, the ICAC highlighted how ‘under-skilled staff were able to obtain their positions at the
Council because recruitment processes were informal and often subject to influence by senior
Council staff’ (ICAC NSW, 2017a, p. 75). Several staff, including the main protagonist, were
‘engaged without a genuine competitive, merit-based selection process’ with one employee
quoted as saying that ‘staff just bring their mates to work’ (ICAC NSW, 2017a, p. 75).
However, while the ICAC report noted that ‘staff lacked the requisite skills and experience to
perform their roles effectively’ (ICAC NSW, 2017a, p. 74), the focus of recommendations was
on governance and audit failures, with just one of nine recommendations touching upon the
particularism that was evident at Botany Bay Council. Consequently, even when this practice
is identified and categorised within the broader investigative efforts of an ACA such as the
ICAC, as a regulator of local government corruption in New South Wales, it is not widely
accentuated in terms of its significance or as a potential enabler of other corrupt tendencies.
More broadly within the local government sector of New South Wales, a study conducted
across ten councils identified that preference to hiring family or friends was witnessed by
nearly a third of respondents (Yates & Graycar, 2020, p. 92). This paper drew on research
conducted by the author of this chapter, and commenced with an excerpt from one of the
respondents to the study, who commented:
The media and regulators seem to focus exclusively on the big-ticket items e.g. bribes or salacious
activity… What is ignored in the corruption focus is the ‘death by a thousand paper cuts’ stuff – the
nepotism that may result in an informal network of people who subtly control the place, the leadership
culture that may subtly punish compliance with norms/power, lack of systems or skills resulting in
lots of small financial losses etc. (Yates & Graycar, 2020, p. 85)
The introductory part of the comment builds on the aforementioned reference to the public
reporting of local government corruption, contending that ‘the media and regulators seem to
focus exclusively on the big-ticket items’. Noting that the ICAC’s remit is to investigate and
make public ‘serious and systemic corruption’ (ICAC NSW, 2016, p. 20), this assumes that
the type of matters predominately brought to the attention of the public are the ones that have
reached a level of unacceptable pervasiveness and/or seriousness. Given this limited mandate,
and the ICAC’s finite resources, it is somewhat understandable that the ICAC remains less
attentive to corruption that falls short of this threshold. However, lower-threshold corruption
invariably graduates to serious and/or systemic corruption if it is unattended to. By then, cor-
ruption has become intertwined within the very fabric of the organisational architecture; this
does not happen overnight, but over time.
The aforementioned respondent’s contention that this focus ignores the ‘nepotism’ that
exists, suggests a cultural norm of corruption that is largely ignored, and supports observa-
tions by Mungiu-Pippidi (2017, p. 8), that ‘institutionalised corruption is based on informal
particularism’. That is to say, the existence and acceptance of informal particularism paves the
way for more corruption. As indicated by several phrases within the aforementioned excerpt,
Allan Yates - 9781789900910

degrees of furtiveness illustrate how corrupt practices can become enmeshed within the daily
working life of local government. These have been fostered through a culture of personal
interest and partiality: ‘the nepotism that may result in an informal network of people who
subtly control the place’, with the extent and normality of such practices exemplified by, ‘the
leadership culture that may subtly punish compliance with norms/power’ (emphases added).
To add a richer dimension to the excerpt referred to above, a supplementary stage of qual-
itative research was conducted by the author of this chapter with a purposeful sample of indi-
viduals who have experience and expertise in governing, investigating or regulating corruption
within local government. Some of these are paraphrased below as a means of highlighting how
and why particularism manifests within councils.
One interviewee stated: ‘I've seen in plenty of organisations, local government in particular,
and probably local government worse than anywhere else in the government sector… this nep-
otism and… promoting those who you want, because they’re going to be yes people, they’re
going to give you what you want, and circumventing processes around that. That is corrup-
tion.’ The impetus behind this practice in councils is, as alluded to by the above interviewee,
to ensure that ‘yes people’ are favoured in the promotion process; that is, favouritism is shown
to employees who acquiesce and conform instead of challenging the status quo. Granovetter
(2004, p. 11) contends that any corruption entrepreneur is well placed to ‘choose strategic
targets who are centrally located in networks that… best serve his [her] goals… [and] will
most likely leverage his [her] efforts’. As they advance within the organisational hierarchy,
they are more prone to a ‘higher immorality’, as a consequence of their biographies, but also
because they have less conscience about their decision-making practices, argues Mills (2000
[1956], p. 343). This informal practice of social exchange incorporates often intangible, yet
well-established, degrees of trust (Popczyk, 2017, p. 50). As one person’s position or influence
benefits another, an obligation to reciprocate is inherently created, impacting upon the ongoing
and pervasive nature of corruption with agents appointed and promoted to protect each other
(Andvig et al., 2000, p. 132). Hence, corruption breeds more corruption (Rose-Ackerman,
1999, p. 3), but reciprocity is elusive and immaterial. Indirect and intangible forms of rec-
iprocity, such as complicity in decision making, enhance the social norm of particularism
(Jones, 2016, p. 10). Such forms of complicity mean that different agendas and thinking
remain unchallenged, which then further facilitate or enable other unsavoury behaviours:
‘Managers at my Council reward favourite, yet incompetent, staff with promotions, upgrade
to higher duties and salaries. My council has a culture of bullying, harassment and intimida-
tion by certain managers (who are then protected by HR).’ This interviewee identifies with
a council culture that is based on particularism, where advancement, extra remuneration or
other appointment-based perks are afforded to employees who are favoured by management.
Such perks or career advancements are funded by the council, which is funded by the rate
payer. These subtle, yet potent practices and realities, rarely feature on popular media outlets,
even if they are identified during the course of any investigation. As an example, even though
the ICAC referred to particularistic practices within their investigation report into Botany Bay
Council in 2017, scant attention was given to its prevalence as a key structural and cultural
contributor to the corrupt practices which continued for nearly two decades (ICAC NSW,
2017a). The following interviewee’s quote identifies with such structural and cultural factors:
It comes down to… having open recruitment processes and encouraging new blood to come into
an organisation, rather than this internal nepotism that goes on… If you have a closed recruitment
Allan Yates - 9781789900910

system, as I saw at [name of Council redacted], where your senior managers are all being promoted
from underneath within the organisation… you don’t get a fresh wash-in of water into the culture
and therefore any bad cultural aspects you have are emboldened and further embedded into the
organisation, and at a more senior level… The closed shop organisational approach is a big factor for
corruption risk… a culture, which is ethical by definition, will never be a closed culture. A culture,
which is corrupt by definition, will usually be a closed culture.
The symbolic existence of a ‘closed recruitment system’ or ‘closed shop organisational

approach’ within local government highlights how potentially embedded particularism is,
and that as a result, ‘any bad cultural aspects you have are emboldened and further embedded
into the organisation, and at a more senior level’. As contended by Ashforth et al. (2008,
p. 675), ‘even if the causes of corruption are not entirely systemic, the consequences are’:
as employees advance within the council, the more autonomy and influence they have, with
social networks further established and embedded through diverse power relations. In this
regard, the informality and acceptance of particularism becomes part of the structural and
cultural composition of the council. The evolution of particularism, as a form of favouritism in
the appointment or recruitment of personnel, is akin to a concept alluded to by Bellow (2003,
p. 19), who considers that ‘new nepotism [is] not the return of something tribal and archaic but
the transformation of an ancient practice into a new and more acceptable form’.
The strength of relationships plays a fundamental role within the formal structure of any
organisation (Walton, 2005, pp. 569–70), albeit they are often intangible and unsolidified.
Human bonds, self-interests, loyalties and inherent prejudices are examples of factors that
may impact upon the dispassionate, objective or merit-based decisions that public servants
are expected to demonstrate. Employees in advantaged positions are more likely to advance
than those who do not have such social capital or networks, attributed to factors such as status,
gender and socioeconomic origin (McNamee & Miller, 2014, p. 83). This is potentially to the
detriment of more meritorious candidates who have qualified biographies and credentials.
THE ACCEPTABILITY OF PARTICULARISM
Heidenheimer (2009, pp. 152–4) refers to the interpretation of activity that everyday citizens
consider corrupt, and how this then affects their evaluation and tolerance of it. A colour-coded
classification of black, grey or white corruption is based on the opinion of the majority, and is
defined below.
Black corruption indicates that in that setting that particular action is one which a majority consensus
of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and would like to see punished on grounds of princi-
ple. Grey corruption indicates that some elements, usually elites, may want to see the action punished,
others not, and the majority would be ambiguous. White corruption signifies that the majority of both
elite and mass opinion probably would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corrup-
tion that they regard as tolerable. (Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 152)
Heidenheimer postulates that ‘behaviour can surreptitiously cross the indistinct line differ-
entiating grey from black behaviour’, and that some forms of corruption regarded as grey in
one setting may be viewed as white, ‘or quite acceptable’, in another setting (Heidenheimer,
2009, p. 153). In this regard, it is worth examining Heidenheimer’s reference to the opinion of
the majority. If public perception is informed predominantly by the media and/or the ICAC in
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relation to certain categories or forms of corruption (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 171), then
the majority are informed accordingly by this means, with different agendas and interpreta-
tions shaping their impressions (Dormaels, 2015, p. 596; Osrecki, 2015, p. 348). Citizens’
knowledge on corruption is thus aligned to newsworthy corruption, such that it may seem
exceptional or sensationalistic in nature, and not the mundane or unexceptional practices that
have been suspected and/or witnessed routinely.
When considering how different practices of corruption may be categorised within
a colour-coded classification such as the one described above, one perspective might be that
citizens’ views are influenced by the perceived harm, or lack thereof, of the offending act
(Becker, 2003, p. 70). This, in turn, affects their tolerance of it and consequently its perva-
siveness. To extend the research base referred to by Yates and Graycar (2020), particularism
(preference given to hiring friends or family for council jobs) was not only one of the most
witnessed practices, but was perceived as the least damaging act for local government officials
to perform. This is illustrated in Figure 11.1.
Figure 11.1 Respondents' views on the most damaging acts(s) of corruption that their
council could harbour (n = 200)
Noting that bribery was considered by twice as many respondents to be more damaging, this
highlights how particularism is not seen as harmful, despite being witnessed by nearly a third
of the council officials in the same respondent base (Yates & Graycar, 2020, p. 92). Drawing
on Denial Theory (Cohen, 2001, pp. 58–9) and the associated Techniques of Neutralisation,
Allan Yates - 9781789900910

there is a general denial of injury (Sykes & Matza, 1957, pp. 667–8). Those engaging in or
benefiting from particularism, or those who observe its incidence, neutralise its wrongfulness
because there is little or no perceived harm (Cohen, 2001, p. 60). Its situatedness, therefore,
becomes more resistant to the label of corruption, unlike other more well-known practices,
such as bribery. One interviewee stated: ‘I think historically there’s been a lot of nepotism,
which doesn’t get talked about a lot as corruption but ultimately is, and I’ve seen that all the
way through my local government career’. Heidenheimer (2009, p. 142) states that ‘the more
complex the network of social interaction and the more complicated and diverse the ways
that tangible benefits can be exchanged, the less likely it is that particular actions can clearly
be labelled corrupt’. To elaborate on this, unlike bribery, being a well-known category of
corruption, particularism is based on different degrees of social interaction and these may be
facilitated by various power differentials. The benefits of particularism are not necessarily
tangible and can be exceptionally diverse (Masters & Graycar, 2015, p. 153).
With further reference to Heidenheimer’s (2009, p. 153) colour-coded classification, he
relates grand corruption with a form of condemnation, noting that the majority would expect
to see punitive action taken. Kurer (2015, p. 36) offers a similar view, contending that percep-
tions of corruption are often linked with ‘punishment, not whether the act is corrupt or not’.
Accordingly, practices of corruption which are seen as white, or towards the lighter shade
of grey within this colour-coded spectrum, would not warrant any form of punishment by
those who might observe it. These practices then become tolerated, and by default, seemingly
normal within the administration of local government.
THE PROBLEM WITH PARTICULARISM: SEEN, BUT NOT VISIBLE
Rotondi and Stanca (2015, p. 231) note:
‘The intrinsic psychological need for a positive self-image drives individuals to compare their own
group with other groups to which they do not belong, giving preferential treatment to members rela-
tive to non-members. In this perspective, humans are naturally sectarian and particularism is a feature
of human nature that may not be easily changed.’
Such is the nature of particularism, that not only is it difficult to determine, but it is inher-
ently very resistant to change. Nepotism and cronyism – practices of corruption which might
be categorised as ‘particularism’ – are considered to be quite ‘an ongoing societal issue of
great concern to the public’ (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 1). If the community set the bar for what
establishes a ‘wrongful exercise of public duty’, and any degree of tolerance with practices
of corruption (Johnson & Sharma, 2004, p. 2; Philp, 2009, p. 47), then it seems that this may
be the catalyst for intervention. However, the nature of particularism is such that it often does
not reach the attention of the community through popular media channels, and therefore, its
pervasiveness is not highlighted.
Various studies in Australia are beginning to show how potentially rife particularism is;
not just within the local government sector of New South Wales (Yates & Graycar, 2020), but
interstate, and within and across other public-sector agencies (IBAC VIC, 2017a, p. 8; ICAC
SA, 2018, p. 6). If particular acts of corruption, such as particularism, are not considered to
be damaging or harmful, then the prospect of them coming to light would be less than other
corrupt acts that might be considered more severe. This serves to undermine any attempt to
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expose the less tangible forms of corruption that may be committed by the elite (Kurczewski,
2004, p. 163), and keeps the current anti-corruption focus on the forms of corruption that are
easy to designate, govern and prosecute.
With particularism, any degree of mutual assistance or protection is more established the
longer that personnel work together (Bauman, 1990, p. 85). From there, a council’s operational
and strategic decisions are made by long-standing employees who are socially and psycholog-
ically similar, with an interchange based on a convergence of interests (Mills, 2000 [1956],
pp. 287–8). Accordingly, a council’s bureaucratic arrangement forms a ‘collective conscience
or organisational mind’ (Punch, 1996, pp. 242–3): a situational morality within the collective
mindset that is shaped and framed by those who see, do not see or choose not to see issues in
what they do and what the others around them do.
The local government workforce is ageing and older in comparison to other government
and industry sectors (Hastings et al., 2015, p. v). Within the organisational hierarchy of each
council in New South Wales, managers and supervisors play a key role in the development
of integrity frameworks and practices within local government (Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2013,
p. 20). They can facilitate the institutionalisation of corruption by ‘rewarding, condoning,
ignoring or otherwise facilitating corruption’ (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, pp. 6–7), but more so
in a council in which the culture is based on informal particularism. When respondents’ views
about the tolerance of particularism was cross-tabulated with demographic data, more than two
thirds of respondents who claim to have directly witnessed particularism have managerial or
supervisory responsibilities some or all of the time (Figure 11.2).
Figure 11.2 Cross-tabulation between direct witnessing of particularism and whether

employees have managerial or supervisory responsibilities (n = 36)
Through socialisation (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 3), ‘newcomers are taught to perform
and accept the corrupt practices’, especially if the managers and supervisors doing the recruit-
ing have benefited by obtaining their appointment or promotion through preference or favour-
itism rather than merit. The purported lack of concern regarding the impacts of particularism,
Allan Yates - 9781789900910

together with its societal acceptability and tolerance, thus compounds its absence of visibility
and renders it seemingly normal within the bureaucracy of administration. It is potentially
embedded within the structure and culture of local government and may endure in perpetuity if
allowed to. Arguably, while those who may have benefited from particularism might be more
inclined to then continue to follow the same particularistic style in their own recruitment and
appointment of personnel, clearly there are a number of observers who feel very strongly about
the unfairness of particularistic behaviours, as demonstrated by the vast number of complaints
made to the ICAC that relate to partiality and personal interests (ICAC NSW, 2018b, p. 32).
The implications of particularism are relatively underconsidered or researched. Feasibly,
councils’ strategic direction and operational decision-making processes are shaped by collec-
tive mindsets, at the expense of intellectually challenging ideas and innovation. Individuals
who have advanced based on their connections, rather than their credentials, may not have
the requisite skill sets, but are remunerated and then advance in a similar manner; potential
appointees, who have studied, trained and earned their credentials are unsuccessful in spite of
their endeavours. Whether such actions then translate into unfavourable outcomes for those
within the community that are affected by the decisions of their council is difficult to say,
and certainly not possible to generalise. Perhaps one of the key implications that should be
considered is how the existence and acceptance of particularism establishes the foundation for
further corrupt tendencies. If ‘institutionalised corruption is based on informal particularism’
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017, p. 8), this seemingly features as a causality behind the resultant aggre-
gation of less significant forms of corruption that then build up to be more serious or systemic,
as was evident at Botany Bay Council.
CONCLUSION
Conducting ethnographic research on corruption is difficult, as the topic is highly sensitive, and
potentially contentious if conducted within the organisational environment itself (Rothstein &
Torsello, 2014, p. 264). There is not a great deal of research examining employees’ perceptions
of particularism (Hudson et al., 2017, p. 1). This chapter highlights that giving preference to
hiring family or friends for council roles might be commonplace within the local government
sector. As it is not seen as harmful, it potentially continues unconsciously and automatically
without any comprehension that anything is wrong by those that advance as a result. Hence,
particularism could be one of the most insidious forms of subterfuge. Once it is practised,
and then further established through cultural acceptance and tolerance, it becomes reinforced
and routinised through the same cliques that have previously benefited. The ensuing strategic
direction of a council is then determined accordingly by personnel who have not obtained their
positions through merit, but through the favouritism and preference of influential bureaucrats.
Particularism is one aspect of the corruption puzzle that needs to explored and unpacked
further, not just in terms of its potential existence and different manifestations, but the
structural and cultural conditions that contribute to its ingrained presence. Citizens’ ongoing
referrals to the ICAC about partiality and preference in the appointment and recruitment of
council employees indicates that more needs to be done to unravel and manage this complex
phenomenon within the local government sector of New South Wales.
Allan Yates - 9781789900910

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12. Curbing corruption in tax administration with
enhanced risk mapping of business processes
Tuan Minh Le and Beytullah Sarican
Disclaimer: The authors are, respectively, Lead Economist, and Senior International Tax Consultant at the
World Bank. The chapter should be cited with the names of the authors. The findings, interpretations and con-
clusions expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or
those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter discusses the causes of corruption in tax administration and provides an analytical
framework for designing the appropriate approach to mitigate it through enhancement of func-
tional business processes. In broad terms, corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power
for private gain.1 In tax administration, the broad definition of corruption can be unbundled
into two separate sets of behavior by taxpayers and by tax officials (see, for example, Low,
1995):
1. Tax officials are corrupt when they use conferred monopoly power to extort money from
taxpayers, or to collude with taxpayers in defrauding the treasury, or to find some other
means of embezzling money from the tax authorities.
2. Taxpayers evade taxes when they intentionally fail to declare taxable economic activity or
use false declarations, with or without collusion from tax officials.
Corruption erodes trust in government and is detrimental to the quality of public institutions.
It therefore impedes the achievement of sustainable development goals. The Transparency
International Global Corruption Barometer and surveys in developing and transition coun-
tries indicate that revenue administration agencies are typically ranked the most corrupt
public institutions (Le, 2007). It is commonly observed that corruption associates with lower
revenue collection. The International Monetary Fund (2019) estimates that the least corrupt
governments collect 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) more in tax revenues than
countries with the highest levels of corruption and the annual total cost of bribery is estimated
to be $1.5–2 trillion per year, which is roughly 2 percent of global GDP.2 The underpinning
factors of such high corruption and low collection embed in the state’s weakened capacity to
tax, inherent disincentives for taxpayers to comply with tax laws and the need for the revenue
administration officials to collect more for the treasury.
Corruption in the revenue systems has varied impacts on ultimate collection across different
types of taxes. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) suggest such negative impacts are more felt in the
case of direct taxes versus indirect taxes. Regardless, reducing corruption becomes a priority
in tax administration reforms and the advancement of information technology (IT) supports
such effort. Technology plays a major role in transforming the ways governments deliver
services to and interact with citizens across various sectors and e-governments initiatives.
Automating systems help combat corruption by reducing officials’ discretion (Okunogbea &
153
Tuan Minh Le and Beytullah Sarican - 9781789900910
Pouliquenb, 2018). However, technology alone does not solve the rooted problems of corrup-
tion and inefficiencies in tax administration. To make effective use of advanced IT, revenue
administrations need to ensure complementary reforms to reengineer business processes and
to develop appropriate legal and human management systems.
This chapter focuses on the administrative corruption. It particularly analyzes the factors
and their vulnerabilities to corruption risks across all the major business functions in tax
administration through detailed discussion of the risk process mapping. We supplement our
stylized discussion with documented country experiences.
Opportunities for corruption take on different forms and dimensions (Dos Santos, 1995).
Within this analytical framework, we acknowledge that the first steps in reengineering busi-
ness processes is to diagnose existing constraints and then map the key business processes in
a coherent set of procedural flows and institutional interlinkage. Such thorough risk mapping
would assist the senior management of revenue agencies to determine the core vulnerabilities
and the approach to mitigate such risks.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section frames the core causes and conse-
quences of corruption in taxation. In the second section, we attempt to present a coherent
approach to map the risks across all the major tax administration functions. The third section
highlights some country examples in dealing with corruption.
FRAMING ISSUES OF CORRUPTION IN TAXATION
Causes of Corruption in Taxation
To develop workable solutions and initiatives, one must first analyze its main causes and
motivations in functions under tax administration. As such, operationalizing the definition
of corruption in the sector as disaggregated into the underlying motives and opportunities for
either taxpayers or tax officials or both becomes critical. The underlying causes that drive the
supply of corruption from tax officials are multiple.
Tax economists and practitioners offer a list of factors influencing the motives and oppor-
tunities for corruption on either side of taxpayers and tax administration officials or both: lack
of transparency; complicated and/or discretionary tax systems; poor enforcement; perceptions
of unfairness in taxation and services; poor government services; lack of integrity, ethics,
formality; and the absence of a functional appeal system (see, for examples, Evans, Krever, &
Alm, 2017; Rahman, 2009; and Purohit, 2007).
Complexity of tax laws and procedures

The structure of tax regimes creates opportunities, which is influenced by the legal, regulatory
and policy framework. According to a World Bank study of 104 countries involving different
income groups and regions covering the period of 2002–12 (Awasti & Bayraktar, 2014), there
is a strong correlation between the various measures of corruption and the indicators of the tax
complexity; a less complex tax system is seen to be associated with a less corrupt government.
Professional ethics and legislation

A lack of professional ethics and deficient laws to regulate, prosecute and sanction corruption
as a criminal offense is another important cause for the emergence and spread of corruption.

Curbing corruption in tax administration 155
A great influence comes also from ineffective sanctioning of corruption, which only increases
the possibility of continuing the corruptive actions of those involved, creating at the same time
a strong likelihood that others will join in the corruption. Corruption also generates a lack of
transparency and control by supervisory institutions. Therefore, where there is insufficient
legal basis or political will to enable transparent functioning of both politics and the economy,
corruption flourishes. Corruption is also affected by the extensive, non-transparent or incom-
plete legislation, where laws can be interpreted in different ways (Šumah, 2018).
Lack of transparency
A lack of transparency creates opportunities for tax officials to abuse their duties for private
gain. This closely relates to accountability, and weak accountability mechanisms tend to facil-
itate corruption. Corruption will flourish where there is a lack of transparency and accounta-
bility. Tax transparency, in the broad sense as it is understood here, serves different functions.
One has to distinguish between the direct procurement of information and further targets
which are pursued by tax transparency, i.e. deterrence on the one hand and accountability and
trust in the tax administration on the other hand. Transparency in regard to the information
necessary to assess taxes is an inevitable precondition for a fair and equal application of tax
laws (Schoueri & Barbosa, 2013).
Functional organization and segregation of duties within the department

Responsibilities in a process are entrusted to one tax official rather than separated and dele-
gated to several tax officials, without the goal of providing a system of checks and balances
to prevent errors or dishonest behavior. Tax officials are generally allotted geographical areas
of operations. For a particular taxpayer, the tax officer is the tax department. This monopoly
power gives tax officers the opportunity to entice taxpayers into corrupt practices of paying
bribes (Purohit, 2007). The fact that liability and taxation transactions are carried out with the
same tax officer is an important reason for corruption. A lack of clearly defined roles, functions
and duties of public officials creates an environment ripe for corrupt behavior (Pashev, 2005).
Internal oversight service

The absence of supervision and accountability gives workers an opportunity to refrain from
performing public duties. The absence of measures designed to maintain the integrity of
staff—such as the promotion and enforcement of ethical standards, merit-based recruitment
and promotion procedure, and regular staff rotation schemes to prevent the creation of lucra-
tive networks—increases the likelihood of staff indulging in corrupt practices (Purohit, 2007).
Lack of effective communication channels

If the communication channels of the tax administration are insufficient, taxpayers may resort
to corruption in order to speed up their transactions. The fact that communication channels are
open increases the transparency of the tax administration. Openness, timeliness and flexibility
are fundamental communication values that should lead the tax administration in fulfilling its
mission and vision.
Officials’ expectation to find high-salaried job in taxpayers’ businesses

Tax collectors can “collect” small bribes from small businesses and can deliberately reduce
the tax fines and penalties by keeping their amount sufficiently low. They do so because after

working in a high-level public inspection institution for a number of years, they transfer to
the “big” businesses with more profitable positions. By keeping their number sufficiently
low, they control the supply of their knowledge deliberately and gain a reputation in the sense
that they are not corruptible. After changing their position from the public office to private
companies, they go with their “insider information” and cause the higher-level tax evasion or
lobbying which might increase inefficiencies (Akdede, 2006).
Low level of automation

Tax administrations with poor automation have a cumbersome structure, which imposes
a serious workload on tax officers. Long-term taxation transactions compel both tax officers
and taxpayers to find different solutions. Tax administrations, where automation systems
are inadequate, keep communication between taxpayers and tax officers at a high level. This
makes the transactions suitable for bribery and corruption.
Problems with appeals processes

Tax cases are often complex and general courts cannot specialize in tax questions, so their
decisions have little chance of being technically sound. In addition, lack of knowledge on the
part of the judiciary produces results that can be contradictory and unfair: sometimes judges
have the attitude of taxpayers confronting the tax administration independent of the merits
of the case they are judging and other times they blindly trust the tax administration as they
cannot understand about the case. Both types of behavior undermine the foundations of the
rule of law and can indirectly lead to corruption (Thuronyi, Counsel & Espejo, 2013).
Consequences of Corruption
The consequences of corruption in tax administration are multi-faceted and well documented
in the literature.
Low compliance level

A major detrimental impact of corruption is a loss of public trust in the work of the tax
administration. Corruption lowers the level of compliance. It leads to the deterioration of and
inequity in income distribution, which in turn make taxpayers not trust the government and
choose emotional tax non-compliance (Cheng and Zeng, 2017).
Normalization of corruption
Entrenched corruption normalizes itself through some sort of “herd” behavior. Corrupt col-
leagues and friends weaken the will of honest officers and reduce the probability of being
detected or losing one’s reputation. As the number of corrupt tax collectors increases, the guilt
feeling of indulging in wrongdoing decreases. When networks of corruption exist, firing some
corrupt officials does not improve the situation, as the fired officials become consultants and
add to the network (Fjeldstad, 2005). Corruption breeds further corruption. Collusion between
corrupt taxpayers and corrupt tax officials puts honest taxpayers at a disadvantage, encourag-
ing them to evade taxes (Purohit, 2007).

Reduction of tax revenues

Corruption drastically reduces tax revenues, forcing governments to find other avenues for
financing government expenditure, including borrowing and inflationary measures. Future
fiscal flexibility is reduced, because servicing of debt has to be given priority over other
expenditures. This creates a vicious circle endangering fiscal sustainability (Purohit, 2007).
Reduction of the modernization of tax administrations

Corruption affects the quality of governance. In a corrupt environment, officials make deci-
sions that do not serve the public interest but promote the interests of corrupt individuals.
Administrative efficiency is at a low level because patronage and nepotism tend to encourage
the recruitment of incompetent people.
Public expenditure manipulation

Corruption increases the volume of public investments (at the expense of private investments),
including unjustified and wasteful investments in tax administration in the name of updating,
for example, the IT system whereas other areas of administration remain neglected. There
are many options for public expenditure manipulation and these are typically carried out by
high-level officials so as to get bribes. This means that more general government expenditures
or a large budget offers more opportunity for corruption (Šumah, 2018).
Reduction of investments and growth

Corruption in tax administration contributes to lower foreign and domestic investments. All
things being equal, investors would look for locales in which there is less corruption, fewer
red tape, simpler laws and procedures and a transparent regulatory environment. Corruption
leads to economic waste and inefficiency, because it adversely affects the potential collection
of revenues, optimal allocation of funds, productivity and consumption.
MAPPING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION

Worldwide, the organizational structure of tax administration has undergone substantial
changes—shifting from archaic tax-type to functional-based, and then to a combination of
functional and taxpayer segmentation models. Under the functional model, tax authorities are
organized along functional lines, with particular roles assigned to headquarters and regional
operational units. International experience indicates that business process reengineering is an
integral part of the overall effective approach to preventing corruption in tax administration.
This methodology includes reengineering the core business processes and sub-processes of
taxpayer functions along with their vulnerabilities to corruption and remedial measures to
address the problems.
In this regard, this chapter examines the business processes of the five core tax adminis-
tration functions and their vulnerabilities. Each part of this session focuses on a single core
function with a graphical illustration of the business process via a process flowchart and risk
analysis. Our analytical methodology follows the international good practices with tested and
workable instruments. The five core functions in tax administration under review are: (1)
taxpayer registration; (2) the filing of tax declarations and payment processing; (3) tax audit;

(4) arrears management; and (5) tax appeals. These functions are operated predominantly at
the local and regional office levels.
This session explores the usefulness of mapping corruption risks in business process flows
as a basis for designing suitable anti-corruption strategies. It begins with the risk mapping in
each of the tax administration functions followed by a matrix identifying the key institutional
and procedural corruption vulnerabilities and potential risk mitigations measures.
Taxpayer Registration
Registration procedures play a critical role in discovering taxpayers who have never registered
for tax purposes, which underpins return filing, collection and assessment activities. Tax
registration is a record compilation function that enables the authorities to identify a person
as a “taxpayer”,3 “responsible person”4 or “potential taxpayer”5 based on tax obligations, who
is required to inform the authorities about any changes within a certain period of time. The
function of registration thus constitutes an important task for tax administration. Tax adminis-
trations cannot fulfill its tasks and achieve its desired outcomes and objectives without reliable
information, captured in the registration process. It is therefore essential to oblige taxpayers to
register and to provide and update their information.
Figure 12.1 and Table 12.1 respectively present a flow chart and analysis of the corrup-
tion risks in tax registration. Corruption would lead to an incomplete or unreliable taxpayer
database and would thus narrow the base and risks rendering the entire tax administration
ineffective.
Filing of Tax Return and Payment Processing
Figure 12.2 and Table 12.2 provide analysis of the corruption risk mapping in tax filing and
payment. There are two main fundamental systems used internationally to determine the
amount of tax liability through the submission of tax returns: official administrative-assessment
system and self-assessment system.
1. Official administrative–assessment system: the tax liability is assessed and calculated by

tax administration with notice of assessment upon presentation of taxable information.
This method involves multiple visits to the tax authority, rent-seeking behavior and dupli-
cation of activities.
2. Self-assessment system: each taxpayer makes its own tax assessment of its business and
reports its taxable base for the relevant tax period.
Self-assessment is one of the fundamental strategies that enable tax administrations to effec-
tively implement the tax legislation and increase voluntary compliance. For example, the find-
ings of the studies revealed that tax compliance in post-self-assessment full implementation is
higher than that of pre-self-assessment full implementation, while tax complexity is lower than
that of pre-self-assessment full implementation (Masud & Alkali, 2015).
The gold standard for self-assessment is that tax returns should be simple and easily accessi-
ble or mailed to taxpayers with basic instructions. If possible, tax returns should be distributed
alongside specific information about taxpayers’ economic activities such as taxable amount,
which requires the tax administrations to have third-party information channels to generate
pre-filled tax returns for taxpayers using third-party information. A pre-filled tax return mech-

Figure 12.1 The taxpayer registration processing
anism will enable most taxpayers to meet their obligations but if it is to work effectively, the
tax administration must have accurate and reliable information about taxpayers’ economic
activities (such as their employers, banks or insurance companies).

Table 12.1 Corruption risks in the taxpayer registration process
Ref. Selected key tax Likely risk Analysis on risk or threat of Possible remedial measures
administration level corruption
operations
1.1 Submission of the Medium Accelerate the processing of The registration process should be fully
registration documents registration documents in the automated with minimum human intervention
at the tax office with system, ignoring any intentional and the business registration process should
the physical forms. or unintentional errors. Accept be integrated and verified with other relevant
unreliable/uncertified documents, government agencies. The simplification
ignoring the need for detection of measures should ensure that taxpayers can
possible fraud or falsified supporting follow up the stages of the registration
documents for tax registration. process at the centralized government agency
network—referred to as e-government.
1.2 System check with the Medium Creation of multiple false tax As an innovative initiative, the national
previous registration or identification numbers to facilitate identification number is corresponded to the
other tax registrations. tax fraud and establishment of individual tax identification numbers for
ghost taxpayer with invalid address citizens.
or same address, which is already
registered with another taxpayer
(highly risky in the administration of
a value-added tax).
1.3 The certification/ High When the taxpayer is registered with The principle of segregation of duties should
licensing process being the system, automatically eligible be properly applied and the entire process
administered manually to get benefit of some exemption should be administered online through an
for taxpayers that are and economic incentives from the e-government platform. The lack of reliable
looking for fiscal or government, which is certified by registration data creates opportunities for
non-fiscal incentives the tax administration standalone the officials and taxpayers as well. The
through bribery. or jointly. verification program needs to be designed
carefully to ensure the capture of all legitimate,
potential taxpayers and categorize them
accordingly.
1.4 Identification of High The tax administration officials can Cross-check with other government agencies.
potential taxpayers overlook the potential taxpayers Effective on-site inspection visit program at
and non-registered who fail to register or falsify their the taxpayer premises through dedicated unit.
individuals and legal registration identities/types of
entities. business.
Tax Arrears Management
The collection of tax arrears and tax refund processing are among the critical functions of a tax
administration in curbing corruption. Tax arrears are those liabilities that have been legally
assessed through a self-assessment, an administrative action and an audit, but not paid by the
legal deadline, including (a) outstanding tax liability; (b) penalties; (c) interest accrued; and (d)
other legally imposed amounts (Crawford, 2013). Tax authorities are relatively equipped with
the legal authority to enforce the collection of tax debts. Tax arrears and refund management
are among the highest risky areas if there is an absence of standard, automated operation pro-
cedure, which is automated (Figure 12.3 and Table 12.3).

Figure 12.2 The filing of tax returns and payment processing
Tax Audit
Tax audit function along with its selection process is highly susceptible to corruption (Figures
12.4 and 12.5 and Table 12.4). Tax audit is the examination of a taxpayer’s business records
and financial affairs to ensure that the amount of tax reported and paid are in accordance with
tax laws and regulations. An efficient and effective tax audit division will assist the govern-

Table 12.2 Corruption risks in the filing of tax returns and payment processing
Selected key tax

Likely
Ref. administration Analysis on risk or threat of corruption Possible remedial measures
risk level
operations
The tax administration would fail to Identify and publish the principles of
fulfill the key conditions and functions the self-assessment system for both
for a properly functioning self-assessment internal tax administration staff training/
system: (1) a legal framework—sufficient guidance and taxpayers service charter in
understanding of tax obligations and communication with taxpayers.
Tax filing in the rights; (2) taxpayer-oriented services; (3)
2.1 High
self-assessment system. simplified filing and payment procedures;
(4) effective non-compliance detection
and collection enforcement; (5) a selective
risk-based audit program and fairly applied
sanctions; and (6) fair and timely dispute
resolution (Okello, 2014).
In case of in-person submission, tax As an innovative initiative, the
officials may take advantage of the lack introduction or improvement of
of knowledge of taxpayers regarding tax electronic systems for filing and paying
laws. Especially in low-income developing taxes (2.1 (b), flowchart) reduce the
countries, the tax administration mainly frequency of in-person interactions
provides a face-to-face service at the tax between taxpayers and tax officials and
offices and this creates more opportunity reduce collusion between the two parties
to tax officials for extortion. They can use to reduce tax payments.
their power and threat in order to extort The development of new initiatives
illicit payments from taxpayers, which is plays a critical role in delivering
referred to as extortion. Tax declarations a corruption-free service that underpins
Tax payment and also are submitted by the tax intermediaries core functions such as:
identification of (accountant, CPA or lawyer). Within – separate, dedicated tax facilitation
2.2 non-filers, stop-filers, High tax administrations, tax intermediaries’ centersa
nil-filers and networks might negatively influence – a tax legislation portal with
non-payers. the environment if there is no sufficient sector-specific secondary regulations
regulation about the responsibility of the – an effective call center facility
intermediaries. – an interactive online taxpayer portal.b
In case the system does not identify The tax system should be simplified in
non-compliance with filing and payment a way that leads to increased certainty
requirements, tax officials may be and stability of tax norms, which is
involved dishonestly and illegally in a powerful instrument to minimize
the identification of those taxpayers and corruption.
thereby negotiate “bribes” with taxpayers.
The reconciliation process poses a revenue
fraud risk if the process is operated
manually with human intervention.
Note: Dedicated tax facilitation centers: a tax official, trained and particularly selected, is assisting a visiting
a
taxpayer with online application at the contact centers to help taxpayers who wish to file electronically but who
do not have access to computers; b Interactive taxpayer portal: defined as an interactive question-answering
system which emerges at the intersection of question-answering and dialogue systems, which allows users to
find the answers to questions in an interactive way. During the answering process, the automatic system can
initiate a dialogue with the user in order to clarify missing or ambiguous information, or suggest further topics for
discussion.

Figure 12.3 Tax arrears management processing
ment in its pursuit of increasing taxpayer voluntary compliance and facilitate the tax adminis-
tration’s aim of getting “the right tax at the right time” (Lethbridge, 2013).
Tax administrations carry out tax audit functions between headquarters and field offices.
While the field office is a focal point of taxpayer services between the tax administration and
the taxpayer community, tax auditors interact with the taxpayers in conducting tax audits.
Since the auditors are required to interact with the taxpayers to perform audits, tax audit

Table 12.3 Corruption risk map of tax arrears management procedures
Ref. Selected key tax Likely Analysis on risk or threat of corruption Possible remedial measures
administration risk level
operations
3.1 Case management High Tax officials are assigned to taxpayers based on The filing—payment—tax arrears
methods to deal with territorial allocation and apply non-standardized management processes must be
the debtors with the tailored debt installment options to the debtor. operated by separate dedicated
pre-programmed Head of tax office is authorized to make installment units under the territorial tax
interventions. and/or start strong enforcement action for cases. This offices.
gives the opportunity for responsible tax officials to Develop a centralized debt
corrupt. management policy in dealing
with debtors, which is regulated
by the administrative acts. This
methodology applies the same
treatment measures (maturity,
reduction) and recovery
techniques to taxpayers, who are
in the same situation.
3.2 Arrears collection High Unsustainable enforcement actions taken by tax Establish an electronic garnishee
enforcement. officials and lack of integrated real-time electronic system to recover money directly
garnishee system leads to creating opportunities for from debtors’ bank accounts,
corruption. by integrating with the banks
and other relevant government
agencies such as asset and real
estate land registries and vehicle
registries.
function is ranked the most corruption function in tax administration in terms of corruption
risks. Hence, reforms of tax administration should aim to have an automated internal and
external system to control and monitor the auditors’ responsibilities and proceed the process
to reducing the vulnerabilities and opportunities for rent seeking. Tax audit processes have the
following key components.
●● selection of taxpayers for tax audit;

●● execution of tax audit;
●● audit closure;
●● post-audit activities; and
●● alternative dispute resolution activities.
Tax Appeals
Some tax administrations have an excessive volume of tax appeals, often due to the complex-
ity of tax laws and procedures, and are therefore prone to risks of corruption (Figure 12.6 and
Table 12.5). A credible and predictable resolution process is the cornerstone of an efficient tax
administration system since the cost of a complex and long litigation process is costly for both

Figure 12.4 Tax audit selection processing
the taxpayer and tax administration sides. Tax disputes may arise from the following situations
(Thuronyi et al., 2013), among others:
1. The outcomes of tax audits are disputed.

2. The taxpayer does not want to accept the assessment made by the tax administration.
3. Administrative errors in the calculation of penalties (miscalculation, double taxation, tax
base).

Figure 12.5 Tax audit execution process
4. Administrative errors in taxation (wrong person or taxpayer, period, tax subject).

5. The facts are in dispute.
6. There are issues regarding the interpretation of the tax provisions, thus requiring a decision
by the relevant tax courts.
Tax disputes can be resolved in three main ways: (1) alternative dispute resolution institutions
before the tax audit is concluded; (2) alternative dispute resolution institutions at the end of the

Table 12.4 Corruption risk map of tax audit selection and execution procedure
operations
4.1 Selection of taxpayers for High The main risk is the manipulation There is a need for risk assessment to
tax audit. of audit selection for financial gains be used in selecting cases for tax audit.
by tax officials. Tax officials can Taxpayers are selected using system-based
take advantage of manual selection methods based on the objective criteria
or random selection through (pre-programmed) and data to identify the
unautomated selection processes in most risky for tax audit.
order to grant not being selected for The model assesses the relative position
tax audit. of each taxpayer among its colleagues
operating in comparable conditions (in
terms of business sector, size and region
of operation) for a number of (risk) factors
and then identifies the deviation of each
taxpayer’s unique position from the
overall pattern of each (risk) factor.
4.2 Assigning the tax auditor Medium There is a risk that corruption in tax Cases selected for tax audit should be
in charge. administration may take place in assigned to the tax auditors based on
a more organized manner with tax workload using some indicators, taking
officials and taxpayers colluding into consideration the nature of the
to evade taxes. Well-connected assignment. On notification, tax auditors
companies try to intervene in the identified to conduct in an assignment
assignment process to be audited by should assess their relationship with
the less experienced tax auditor. the audited taxpayers and its staff
and determine whether there are any
circumstances that could potentially
impair their independence or objectivity
while conducting the tax audit.
4.3 Ensuring the High Tax auditor can take advantage of An internal management system should be
standardization in the non-standardized procedures, or developed to standardize the execution of
execution of tax audit. technical complexity of disputed tax audits by tax auditors and the senior
issues in the execution of tax audit management team, which will facilitate
by overriding procedures for a bribe the investigation of corruption and limit
or vice versa. Closure of a tax audit tax auditors’ discretionary powers.
without any reassessment being
made or penalties being imposed
for an evaded liability.

operations
4.4 Communication with the Medium During the audit, tax auditors can Develop an external, interactive taxpayer
auditee taxpayer during override (or vice versa) examination audit portal to communicate with the
the tax audit. procedures for performing head of the audit department, chairman
cross-check activities with the of the tax administration and dedicated
auditee taxpayer and third parties unit, aimed at enhancing ethics and
for a bribe. Without well-designed integrity within the tax administration and
hearing processes, tax auditors may government.
manage the process alone. The primary role of taxpayer
communication portals is to provide
contact management services during
tax audits for the audited taxpayers, tax
audit managers and senior management
team. Taxpayers could use the portal to
inquire about the status of the tax audit.
The taxpayer audit portal should support
tax audit function and allow taxpayers to
send their requests directly to the senior
management team.
4.5 Dealing with disputes High Disputes can arise during the audit Establish a report-evaluation commission
during the audit and taxpayers want to solve this to ensure the standard operation procedure
procedure. issue before the audit is concluded and discuss technical issues regarding the
due to the high cost and long facts and disputed issues.
procedure of the litigation process.
4.6 Dealing with disputes High The audit procedure concludes Settlement/conciliation could be used in
at the end of the audit with the proposed tax reassessment the context of formal negotiation created
procedure. by the tax auditor, opening up the by legislation to reach an agreement and
opportunities and motivations for terminate the dispute with the taxpayer
both taxpayers and tax officials to before or after realization of the tax
engage in corrupt behavior. assessment.
In case of disagreement, there is
a settlement mechanism within the tax
administration to solve the disputed issue
as an alternative dispute resolution.
tax audit within the tax administration; and (3) appeals to the court. Tax legislation provides
that a taxpayer can contest assessments issued by the revenue authorities.
REFORM MEASURES IN DESIGNING THE ANTI-CORRUPTION

ACTION PLAN AND SUCCESSFUL COUNTRY STORIES
Risks of corruption may be generated either by the weaknesses inherent in the tax admin-
istration’s own internal procedures or external factors in the framework in which the tax
administration operates. Crucial to designing a tax administration anti-corruption strategy
is the identification of bottlenecks that hinder tax administration processes and creating
opportunities for corruption. In the area of organization and processes, the development

Figure 12.6 Tax appeal process
of an anti-corruption strategy requires determining the specific risks of corrupt behavior at

the various stages of the tax administration business process. An analysis of the corruption
opportunities of the tax administration business process and the development of a risk map are
prerequisites for the design of an anti-corruption strategy. Governments are currently under-
taking a series of reforms to fight against corruption in the area of tax administration. Table
12.6 presents selected country cases.

Table 12.5 Corruption risk map in tax appeals procedure
Ref. Current situation Likely risk Analysis Recommendations

level
5.1 Dealing with disputes after High Due to the high cost of court The tax appeals commission is an
the audit within the tax proceeding, tax litigation independent statutory body and has sole
administration or external process poses a high risk with responsibility for accepting or refusing
body during the pre-court its complexity, uncertainty appeals although revenue can raise
process. and unpredicted outcomes, complaints to appeals.
which creates opportunities for
corruption.
5.2 Decision-making process by Medium The appeal process is Transparency of tax litigation process
the taxpayer. time-bound, thus resulting in and unclarity in the potential outcomes.
speedy resolution of appeals. Establish a tax appeal portal publishing
This is a key requirement of court decision, which enables taxpayers
the efficiency of the dispute to find relevant decisions as needed by
resolution process for both the sector, theme, issues, tax provision, etc.
taxpayer and tax administration.
CONCLUSION
Corruption in tax administration exerts a detrimental impact on not just revenue collection,
but even more so, on growth and equity. Its root causes are multiple and therefore designing
an effective anti-corruption strategy is inherently complicated and multi-faceted. Regardless
of the specific shapes and forms of an anti-corruption program, thorough diagnostics of the
institutional and procedural weaknesses as well as vulnerabilities in the core functions of tax
administration—and based on such diagnostic outcomes, the development of a functional risk
map—become prerequisites for the design of any workable anti-corruption strategy.
This chapter aims to add value in the existing body of literature on corruption in taxation by
offering a roadmap for designing anti-corruption programs based on risk mapping of key busi-
ness functions. It is worth highlighting, on the other hand, that enhanced risk mapping even
though critical serves only part of the overall solution. As global experience indicates, curbing
corruption in tax administration can never succeed with just an isolated short-term vision or
without a comprehensive, “whole of government” approach to target a broader set of gov-
ernance initiatives (see, for example, Le, 2007). In taxation, anti-corruption measures would
ultimately boil down to reducing the opportunities for rent seeking. These would require the
setting of coordinated organizational and legal reform actions, ranging from simplifying the
overall tax system to automating specific business processes.
To conclude, we suggest that further research be extended in the direction that would
deepen business process reengineering based on finer analyses of the multiple faces of motives
and opportunities for corruption. The six core dimensions of such targeted business process
enhancement consist of: (1) mapping operational corruption risks; (2) simplifying the tax laws
and procedures to facilitate administration and reduce compliance costs; (3) adopting digital
technologies; (4) establishing an effective tax control and audit procedure; (5) strengthening
the institutional governance using a three-pronged approach anchored upon human resource
development, organizational restructuring and performance management system; and (6) cre-
ating effective communication channels and political commitment to reform.

Table 12.6 Country-specific programs for mitigating corruption risks in tax

administration
Country Guiding principle Reform approach

Georgia Introduction of By 2003, rampant corruption involving tax evasion, illegal tax credits and theft of
comprehensive tax government tax revenue had left public finances in a shambles. A policy of zero tolerance
administration reforms for corruption was adopted and the tax system has been simplified through the smart use
of an information management system to improve compliance and fight corruption. By
2008, Georgia’s tax revenue to GDP ratio had doubled to 25 percent. The key lessons
derived from Georgia’s experience include: (1) for tax reforms to be successful, they
must be driven by both the tax administration leadership and the overriding government
leadership; (2) in order to curb corruption, there must be a transformation of mindset of
both tax administrators and taxpayers; (3) early success of tax reforms must be matched
with visible improvement in public service delivery in order to ensure sustainability of
achievements; (4) tax administrators must be empowered to perform their duties without
political interference; (5) tax laws and reforms must be applied uniformly to all taxpayers;
and (6) salary increments for tax administrators must be matched with an increased
probability of detection of corruption and guaranteed termination of employment should
a tax administrator be found guilty of corruption (Magumba, 2019).
Australia Development of tax Tax office guidelines for understanding and dealing with the bribery of Australian and
office guidelines for tax foreign public officials form part of the instruction manuals for tax staff and include
officers instructions on referring suspicions to the police as well as useful additional information
that can help in dealing with such cases (OECD, 2012).
Zambia Political commitment The Zambia Revenue Authority has introduced a number of initiatives designed to
to increased level of increase taxpayers’ awareness of tax laws, customs rules and regulations. These include
integrity publication of information brochures and posters, development of a public website and
regular participation in public radio programs (Fjeldstad, 2005).
Bolivia Business process A recent and relatively successful anti-corruption strategy on value-added tax refunds
improvement conducted in Bolivia applied a process flow approach that appears to be powerful in
preventing corruption in tax administration.
India Automation of tax IT is used to reduce corruption in several tax areas. The Computer-Aided Administration
management system of Registration Department (CARD) replaced manual procedures that lacked transparency
in property valuation and resulted in a flourishing business for brokers and middlemen,
who exploited citizens buying or selling property. The CARD system replaces the manual
services with computerized services and introduces several new services. It eliminates
interaction with tax officers. It completes registration formalities within an hour, through
electronic delivery of all registration services. It improves the quality of services offered
by providing a computer interface between citizens and the government. Computerization
has ensured transparency in the system and made the life of ordinary citizens easier
(Purohit, 2007).

Country Guiding principle Reform approach

Turkey Reengineering of the In Turkey, the central database receives input from four primary sources: the value-added
business process and tax return, a list of suppliers, a list of customs declarations and a list of export invoices.
use of automation This information, in conjunction with the taxpayer’s application for a refund, is fed into
through value-added the central database and analyzed and a value-added tax refund control report is issued to
tax self-enforcing the tax offices. One of the exceptional parts of the value-added tax risk model is the use
mechanism of reports of purchase/sales forms to analyze additional suppliers in the transaction chain.
This is a very important aspect of the model because, in most cases, fictitious companies
are hidden under the claimants’ suppliers. Typically, they disappear after they issue false
invoices for a couple of months. Therefore, detecting them as soon as possible in the
transaction chain is vital for spotting false value-added tax refunds (Dogan, 2011).
Tajikistan Adoption of digital Modernization of IT infrastructure and the introduction of a unified tax management
technologies system mean increased efficiency, with reduced physical interaction between tax officials
Introduction of and taxpayers. The rate of e-filing is now as high as 87.4%, with 97.2% of all legal
electronic tax filing entities and 77.8% of individual entrepreneurs filing their tax returns electronically. The
new system enables the tax committee to generate the data necessary for its analytical
work, and to improve reporting and tax assessments. Around 200 electronic kiosks are
being built and equipped in remote locations around the country to help taxpayers who
wish to file electronically but who do not have access to computers. This will help ensure
that the tax committee can receive local taxes in time and with less cost. The likelihood
and impact of e-filing adoption varies across firms with low and high risks of tax evasion
by reducing opportunities for collusion between taxpayers and tax officials. Such
programs have led to a substantial increase in tax collection and a reduction in corruption
cited in business surveys.
NOTES
1. How do you define corruption? Transparency International, 2018: www.transparency.org/what-is
-corruption#define (accessed October 20, 2019).
2. Anti-corruption challenge, International Monetary Fund: https:// imfilab
.brightidea.com/
ANTICORRUPTION (accessed October 20, 2019).
3. Taxpayers are any persons (natural persons or legal entities) registered for tax purposes, who are
obliged to pay or collect, deduct or remit any of the taxes in terms of the respective tax legislations,
or who are required to provide information to the tax administration.
4. The entity or individual person is responsible for paying taxes and fulfilling the tax obligations
defined in the law.
5. Potential taxpayers are persons who are registered in the system with a tax identification number but
who are not taxpayers or responsible persons.
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13. Corruption and administration in
environmental protection
Rob White
INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the nature of corruption in relation to environmental crime. The impact
and consequences of environmental crimes and harms on a planetary scale are growing and are
becoming ever more devastating. For example, exploitation of species (plant and non-human
animal) and destruction of ecosystems and landscapes (including specific features such as
rivers and mountain tops) are leading to the further demise of the living and non-living.
Biodiversity is rapidly diminishing, and waterways and oceans are being despoiled. The scope
and scale of the problem is widening daily – illegal fishing is a global problem; deforestation is
a global problem; air, land and water pollution is a global problem – such that the transnational
character of environmental crime is fundamental to the harms with which it is associated.
Behind the commission of many environmental crimes lies corruption. This can involve
specific acts such as bribery in the public and private sectors, embezzlement, influence
peddling, abuse of functions and illicit enrichment. It may refer more generally to unethical
and self-interested behaviour. For the purposes of this chapter, corruption is defined in two
ways (White, 2017: 56). Corruption relating to the environment is interpreted as implying
both moral corruption (involving the undermining of trust and respect for established govern-
mental processes and institutional practices, as guided by democratic oversight) and/or direct
corruption (involving direct breaches of criminal laws, facilitated by government officials and
non-government actors).
Environmental crime refers to transgressions against humans, specific environments and
plant and animal species. It is typically defined on a continuum ranging from strict legal
definitions through to incorporation into broader harm-based perspectives. It includes specific
types of crime such as air, water and land pollution, illegal disposal of electronic waste, wild-
life trafficking, illegal fishing and illegal deforestation. Depending upon perspective it can
also include harms that have yet to be officially criminalised, such as activities that diminish
biodiversity and that contribute to global warming. A distinction can be drawn between envi-
ronmental crimes defined by illegality and serious harms that hitherto have been unrecognised
under law as illegal, but which nonetheless are of great interest to criminologists and others
working in this area.
The main concern of this chapter is with environmental crimes that are legally defined as
such, that are associated with natural resource extraction and that involve some element of
corruption in their execution. Environmental harms are furthered by politicians who make
bad decisions, corporate groups that seek to maximise profits, local citizens who take more
than they sustainably should and bureaucrats who find themselves under enormous pressure to
satisfy competing stakeholders especially from powerful sectoral interest groups. Sometimes
people make bad decisions because they are bribed to do so. Sometimes they do so because
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Corruption and administration in environmental protection 175
they have conflicts of interest or fail to fully appreciate the gravity and nature of the harm (as
in the case of ‘folk crimes’ like illegal hunting or fishing in rural communities). Some engage
in corrupt behaviour in order to make money for themselves, their families or their mates
(business acquaintances or friends). Bad decisions in this instance are decisions that are made
against the public interest and for illegal and/or unethical political gain or financial profit.
What follows are some of the challenges in the environmental space that face public admin-
istration. In this area more than in most there is an intersection of civil service, politicians,
corporations and organised crime. In part this is due to the substantive importance of the envi-
ronment, and particularly resource extraction, to many economies. For example, in Australia,
the resource-extraction industries – such as forestry, coal and gas, mining and water for
irrigation – are key employment generators and economic benefit multipliers. This translates
into a different dynamic for public servants when dealing with the challenges of environmental
crime and environmental regulation. There are many specific interests at play, and some of
these are powerful indeed.
The challenges associated with environment resource use and management are evident at
different levels across the bureaucratic spectrum. Many people are implicated in these pro-
cesses – scientists, clerical officers, customs inspectors, accountants, tax collectors, fisheries
officers, border personnel, parks and wildlife officers, environmental protection officers and
so on. Moreover, the number and expertise of these public servants who collect data, apply sci-
entific knowledge, issue permits, inspect sites, count revenue, invest in infrastructure, measure
outcomes and enforce compliance are dictated not only by manifest ecological and social
obligations surrounding environmental resources, but political context, fiscal considerations,
legislative parameters and legal frameworks, and business responses to allied matters such as
taxation and ‘green tape’.
Untangling the roles and duties of, as well as the pressures on, those engaged in public
administration in natural resource management areas warrants close scrutiny and ought to
be the subject of a larger work. For present purposes, however, this chapter provides a short
survey of some situations in which civil servants and others are implicated in corrupt and
unethical activities involving particular environmental and social outcomes.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
Much attention within the relevant criminological literature on environmental crime is directed
at how, where and why natural resources are used, and the impacts of this on the wider envi-
ronment. This includes consideration of:
●● natural resource extraction and, in particular, what is being extracted, how and for what
purposes (for example, trees from forests, water from rivers, fish from oceans);
●● contamination related to natural resources (such as pollution of streams and creeks from
factories) and the threat posed by stockpiles of toxic and hazardous materials (for example,
mine tailings dams); and
●● transformations in nature that have potentially harmful consequences (for example, clear-
ing land for flex crops (for example, multi-use plants such as palm oil) and building dams,
both of which affect water flow and land use).
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The most common environmental crimes fall into two broad categories: natural resources
crimes (e.g., trees and animals) and pollution crimes (e.g., contamination and toxic waste).
Yet, even these environmental crimes frequently embody a certain ambiguity. The label of
environmental crime tends to be applied to specific activities that are otherwise lawful or
licensed (e.g., cutting down trees, pulling fish from the ocean) since these are viewed as
not being intrinsically criminal or ‘bad’. It is the context that makes something allowable or
problematic.
Institutionally, government oversight and regulation of natural resources occurs in a sector
that is wide ranging. It can include, for example, matters pertaining to agriculture, climate
and environment, water, fisheries, forestry, mining, wildlife and land use. Within this sector
there are many different stakeholders. At an official level, these include industry and firm
representatives, scientists, farmers, fishers, government regulators and political leaders. In
some instances, non-government organisations (NGOs) may be accorded official powers and
status (for example, in dealing with the welfare of animals), and diverse interest groups (such
as recreational fishers and surfers) may be part of public dialogue about natural resource use
and environmental consequences (for example, the impact of salmon farms). The complexity
of the sector is heightened by the fact that much environmental harm occurs not only within
but across governmental borders, hence increasing the need for multi-agency and cross-border
collaboration.
Most environmental harm is intrinsically transnational since it is by nature mobile and
easily subject to transference. The classic case of this is air pollution. For example, 2015 saw
the worst ever smoke haze over Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, extending to Thailand and
the Philippines. This was caused by illegal fires started in peatland and forest on Indonesia’s
Sumatra Island and the Indonesian part of Borneo. The fires were started in order to cheaply
clear land for palm oil and pulp and paper plantations.
The illegal trade in wildlife is similarly transnational in character. Environmental crimes in
Asia, for example, involve countries that are engaged in various forms of global transfers – of
animals and plants, fish and other creatures of the sea, and forest products (see for examples,
Lundgren, 2012; Joines, 2012; Setiono, 2007; Zhang et al., 2008; Wong, 2019). Specific coun-
tries and specific regions experience different types of wildlife crime (in relation to Vietnam,
for example, see Cao, 2017). Much illegal wildlife trafficking involves Asian consumers as the
main markets for commodities sourced elsewhere. For example, a rhinoceros product (espe-
cially the horn) makes its way from various African countries to destinations such as Vietnam,
China and Hong Kong, for the purposes of traditional medicine and/or as a (mythical) cancer
cure. Abalone is illegally trafficked from Australia to food markets in Hong Kong and Japan.
Tiger skins are taken through Nepal and Tibet to mainland Chinese cities (Wong, 2019).
Illegal wildlife trade is not the only threat to particular animal species. The intense com-
petition for food worldwide is also evident in the ways in which commercial fishing takes
place. The issue here is not only that of biodiversity, but of wholesale destruction of major
breeding grounds and fishing beds. The greatest negative impact to the long-term sustainable
management of global fisheries is a combination of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
(Petrossian and Clarke, 2014). This may involve huge factory ships that operate on the high
seas, and which process thousands of tons of fish at any one time. Alternatively, it may be
organised around dozens of smaller vessels, each of which is contracted to provide a catch that
ultimately brings reward to the originating contractor. In other words, such production can be
organised according to the economies of scale (e.g., factory ships) or the economies of scope
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(e.g., small independent fishers). In each case, however, there is a link to legitimate markets
(e.g., for abalone, for crayfish, for fish) so that the value of the commodity can be realised in
dollar terms. It has been estimated that illegal fishing losses in the Asia-Pacific are in the range
of 16 per cent of the overall annual catch (Meere, 2009). Notably, countries in the region also
constitute significant markets for illegally sourced fish and seafood.
The complexity of environmental crime is related to geography, ecology and political gov-
ernance. The laws and rules guiding action on environmental crime vary greatly at the local,
regional and national levels, and there are overarching conventions and laws that likewise have
different legal purchase depending upon how they are translated into action in each specific
local jurisdiction. In part, differences in law-in-practice and conceptions of what is an environ-
mental crime stem from the shifting nature of what is deemed harmful or not.
Also relevant to the study of environmental crime is the notion of ‘cross-over’ crime. This
refers to interlinked crimes that include environmental offences. An example of this is human
trafficking and persons being forced into virtual slavery on illegal fishing boats (UNODC,
2011). Environmental crimes such as wildlife trafficking occur alongside other serious
offences, including theft, fraud, corruption, drugs and human trafficking, counterfeiting,
firearms smuggling and money laundering (Wyatt, 2013). Another related aspect of this is the
involvement of organised crime groups. Criminal networks involved in environmental and
related cross-over crimes are many and varied (Ayling, 2013). Some are involved in transport-
ing and trading more than one commodity at a time. Such crimes also demand access to and
use of money-laundering facilities and financial institutions (Setiono, 2007).
Importantly, specific commodities (such as tiger skins, rhino horns and elephant ivory)
require an integrated network that links the point of origin to the point of sale, even though the
gatherers/producers and consumers/clients may be disparate and unconnected. This demands
local knowledge of poaching practices and communal contexts, as well as transit routes and
venues for opportunistic exchanges (Wong, 2019). Particularly in relation to cross-border
crime the operational success of criminal networks involves conscious, intentional criminality
and, where required, the paying of bribes to appropriate government officials in regards illegal
logging, illegal wildlife and other environmental crime commodities. The corrupt engagement
of government officials, including those at the front end of environmental law enforcement
(e.g., customs officials, local police), is likewise part of the overall picture of environmental
crime (Setiono, 2007; INTERPOL, 2015).
NATURAL RESOURCES AND CORRUPTION
Corruption and natural resource extraction have long gone hand in hand, especially in the
wildlife and forestry sectors. In these sectors corruption is evident in activities such as
payment of bribes to government officials or politicians for preferential treatment, extortion by
officials from operators to artificially legalise illegal operations, evading national regulations
with relative impunity and bribing customs and border security personnel to ignore smuggling
(Van Dinh, 2012; INTERPOL and UNEP, 2016). But corruption always occurs in specific
places, involves specific actors and involves concrete activities such as bribery and abuse of
office. The nature and extent of corruption will vary from country to country and situation to
situation, as will the officials working in enforcement, detection, prosecution, the judiciary and
policy making who are implicated in corruption (UNODC, 2012).
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Arguments to the contrary notwithstanding (‘it does not happen here’), corruption is ubiq-
uitous and global – that is, it is a Western as well as non-Western phenomenon (see Whyte,
2015). For example, moral and legal corruption is evident in places such as Australia, and
especially in regards the natural resources extraction industries (White, 2017). The specific
dynamics of corruption may vary, but the core problem of corrupt business dealings is exten-
sive. In a similar vein, there is an interrelationship between the causes and consequences of
environmental harm on a world scale, and environmental crime is only part of this overarching
picture.
The bulk of environmental crime-related transfers involve the movement of valued com-
modities from vulnerable communities and nation-states to more powerful nation-states and
privileged classes. By and large, it is the South feeding the appetites of the North. Timber, fish,
wildlife and minerals tend to flow from source countries through transit countries to countries
of destination, where those with the money (corporations and high-status groups and individ-
uals) can purchase what they wish.
Many countries are simultaneously transit and destination countries, just as they may well
harbour the ‘victims’ of environmental harm as well as the ‘offenders’ who perpetrate envi-
ronmental harms. For example, China is not only a major destination country for e-waste, it is
also one of the highest e-waste generators in Asia – thus, it is both a source of and a destina-
tion for e-waste. In a similar vein, Vietnam, China and Hong Kong are destination countries
for illegal wildlife. It is consumer demand in these countries that fosters the exploitation of
animals elsewhere, from South Africa, Australia and New Zealand for example. Deforestation
in Indonesia may be bolstered by government bio-fuel policies in Europe, but the resulting
pollution nonetheless affects many of its Asian neighbours. Moreover, China and India are,
themselves, major importers of flex crops, thereby contributing to the problem of deforestation
stemming from changing land uses.
The flipside of corruption is regulation. What companies can or cannot do is very much dic-
tated by the laws and regulatory regime in place that guide natural resource use and extraction.
Short of direct corruption, there are many ways in which lack of adequate regulation can itself
be seen as a form of corrupted practice. For instance, in supporting economic development,
the state can cut costs and encourage business growth by narrowing the scope of its purview
and involvement in regulation. This reduction can take several different forms, such as cuts
in state resources allocated to environmental audits (e.g., botany mapping), or the censoring
of scientific information which may be publicly sensitive for specific industries (e.g., fishing,
forestry, mining) or for private contract partners of government (e.g., water treatment plants,
power station operators).
The state nevertheless has a formal role and commitment to protect citizens from the worst
excesses or worst instances of environmental victimisation. Hence, the introduction of exten-
sive legislation and regulatory procedures designed to give the appearance of active interven-
tion, and the implication that laws exist which actually do deter such harms. The existence of
such laws may be encouraging in that they reflect historical and ongoing struggles over certain
types of business activity.
In the specific area of environmental regulation, the role of government remains central,
even if only by the absence of state intervention. The general trend has been away from direct
governmental regulation and toward ‘softer’ regulatory approaches. This, too, opens the door
to corrupted governmental processes. Consider, for example, the notion of regulatory capture.
The concept of regulatory capture refers to the situation where a government agency is domi-
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nated by the very businesses and corporations it is meant to be regulating. For instance, Simon
(2000) describes many instances in which the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) seemed to be more concerned with protecting corporate interests than protecting the
environment. An example of this was a study that showed that the EPA devoted more of its
resources in terms of time and money in the early 1990s to exempt corporations from its regu-
lations than it did to enforce the regulations.
Today, this phenomenon of regulatory capture is most obviously manifest in the adminis-
tration of President Donald Trump who, upon election, systematically appointed pro-industry
officials to key environment and natural resource portfolios (such as Scott Pruitt, who had filed
lawsuits against the EPA in support of business while Oklahoma Attorney-General, to head
up the EPA).
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
This section provides illustrations of various kinds of corruption associated with the exploita-
tion of natural resources. The examples are drawn from different national contexts and deal
with diverse types of activities and commodities (such as fish, water and wildlife). A dis-
tinction is made between direct corruption and illegal actions, and unethical and corrupted
practices.
Direct Corruption and Illegal Actions
Wildlife trafficking
The illegal trade in wildlife involves the trading of non-human animals (alive or dead, in whole
or in part) and plants (including seeds) that is expressly prohibited in international convention
and domestic laws. This is very much transnational in scope, as recognised by authorities
in Europe and Asia amongst other places, and is frequently seen to involve corruption. For
example, from the point of view of the European Union:
It is acknowledged that corruption is an important driver for wildlife trafficking and that it seems
to occur at every stage of the value chain. More precisely, corruption happens in source countries
on the level of poaching, preparation and selling. In transit regions, the steps of concealment,
cross border smuggling and fraudulent documentation need corrupted actors. Finally in destination
countries, corruption plays an important role in documentation, storage, consumption and sales.
(EUCPN, 2019: 21)
In a similar vein, studies of illegal wildlife trade and the nature of border smuggling in
countries such as China, Russia, Uganda and Morocco have highlighted the prevalence of cor-
ruption in particular countries, in particular locations and in regards particular commodities,
as well as the way in which lack of training and human resources contributes to the problem
(Wyatt, 2013; Wong, 2019).
Wyatt et al. (2018) observe that corruption associated with wildlife trafficking occurs
within the context of three structural elements: where agents within the criminal justice system
collude with criminal groups (for example, taking bribes to acquit smugglers or to permit them
to cross borders); where there are weak financial institutions and failure to enforce money
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laundering and tax evasion laws; and where there is lack of political will to enforce laws and
strong measures directed against wildlife trafficking.
Forests
Deforestation is a major issue and is occurring in tropical forests located in countries such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar, with substantial negative biodiversity impacts
(UNEP, 2013). Estimates of illegal logging account for about 25 per cent of removals world-
wide (Setiono, 2007: 27). It has been estimated that the Greater Mekong region, a major source
of the world’s biodiversity, has lost nearly one third of its forests in the past four decades and
that Cambodia loses its forests at the rate of over 2,000 square kilometres a year (Ghosh, 2015).
In the Asian context, much of this illegal logging occurs with the involvement of corrupt
government officials, including law enforcement officers, financial institutions and backers,
and businesspeople who import timber or wood-base products. Bribery and ‘goodwill’ pay-
ments, smuggling, illicit trafficking, money laundering and forging of documents are all part
of the illegal logging industry (Setiono, 2007; Cao, 2017). China is the biggest consumer of
stolen timber in the world, and like Singapore is a major transport hub, as well as destination
country.
Unethical and/or Corrupted Processes
Fishing
The largest producer of farm-raised salmon in Australia, Tassal, has come under considerable
criticism for its environmental impact. Despite this, since 2014 the Aquaculture Stewardship
Council and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have certified it consistently as a sustainable
business. Looking at the nature of specific NGO–corporate partnerships, it has been observed
that the WWF has long had a transactional relationship with Tassal involving a paid corporate
consultancy on the part of the WWF (Bleakley, 2019). Namely, in return for a substantial
yearly payment (in the order of AUD$500,000), Tassal received both consultancy support
and exclusive rights to the use of the WWF logo in the Tasmanian aquaculture industry. The
unethical behaviour can be applied two ways, to the company and to the NGO:
the loose regulations governing environmental NGOs has compromised the eco-labeling system and
has contributed to a situation in which a company, such as Tassal, is able to misrepresent the true state
of its environmental credentials. While it is not a crime for an environmental NGO, such as the WWF,
to receive money from a business to use its logo, these organizations can become complicit in perpet-
uating a form of fraud on the buying public – one in which consumers are greenwashed into believing
that the product they are purchasing is verified as sustainable, when it is not. (Bleakley, 2019)
Another instance of ethically suspect action relates to Timor-Leste, but this time in relation
to illegal fishing. In 2017, a large fleet of Chinese fishing boats was caught out by police in
Timor-Leste with thousands of dead sharks on board – evidence of illegal fishing on a massive
scale. The 15 boats and their Chinese crew were impounded and detained, while prosecutors
investigated their activities and prepared a legal case against them. However, it was later
reported that ‘inexplicably, East Timor’s District Court in Baucau has now released the crew
without charge and allowed them to take the boats back to China – in return for a US$100,000
guarantee – on the grounds the crew did nothing wrong’ (Barker, 2018). The sharks were
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apparently not confiscated but allowed to go back to China with the boats, where they would
have been worth millions of dollars.
Timor-Leste is not, however, a signatory to the CITES convention, which prohibits fishing
of endangered species. Nonetheless, spokespeople from Sea Shepherd argued that several
breaches of the fishing license occurred. Moreover, if the Chinese boats had not broken the
law, then why would they pay the money. Questions were also raised as to where and whom
precisely the money was paid (Barker, 2018).
Water regulation
In July 2017, an Australian Broadcasting Corporation Four Corners investigation revealed
a series of improper conducts pertaining to the Murray-Darling Basin, the largest fresh-water
system in Australia (ABC Four Corners, 2017). Four Corners is a long-running investigative
current affairs television program produced by the national public broadcaster. Specifically, it
was alleged that in New South Wales:
●● huge amounts of water were being diverted (stolen) for use by large agriculture companies
upstream – more than they were entitled to (1.1 billion gigalitres for one property alone);
●● there was pump tampering and failure to keep diaries and logs;
●● the top regulator in New South Wales had offered to help lobbyists campaign against the
Murray-Darling Basin plan (by sending de-identified government documents to industry
people); and
●● the Strategic Investigations Unit in New South Wales was disbanded at precisely the time
when it was asking for more resources to address significant problems (compliance was
moved out of the relevant government department).
The broadcast led to no less than eight official inquiries into these issues (Murray-Darling
Basin Authority, 2017; Craik, 2018), involving federal and state agencies, anti-corruption
and water management groups, the New South Wales ombudsman and the South Australian
Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission.
In addition to these sub-sectors there are lessons to be learned from corruption in the admin-
istration of forests, oil and gas and mining (White, 2017) just to mention some domains.
CONCLUSION
For civil servants in the natural resource sector there are many challenges in dealing with
corruption. These pertain to models of intervention (e.g., from soft compliance to ‘big stick’
approaches), regulatory frameworks (e.g., pyramid or tool-box approaches), integrity in
management (e.g., ethics and internal monitoring systems), whistleblowing and anonymous
response systems (i.e., identification of problems and violators), political interference (e.g.,
regulatory capture) and raising awareness generally of issues of public interest and concern
(e.g., education and civilian engagement). What complicates these issues in regards envi-
ronmental harm is the fact that much of the corruption and criminality in this area also has
transnational aspects.
As noted earlier, many of the operational matters pertaining to environmental crimes are
inherently international in scope and substance. Networks are geographically based (for
example, known transit points and destinations in Asia), discipline-based (for example, envi-
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ronmental prosecutors) and commodity-based (for example, wildlife) (Pink and Bartel, 2015).
Collaboration across these dimensions and involving these networks can be predominantly
horizontal, vertical or diagonal (Pink and White, 2016).
International calls to fight corruption are resonating in places such as South East Asia, in
part because there are regional pressures building up to stop activities that are demonstra-
bly hurting people in nearby countries, such as the lighting of illegal fires in Indonesia to
facilitate crop substitution. In response to these pressures, there now exists in Indonesia the
Financial Investigative Unit and the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Agency, both of which have
engaged in training courses offered by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, with
positive results in regards to the detection, investigation and prosecution of illegal logging
(Nellemann et al., 2014: 90). Other initiatives have included measures such as enhanced use
of the timber-tracking database system through to the participation of local communities as
‘barefoot investigators’, particularly in the national parks and forest reserve areas (Santoso,
2012). Efforts to combat environmental crimes of this sort have included stakeholders such as
enforcement agencies, the public at large and NGOs.
Moreover, in Indonesia there has been the use of anti-corruption laws to catch and indict
members of the so-called ‘forest mafia’ (comprised of government officials working in con-
junction with private companies) who have been found guilty of corruption in the forestry
sector (Fariz, 2012: 32). This is especially significant insofar as:
In many provinces and districts, illegal logging leading to rapid deforestation has not only been
carried out by illegal companies, but also by legitimate businesses that acquired legal concessions.
Legal companies, including mining and palm oil companies, have obtained concession permits from
governors and regents to clear the state forestlands and then convert them illegally to mining sites and
palm oil plantations. (Fariz, 2012: 31)
Corruption which is generally seen to be detrimental to national development constitutes one

of the major limitations of existing environmental law enforcement efforts globally (Graycar
and Felson, 2010; Akella and Allan, 2014). The fight against corruption is nonetheless today
part of international political discourse. Countries and regional associations such as the
European Union are responding to these international calls to fight corruption, as are agencies
such as Interpol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
A number of NGOs are also well-known whistleblowers and critics of corruption (see, for
example, Global Witness, 2015). By increasing the number of agencies, actors and profes-
sional experts engaged in environmental crime efforts, there is greater potential to respond
more robustly to corruption (White, 2017).
What is needed, therefore, is an integrated program of intervention that incorporates several
dimensions. These include, for instance, further development of inter-agency collaborative
approaches to environmental law enforcement, and specifically the opportunities and promise
of the NEST model recently developed by INTERPOL as a preferred model of intervention;
consideration of the specific role and value-adding to law enforcement offered by NGOs, and
by whistleblowers (situated in both government and NGO agencies) in exposing and address-
ing issues of corruption, money flows and crime detection and response effectiveness; and
enhancing the levels and types of specialisation in dealing with environmental crimes required
for effective law enforcement in this area, across the spectrum of detection, investigatory,
prosecution and adjudication activities.
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14. Studying police integrity
Sanja Kutnjak Ivković
INTRODUCTION
Stories of police corruption, particularly when widespread and systematic, are cover-page
news. They show how police officers, public servants entrusted to enforce the law, instead
abuse their position for personal gain. When David Burnham, a former New York Times
journalist, decided to publish the story of police corruption among the New York City Police
Department police officers in the 1970s, a chain of events that unfolded illustrated the gravity
of the problem it uncovered. Realization that police corruption is widespread and systematic,
yielding millions of dollars in illegal gain, as Frank Serpico initially stated to Burnham,
resulted in the establishment of the Knapp Commission (1972), a systematic investigation of
police corruption, numerous arrests of police officers, and a reform of the police department.
Twenty years later, the arrest of Michael Dowd, a former New York City Police Department
officer who became a drug dealer and earned ten times his salary from his illegal transactions,
and his colleagues in 1992 by the Suffolk County Police, resulted in the revelations of the
close connection between the police and organized crime, convictions and lengthy prison
sentences, a scandal, the establishment of the Mollen Commission (1994), and another exten-
sive reform of the police department. The Rampart Division scandal in the later 1990s in Los
Angeles, implicating more than 70 police officers in a range of corrupt activities, from steal-
ing and selling narcotics, planting false evidence, committing bank robberies, and perjuring
themselves, shook the country yet again and resulted in disciplinary actions against 24 police
officers, closing of the police CRASH unit, reopening and eventually an overturn of over 100
prior criminal convictions, filing over 140 civil law suits against the City of Los Angeles, and
settlements in over $125 million (PBS, 2012).
Police corruption is not limited to the United States. Two Australian independent com-
missions demonstrate its severe consequences. The Australian Fitzgerald Inquiry (Fitzgerald
Commission, 1989, p. 216) engaged in a systematic investigation of police and political
corruption in Queensland, providing evidence of corruption sufficient to generate numerous
prosecutions and convictions of top-ranked Queensland police officers. The report of the
Wood Royal Commission (1997), tasked to investigate the systemic and entrenched nature
of police corruption within New South Wales, revealed that police detectives were regularly
paid to protect a ring of pedophiles. In the aftermath, numerous police officers were arrested,
Peter Ryan from the United Kingdom was hired to oversee the reform upon realization that
the top administrators are too compromised by their own misconduct and ties to corrupt police
officers to conduct the reform themselves, and the New South Wales laws were revised.
Thus, various independent commissions (e.g., Knapp Commission, 1972; Mollen
Commission, 1994; Wood Commission, 1997), scholarly studies (e.g., Kane and White, 2009;
Kutnjak Ivković, 2003), and case studies of police corruption (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković et al.,
Forthcoming) provide ample evidence that police officers engage in various forms of police
corruption. While it is clear that some police officers sometimes violate official rules and
185
Sanja Kutnjak Ivković - 9781789900910
engage in police corruption, more precise insights into the prevalence and degree of severity
of such behavior are anything but, in no small part because obtaining accurate information is
riddled with challenges.
Policing is an occupation rife with opportunities for corruption; as Klockars and colleagues
argue (2004, 2006), it is a discretionary activity that typically occurs outside of supervisors’
oversight and before witnesses who lack credibility, are unwilling to report misconduct
because of the code of silence, or have motives not to report because they engage in police cor-
ruption themselves (Kutnjak Ivković, 2003). Prior scholarly studies attempting to measure the
extent and nature of police misconduct illustrate these problems. Martin (1994) and Knowles
(1996) both experienced very strong resistance from the police officers to any study of police
misconduct and, because of opposition from the police unions, had to change their research
strategy and drop from their projects a number of data-collection sites, including the City of
Chicago and the State of Pennsylvania. Similarly, Fabrizio (1990) asked experienced police
officers attending the Federal Bureau of Investigation police academy about police corruption;
unlike all of the other questions, characterized with very high response rates, questions about
corruption were returned blank.
This chapter discusses the theory of police integrity and the related methodology, devel-
oped to circumvent the challenges associated with direct measurement of police corruption
by studying instead its opposite—police integrity. The chapter outlines the basic assumptions
of both the police integrity theory and the police integrity methodology. Although the police
integrity approach has been used extensively over the last 25 years to measure the contours of
police integrity in over 30 countries, only a handful of prior studies have used this approach
to measure the contours of police integrity over time. This chapter contains an empirical
exploration of the contours of police integrity in Croatia, an East European country in transi-
tion, over a period of 14 years. We measure whether the way in which the society at large has
been dealing with corruption has affected police officers’ views of police corruption and their
willingness to report it.
THEORY OF POLICE INTEGRITY

To avoid the problems associated with direct measurement of police corruption, Klockars and
Kutnjak Ivković (2004) have opted to measure its opposite—police integrity. Police integrity
is defined as “the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights
and privileges of their occupation” (Klockars et al., 2006, p. 1). The theory of police integrity
(e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006;
Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a) rests on the premise that the causes of police integrity are organiza-
tional and societal.
The first dimension of the theory focuses on the official rules and the way they are made
by the police administration, communicated to the police officers, and enforced by the police
administrators (e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997, 2000, 2004,
2005, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019). Official rules
regulating proper police behavior and prohibiting police misconduct could range from the
constitutional norms and legal statutes to the police agency official rules and the code of ethics
(e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a). What differs across police agencies is the extent to which
official rules regulate police misconduct, the way these official rules are made, how often they

Studying police integrity 187
are enforced, and how familiar police officers are with, and supportive of, the official rules
(Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a). Hence, a police agency of high integrity is an agency in which the
official rules prohibiting police misconduct have been established and are taught, internalized,
and supported by the police officers (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a).
The second dimension of the theory links police integrity with the control mechanisms used
by the police agency to detect and investigate police misconduct (e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak
Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a;
Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019). These control mechanisms could include proactive
internal methods, such as education in ethics, integrity testing, and early warning systems, as
well as more traditional reactive control methods, such as internal investigation and discipline
of police officers (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a). Therefore, police agency of high integrity
utilizes both reactive and proactive mechanisms of control regularly and does so consistently
(e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 2000, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković,
2015a).
The third dimension of the theory links police agencies’ efforts to curtail the code of
silence—an informal rule in the police culture that prohibits police officers from reporting
misconduct conducted by fellow police officers (e..g, Mollen Commission, 1994)—with the
level of police integrity (e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997, 2000,
2004, 2005, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019). Klockars
and colleagues (2000, p. 2) proposed that the parameters of the code of silence, namely what
behavior is protected by the code and to whom this protection extends, vary across police
agencies. Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld (2019) argue that the police agency’s efforts in
curtailing the code of silence directly relate to the contours of police integrity in the police
agency. Hence, a police agency of high integrity is an agency characterized by a weak code of
silence that does not protect serious forms of police misconduct (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a).
The fourth dimension of the theory links social, political, economic, and legal conditions
in the society at large with the level of police integrity in the police agency (e.g., Klockars
and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković,
2015a; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019). According to the theory, societies at large shape
the level of police integrity in their police agencies by establishing, teaching, and enforcing
the laws, creating and operating external control systems, and fostering a culture intolerant
of misconduct by governmental employees. Therefore, a police agency of high integrity is an
agency that embraces positive, integrity-inducive societal conditions and minimizes the effect
of negative, integrity-challenging societal conditions (Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019).
MEASUREMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY
The theory of police integrity is accompanied by an empirical approach that allows scholars
and police administrators to measure the contours of police integrity. Originally developed
by Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004), it rests on the premise that it is possible to ascertain
the contours of police integrity systematically and empirically while avoiding the pitfalls that
direct measurement of police misconduct would likely engender. Toward that goal, Klockars
and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) have focused on measuring police integrity or the level of intol-
erance for misconduct in the police organization (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019).
Instead of asking direct questions about the prevalence and nature of police misconduct,

Klockars and colleagues ask questions of fact and opinion about police integrity less likely
to result in such resistance (e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997,
2000, 2004, 2005, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019). The
approach is based on hypothetical scenarios describing various forms of police misconduct.
The first questionnaire that Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) designed, the police cor-
ruption questionnaire, was envisioned to measure the opposite of police corruption. It contains
11 scenarios, of which nine are examples of police corruption. The second questionnaire
developed by Klockars and colleagues (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019) broadened
the scope of inquiry to other forms of police misconduct. It contains 11 scenarios describing
a range of different forms of police misconduct.
Upon reading each of the hypothetical scenarios, the respondents were asked seven identical
questions (e.g., Klockars et al., 2000, 2004, 2006). Three questions contain measures of the
first dimension of the theory, assessing the respondents’ familiarity with the official rules and
their support for the official rules. Although the questionnaire does not measure directly the
quality of the internal control mechanisms, that is, the second dimension, it contains two ques-
tions related to the control mechanisms. These questions focus on the respondents’ perceptions
of the appropriate and expected discipline. The questionnaire incorporates two measures of
the third dimension of the theory pertaining to the code of silence. The questions tap into the
respondents’ willingness to report misconduct and their perceptions of the likelihood that other
police officers would report. Finally, the questionnaire does not contain any measures of the
fourth dimension, so these measures would need to be developed separately (e.g., Kutnjak
Ivković and Haberfeld, 2019).
MEASURING POLICE INTEGRITY OVER TIME
The theory of police integrity and the related methodology were developed over two decades
ago and have been used by scholars to explore the contours of police integrity in over 30
countries (e.g., Klockars et al., 2004, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2015a; Kutnjak Ivković and
Haberfeld, 2019). Yet, the overwhelming majority of extant studies have measured police
integrity at a particular point in time. By contrast, very few studies have engaged in the meas-
urement of police integrity over time.
Klockars and colleagues (2006, p. 137) highlighted the importance of repeated applications
of the police corruption questionnaire and the police integrity questionnaire:
The simplest way to employ a second survey as a test of the reliability of the earlier inquiry is what is
sometimes called a “test-retest” strategy. It involves distributing a second survey after sufficient time
has passed for respondents to forget the answers they had given on a first survey and then comparing
the results. If answers to the same question on both surveys are identical, or differ only in ways that
are explainable by some obvious event, it is evidence that respondents are answering honestly.
To achieve this goal, they incorporated several scenarios from the police corruption question-
naire into the police integrity questionnaire (see the Methodology section for details; Klockars
et al., 2006).
The first application of the police integrity methodology over time occurred soon thereafter;
Klockars and colleagues (2006) compared the responses provided by the police officers from
three police agencies surveyed about two years apart using the two versions of the question-

naire. Although there were no statistically significant differences between the results on the
police corruption questionnaire and the police integrity questionnaire administered two years
apart in Charleston and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Klockars and colleagues (2006) reported
significant differences in such views in St Petersburg, but only for one scenario. The change in
the police officers’ assessment of the acceptance of gratuities detected by the empirical results
was a consequence of the new approach toward the acceptance of gratuities developed by the
police administration during this time period.
Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman (2012) traced the contours of the code of silence among
police officers in South Africa. Like Klockars and colleagues (2006), Kutnjak Ivković and
Sauerman (2012) focused on the six scenarios used in both versions of the questionnaire
and reported that the respondents’ own willingness to adhere to the code of silence seemed
somewhat weaker in 2010/11 than it was in 2005. This change did not affect their perceptions
of how likely most police officers in their agencies would be to report misconduct. Similarly,
Khechumyan and Kutnjak Ivković (2015) examined the contours of the code of silence among
Armenian police officers and found that the code of silence might have weakened in the
period of about five years (2008/2009 to 2013). The most recent study of changes in the police
integrity-related views over time (Van Droogenbroeck et al., 2019) measured the short-term
effects of specific police training on the police officers’ integrity views; one month after the
training was completed, the respondents’ estimates of misconduct seriousness and willingness
to report remained about as high as they were immediately after the training, and both were
higher than before the training had commenced.
The police integrity theory and methodology could be adjusted to assess changes in not
only police officer views, but also public views about police misconduct. Kutnjak Ivković and
colleagues (2019) assessed the potential changes in the public views about police misconduct
over a period of two decades (1996 versus 2016). The results uncovered that the students sur-
veyed in 2016 perceived police misconduct as more serious, supported more severe discipline,
and seemed more likely to report misconduct than their counterparts in 1996 did. However,
the differences across the two cohorts in the assessments of how police officers would evaluate
misconduct were not nearly as pronounced.
METHODOLOGY
The Questionnaire
The first police corruption questionnaire focused almost exclusively on one form of police
misconduct—police corruption (e.g., Klockars et al., 1997, 2000, 2004). Following Roebuck
and Barker’s typology of corruption (1974), nine scenarios included in the questionnaire
described a range of corruption activities, from the acceptance of gratuities and internal
corruption to shakedown and theft. In addition, there is a scenario describing off-duty employ-
ment and a scenario describing the use of force. To address the problem of measuring only the
resistance to the for-gain misconduct (i.e., police corruption), the second version of the ques-
tionnaire (Klockars and colleagues, 2005, 2006)—the police integrity questionnaire—contains
a wider range of forms of police misconduct, from the use of excessive force (four scenarios)
and police corruption (five scenarios), to planting of evidence and falsification of the official
report (two scenarios).

After the police officers participating in the study read the description of each scenario, they
were asked a series of identical questions. While the wording of the questions was the same
in all versions of the questionnaire, the answers were not always identical. The first pair of
questions inquired about the perceptions of misconduct seriousness. The first question focused
on the respondents’ own evaluations of misconduct seriousness, and the other question asked
the respondents to estimate how serious “most police officers in your police agency” would
evaluate them. The respondents could pick an answer from a five-point scale, ranging from 1
= “not at all serious” to 5 = “very serious.”
The next pair of questions targeted the respondents’ views about discipline. The first
question asked about the respondents’ views about the approprite discipline, while the second
question asked the respondents about discipline they expect their agency to mete out. The
offered answers are dependent upon the legal options available at the time. The police corrup-
tion questionnaire used in 1995 had only five choices (“no discipline,” “public reprimand,”
“fine,” “period of suspension,” and “dismissal”) and the police integrity questionnaire, used
in Croatia in 2009, had six disciplinary options (“no discipline,” “public warning/reprimand,”
“fine in the amount of 10% of the employee’s salary,” “fine in the amount of 20% of the
employee’s salary,” “no promotion in rank for 2–4 years,” “no advancement in service for 2–4
years,” “reassignment into a lower-ranked assignment,” and “dismissal”). We have reclassi-
fied answers to create four categories in each version of the questionnaire (“no discipline,”
“reprimand,” “harsher discipline other than dismissal,” “dismissal”).
The last two questions focused on the code of silence. The first question teased out the
respondents’ own willingness to report misconduct, while the follow-up question asked the
respondents to estimate how likely most police officers in the police agency would be to report
the misconduct. The respondents could pick an answer from a five-point scale, ranging from 1
= “definitley would not report” to 5 = “definitely would report.”
To entice the respondents’ truthful answers, Klockars and colleagues (e.g., 2000, 2004,
2005, 2006) included only a few demographic questions, focusing on the respondents’ length
of service in policing, their assignment, and supervisory position. Then, the respondents were
asked whether most police officers filling out the questionnaire would answer honestly. The
last question inquired whether the respondents themselves told the truth while filling out the
questionnaire.
The Samples
The first sample, collected in 1995 (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković and Klockars, 1998, 2004), is
a stratified random sample of 41 police agencies, selected in a way that closely represents
the national distribution of police agencies by region, size, and type (Kutnjak Ivković and
Klockars, 1998). Border police and specialized police agencies were excluded from the sample
frame. The resulting sample of 1,649 police officers is a representative national sample.
The second sample, collected in 2009 (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015b), is also a stratified
random sample, covering 22 police agencies selected in a way that closely resembles the
classification of police administrations and police agencies (see, e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2015b).
Specialized police stations (e.g., border police, maritime police) were excluded from the
sampling frame. The stratified sample includes 966 police officers and 176 additional police
officers throughout the country assigned to community policing, comprising a representative
national sample of 1,142 police officers.

At the time the data were collected in 1995, Croatia had just implemented “Flesh,” a major
military operation, and, less than three months later, would engage in an even more encom-
passing military operation, “Storm.” Both military operations included not only the Croatian
military, but also the police. When the war broke out in Croatia in the early 1990s, the police
were the only legitimate agency with the right to use coercive force. The Croatian Parliament
passed the statute that established the National Guard Corps as a police service within the
Croatian Ministry of the Interior (e.g., Kutnjak Ivković, 2000; Kutnjak Ivković and Klockars,
2004) and the process of hiring a large number of police officers followed immediately. For
the next two years, the police performed both the defense role and the regular police role
(Kutnjak Ivković, 2000). The war had many negative consequences, including the relaxation
of official rules and the strengthening of the code of silence among the police (see, e.g.,
Kutnjak Ivković, 2004).
The end of the military conflict, the peaceful reintegration of the remaining part of Croatian
territory, and the transition toward a democratic society and the police followed in the later
1990s and early 2000s. During this period, a range of economic, social, legal, and political
transitions occurred in the society at large (Kutnjak Ivković, 2000, 2004, 2015b). Croatia’s
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index gradually improved from 2.7 in
1999 to 4.4 in 2008, suggesting that the country was perceived as less corrupt over time.
The circumstances seem to have worsened over the next few years, though, with the score
declining to 4.0 in 2011. The majority of the Croatian citizens participating in the late 2000s
Transparency International survey estimated that the level of corruption in the country had
increased in the previous three years (Transparency International, 2011) and evaluated the
government’s efforts to deal with corruption as ineffective (2011, p. 47). The 2011 United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime study provided further support that corruption remained
a problem; about one third of the respondents thought that the level of corruption had increased
over the previous two years and about one half perceived that the level of corruption had
remained the same (UNODC, 2011, p. 44). The strongest motivator to deal with corruption in
the country was the possibility of accession to the European Union, which eventually occurred
in 2013, five years after our second survey.
These changes in the society at large also affected the police; new laws were enacted that
dramatically changed the definition of the police role and the police functions (Police Law,
2000, 2011). The police were officially defined as the “public service within the Ministry of
the Interior entrusted to perform the tasks enumerated by the law” (Police Law, 2000, Article
2). In addition, the new laws, such as the Police Law (2000, 2011) and the Code of Criminal
Procedure (1997, 2008), imposed more stringent regulations on the police rights and duties
and regulated police discipline (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015b). Despite the enactment of the new
laws regulating police conduct, Kutnjak Ivković (2015b) argued that their consistent and
uniform enforcement remained a challenge.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

Demographic characteristics of the two samples (Table 14.1) reflect the development of the
Croatian police. Because the Croatian police was established in the early 1990s, it is not sur-
prising that over three quarters of the respondents (76%; Table 14.1) in the 1995 sample had
been police officers for five years or fewer. On the other hand, most of the police officers in

Table 14.1 Sample characteristics
1995 sample (%) 2009 sample Chi-square Phi

(%)
Length of service 1,017.45*** .647
Up to 5 years 75.5 13.4
6–10 years 8.9 9.6
11–15 years 7.6 33.3
16–20 years 6.0 38.4
Over 20 years 2.0 5.3
Assignment 591.57*** .503
Patrol 44.3 34.7
Investigation 11.2 15.4
Communication 15.7 4.2
Traffic 22.6 4.2
Administration 1.4 1.7
Community policing 4.8 25.6
Other 0.0 14.1
Supervisory position 9.79** -.064
Yes 20.1 15.2
No 79.9 84.8
Others told the truth 90.73*** .193
Yes 80.8 63.6
No 19.2 36.4
Respondent told the truth 117.82*** .220
Yes 100.0 91.8
No 0.0 8.2
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
the 2009 sample had between 11–15 or 16–20 years of experience (33.3% and 38.4%, respec-
tively, Table 14.1). The most dominant assignment in both samples is patrol, with traffic as the
second most frequent assignment in the 1995 sample and community policing as the second
most frequent assignment in the 2009 sample.
About one fifth of each sample consists of supervisors; therefore, the majority of the
respondents are line officers. When asked whether other police officers would tell the truth
while filling out the questionnaire, over two thirds of both samples answered affirmatively,
but the 1995 sample was more likely to assume that other officers would tell the truth than
the 2009 sample was (Table 14.1). Finally, when asked whether they had answered truthfully,
virtually all respondents in the 1995 sample and over 90 percent in the 2009 sample answered
affirmatively. The respondents who had stated that they lied were excluded from further
analyses.
RESULTS
Evaluations of Corruption Seriousness
The respondents first provided estimates of corruption seriousness (Table 14.2). In the major-
ity of the scenarios, both samples evaluated corruption as serious; the mean values are above

the scale mid-point of 3.0 and toward the serious side of the scale for four scenarios in the
1995 sample and six scenarios in the 2009 sample. In five out of six scenarios, statistically
significant differences indicate that the respondents in the 2009 sample evaluated corruption
as more serious than the respondents in the 1995 sample did.
An analysis of the mean values of the respondents’ estimates of other police officers’
evaluations of seriousness of police corruption revealed that the respondents in both samples
assumed that their peers would evaluate most examples of corruption as serious. However,
a comparison across the two groups revealed statistically significant differences in five out of
six scenarios (Table 14.2); compared to the respondents in the 1995 sample, the respondents
in the 2009 sample assumed that most police officers in their agency would be more likely to
evaluate corruption as serious in four out of five scenarios with statistically significant differ-
ences. Although their own evaluations of seriousness for a theft from a crime scene are very
similar (i.e., not statistically significantly different), the respondents from the 1995 sample
were more likely to assume that other police officers would evaluate them as more serious than
the respondents in the 2009 sample were (Table 14.2).
A comparison of relative perceptions of seriousness, that is, how serious corruption
described in one scenario is evaluated compared to the corruption described in other scenarios
in the questionnaire, reveals substantial similarities in the respondents’ own evaluations of
seriousness across the two groups (Spearman’s rho = .886, p < .05); both evaluated the accept-
ance of gratuities and the police drink driving (DUI) as the least serious in the questionnaire,
and the theft from a crime scene and the acceptance of a bribe from a motorist caught speeding
as the most serious (Table 14.2). Similarly, there is a substantial similarity across the two
groups in the respondents’ evaluations of how most police officers would evaluate corruption
seriousness (Spearman’s rho = .886, p < .05); both evaluated the acceptance of gratuities and
the police DUI as the least serious in the questionnaire and theft from a crime scene and the
acceptance of a bribe from a motorist caught speeding as the most serious (Table 14.2).
Views about Discipline
There was only one scenario—the acceptance of gratuities—in which the majority of the
respondents in the 1995 sample thought that a police officer should receive no discipline at all
(Table 14.3). There was no scenario in which the majority of the respondents in 2009 thought
that the police officer should not be disciplined. On the other hand, in none of the scenarios
did the majority of the respondents in 1995 think that dismissal was the appropriate discipline,
although in one scenario—describing a theft from a crime scene—close to one half thought
that dismissal might be appropriate. By contrast, a slight majority of the respondents in the
2009 sample found dismissal appropriate for two scenarios (Table 14.3).
Some of the differences between the two groups of respondents in the respondents’ views
about appropriate discipline are very prominent. For example, in three scenarios (gifts; police
DUI; kickback), the difference between the percentage of the respondents in the 1995 sample
and the percentage of the respondents in the 2009 sample who thought that the police officer
should not be disciplined at all or should receive only a reprimand was in excess of 10 percent
(24% for gifts; 10% for police DUI; 11% for kickback). Similarly, there were two scenarios
(kickback; speed) in which the difference between the percentage of the respondents in the
1995 sample and the percentage of the respondents in the 2009 sample who thought that the
police officer should be dismissed was in excess of 10 percent (13% for kickback; 30% for

Table 14.2 Estimates of seriousness
Own seriousness Others’ seriousness

1995 sample 2009 sample t-test Diff. 1995 sample 2009 sample t-test Diff.
Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank
Scenario 1: Gifts 2.13 1 3.38 2 -.21.95*** -1.25 2.09 1 2.89 2 -15.92*** -.80
Scenario 2: Theft 4.72 6 4.78 6 -2.04* -.06 4.38 6 4.22 6 3.97*** .16
Scenario 3: Supervisor 4.09 4 4.34 3 -5.38*** -.25 3.76 4 3.67 3 1.81 .09
Scenario 4: Police DUI 2.79 2 3.02 1 -3.76*** -.23 2.65 2 2.79 1 -2.61** -.14
Scenario 5: Kickback 3.86 3 4.41 4 -11.46*** -.55 3.50 3 3.87 4 -7.19*** -.37
Scenario 6: Speed 4.47 5 4.68 5 -5.40*** -.21 3.91 5 4.17 5 -5.61*** -.26
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.


Table 14.3 Views about appropriate discipline
No discipline Public Harsher

Dismissal (%) Rank Chi-square Phi
(%) reprimand (%) discipline (%)
Scenario 1: Gifts 393.25*** .413
1995 sample 62.5 23.3 12.1 1.9 1
2009 sample 21.6 40.4 31.8 6.2 3
Scenario 2: Theft 8.82* .062
1995 sample 1.7 4.1 46.5 47.7 6
2009 sample 0.6 3.9 43.1 52.4 6
Scenario 3:
42.77*** .137
Supervisor
1995 sample 19.7 30.5 38.4 11.4 3
2009 sample 17.6 25.9 50.6 5.9 2
Scenario 4: Police
26.28*** .107
DUI
1995 sample 31.9 36.6 28.4 3. 2
2009 sample 29.1 29.7 38.4 2.8 1
Scenario 5:
65.84*** .169
Kickback
1995 sample 10.5 20.6 51.1 17.7 4
2009 sample 7.2 13.3 48.7 30.8 4
Scenario 6: Speed 242.93*** .324
1995 sample 2.3 12.6 63.7 21.3 5
2009 sample 2.3 3.9 42.4 51.3 5
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
speed). Both types of examples point toward the 2009 sample as more accepting of disci-
plining police officers when they engage in corruption and, when corruption is more serious,
disciplining harsher.
The second discipline-related question targeted the respondents’ views about expected
discipline—the discipline they expect the police administration to administer. The respond-
ents’ views about expected discipline tend to be more similar than they were for their own
views about appropriate discipline (Tables 14.4 and 14.5). Specifically, there were two (not
three) scenarios (gifts; police DUI) in which the difference between the 1995 respondents
and the 2009 respondents who expected no discipline or only reprimand was in excess of 10
percent. Similarly, there is only one scenario (not two) in which the differences were above 10
percent for dismissal (Table 14.4).
A comparison of the relative order of scenarios based on the percentage of respondents who
thought that discipline should or would be appropriate, capturing relative assessments of how
harsh discipline should and would be for each scenario compared to the other scenarios in
the questionnaire, indicates a high degree of similarity across the two groups of respondents
(Spearman’s rho = .829, p < .05 for appropriate discipline; Spearman’s rho = .771, p < .10 for
expected discipline).
Perceptions of the Code of Silence
The results show that the code of silence was present among the respondents from both groups,
but it was stronger among the respondents from the 1995 sample (Table 14.5). In particular, in

Table 14.4 Views about expected discipline
No discipline Public Harsher

Dismissal (%) Rank Chi-square Phi
(%) reprimand (%) discipline (%)
Scenario 1: Gifts 216.07*** .307
1995 sample 53.4 26.6 17.5 2.4 1
2009 sample 26.7 28.2 36.6 8.6 3
Scenario 2: Theft .058 .016
1995 sample 1.8 3.9 44.3 50.0 6
2009 sample 2.1 4.2 45.0 48.7 5
Scenario 3:
37.31*** .128
Supervisor
1995 sample 28.9 27.4 33.6 10.1 3
2009 sample 33.5 22.0 39.9 4.6 2
Scenario 4: Police
41.54*** .135
DUI
1995 sample 24.1 33.2 39.0 3.7 2
2009 sample 22.5 22.3 51.0 4.3 1
Scenario 5:
38.11*** .129
Kickback
1995 sample 8.4 18.3 52.7 20.6 4
2009 sample 10.5 10.5 51.0 28.1 4
Scenario 6: Speed 224.47*** .313
1995 sample 2.5 10.9 61.4 25.2 5
2009 sample 3.4 3.7 38.2 54.8 6
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
five out of six scenarios the mean values provided by the respondents from the 1995 sample
were about the mid-point of the scale or even into the non-reporting side (Table 14.5). On the
other hand, this was the case for only two scenarios for the 2009 respondents (Table 14.5). The
only scenario in which the respondents in the 1995 sample seemed willing to report corruption
describes a theft from a crime scene. At the same time, the willingness to report this theft was
not statistically significantly higher in 2009 (Table 14.5), while the respondents in the 2009
sample were statistically significantly more likely to say that they would report all other five
scenarios than were the respondents from the 1995 sample. The differences were particularly
large, about 1 on a five-point scale in two scenarios (acceptance of gratuities; accepting
a bribe) and, hence, of substantive importance (Klockars et al., 2006).
Unlike their own expressed willingness to report, the respondents’ estimates of the
others’ willingness to report suggested a more homogeneous picture over time (Table 14.5).
Specifically, only three scenarios featured statistically significant differences between the two
groups in the estimates of others’ willingness to report; in one of the scenarios (theft from
a crime scene), the respondents in the 1995 sample were more likely to expect that others
would report than the respondents in the 2019 sample were (Table 14.5). In the remaining
two scenarios with statistically significant differences (acceptance of gratuities; accepting
a bribe), the respondents in the 2009 sample were more likely to say that others would report
this behavior than their colleagues in the 1995 sample were.
The relative order of scenarios based on the mean values suggested that the respondents in
the 1995 sample and the respondents in the 2009 sample expressed similar relative willing-
ness to report (Spearman’s rho = .886, p < .05). The relative order of how likely other police

Table 14.5 Estimates of willingness to report
Own willingness Others’ willingness

1995 sample 2009 sample t-test Diff. 1995 sample 2009 sample t-test Diff.
Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank
Scenario 1: Gifts 1.67 1 2.68 2 -17.49*** -1.01 1.85 1 2.43 2 -11.44*** -.58
Scenario 2: Theft 3.96 6 4.04 5 -1.40 -.08 3.72 6 3.50 6 4.21*** .22
Scenario 3:
2.72 3 2.99 3 -4.16*** -.27 2.73 3 2.68 3 .71 .05
Supervisor
Scenario 4: Police
2.09 2 2.35 1 -4.31*** -.26 2.20 2 2.27 1 -1.35 -.07
DUI
Scenario 5:
3.14 4 3.52 4 -5.89*** -.38 3.05 4 3.12 4 -1.24 -.08
Kickback
Scenario 6: Speed 3.16 5 4.13 6 -3.17** -.97 3.07 5 3.30 5 -4.25*** -.23
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

officers would be to report behavior is even more similar between the two groups of respond-
ents (Spearman’s rho = .943, p < .01).
CONCLUSION
This chapter illustrates how problems associated with the direct measurement of police cor-
ruption can be alleviated by focusing instead on the measurement of police integrity. We used
the theory of police integrity and its related methodology (e.g., Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković,
2004; Klockars et al., 2000, 2004, 2006) to conduct an empirical study that sought to measure
potential changes in Croatian police officers’ views on police corruption over time.
The police officers surveyed in 1995 perceived corruption as somewhat less serious,
thought that somewhat less severe discipline was appropriate, and were less likely to say that
they would report than the respondents in the 2009 survey did. However, the results do not
suggest large differences in the opinions toward police corruption; rather, most differences are
moderate in size. The results of our study, conducted over a period of 14 years, also demon-
strate that the changes in the society at large could be directly related to how police officers
perceive corruption. Immediately after the war had ended, at the time of our first survey,
Croatia commenced the transition process. However, the zeal for, and effectiveness of, dealing
with corruption in society did not followed a clear path and, in fact, might have worsened
around the time of the second survey in 2009. Although stories of government-related cor-
ruption circulated through the press during this period, they peaked two years after, in 2010,
with the arrest of Ivo Sanader, a former leader of the Croatian Democratic Union and former
prime minister.
Our results also demonstrate that the respondents’ own views have changed more than
their perceptions of police culture. In each and every measure of the respondents’ views
about police corruption, the respondents in the 1995 sample typically expressed attitudes
associated with lower integrity. However, when it came to their assessments of police culture
and the actual discipline that the police agency would administer, the views expressed by the
two groups of respondents tended to be more similar. Our findings align with the findings
from the South African study (Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2012), which reported more
extensive changes in the personal views than in the views about police culture. Although the
views of their peers have changed over time—as evinced by the shift in their personal views
about police corruption—the respondents used a somewhat outdated set of perceptions about
how other police officers would react, which creates opportunities to deal with police culture.
Police administrators could use the results of empirical studies to signal to their police officers
that their peers may perceive police corruption more seriously than the police officers may
have assumed, thereby imparting information that, hopefully, will help create a culture in
which police corruption is less likely to be tolerated.
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15. Prison corruption: an ecological framework
Andrew Goldsmith
INTRODUCTION
Prisons are complex entities that frequently fail on their own terms. They aim to meet a range
of objectives (security, good order, rehabilitation, human treatment), however these aims are
often difficult to achieve in practice and can contradict or undermine each other. The condi-
tions of confinement mean that imprisonment inevitably imposes ‘pains’ of some kind on their
populations that contribute to stressful conditions for both staff and prisoners. These condi-
tions can set the scene for various kinds of corruption. Prisons also contain somewhat unique
populations united by the fact that those populations have been convicted of relatively serious
or very serious crimes, and often will have ongoing criminal associations in the outside world.
In many cases prisoners enter prison with prior histories of conflict with police, schools, courts
and other authorities, and troubled histories in terms of work, health and mental well-being,
yet prisons choose not to or are unable to do much to assist them. These factors also enable
prison corruption of various kinds. What occurs by way of corruption typically reflects inter-
sections between individual, group, institutional and wider environmental conditions. The
knotty problems of prison corruption will require responses often on more than one level. This
chapter therefore proposes to adopt what will be called an ecological approach – the need to
look at the myriad influences behind corrupt acts in terms of the ecology of prisons.
This approach finds support in the work of Philip Zimbardo, the originator of the famous
Stanford Prison Experiment in the early 1970s. Zimbardo declared many years later that the
most important lesson to be drawn from that experiment (as well as from many years of subse-
quent study and analysis) was that ‘Situations are created by Systems’ (Zimbardo 2007: 226).
His concept of system refers to the ‘institutional support, authority and resources that allow
Situations to operate as they do’. Systems, according to Zimbardo, operate in ways to validate
actions ‘that would ordinarily be constrained by pre-existing laws, norms, morals and ethics’
(2007: 226). Systems, he notes, have ideologies. An ideology is a ‘slogan or proposition that
usually legitimates whatever means are necessary to attain an ultimate goal’ (226). In terms
of applying this perspective to prison corruption today, we need to locate and account for the
influence of these ideologies in terms of how they legitimate or justify deviations from legal
and administrative commitments to rehabilitation and humane containment inside prisons.
We also need to look at those factors that shape particular situations of corrupt action.
Punishing the corrupt prison officer for bringing illicit drugs into prison to sell to prisoners
by itself does not explain why the demand for those drugs exists, or what factors around that
situation may encourage prison officers to act in this way. For Zimbardo, the system is not just
the immediate institutional environment, in the present case the prison (physical conditions,
management arrangements, staffing levels, training, etc). It also includes the wider sources of
resources, authority and ideology that enable and promote deviations from laws, norms and
ethics. An overwhelming focus on preventing escapes and limiting violence inside prisons
can displace attention from the other ends of imprisonment and unleash a range of practices
201
Andrew Goldsmith - 9781789900910
deviating from law and morality. His reflections on the system at Abu Ghraib military prison
in Iraq are consistent with, and support, his general argument.
The chapter is organised into four sections. The next section draws on some recent exam-
ples to make the case for a multi-level systemic approach to understanding prison corruption.
It points to links between characteristics of particular settings (e.g. architecture, facilities,
personnel working there, programmes) and wider influences (group, structural, political,
economic) and to the often unforeseen or unintended consequences locally of more general
policies and practices. This approach, we suggest, reflects an ecological model. The third
section then looks at several principal areas of prison corruption (inappropriate relationships,
contraband and inappropriate access and use of prisoner information). In light of the analysis
of their causes, I shall propose measures that go beyond responding to instances and that also
seek to remedy systemic issues. In the final section, I shall examine some areas in which
correctional integrity can be further developed and implemented as a key orienting principle
for prison operations.
THE COMPLEX ECOLOGIES OF PRISONS: SOME EXAMPLES
The following passage is from a recent report by the United Kingdom’s (UK) chief inspector
of prisons into conditions in Bedford Prison, a prison in the south of England. The conclu-
sions on the prison environment at Bedford are disturbing. Though the term corruption is not
directly employed, it is implicit at least in many of the issues raised, and therefore linked to
wider systemic problems.
The prison was fundamentally unsafe. Violence of all kinds had risen alarmingly since the last
inspection a mere two years ago. In the same period there had been five self-inflicted deaths and
levels of self-harm had risen. The violence was largely fuelled by drugs, and the prisoners – many of
them living in fear – were confined for unacceptable lengths of time in cells that were all too often
infested with vermin, dirty and unfit to be occupied. Many staff were doing their best in difficult
circumstances, but inspectors witnessed a dangerous lack of control and excessive tolerance of poor
behaviour. Meanwhile, few prisoners attended work or education and there was little encouragement
to do so by staff. Many prisoners milled about aimlessly on wings with nothing to do. In short, the
prison lacked a culture of work or learning. (Report on an unannounced inspection of HMP Bedford
by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 28 August–6 September 2018: 5)
Several points arise from this passage. The first is that corruption is not directly mentioned.
Yet references to drug-related violence and its impact on prisoner safety and access to services
point directly to the operation of drug markets inside many prisons. This link should cause us
to ask how such prohibited practices are possible. Prison officers are described as operating
in ‘difficult circumstances’ of squalor and vermin infestation. The demand for drugs in such
a setting should hardly be surprising, with fear, menace and pointless time-serving pervading
day-to-day life of staff and prisoners. Nor is it surprising to find that prison officers and other
staff are corruptly engaged in facilitating these prohibited activities. How is it then, we should
ask, that the ‘system’ permits or tolerates these conditions and related corrupt practices to
persist?
Some similar reflections on the connections between prison corruption and the wider
environment emerge from the following passage, again by the chief inspector of prisons, into

Prison corruption 203
life inside Feltham Young Offenders Institution, a ‘prison’ for young persons in the Greater
London region:
As HM Inspectorate of Prisons has reported in the past, the overriding issue behind the extraordinary
decline in performance over the past 18 months is the approach to dealing with violence and manag-
ing the behaviour of children. Of course, there is a need to keep children safe from each other, and for
staff themselves to be safe in their workplace. However, the response at Feltham A, for many years,
has been to focus too heavily on containing the problems rather than addressing them. As a result,
‘keep apart’ policies – developed so that children from rival gangs, or who for other reasons are likely
to be violent to each other, are kept separate – have come to dominate. This has led to a collapse of
any reasonable regime, prevented many children from getting to education or training, delayed their
access to health care, isolated them from meaningful human interaction and frustrated them to the
point where violence and self-harm have become the means to express themselves or gain attention.
There clearly needs to be a new approach which looks fundamentally to change behaviour and goes
beyond merely trying to contain violence through ever more restrictive security and separation.
(Urgent Notification: HMYOI Feltham A, HMIP, 22 July 2019)
Behind the appalling conditions described is a fundamental concern – the young people
inside are not getting the kinds of positive programmes and opportunities that they need for
successful release and integration back into the community. The emergence of gangs, often
linked to control of illicit markets inside prisons, is a wider phenomenon that goes to the prison
climate and threatens what can be called correctional integrity – the realisation of the proper
aims of the prison system (Goldsmith et al. 2016). While some components of the ecology of
corruption are internal to the prison or prison system, others are undoubtedly linked to factors
outside prison. Problems in the wider community, including drug and other forms of addiction,
are represented inside prisons, often in more acute form due to the paucity of treatment options
and the higher prices for illicit goods generated by the prohibition regime.
An ecological approach to understanding prison corruption, and the factors that under-
mine correctional integrity, requires consideration of particular examples of corruption from
potentially four different levels: (1) individual (personal, demographic features that influence
behaviour); (2) the micro-system (the power relations and the interactions between prisoners,
and staff and prisoners, in the prison); (3) the meso-system (the characteristics, policies and
practices of the prison, as well as the inmate culture); (4) the macro-system (‘the social atti-
tudes, perceptions and cultural beliefs of a society… may also include laws and customs’)
(Ahlin 2019: 165). The ‘System’ referred to by Zimbardo fits within this model, referring to
factors particularly in levels 3 and 4. The model also rejects the idea that prison corruption is
mainly or principally a matter of ‘bad apples’ and therefore of detecting and removing them.
Instead, we must look to the system that is the ‘barrel’ and indeed the ‘orchard’ in order to
explain why ‘apples’ (individuals) go bad (Punch 2003; Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996). This
multi-level framework is also convenient in that it allows the use of a range of criminological
theories that vary from structural (or background) factors such as race and economic inequal-
ity, to mid-level theories of group and media influence, to situational and individual theories
that focus on interactions and features of immediate environments.

MAJOR FORMS OF PRISON CORRUPTION
In 2015, a 51-year-old grandmother, Joyce Mitchell, assisted two convicted murderers to

escape from the Clinton Correctional Facility in New York. She did this while working on
staff at the prison. Prior to assisting the escape, she had progressed from bringing in cookies
for certain prisoners to conducting a sexual relationship with one of the prisoners in the prison
tailor shop where she was the superintendent. In preparation for the escape, she had smuggled
items into the prison such as hacksaw blades to be used in the escape. Mitchell was also found
guilty of conspiring with one of the escapees to murder her husband (Worley et al. 2018).
A couple of years earlier, a leader of a prominent prison gang, Tavon White, was operating
his drug-trafficking business from inside the Baltimore City Detention Center. In addition to
having up to 13 prison officers involved in smuggling contraband on his behalf into the prison,
he also had found the time and opportunity while imprisoned to father five children by four
different prison officers (Worley et al. 2018).
What we see here are several things. One is the blurring of prison corruption and organised
crime. Despite being in prison, some individuals can be involved in both activities, typically
which are linked to each other in some way. Another is the reversal of power relationships pre-
sumed to operate between officers and prisoners. In both these cases, prisoners had managed
to exercise power over the decisions of prison officers, with a variety of (mostly dire) conse-
quences. Also, what is evident is both a progression from relatively minor acts of corruption
to more serious forms (a ‘slippery slope’) and the co-incidence of different corruption types;
conducting a sexual relationship can lead to more serious breaches of security or accompany
other breaches at the same time (e.g. smuggling in contraband for a prisoner with whom one
is conducting a relationship).
The varieties of prison corruption are numerous and too difficult to address here in such
a finite space (see Goldsmith et al. 2016 for a wider review). For this reason, only three major
forms of prison corruption will be focused upon – inappropriate relationships, trafficking of
contraband and misuse of prisoner information. One reason to include inappropriate relation-
ships is that these relationships can be associated with a range of different corrupt practices.
This includes trafficking of contraband, as we will see, when prison officers form relationships
inside as well as outside prison to facilitate this traffic. Misuse of information can take differ-
ent forms, and be motivated for different reasons, as will be discussed. However, it is included
here because of the significance for prisoner well-being associated with the use and abuse
of this information. Information on prisoners can be falsified or leaked, affecting prospects
within the system as well as damaging their personal privacy.
INAPPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIPS
The nature and quality of relationships between prison staff and prisoners fundamentally
affect the prison climate and how prisons are run. As the Tavon White case shows, the type of
relationships White established with a large number of prison staff had a detrimental effect on
the prison regime. A difficult line must be drawn for those working in prison between dealing
in a respectful and concerned manner with prisoners, and getting too close, exposing staff to
the risk of manipulation and exploitation. Prison rules invariably impose strict limits on such
things as exchanging gifts or favours, formation of relationships with prisoners and excessive

fraternising on the grounds that professional distance is important to the good order of prisons.
The avoidance of perceptions of favouritism is one ground for such rules. Another is the erosion
of disciplinary capability of an officer compromised by such a relationship. By not getting the
right balance, the ability to practise dynamic security, the principle that prison safety and
security depends on good relationships in which staff and prisoners interact with respect and
staff provide fair treatment of prisoners (UNODC 2017), is compromised. Breaches of prison
and professional rules of these kinds are sometimes called boundary violations.
According to one former correctional officer and prominent researcher in the field:
Inappropriate relationships between inmates and staff occur much more frequently than outsiders
would care to believe, and in male facilities, they are often initiated by offenders. These actors, or
‘ballbusters’ to use Sykes’ (1958) terminology, can be extremely persistent and will often go to great
lengths to compromise correctional employees and disrupt the security of prison facilities (Worley
2016: 1224).
Perhaps the most prominent and familiar kind of inappropriate relationship in prison settings
is the sexual/romantic relationship between prison staff member and prisoner. These often
attract considerable media attention (e.g. Grierson 2019; Sky News 2018). What makes these
relationships inappropriate is not simply the fact that a rule against such relationships has
usually been contravened. It is rather the fact that a position of trust and responsibility has
been compromised, either by the officer ‘taking advantage’ of the vulnerability of the pris-
oner (reflecting an exploitation of a power imbalance between the two), or conversely when
a prisoner has successfully groomed an officer in order to obtain some kind of improper and/
or prohibited benefit inside the prison system. It should be noted, however, that inappropriate
relationships can also manifest non-sexually in the form of favouritism and nepotistic arrange-
ments from which some prisoners benefit unfairly over other prisoners. Inherent in the notion
of inappropriateness is the idea of boundary violation, the idea that work-related roles should
not become blurred by sentimental or other personal considerations, even if they are well
intentioned. These violations can occur between general prison duty officers and prisoners as
well as between specialist staff (nurses, teachers, etc.). In both cases, the conduct of such rela-
tionships is normally in breach of occupational and/or professional codes, as well as contrary
to the rules of the institution.
Inappropriateness can also occur in exogenous relationships, those conducted with persons
outside the prison. These could be relatives, friends, associates or acquaintances of prisoners.
Often these relationships are conducted through prison visits, letters and telephone conversa-
tions. From a prison corruption point of view, they are significant in two main senses. The first
is when these relationships relate in some way to the operation of illegal or prohibited activities
inside the prison (e.g. supply of drugs and contraband). The second sense, which can be related
to the first, is when prison staff become the vectors for communication between prisoners and
those outside the prison. In some cases, such relationships are planned from the beginning,
when an applicant for employment in prison has pre-existing relationships or associations
with persons inside prison (particularly, prisoners) or it can emerge later, when a prison
officer decides to assist persons outside and/or inside on the basis of relationships formed
with persons outside the prison. This category is sometimes referred to as insider threats when
there is a clear intent to exploit a workplace position for criminal or other improper purposes
(Goldsmith et al. 2016: 38). The United Kingdom Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017–2022 (HMG
2017) identified insider threats in prisons as one key area of critical vulnerability due to its

links to the furtherance of organised crime (as well as to realising the usual objectives of the
prison system) (HMG 2017: 31–2). These relationships are risk-prone to exploitation when
the staff member actively engages in activities (e.g. taking messages in or out, bringing in
contraband) that are illegal or prohibited.
The reasons why officers become engaged in these relationships can vary. At some level it
can be attributed to human nature; proximity of staff and prisoners under conditions of varying
intimacy and covertness link opportunity and temptation. The growing incidence of women
officers in male prisons certainly provides greater opportunity for heterosexual couplings than
was the case in the past. The conduct of improper relationships in prison requires one or more
of the following circumstances: places where scrutiny by others can be avoided for periods
of time, and the connivance or indifference of other officers and/or prisoners. Physical con-
ditions therefore can be analysed for risks in this respect, and devices such as CCTV cameras
and other forms of structured surveillance can be used to reduce opportunities (see Wortley
2002). It is difficult to deny also that some officers may succumb by reason of a combination
of personal circumstances and social isolation. Officers vulnerable to grooming for romantic
or sexual ends have been observed in many instances to be less well integrated peer-wise with
other officers, and to generally feel undervalued or mistreated in the workplace (Worley and
Worley 2011). In a recent case from Western Australia, a prison officer was groomed by pris-
oners when they noticed that other officers would have little to do with that officer. The officer
in question had moved to Perth from New Zealand and had no family or friends in Perth, so
he was socially isolated. He agreed to bring in drugs and other contraband based upon the
relationships he established with certain prisoners and their drug-supplying associates on the
outside (Western Australia 2018).
The theme of organizational injustice, the feeling held by employees that they are ignored,
undervalued or mistreated in the workplace, is a theme linked in some studies to the prevalence
of officer misconduct (Boateng and Hsieh 2019). By way of response, this line of analysis
points to the need for prison managers to pay more attention to questions of effective super-
vision and to ensure fair treatment of employees in the workplace. However, not all cases of
inappropriate relationship reflect poor peer integration or reliance on an absence of oversight.
There are accounts of these relationships on occasion being actively supported by other
officers, or of other officers ‘turning a blind eye’ to such things (Goldsmith et al. 2016). The
question of why officers fail to report breaches of prison rules by other officers is something
addressed later in this chapter.
TRAFFICKING AND CONTRABAND
A recent headline from the UK’s Independent newspaper read ‘Hundreds of prison officers
sacked for smuggling contraband into jail, new figures reveal’ (Forrest 2018). While pointing
to a disturbing level of failure by prison officers to follow the rules governing prison life, such
corrupt practices, as noted earlier, help foster and sustain the illicit prison markets for these
goods. The negative impacts from such compromises on officer control and authority inside
the prison are well established:
[T]he illegal system of goods and services definitely produces a situation where the corruption of
authority among officers is inevitable. Since officers are evaluated on how well they control their

respective areas and the inmate leader’s power is founded in the ability to facilitate contraband flow,
there is a necessary linkage between the two to promote long-term prison stability. Thus, the prison
organisation is forced to trade off some corruption for ‘order’. (Kalinich and Stojkovik 1987: 16–17)
While trading inside prison may be functional for some prisoners, there are many ‘dangers
of active involvement in the underground economy of prison life’, of which illicit drugs and
mobile phones are an integral part. As Copes et al. found, ‘When inmates engage in trading of
goods, services or other valued commodities, there is a likelihood not only of suffering from
inequitable exchanges, but also of finding oneself in a position of indebtedness or of being per-
ceived as a deserving or vulnerable target for violent reprisals, robberies or attacks’ (Copes et
al. 2010: 13–14). As in the case of illicit drug markets outside prison, those inside who control
access to drugs are able to manipulate demand among prisoners. One means is by providing
newly admitted prisoners with drugs on credit. By creating a debt in this way, prison drug
dealers are then able to exploit the indebted prisoner and his or her relatives through threats of
punishment or sexual assault (see Goldsmith et al. 2016: 69).
The ongoing trade in contraband of various kinds (cash, phones, SIM cards, drugs, etc.)
indicates strong demand from within the prison population for these items and the limited
effectiveness of current physical screening measures and supervisory practices in restricting
this illicit trade.
Several explanations for this corrupt practice are relevant. Policies that prohibit high-demand
goods such as psychoactive drugs are certainly part of the wider system that we must have
regard to in explaining the persistence of such activities. As policies towards ‘softer’ drugs
become more liberalised in the outside communities, there may in fact be greater demand in
future for such drugs inside prisons. Ongoing policies prohibiting access will inevitably fuel
the illicit market for such items inside prisons. They will also ensure that prices for items
inside prison are much higher than on the outside, and that the market forces inside the prison
to exploit this price discrepancy will be strong if not severe. There is also, relatedly, the fact
that many prisoners enter prison with acquired habits or dependencies of drugs and/or alcohol
that often go untreated during their time in prison. Failure to accord humane treatment to such
persons during their incarceration, thus affecting their post-release probabilities of successful
rehabilitation and reintegration, means that the demand side is left unaddressed. Such program
failures also leave open the possibility that some prisoners will become exposed to addictive
drugs inside prison for the first time and will leave prison with acquired habits or addictions.
Explanations also must be found in terms of individual vulnerabilities, micro-system
failures (officer cultures of indifference or support, supervisory deficiencies) and situational
factors. Taking first the issue of officer vulnerability, as we saw in our discussion of inap-
propriate relationships, some officers are susceptible to grooming by prisoners. Grooming
by prisoners is usually motivated by ulterior objectives, such as getting the officer to bring in
contraband. Sometimes officers are groomed by associates of prisoners through contact with
them in outside activities. In the Western Australian case mentioned earlier, the prison officers
concerned had attended a gym that was also attended by ex-prisoners and members of outlaw
motorcycle gangs who were able to supply drugs and provide introductions to prisoners in the
prison where the officers worked (Western Australia 2018). In the case of one of these officers,
as previously stated, he had also been targeted by prisoners for grooming because it had been
noted that the officer was not well accepted by his fellow officers. Officers implicated in such

activities often have high-risk markers such as financial problems (often gambling related),
marital breakdown and pre-existing drug histories for drugs such as steroids.
Another factor supporting this form of corruption is the unique opportunity prison officers
possess through their jobs to facilitate the trafficking of contraband. They come and go regu-
larly from prisons because it is where they are employed. They also do so with much greater
frequency than visitors or contractors working in the prisons, who are other known carriers of
contraband. So, opportunities to act corruptly in this way are part of prison officers’ ‘routine
activities’. As noted, these opportunities can often be highly financially rewarding. Officers
may be paid hundreds or even thousands of dollars to bring in to prison a single package of
contraband. Given this structural vulnerability, it is important to examine the systems in place
to monitor officer behaviour including the measures used to screen officers at the points of
entry and exit from prisons. These consist of systems relating to the recruitment, training and
supervision of officers on the job, as well as the ‘hard’ security measures for preventing and
detecting the inflow of illicit goods and items (see Wortley 2002). A related informal element
at this level is the officer subculture, and how it ignores or even supports some forms of cor-
ruption. More will be said about the contribution of this element in the next section on misuse
of prisoner information.
Another lens to consider prison officer involvement in contraband, and indeed other forms
of prison corruption, is that of moral desert and deservingness. As Zimbardo’s work shows,
efforts to dehumanize prisoners or to see them as less deserving of care or respect sets the
scene for excusing or justifying actions harmful to the welfare of prisoners. If prisoners attack
each other because of disputes over drugs, for example, it might be overlooked on the basis
that prisoners ‘deserve’ to be mistreated in prison. Feelings of organisational injustice on the
part of officers, paradoxically, can alternately contribute to feelings of greater solidarity with
prisoners than with the system, leading to inappropriate relationships and other forms of cor-
ruption. Corruption can potentially arise therefore from officer contempt or sympathy. A kind
of negative distancing from prisoners, however, is often the precursor to forms of abuse and
corruption. Scott (2008) drew upon Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralisation to explain
the ‘ghosting’ of prisoners by prison officers. This occurs when the experiences and needs
of prisoners are disregarded. The five neutralisations he found officers using were denial of
responsibility (prisoners deserve what prisons inflict because of their own shortcomings);
denial of injury (prisons offer better conditions than most prisoners have had in the outside
world); denial of victim (‘they don’t know any different’); condemning the condemners (those
critics of prison conditions are naïve do-gooders); and appeal to higher loyalties (the real
victims are those abused by the prisoners when they committed their crimes). These moral
justifications more clearly relate to officer treatment that is harmful or neglectful; ‘turning
a blind eye’ to prisoners’ illicit activities in prison as noted may stem from a cynical view or
from a more positive sense of complicity.
INAPPROPRIATE DEALING WITH PRISONER INFORMATION

One sphere where officers can exercise influence over prisoners with less direct risk of expo-
sure or compromise of their authority is that of personal information regarding prisoners held
by the system. The levers are less visible, and potentially therefore harder to monitor and to
hold officers accountable for: ‘They don’t beat us anymore – they don’t have to. They can win

by using bits of paper. It’s all a mind game now’ (prisoner quoted in McDermott and King
1988: 373).
In an increasingly data-centric world, control over information invests the holders of infor-
mation with enormous power. The information held by prison systems relating to prisoners
(their background details, convictions, records of time spent in prison, etc.) is of inordinate
importance to prisoners. Ensuring confidentiality around personal information is often impor-
tant in reassuring prisoners that they will not be discriminated against or targeted for some
aspect of their past that they would prefer to keep discreetly hidden. It is also the case that
what is ‘put in the record’ regarding their time in the system can have a range of important
consequences for classification decisions (regarding where and under what conditions they
serve their sentence), access to privileges during their sentence and decisions regarding the
granting of early release and parole. A particularly concerning abuse in this regard is the filing
of false reports carrying a negative connotation for the prisoner concerned. To give a recent
New South Wales case as an example, a prisoner was the subject of false intelligence reports
stating that an illegal drug had been found in his cell. What compounded the degree of corrup-
tion in this instance is that the prisoner had been the victim of assault by officers, and this false
report was filed in an effort to cover up a case of excessive force (New South Wales 2019).
Another area of risk related to the holding of information relating to prisoners is the value
sometimes attached to personal prisoner information by the media. The demand for informa-
tion from certain mainstream media outlets has been implicated in several high-profile cases in
the UK. English prison officer Scott Chapman was reportedly paid in the vicinity of £40,000
for information relating to the prison conditions in which convicted child killer Jon Venables
was being kept (Goldsmith et al. 2016: 108). Prisoner-related information may also be of
value to organised crime interests, seeking to locate a particular prisoner or his or her relatives,
again creating a market for information of this kind that puts prisoners’ interests at risk. In
other instances, the interest in prisoner information reflects voyeuristic interest among prison
officers themselves, sometimes disclosing information to relatives and friends. Other instances
of disclosure have arisen from carelessness, such as leaving a file on a desk or a computer
monitor open for others to see. Overall, the unauthorised release of personal information to
outside parties has been noted in several reports in Western countries to occur with disturbing
frequency (Goldsmith et al. 2016: 106).
Inappropriate dealing also occurs when officers engage in the filing of false or misleading
records. A self-reported study of Queensland prison staff found that one in eight officers
surveyed thought false reporting on prisoners happened ‘sometimes’ or even more frequently
(Crime and Misconduct Commission 2009: 20). Understanding why officers might be dis-
posed to make false reports needs to take account of the power relations at the interpersonal
and institutional level, and of the feelings of officers towards their working conditions and
environments. Feelings of organisational injustice have been linked to higher incidences of
officer misconduct (Boateng and Hsieh 2019), but this finding is not associated specifically
with abuses of prisoner information. Some studies of officer attitudes towards prisoner infor-
mation suggest a level of casualness to this material, including a willingness to share it with
others for voyeuristic reasons. These studies also point to difficulties many officers have in
recognising that such sharing is inappropriate, and of their limitations more generally in terms
of their ability to recognise and manage conflicts of interest in the workplace (Goldsmith et al.
2016: 108). The casual indifference evident in so many cases of officer disclosure of prisoner
information is consistent with tendencies noted earlier for officers to neutralise the wrongness

of their actions against prisoners, discussed above. The growing popularity of social media
among those working in police and prisons is also a proven risk factor in terms of inappropriate
disclosure, providing the potent combination of opportunity, means and the absence of effec-
tive oversight (Goldsmith 2015).
RESPONDING TO PRISON CORRUPTION
An ecological approach to understanding prison-based corruption necessitates a response that

is attentive to the range of factors that contribute to the harms and impacts from corruption.
Much more needs to be done at the individual and institutional levels. At the individual level,
there is a need to identify vulnerabilities through addiction, age, ethnicity and other personal
factors that lead to involvement in corruption as victims or perpetrators. At the institutional
level, the impact of illicit drugs and prison gangs on prison life includes forms of corruption
of relationships between officers and prisoners, as well as between prisoners. The pressures
on staff working especially in large prisons, prisons with very diverse populations and prisons
with high percentages of serious offenders in the population are particularly at risk for inter-
personal violence and exploitation. Such conditions arguably make it hard for officers to treat
prisoners respectfully. Some studies have identified a link not only between prison size and
risk of violence but also between histories of drug use and victimisation in prison (Teasdale
et al. 2016). Interestingly, by contrast, having convictions for drug trafficking appears to be
a protective factor against violent victimisation in prison (Teasdale et al. 2016). These findings
confirm the significance of ongoing illicit drug markets in prison in terms of negatively impact-
ing on the objectives of humane containment and providing opportunities for rehabilitation.
Stepping back from this picture, we see matters such as prison size and the ongoing harms
from illicit markets as making a material contribution to prison conditions and to diminishing
correctional integrity. Larger prisons tend to be more violent and more corrupt. Heterogeneous
prison populations also provide more fertile ground for various forms of disorder and abuse.
How able prison systems feel to respond to corruption is linked to budgetary circumstances
and pressures to accommodate more prisoners at the expense of other measures geared to
correctional integrity and prisoner well-being (see Western Australia 2018: 36). These factors
cannot be separated from wider public and political considerations of prison budgets and the
priorities within prison-related policies. Other factors, such as deficiencies in drug-rehabilita-
tion facilities inside prison, and the failure to provide meaningful activities, contribute to
setting the scene for greater scope for illicit activities inside prison and the exploitation of
more vulnerable prisoners. More research can assist us to better understand these associations
and to devise policies that address the risks and harms effectively. These inevitably require
higher-level policy resetting and commitment. As an example, the association between prison
size and risk of violent victimisation may be explicable in terms of larger prisons having
more spaces where victimisation can occur due to reduced natural surveillance. Alternatively,
higher victimisation may arise in such settings due to the greater social distance that develops
between officers and prisoners in such large-scale impersonal settings (Caravaca-Sanchez et
al. 2019). Both scenarios call into question the configuration of current prisons and point to the
need for greater focus on the detrimental effects of current configurations.
More can also be done in conventional terms to reduce the incidence of and harms from
prison corruption. While a broader focus on correctional integrity is important in tackling

issues preventively and systematically (Goldsmith et al. 2016), the detection and punishment
of serious transgressions remains essential to disrupting corrupt practices and deterring others
from engaging in them. While it is important therefore not to view the ‘anti-corruption’
approach in isolation from other measures (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996), this approach
needs to be effective in what it does. Technology has a contributing role to play in terms of
situational prevention of corruption within prisons (Wortley 2002; UNODC 2017). In the case
of mobile phones, tools such as Managed Access Systems can be deployed, whereby mobile
phone towers are installed within the prison that prevent mobile phones in the vicinity from
connecting with other telecommunication providers. Only phones registered and approved by
the prison management can operate in those vicinities (see Grommon 2018).
One area of vulnerability in terms of ongoing corruption is the difficulty the system has
in detecting and acting on instances of corruption. The passivity of prison officers is a major
contributor to this situation. Prison officers are not particularly good, or indeed inclined, it
seems, at reporting the corrupt acts and misconduct of fellow officers. Though subject very
often to obligations to disclose matters such as illicit drug use or fraternising with ex-prisoners,
there are many instances where this has not occurred. In some cases, the officers in a posi-
tion to report have been compromised by also engaging in the same or similar activity (e.g.
taking steroids) (see New South Wales 2013). Measures are needed to encourage those who
witness or experience them directly to report them to anti-corruption mechanisms, whether
located within the organisation or outside. The trend towards external anti-corruption bodies
in Western countries in recent decades in part reflects the desire to build institutions that indi-
viduals can come to in, and with, confidence to report acts of corruption. Without willingness
among staff or indeed prisoners to report instances of suspected or actual corruption, often
little can be done by way of formal action. Change requires active, not passive, bystanders.
Explaining staff reticence to turn in a colleague (Goldsmith et al. 2016: 132–3; Wortley
2015: 211) requires consideration of a range of workplace factors as well as consideration of
management and leadership influences. Given the natural advantage officers have to observe
wrongful behaviours in prison, it is imperative that more be done to encourage staff to step
forward to blow the whistle when needed. Getting staff to overcome feelings of disloyalty
towards other officers, and to have confidence that their reports will be confidentially dealt
with and acted upon sensitively and effectively, is no mean feat that can be mitigated to some
degree through training and appropriate peer and mentor support. The history of whistleblow-
ing, however, is generally a dismal one, showing a pattern of suffering by whistleblowers for
their actions (e.g. Alford 2001; Miethe 1999).
Prison management has a major responsibility here. These schemes need to be seen to work
in practice. Support for whistleblower schemes is not enough, and many recent changes in this
area have proven insufficient (Smith 2014). The proof of the pudding, as the saying goes, is in
the eating. Few prison officers, it seems, are choosing to eat the pudding. As just one example,
in the UK, a recent report from the Prison and Probation Service referred to current whistle-
blower arrangements for prison staff. In the 12 month reporting period, just two cases had
been reported to the nominated officials for receiving reports. In both cases, the matters were
‘resolved with no case to answer’ (Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service 2019: 92). For
a prison service that employs around 22,300 staff across 117 institutions holding in excess
of 80,000 prisoners at any one time (Portal 2019; World Prison Brief 2019), these figures at
face value are disturbingly low. It is possible that local, more informal schemes are working
well, but we have little confirmation that this is the case. The accounts provided earlier in this

chapter from the inspectorate of prisons, as well as the 2018–19 annual report (Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Prisons 2019), point to a far more challenging and corrupted environment
inside many prisons than the negligible number of reports from prison officers would indicate
(see also Portal 2019). Building a more corruption-resistant culture among the staff will require
attention to a variety of conditions inside prison and relating to employment. Employees con-
fident in their role and not fearful of repercussions from other staff, management or prisoners
are best placed to play an effective role in reporting corruption. The evidence of organised
crime operating within many modern prisons is a reminder that how we view prison corruption
and devise responses to it necessitates looking at the wider settings upon which illicit prison
markets depend, and looking at ways of protecting witnesses to enable them to come forward
to assist in investigations, whether they happen to reside inside or outside the prison.
CONCLUSION
An ecological approach to prison corruption fits well with the ‘healthy prisons’ perspective
used to frame the inspection assessments in prisons in England and Wales. This framework
focuses on safety, respectful treatment, purposeful activity and access to programming (Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons 2019). Failure to meet standards in these areas in no small
measure is linked to the pervasiveness of forms of corruption and violence linked to illicit
drug markets in prisons. The short termism often seen in system responses to corruption over-
looks or neglects the fact that virtually all current prisoners will return to the outside world at
the end of their sentence. If we ignore the wider aims of the system, they will do so with an
enhanced or steady likelihood of returning to crime. Reducing prison corruption inevitably
requires looking beyond the savings from short-term austerity cuts to the unmeasured costs
and longer-term losses from such a myopic view.
Any changes must reflect the implications of the system. Piecemeal anti-corruption meas-
ures alone will not be enough. While better vetting of officer recruits, and more targeted
training around grooming risks, for example, are likely to be useful, more is required. We
must recall that the system consists of supervisors and managers as well as frontline officers
and prisoners. Setting the ‘tone at the top’ in terms of principled commitment to the full suite
of prison objectives is critical in terms of establishing the right ethical climate inside prisons
(Goldsmith et al. 2016: 133–4). The governing legislation needs to make these objectives
clear, and follow-up mechanisms such as an inspectorate with responsibility for administering
‘healthy prison’ assessments to ensure that standards of humane containment and provision
of rehabilitation opportunities are monitored and accountability for deficient performance in
these areas can take place. Another line for exploration is the use of prison officer peer com-
mittees that would meet to discuss a variety of accountability and working conditions issues;
one potential gain from this practice, it has been suggested, is the encouragement of collective
efficacy among staff that can assist in resisting such things as prisoner grooming of officers
and social isolation of vulnerable officers (Worley et al. 2018: 342). Lastly, the integrity of
prison establishments depends not only on prisons and prison staff not doing the wrong thing,
but also on them doing the right thing. ‘Doing the right thing’ depends upon all levels of the
prison system working together according to the same objectives.

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16. Corruption in border administration
David Jancsics
INTRODUCTION
Corruption in border administrations is a unique form of corruption. A special combination

of social and organizational factors makes these public organizations particularly prone to
corruption. This chapter focuses on the main types of border corruption, the key factors, the
most important variables, and the presumed relationships among them; in other words, clas-
sifications (what), explanations (why), and mechanisms (how) of corruption in border admin-
istrations. The chapter also attempts to integrate concepts from different disciplines, such as
petty corruption, police corruption, workplace crime, informal networks, and brokerage, that
are relevant to understanding the phenomenon.
Border administrations are typically the largest public-sector agencies, and their employ-
ees conduct transactions with more people on a daily basis than any other law enforcement
organizations’ personnel. For example, United States (US) Customs and Border Protection
interacts with and clears into the US over 1 million people, on average, every single day
(Homeland Security Advisory Council 2016). This indicates that a large number of border
law enforcement officers might be exposed to corruption. The way in which border-protection
activities are organized, especially the officers’ exceptional administrative monopoly and
broad discretionary power over the movement of people and valuable goods across countries,
also contributes to higher corruption risks on the border (Ferreira et al. 2006; Klitgaard 1988).
Corruption in border administrations could significantly increase national security risks,
a rather uncommon feature in other forms of corruption. In Germany, for example, more
than 70 percent of illegal drugs seized every year can be attributed to detection by customs
officers (Ferreira et al. 2006). Since organized crime groups are often involved in such illegal
businesses, border corruption can be linked directly to the activities of crime syndicates more
than any other form of corruption. Terrorist groups can also use smuggling channels and bribe
border law enforcement officers in order to finance their organization through illegal traf-
ficking or to physically relocate themselves and spread terrorist cells across countries (Chêne
2018).
Communities on both sides of the border are highly interconnected. For instance, 80 percent
of the people living on the US side of the country’s southern border trace their ancestry back
to Mexico (Heyman & Campbell 2008). This indicates another interesting feature that border
corruption is deeply embedded in local social structures on both sides and is a significant issue
for public administration.
THE WHAT: CLASSIFICATION OF BORDER CORRUPTION
In most cases, borders between nation states are managed by formal government authorities.
While crossing a border, people, vehicles, and goods must comply with the laws of both the
215
David Jancsics - 9781789900910
exit country and the entry country. The two main general functions of border administrations
are national security and revenue collection: keeping undesirable goods and people out while
collecting revenue and taxes on goods that are allowed in (Doyle 2011).
At official points of entry, authorities accommodate customs, immigration, and
control-related activities (Zarnowiecki 2011). In most countries, the border areas between
ports of entry are also patrolled by officers to prevent illegal border crossing. Yet there is
a wide variation of how different states organize their border administrations. In some coun-
tries, these often overlapping tasks are carried out by one border control organization, while in
many other nations each task is carried out by a special agency or department. These functions
may also be organized under authorities such as police, military, or tax agencies.
Border-related illegal practices may manifest through various forms, including (1) bribery,
or exchange between a border law enforcement officer (bribe taker) and client(s) (bribe givers)
in order to facilitate the illegal physical movement of goods and people from one country to
another; (2) misappropriation, or embezzling and stealing resources from a border administra-
tion agency; (3) nepotism, or selecting and promoting people within the agency on the basis
of an existing relationship rather than on merit; and (4) illicit financial flows, such as money
laundering, across countries (Chêne 2018). In fact, only the first form, bribery exchange, rep-
resents genuine border corruption, since this alone is related to physical movement of goods
and people from one country to another and involves participation of border law enforcement
officers (Jancsics 2019a). Other forms either do not require physical border crossing (e.g.
money laundering) or are not border-specific. Although conducted by employees in border
authorities, such non-border specific forms (e.g. embezzlement, nepotism, or fraud) may occur
in any public administration.
In this analysis, border corruption is defined as an illegal exchange between two or more
actors – an agent (bribe taker) and clients (bribe givers) – who may be individuals, firms, or
organized crime groups. Although this chapter mainly focuses on corrupt deals between border
law enforcement and clients, it is worth noting that other government personnel who work
away from the border but have access to sensitive agency information (e.g. intelligence activ-
ity) may be bribed by actors who are interested in illegal movement of things across countries
(Frost 2010). Moreover, employees of private companies (for example, staff from airlines,
airports, or ports) may be also involved in border-related corruption (Koser 2008).
Further analyzing border-related bribery by using two dimensions – the bribe giver
(individual, informal group, or formal organization) and the collusive/coercive nature of the
exchange – the phenomenon can be classified into six types, shown in Table 16.1 (Jancsics
2019a). Border-crossing individuals typically bribe an officer to turn a blind eye to an expired
passport, overstay in a country, or small-scale smuggling of consumer goods, such as alcohol,
tobacco products, or petrol. This is an ad hoc impersonal transaction where an individual tries
to bribe whoever is on duty. Another coercive version of this type of “petty” corruption is
when border law enforcement officers intentionally create situations in which the individual is
“forced” to pay bribes. At the border, there is a significant potential for such extortion because
officers have wide discretion to block people’s or goods’ physical movement. Border law
enforcement officers often demand bribes for made-up offenses such as allegedly missing doc-
umentation, forms, or signatures. Another usual practice is when officers slow down border
traffic and go back to normal pace only if they receive bribes from the travelers (Ndonga 2013;
Wickberg 2013).

Corruption in border administration 217
Table 16.1 Typology of border corruption
Actors on the client side Collusion Coercion

Individual Individual receives illegal advantages or Individual pays to receive fair treatment
avoids negative consequences
Informal group Informal group reduces risks derived from Organized crime group coerces officers
its illegal activity into facilitating illegal activity
Formal organization Trading company increases its official Trading company pays to receive fair
profit by using illegal means treatment
A qualitatively different type of border-related bribery is when an informal group, often an

organized crime network, can be found on the client side of the corrupt exchange instead of
just an individual. This is often a recurring activity, based on some level of trust and strategic
conspiracy between the corrupt partners. Here criminal syndicates intentionally develop rela-
tionships with officers, starting with gifts and small favors and expanding into more serious and
regular smuggling schemes (US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs 2010). Take the case of local smugglers in Central America, who often cultivate friend-
ships with customs officers and meet them on a regular basis; for example, the arrangement
could be to meet bi-weekly to have drinks and arrange bribes (Galemba 2012). A coercive
form of this type of corruption is when drug cartels deliberately develop dependency-based
and unequal social relationships with border law enforcement officers. They target people that
are vulnerable and prone to infidelity or drug or alcohol abuse and exploit such vulnerabilities
(US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2010).
There are also border bribery cases when formal organizations – export/import firms or
other companies moving their goods across borders – bribe border law enforcement officers to
overlook overweight vehicles or undeclared goods, permit underinvoiced goods, speed up or
skip inspection, permit traders to claim deductions for fictitious exports, issue import licenses
or warehouse approvals without proper justification, or accept fraudulent value-added tax
refund claims (Ferreira et al. 2006; Michael 2012). In a coercive version of this corruption
type, officers can extort illicit payment from importers by, for example, threatening them with
misclassification of imports into more heavily taxed categories unless they agree to pay a bribe
(Dutt & Traca 2010).
THE WHY: EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF BORDER CORRUPTION
Although many studies focus on the possible causes of corruption, I do not review this general
literature here but instead discuss only the specific variables that might explain border-related
corrupt activities. Multiple factors at different analytical levels can be identified. At a trans-
national level, a country’s geographic position creates opportunities for border corruption
(Velkova & Georgievski 2004). Several countries are located at the intersection of interna-
tional transport networks which makes them attractive transit corridors for drug traffickers
and human smugglers. For example, organized crime groups in the Balkans cooperate with
criminals in the Middle East and Latin America while enjoying relatively easy access to
a huge integrated market for illicit goods and services, the European Union. During this transit
process these groups have to manage to cross multiple borders, and they often bribe border law
enforcement to enable their illegal activity.

At a national level, the length of the border and the number of ports of entry may affect
the risk level of border corruption. A country’s particular trade policy, such as higher tariff
rates, may also create incentives for firms to engage in corruption (Fisman & Wei 2004;
McLinden 2005). Yet the most important explanatory factors are related to the organizational
and occupational structures of border administrations. The next few paragraphs focus on such
organizational-level factors.
The structure of the organization and the actor’s position within this structure create oppor-
tunities by providing settings where corruption might occur (Vaughan 1982; Jávor & Jancsics
2016; Graycar & Prenzler 2013: 28–9). A very unique opportunity structure, derived from the
nature of the border operation, predisposes these administrations to an especially high prob-
ability of corruption. The most often mentioned factor is the combination of administrative
monopoly and broad discretionary power of officers over valuable goods (Ferreira et al. 2006;
Klitgaard 1988; McLinden 2005; Wickberg 2013; Ndonga 2013). The fact that relatively
low-wage agents make critical decisions about whether individuals or valuable goods are
allowed to enter a country may encourage officers to use such power for illegal private gain.
Moreover, compared to average street-level bureaucrats, law enforcement officers deal with
an especially high number of transactions on the border, which multiplies the opportunities
for corruption (Parayno 2013). In many areas of public administration, technology has deper-
sonalized the relation between public employees and private actors (e.g. online procurement),
thereby reducing the risks of corruption. On the border, however, direct contact cannot be
avoided because goods must still be physically inspected. The physical contact between poten-
tial corrupt partners creates further opportunity to initiate a corrupt transaction and/or develop
a long-term corrupt relationship (McLinden 2005). An empirical study found that service
history in border administration in the US was a strong predictor of different types of border
corruption (Jancsics 2019c). Border law enforcement officers with very short service history
were much more likely to be involved in drug-related corruption, while more veteran officers
were instead prone to facilitate human smuggling.
The organization’s geographic location and the distance between units can generate oppor-
tunity for unlawful behavior by creating structural secrecy (Vaughan 1982). The physical
location of remote land borders creates “authority leakage,” which makes it difficult for the
upper levels or headquarters to supervise subunits (Tullock 1965; Gounev et al. 2012). It is
even harder to monitor and supervise the activity of agents who do not work at stations but
patrol the border between ports of entry (Balla 2016). Moreover, in isolated border areas,
clients have limited opportunity to report abuse of power, which makes extortion less risky for
corrupt officers.
The manner in which professional occupations are organized can also increase opportunities
for corruption. The occupational structure of border administrations is very similar to other
law enforcement organizations, especially police. In many countries, border control actually
belongs to the national police authorities. In his classic work, Gerald Mars (1982) argues that
two dimensions of the occupational process, the “grid” and the “group,” indicate a predisposi-
tion to different forms of workplace crime. The grid dimension reflects strong or weak forms
of formalization and control in the workplace, while the group dimension indicates strong or
weak collectiveness among co-workers. Jobs are strong in the grid dimension when employ-
ees must follow many constraining rules and a well-defined ranking system, such as wearing
uniforms, which can visually separate people and predetermine their responses to one another.
These jobs often fix people in specific places, times, and modes of work. The second dimen-

Table 16.2 Gerald Mars’s dimensions of the occupational process
Group
Strong Weak
‘Wolves’ ‘Donkeys’
Strong
Tight work groups Isolated subordinates
Grid
‘Vultures’ ‘Hawks’
Weak
Loose work groups Individual entrepreneurs
sion indicates that employees in strong group occupations frequently interact face to face and
often form a mutually interconnected network. Here the work group has strong influence over
even the individual’s private life. Table 16.2 shows the intersection of these two dimensions,
which creates a four-category classification of occupations. Mars gave different animal names
to each category. I focus on “wolves,” whose job can be characterized by both strong grid and
strong group features. These occupations are based on interdependent and highly stratified
roles. Mars’s strong grid-strong group category can be applied to border administrations
because wolves typically work in “total institutions” such as law enforcement, prisons, the
military, hospitals, and oil rigs.
Wolves often live on or close to the premises at which they work; therefore, work, resi-
dence, and leisure overlap. Activities in one area are reinforced by cohesion in others, which
makes them a highly collective “wolfpack” work group. Such phenomena can be seen in
border corruption as well. For example, Ferreira and co-authors (2016) found that all male
inhabitants of a small village in Russia close to the Ukrainian border worked at the customs
office. They operated a major corruption network involving millions of dollars’ worth of
custom duty evasion. Across the globe it is not uncommon that other family members or even
spouses are in the same “wolf” occupation or in the same organization.
Mars argues that for security reasons, teamwork and a high level of coordination are crucial
and highly valued in the wolves’ criminal activity. Corrupt border law enforcement officers
also rely on division of labor, where every person’s skill to organize workplace crime is used.
The list of specialized activities necessary for border corruption includes organizing shifts,
circulating information, falsifying paperwork, monitoring and reporting inside investigations,
monitoring and punishing independently corrupt officers, doing fake cargo/vehicle inspec-
tion, redirecting and guiding illegal traffic to safe passages through the “green border,” and
calculating, collecting, and sharing illegal profit. For example, a crucial risk factor, especially
in the case of ad hoc petty corruption with individuals, is the large amount of cash bribes the
corrupt officers receive and have to carry while they work. In order to reduce such risk, they
often entrust a colleague who is finishing his/her duty with the task of collecting the money
and taking it outside the border station (Kardos 2014).
Such highly integrated informal networks of corrupt border law enforcement officers
may allow them to deactivate an important anti-corruption tool, job rotation, or random
job assignment (McLinden 2005). Corrupt outsider partners can be easily introduced to the
newly assigned corrupt colleagues. On the border, the “organization of corrupt individuals”
phenomenon becomes apparent after the corruption has already spread and taken root in the
organization (Pinto et al. 2008). It is not rare that such collusion affects an entire local border
station as a large number of officers organize themselves into collusive groups to collect
bribes from clients (Pinto et al. 2008; Rose-Ackerman 1999, 51; Ferreira et al. 2006). For
example, in 2015, after a police raid, 53 border law enforcement officers were indicted for

corruption in Záhony, on the Hungary–Ukraine border (Magyar 2015). In these types of cases,
officers do not hide corruption, or even boast that they can afford lavish consumption due to
the bribe money they received. In this case, the Hungarian officers shared photos on social
media with their colleagues from expensive vacations (Magyar 2015). This suggests that they
perceived minimal risk of detection and sanctioning by the organization (Vaughan 1983: 76).
Sometimes, key posts along smuggling corridors are even informally auctioned within the
agency. For example, in Mexico, several senior drug enforcement posts were given to the
highest bidder (Andreas 2009: 63). In Cambodia in the early 2000s, an approximate $10,000
“concession fee” was required by future employees to secure a customs post (Ferreira et al.
2006). Similar practices were reported in Pakistan (Hors 2001).
THE HOW: SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISMS OF

BORDER CORRUPTION
Corrupt transactions, just like many other activities in our social lives, are coordinated by
various mechanisms (Frances et al. 1991). In border corruption, there are two main areas
where the actors’ behaviors are coordinated: interactions between the border law enforcement
officers and the client(s), and interactions between the officers and other organizational
members inside the agency. Here I discuss the variation is such mechanisms.
Mechanisms between the Officer and the Client(s)
When border-crossing individuals bribe a border law enforcement officer, the corrupt deal
is typically an impersonal act (market corruption), consisting of a transfer and an immediate
counter-transfer between two strangers (Jancsics 2019b). The officer’s main motivation for
participating in this type of “petty” corruption is to collect illegal profit, while the individual
client engages in market corruption to receive special treatment. In the coercive version of
this type of corruption, the client engages in the illegal act because this is the only way he or
she can reduce the cost (e.g. slow border traffic) created by the agent. In these market-type
exchanges the “price” captures all relevant information and coordinates the actors’ behavior(s)
(Powell 1990; Jancsics 2019b). If benefits are high and/or costs are low enough to take the
risk, the agent and the client will break the rules and participate in corruption. Since the actors’
social contexts are relatively irrelevant in this situation, social norms play a limited role in
coordinating their behaviors.
When an informal group, often an organized crime network, can be found on the client
side of the corrupt exchange, social bonds and some level of trust between the officer and
the client(s) have been established. Instead of price mechanisms, these transactions are often
coordinated by reciprocity, a universal social norm that can be found in almost all cultures
(Graycar & Jancsics 2017). Reciprocity means lending resources to someone who then feels an
obligation and therefore will compensate in the future (Peebles 2010). These gift-type transac-
tions make social bond-based bribes a much safer form of illegal exchange for the participants
than market corruption.
Beyond the obligation to reciprocate, other informal norms may also coordinate the inter-
actions between the officers and the client(s). Many agents come from the border regions or
surrounding areas where family ties and relations are very strong (Heyman & Campbell 2008;

Velkova and Georgievski 2004). For example, an earlier empirical study claims that in the US,
56 percent of border patrol officers and 89 percent of port of entry inspectors grew up in border
counties (Heyman 1995: 272). This suggests potential kinship or friendship connections to
people who are directly or indirectly involved in local smuggling activities (Gounev et al.
2012). In this case, powerful informal norms of the local community or the family network
may facilitate the social bribe transactions. For example, a customs and border protection
official in El Paso, Texas worked with his wife and brother-in-law in a drug-trafficking ring
(Cobler 2016).
Corrupt clients do not always come directly into contact with border officers; rather, some-
times they have contact with intermediaries (Gounev et al. 2012). Brokerage is an informal
mechanism by which disconnected or isolated actors can interact (Jancsics 2018). There are
two different functions of brokerage: (1) middleman brokerage, when the broker facilitates
the flow of goods or resources but remains in the middle of otherwise unconnected actors, and
(2) catalyst brokerage, when the broker creates new connections by introducing previously
unconnected people (Stovel & Shaw 2012). In border corruption, examples of both functions
can be found.
In human smuggling, smugglers often act as middlemen between the bribed officer and the
trafficked refugees or immigrants. They usually do not allow the two parties to connect. On
the other hand, fellow social group members may act as catalyst brokers and introduce clients
and agents to each other (Jancsics 2015). Since border officers often live in the same areas/
communities in which their work sites are located, informal relation structures outside and
inside the organization can overlap and form a single social field. Therefore, it is possible that
the corrupt officer, his/her colleagues, and their clients belong to the same social network.
They socialize and even spend their leisure time together. This suggests that the same informal
norms facilitate their behaviors. For example, in a well-publicized case, a colleague of a US
customs and border protection officer in San Diego, California introduced him to a female
smuggler, who ended up marrying him. She acted as his go-between during a decade-long
corruption operation and introduced the officer to several other smugglers (Davis 2013).
There are border corruption cases where neither an individual nor an informal group but
a whole formal organization is the primary and direct financial beneficiary of the corrupt trans-
action. These are “bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy” transactions, where both parties exchange
organizational resources instead of private or community resources (Graycar & Jancsics,
2017). This collusive border corruption can be either ad hoc market corruption or social
bribe-type corruption and therefore can be coordinated by either “prices” or reciprocity and
brokerage. For example, in order to reduce the costs of border crossing, truck drivers or other
representatives of a company – often with the informal support of their supervisors – may
bribe anyone who is on duty to do things like overlook overweight vehicles or undeclared
goods, permit underinvoiced goods, speed up or skip inspection, permit traders to claim
drawbacks for fictitious exports, issue import licenses or warehouse approvals without
proper justification, or accept fraudulent value-added tax refund claims (Dutt & Traca 2010;
Ferreira et al. 2006; Michael 2012). As part of the cost of doing business, export/import firms
even calculate how much should be paid as illegal bribery (Mathews 2015). Corrupt border
officers also extort bribe payments from formal organizations. For example, they can threaten
importers with misclassification of imports into more heavily taxed categories unless they
agree to pay them a bribe (Dutt & Traca 2010). The most vulnerable representatives of formal
organizations are truck drivers, especially those with perishable freight, who can be easily

forced to pay bribes just to avoid an overnight wait at the border. There are many anecdotes
from Eastern European countries that truck drivers keep handy several packs of cigarettes,
high-quality liquor, or small bills in local currency while crossing multiple borders just in case
they have to bribe coercive border officers.
Yet since this market-type corruption is exceptionally risky exporters who intend to avoid
tariffs on a permanent basis may seek out personal connections among border officers in order
to make the bribe payment standard and corruption more predictable. Therefore, they prefer
reciprocity-based social bribe exchanges when they can make corrupt business arrangements
repeatedly with the same officers to impersonal market-type transactions. With this arrange-
ment, mutual trust allows actors to conspire strategically. For example, days or weeks after
a transaction, the partners can meet in a neutral place (restaurant, bar, hotel, or private apart-
ment) to make the payment and schedule the next transaction. As an example of middleman
brokerage coordination, exporters, interested in quick processing, may allow the forwarding
agency to act as a middleman and bribe the customs officials (Velkova & Georgievski 2004).
Mechanisms between the Officers and Other Organizational Members
Border corruption is often a collective organizational activity, and informal norms coordinate
corruption within the administration (Ashforth & Anand 2003). For example, agents often
share the obligation of distributing the profits from corrupt practices with colleagues and
superiors (McLinden 2005; Magyar 2015). People who do not follow these norms, such as
those who work independently or are not corrupt, are often punished by the group (Mars
1982). Interviews with border agents confirm that corrupt officers start bullying those who are
“not in” because they represent imminent risk for the groups’ corrupt operation. Moreover,
new employees on the force are usually asked after one month of service whether they “want
to make a little money” (Magyar 2015).
Informal norms in a highly integrated workforce also prevent reporting of corruption.
Covering up the illicit or illegal behavior of colleagues is a phenomenon empirically con-
firmed by police corruption research (Westmarland 2005; Chan 2003: 34). Such corrupt
organizational subcultures help socialize non-corrupt new recruits into accepting corruption.
However, people also enter border agencies solely for the purpose of being corrupt and taking
advantage of the discretion they have as an officer (US Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs 2010).
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
This chapter has some implications for practice and provides policymakers with a tool to
distinguish between different types of border corruption and to strengthen decision making
regarding anti-corruption policies. Since officers in border control administrations work away
from organizational centers or headquarters (e.g. night shifts, streets, entry ports, remote land
borders, rural areas), frequently meet many outsider clients, and have considerable discretion
in making decisions monitoring their activities, their situation is more challenging than in
other public organizations. Yet some technological innovations such as body cameras and
other surveillance systems tracking officers’ movement with GPS might improve the effec-
tiveness of monitoring.

Since one of the most powerful drivers in petty border corruption is the agent’s rational
calculation, maximizing the costs of corruption and minimizing the benefits are effective
anti-corruption tools against market-type border corruption. Here punitive control techniques
to detect and punish corrupt border law enforcement officers can be successful. Intelligence
practices such as wiretaps, body microphones, or faked situations (sting operations) are well
suited against this type of border corruption. Moreover, limiting the cash amount officers can
carry might reduce the opportunities for accepting a bribe “on the spot.” Finally, external
whistleblowing might be an effective tool against extortion-type petty border corruption.
Forcing individual travelers to get involved in a corrupt exchange despite their will may trigger
disapproval and protest against extorters and a willingness to report corrupt officers.
It is more difficult to detect and curb social bribe-type border corruption because trust
between corrupt partners allows them to effectively conspire for a long time. Here the level of
trust is an important factor. If partners are connected only with weak social ties (lower-level
trust), then asymmetric (top-down) penalties such as exemption from prosecution or lighter
punishment imposed by internal or external authorities will increase the chance of (self-)
reporting. However, if the partners are closely connected (e.g. friends or family members),
informal norm systems facilitating the social relationship often clash or even supersede
with formal rules and reduce the effectiveness of the threat of formal sanctions. Yet some
techniques can deter the already arranged corrupt transaction or reduce the opportunity for
conspiring in social bribe-type border corruption. Such techniques include prohibiting private
cell phone use on duty; assigning duty locations, security lanes, or areas to patrol randomly; or
limiting clients’ options to freely choose border lanes.
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17. Features of corruption and anti-corruption
work in China and India
Lina Vyas and Alfred M. Wu
INTRODUCTION
The world’s two most populous nations, China and India, do not fare well in the corruption
stakes. Both have massive bureaucracies; both have decentralised bureaucracies and the
opportunity for corruption abounds. In the 2019 Corruption Perception Index by Transparency
International both scored 41 out of 100 points and both ranked an equal 80th out of 180 nations.
The widespread existence of corruption is both an issue for the well-being of the economy and
society, as well as an issue for the public sector and the legitimacy of administration.
In China, corruption has a long history, especially in the political arena. However, there
have been improvements in recent years under Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign (China’s
Tiger Hunt, see Vyas & Wu, 2020). The establishment of new laws aimed at making the
working environment of government officials more transparent also works. In India, corrup-
tion is still a major problem affecting the economy costing Indian people approximately 6
trillion rupees in unofficial payments every day. Over the past few decades, India has gone
through a series of public- and private-sector scams across the country, for example the Indian
2G spectrum scam propelled by pressure to catch up with China in meeting the demand for
telecommunications services. In recent years, in order to foster a clean government, the Indian
government has tried several urgent economic measures, such as demonetisation in 2016. In
spite of the efforts, as previous research indicated, the legal framework and the law enforce-
ment system have not shown a significant effect on corrupt behaviour. This means that policy
cannot be implemented cleanly and impartially, and as such corruption creates a weakness of
government capacity (Graycar & Villa, 2011).
This chapter examines and compares the different ways in which corruption has developed
in the economies of China and India together with the different approaches taken by respective
governments in tackling the problem of corruption. It also distinguishes the causes and effects
of the reforms both governments have used to reduce corruption. This review is based on
secondary data, including comments from newspapers and major reviews of recent articles
on anti-corruption. The institutional arrangements of the anti-corruption work in China and
India are discussed, followed by the reforms and limitations of the anti-corruption initiatives
undertaken in each country.
The chapter can be divided into two parts. Both parts include the backgrounds of the
countries’ economies and politics, but the first half of the chapter discusses socio-economic
factors and anti-corruption laws in China and India and is supplemented by pressing issues of
corruption cases which have appeared in the media. The second half of the chapter discusses
the structures of anti-corruption systems in both places, including supervision, local party
committees and anti-corruption development. In addition, recent reforms and anti-corruption
laws are analysed and the major players in anti-corruption work are identified.
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Lina Vyas and Alfred M. Wu - 9781789900910
The first section argues that the general public lacks legal literacy and the implementation
of anti-corruption educational programmes in schools could help to solve this problem. The
second section argues that anti-corruption measures create uncertainty and fear among offi-
cials in all dimensions. This section ends with the analysis of the challenges and limitations
of anti-corruption measures in both countries. The concluding section discusses corruption
reduction. This section includes a brief summary of the anti-corruption measures, major
players in anti-corruption work, challenges and side effects of anti-corruption measures.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION

WORK IN CHINA
There is great variation of corruption based on culture, traditions and the political systems.
Therefore, when discussing corruption in China, it is necessary to focus on the social situation,
political system and its development. The study of China’s corruption needs to focus on more
relevant parts, including the anti-corruption system, power restriction system and the political
system.
The institutional framework of anti-corruption mechanisms can be divided into several
periods. The first starts when the Communist Party was established in 1921. The anti-corruption
methods were only used within the government structure and in the military system and before
the Communist Party obtained full control over the country. After 1949, the Communist Party
of “new” China tried to combine the anti-corruption system with the development of socialist
construction. The most important thing was to make sure the officials were truly loyal to the
government and the party which was believed to be essential for the stability and purity of the
government. Another important factor in the fight against corruption at that time was the polit-
ical campaign led by the party. Mao Zedong, then the chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), implemented a campaign, which included a political mobilisation from top to
bottom to fight corruption. Two departments carried out a significant part of the campaign.
One was a commission for discipline inspection, a department that was directly controlled by
the CCP. Its duty was to safeguard the constitution and internal laws. Another department par-
ticipating in the campaign was the supervision department, which worked for the government.
Its role was to supervise the exercise of administrative power by state administrative organs
and their civil servants. The two departments cooperated in monitoring officials in working
situations and corruption prevention (Ko & Weng, 2012).
Anti-Corruption Legislation
In the period from the late 1970s to the 1990s, apart from the anti-corruption methods men-
tioned above, the government began to develop a more complete system of anti-corruption
work. In the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China in 1978, it was decided to re-establish the CCP’s commission for discipline inspec-
tion. Thus, the CCP began to build an organisational system, an institutional system, a working
system and a personnel system to prevent corruption. In addition, in June 1987, the govern-
ment re-established the Ministry of Supervision by constructing an organisational, work and
personnel system to punish and prevent corruption. The major goals of the commissions for
discipline inspection were to safeguard the constitution of China and other internal rules and

Corruption and anti-corruption work in China and India 229
regulations. The party’s commission held regular integrity talks to inspect the leading bodies
and fight against corruption. It also implemented a responsibility system to promote honesty
and loyalty to the party and the government.
In the 1990s, the anti-corruption system became more rigorous. To better fight corruption,
the government introduced some new laws, such as the Administrative Procedure Law, State
Compensation Law, Administrative Procedural Law, Administrative Licensing Law and
Government Information Disclosure Regulations. These laws and regulations aimed at making
the working environment of the government officials transparent. The laws also covered the
punishments of the officials caught in corruption cases. The new laws made the institutional
framework of the anti-corruption measures more strategic and comprehensive than before.
They showed that the government and the party were more conscious in their fight against
corruption. It is possible to identify three core elements in the laws related to corruption. These
are (1) the civil servants’ declaration of the assets, (2) the financial real-name system and (3)
the civil servants’ avoidance of conflicts of interest. The declaration system for civil servants
made it difficult for officials to hide any illegal gains. The financial real-name system required
every citizen to use his/her real name when opening an account at any financial institution.
Additionally, all financial transactions had to use the real names of the involved parties and
the transactions had to be recorded. The avoidance of conflicts of interest stated that public
servants could not concurrently hold more than one public office or hold other posts besides
the public office post. Public servants were also prohibited from engaging in part-time jobs
that generate behavioural conflicts or inconsistent financial interests. Moreover, it was stated
that no public official should engage in business or accept any employment or work without
prior approval of the government.
In recent decades, the internal main reasons for corruption in China were related to the ways
the party ofﬁcials were able to monetarise their positions (Brown, 2018). After building up
a comprehensive system, including introducing laws concerning corruption and establishing
a department concentrating on anti-corruption work, fighting corruption did not slow down.
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the state-owned enterprises create a blur between
the government and business corruption (Wedeman, 2013).
In the Media
Before considering the trending news on corruption and anti-corruption campaigns, it is

necessary to mention that Chinese media is required to be loyal to the CCP, who holds the
leadership of the country. In 2016 President Xi visited major news outlets in China to remind
the media of absolute loyalty. Notwithstanding, Western media covers criticism and is able
to raise questions regarding legitimacy by government actions and describe the ambiguity of
arrests related to corruption activities.
An article in the South China Morning Post stated that within six years of President Xi
Jinping’s fight against corruption, the “Communist Party’s graft-busters detained another 23
‘tigers’ – or high-ranking officials – in 2018, five more than the previous year. Prosecutors
also charged 32 provincial- and ministerial-level officials last year, which was 14 more than
in 2017” (Zheng, 2019a). This article shows that it is important for the Chinese government to
raise the number of corruption cases to prove the efficiency of present policies. Another news
story from NBC News highlights the power of Xi indicating that more than 1,000 Chinese
absconders who left the country were made to return last year and more than $519 million of

corruption money was recovered. An operation known as “Sky Net” was introduced to further
highlight the ongoing anti-corruption drive Xi launched more than eight years ago.
The following news in a foreign media outlet stated: “The year’s tally does not indicate the
party watchdog and prosecutors went after more senior scalps in 2018 – many of the cases
prosecuted were the result of lengthy investigations carried out over previous years” (Zheng,
2019c). The former Chinese president of Interpol, Meng Hongwei, was expelled from the
CCP and stripped of all his positions for serious violation of the law and discipline. When
announced, this news resonated strongly throughout society. The news then spread in many
countries and newspapers (BBC News, 2018; PTI, 2019; Zheng, 2019c): “Meng was last heard
from on September 25 after leaving his home in the French city of Lyon bound for China.”
NBC News reported:
Beijing has been chosen together with two other provinces to pilot the crackdown’s expansion beyond
the ruling Communist Party to government officials and people working for state-owned enterprises as
well as those providing education, health and other services. “This will ensure that supervision covers
everyone working in the public sector who exercises public power,” said Zhang Shuofu, director-general
of the newly established Beijing Municipal Supervision Commission. (Baculinao, 2018)
Long-time China watcher Anne Stevenson-Yang, told Barron’s magazine that this “much
ballyhooed anti-corruption campaign” is “an old-style party purge reminiscent of the 1950s
and 1960s with quota-driven arrests, summary trials, mysterious disappearances and suicides”
(Laing, 2014). She felt uncomfortable that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign had been depicted
as a good governance effort.
Another interesting comment is from the former head of the American Chamber of
Commerce in China and current chairman of the greater China office for APCO Worldwide,
McGregor, who buys into Xi’s rhetoric about strengthening the rule of law in China. With the
goal of bringing greater legal certainty and transparency to the system Xi is “playing a long
game”, McGregor said (Hewitt, 2019).
Another fresh case highlighting the CCP’s new milestone in anti-corruption work was
reported by Reuters (2019a): “‘China’s military must resist the “corrosion” of corruption and
ensure the fight against graft is deepened,’ President Xi Jinping told senior officers… ‘offering
a renewed warning against a deep-seated problem’.” Another Reuters news article told that
China’s anti-corruption watchdog “would prosecute Nur Bekri, one of the highest-ranking
ethnic Uighur officials in the country, over allegations of graft during his time as governor
of Xinjiang” (Reuters, 2019b). According to the South China Morning Post (Zheng, 2019b),
the arrest of Zhao Zhengyong, who served as governor and then as provincial party head
of Shaanxi province, was foreshadowed by a state television documentary on corruption in
Shaanxi province days before the official announcement. Zhao Zhengyong was an ally of Wei
Minzhou, the former deputy head of the Shaanxi People’s Congress. Wei is currently serving
a life sentence.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION

WORK IN INDIA
Every year Indians spend about 6 trillion rupees, approximately US$84 billion, on “unofficial
payments” to government officials. Corrupt payments are often required to obtain driver’s

licenses, birth and death certificates and passports. Corruption touches in one form or the other
almost every person in India. According to research by the non-governmental international
organisation Transparency International, 27 per cent of the world’s population has at least
once in the last 12 months resorted to giving bribes when applying to state institutions. Some
statistics show that almost half of the funds intended to cover various programmes to improve
the quality of life are going to numerous officials or businessmen. Based on the recent data,
there are more than 250 million people in India who are considered poor and almost 300
million do not have access to electricity. Furthermore, about 100 million people have no access
to clean water. The sanitary and hygienic living conditions of more than half of Indians do not
meet international standards (about 800 million people).
The most corrupt entities in India, as in China and many other countries, are political parties.
However, at least in theory, they should be the most transparent institutions. Meanwhile,
according to Slonskaya (2015), 86 per cent of respondents covered by various surveys
characterised political parties as prone to corruption. Second place was taken by the police
(approximately 75 per cent) and third was shared between officials and legislative bodies
(65 per cent). For educational institutions, the corresponding figure was 61 per cent, and for
the judicial system 45 per cent (Slonskaya, 2015). The least corrupt were non-governmental
organisations and military organisations. In that study, 62 per cent of respondents said they
paid a bribe when they contacted the police, 61 per cent with the authorities responsible for
registration and issuing permits, 48 per cent paid bribes to educational institutions and 36 per
cent to judicial authorities. More than half of those living in India believe that over the past
two years, the situation with corruption in the country has worsened. This is evidenced by the
data obtained in various surveys by Transparency International.
Simultaneously, Indians connect corruption not only to the direct bribing of officials. People
believe that personal contacts and connections also help to achieve their desired goals. In terms
of trust in the government, India was placed 115th out of 143 (World Economic Forum, 2013).
Of the respondents, 40 per cent are confident that the country is ruled by a small group of
people who are not interested in the prosperity of the state, but in the realisation and achieve-
ment of their own selfish goals. In this regard, the state cannot and does not want to fight cor-
ruption, and all measures taken by the authorities to eliminate it are not sufficiently effective.
Corruption is a major problem affecting the economy. In the last decades, India has been
through a number of public- and private-sector scams across the country. The World Bank
(2010) believes corruption is one of the biggest obstacles to economic management, business
and social development. Corruption mostly happens in three areas and can be divided into
bureaucratic corruption, political corruption and economic corruption.
According to the World Bank (2019), India is not just the largest democracy in the world
where more than 1.2 billion people live. India is an important economic centre, demonstrating
high rates of annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the 2000s and significantly
exceeding the corresponding figure of global growth rates.
However, economic growth has slowed down latterly according to International Monetary
Fund forecasts. The negative trends in the Indian economy are the result of various factors,
including domestic ones, such as the ineffective regulation of many sectors in the country
and external factors – a general slowdown in the global economy, falling prices for export
goods, lack of investment inflows, etc.In the meantime corruption, increasingly widespread,
has become a real disaster affecting not only several sectors of the economy, including foreign
economic activity, but also the entire society in India. Furthermore, acute problems such as

poverty, a low level of education, lack of access to clean water for a significant proportion of
the population and lack of electricity and other amenities necessary for a normal life do not
find a quick solution, largely due to the deeply embedded corruption of public and private
institutions.
Socio-Economic Factors
Although, unfortunately, corruption covers almost all spheres of public life, “corruption in the
form in which it exists in India undermines institutional development”, says Jagdish Bhagwati
at Columbia University (2004). Public governance, law and order, schools, health and social
welfare affect the level of literacy and education. In fact, in schools run by politicians, it is
reported that the literacy rate is lower than 75 per cent and these schools usually do not meet
quality standards (Aranha, 2018). This results in difficulties for fresh graduates to find jobs.
According to Slonskaya (2015), health care has its hardships as 7 per cent of medical products
are fake. In terms of welfare, Slonskaya (2015) added that because of illegal actions of thieves
or politicians, 14 per cent of Indian citizens claimed that they had lost their property. The huge
public funds that should have been spent on educating a stratum of highly professional Indians
are being negatively affected.
Poverty problems are still acute for India. At the same time, according to some estimates,
about 20 million tons of wheat disappears annually only because of the insufficiently devel-
oped infrastructure of the storage and transportation of grain. It is not possible to ensure proper
conditions in this area due to the high level of corruption of the relevant departments.
However, the necessary conditions to include foreign capital and the activities of foreign
companies in the Indian market have not been improved and actually worsened to some
extent. The same is evidenced by a fall in the inflow of foreign direct investment in recent
years. Compared with their growth in the early 2000s, the inflow of foreign investments in
the national economy of India has slowed significantly. Worse yet, there is also an outflow of
funds. Thus, the illegal outflow of capital from the country for the last period averages about
$52 billion a year (Global Financial Integrity, 2015).
In the Media
Major cases of corruption, which were found out in India and reported in the media, are related
to scandals, either social or economic issues in connection with corruption. According to the
Indian newspaper the Economic Times, from the beginning of 2015 until March 2017, India
needed about US$1 trillion of investments to implement infrastructure projects such as the
construction of ports, airports, roads and to give the entire economy a powerful impetus for
further development.
According to the former judge of the Supreme Court, Santosh Hedge, who was investigating
a scandal in the south of the country, “today, politicians in India have such power that together
they are able to completely plunder the country.” Such scandals demonstrate a complete ina-
bility and the unwillingness of the government to deal with existing problems. But if during
periods of active economic growth this was not given importance, now, given the slowdown in
the economy, according to many analysts, the country simply cannot afford to have a govern-
ment that does not fulfil its promises in such a blatant way.

In the early 2000s, Indian leaders set a goal – to provide electricity to the entire population
of the country by 2012. This was supposed to be accomplished through the construction of
thermal power plants across the country. However, this has not been done so far. The scandal
that erupted in the coal industry only worsened the situation in the energy sector, and the ina-
bility to produce enough electricity was one of the main factors hindering economic growth.
In 2010, in connection with the corruption charges against him, P. J. Thomas, head of the
Indian anti-corruption body, was forced to leave his post. In the same year, many officials
responsible for conducting the Commonwealth Games were arrested for alleged financial
fraud. According to some estimates, the holding of these Games cost the country $4.1 billion
instead of the previously estimated $270 million (Commonwealth Games, 2010).
ORGANISATIONS, REFORMS AND LIMITATIONS IN CHINA
Supervision Committees
With the enactment of the National Supervision Law of the PRC in 2018, Supervisory
Commissions at all levels of the country were formed to exercise the supervisory function
of the state. In accordance with the Supervision Law, the commissions supervise all public
officials who exercise their power, investigate violations and crimes and promote the develop-
ment of the anti-corruption system. Supervision Commissions are established within different
territory and municipal levels: provinces, autonomous regions, prefectures, districts within
cities, and counties.
Local Party Committees
The local party committees refer to the CCP committees at all levels. The local party commit-
tees have a duty to supervise the party members under their jurisdiction to earnestly fulfil their
obligations, improve their work quality and responsibility, enhance the party spirit, strictly
organise party life, carry out criticism and self-criticism and maintain and implement party
discipline.
Compared with higher-level party committees, local party committees have more detailed
and targeted responsibilities. They play an important role in preventing corruption in society.
Supervising and educating employees at the bottom level ensures the integrity of officials at
all levels; but also effectively prevents corruption at the top from affecting party committees
at the grassroots level.
Leading Control in the Anti-Corruption System
As the leader of the CCP and China, Xi Jinping has a special method against corruption, con-
sisting of three steps or goals. The first goal is to have politics back in control. Media outlets
have called President Xi the most powerful leader of China since Mao. Some researchers
pointed out that Xi views his detailed and comprehensive knowledge as one of the reasons for
his political success (Brown, 2018). He has largely followed the rule that politics must play
a leading role. The second goal is to improve morality in society and seek loyalty. However,
while there seems to be a strong institution against corruption, corruption still has a chance to

occur from the inside. The most significant incidences are the Bo Xilai and Ling Jihua cases,
where two previously high-level officials in the CCP were sentenced for corruption. It is
reasonable that much of the discussion on how to fight corruption focuses on how to transfer
power and influence from individuals to the party. A major problem has been that even those
who are in charge of handling corruption cases would later succumb to corruption because of
their desire for a higher position or more money. Therefore, another way to fight corruption
is to demand officials for loyalty to the party. Thus, Xi has demanded that newspapers, tele-
vision and radio stations are loyal to his government. Xi has also vowed to punish both tigers
and flies (tigers refer to corrupt high-ranking officials and flies rank-and-file public-sector
workers, see Vyas & Wu, 2020). This means that the party and government are determined
to fight corruption at all levels of society. The third goal is to keep equity and efficiency in
policy work. Another way to help officials become more cautious about corruption is the use
of technology for discretionary arrests, local investigations and the creation of uncertainty and
fear among those who could be involved in corruption cases. Local government involvement
in managing government integrity is encouraged by the central government and has been
achieving far-reaching results (Gong & Wu, 2012; Gong, 2015). The cases, especially those
translated in the media, help to rouse awareness among government officials to prevent illegal
actions. By reason of party controls the key instruments of the economy, business and politics
should have no ambiguity or doubt in the strength of government regulations. However, it is
not always the case in reality.
Creating a Balance
Since late 2012, after Xi Jinping became the leader of China, the anti-corruption work has
reached a “new normal.” Many officials who work for the government, including both the ones
who have the most power and the ones working in the lower positions, have been investigated,
prosecuted and/or found guilty. Such cases are highlighted and confirmed in the media.
The case of Xi’s anti-corruption actions shows that transparency is significant. It is evident
that prior to Xi’s anti-corruption work, corruption cases were mostly dealt with within the party
and stayed out of the public eye. However, after Xi took up the leadership role, the most sig-
nificant change in fighting corruption was that corruption cases became public. Consequently,
transparency has been one of the most significant changes in anti-corruption work in China.
This indirectly shows the determination and tough methods used in fighting corruption.
It is obvious that Xi’s methods do not solely focus on corruption or tackling the problems
through internal channels. This means that the institutional methods have also changed.
Starting from the institutional reform and preparatory work of the anti-corruption campaign,
the simplicity of the establishment of the national supervisory commission system has trans-
formed into an original dual-track anti-corruption system. Later, three pilot areas changed to
a single anti-corruption bureau. The central commission for discipline inspection has absorbed
the anti-corruption power of procurator organs and become the only anti-corruption agency.
The influence of the party’s local leaders in fighting corruption has plummeted. Rather than
giving up control or advancing the rule of law, the CCP central committee has accelerated
actions to keep authority within the new system.

REFORMS AND LIMITATIONS IN INDIA
Modi’s Rule
Narendra Modi, the current prime minister of India, has held office since 2014. He served
as the chief minister of Gujarat for 13 years before he became the country’s leader. After he
took office, Modi has reformed and challenged the anti-corruption system in India. The most
significant reform in the anti-corruption system has been the economic method called demon-
etisation. In November 2016, the Indian government announced the demonetisation decision
to replace 500 and 1,000 banknotes to the new 500 and 2,000 rupee banknotes.
Although this method was helpful to return a part of the funds, ordinary people suffered
because of the poor organisation of exchange points and many of them eventually became
victims. Thus, from the public reaction, the demonetisation method was not kind to the
residents.
Anti-Corruption Act
Offshore transactions may be associated with corruption in India. Mauritius ranks first in the
list of international investors in the Indian economy. Singapore ranks second, followed by the
United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and the United States. This reflects the fact that Mauritius,
along with Singapore, plays an offshore role for Indian companies. According to some esti-
mates, the amount of offshore Indian capital ranges from $100 billion to $150 billion. Due to
this, the country has been discussing whether to introduce measures to stop this process, since
it is to a certain extent destructive for the Indian national economy, as large sums of money
flow away without bringing benefits to the state.
However, corruption in India arose quite a long time ago. It existed in the pre-colonial
period and subsequently flourished in the colonial era. Nonetheless, at that time it was per-
ceived as a kind of characteristic feature inherent in the system that developed in the colony.
Many British henchmen from among the local elite, who were responsible for maintaining law
and order as well as collecting taxes, could charge a kind of “commission” or “food” in order
to accept “gifts” called “gave”. Most of the colonial authorities believed that corruption was
a permanent component of Eastern society in general and in India in particular.
The first coordinated steps to fight corruption were taken in the late 1930s when the British
still dominated India. The Indian National Congress (INC) opposed the democratic principles
proclaimed by it to the “corrupt system of colonial despotism”.
Since 1941, the government has put in operation a special police unit designed to resist
acts of corruption. In March 1947, the Indian government passed the anti-corruption act, The
Prevention of Corruption Act. The document was intended to “clean up” the administration
and became the basis for the emergence of protest movements focused on the fight against
corruption.
Leading Control and Period of Development
In 1947 India gained independence from British rule. The free state took control of the system
that had been formed over the years in the colonial era. Independence did not bring relief from
the problems inherent in colonial India, and some problems even worsened. “Corruption in

India is thousands of years old, but it has changed a lot. Over the past 20 years, there has been
a transition to large-scale corruption: we have never met with scandals of the scale and size
that we have had to deal with lately.” The reason for this is the dynamic development of India.
Rapid growth has given new opportunities for illegal profits.
Anti-Corruption Development
An important feature of the Indian economy during independence was the licensing system.
Its essence lay in the fact that any action related to the purchase of raw materials, equipment,
opening branches or expanding a company required a license. This was done in order to limit
the monopolisation of industries and protect national production. In addition, it was supposed
to help to preserve the foreign currency necessary to pay for imports. After the implementation
of the licensing system, the purchases process was often delayed for a long time. Production
was slowed down, and there was hardly any opportunity for companies to develop. The
Council on Foreign Affairs stated: “the institution of licenses and permits has become a source
of corruption on a massive scale”.
Policies have been aimed at restricting the inflow of foreign capital, imported goods,
a ban on the export of Indian investments, and consequently, restriction of competition from
foreign companies to support the national industry. All this, despite many positive results,
also created many barriers for enterprising Indians. Indians began to resort to semi-legal and
illegal methods of capital export in pursuit of greater profits and seek opportunities to invest
in production abroad. The flight of capital has arisen. According to Dooley (1988, p. 422),
“flight capital is defined as the stock of claims on nonresidents that do not generate investment
income receipts in the creditor country’s balance of payments data”. When comparing this
period with the colonial era, Indian economists call the current time as the time of “dominion
of licenses” by analogy with the British dominion.
A former correspondent for the Indian Times newspaper, Anita Pratap noted that from the
1970s the state did not deal with the problem of corruption seriously. Since the authorities
themselves won at its expense, India lost huge funds that could have been invested in the
development of the country. In the 1980s a corruption scandal broke out. The Swedish arms
company, Bofors, was signing a trade agreement in India. The government of Rajiv Gandhi
was paid huge bribes by many Indian and foreign companies. The opposition of the INC
accused leading Congressional leaders Rajiv and Sonya Gandhi of participating in this corrupt
deal. As a result, the INC lost the election in 1989.
From the early 1990s, the economy in India gradually began to “open up to the world”,
which provided new opportunities for deceptive schemes and mechanisms, and the number of
scandalous court cases increased. Privatisation and public–private partnerships widely spread
in many areas of business and immediately became objects of corruption.
In 2008, there was a scandal with telecommunications companies (Yardley & Timmons,
2010). In 2012, the Indian Supreme Court revoked 122 licenses belonging to only eight
companies. As a result, the minister of telecommunications was put in prison. However,
many experts argue that the mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption
schemes are not enough. Over recent years, only 25 civil servants have been checked for cor-
ruption, but no one has lost their post.
Soon after the telecommunications case (2008–12) and Commonwealth Games scam
(2010), a “Coalgate” scandal (2012) broke out that revealed the negative aspects of the Indian

economy and political system. It resulted in mass protests in Delhi and affected Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh. It turned out that some representatives of the business community, as well
as politicians who had contacts in the government, had illegally managed to obtain the right to
develop still undeveloped coal deposits. Manmohan Singh held this post until 2014 and was
then replaced by Bharatiya Janata Party leader Narendra Modi. Consequently, Modi became
the head of government during the time of the fight against corruption and this became one of
his major goals in politics.
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
China
The anti-corruption strategies in China are divided into different dimensions.

Mitigating corruption through legislation could be the way to diminish corruption levels.
For instance, if the laws are more specific and authoritative, they will help to reduce the
perception of official corruption. Besides the laws, which could punish corrupted officials,
there should be other regulations to restrict some behaviours that may cause corruption. For
example, one of the effective methods could be to make it obligatory for government officials
to register their assets and hold corrupt officials accountable. The most necessary change for
the government is to become open to the public.
For corruption that happens in the administration, the way to minimise corruption levels
would be to oversee government power and to set up a series of departments to monitor
officials’ behaviours. It is important to ensure that the department is independent enough. For
instance, the collusion between the judicial departments and local officials has led to judicial
injustice. Corrupted officials must be severely punished and deprived of judicial qualification
for life and unable to be employed anywhere in the public sector. What is more, a special con-
stitutional maintenance body should be set up to oversee the impartiality of law enforcement
in judicial departments and the integrity of government officials at all levels.
Side effects and challenges

When the government spends a lot of power and time focusing on handling the corruption
problem, it leads to the formation of new groups of interest, distracting the national attention
from other domestic issues. Often the ways used to expose much of the anti-corruption work to
the general public have only created side effects. For example, the legitimate rights of corrupt
officials during the sentencing process may be jeopardised. Excessive and high-pressure
anti-corruption has led to government inaction and a brain drain. Taking the lead of the
discipline inspection commission, a Party organisation, which is not a neutral, independent
institution, would lead to the dictatorship of the Party and undermine the rule of law. Other
challenges would be passive acts of the government and public officials. Due to strong pres-
sure from the superiors on fighting corruption, public officials may lose working enthusiasm.
In addition, lower-level officials may have a countermeasure to supervision during inspections
and not perform to their best capacity.

Possible anti-corruption reform campaigns

Besides the institutional/legal reform, the grassroots and government departments require
more attention. There is a clear need to strengthen the party’s unified leadership over party
conduct, integrity and anti-corruption work. It is also important to reform the party’s system
for disciplining the wrongdoers, and improve the party’s leadership and working mechanisms
against corruption. Its content can be summarised as “two responsibilities” (liangge zeren) and
“two mains” (liangge weizhu).
“Two responsibilities” refers to the implementation of the responsibility system for building
a clean and honest government by the party organisations (CCP) at different levels; in the
meantime, commissions for discipline inspection are in charge of anti-corruption at all levels
of the party-state apparatus. “Two mains” means that corruption cases should be investigated
and dealt with mainly by the leaders of the discipline inspection commission at a higher
level than the assumed corruption case. The handling of clues and case investigation must be
reported to the discipline inspection commission at the higher level while being reported to the
Party committee at the same level (Sun, 2019, p. 195).
The prevention of corruption

The first significant change is increased transparency and stricter anti-corruption activities.
Xi first began his transparent and strict anti-corruption campaign soon after he took office
in November 2012. Before Xi’s rule, the anti-corruption work within the party seemed not
to be open to the public as it was mostly done through internal decisions. However, when Xi
became the CCP leader, the most significant change in fighting corruption was not just finding
and punishing party officials but that whole scandals were exposed, including the details and
participating people. Consequently, transparency is one of the most significant changes in the
anti-corruption methods used in China. This indirectly shows the determination and tough
methods of the party in fighting corruption.
Another visible change in the follow-up scandals was that the Chinese officials were banned
from using luxury cars, announced by Xi in a Party Central Committee meeting in December
2012. Officials were also advised to be less ceremonious and not to give in to the old customs
and habits. The second significant change in the anti-corruption work is to reduce the lavish
behavior of public officials. Besides the officials in the party this also includes leaders in other
areas such as state-owned enterprises like China National Petroleum Corporation.
India
Parliament and outside views

Many people remember the riots in the Indian Parliament in 2011 after the notorious Wikileaks
website published information that a few parliamentarians received significant amounts of
money. During the vote of confidence in 2008, they cast their votes in support of the govern-
ment. Even though Congress lost the support of its centre-left, the results of the elections were
favourable for the government. Many accused Congress of bribing members of parliament,
but the INC rejected everything. As a result of the investigation, two parliamentarians were
arrested, whose involvement in the abuse was proved.
Another corruption scandal ensued: the chief minister of the state of Maharashtra, Ashok
Chavan, was forced to resign in 2011. He was charged with changing the housing that was
intended for military widows to a property for the relatives of high-ranking military officers

and officials. Chavan and two of his accomplices were convicted for organising the criminal
conspiracy, fraud and falsification of documents.
In 2011, the anti-corruption movement intensified markedly. It was initiated by 74-year-old
Anna Hazare, an Indian public figure who several times organised hunger strikes in the centre
of Delhi to force the government to adopt a package of anti-corruption laws. Corruption, in
the opinion of Anna Hazare, who was often called the “new Gandhi”, became the main social
disease in India, and it was necessary to fight it “to the end”. Supporters of this movement
demanded the creation of a special anti-corruption agency. An attempt to arrest an activist
turned into a powerful wave of protests across the country; demonstrations in support of
Anna Hazare took place in almost every major city, and the authorities were forced to cancel
the arrest. The government announced that a committee would be set up to draft a bill. In
December 2013, a new law was approved by parliament.
In March 2012, army commander general V. K. Singh reported that he was offered a bribe
of over $2 million by a person closely associated with the defence industry. In exchange the
army had to buy several hundred trucks. This message provoked strong indignation in parlia-
ment, and the minister of defence, A. K. Anthony, promised to investigate. However, due to
the lack of a written statement from the general, an official case was never opened.
In recent years, political parties have used anti-corruption slogans as a powerful tool to
attract the electorate. The Aam Aadmi Party built their program on the anti-corruption strug-
gle, which greatly increased its popularity among the population. In 2013, in the elections to
the Delhi Legislative Assembly, the Aam Aadmi Party won almost a third of the votes, beating
the INC and losing only to the Bharatiya Janata Party. The leader of the Aam Aadmi Party
became the chief minister of the capital.
At the beginning of 2014 in a speech to the representatives of his party, Arvind Kejwiral
accused about 20 high-ranking politicians of corruption. Among them were the leader of the
Congress, Rahul Gandhi, and the Bharatiya Janata Party leader, Narendra Modi, who had
not yet become prime minister but was the chief minister of the state of Gujarat. Thus, the
fight against corruption turned into a political game for power. According to Kejwiral, a list
of corrupt officials was compiled in order to let Indians know who should not be elected to
parliament. The head of the Aam Aadmi Party said that “one of the main tasks of the party is
to prevent any corrupt official from entering the parliament”.
However, in the winter of 2014, an anti-corruption bill was rejected in parliament by two
leading parties, since Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party considered unconstitutional its
adoption in the absence of an agreement with the federal government. After the rejection of the
bill, which proposed the creation of an independent body with the authority to verify political
and civil servants suspected of corruption, Arvind Kejwiral left his post in protest. There have
been other attempts to combat corruption in India at different times. In 2005, the government
authorised the emergence of a law on the right to information, according to which Indian citi-
zens were able to request access to any document of a public nature, including documents that
gave rise to suspicions of corrupt practices. Anti-corruption legislation was tightened and the
work of the judiciary became more effective.
The fight against corruption is conducted at the level of individual cities and states.
Accordingly, a program was adopted to teach literacy to city residents with the help of vol-
unteers in the city of Kottayam, Kerala, in 1988. Since this action was carried out without
any external financing, only thanks to the personal aspirations of individuals, corruption was
avoided. By June 1989, Kottayam became the first city in India where the literacy rate reached

100 per cent. In Bihar, the number of police officers was increased, trials began to be carried
out faster. In Chhattisgarh, in 2003, a unique grain distribution system was introduced, which
helped get rid of corruption in this important endeavour. This system has been recognised by
the World Bank as the best in the world.
CONCLUSION
Corruption is still a definite threat to two of the world’s largest economies, China and
India. This is certainly not a new issue; rather, it has very deep roots in both countries. It
is no exaggeration to say that corruption is widespread in India where it has become a part
of everyday life for most Indians. In China, although the Xi Jinping regime launched the
largest anti-corruption campaign in recent decades, anti-corruption remains a daunting
task. Corruption is like a creeping cancer which can have many negative consequences.
For instance, it can have a huge impact on not just public trust in government, but also the
economic development of the nation. In view of the real and potential risks of corruption that
could hurt the country, the fight against corruption has been on the agenda of both countries
for years. Corruption is still ongoing in both countries, although there have been some signs of
improvement. Nevertheless, under the current leaders of both nations, Xi Jinping and Narendra
Modi, anti-corruption has been a defining feature of China and India’s attempts of reforming
their political and administrative systems.
Xi demanded newspapers, televisions and radio stations be loyal to the government. There
is a clear use of technology for unlawful arrests, local investigations and creating uncertainty
and fear among officials in all dimensions. This has led to a situation where officials have to be
careful of controlling excessive behaviour and pausing to think before they are too immersed
in illegal business. In addition, it is important to have a clear view of senior management,
while the party controls key delegation instruments; there should not be any ambiguity or
doubt in business and politics. Therefore, it is necessary to find a balance between justice and
efficiency. During the period of the large-scale anti-corruption campaign, which began with
the term of Xi Jinping, over 1.5 million members of the Communist Party were punished for
violations. Despite significant achievements, the situation is extremely difficult, and the tasks
are complex. The environment that generates corruption still exists and the problems in various
departments have not disappeared. Formalism and bureaucracy are some of the obstacles still
to be solved. The fight against corruption in China will become increasingly large scale and
this will help to fulfil the “Chinese dream” and revive the Chinese nation.
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi won the support of many voters, promising to solve
two acute problems of the country – corruption and slow economic growth. Since the begin-
ning of 2016 GDP growth rates have declined and in the second quarter of 2017 fell to 5.7 per
cent (they previously reached 7 per cent), the lowest level in three years. According to some
experts, Modi’s two ambitious goals are incompatible: an anti-corruption campaign hinders
economic growth. The Indian and international expert community still cannot give a clear
assessment of the anti-corruption policy of Narendra Modi. On the one hand, a rational gain
is undoubtedly present in his strategy aimed at the withdrawal of funds illegally received
by corrupt officials. However, on the other hand, ordinary Indians, traditionally inclined to
distrust their savings to banks and keep them at home, have suffered significant damage. If we
consider only the influence of Narendra Modi’s policy on the situation with corruption in the

country, then referring again to the data of Transparency International we can see that the cor-
ruption perception index in 2017 increased by two points compared to 2016. It indicates minor,
but still positive, developments in addressing the problem of corruption in India. Although the
anti-corruption movement still provides Modi with political support, economists say this must
be traded off for lowering entrepreneurial and consumer confidence. This is one of the reasons
why private investments are not growing, which in the past have ensured the acceleration of
the economy.
The problem of corruption has not lost its relevance for a long time in India. According to
experts, one of the reasons for the poor effectiveness of the fight against corruption is the lack
of legal literacy of the population. There are no anti-corruption educational programmes in
Indian schools. Law schools and universities study anti-corruption legislation, as well as law
enforcement practice, mainly in the framework of training courses on social and economic
offences, or on white-collar crimes, or in the framework of the criminal procedure code, but
not as separate courses. In order to create effective mechanisms for solving the problem, in
2010 the Central Supervision Commission prepared a draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
This document emphasises the importance of the role of appropriate education in preventing
corruption and forming intolerance to bribery among the population. The importance of the
Law on the Right to Information as an anti-corruption tool is emphasised, recommendations
have been made to develop education and public awareness programs, including courses on
the study of this law in school and college curricula, and a working group has been established
to revise educational curricula. Although Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is visible,
China also needs to enhance anti-corruption education, which could address the fundamental
issue of the corruption which is embedded in people’s daily lives.
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18. Corruption in Lithuania: between institutions
and perceptions
Eglė Butkevičienė, Eglė Vaidelytė and Vaidas Morkevičius
INTRODUCTION
Corruption as a phenomenon manifests a complex nature which is highly dependent on cul-

tural context. It is widely discussed that Lithuania as a Central and Eastern European country
still experiences difficult moral legacies from the 50 years of Soviet occupation and is very
susceptible to different forms of corruption. Even today, the cliché that Lithuania is a highly
corrupt country often occurs in public perceptions as well as public and media discourse.
However, institutional indices on corruption and integrity reflect a much brighter view of
Lithuania in the context of corruption. According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
the Index of Public Integrity, and Democracy Barometer, Lithuania has relatively high rates
of transparency in comparison with other countries in the world, and usually appears above
many other post-communist and even Western countries. Moreover, it should be noted that
other post-Soviet countries with lower positions in the aforementioned indices manifest higher
citizen satisfaction with corruption levels in their countries and government capacity to control
it. What are the reasons for this cleavage between public opinion and expert evaluations of
institutional settings?
This chapter presents the case of Lithuania in the context of corruption and its prevention.
It includes analysis of quantitative and qualitative data as well as an historical review of social
and political settings in Lithuania. The chapter starts with an overview of the history and the
current public administration system in Lithuania that has experienced many reforms and
changes, especially since the early 1990s when Lithuania restored its independence and faced
a challenge to create a new public governance system based on Western values. It also stresses
that Lithuania still experiences many unfavourable moral and institutional legacies from the
Soviet period which have influence on public perceptions of corruption as well as on public
governance practices.
Further, the chapter presents positive trends of integrity and transparency in Lithuania
indicated by institutional measurements and an interview with the executive officer of the
Lithuanian anti-corruption agency. Based on the quantitative survey data, we note that public
perceptions of corruption describe Lithuania as a quite corrupt country and try to explain these
rather negative views exposing the relationship between corruption perceptions and political
trust and political efficacy. In the final part of the chapter we describe the corruption preven-
tion system in Lithuania and provide conclusions and a general outlook of the corruption and
its prevention system in Lithuania.
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Eglė Butkevičienė, Eglė Vaidelytė and Vaidas Morkevičius - 9781789900910
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM IN LITHUANIA: BRIEF

OVERVIEW
The current public administration system in Lithuania has inherited legacies of several his-
torical periods. While the most important influence has been exerted by the Soviet period,
the administrative practices of Tsarist Russia, to which Lithuania belonged in the nineteenth
century, and the short period of independence between the two world wars have also left some
imprints (Pivoras, 2013). After establishing its independence in 1918, Lithuania introduced
a Weberian type of public administration system which was, at that time, the dominant trend in
Western democracies. This system “with a strong emphasis on professionalism, hierarchy, and
the regulation of the civil service according to public law” (Pivoras, 2013, p. 137), with some
minor modifications, prevailed in Lithuania until the Second World War.
During the Second World War, Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union and remained
incorporated in the Soviet administrative system for almost 50 years (until 1990). The charac-
ter of the Soviet administrative system was well known for its double standards. On the one
hand, it was characterized by “an excessively hierarchical and legalistic nature” (Nakrošis,
2003, p. 126), where “officials under the old system tended to be more concerned with carry-
ing out orders and less concerned with the outcomes of their activities” (Barr, Gomulka, and
Tomes, 1994, p. 105). On the other hand, a very important part of Soviet public bureaucracy
was nomenklatura and “the formal rules could easily be changed according to the wishes of
top nomenklatura officials and as a result, administrative voluntarism behind the mask of
formal legalism was a reality” (Pivoras, 2013, p. 139). Thus, while in the rest of the world
public administration was shifting from Weberian bureaucracy towards new public admin-
istration and later towards new public management, the Soviet-occupied area of Europe had
to deal with a public sector dominated by hierarchical legalistic practices coexisting with the
nomenklatura networks and widespread corruptive practices (bribes, nepotism, favouritism,
patronage, etc.).
In the last decade of the twentieth century, Lithuania restored its independence and started
to reform the existing public administration system. Baimenov and Liebert (2019) argue
that the newly independent states that once made up the Soviet Union were faced with the
herculean challenge of reforming existing governance structures to enable them to develop
their collapsing economies and effectively deliver services to their people. At that time, public
administration in Western countries experienced the rise of new public governance, while the
Lithuanian public administration system was undergoing major transformations, as well as
fighting with the Soviet legacies related to informal practices, high levels of corruption, and
distrust in the public sector. The first decade of independence was marked by weak public
institutions and an ineffective civil service. However, during that time, major legislative doc-
uments regulating public service were adopted, including the Law on Public Administration
passed in 1999.
The newly developed public administration system was still quite hierarchical and legalis-
tic. As emphasized by Nakrošis (2018, p. 676):
Public administration in Lithuania is very much legalistic and follows the “Rechtstaat” tradition.
Policy making is understood primarily as the preparation and adoption of legal acts, with particular
attention to legal drafting techniques… Legalism permeates to the civil service where laws delineate
the duties and responsibilities of civil servants, effectively limiting their discretion. Besides, politi-

Corruption in Lithuania 245
cians are sometimes unwilling to delegate tasks to civil servants in order to safeguard their political
power.
However, during the preparatory period for the accession to the European Union (EU),
a number of new public management-type managerial instruments were introduced, which are
still prevalent on the government agenda (Nakrošis, 2018).
Currently, the central administration of Lithuania consists of several types of institutions
accountable to (a) the government and separate ministries, (b) the parliament, and (c) the
president of Lithuania. There are 14 ministries in Lithuania with a focus on specific policy
areas and considerably unified administrative structures within each ministry. The primary
coordination body of the centre of government is the Office of Government, which is led by
the chancellor of the government, who is appointed by the prime minister and is a civil servant
of political confidence (Nakrošis, 2018, p. 669). Its main functions are strategic planning,
monitoring and evaluation. This important public-sector organization role is also played by the
state-owned enterprises that provide numerous public services.
Below the central-level institutions, Lithuania also has 60 municipalities, that “de jure
possess the power to act in an autonomous way within their competence areas, but a lack of
fiscal capacity constrains their room for manoeuvre” (Nakrošis, 2018, p. 667). As empha-
sized by Nakrošis (2018), although municipalities have their own budgets, a large share of
them comes from the central government, resulting in a low level of fiscal decentralization.
Municipality competence areas include education, territorial and urban planning, social
welfare, and public services.
In Lithuania, public-sector employees in leading positions are also of two types: executives
and civil servants of political (personal) confidence; e.g. at municipality level, mayors and
members of municipal councils are elected every four years. However, the director of a munic-
ipal administration takes an executive role. At the central level, each ministry has a minister,
vice-ministers, a chancellor, and some advisers to the minister. All of them are civil servants
of political (personal) confidence. On the other hand, the heads of departments or divisions and
their deputies are mostly on executive contracts.
PUBLIC-SECTOR INTEGRITY AND LEVELS OF CORRUPTION IN

LITHUANIA
Various international corruption and integrity indices reveal general trends of public-sector
integrity and levels of corruption in Lithuania. Importantly, they are deemed to be more
objective and free from social stereotypes and subjective opinions. According to the 2019
CPI, which “ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector cor-
ruption according to experts and businesspeople” (www.transparency.org/cpi2019), Lithuania
had a score of 59 points and was ranked 35th position among the 180 countries in the world
(Transparency International, 2020). For the last few years Lithuania has held stable on the CPI,
which indicates a relatively high level of transparency compared to 1999, when Lithuania’s
score was just 38 points out of 100 (Transparency International, 1999). Lithuania demonstrates
a similar score if compared to the neighbouring EU countries having common historical roots
of public administration. Latvia is ranked 44th, Poland 41st, and Estonia 18th out of 180 coun-
tries (Transparency International, 2020).

Also, according to the Index of Public Integrity, which is a composite index consisting
of six components – judicial independence, administrative burden, trade openness, budget
transparency, e-citizenship, and freedom of press – Lithuania in 2017 was ranked 23rd out
of 30 countries in the EU, Norway and United States regions. Meanwhile, Estonia is in 8th
place, and Latvia is at 21st place on the same scale. However, taking each criterion separately,
Lithuania appears in different positions. On both e-citizenship and trade openness, Lithuania
holds the 20th place out of 30 countries; according to freedom of press, Lithuania is in the
middle of the scale (ranked 15th out of 30), and according to administrative burden, Lithuania
is above average (ranked 13th out of 30). According to juridical independence, Lithuania
is ranked 19th, but according to budget transparency, Lithuania is in the last position in the
region (https://integrity-index.org). Low budget transparency indicates that citizens are not
active in conventional local government decision-making processes.
According to the Corruption Absence Index produced by the Democracy Barometer project
(Merkel et al., 2018), which consists of the CPI (produced by Transparency International) and
the Corruption Index (developed by International Country Risk Guide), in 2016 Lithuania was
26th out of 47 countries, and had a score of 39.5 on a scale from 0 to 100. Lithuania is above
such EU countries as Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Latvia, Malta, and Spain. The leading seven countries according to these statistics
are the Nordic countries, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.
Finally, according to the Control of Corruption Index, which “captures perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ the state by elites and private interests”, included into
the Worldwide Governance Indicators database published by the World Bank (Kaufmann and
Kraay, 2019), Lithuania holds the 63rd position, Latvia the 64th, and Estonia the 28th position
among 209 countries (https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi).
Thus, from an institutional perspective, the general situation of corruption in Lithuania
is relatively positive. However, there are many legacies related to historically determined
socio-cultural and political contexts. The executive-level official of the Lithuanian Special
Investigation Service (SIS) in an interview1 revealed that the significant feature of corruption
in Lithuania is routine bribing: “the petty corruption in the form of bribes is very popular…
first of all, in healthcare system”. According to the Lithuanian Corruption Map developed by
SIS (www.stt.lt/en), the Ministry of Health is identified as one of the most corrupt institutions
in Lithuania (55% of respondents in 2014 and 47% citizens in 2019 think that it is highly
corrupt, see Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, 2019). At first glance, it might be assumed that the
key issue in this situation is the low salaries of medical staff in comparison with salaries in the
same field in Western countries. As noted by the SIS official, “a surgeon of highest compe-
tence receives 1000 euros monthly officially and earns 5000 euros per month from bribes paid
for surgeries”. However, the cultural mentality plays more than a minor role in explaining the
situation. The interviewee claimed that there is still distinctive thinking as a legacy from the
Soviet period, whereby citizens are convinced that in order to obtain better quality of medical
services, it is essential to give a bribe to a doctor: “in Soviet times and the early post-Soviet
period, the culture of bribery as an instrument of negotiation was formed and culturally
embedded in social interaction in this field of services”. Nowadays, the institutions of the
Lithuanian healthcare system are highly regarded in Europe, and primary healthcare reflects
best Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development practices (OECD, 2018).
The mentality and practice to give an under-the-table payment to a doctor as an expression of

gratitude is still very common. On the other hand, “nobody would give a bribe if it was known
that a doctor was not going to take it” (the SIS official). The respondent emphasized that the
lack of political will among medical doctors to promote zero tolerance to bribery is another
central reason of corruption existence in the field of healthcare. The respondent discussed that
the possible solution to make the situation more transparent could be the launch of a special
foundation where citizens could voluntarily donate to a doctor as an expression of gratitude.
In summary, we can see that institutional corruption measurements indicate that Lithuania
is in the middle of the scale, or even above average, according to different corruption indices.
Nevertheless, public perception about corruption in Lithuania appears to be more pessimistic
and is presented in the next section.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ABOUT CORRUPTION AND BRIBES IN

LITHUANIA
Public perception is one of the factors that shapes public discourse and gives birth to stereo-
types and popular clichés. Public opinion surveys indicate that Lithuanians, more than other
Europeans, tend to think that corruption is a major issue in the country and do not trust the
government in the fight against corruption. According to data from the Lithuanian Corruption
Map 2019, Lithuanians think that corruption is the fourth most important problem in Lithuania
after such issues as low salaries, high prices/inflation, and emigration. This opinion varies in
different groups of respondents: corruption as the most important problem is identified by 36
per cent of citizens, 32 per cent of businessmen, and 23 per cent of civil servants (Specialiųjų
tyrimų tarnyba, 2019). Comparing the different public spheres, Lithuanian residents think that
corruption is most widespread in the healthcare system (81.9%), among the politicians at all
levels (61.4%), and public servants issuing building permits (61.1%) (Eurobarometer 88.2,
2017). Just over half of the respondents (52.4%) think that corruption is widespread in police
and customs, while the education system and banks are seen as comparatively transparent as
only 26.4 per cent and 17.5 per cent of the respondents indicated that corruption is widespread
in these spheres.
Lithuania is not unique in its high level of corruption perceptions, as following Eurobarometer
88.2 (2017), in most EU member states, citizens consider corruption to be very or fairly wide-
spread in their countries (see Figure 18.1). There are only a few countries in Europe (and most
of them are Nordic countries) where less than 50 per cent of citizens think that corruption is
not very or fairly widespread in their country. Meanwhile, Lithuania is among those countries
where absolute majority of citizens (95.7% of respondents) believe that corruption is very or
fairly widespread in the country (see Figure 18.1).
However, in most Central and Eastern European countries, almost every second respondent
declares that it is acceptable to give money or a gift or do a favour in order to ensure that they
get something from public administration/public service (Figure 18.2). As the data show,
almost half of respondents in Lithuania (48.9%) think that it is acceptable to give money
or a gift or do a favour to a representative of public administration in order to obtain public
service.
Besides that, Eurobarometer data confirm expert opinions discussed above, that tolerance
to corruption is considerably higher when speaking about health and healthcare issues.
Apparently, the healthcare system is one of the fields that manifests high levels of petty cor-

Source: Eurobarometer 88.2, 2017.
Figure 18.1 Evaluations of the spread of corruption in the country (literal question,
QB5: How widespread do you think the problem of corruption is in (OUR
COUNTRY)?)
ruption. In healthcare, moral decisions are directly related to survival needs, thus are full of
moral intensity and are ethically very complicated. Also, according to the Eurobarometer 88.2
(2017) data, around 36.7 per cent of respondents indicated that corruption is widespread in the
healthcare systems of their countries. However, country statistics range from as little as 5.8 per
cent in Finland to as high as 82.5 per cent in Greece (see Figure 18.3). Habibov (2016), in his
research, emphasized that corruption in post-Soviet healthcare systems “exists as a rampant
issue”, and Figure 18.3 indicates that most Eastern European countries are among the coun-
tries where more than half of the respondents think that corruption is widespread in their
healthcare systems. Usually, people follow a “tradition” to give an under-the-table payment
for the service in healthcare systems, and petty corruption like backhanders or small presents
in the healthcare system in some countries is often considered as a cultural norm (Wang-Sheng
and Guven, 2013).
According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2016 conducted by Transparency
International, 24 per cent of Lithuanian respondents reported that they or their family members
have given a bribe in the past 12 months. It is the second highest rate in the EU after Romania
(29%). In comparison, the bribery rate in Latvia is 15 per cent and in Estonia it is as low as
5 per cent. However, citizens in Georgia and Belarus (countries ranked lower on various
institutional corruption indices than Lithuania) are convinced that corruption is not the biggest

Figure 18.2 Tolerance towards bribes and favours in the public sector (literal question,
QB4: Talking more generally, if you wanted to get something from
public administration or a public service, to what extent do you think it is
acceptable to do any of the following? Items: to give money; to give a gift; to
do a favour)
problem in the country (Transparency International, 2016). Also, Azerbaijani citizens identify
corruption as a medium risk in their country, although according to CPI in 2018, Azerbaijan
was rated among the most corrupt countries in the world (152nd out of 180 countries).
Apparently, in many cases, public perceptions of corruption and the institutional corruption
indicators diverge significantly and this is the case for Lithuania.
One possible explanation for this incongruence might be related to low trust and political
efficacy that are direct expressions of the Soviet legacy (Boda and Medve-Bálint, 2014; Rose
and Mishler, 2011). Considering internal political efficacy, as seen in Table 18.1, respondents
in Lithuania score very low on this indicator, as only 20.2 per cent of respondents think that
their voice counts in the country, while the average for EU countries is 60.1 per cent. More
importantly, the evaluation of the spread of corruption is highly related to internal political
efficacy as the percentage of people who think that their voice does not count is 20 percentage
points higher among those who declare that corruption is very or fairly widespread in their
country compared to those who think otherwise. Moreover, as the data in Table 18.2 show,
the same relationship holds when people evaluate levels of corruption of both politicians and
public officials.

Figure 18.3 Evaluation of the spread of corruption in the healthcare system (literal
question, QB7: In (OUR COUNTRY), do you think that the exchanging of
bribes and the abuse of power for personal gain are widespread among any
of the following? Item: the healthcare system)
An even stronger relationship exists between political trust and corruption perceptions.
As we see from Table 18.3, the level of trust in politicians and civil servants is very low in
Lithuania. This low level of trust makes an impact on corruption perception. The percentage
of respondents who do not trust politicians and civil servants is respectively 14.9 and 16.7 per
cent higher among those who think that quite a lot or almost all politicians and public officials
are involved in corruption compared to those who think otherwise.
Table 18.1 Perception of corruption and political efficacy (Lithuania)
How widespread the problem of corruption is in your country (%)

No corruption at all or very/
My voice counts in my country fairly rare Very/fairly widespread Total
Totally disagree 35.1 43.6 43.3
Tend to disagree 24.3 37.1 36.5
Tend to agree 35.1 18.2 18.9
Totally agree 5.4 1.1 1.3
Note: Spearman’s rho = -0.16, p<0.001; N=876.


Table 18.2 Perception of corruption and political efficacy (Lithuania)
How many politicians are involved in How many public officials are
corruption* (%) involved in corruption** (%)
People like me have no say about what the Almost none/a few/ Quite a lot/almost Almost none/a few/ Quite a lot/almost
government does some all some all
(Strongly) disagree 12.3 9.0 10.7 9.2
Neither agree nor disagree 19.2 18.2 20.6 17.2
(Strongly) agree 68.5 72.8 68.7 73.5
Note: * Spearman’s rho = 0.15, p<0.001; N=905; ** Spearman’s rho = 0.13, p<0.001; N=900.
Source: International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government V – ISSP 2016 (ISSP Research Group, 2018).
Table 18.3 Perception of corruption and political trust (Lithuania)
How many politicians are involved in corruption* (%)

Members of parliament try to keep promises Almost none/a few/some Quite a lot/almost all
(Strongly) disagree 63.7 78.6
Neither agree nor disagree 28.9 15.3
(Strongly) agree 7.5 6.1
How many public officials are involved in corruption** (%)
Most civil servants can be trusted Almost none/a few/some Quite a lot/almost all
(Strongly) disagree 52.0 68.7
Neither agree nor disagree 35.3 24.5
(Strongly) agree 12.7 6.8
Note: * Spearman’s rho = –0.14, p<0.001; N=906; ** Spearman’s rho = –0.17, p<0.001; N=881.
Source: International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government V – ISSP 2016 (ISSP Research Group, 2018).
CORRUPTION PREVENTION SYSTEM IN LITHUANIA
Establishing an effective corruption prevention system is a multifaceted issue which chal-

lenges every government around the world. Various corruption prevention strategies have
been adopted by international organizations including the United Nations, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, and Council of Europe. The most comprehensive
of them is considered to be the United Nations Convention against Corruption that provides
a “comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules that all countries can apply in order to
strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption” (UNCAC, 2004). Also, the
Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is considered to be one of
the most successful and famous, founded in the 1970s and significant for the following char-
acteristics (Graycar and Prenzler, 2013): a single organization with de facto monopoly over
corruption control; independence from government; a strategy of prevention, education, and
sanction that is reflected organizationally into corruption prevention, community relations,
and operations departments; extensive powers that include the right of arrest and detention;
secure funding; personnel of the highest moral calibre, the political will to combat corruption,
public support of sufficient strength, and high public trust. This model has been chosen to
follow when introducing corruption prevention systems in Lithuania.
In 1997, the government established SIS which was granted with the function to fight
against corruption in the public governance system. Until May 2000, SIS was an institution

subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior; however, in 2000, in order to improve performance
to combat corruption in public administration, the decision to expand SIS functions was taken
by the Lithuanian parliament (the Seimas) and SIS became an independent agency directly
accountable to the president and the Seimas. It was assigned functions related to the detec-
tion and investigation of corruptive offences and developing and implementing corruption
prevention measures (www.stt.lt/en). Expanding its activities in July 2002, SIS established
the Department of Corruption Prevention and delegated to it an anti-corruption assessment of
legislation, monitoring the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Programme meas-
ures, the development of methodologies for the assessment of the likelihood of corruption, the
analysis of opportunities for corruption, and anti-corruption education and raising awareness
among the public. Eventually, it could be noticed that the corruption prevention system in
Lithuania to some extent has followed the famous Hong Kong ICAC example. Apparently,
SIS is a single organization over corruption control, independent from the government, has
a corruption prevention department, extensive powers, and promotes the political will to
combat corruption. The main areas of the Lithuanian anti-corruption policy for 2015–25 are
the following: increasing efficacy of public-sector governance; inevitability of sanctions for
corruption offences; reducing supervisory and administrative burden; ensuring transparency of
public procurement procedures; eliminating corruption in healthcare; increasing public intol-
erance for corruption; and encouraging greater public involvement in anti-corruption activities
(Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, 2016, p. 6).
An important role in corruption prevention is also played by the local branch of
Transparency International. In Lithuania, this non-governmental agency aims to ensure greater
accountability and transparency in public life, contribute to the eradication of corruption,
conduct research, and create learning and anti-corruption tools. Their main activities include
analysing (1) potential gaps in laws, legal drafts, and other proposals to reinforce transparency
and anti-corruption regulation; (2) effectiveness of national and institutional anti-corruption
programmes and measures; (3) corruption risks in public procurement; (4) corruption in state
and municipal institutions and the private sector; and (5) access to information provided by
national and municipal institutions (www.transparency.lt/en/activities).
According to Transparency International data, it could be assumed that efforts to combat
corruption in Lithuania are achieving results: in 1999, according to the CPI, Lithuania was
in the 50th position in the world (among 99 countries), while in 2016 it was 35th among
180 countries (Transparency International, 1999, 2020). Compared to the Hong Kong ICAC
model, the feature still missing in SIS performance is the development of a community-related
dimension that leads to higher levels of institutional trust. Thus, it still needs a few steps
forward to reach higher corruption prevention levels.
CONCLUSIONS
Different historical and political experiences have made a strong impact on public-sector
integrity, levels of corruption, and its public perceptions in Lithuania. For more than half
a century, the public administration system in Lithuania was under the influence of the Soviet
administrative system, which is well known for its double standards, shadow economy, and
other informal corruptive practices. After restoring its independence in the last decade of the
twentieth century, Lithuania faced the challenge to reform its public administration system

advancing it towards the new trends of public governance, introducing some aspects of the
new public management and fighting with the legacies related to corruption and high public
distrust in the public sector.
After several decades of independence, Lithuania has demonstrated relatively high rates of
transparency and integrity reflected by various international corruption and integrity indices.
However, the indices also reveal that citizens in Lithuania are still not active in public gov-
ernance and even corruption prevention. The interview with an executive-level official of the
Lithuanian SIS revealed that the significant feature of corruption in Lithuania is petty routine
bribing, strongly dependent on a mentality of backhanders, which is prevalent among the older
generations who lived most of their lives during the Soviet occupation.
Public opinion surveys tend to reveal that Lithuanians – more than people in other countries
– tend to think that corruption is a major issue in the country and do not trust the government in
the fight against corruption. Paradoxically, in some countries with lower institutional indices
of transparency, citizens are not as pessimistic about their governments as Lithuanians are. It
might be assumed that the split between transparency facts and public opinions appear to be
related to low political trust and low political efficacy which may be directly related to the
Soviet legacies.
The corruption prevention system in Lithuania takes as an example a widely known Hong
Kong ICAC model and is led by SIS, which is the main state anti-corruption agency that also
very strongly promotes the political will to combat corruption. An important role in corruption
prevention, especially related to research and education, is also played by non-government
organizations, including the local branch of Transparency International.
NOTE
1. The interview was conducted in September 2017 by the authors of this chapter.
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19. Public administration and corruption:
a comparative case study of the police services
in Ghana and Uganda
Donna Harris and Mesharch Walto Katusiimeh
INTRODUCTION
The term “public administration” is generally used to refer to executive government either as
an entity or as an activity. Structurally, these can be agencies, authorities, departments, public
offices and commissions that deliver government policies and programmes.1 Good public
administration is a core requirement for development, as all the literature agrees (de Ridder et
al., 2015). But most studies show that African citizens’ satisfaction with the provision of basic
public services appears to have diminished over the last decades. Governments are not meeting
public demand in areas such as health, education, justice, safety and security. The Ibrahim
Index of African Governance indicates progress in overall governance on average in Africa,
but a decline in the provision of core public services.2
There are so many challenges that African public administration faces. Nhema (2016),
for example, highlights brain drain as one of the challenges. Brain drain is the loss of highly
trained labour force to rich countries. Such loss has an adverse impact on the quality of
African public administration. Nhema also cites the lack of administrative capacity in many
developing countries as another key challenge that undermines the respect and legitimacy of
public administration. Lack of skilled manpower and capable administrators and corruption
has become part of the process. African elites who are part of the African public administra-
tion are linked to large networks of social obligations that affect the way they work. African
leaders are often entangled in a web of social relations that involve a large number of poor
rural and urban relatives who seek the elites for assistance. African elites are forced by their
patronage and social obligations to assist their poorer kin. The patronage and strength of moral
pressure partly explain why state organisations are used in Africa to pursue informal, personal
goals rather than collective ones (Hyden, 1983). The net result is “personal rule” – a situation
where most actors expect to use governmental agencies to achieve personal and other extra
organisational goals first and formal goals second – which gives rise to corruption, bribes and
graft (Nhema, 2016).
Corruption is one of the major challenges in efficient public administration and can create
a culture of dysfunctional organisation that hinders economic development (Gould and
Amaro-Reyes, 1983; Klitgaard, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; United Nations, 1989).
Corruption is regarded as antithetical to the purpose of public administration. It is often
referred to as a failure of the institution of public service and as a betrayal of the essential
professional ethics of the public administrator.3 Historically the institutional culture of public
administration was established as a form of protection against corruption. Prevention efforts
within the public administration are often directed at supporting the professional integrity
255
Donna Harris and Mesharch Walto Katusiimeh - 9781789900910
Source: Afrobarometer, 2016/18.
Figure 19.1 Corruption among government officials (“How many of government officials
do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about
them to say?”)
of public officials (UNODC, 2009). Corruption has bred inefficiencies into public expendi-
ture, distorted the allocation of resources, and at times skewed policy decisions, resulting in
fewer resources being available for poverty-reduction activities. Corruption has also in some
instances driven away both local and international investment. For the poor this means fewer
employment opportunities and therefore less income and little possibility to improve their
quality of life.
In this chapter we will discuss corruption in public administration in Africa, focussing par-
ticularly on the police administration in Uganda and Ghana as the main case studies. Uganda
and Ghana share many similar characteristics. They were both colonised by Britain and their
systems of public administration can be traced back to colonial times. Ghana and Uganda
experienced violent instability including military coups immediately after independence until
the 1990s when both countries were thought of as the best prospects for democratic consolida-
tion (Apter, 1995). However, despite numerous policy frameworks and governance arrange-
ments in the fight against corruption, corruption is still prevalent in these two countries as
captured by a multiplicity of indicators. For example, Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) 2018 placed Ghana at number 78 and Uganda at number 149 out of
180 countries surveyed (Rahman, 2018). Figure 19.1, panel A shows the Afrobarometer data
from the latest round (2016/18) on the citizen’s perception of corruption among government

Public administration and corruption in Ghana and Uganda 257
Source: Afrobarometer, 2016/18.
Figure 19.2 Trust in the police (“How much do you trust the police, or haven’t you heard
enough about them to say?”)
officials for Ghana and Uganda. Eighty-six per cent of the respondents in Ghana (N=2,398)
and 92 per cent in Uganda (N=1,200) think that at least some of them are corrupt.
Police corruption is seen by the respondents as one of the major problems in both countries
as shown in Figure 19.1, panel B. Strikingly, larger proportions of the respondents think that
either most or all of police officers are corrupt (92% in Ghana and 94% in Uganda). Such
evidence stands against the elaborate anti-corruption legislation, ratified international treaties
and public institution reforms aimed directly at combating corruption.
Corruption in both countries has evolved into a pressing problem, especially with regard to
high-ranking cases of political corruption, which has diminished public trust in the govern-

ment and is poised to have long-term and adverse effects on public attitudes toward the dem-
ocratic system.4 Trust in the police, for example, is very low in Ghana and Uganda as shown
in Figure 19.2. Fifty-eight per cent and 44 per cent of the respondents in Ghana and Uganda,
respectively, said that they either did not trust at all or had very little trust in the police.
Corruption in the police service worldwide has come under increasing public and official
scrutiny in the past few years (McLagan, 2007; Punch, 2013; Holmes, 2014). Despite increas-
ing interest, there is still a lack of understanding of what could be the underlying causes for
pervasive corruption within the police service. Our knowledge of police corruption, especially
in Africa, and what drives this behaviour is still limited. The aim of this chapter is to try to
shed some light on this phenomenon. It is important to understand how and why the police
administration was established in the first place and where the breeding ground for corruption
came from. What drives corruption at different management levels and in what forms does
it take? We know that the manifestations of corruption range from small bribes to grand
corruption. Some incidents are initiated at individual level, but there have also been other
cases of syndicated corruption that involve more than one individual and of different rankings.
Corruption can spread across the chain of service, from road traffic enforcement to criminal
investigations. Police authorities have acknowledged this fact and internal corruption is known
as their biggest challenge and concern.5 But why have efforts towards police reforms aimed at
tackling corruption not been successful?
How helpful are the theoretical frameworks in helping us to understand and unpack the
mechanisms that drive corrupt practices within the police? The chapter intends to spark
a debate about strategies to combat corruption and other inefficiencies experienced in public
administration in general. It also hopes to provide insights to both policymakers and employ-
ees within the public sector who are faced with such recurring issues in order to device better
anti-corruption measures that can lead to more sustainable outcomes.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN GHANA AND

UGANDA
Corruption in Public Administration
Benson O. Igboin, in his paper entitled “Traditional leadership and corruption in pre-colonial
Africa”, contends that the question whether there was corruption or not in pre-colonial Africa
cannot be answered in a straightforward manner (Igboin, 2016). Some believe that pre-colonial
African public administration was almost perfect and free from corruption. That pre-colonial
Africa, for the most part, was founded on strong ethical values sometimes packaged in spiritual
terms, but with the end result of ensuring social justice and compliance (Chikaforafrica, 2012,
see note 6).
For others, however, corruption has always existed in public administration in different
forms, and is not determined by politics or geography (Lumumba, 2014). Laws were mostly
unwritten and therefore prone to being easily forgotten. They were often couched in super-
natural terms in order to instil fear.6 Gift giving was often cited as the most common form
of corruption during the pre-colonial era. Some African kings received arms from the slave
dealers to conquer their own people and then sold them on as commodities. The fact that
many of the African kings were willing compradors in this transaction demonstrated a clear

case of corruption. The kings were neither questioned nor called to account for the kingdoms’
resources and taxes because they were simply above the law as representatives of God on earth
(Igboin, 2016).
In his book Slavery and African Life, Patrick Manning argued that slavery was the main
source of pre-colonial corruption (Manning, 1990). The high demand for slaves in Europe and
the Middle East created an incentive for corruption in Africa. African kings were enriching
themselves with the gifts from the slave traders and went to war with each other, causing
political instability between the kingdoms (Kusimba, 2004).
Other scholars attribute the origin of Africa’s high-level corruption to the colonial power.
The special strategic, political, and economic interests in Africa and the need to protect these
interests motivated the colonial administrations to establish state institutions, such as the army,
the police, and the courts to subjugate, coerce, and oppress indigenous communities to accept
their legitimacy. These institutions served as legal conduits and enforcement mechanisms for
the colonial administrators’ interests (Nyago, 2012). Since they were part of an authoritarian
regime, indigenous communities could not hold colonial officials accountable for their deci-
sions. The system of public administration that was established by the British rulers in their
colonial territories was indirect rule, where they ceded the power of local chiefs (Boateng and
Darko, 2016). The colonial government allowed the local leaders to retain some percentage
of the taxes they collected (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980), which encouraged the chiefs to
ignore their traditional values and laws that were pivotal to pre-colonial African societies.
Hrituleac (2011) contends that colonial rulers distorted the natural process of public admin-
istration and state development in Africa and instead inculcated the norm of corruption and
political instability. Kings who rebelled against the colonial occupation were humiliated and/
or overthrown.
After independence, the state of public administration largely remained the same. There was
little change in either structure or form. The corrupt practices introduced during colonialism
survived the struggle for independence in many African countries and has since been nour-
ished by weak institutions and leadership in post-colonial Africa (Lumumba, 2014).
Corruption in the Police Administration
Before colonisation, policing in the kingdoms was entirely in the hands of traditional author-
ities, who provided security and protection within their own jurisdictions. Traditional chiefs
had the authority and power to organise able-bodied men into units to enforce community
byelaws (Boateng and Darko, 2016). However, those charged with policing were not profes-
sionally trained and were providing voluntary service. Individuals, extended family, groups of
men, and the community performed various police functions. The main objectives of the tra-
ditional police administration were crime prevention, apprehension, and punishment of those
who had committed an offence. The communities did not have a prison system – offenders
were instead ostracised from the community for a set period of time.7
The power of the traditional authorities gradually eroded when the British conquered the
Gold Coast and began their imperial expedition in the nineteenth century. The contemporary
police systems in Ghana and Uganda, as they are known today, were established during the
colonial public administration and were initially para-militaristic in nature, using oppressive
tactics to accomplish their mission. The police’s primary function then was to promote the
interests of the colonial powers rather than crime control and order maintenance (Boateng

and Darko, 2016). The police as an institution (and as individual officers) were viewed as
a part of the colonial regime, even when indigenous people were employed as police officers.
The perception during the colonial period was that the police was imposing its power on the
people rather than working for the people. In other words, colonial policing had little to do
with serving the community and everything to do with upholding the authority of the colonial
state (Offerdahl, 2016).
The British colonial authorities established an official police force in the Gold Coast in
1831. In 1873, an ordinance was enacted that formalised the operations of the Gold Coast
Police Force (Boateng and Darko, 2016). In 1876, after the Gold Coast Armed Police was
renamed the Gold Coast Constabulary, several important units were created, such as the
Railways and Mines Detachments, Escort Police, Marine Police, and Criminal Investigations
Department. The ordinance led to the formation of police stations and the standardisation of
policing in the British-controlled areas of the Gold Coast (Boateng and Darko, 2016).
Ghana
In Ghana immediately following the attainment of political independence in 1957, the Gold
Coast Constabulary was renamed the Ghana Police Service. An initiative was begun by the
first president – the late Kwame Nkrumah – to Africanise the police force under the era of the
ideology of African socialism that was spreading like wildfire among the post-independent
countries in Africa. One of the African socialism principles was the Africanisation policy that
was aimed at making Ghanaians the sole occupants of the top hierarchy of the public admin-
istration positions – formerly occupied by Europeans (Boateng and Darko, 2016). Although
efforts were made to rebrand the police force, all that changed was the name and to some
extent the composition of the personnel. On 2 January 1964, a police officer made an unsuc-
cessful assassination attempt on President Nkrumah. In the wake of the attempted shooting,
the police commissioner and a number of other senior officers were arrested and detained. The
president made it clear that he did not trust the police and reduced the size of the organisation
from 13,247 in 1964 to 10,709 in 1965 (Boateng and Darko, 2016).
In 1966, the military and the police joined together to overthrow President Nkrumah and the
Convention People Party. The government was dismissed, the Convention People Party and
legislature dissolved, and the constitution suspended. While waiting for a replacement gov-
ernance structure, the National Liberation Council was put in place, consisting of four police
officers and four military officers. The police were heavily involved in both the coup and the
subsequent government – senior officers publicly admitted involvement in the coup planning
and execution. This regime brought into force a Police Service Act that had been drafted in
1965. The act provided for the organisation of the police service, the appointment, promotion,
and retirement of police officers and the conditions of service, disciplinary proceedings, and
other matters relating to the police service.
The National Liberation Council handed over power to an elected civilian government in
1969, under a new constitution. The 1969 Constitution established the Police Council, and
brought the police service into the folds of the public service. The government continued to
work towards police reform, putting together a committee to review the police, particularly
focussing on structure, effectiveness, and state of equipment. However, in early 1972 the
military, led by General Acheampong, seized power and put the National Redemption Council
in place. The council was made up of military officers, the head of the police, and a civilian.
General Acheampong’s regime was plagued with a high level of corruption and misman-

agement and was subsequently deposed in a violent military coup in 1979, led by Flight
Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. In September
1979, Rawlings’ interim government handed over power to a democratically elected president
and parliament, underpinned by a modern constitution based on examples from Western
democracies. However, this government was short lived and was overthrown by a second
coup led by Rawlings once again in 1981. During these turbulent times, the police continued
to use repressive measures and other paramilitary tactics. President Museveni took over in
1986 and corruption was regarded as one of the country’s major challenges (Ruzindana,
1997). Nevertheless, Museveni’s government continued to be corrupt (Tangri and Mwenda,
2001, 2013). Just like the presidents before him, Museveni ignored the constitutional limits
of his power and allowed the police to abuse human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2014).
Any attempt to challenge these human rights violations was dealt with maximum force by the
police.
Uganda
Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894 and immediately the judicial system based on
the British common law was imposed with the backing of an armed police force. The Ugandan
police force was first established in 1899 as the Uganda Armed Constabulary. In 1906, the
Uganda Armed Constabulary was renamed the Protectorate Police Force to suppress rebellion
against the colonial government policies in several parts of the country.8 After independence
in 1962, the colonial police was turned into the national police without necessarily taking into
consideration the interests of the local people (UNDP, 2019). The first post-independence head
of government was the leader of the Uganda People’s Congress, Apolo Milton Obote. He used
the police and the army to consolidate himself by suppressing the opposition and protecting his
corrupt regime supporters. He used the security forces including the police to attack Kabaka
Mutesa II, the then president, and eventually forced him into exile. To further consolidate his
power, Obote abrogated the 1962 constitution and replaced it with the 1967 constitution which
centralised power. Like the colonialists who used the security forces to establish its rule, by
1971 Obote had established his complete government with the police’s assistance.
The government put in place some measures including police reforms aimed at curbing
corruption but in reality not much impact was realised. According to Tangri and Mwenda
(2013), corruption in Uganda was promoted by the ruling elite because it created loyalty of the
state allies to the incumbent regime, making the incumbent leadership united and cohesive.
Corruption was also used as a mechanism for buying off political opponents (Amundsen,
2006; Yadav and Mukherjee, 2016).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
The historical analysis of the origin of police administration in both countries suggests that the
police were mainly used to suppress the opposition, first by the colonial rulers and then after
independence by the subsequent leaders due to the high level of political instability. The police
were not seen as protectors of the public or as law enforcers, but rather as a political tool.
Leaders who wanted to overthrow the incumbent government or the incumbent government
that wanted to suppress political rebels and the opposition would need to ensure that the police
were on their side, which provided a breeding ground for corruption. Given this historical

background, the next question is what types of corruption are more pervasive within the police
administration and why? Can economic theories help us gain a better understanding of the
underlying behavioural mechanisms to drive different forms of corruption within the police?
Principal–Agent Approach to Corruption
The Principal–Agent approach has been one of the most commonly used theoretical frame-
works in economics to study the micro-foundation of corruption. In the principal–agent
framework, there are two key assumptions: that the principal who is benevolent and the agent
have diverging interests and that the agent has more information than the principal. Due to
asymmetric information, the principal is unable to perfectly monitor the actions of the agent,
and so the agent has some discretion to pursue their own interests. Moral hazard occurs when
the interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned, and the agent pursues their own
interests at the expense of the interests of the principal (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015).
Corruption is often described to exist in society as a double principal–agent problem. In the
first instance, a political leader is cast as the principal tasked with monitoring the actions of
bureaucrats (the agent) in order to keep them incentivised (to do their job and serve the public)
and is held accountable for bad decisions (Department for International Development, 2015).
Without the ability to perfectly monitor their actions, however, bureaucrats use their discre-
tion over resources to extract rents when the opportunity arises. The second principal–agent
problem occurs when public officials (bureaucrats or politicians) are conceptualised to be
the “agents” and the public, more generally, as the “principal”. The public official is able to
abuse their office and discretion over public services to secure private rents from members of
the public, and the public is unable to perfectly monitor or hold public officials accountable
(Marquette and Peiffer, 2015).
A slightly modified version of the principal–agent model, known as the “three-actor
model”, highlights the relationship between the agent and the client (Banfield, 1975). In this
model, in addition to the relationship between the principal and the agent, the agent can abuse
his or her power for the benefits offered by the client. The client is usually located outside the
organisation and does not have a direct relationship with the principal.
However, viewing corruption through a principal–agent lens emphasises the rational
choices of individuals that take place in discrete incidences of corruption. This focus implies
that corruption is “solvable” with policies that alter the degree to which principals are able to
monitor and sanction their agents and the level of discretion given to agents and their individ-
ual incentive calculations (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). To date, the majority of corruption
research and anti-corruption interventions have used the principal–agent approach as a basis
for understanding the problem to the extent that most anti-corruption reforms are based on
this conceptualisation of corruption. Such solutions typically include oversight mechanisms
to inform the “principals” and sanctions to incentivise the “agents”. However, Sundell (2016)
identifies limitations in understanding corruption only as a principal–agent problem. For
example, such “principals” may not exist in reality, or may themselves participate in corrupt
behaviour. Anti-corruption programmes based on the principal–agent model do not consider
that in highly corrupt environments there may be a lack of “principled principals”, especially
in cases where corruption is systemic, and where there are low levels of social and political
trust (Department for International Development, 2015). The principal–agent framework
neither captures the multi-layered relationships of corrupt networks nor does it help explain an

environment where corruption has become a norm. Other alternative views of and approaches
to corruption may explain why some anti-corruption efforts fail, and that drawing on these
would improve the impact of anti-corruption strategies.
Patronage: Clientelism
Throughout history, patron–client networks have played important roles in organising political
life in many systems (Jiang, 2018). These informal, hierarchical ties of reciprocal benefits
have not only governed the relationship between the state and society, but also functioned as
a key institution for regulating interactions among political elites. Patronage was one of the
key methods by which pre-modern political regimes, such as tribes, monarchies, and empires,
allocated resources. It continues to influence the operation of governments in many modern
societies, shaping the patterns of elite selection and the direction of public policies. The
existing research on patronage networks holds a generally negative view about their impact on
government performance. Studies from various political settings have argued that these private
networks tend to undermine a government’s ability to fulfil its public functions by breeding
corruption, distorting political incentives, and subverting formal accountability mechanisms
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Jiang 2018).
The patron–client relationship can best be understood when compared with the ideal world
of a bureaucracy as expounded by Max Weber. According to Weber, a fully developed,
hierarchical, rational bureaucracy produces the most precise, reliable, standardised results
in the most economical and most efficient way possible. This process hinges on the fact that
its officials are professional, trained, disciplined, and earn a full-time salary. As opposed to
traditional or charismatic authority, the legal-rational authority gives the ideal type of author-
ity. Legal-rational authority rests on the belief that those who govern are bound by the same
written rules which gave them the authority to govern. Legal-rational authority makes the rule
of law possible for everyone and ensures that the decisions of the administration are reliable,
consistent, informed, and logical.
The core features of the ideal-type bureaucracy can be summarised as follows: (1) a bureau-
cratic administrative staff legally runs the organisation; (2) the organisation is based on the
principles of continuity, hierarchy, competence, and efficiency; (3) the organisation is divided
into offices that specialise and carry out official functions bound by rules; (4) these rules,
which regulate the conduct of an office, are technical rules – prescribed courses of action
whose primary goal is to attain efficiency; (5) specialised training is necessary for officials
to be able to apply these rules in a fully rational manner; (6) it is, thus, imperative that only
a person who has demonstrated adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of
the administrative staff and, hence, only such persons are eligible for appointment to official
positions; (7) the entire administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership
of the means of production or administration; and (8) all administrative decisions and rules are
produced and documented in writing including those of oral discussion.
In contrast with the ideal-type of bureaucratic conduct, clientelism is highly personalistic and
exists without a formal contract. In a clientelist bureaucracy, the rules of the “legal-rational”
game are bended towards achievement of the clientelist deal between the patron and the
client(s). Accordingly, the logic of clientelism dictates that the patron (e.g. a high-ranking
bureaucrat looking for employment for his client) should do whatever is in his power to keep
his promise to the client regardless of what merit or expertise the client has to offer to the

public agency. From Weber’s point of view, in a clientelist bureaucracy, the bureaucrat (the
patron) defies the rational authority in several ways.
First, the bureaucrat disregards the rule that in the recruitment and promotion of public
administrators merit and expertise (should) triumph over political alignment, personal
connections, kinship networks, or ethnic background. By basing his selection on personal
relationships, he is most likely to hire someone who is incompetent for the task, and by hiring
incompetent employees he will damage the efficiency and reliability of the department.
Second, he further challenges the separation of ownership of the means of production from the
officials holding the office by treating the “office” as his own personal property. He abuses
the legal-rational authority entrusted upon him by making his choice based on personal prefer-
ences. By hiring or promoting staff based on personal loyalty, he transforms the legal authority
to traditional authority. The bureaucrat who acts as the patron changes the manner by which all
administrative decisions and rules are produced.
As Hicken (2011) argues, clientelism can drive corruption along three different paths.
First, certain clientelist exchanges can be outright illegal such as vote buying. Second, by
undermining citizens’ ability to hold public officials accountable, clientelism creates a culture
of impunity for corrupt behaviour. Third, the demand for resources (needed to facilitate an
exchange between client and patron) could work as a driver for politicians to utilise corrupt
ways to acquire more resources (Varraich, 2014). The problem in Africa is the absence of
accountability that allows leaders to treat the public domain as private.
However, some scholars argue that patronage and clientelism is losing its relevance as a tool
of analysis (Putnam, 1993). In today’s globalised world, the important actors are international
market chains or providers of overseas development assistance, not the local economic elites
who have traditionally dominated (Leonard et al., 2009). So, while patronage could still be
relevant to the processes through which we analyse corruption and public administration, it
could have changed its shape and character.
Identity, Narratives, and the Social Norms Framework
Emerging literature supports the view that choices and behaviours of people are affected
by the perceptions of the generalised patterns of action adopted by others around them. For
example, people assume that if everyone else around them is paying bribes and accepting that
as a normal state of affairs, then corruption will indeed become normalised (World Bank,
2015; Stahl et al., 2017). Generalised corruption then becomes the narrow frame for shaping
the reactions of individuals who, when faced with a public official, will immediately assume
the person in front of them is expecting a bribe. This type of scenario has been empirically
validated by a wealth of studies across several disciplines and utilising different methodo-
logical approaches (Kahan, 2003; Lindner, 2014). Individual behaviours are guided, not by
rational decision making, but by emotional perceptions of reciprocity stemming from what
are perceived to be the modal patterns of behaviour. For example, testing for the importance
of reciprocity, Kahan (2003) found that the perception of others’ corrupt behaviour induced
individuals to be corrupt themselves out of pride, resentment, and even revenge, whereas
perceived integrity of others induced individuals to behave in a similar fashion out of feelings
of honour and altruism.
Because corrupt practices are often influenced by social preferences, social networks, social
identities, and prevailing social norms (Stahl et al., 2017), they are rarely condemned and at

times praised because they are understood as being pursued in the fulfilment of values held
dear in the communities (Anders, 2005). Reciprocity is one of the social values that appear
to be strongly associated with practices of corruption. As such, it is often inherent in the lan-
guage used to implicitly refer to bribery in the public service. For example, in an ethnographic
study of petty corruption in Tanzania by Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga (2016) corruption
was articulated as “something for something” based on a notion of justice being founded on
reciprocity. One associated practice is gift giving which tends to be widespread in contexts
where reciprocity is highly valued. However, finding a clear-cut way to draw the line between
a gift and a bribe is extremely difficult and can be controversial, particularly in the context of
African cultures.
Informal social networks of family, clan, village, tribe, or race – which are bound together
by affectionate ties – are strongly associated with corrupt practices due to their reliance on
reciprocity and a sense of obligation that extends to those members employed in the public
sector. Such individuals are often subject to strong pressures to respond to the demands and
expectations of their social networks, which often include making use of their position to
extract rents for the benefit of the in-group. The moral weight ascribed to these group obliga-
tions is often so strong that it tends to outweigh any sense of responsibility to protect public
resources. This is to a large extent due to the fact that missing an opportunity to avail resources
for the benefit of the group may have heavy social costs, including social shame, mockery,
and ostracism. Therefore, the role of these network dynamics in fuelling corrupt practices is
closely associated to locally recognised norms of sociality involving very delicate questions of
status, respect, shame, guilt, peer pressure, reputation, and other socially reinforced normative
constraints (Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga, 2016; Dong et al., 2009; Heilman and Ndumbaro,
2002).
Identity-based economic analysis can help explain behaviour by individuals that may seem
detrimental, self-destructive, or simply irrational, but nonetheless affects the outcome of an
organisation as a whole. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) indicate that people have identity-based
payoffs that are based upon their own and other people’s actions, that third parties can influ-
ence their identity payoffs, and that some identities can be chosen while others are limited and
path-dependent. Identity directly influences what preferences individuals have, which they
share in part with a subgroup of people, giving them a sense of belonging to the group. People
can have several identities depending on the situation or the role they are in. Assuming that all
other factors remain unchanged, a different set of preferences is expressed by the same person
if they adopt a different identity. For example, a police officer can have many different identi-
ties, including being a husband and a father in his family network, a friend to his colleague, and
a subordinate to his commander. Identity is therefore not static and can be endogenously and/
or exogenously influenced (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Which identity prevails depends on
the context, social environment, and the narratives that circulate around the social networks.
Narratives or stories that are shared by many people through social networks also influence
how relationships are understood by people given their preferences and thus their identity. In
general, people derive understanding through three methods: analytical explanations, direct
observations, and narratives (Collier, 2016, p. 6). Narratives are simple but powerful as they
are stories of causal events that amplify direct observations by people and are proven in psy-
chology to be stronger and more memorable than understanding derived by analytical facts.
People tend to believe narratives more than individual direct observations. This has important
implications because it means that people who are well connected in a social network (nodal

actors) can strategically spread narratives to influence behaviour. A significant network to

spread narratives is mass media, whether those are television shows, novels, or movies. They
can both influence and even change narratives in a given society (Guiso et al., 2006). The
underlying causal hypotheses do not need to be true for them to be narratives, making them
dangerous tools to influence public opinion away from the truth (Collier, 2016).
Social norms are socially constructed constraints on behaviour and vary between societies.
If an individual does not adhere to their societies’ norms, they feel a sense of guilt, shame, and
even stigma (known as injunctive norm). This means that it is in the interest of the people to
adhere to the norm. Because of the self-reinforcing nature of norms, it is hard to influence or
change norms in a society. People adhere to norms partly because they have internalised them
and partly because others in society have done so. If someone violates the norm, it generates
internal shame and/or anger from others. The expectation of stigmatisation upon breaking
a norm, in turn, reinforces adherence to it. Norms can be consciously used in an organisation
to influence workers’ behaviour and motivation that cannot be stipulated in contracts, to align
them with the company’s incentives.
Different societies adopt different norms, but generally, they include some of the funda-
mental values of care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. Interesting behaviour
occurs when two moral values are in conflict. For example, an individual’s loyalty to a group
might override the group’s anger towards the individual breaks a (universal) norm (small
versus larger group). In other words, rather than punishing the norm violator through social
sanctions, fellow members of a group might defend his or her action. This is especially impor-
tant to consider in the case of dysfunctional organisations, where a stronger collective identity
may motivate people to work towards a common goal and increase productivity. However,
closer social ties within a smaller group could also make it easier to get away with immoral
behaviour that does not correspond with the (universal) norms (but beneficial to the in-group).
If two politicians, police officers, or other officials have a strong mutual connection, they
might favour loyalty to the in-group over reporting a misconduct. As Ocheje (2018) reminds
us, if the law strays too far from the norms, the public will not respect the law and hence will
not stigmatise those who violate it.
All three types of social constructs mentioned above (identities, narratives, and norms)
influence how individuals think, which in turn influences the beliefs of others. Each individual
is thus an actor and audience simultaneously. These influences pass along through networks
which are just a level of abstraction of social interactions which channel information. Such
networks are mostly informal but can also be formal as in an established organisation. Only
very few networks reach all agents, whereas most networks reach only a subgroup of agents
and are thus segmented. In recent years, the cost of transmitting information has fallen
drastically with the advent of new technologies. While it might be believed that this results
in better-informed people, this also means that networks become more segmented and, thus,
less exposed to different belief systems. This is due to the limited amount of information and
social interactions that people can handle. Ultimately, this means that actors have to choose
what networks they belong to, which influence what narratives, identities, and norms they get
exposed to.
The three theoretical approaches discussed tend to emphasise different dynamics of cor-
ruption and the incentives that drive it. However, the issue is not about choosing one or the
other conceptual interpretation of corruption, but rather about identifying the contexts/settings

where each of these perspectives is likely to be analytically most useful in relation to the study
of corruption in the police and administration in Africa.
It is also important to stress that in studying the African public sector, it becomes clear
that incentives alone are not enough to motivate workers to do their job in the right way.
The public sector in poor African countries suffers from low productivity despite getting the
benefits from scale and specialisation. Ugandan school teachers only show up to teach two
hours a day despite being paid for seven hours. In Zambia, the permanent minister of health
received funding to buy medicine which he authorised to be bought from a company he set up
himself to sell drugs at a higher price and pocket the difference. Current policy in the given
African countries is aimed at addressing incentives to demotivate people from engaging in
unproductive behaviour. Collier (2016) argues that in these situations, the organisations are
dysfunctional, not because of missing incentives, but because of a deeper failure to internalise
identity, norms, and narratives. So imposing rules and codes of conduct to address social
behaviour is not effective and is bound to fail. In the next section we will see how these have
played out in the case of Ghana and Uganda.
POLICE REFORMS IN GHANA AND UGANDA AND WHY HAVE

THEY NOT WORKED
The police in Uganda and Ghana belong to the executive arm of government. The president
of Uganda is head of the executive arm of government just like his Ghanaian counterpart. The
position of president is a tremendous authority with the power to appoint top executives in the
public administration system of the country including the inspector general of police and his or
her deputy. While parliament approval is required in the case of Uganda, it is widely believed
it is a rubber stamp parliament. In Ghana and Uganda, the president appoints the inspector
general of police and his deputy on the advice of the Police Council. However, the presidents
can also remove their appointees any time he or she wishes as there is no fixed tenure and
without anyone’s advice.9
In Ghana, the president uses the powers vested in him under Article 202 Clause 3 and
Article 203 Clause 1 to appoint all the top leadership of the Police Service (CWHRI, 2007).
These constitutional arrangements have situated the Ghana Police Service, as it were, under
the command and control of the president of the republic (Osei-Adubofour, 2017). Thus, the
police have been legally structured in such a way that they appear not to have any adminis-
trative autonomy of their own that is without influence from the political leadership of the
country. This has led to the common practice among the first acts of any new president since
1993, which is the compulsory retirement of the inspector general of police, regardless of their
age or years left for them to retire. For example, upon being sworn in as president on 7 January
2009, President John Evans Atta-Mills removed the then inspector general of police, Patrick
Kwarteng Acheampong, on 28 January 2009. Acheampong was then 57 years old and had
three years left to his otherwise compulsory retirement age of 60. When the current Ghanaian
president Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo also assumed the reins of government on 7 January
2017, the then incumbent inspector general of police, John Kudalor, who had been less than
a year on the job, had to tender in his resignation on 25 January 2017 (Osei-Adubofour, 2017).
There have been a number of reforms in police geared to combat corruption in Uganda
and Ghana. For example, in Uganda in 1999 President Museveni appointed a commission of

inquiry into the police force because of an outcry of police corruption from the wider public.
But the recommendations were not implemented and corruption is still prevalent. In Ghana,
a number of police reforms have been put in place. The Archer Commission is one of the most
far-reaching commissions on policing in Ghana. The government appointed the commission
in February 1996, under retired Chief Justice Archer, and mandated it to review the structure
and operations of the service and determine its response to the law enforcement needs of the
nation. The Archer Commission submitted its report in March 1997. It took the government
two years to respond with a white paper – indicative of the delay and lack of enthusiasm that
prevented the Archer Commission’s recommendations from becoming part of the policing
structure (CWHRI, 2007).
In Uganda, the Anti-Corruption Strategy within the police force aimed at making a signifi-
cant impact on eliminating corruption in the institution as well as building and strengthening
the quality of accountability in the country as a whole has been adopted. This strategy is
anchored to the National and Justice Law reform initiatives and Anti-Corruption Strategic
vision of Zero Tolerance to Corruption to enhance good governance. Similarly, the Ghana
Police Service launched a five-year Strategic Policing Plan to improve the operations and
all aspects of policing in Ghana in line with their constitutional mandate in May 2010. This
included general policing issues and how to tackle corruption, but not much has been achieved
so far (Osei-Adubofour, 2017).
Policies, laws, and regulations intended to change the behavioural standards of police
officers. However, they have not been effectively adopted. We conjecture that there may be
horizontal (i.e. peer) pressures on police officers not to abide by the code of conduct and the
formal rules and regulations. There may exist a parallel code that tolerates corrupt actions that
is upheld by the majority of police officers. Official codes of conduct also need enforcement
from above, that is, from figures at higher levels of an organisation (Jackson et al., 2018). But
police officers of higher ranks may be receiving a share of the proceeds of corruption schemes
and, therefore, have little interest in enforcing rules and in the worst cases they may be the ones
issuing directives to lower offices to engage in corruption commonly known as “order from
above” in Uganda. The lower officers tend to go by what their superiors tell them.
In addition, while it is widely believed that there is corruption in the police force, there
are not many cases of arrests that have been made that target police officers involved in cor-
ruption. In Uganda, one of the few cases was in 2017 when the Ugandan Police uncovered
a narcotics syndicate involving senior officers. This suggested close links between organised
crime groups and state institutions. The suspected police officers sold drugs recovered from
suspects. This is an organised group of senior officers and commanders who wield power
and control over subordinates. The group was allegedly involved in other corrupt practices
including trafficking people, selling ivory and rhino horn, aiding and abetting tax evasion, and
extorting money from airport users.10 Similarly, in Ghana, cases reported of police corruption
are very rare. In 2015, high-ranking police officials, including a commissioner, were arrested
and charged for their involvement in a scandal in which approximately 200 potential police
recruits were given fake acceptance letters and charged around $500 to begin training at the
police academy (Rahman, 2018).
Both the Uganda and Ghana police services have clear legal responsibilities to investigate
and respond to public complaints. Information relating to reporting and receiving feedback
from police can be found in their respective Police Acts where it is noted that the force is
obliged to set up a public complaints system that allows any member of the public to file

a written complaint regarding bribery, corruption, intimidation, neglect, non-performance of

duty, or other police misconduct. While this appears smart on paper, in practice most citizens
never know whatever happens to their cases after reporting to police. People assume that their
complaints disappear in police bureaucracy and never get investigated. Although the broad
framework for disciplinary systems is set out in national laws regarding the police, the infor-
mation relating to details about how these systems work in practice are rarely made public.
One of the ways that the police has tried to provide feedback about complaints is through
their annual crime reports. Unfortunately, these reports are often delayed. For example, the
Ghana police force has not yet released the crime report for 2018. The Ghana crime report of
2017 was released in August 2019. These crime reports provide good information relating to
older cases received, investigated, and forwarded to court. These police crime reports can be
accessed online. However, the police do not explain the compelling stories behind the numbers
of cases in their reports. They also do not offer ongoing information on pending cases for the
previous years. It would be significant for the police to shed some light on cases pending in
the past years. That alone would showcase police commitment and accountability towards
fighting corruption in the police force.
There is also a lack of knowledge about the legal systems and procedures, particularly
amongst the poor or illiterate population, creating fertile ground for misinformation to take
root and to become established “fact”. On the one hand, citizens may not even be aware that
they are engaging in a corrupt exchange. On the other hand, because they are misinformed or
ignorant about the criminal justice process, citizens may also characterise non-corrupt actions
as corrupt. For instance, if a suspect is released by the police due to insufficient evidence,
the common interpretation by the public is that the suspect bribed the police to be released.
To the average citizen, what matters is that the process did not meet their expectations, and
they attribute this – rightly or wrongly – to corruption. This, in turn, erodes citizen trust in the
police.
There is also a perception that impunity for criminal and corrupt actions within the police
force is the norm. Such impunity contributes to the sense of desperation felt by citizens when
confronted with the police, as they do not believe that there will be any form of accountability
to counter police corruption. At the same time, there is little fear of being caught when offering
a bribe to the police. This perception increases the likelihood of both offering (supply) and
accepting (demand) a bribe, as there is little or no consequence of such actions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter looks at the nature of corruption in the African police service in Ghana and
Uganda. Like other public service jobs in Africa, a police officer is a job of good standing
within the society in terms of acquiring wealth. Police officers are expected to be corrupt and
to have accumulated wealth. Therefore, they experience significant social pressure to display
wealth, if they wish to be respected and/or perceived as successful. They feel pressured to live
beyond their means, which creates a demand for additional resources. According to Ocheje
(2018), there are certain idioms that reflect the attitudinal dispositions that have been nur-
tured in Nigeria, which also apply to Uganda and Ghana, that push people to be corrupt. For
example, “A goat eats where it is tethered or where one works is where he chops”; “A posi-
tion in government is an opportunity to eat”; “Government business is nobody’s business”;

“When there is a big tree, small ones climb on its back to reach the sun”; “The national cake
must be shared”; “Those who take from government are wise; those who do not are fools”;
“Government is an alien entity”; “Eating but working is acceptable”; “It is not what you know
but who you know”. The implication of such narratives is that police officers just like other
public servants may not engage in corruption simply because of greed or to supplement their
incomes; but they often experience peer pressure to participate in corruption. With the increase
in peer pressure comes more regular engagement in corruption, as individuals conform to these
expectations. Over time, corruption becomes a learned and accepted behaviour among the
police – a social norm.
It is, therefore, no wonder that after many years of implementing reforms, these efforts
appear to have had no impact. Today, the public image of the police in Uganda and Ghana
is very negative. Only suspicion, discontent, and distrust mark the relationship between the
public and their police. The aim of this chapter is to draw attention to the historical, contex-
tual, and social factors that drive corrupt behaviour within the police administration. It also
points to the fact that further research is needed to revise the formulation of anti-corruption
reforms by considering the locally prevailing social and historical contexts. In order to do
so, researchers may benefit from exploring behavioural influences that motivate actions and
their relationships to the observed entrenched character of corrupt practices in the police. This
means developing a set of interventions that complement the traditional interventions – such
as salary increases, policy reforms and implementation, codes of conduct, and scrutiny by
civil society groups. This can only be done after thorough research to understand the forces
that sustain and maintain the corrupt practices both from the demand and supply sides as well
as the vertical and horizontal pressures within the police organisation that push police officers
towards corrupt practices.
NOTES
1. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan049589.pdf (accessed 8
April 2020).
2. www.news24.com/Africa/News/why-african-countries-should-strengthen-their-public-service
-20181018 (accessed 8 April 2020).
3. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan049589.pdf (accessed 8
April 2020).
4. www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-ghana-2018-update
(accessed 8 April 2020).
5. https://accu.or.ug/corruption-our-top-problem-igp-ochola/. The inspector general of police, Martin
Okoth Ochola, has named internal corruption in the Uganda Police Force as its biggest challenge.
6. Chikaforafrica (2012) “Origin of Corruption in Africa and Way Forward”. Presentation made to
the Parliament of Rwanda and other participants, during the international conference to mark the
nation’s 50th Independence Anniversary in July 2012.
7. Commonwealth Human Rights www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/police
_accountability_in_ghana.pdf (accessed 8 April 2020).
8. www.upf.go.ug (accessed 8 April 2020).
9. The recommendation made by the Sebutinde Commission that the government should develop
guidelines to be followed in the appointment of the inspector general of police and his or her deputy
has not been implemented.
10. Deo Gumba, ENACT regional organised crime observatory coordinator – East and Horn of Africa,
ISS. Police Crime Syndicate Disrupted in Uganda, https://enactafrica.org/research/trend-reports/
police-crime-syndicate-disrupted-in-uganda (accessed 8 April 2020).

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20. Corruption, organized crime and the public
sector in Mexico
Bonnie J. Palifka
INTRODUCTION
December 2018 marks an historic moment: the swearing in of the first Mexican president
who was not from a major political party. Manuel Andrés López Obrador (known as AMLO),
like many other current and recent world leaders, was elected on an anti-corruption and
anti-establishment platform. Unlike many of his contemporaries, AMLO has spent the past
couple of decades decrying corruption in Mexican politics. A former mayor of Mexico City,
AMLO had lost two presidential elections before, claiming electoral fraud each time. As of
this writing, he has been in office less than a year: too soon to evaluate whether his administra-
tion will deliver on his promise to ‘eradicate’ (in candidate speak) corruption by ‘sweeping the
stairs from the top down’ (López Obrador, 2018). Rather, this chapter describes how Mexico
arrived at the point of electing a candidate who promised a break from business as usual, the
challenges AMLO faces and lessons for the rest of the world.
Despite the influences of Spanish colonization and proximity to the United States (US), the
twentieth-century history of Mexico mirrors more closely that of Russia. A bloody revolution
against inequality and autocracy ushered in seven decades of nominally democratic rule by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). During this time, the country nationalized industries,
redistributed land from rich to poor and adhered to import-substitution industrialization,
creating public and private monopolies over most industries. Cronyism, patronage, nepotism
and bribery were common practices. The last two decades of the century brought economic
instability, financial and fiscal crises, monetary devaluation, economic liberalization, local
uprisings, the assassination of a presidential candidate and a transition to ‘true’ democracy,
in which the PRI first lost some local elections and the majority in congress, and then lost the
presidency.
The twenty-first century began amid high hopes. The first National Action Party (PAN)
president, Vicente Fox, took oath in 2000, following elections that domestic and international
observers judged to be fair. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) improved by four tenths
of a point (out of 10) that year. Fox undertook a comprehensive anti-corruption effort that
included a transparency and freedom-of-information law, public awareness campaigns, per-
sonnel changes and professionalization of bureaucracy.
The PAN’s candidate, Felipe Calderón, won the next election, in 2006. During Calderón’s
presidency, however, organized crime-related violence increased exponentially (Feldab-Brown,
2011). The administration escalated the war on drugs and perceptions of corruption fell to their
worst point since 1997. In 2012, the PRI retook the presidency with Enrique Peña Nieto,
a young state governor married to a soap opera star. Although Peña Nieto had campaigned on
anti-corruption, this issue received low priority until the Casa Blanca scandal, which involved
the first lady purchasing a property from a government-favoured contractor (Partlow, 2016). In
274
Bonnie J. Palifka - 9781789900910
Corruption, organized crime and the public sector in Mexico 275
2015, the government passed sweeping reforms, designed with and promoted by civil society,
which increased transparency further and created the National Anti-Corruption System (NAS).
Mexico is a microcosm: a middle-income country, geographically juxtaposed between
North and South, between the Pacific and the Atlantic, with rainforests, plains, beaches,
deserts and snow-capped volcanoes. Home to the wealthiest per capita municipality in Latin
America, Mexico also has indigenous communities with limited access to modern comforts.
Endowed with abundant natural resources, including petroleum, forests and silver, Mexico
also boasts strong technology and services sectors. Politically, Mexico is a federation of 32
states, with a president and list-based elections to the legislature.1 Taxes and development
programmes are mostly centralized, with hierarchical distribution of funds to the state and
municipal levels, creating opportunities for the funds to be deviated. Grand corruption occurs
in the privatization of state enterprises. Kickbacks in public procurement are standard. Petty
corruption is commonplace, with approximately one third of the population paying bribes to
start and operate businesses, to win legal cases or have them dismissed, to evade taxes and
fines, to get a job, for admission to public schools and hospitals, etc. Both grand and petty
corruption are prevalent in customs administration, natural resources exploitation and national
security. Corruption occurs not only when interacting with government representatives, but
also in dealings between firms. Thus, ‘corruption in Mexico’ refers to many types of corrup-
tion, as is true in most countries.
Also as in many places, corruption seems to be getting worse in Mexico, despite approx-
imately 20 years of official anti-corruption efforts. According to most indices of corruption
perceptions or experiences, corruption has deteriorated in the last several years. This may be
a perverse result of the relative freedom and independence of the press in Mexico: perhaps
Mexico has always been this corrupt, but now we are more aware of it. More evidently,
Mexico is in a vicious spiral among corruption, organized crime and money laundering
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2018). Indeed, Johnston (2005, 2014) classifies Mexico as
regressing from Elite Cartels (in which a relatively small number of families control economic
and political concerns) to Oligarchs and Clans (in which many groups compete violently for
control).
Mexico is a signatory of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. These
conventions are obligations to demonstrate progress towards reducing corruption by building
institutions. Some Mexican initiatives have borne results, but for the most part, they are
perceived as facades designed to make a good show of anti-corruption, while masking the
persistence of the status quo. For example, the OECD applauds Mexico’s recent legal reforms
but expresses ‘significant concern’ at ‘the absence of prosecution of foreign bribery by Mexico
more than nineteen years after Mexico’s foreign bribery offence came into force’ (OECD,
2018, 5). In the second decade of the twenty-first century, warnings emerged that Mexico was
on the verge of becoming a failed state; ‘[i]n at least part of its territory, Mexico is a failed
state’ (Philip et al., 2016, 13).
Mexico’s biggest advantage is a strong civil society. The Capacity to Control Corruption
Index (Simon and Aalbers, 2019) assigned Mexico a score of 4.29 (of 10) in Legal Capacity,
4.52 in Democracy and Public Institutions and 6.47 in Civil Society, Press and Private Sector.
The relative freedom of the press has enabled investigative journalism to expose many cases of

corruption and pressure from civil society and firms has contributed to incremental improve-
ments in anti-corruption structures.
This chapter provides a broad overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Mexico. No
discussion of corruption in Mexico would be complete without explaining the role of organ-
ized crime. Therefore, I also explain how Mexico has fallen into a vicious spiral, in which
government corruption and weakness left a vacuum in society that organized crime groups
(OCGs) have filled, at the same time that OCGs have further corrupted Mexican politics
and public service. Finally, I describe the comprehensive institutional changes embodied in
Mexico’s new NAS and the challenges ahead.
CORRUPTION IN MEXICO
Statistics and Prevalence
Mexico is on the more corrupt side of most measures. Using newspaper mentions, Morris
(1991) identified a recurring pattern in which each new president going back to the 1970s
started with a strong anti-corruption campaign and low perceptions of corruption. Over each
sexenio (six-year presidency), the campaign would dwindle and perceptions of corruption
would increase, paving the way for the next president (from the same party) to declare that the
previous administration had been corrupt. Theobald (1999, 494) observes that ‘in Mexico the
end of every sexenio sees a complete change of personnel at the upper echelons of the state’.
This anti-corruption pattern has apparently continued into the more democratic period. As
Figure 20.1 shows, each presidency begins with an improvement, but perceptions of corrup-
tion worsen as the presidency progresses. The current administration took office in December
2018; the CPI improved by one point in 2019. The 2019 Global Corruption Barometer
(Transparency International, 2019) found that 61 per cent of Mexicans surveyed in the first
quarter of 2019 approved of the fledgling government’s anti-corruption measures – the same
percentage that disapproved of anti-corruption measures in 2017. Only time will tell if the
perceived improvement is real this time.
Mexico has the second-highest bribe incidence in Latin America, surpassed only by
Venezuela (Transparency International, 2019). Perhaps not coincidentally, Mexico and
Venezuela are the only two countries in Latin America implicated in the Odebrecht scandal2
that have not yet sanctioned any public servants in the case. Even Odebrecht itself was
debarred not for bribery but for contract manipulation and non-fulfilment,3 despite Odebrecht
employees having admitted to paying bribes in Mexico. Mexico has rejected two offers – in
2017 and 2019 – by Odebrecht representatives to provide information to assist in investiga-
tions (Cárdenas, 2019).
The Mexican chapter of Transparency International published a detailed index of corruption
incidence between 2000 and 2010, finding that Mexican households spend 14 per cent of their
annual income on corruption, with the figure rising to 33 per cent for the poorest households
(Bohórquez and Devrim, 2012). Bribes or informal payments were paid most frequently – at
least 59 per cent of the times respondents had contact – in three types of transaction related
to automobiles: to avoid a traffic fine, to avoid impounding or to recover the auto from the
impound lot and to park in areas controlled by informal ‘car sitters’ (Transparencia Mexicana,
2010). (The last category is related to corruption because car sitters allow cars to park in

Note: The methodology and scale changed in 2012. Prior to 2012, 10 indicated ‘completely free of corruption’ and
0 ‘totally corrupt’. Starting in 2012, a 0–100 scale was used. Because the methodology also changed, the two time
periods are not perfectly comparable.
Source: Elaborated with data from Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, various years.
Figure 20.1 Corruption Perceptions Index, Mexico
no-parking zones, in collusion with traffic officers. One anthropological study in the northern
city of Monterrey found that a car sitter paid officials MXN$6,000 (approximately US$315)4
to operate and kept MXN$26,000 (US$1,370) in profits each month (Zúñiga et al., 2018),
more than ten times the minimum wage.) The national statistics office (INEGI) has published
a less detailed survey of corruption incidence every two years since 2011. In 2017, 14.6 per
cent of respondents paid a bribe in relation to at least one of four categories of public services.
Contact with public security forces (including traffic officers) has the highest bribe incidence,
at 59.5 per cent (INEGI, 2017).
Despite these numbers, or perhaps as a reflection of them, it is difficult to find cases of
corruption in Mexico: there are mostly cases of alleged corruption. Many types of petty
bureaucratic corruption are classified as administrative failures: sanctions are determined and
applied by the immediate superior, who may be complicit. For example, of 577 cases of budg-
etary irregularities reported in 2017 in the state of Nuevo León, 527 are still in process two
years later, 49 have been declared unworthy of sanction and one resulted in a private scolding
(Charles, 2019). From 2013 to 2019, only 207 federal workers were sanctioned for abuse of
authority, 76 for bribery or extortion and 780 for ‘administrative negligence’; the sanctions
were blacklisting from government employment for between two and 30 years, the majority
for ten years (Secretaría de Función Pública, 2020).
At the same time, alleged grand corruption has proven difficult to prosecute. For example,
Carlos Romero Deschamps was leader of the petroleum workers’ union from 1993 to 2019
and a PRI senator or member of Congress (enjoying prosecutorial immunity) during most of
that time. Despite at least 27 legal procedures against him for embezzlement, fraud and illicit
enrichment (among other charges), Romero Deschamps has eluded sentencing and acquired
an injunction against arrest or preventive imprisonment (Flores, 2019).5 Many cases of poten-
tial deviation of funds or other corrupt acts are dismissed for want of evidence or procedural

violations. Journalists who report on such cases expose themselves to defamation lawsuits that
may very well prosper.
Between 97 and 99 per cent of crimes in Mexico go unpunished (Institute for Economics
and Peace, 2019; Global Impunity Index Mexico, 2016, 2018). Even when charges stick, they
may act more like post-it notes than super glue. Elba Esther Gordillo, the head of the national
teachers’ union, was imprisoned in 2013 for embezzling nearly 2 billion pesos (US$100
million) from the union, money laundering and organized crime, but was released in 2018
after a judge found that her enrichment, while uncontested, was not illicit (Barajas, 2019). As
Hallak and Poisson (2007, 158) document, ‘the National Education Workers Union has set up
a system of patronage, including the selling of positions’. In the Guardería ABC case (Box
20.1), 19 of 22 indictments led to sentencing, but all 19 are out on appeal. Of over a dozen
governors accused between 2015 and 2018 of deviation of public funds or other acts of cor-
ruption, one admitted guilt and is serving a nine-year sentence; two have been extradited to the
US; and the rest are awaiting trial, acquired injunctions, or fled (Expansión, 2018). Cases like
these lend credence to arguments that anti-corruption is merely political.
BOX 20.1 GUARDERÍA ABC
On 5 June 2009, over a hundred children under the age of five were taking their afternoon
nap at the Guardería ABC (ABC day care centre) in Hermosillo, Sonora, when the building
caught fire. The staff were between shifts and some had stepped out to eat, leaving only
14 of 41 workers still on duty. To make matters worse, there were no emergency exits, no
sprinklers or fire extinguishers, and malfunctioning smoke detectors. It took 30 minutes
to evacuate as the polyurethane ceiling succumbed to the flames, releasing toxic fumes.
Forty-nine children died and at least 706 were injured.
The day care centre was one of many licensed private facilities available to workers reg-
istered in the Mexican Social Security (IMSS) system. Over the next several weeks, news
reports revealed that the owners of ABC were politically connected: a former state treasurer
for the PRI, his wife and a cousin of the first lady. The IMSS denied any responsibility –
ABC had provided passing certificates signed by the fire department and three other state
and municipal offices – and refused to compensate the victims’ families (Fuentes, 2009).
The families of the children formed an organization dedicated to demanding justice and
ensuring that this tragedy would not be repeated. They proposed a national law (Cámara de
Diputados, 2018), passed in 2011, that specifies rules for institutions that care for children.
The organization argues that the fire was set intentionally to destroy ‘documentation related
to the $10 billion [pesos – approximately US$1 billion at the time the debt was accumulat-
ed] debt generated during the administration of former governor Eduardo Bourns Castelo’
(Díaz Favela, 2013). The papers were allegedly next door, in a storage room rented by
the state treasury department. Two independent forensic studies carried out by US experts
found that the fire had been set intentionally; three Mexican investigations determined the
cause of the fire to be overheating of either a cooling unit near the ceiling or an electric cord
at floor level (Chacón, 2013).
Epilogue: despite the new law (and building codes established after a tragic earth-
quake in 1985), on 19 September 2017, 19 children and seven employees perished when
the Rébsamen School collapsed during a 7.1 magnitude earthquake in Mexico City. The

school had been built piecemeal with little oversight, insufficient structural support and
improper documentation. Furthermore, the designated escape routes were unnecessarily
long (Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad, n.d.).
Prevalence and Normalization
Colloquialisms and practices have normalized corruption in Mexico. Sophisms such as ‘El que
no transa no avanza’ (roughly, If you don’t cheat, you can’t compete), ‘Dando y dando’ (You
give, I give) and ‘Hoy por mí, mañana por tí’ (Today it’s my turn; tomorrow it’s yours) are the
cultural justifications for corruption repeated throughout society (Dehesa, 2002).
The period of one-party rule created entrenched corruption networks, a series of ‘machines’
that were coordinated under the PRI. Many sectors were nationalized; jobs in the bloated state
were available for PRI members, through connections (palanca), or for a price. Constitutionally
guaranteed labour unions – among them, the teachers’ union, at 1.5 million strong, the largest
union in Latin America – commandeered votes in exchange for political influence (Ornelas,
2008). Vote buying became a tradition that would be adopted by other major parties (Serra,
2016). State-owned enterprises (like the petroleum company PEMEX) were inefficient and
services painfully slow: households had to wait years for a phone line if they followed official
protocols, for example. Each of these machines – political parties, workers’ unions, industrial
conglomerates – was run hierarchically and organized into cells, with orders running from top
to bottom, money and power flowing from bottom to top. The result was a ‘low-trust bureau-
cracy’, in which citizens distrust the government and government distrusts its citizens (Peeters
et al., 2018).
Thus, when the PRI was in charge, corruption and power were centralized. As the PRI lost
control, state governments became more autonomous and it was more difficult both for the
president to control local politics and for the presidency to make deals with labour unions
and OCGs. As in post-Suharto Indonesia and post-Soviet Russia (Bardhan, 2006), post-PRI
Mexico has suffered the effects of decentralized corruption. Grand corruption at the state
level increased as governors became more autonomous, while OCGs found an opportunity to
penetrate at the state and municipal levels.
CORRUPTION, ORGANIZED CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING

IN MEXICO
OCGs in Mexico are usually called ‘drug cartels’, a reference to their early development as
regional groups formed by creating alliances among smaller gangs, thus consolidating market
power. During the PRI-dominated decades, a certain equilibrium prevailed, in which the
government allowed the cartels to operate and the cartels more or less respected each other’s
territories and operated relatively peacefully. The rapid growth of organized crime in Mexico
can be traced to the US War on Drugs during the 1980s, which shifted routes and production
from Colombia to Mexico (Chabat, 2002; Organization of American States, 2013a). The
North American Free Trade Agreement entered into force in 1995, dramatically increasing
the number of vehicles crossing the border and strengthening Mexico’s position in the US
drug market. As the PRI lost its monopoly over government, the relationships between the

cartels and governments became unstable. Weaker controls and higher profits attracted new
groups. Then, in 2004, the end of the assault weapon ban in the US made it easier for cartels to
out-gun local law enforcement (Morris, 2012). In 2008, Mexico and the US signed the Mérida
Initiative,7 providing weapons and anti-OCG training to the Mexican military, police and
customs forces – officially launching the war on drugs in Mexico. The method of capturing
OCG heads had worked well in the US and Colombia, but OCGs in Mexico are like hydras:
when one head is removed, several grow in its place. When Calderón began the war on drugs
in earnest, the effect was to splinter OCGs into sub-groups that became violent rivals. Further
complicating matters, from 2009 to 2011, the Arizona office of the US Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives undertook a controversial strategy dubbed Operation Fast
and Furious. US authorities allowed almost 2,000 firearms to enter Mexico, ostensibly part
of a plan to identify and dismantle cartels, although only two of the guns had GPS chips (US
Congress, 2012). This coincides with the period of rapid escalation of violence (Calderón et
al., 2019).
Mexico has fallen into a vicious spiral of corruption, organized crime and money launder-
ing. It is difficult to determine whether corruption allowed OCGs to flourish, OCGs corrupted
government or weak governance favoured both corruption and organized crime. What is
certain is that corruption and OCG activity have increased in the past decade or so.
Corruption delegitimizes the state (Morris, 2008, finds this empirically), leaving a vacuum in
the provision of services, including security. OCGs fill this vacuum, providing infrastructure,
loans and justice in underserviced communities as a kind of public relations (Feldab-Brown,
2011; Wainwright, 2016). Eventually, the local OCG becomes more legitimate than the state
in the eyes of the public. Concurrently, OCGs influence politics and corrupt police forces and
public servants through plata o plomo (‘silver or lead’: money or a bullet) tactics. As the spiral
descends further, OCG members are elected into office and begin to shape the law directly
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016).
Mexican OCGs are big business. The number of ‘employees’ in a single regional plaza
(distribution space) ranges from 61 to 600 (larger than most Mexican firms) and the number of
police and other officials paid off can be as high as 1,000 (Organization of American States,
2013b). In addition to trafficking drugs, these groups engage in many other illegal activities
for profit: kidnapping, extortion, protection rackets, trafficking in pirated goods, theft, tapping
gasoline ducts, the sex trade and migrant smuggling. In the legal sector, they own businesses
– casinos, hotels, mines – and win tenders for public works (El Norte, 2012). The war on
drugs in Mexico drove this diversification (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2015), but the war on drugs in
Colombia created shortages and fuelled violence in Mexico (Castillo et al., 2014). As police
and military forces disrupted Mexican drug routes and contracts, violent competition among
groups intensified, even as they also engaged violently with security forces. The separation
of the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, in 2010 unleashed a series of turf wars
throughout Mexico and Central America, in which Los Zetas used gruesome murders as
a terrorism tactic to subdue the populace and establish territorial dominance. Three former
governors of Tamaulipas, the state Los Zetas call home, have been charged in the US with
money laundering and ties to organized crime (Reagan, 2019).
According to the Mexican Peace Index, Mexico has become less peaceful each year from
2015 to 2018 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). The per person cost of violence in
2018 was nearly half the average annual salary and the homicide rate was 27 per 100,000
inhabitants, the highest since 1997, costing the Mexican economy 10 per cent of GDP (Institute

for Economics and Peace, 2019; Vision of Humanity, 2019). Not surprisingly, despite nominal
press freedom, Mexico is the deadliest country for journalists, especially those investigating
cases of corruption or organized crime (Reporters without Borders, 2019).8
Narco-State
There is a close relationship between OCGs and Mexican politics. For example, drug lord
Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán reportedly helped finance Peña Nieto’s presidential campaign
and paid him a US$100 million bribe after Peña Nieto won (Esquivel, 2019). Where the PAN
won mayoral elections, trafficking routes moved to other cities (Dell, 2015). At the same time,
‘drug cartels systematically influence local and regional politics through corrupt practices’
(Philip et al., 2016, 22) and OCGs and certain political elites work to each other’s benefit
(Foglesong and Solis, 2009, cited by Dell, 2015). As in Italy, in Mexico violence increases
before elections and when unfavourable candidates win local elections (Alesina et al., 2016).
During the 2017–18 electoral cycle, 48 candidates or pre-candidates for elected positions were
assassinated, as well as 104 other politicians and 371 non-elected public servants; others were
intimidated via threats, assaults, kidnapping or aggression against family members (Etellekt,
2018, 9). Eighty-two per cent of politicians murdered were municipal-level politicians and
69 per cent were members of parties opposed to the governor’s party (Etellekt, 2018, 16, 18).
In 75 per cent of these homicides, the evidence indicates that organized crime was involved,
either to remove an undesirable contender or to eliminate a politician connected to a rival
group (Etellekt, 2018, 21). Indeed, a Senate report found that 80 per cent of municipal govern-
ments are controlled directly or indirectly by OCGs (Ravelo, 2018).
Money Laundering
Money laundering is an important link between corruption and organized crime. The Mexican
branch of HSBC has been associated with laundering money for at least one Mexican cartel
(Platt, 2015) and Mexican politicians (Trautman, 2017). Politicians and public servants
launder embezzled funds and bribes, sometimes from OCGs. Mexico is second only to China
in illicit financial flows (Global Financial Integrity, 2019).9
ANTI-CORRUPTION A LA MEXICANA
Because corruption occurs at the intersection of institutions, incentives and ethics

(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016), anti-corruption should attempt to improve these three
factors. Part of AMLO’s discourse revolves around changing societal norms, toward greater
honesty, by setting an example from the top.10 A key element of the Fox anti-corruption initi-
ative was raising public awareness through film shorts played before feature films at the two
main theatre chains (Macías, 2003).11
Changing Incentives to Combat Petty Corruption
Mexico has undertaken a number of experiments to change the incentives to engage in or

abstain from corruption in relation to specific government services. For example, following

customs administration reform in the 1990s, approximately 2,000 of 12,000 customs officials
were replaced in 2000, at the same time that controls were tightened and cooperation with
US customs officials were enhanced (Cerda et al., 2001). To fight corruption in driving tests,
in 2003 Mexico City eliminated the driving test altogether (Altamirano, 2015). To reduce
traffic-related corruption, Mexico City deployed female traffic officers (BBC News, 1999);
Querétaro preferred careful selection and training, higher salaries, computerized ticketing and
microphones and cameras (Cópil, 2001). Birth certificates and other documents were made
available through public kiosks starting in the late 1990s in Colima (Chávez, 2001) and many
procedures and documents throughout Mexico are now available online, bypassing human
interaction entirely.
Early Institutional Reforms
Mexico operates under constitutional law on the French model. Constitutional and legal
reforms in the last half-century have promoted greater transparency and accountability, in the
type of gradual improvement that Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) and Johnston (2014) describe. The
first institutional changes occurred in the early 1980s (Casar, 2016). The public procurement
platform Compranet was launched in 1997, leading to a 2001 scandal denominated Toallagate,
involving the purchase of towels for the presidential residence, at over US$400 each. This is
the perfect example of how greater transparency can lead to perceptions of higher corruption:
without the publication of the presidential budget, citizens would be unaware of such pur-
chases (Oppenheimer, 2001). It is only through transparency that the public can observe and
decry overpricing.
In 2002, Mexico passed the first Transparency and Access to Information Act, which
created the Federal Institute for Access to Information. Michener (2010) argues that the law,
which created a well-funded agency to fulfil information requests, passed because President
Fox held a minority in Congress. Thus, Congress was interested in legislation that would
tighten checks on the president, at the same time that the president wanted to compete with
Congress to present the best legislation. ‘Since its enactment, the law has been upheld as a gold
standard of international access to information legislation, and is noted to have moved Mexico
from a political culture of opacity to one of greater openness’ (Michener, 2010, 73). A 2014
reform granted the institute autonomy and greater authority in decisions regarding access to
information (Transparency International, 2014).
Transparency, however, is only one part of the process: despite open data, Mexico con-
tinues to be a high-corruption country (Peteram et al., 2019). Someone – usually watchdog
agencies and the press – must take advantage of the information the government publishes, sift
through it and bring the anomalies to light. Then, the public must insist upon accountability.
Furthermore, judges and magistrates must be independent from the executive and legislative
branches, as well as from political parties, and all elements of the justice system must be free
from corruption. Those responsible must also be accountable under the law: the executive and
legislative branches enjoyed prosecutorial immunity until at least 2015 (later in some states
and at the national level).

National Anti-Corruption System
After decades of anti-corruption rhetoric and baby steps toward greater accountability, Mexico
has finally undertaken major institutional change in the shape of the NAS. The NAS is one
giant step towards better governance and will have jurisdiction over the civil service. The
laws creating the NAS also changed incentives by criminalizing corrupt acts that previously
received administrative sanctions; increasing statutes of limitation; requiring members of
government and public servants to declare income, assets and conflicts of interest; expanding
the list of crimes that qualify for preventive imprisonment; and permitting the government to
freeze and seize assets in cases of illegal enrichment. Civil society was heavily involved in the
design of the NAS and in drafting the laws, taking into account international best practice and
the requirements established in the anti-corruption conventions that Mexico has signed.
While some parts of the NAS were proposed under Calderón, the reform and laws creating
the NAS were passed in 2015 under Peña Nieto. The NAS must be replicated at the state
and municipal levels. The states passed their constitutional reforms between June 2015 and
October 2017 and the laws creating the state systems (SASs) between December 2016 and
April 2018. An SAS is complete upon installation of its Coordinating Committee, which
requires the appointment of several key figures, including an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor and
a Citizen Participation Committee (CPC, see below). The first Coordinating Committee was
installed in June 2017; as of this writing, one SAS is still incomplete (El Sie7e de Chiapas,
2019).
The NAS has many of the characteristics of an anti-corruption agency, but it is much more.
Among its features are:
●● Citizen involvement, in the form of the CPC. The CPC consists of five autonomous
members – they should have anti-corruption backgrounds and no political ties. Its mandate
includes proposing anti-corruption policy, conducting publicity campaigns and serving as
a link between the anti-corruption system and society. As part of its activities, the CPC
should work with universities and anti-corruption organizations. This embodies ‘deep
democratization’ (Johnston, 2014).
●● E-government, in the form of a National Transparency Platform,12 where state and national
governments and offices, as well as any entity receiving government funds, are required
to publish information as specified in the Freedom of Information Act. Citizens may also
request information of a specific entity using a simple online form and file complaints
when they receive an unsatisfactory response. The National Digital Platform,13 still under
construction, will be a standardized depository for information related to hiring, contract-
ing, procurement and corruption-related sanctions applied in all state and local govern-
ments and government entities. Citizens will also be able to report corrupt acts and upload
evidence of them, anonymously, if desired.
●● Coordination of anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering bodies. The Coordinating
Committee of the NAS and each SAS (with some variation) includes representatives of the
anti-corruption prosecutor, the financial intelligence unit, the local transparency agency,
the CPC, the judicial council, the comptroller and the administrative responsibilities
magistrate.
The NAS has the potential to be a game changer in anti-corruption, but ‘[i]ndependence is the
standard for effective [anti-corruption agencies]’ (Recanatini, 2011, 551). Many members of

the NAS have ties to politicians or political parties (Olvera Rivera and Galindo Rodríguez,
2019). Thus, the various institutions that comprise the NAS are not completely autonomous.
This does not necessarily mean that anti-corruption will be politicized – many appointees are
dedicated to their task – but it does pose that risk. Furthermore, any lack of respect for the
processes and spirit of the law perpetuates the widespread perception that anti-corruption is
a farce.
CONCLUSIONS
Corruption in Mexico has eroded trust in government and the rule of law. Corruption weak-
ened the PRI’s grip on the state, leading to greater democracy in the new millennium, with
two contradictory results. On the one hand, alternating governments have introduced laws that
have gradually improved transparency and anti-corruption institutions. On the other, as the
PRI lost hegemony, centralized power and corruption devolved into decentralized corruption
and power grabs, in which state government and other offices were vulnerable to bribery,
embezzlement and organized crime’s influence. Despite reforms, corruption and violence
have grown in the last decade with near total impunity. Thus, at the same time that laws were
strengthened, the rule of law deteriorated.
The NAS is an ambitious, far-reaching set of institutions based on international best prac-
tice. It incorporates elements of transparency, professionalization, sanctions, citizen involve-
ment, e-government and cooperation among entities: an anti-corruption network to counter
corrupt networks. Its success, however, depends in large part on political will at the state and
municipal levels, where OCGs tend to rule directly or indirectly.
The task facing AMLO is monumental: his government must strengthen the rule of law by
fortifying institutions and fighting corruption, especially in law enforcement and the judicial
system. The NAS has the potential to be instrumental in that fight, but only if its appointees
fulfil their duties. At the same time, Mexico must dismantle the corrupt networks among the
various parts of government and the private sector, including OCGs. The law must be enforced
to be effective.
NOTES
1. Persson et al. (2003) find party-list elections correlated with higher levels of corruption.
2. Odebrecht is a Brazilian construction firm that admitted in a United States court to having paid
US$788 million in bribes in 12 countries, including Mexico, to secure public contracts. See Smith
et al. (2017).
3. Consultation of the sanctions section of Mexico’s public procurement platform, Compranet,
accessed 6 November 2019 at https://directoriosancionados.funcionpublica.gob.mx/SanFicTec/jsp/
Ficha_Tecnica/SancionadosN.htm
4. The Mexican peso has lost half its value in 20 years, from approximately 9.50 MXN/USD in 2000
to about 19 MXN/USD in 2019.
5. As of this writing, the office of the attorney general has reportedly opened a new case against
Romero Deschamps on charges of embezzlement and he has resigned as union leader (Economía
Hoy, 2019).
6. Reports vary from 70 to 90 injured. See Chacón (2011).

7. See https://mx.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/the-merida-initiative/ (accessed 3

November 2019).
8. Ten Mexican journalists were killed January–November 2019, of 36 journalists killed globally in
the context of their work, according to Reporters without Borders (2019). See Michener (2010) for
the complicated government–press relationship going back to 1976.
9. See Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2018) for a more detailed explanation.
10. See, for example, AMLO’s official platform, published 18 December 2017, accessed 12 November
2019 at https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/honestidad/
11. These short films are available on YouTube under the heading ‘Cineminutos contra la corrupción’.
12. Accessed 6 November 2019 at https://www.plataformadetransparencia.org.mx/web/guest/inicio
13. Accessed 16 November 2019 at https://plataformadigitalnacional.org/. As of this writing, only
Mexico State and the Secretaría de Función Pública have uploaded information to the platform.
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21. Public administration and integrity in South
Africa: the case of the National Prosecuting
Authority
Marianne Camerer1
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this handbook is on corruption and integrity in public administration. This
chapter looks at recent challenges to integrity and public administration in South Africa
and shows how a politicised appointment process in the senior ranks of the public service
(in particular those charged with criminal justice) has served to undermine independence,
trust and institutional capacity of the prosecution service. This has enabled the prevalence of
corruption and state capture, particularly during the Zuma years. Rebuilding a high integrity
public service needs to reinstitute merit and professionalism over politics in the appointment
of senior public officials.
To a packed parliament on 20 June 2019, President Cyril Ramaphosa, who had come to
office almost 18 months earlier following a bruising internal African National Congress
(ANC) factional battle, conceded that South Africa, 25 years on from formally shedding
Apartheid, faced some big challenges: “Our economy is not growing. Not enough jobs are
being created. This is the concern that rises above all others” (Ramaphosa 2019).
The link between corruption and economic growth has been well documented with perceived
corruption linked to a failure to attract investment. In South Africa, along with corruption and
state capture, additional factors such as “rising costs of doing business, electricity supply
constraints, our skills crisis, declining productivity and competitiveness, labour volatility, and
policy and political uncertainty” have, according to former deputy finance minister, Mcebisi
Jonas, played a significant role in South Africa’s economic decline and directly impacted on
investment confidence: “Under state capture, effective governance, especially of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) was sacrificed, a pliant and factional security cluster was established and
state capacity was hollowed out as the organs of state were repurposed to serve corrupt patron-
age interests” (Jonas 2019: 6–7).
Referencing the 2012 National Development Plan, Ramaphosa said a priority of his new
administration was to build “a capable, ethical and developmental state… that not only
provides the institutions and infrastructure that enable the economy and state to operate, but
has the means to drive transformation”. Building an ethical state “in which there is no place
for corruption, patronage, rent-seeking and plundering of public money” required “a corps of
skilled and professional public servants of the highest moral standards – and dedicated to the
public good”.
In order to end state capture and fight corruption he noted that steps were being taken to
improve success rates in investigating and prosecuting crimes, and to ensure better training
and professionalisation throughout the criminal justice system. The newly appointed National
289
Marianne Camerer - 9781789900910
Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Advocate Shamila Batohi, had been tasked to develop
a plan to significantly increase the capacity and effectiveness of the National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA), including to ensure effective asset forfeiture. With growing despair by the
general public and investors at the seeming inability of the criminal justice agencies to bring
corrupt politicians and civil servants to account, this was a call to exercise patience.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH

AFRICA
In looking at the South African case, it is necessary to revisit the bureaucratic challenges
that the new democratic state faced at the time of transition in 1994 and the logic that led to
transformation being achieved through politicisation of the public service over a merit-based
professional bureaucracy.
South Africa’s constitution adopted in 1996 sets out the parameters and values of public
administration for a new public service which for the first time would serve all South Africans.
The major challenge was to move from a system which provided services predominately to its
white constituency, at the time around 4 million people, to 44 million citizens. “Public service
reform in South Africa has in many ways been a remarkable transition from apartheid based,
internationally outdated public service to a more democratic administration” (Cameron and
Thornhill 2009: 898–9).
Chapter 10 of the Constitution lists the basic values and principles governing public admin-
istration (Act 108 of 1996). Section 195 (1) states: public administration must be governed
by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, and it outlines a set of
principles, the first being that a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and
maintained.
A sunset clause in South Africa’s constitution meant that public servants previously
employed under the Apartheid regime would be retained for the first five years of transition
(until 1999). Could these public servants be relied upon to uphold the values of the new dem-
ocratic constitution?
The Apartheid bureaucracy was regarded as unfit to carry out the orders of the dem-
ocratic government, not least because it was staffed at senior levels by largely white,
Afrikaans-speaking men – the very people responsible for implementing the racist pro-
grammes of the former government (Picard 2005: 302 in Chipkin 2016: 7). The ANC believed
it had inherited a state which was illegitimate and structured to serve the interests of a white
minority and was itself a “seedbed of corruption and criminal activity both within the country
and abroad”. As such the Apartheid state had to be destroyed in a process of fundamental
transformation and the new state should be, by definition, “the antithesis of the apartheid
state” (ANC 1998, in Chipkin 2016: 7). In order to transform the state a model of recruitment
that privileged political considerations over purely administrative ones was introduced. This,
according to a former minister of Public Service and Administration, was “to establish control
over the bureaucracy and to inculcate a new value system and philosophy, in tune with the
agenda of the ruling party” (Fraser-Moleketi 2006: 20 in Chipkin 2016: 11–12).

Public administration and integrity in South Africa 291
POLITICISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
Politicised appointments within the civil service are a key feature of South Africa’s democratic
transition and essential to understand as a backdrop to any discussion of public administration.
Rather than primarily merit and competence, ideological and political considerations would
be taken into account, particularly in appointing senior public officials. Given the ANC’s need
to fundamentally transform the Apartheid basis of the South African state it is perhaps not
surprising that the South African public service is highly politicised for as a former minister of
Public Service and Administration explained, “you brought in people you could trust, namely
old comrades from years of struggle” (Cameron 2010: 687).
In 1997 the ANC’s Cadre Policy and Development Strategy was formally introduced which
politicised appointments of senior positions in the public service. The final report to the 50th
National Conference of the party explained why this was necessary to effect public service
transformation:
We have experienced serious resistance to the transformation of the public service, with representa-
tives of the old order using all means in their power to ensure that they remain in dominant positions.
Some among these owe no loyalty to the new constitutional and political order nor to the government
of the day and have no intention to implement our government’s programmes aimed at reconstruction
and development (ANC 1997 in Chipkin 2016, p. 11).
The policy made no reference to the need for administrative competence (Cameron 2010),
and so to some extent obscured the notion of merit (Naidoo 2013). To accommodate the dual
imperatives of political alignment and transforming the racial representation of public service
management, this policy would have severe consequences, not least the mismanagement
of public resources. Whilst incoming governments should have the right to replace staff in
selected senior positions with individuals who share their ideological beliefs, Cameron (2010)
argues this should be provided that they are administratively competent. Some of the first
wave of ANC appointees met this criterion, but many of the second-wave appointees seem
to lack managerial competence. According to Cameron politicisation of the public service
then seemed to shift away from appointing people with similar ideological positions towards
deploying ANC card-carrying cadres. There also emerged a third category of political appoin-
tees, namely a cruder form of patronage which involves the appointment of families and
friends to government posts, the latter tendency most pronounced at local government level
(not part of the public service). This form of patronage is less susceptible to political control
and tends to be a reward for political loyalty (Cameron 2010).
The Zuma administration (2009–18) was characterised by these type of appointments,
leading to a bloated public service with many people, often incompetent and unethical,
employed primarily on the basis of their loyalty and alignment to a particular faction of the
ruling party.
AN ETHICAL, CAPABLE DEVELOPMENT STATE?
The ANC government has since the late 1990s referred to itself as a “developmental state”
both in terms of its economic policies and international relations. However, as Chipkin and
others pointedly note, there are some differences as to how South Africa was, or is, able to

apply this concept. Since the developmental state is premised on a strong interventionist
“activist” state and intended to simultaneously promote economic growth and social objectives
such as poverty alleviation, Levin (2007) has argued that the public service or administration
of a development state has to be strong and capable of intervening, planning and challenging
societal resources towards resolving national development strategies (in Cameron 2010).
The current lack of skills in the public service makes the achievement of developmental
state goals unrealistic. For one, South Africa does not have the skills base that the East Asian
developmental state enjoyed (Butler 2008: 2–3 in Cameron 2010: 695). Meritocracy forms the
basis of the public service in these developmental states where the bureaucracy is composed
of some of the country’s best thinkers and highest achievers, whose careers are not dependent
upon the whim of politicians (Southall 2006: xxv in Cameron 2010: 695).
Chipkin (2016) draws attention to the Public Service Commission’s 2014 report (pp. 22–4)
which noted four major differences. In a developmental state:
1. Appointments are not made on the basis of political or other primordial considerations.
2. Top managers are technocrats appointed from within the public service.
3. Educational qualification is a crucial factor for entrance into the bureaucracy.
4. Merit is achieved through open, transparent and competitive examinations.
In South Africa the responsibility for recruitment, in particular in the appointment of senior
public servants, was taken away from statutory bodies (such as the Public Service Commission
– who are meant to “protect and advance the principle of merit”) and handed over to ministers
and their provincial government equivalents (Chipkin 2016: 8). Since 1999 directors-general
have been appointed by the president (with ministers exercising huge influence), a procedure
ensuring that they are appointed largely on the basis of political affiliation – that is, on the
strength of friendships and networks of the anti-Apartheid struggle – and brought in on the
basis of trust (Miller 2005: 85–6,103, 117 in Cameron 2010). In recent years “it even became
popular to deride ‘technocrats’ in the civil service as if it were somehow wrong to possess
a high level of technical skill when what was needed was political loyalty to the ruling party”
(Jonas 2019: 175). A key issue in public reform going forward is about how to balance the
power of the minister in this regard by requiring more rigorous recruitment, minimum com-
petencies and qualifications as well as the inclusion of senior public servants and the PSC in
processes of recruiting and disciplining senior public servants (Schmidt 2020).
Thus, the situation arises in South Africa that “political discretion, not simply in the
recruitment process but in the very design of posts, coupled with the absence of an entrance
exam or career advancement on the basis of subject-related tests means that the public service
after 1994 has been organized with a view to reduce as much as possible its administrative
autonomy” (Chipkin 2016: 9). There is very weak scrutiny of the competence of senior
public servants as a general rule. Performance management as has been applied, has rarely
been an evidence-based independent process geared to improving performance and weeding
out incompetents DGs and Deputy DGs. On the contrary, these processes together with
“non-compliance” with non-substantive requirements of other legislation such as the Public
Finance Management Act (PFMA), are more typically used to remove competent top officials
where they have frustrated ministerial actions that are contrary to policy or law (Schmidt
2020).
The political-administrative interface is complex and critical and in South Africa needs to
be understood more clearly and managed in a way that can improve integrity and accounta-

bility within the public service. Political leadership needs to understand how administration
works but senior managers conversely need to understand the dynamics of politics. Some
research has been done in this regard at city level (Schmidt 2017).
“RADICAL ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION” AND THE

CAPTURE OF THE STATE
Under the Zuma administration, the resources and institutions of the state would be repurposed
or “captured” as part of a political project to supposedly achieve the social and economic
promises of the developmental state. In practice it would be loyalists and friends of the pres-
ident (such as the infamous Gupta family) who would capture the resources of the state – in
most cases for personal benefit – under the guise of “radical economic transformation”. Any
individual or agency trying to stop this project would be labelled “counter-revolutionary”.
The reality is that this was not a new strategy: the Afrikaner nationalists in the 1930s
had used the parastatals (now called state-owned enterprises) as well as the public service
to empower poor white Afrikaners. The strategy of economic transformation using state
resources was compelling to the Zuma faction, as Chipkin (2018) explains:
The idea of using the government’s procurement budget to realise social and economic outcomes was
not a new one. It was the backbone of South Africa’s “developmental state” in the 1930s and a key
plank in the Apartheid platform, especially in cultivating a national class of Afrikaner capitalists.
From about 2011, sections of the ANC and ministers and officials in the Department of Trade and
Industry, supported by elements of organised black business, started referring to “radical economic
transformation”. This was the name for an ambitious project to leverage the procurement budgets of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to displace established white firms and to create new, black-owned
and controlled industrial enterprises… Here was a vision of economic transformation that was not
contingent on the reform of “white businesses” and did not depend on the goodwill of whites to invest
in the economy, employ black people, and treat them as equals. (Chipkin 2018: 104)
When the protagonists of black economic empowerment insisted that 30 per cent of govern-
ment contracts, especially those of SOEs be set aside for black companies, irrespective of their
experience, capacity or price at which they offered to provide services or goods, the National
Treasury pushed back insisting government entities proceed in a way that was “fair, equitable,
transparent, competitive and cost-effective” (Chipkin 2018: 105). This explains the targeting
of former finance minister Pravin Gordhan and the National Treasury.
The stage had been set for factional politics and a contest of power: within the ANC those
committed to constitutionalism imperatives and the rule of law versus proponents of “radical
economic transformation”, led by the Zuma faction; the latter would proceed, largely unhin-
dered, to capture the state and repurpose its institutions (including criminal justice agencies).
An internal organisational renewal document released by the ANC in 2012 noted how within
the party there had been a “silent retreat from the mass line to palace politics of factionalism
and perpetual in-fighting” (ANC 2012: 9). This “new type of cadre”, self-interested and prone
to pursue their self-interest through divisive alliances, benefits from government and party
interventions, was seen to “misuse” public resources, i.e. be corrupt. Here “ill-disciplined
members of the ANC acting in ways contrary to what is expected of them, either by the
standards of the ANC as a political organisation or by the standards of the public service”, are
corrupt (Chipkin 2016: 17).

Chipkin’s analysis (2016) of the politics within the ANC is salient here:
There is growing contestation about who has legitimate authority in the organization and where,
moreover, power lies… There are accusations, moreover, that President Jacob Zuma, has allowed his
family and their business associates (the Gupta family) to “capture” key institutions… What all these
intrigues have in common is that they centre on reducing the autonomy of state institutions and/or
displacing those who currently control them in favour of a new configuration of forces. The politics
of purge and displacement has wracked the law and order departments (the police, the directorate for
specialized crimes (the “Hawks”), the National Prosecutions Authority (NPA), the South African
Revenue Services (SARS) and some of the state-owned enterprises, most recently Denel, a state arms
company). (Chipkin 2016: 18)
As the Zuma administration radicalised and resorted to increasingly illegal means to pursue
“radical economic transformation”, it was driven to “capture” and weaken key institutions.
It had to manage increasingly complex relations, many of which involved people engaged
in unlawful activities, and so the Zuma administration moved to establish control over key
institutions, especially those involved in criminal investigation and prosecution: the SARS,
the Hawks (high priority crimes unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS)), and the
National Prosecuting Agency (NPA). It had been necessary to shut down certain investigations
and immunise or protect key people from prosecution. In this sense, Chipkin (2018: 106) notes
“the political project of the Zuma administration came at a very heavy price for the capability,
integrity and stability of the South African state”.
SPEAKING OUT AND “CONNECTING THE DOTS”
In May 2016, 27 former directors-general in the South African civil service felt compelled to
issue a statement voicing their concerns about corruption and state capture, specifically men-
tioning the Guptas who were said to be influencing cabinet appointments. This unprecedented
initiative by senior civil servants to speak out was extraordinary. They described their action
as “not a party-political initiative” but rather “driven by our shared commitment to our consti-
tutional democracy”. As former directors-general they brought “a collective commitment to
serve and dismantle the apartheid state machinery and replaced it with democratic institutions
that were informed by democratic values, social justice, fundamental human rights and a deep
desire to improve the lives of all South Africans”. They noted that the post-1994 state was built
through the sweat and blood of thousands of South Africans, and many paid the ultimate price.
“Remaining silent amounts to betrayal of the trust bestowed upon all South Africans by the
millions who fought for democracy and the demise of apartheid.”
In their statement the directors-general called for an Independent Public Inquiry in terms of
Section 4(1) (a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. It was eventually the Zondo
Commission into State Capture that would bring home the reality to South Africans of the
magnitude of state capture and corruption during the past decade.
In a week of high drama, on 30 March 2017 President Zuma fired finance minister Pravin
Gordhan and deputy minister Mcebisi Jonas, who had been recalled at short notice earlier in
the week from an investment roadshow in the United Kingdom – referencing an intelligence
report accusing Gordhan of conspiring with foreign forces against him. Zuma’s manipulation
of state intelligence agencies is well known. One of his first appointments as president in

2009 was to appoint Richard Mdluli as head of SAPS crime intelligence, who would later be
declared unfit and improper to hold office.
On 1 April 2017, following the death on 28 March of struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada,
fired finance minister Pravin Gordhan, at the first of four memorial services for Kathrada,
called for mass mobilisation against state capture. Specifically, he asked South Africans to
“connect the dots” to determine how and to whom money flowed from Treasury to various
projects.
In May 2017, an influential report, Betrayal of the Promise, written by leading academics
“connected the dots”. The report convincingly shows how as a political project of the Zuma
faction, the state was being repurposed under the guise of radical economic transformation to
corruptly benefit the former president and his faction of the ANC. Anyone who opposed this
often blatant stealing and tried to uphold the integrity of the procurement process, referencing
the rule of law and constitutionalism (for example National Treasury and long-serving minis-
ter, Pravin Gordhan) would be targeted (Bhorat et al. 2017).
THE ZONDO COMMISSION
In one of his last acts as president of the Republic of South Africa, on 9 January 2018,
President Zuma announced a full Judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by Honourable Mr
Justice Raymond Zondo, deputy chief justice of the Republic of South Africa, to inquire into
allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector including organs of state.
The Zondo Commission’s establishment flowed from the recommendations in the 355 page
report, “State of Capture” (whose release Zuma tried unsuccessfully to block), by former and
widely respected public protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela. The report’s full name gives an
indication of the ambit of her investigation: Report on an investigation into alleged improper
and unethical conduct by the President and other state functionaries relating to alleged
improper relations and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment
of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly
corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses (Madonsela,
2016).
One can well ask why, with the range of existing anti-corruption agencies in South Africa,
a separate Commission of Inquiry into state capture had to be appointed? The answer lies in
the conscious decimation and manipulation during the Zuma regime of the capacity and inde-
pendence of the country’s criminal justice agencies to fight corruption.
Indeed, in one of his first presidential moves, Jacob Zuma would disband the highly effec-
tive Directorate of Special Operations, known as the Scorpions. Ten years earlier, in 1999,
then president Thabo Mbeki had announced the formation of the Scorpions as a specialised
unit which would prosecute high-profile corruption cases. Former president Zuma’s erstwhile
business partner Schabir Shaik would be successfully prosecuted for corruption in the arms
deal, receiving a 15-year sentence. Interestingly, President Mbeki would himself be recalled
from office by the ANC and accused of allegedly manipulating criminal justice agencies, in
this case the Scorpions, to target his political opponents. But that is another story.
Several cautions can be raised against commissions which according to Le Roux and Davis
in their important book Lawfare: Judging Politics in South Africa (2019) have several undesir-
able features in common. These include “huge budgets, lengthy processes, armies of lawyers

– often side-lining the very people with the story to tell – and the production of voluminous
reports containing recommendations for policy reforms and even criminal prosecutions”.
Their concern is that then nothing happens.
No prosecutions. No policy reforms. No consequences. Moreover for so long as a commission is

active, law-enforcement agencies, politicians, and those implicated point to the ongoing process, the
daily media reports, the theatre of accountability, as the reason why they are not doing more to redress
or address whatever it is that occurred. So we need to be supportive but also sceptical of commissions
as they often seem to decommission inquiry. (Le Roux and Davis 2019: 295–6)
Commissions of inquiry should thus supplement and not be a substitute for effective law
enforcement (Le Roux and Davis 2019). Hence the importance of the urgent reconstruction of
the NPA. It is to this that we now turn.
THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY AND THE RULE

OF LAW
The focus on the NPA is fundamentally important because it is tasked with upholding the rule
of law. Judge Dunstan Mlambo summed this up at the May 2019 strategy meeting with the
NPA leadership:
South Africa’s rampant lawlessness and corruption is the reason the NPA matters. The NPA is
integral to upholding the rule of law, and the judiciary is ready to co-operate. At the centre of any
functioning constitutional democracy is a well-functioning criminal justice system, and the office of
the NDPP is at the core of delivering criminal justice (NPA 2019).
It is clear that during the Zuma years there was a conscious effort to control key institutions
of criminal justice, such as the Hawks and the SAPS, but our focus is on the NPA which as
a “single national prosecuting authority” has “the power to institute criminal proceedings”
and exercise its functions “without fear, favour of prejudice”. It is these formidable powers
that were abused by the politicisation of the NPA through the appointment of individuals
with questionable integrity and ambivalent commitment to the independence of the office.
Appointments to the leadership of key institutions of criminal justice would from 1997 also
have factored in the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment based on political loyalty.
Under the constitution, the president currently has a presidential prerogative to make these
key appointments. Several submissions by leading civil society organisations and think tanks
in recent months to the Zondo Commission concern the manipulation of the criminal justice
agencies and focus in particular on the appointment and dismissal procedures of the top lead-
ership (Corruption Watch and Institute for Security Studies 2019). As these submissions point
out, the executive has considerable powers in relation to the appointment of senior leaders.
Implicit in the constitution, however, is the assumption that the executive will exercise these
powers in good faith in order to appoint people who are likely to discharge their responsibili-
ties effectively in line with the constitution. However, notably during the Zuma era, a number
of senior appointments were made that were apparently intended to ensure that the powers of
these agencies were exercised in a selective manner favourable to the executive (Corruption
Watch and Institute for Security Studies 2019).

This “Achilles heel” to make top appointments was exploited by the former president who
had a particular interest in controlling these agencies: for one, he himself is facing corruption
charges. An aggressive “Stalingrad” legal strategy, that is still ongoing, has managed to delay
his “day in court” since the charges were first raised in respect to the arms deal (see Camerer
2009, 2011). In April 2020, Zuma’s legal team approached the apex Constitutional Court,
following a March dismissal of his bid for a permanent stay of prosecution by the Supreme
Court of Appeal (Maughan 2020). The Supreme Court of Appeal had dismissed it without
even hearing the argument on the case on the basis that Zuma’s appeal bid had no reasonable
prospect of success. The NPA has slammed the last-ditch attempt to permanently stop his cor-
ruption trial as “hopeless” saying that the application’s “real purpose and effect” was to delay
the case against him and that “the State is ready to proceed”. Zuma subsequently withdrew his
leave to appeal with the Constitutional Court. The trial of the former president is now sched-
uled to begin on 23 June 2020, Covid-19 and his health permitting.
It can be argued that the prosecution service failed to halt state capture because of the
appointment and elevation of a host of compromised individuals to its leadership structures.
As a consequence, those involved in state capture were never prosecuted or properly inves-
tigated and a range of others, some of whom were fighting state capture, became its targets
instead (Jonas 2019: 119).
In 2014, former prosecutor and criminal justice expert Martin Schonteich noted how the
NPA’s fate as an institution that exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice, as
mandated by the constitution, “hangs in the balance”. With the appointment of its 6th head or
acting head by late 2013, “the NPA has been burdened with inconsistent – and at times poor
and unsuitable – leadership. Relatedly, political interference and the politicisation of the NPA
has seriously undermined a once promising institution, negatively affecting staff morale and
sapping public confidence” (Schonteich 2014: 5). By 2018, things had only got worse.2
A NEW DAWN
Early on in his presidency, Cyril Ramaphosa had the opportunity to signal a “new dawn”
characterised by a commitment to uphold constitutionalism and the rule of law. In 2018 he
appointed the Mokgoro Commission of Enquiry to look into the fitness to hold office of two
senior NPA prosecutors, Advocates Nomgcobo Jiba and Lawrence Mwrebi.
The case of the former acting NDPP, Nomgcobo Jiba, is a case in point. Described by
Renwick (2018) as a “Zuma ultra-loyalist” for whom Zuma had reportedly expunged the crim-
inal record of her husband (for embezzling a trust fund), she pursued a vendetta against senior
prosecutors Gerrie Nel and Glynnis Breytenbach and also refused to continue investigations
against the senior intelligence officer closest to the president, Richard Mdluli, who had been
arrested on charges of corruption, intimidation and suspicion of connection with the murder of
the husband of his girlfriend.
Ramaphosa eventually fired Advocates Jiba and Mwrebi in April 2019 following the
Mokgoro Inquiry that found neither of them “fit and proper” to hold their respective offices.
The decision to dismiss them was upheld by parliament’s Justice Committee in late November
2019, bringing to an end the public service careers of these senior prosecutors who had failed
to uphold their professional code and brought untold damage to the NPA.

Addressing the important role of the independence of the NPA in the context of South
Africa, the Mokgoro report notes:
In the face of South Africa’s painful history and its struggling inequality, it is the rule of law that holds
every individual to the same standard and, in so doing, recognises the inherent dignity within every
individual. Whether one wields power or is of the most vulnerable, the rule of law guarantees equal
treatment. Without it, the vision of a constitutional democracy is dead in the water. Appreciating that
the NPA plays a critical role in upholding the rule of law, it is crucial that it is seen to be free from all
external pressures which might threaten prosecutorial independence. (2019: 137)
Section 179 (4) of the constitution says that “National legislation must ensure that the pros-
ecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. In line with the
constitution, Section 32 (1) (a) of the NPA Act (32 of 1998) requires members of the prose-
cuting authority to carry out their duties without fear, favour or prejudice, and subject only
to the constitution and the law. The Constitutional Court has also stated that section 179(4)
of the constitution “requires there be national legislation which guarantees the independence
of the prosecuting authority”. The independence of the NPA and Hawks is therefore either
explicitly or implicitly protected by the constitution. Whilst these agencies form part of the
executive arm of government, the constitution (explicitly or by implication) upholds their right
to operate independently. Implicitly, the purpose of securing independence for these agencies
is to protect them from “undue influence” in order to uphold the principles of law and equality
before the law that are fundamental to the constitution (Corruption Watch and Institute for
Security Studies 2019: 19).
Operational independence from political interference is a key theme highlighted by two
ANC veterans and former NDPPs, Adv Bulelani Ngcuka and Adv Vusi Pikoli. Both regarded
as men of integrity who upheld the independence of their office at great personal cost, they
were invited to attend the NPA strategy meeting in May 2019. Ngcuka, who was once accused
by his detractors of being an Apartheid-era spy, noted how independence “is the most impor-
tant issue for the new NDPP and the NPA as a whole” (NPA 2019). For Pikoli, independence
is about “doing your job and doing it in the right way with integrity, irrespective of external
pressure” (Ngcuka 2019: 5). Pikoli was suspended by President Thabo Mbeki when he tried to
pursue charges of corruption against the former head of police, and former ANC youth league
president, Jackie Selebi, who was eventually convicted of corruption (for a full exposition of
his time in office, see Pikoli’s memoir written with Wiener: 2013).
The Mokgoro Inquiry also highlighted the Code of Conduct that prosecutors are required to
uphold to ensure that there is public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice process
and that the NPA maintains its legitimacy. The code holds individuals within the NPA to
a high standard – to uphold justice, human dignity and fundamental rights, prosecutors are
personally accountable for their cases, may not mislead the court or suppress evidence and
should assist the court in arriving at a just verdict – refraining from violating the decorum
of the court (2019: 137). Where officials are mired in controversy and consistently taken on
review for irrational decision making, and found wanting by the courts, it damages the public
confidence. “The NPA must instil a strong sense of constitutional values and belief in the rule
of law. When these values are internalised and fought for vociferously from within the NPA,
only then will the institution enjoy the confidence of the citizenry and become the prosecuting
authority that South Africans deserve” (2019: 138).

The instability, compliance and questionable integrity of several of the NDPPs (prior to
Batohi’s appointment) has undoubtedly aided the dysfunctionality of this critical criminal
justice agency and served former president Zuma and others to evade corruption charges. With
the public enquiry and resultant dismissal of senior NPA advocates under the Zuma adminis-
tration, and a new leadership team at the helm, the stage is potentially set to revitalise the NPA
to use, and not abuse, its powers to bring criminals to book.
NEW LEADERSHIP AND CHALLENGES FOR THE NPA
Whilst he had a presidential prerogative to act unilaterally in appointing the NDPP without
consultation – as had been done during the Zuma years where there had been six acting NDPPs
of varying integrity – President Ramaphosa followed a different, consultative process. On 10
October 2018 he announced he would appoint a panel to advise him on the appointment of the
new NDPP. This was unprecedented.
Following public interviews with shortlisted candidates, the panel recommended five candi-
dates for the president’s consideration. He appointed advocate Shamila Batohi who, before she
returned to South Africa, had been a senior legal advisor to the prosecutor at the International
Criminal Court in the Hague and had previously served as director of public prosecutions for
KwaZulu-Natal from 2000 to 2009. She described her new position as walking into a “shark’s
cage”.
In looking at how to avoid manipulation of the criminal justice system both the appointment
and dismissal processes of its leadership are key (Corruption Watch and Institute for Security
Studies 2019; PARI 2019; Dullah Omar Institute 2019; Helen Suzman Foundation 2019).
Institutionalising mechanisms, such as advisory panels that include professional peers, to
ensure that the most suitable candidates are appointed to leadership roles in the criminal justice
and other key government agencies, is recommended. President Ramaphosa set in motion
a progressive precedent in this regard through the panel appointment process he implemented
for the NPA and SARS appointments (Jonas 2019: 179).
On her first day in office Advocate Batohi initiated a comprehensive and confidential staff
survey of the 4,000 employees of the NPA. The results of the survey give her a further mandate
to take strong leadership action. Low staff morale is evident with many vacancies creating
increasing pressure and workload on remaining staff. Budgetary resources are stretched and
many competent prosecutors have left. A key gripe is the lack of career pathing and opportu-
nities for training and staff development. Whereas the NPA had in the past been an employer
of choice, this was no longer the case.
Beyond the internal organisational challenges, there is growing external pressure for action
by the NPA against alleged perpetrators of state capture. Daily televised revelations of the
scale of corruption at the Zondo Commission are creating further impatience at the perceived
impotence of the NPA to act “without fear or favour”.
Section 7 of the NPA Act (32 of 1998) provides for the president, by proclamation, to
establish investigating directorates in the office of the national director. A new Investigative
Directorate on Corruption, led by Advocate Hermione Cronje, a career prosecutor with over 20
years of experience, has been established and is poised to take up complex cases for criminal
prosecution from the Zondo Commission. “Case selection criteria will ensure we address those

who planned, orchestrated or instigated the corruption of the system and those who ultimately
derived the benefit of the looting of state coffers, not only the foot soldiers” (NPA 2019).
Finance minister Tito Mboweni recently announced an additional R1.3 billion in support for
the NPA which will allow many of the acting positions to be formalised and support the recent
secondment to the new Investigative Directorate of senior advocates with the requisite skills
in dealing with complex commercial crime cases. Until high-profile politicians and public
servants who have corrupted are prosecuted and jailed, there will be no faith in either the
civil service or criminal justice system and this cleaning up can only occur if a powerful and
institutionally independent prosecution service is given the resources to prosecute all instances
from the very highest to the lowest (Jonas 2019: 175).
Civil society has promised its support, advocating for an ethical and efficient constitutional
democracy, calling for those implicated in state capture to be accountable and dedicating
themselves to rebuilding the state and institutions decimated by years of capture and poor
governance. A recent conference, “Civil Society – Defeating State Capture and Rebuilding the
State” – committed delegates to helping “strengthen, resource and guarantee the independence
of the criminal justice system and put in place checks and balances to remove opportunities
for corruption”. The conference outcomes also called for the Zondo Commission to issue an
interim report and on the NPA to prosecute cases where sufficient evidence exists.
IN CONCLUSION
In his frank and thoughtful book, After Dawn, fired deputy finance minister and state capture
whistle-blower Mcebisi Jonas notes how 25 years into South Africa’s democracy it is time to
revisit merit as key for public servant appointees. Whereas the decision to appoint unqualified
people to positions of responsibility in the civil service was initially justified as a mechanism
to make the service – which was dominated by whites – more representative of the general
population, this imperative no longer exists. “Twenty five years into democracy it is possible
to have a representative civil service that is peopled by qualified, skilled and experienced
people who can raise productivity and bring professionalism to bear. A further result of our
politicised civil service is that it fell victim to manipulation by patronage networks… Some
say as much as a third of public procurement has been siphoned off by the corrupt” (Jonas
2019: 175).
The solution is clear: depoliticise appointments and base them on merit so that top skills
can be attracted. Senior ANC leader and former interim president Kgalema Mothlanthe has
also advocated for a meritocratic public service where appointments are based on a rigorous
recruitment, interviewing and selection process underlined by ethics, morality and state
building, wholly contrary to the existing practice where appointments are made by political
grandees and are based more on extending political influence than getting the job done (Jonas
2019: 175).
With the precedent set of a transparent appointment process, visible, competent and ethical
leadership at the top of the NPA, it seems as if the tide could be turning. Articulating explicit
professional values and a commitment to a truly independent prosecutorial service is led by
Adv Batohi: “Through its ethical conduct, empathy to clients and exemplary legal adeptness,
we will convey our professionalism. There is a need for the highest standard of integrity, and
those whose conduct falls short will not be tolerated in the NPA” (NPA 2019).

During his tenure President Jacob Zuma intentionally crippled agencies with the power to
investigate and prosecute the crime of corruption. Primarily this was enabled by his grip on
the ANC which seemed to lose its moral compass under his leadership, and his presidential
prerogative to make key appointments to the leadership of criminal justice agencies, such as
the NPA. Individuals with a questionable commitment to prosecutorial independence and
upholding the constitution were put in place. Thankfully those days are over. President Zuma
will himself hope to benefit from an independent prosecution service which can be trusted to
do its job without fear or favour, when he eventually has his day in court.
NOTES
1. I note that prosecution agencies, such as the NPA, are by their very nature different from main-
stream government departments, the traditional terrain of public administration; they have a higher
“independence” threshold when it comes to operations.
2. Timeline of NDPP appointments: 1 April 2001–31 August 2004: Bulelani Ngcuka; August 2004–
January 2005: Silas Ramaite (acting); 1 February 2005–17 February 2009: Vusi Pikoli (suspended
and then removed/retired); 1 May 2009–31 October 2009: Mokotedi Mpshe (acting); 1 December
2009–1 October 2013: Menzi Simelane (December 2011 suspended after the Supreme Court of
Appeal, 8 May 2012 removed pursuant to CC judgment – not “fit and proper” for the office); 20
December 2011–30 September 2013: Nomgcobo Jiba (acting) including her maternity leave, early
January–17 May 2013; 1 October 2013–31 May 2015: Mxolisi Nxasana “reached a settlement”
after the president cancelled inquiry into whether he was “fit and proper”; 18 June 2015–13 August
2018: Shaun Abrahams (found to be irregularly appointed); 1 August 2018–31 January 2019: Silas
Ramaite (acting); 1 February 2019–present: Shamila Batoyi.
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22. Corruption, ethics and integrity in public
administration in Ukraine
Thomas H. Speedy Rice, Alora Jiang and Artem Shaipov
INTRODUCTION
Ukraine has a long history of public corruption. After independence from the Soviet Union in
1991, Ukraine began a process of privatization of critical state assets and major industries. In
this process, well-connected elites leveraged their considerable resources and political influence
in order to “capture” weak state institutions for their own private gain.1 These well-connected
elites, often referred to as “oligarchs,” secured extensive influence over Ukraine’s government
and economic system during these chaotic early years of the post-Soviet era.2 Many politi-
cians, judges, prosecutors, and high-ranking ministers obtained, and hold, power through their
relationships with corrupt oligarchs, or are the oligarchs themselves.3 This state of affairs has
enabled the oligarchs and other prominent officials to leverage public offices to facilitate illicit
business practices and financial gains with impunity, entrench their monopolistic control of
Ukraine’s wealth, and encourage a culture of corruption amongst government officials.4 As
a result, Ukraine struggles to devise and enforce effective anti-corruption statutes to this day.
These corrupt practices grew largely unabated until the 2004 Ukraine presidential election
was undermined by massive electoral fraud in favor of the Russian-leaning candidate, Viktor
Yanukovych. The Western-leaning candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, was also poisoned.5, 6
Ukrainians expressed their indignation towards the flagrant corruption through extensive
protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution (named after the primary color asso-
ciated with Yushchenko’s campaign).7 The protests resulted in a more open and fair run-off
election, which was won by Yushchenko. However, Ukraine’s system of governance was still
characterized by oligarchic monopoly and rampant corruption in public institutions.8
According to Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption Barometer, Ukraine
was among the top 25 countries most affected by bribery.9 The next year, the Ukrainian
Ministry of Interior Affairs determined that the total monetary value of bribe taking among
public servants tripled in 2008 when compared to 2007.10 Even though the Orange Revolution
and the resulting run-off election denied Viktor Yanukovych victory in 2004, he won the 2010
presidential election.11 During Yanukovych’s regime (2010–14), Ukraine once again experi-
enced increasing centralization of power and wealth among the oligarchs, at the expense of
infringement upon the law and the constitution of Ukraine.12
The increase in corruption and inequality sparked a second monumental protest movement
among the Ukrainian people in 2014, known as the Euromaidan Revolution.13 Enduring sup-
pression, police violence, and bloodshed, the Ukrainian protesters succeeded in ousting the
Yanukovych administration.14 After the Euromaidan Revolution, the Ukrainian government,
304
Thomas H. Speedy Rice, Alora Jiang and Artem Shaipov - 9781789900910
Corruption, ethics and integrity in Ukraine 305
with the help of international organizations and civil societies, began a series of reforms to
combat its entrenched public corruption issue.15 Some highlights of these reforms included:
●● the introduction of a centralized electronic procurement and auction platform;
●● the requirement of electronic asset declarations for public officials;
●● the development of an integrated electronic human resources hub to track, store, and
analyze recruitment and management information; and
●● the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, High Anti-Corruption Court,
and many more.16, 17, 18, 19
The success of these reforms has varied due to the obstructions of the entrenched interests.20
While there are many remaining issues, and a long way ahead in Ukraine’s long-term battle
against corruption, the post-Euromaidan reforms are meaningful and encouraging steps in the
right direction.
This chapter aims to provide an overview of some of the major sectors of public corruption
in Ukraine, describe significant incidents that illuminate the specific corruption issues faced by
each sector, and highlight the major responding reforms in each sector. Some of the common
problems include unequal access to profitable public bidding and auction opportunities, abuse
of state authorities for private protection, and a lack of transparency, which breeds additional
opportunities for corrupt behavior.21, 22 The World Bank’s definition of corruption: the abuse of
public office for private gain,23 covers when officials accept, solicit, or extort bribes and when
private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive
advantage and profit, as well as patronage, nepotism, the theft of state assets, and the diversion
of state revenues.24 All of which are found in Ukraine.
PROCUREMENT
Procurement contracts with the Ukrainian government have historically been beset by endemic
corruption, a lack of transparency, and ineffective enforcement mechanisms that fail to prevent
collusion among large, politically connected companies and their oligarchs.25 From military
acquisitions to pharmaceuticals contracts, widespread procurement corruption has led to
massive cost overruns, the disappearance of public funds, and the poor quality of received
goods and services.26, 27
There are three primary avenues of corruption in government procurement. First, “compet-
itors” in industry cartels collude and coordinate their bids to maximize the final price of the
contract, or alternatively, leverage their influence with government actors to ensure that com-
petitors are excluded from the bidding process.28, 29 Second, corrupt actors engage in regulatory
capture to illicitly promote their own bids, hinder government investigations and transparency
efforts, and/or manipulate the prices for contracted goods and services. Finally, corrupt actors
that lose bids regularly use judicial or regulatory mechanisms, as well as bribes, intimidation,
or both, to block or delay the final award of contracts.30 Taken together, these mechanisms
provided corrupt actors with many potential means to manipulate the procurement process.
Medical procurement in Ukraine is a good example. Medical procurement has been marked
by collusion and corrupt behavior concentrated in a small number of politically connected
firms.31 Major government procurement contracts were regularly awarded to a small number
of opaque, politically connected conglomerates, many owned by oligarchs with ties to

members of the Ukrainian parliament and bureaucracy.32 This select group of companies,
nicknamed “the pharmaceutical mafia” by the Kyiv Post, used a number of anti-competitive
practices to win national tenders, despite charging exorbitant prices for low-quality medical
supplies and pharmaceuticals.33 Prior to the procurement reforms introduced in the mid-2010s,
the Ukrainian government struggled to ensure that it paid reasonable prices for contracted
goods and services.
These practices depleted allocated government funding so quickly that there were drug
shortages for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and cancer medications.34 As an example, in 2009, after
an influenza epidemic, then-prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko signed a decree allocating 1
billion Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH), approximately 100 million United States dollars (USD),
to purchase vaccines and fight the epidemic.35 To acquire the vaccines, the government con-
tracted with Interfarm, one of Ukraine’s biggest medical suppliers.36 However, the project
quickly came under scrutiny due to claims that the prices of millions of doses of the influenza
vaccine were artificially inflated.37 Interfarm was accused of entering into a sham contract for
the purchase of these vaccines with an Oregon-based company, Olden Group.38 The two com-
panies allegedly submitted false invoices and customs declaration forms to sell vaccines to the
Ukrainian government for more than twice their original purchase price.39 In 2011, a federal
district court in Oregon entered a default judgment against the Olden Group for its involve-
ment in the fraudulent schemes with Interfarm, and ordered it to pay 60 million USD to the
Ukrainian government.40 Unfortunately, the primary victims of these schemes were Ukraine’s
sickest and most vulnerable citizens,41 who never obtained the treatments they needed and the
judgment was no value to them.
Another anti-competitive practice is where multiple bidding companies are owned by the
same person. These “staged bidding competitions” regularly resulted in procurement prices
150 to 300 percent higher than the same drug prices acquired by patients’ organizations or
non-profits.42 In 2014 Lumier Pharma and Pharmadis both competed for a contract to supply
anti-hepatitis drugs to the Ukrainian government. The contract was eventually won by Lumier
Pharma.43 However, both competing companies registered identical addresses and phone
numbers, and were both parts of Bahriy’s Group, a complex web of pharmaceutical companies
controlled by Petro Bahriy, the president of the Ukrainian Association of Medicine Producers
and a member of the Council of Entrepreneurs under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.44
When these companies were not awarded contracts, they frequently filed complaints in the
Antimonopoly Committee to contest the award of contracts to the tender winners.45, 46 As
a result of these corrupt, anti-competitive practices, Bahriy’s Group received more than 90
percent of the government funding allocated for hepatitis drugs in 2014, and almost 200
pharmaceutical lot contracts were divided amongst these two companies in 2013 and 2014.47
In March 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a groundbreaking reform bill to tackle the
deep-seated corruption in medical procurement, despite the opposition of domestic drug com-
panies. The bill transitioned procurement responsibility for 12 state programs for the seriously
ill from domestic pharmaceutical companies to international organizations such as UNICEF,
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Crown Agents.48 Finding this
method effective in curbing corruption, lowering cost, and increasing the variety of available
medications, the Ministry of Health transferred all procurement programs to international
organizations in 2016.49,50 In January 2019, 90 percent of tumor medicines for adults were pro-
cured at a lower price than before the transition, with some cancer medication prices reduced

by 80 to 95 percent.51 Beyond Ukraine’s borders, similar procurement practices were adopted

by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.52
Many of the same corrupt practices observed in the medical sector are prevalent in the
defense procurement sector. The Kyiv Post reported that Ukraine’s top defense industry man-
agers siphoned almost 100 million UAH (3.8 million USD) in funds allocated to buy spare
parts for armored vehicles between 2014 and 2015.53 In this scheme, elements of Ukraine’s
state-owned defense conglomerate, UkrOboronProm, contracted with a web of shell compa-
nies and intermediaries to obtain the spare parts, several of which had no production capacity,
defense procurement expertise, or even a physical address.54 Partially due to this opaque struc-
ture, poor bid selection, and inadequate oversight of the project, Kyiv Armored Plant, which
had contracted for the spare parts, was never supplied with components under the contract.55
To increase the transparency of Ukraine’s public procurement process and increase competi-
tion in government tenders, Ukraine passed a law in December 2015 that began mandating that
procurement take place through a new electronic procurement platform named “ProZorro.”56
This system sought to reduce the likelihood of collusion, and other anti-competitive practices,
by providing a transparent, centralized mechanism for requesting proposals, submitting bids,
conducting auctions, and providing detailed information about competitors for public con-
tracts.57 In August 2016, electronic procurement through ProZorro became mandatory, and
all procurers of public purchases transitioned to using it exclusively.58 Notably, Ukraine’s
ProZorro electronic public procurement system won the 2016 Open Government Award at the
Open Government Partnership Summit in Paris.59
This transition to ProZorro greatly improved transparency, accessibility, and competitive-
ness in the public procurement process. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
estimates that the Ukrainian government saved more than 86 billion UAH between 2016 and
2019 by using the ProZorro system, while also obtaining tangible benefits in the quality of
supplied goods and services.60 By purchasing food products through the ProZorro system, the
Ministry of Defense was able to reduce its food expenditure by 34 percent.61 During the elec-
tronic auction for this contract, the competition drove the price down from 3.24 million UAH
to 2.15 million UAH, and a company that had never before participated in the government
procurement process became the winner.62 As a result of this auction, the Ministry of Defense
obtained access to comprehensive cost calculations for the first time, and the number of differ-
ent food products in soldiers’ rations increased from 32 to 248.63
Ukraine has made remarkable progress in reforming public procurement and reducing the
incidence of procurement-related corruption, even receiving praise from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development in 2016.64 However, particularly lucrative sectors
such as military procurement still struggle with entrenched corruption. In early 2019, close
associates of Oleh Hladkovskyi, a senior defense official and a former business partner of
then-president Poroshenko, were allegedly involved in laundering 9.2 million USD from
defense procurement contracts.65 In this scheme, Hladkovskyi’s son is claimed to have coerced
and bribed directors of a state-owned enterprise to buy smuggled Russian military components
at wildly inflated prices and deliberately misidentified the parts during importation to conceal
their origin, value, and purpose.66, 67, 68 While the relevant contract was reported on ProZorro,
the associated records were sparse and misleading, in one instance stating that 14.38 million
UAH was to be paid for “special equipment.”69 While the affair led to criminal investigations
and comprehensive international audits of the Ukrainian defense industry and its officials, it

also highlights the enduring challenge that corruption and undue political influence presents
for Ukraine and the ProZorro system.70
DELIVERY OF SERVICES
Since Ukraine’s independence, public service delivery has suffered from the undue influence
of senior government officials and exploitation to illicitly enrich public servants as well
as their allies outside government. These corrupt practices have reduced the quality of the
public services provided. Ukraine’s judiciary and law enforcement consistently rank among
Ukraine’s least trusted government agencies.71 The judicial branch lacked independence from
political pressure as a result of both formal institutional arrangements and informal applica-
tions of power, enabling powerful actors to escape prosecution.72 The Ukrainian police forces
were, and in many respects still are, often unaccountable, secretive entities that facilitate
public and civil society harassment and repression.73
Due to a legacy of undue political influence, which has served to protect prominent indi-
viduals and business interests, the judicial branch has historically been perceived to favor
Ukrainian elites. In particular, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine has often
functioned as a vessel for protecting the political and economic interests of Ukrainian pres-
idents and their associates.74 The same holds true for other judicial offices, as oligarchs and
other elites have leveraged their political influence to install amenable prosecutors, judges,
and investigators into prominent positions.75 The prevalence of this problem is reflected in the
public’s perception of corruption in Ukraine. According to Transparency International’s 2007
Global Corruption Barometer, the judiciary was deemed Ukraine’s most corrupt institution.76
In the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, Ukraine’s judiciary system was deemed the most
corrupt in the world.77
Ukraine struggled to cleanse its judiciary of ubiquitous bribe taking and punish the abuse
of legal authority prior to post-Euromaidan reforms. In 2008, a former Lviv appellate court
judge was caught accepting a 100,000 USD bribe.78 A subsequent search of the judge’s house
revealed over 1 million USD in cash, which he called “housewarming gifts.”79 In addition to
accepting bribes from government officials, judges also actively solicited bribes from ordinary
citizens. In 2011, a district court judge in Kyiv was arrested after taking a 1,000 USD bribe,
which he allegedly demanded from a Kyiv resident in exchange for not imposing a prison sen-
tence.80 Judicial authority was also wielded as a tool for suppression. During the Euromaidan
Revolution, one of then president Yanukovych’s loyalists, Mykola Chaus, issued numerous
rulings against the protesters. On appeal, these rulings were found unlawful by the disciplinary
section of the High Council of Justice.81 Nevertheless, the High Council of Justice refused to
dismiss the judge.82
Ukraine’s police force has traditionally been well integrated into the power structure of the
executive branch, making it unaccountable to the public.83 Ukraine’s Ombudsperson’s Office
stated that they received approximately 5,000 complaints of torture and other ill-treatment by
law enforcement in 2010.84 Almost all of these complaints were ignored or dismissed without
further investigation.85 A 2011 Amnesty International report revealed widespread usage of
torture, extortion, and arbitrary detention by the police, which was rarely punished due to
flawed investigations, harassment or the intimidation of complainants, and an unwillingness
to prosecute such crimes.86

The Ukrainian police force was also frequently employed as a weapon to punish disobe-
dient journalists and silence dissent. In June 2000, a journalist was kidnapped and beaten
by three policemen, whom were led by Ukraine’s then-police general, Oleksiy Pukach.87
In September 2000, Pukach and his police officers kidnapped and murdered a prominent
critic of then-president Kuchma after the critic exposed high-level corruption.88, 89 During
Pukach’s 2009 trial, he testified that Kuchma and former interior minister, Yuriy Kravchenko,
had ordered him to kill the critic.90 Despite Pukach’s testimony, which was corroborated
by wiretap recordings of Kuchma, no more senior Ukrainian officials were charged with
a crime.91, 92 In 2001, a group of senior police officers murdered another high-profile journalist
in Donetsk Oblast and then falsified evidence to frame a local homeless man for the murder,
who was later poisoned after being found not guilty by the court.93 Investigations revealed that
a local crime boss directed the policemen’s actions because the journalist had helped expose
a conspiracy between the crime gang and the local police.94 These rampant collusions among
police officials, politicians, and criminal organizations targeting journalists impeded the inde-
pendence of Ukraine’s media and increased the atmosphere of impunity for corrupt conduct.
In addition to targeting journalists, Ukrainian law enforcement routinely harassed citizens
and vulnerable populations. A common scheme would involve arresting people using false evi-
dence, followed by a demand for a bribe as a condition for release. In 2010, hundreds of shop
owners and workers at Kyiv’s largest street market, many of whom were recent immigrants,
were repeatedly targeted, forcibly detained, accused of minor violations, and compelled to pay
a bribe before release.95 In some incidences, policemen would use, or threaten to use, physical
violence and demand bribes against innocent citizens, and then claim that they were acting in
self-defense following any accusations of misconduct.96
After the Euromaidan Revolution, Ukraine worked to establish and strengthen impartial law
enforcement institutions. In October, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament passed new legislation
to establish the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), which is a specialized
law enforcement body charged with investigating and solving corruption-related offenses
committed by senior officials of the Ukrainian government.97, 98 NABU was designed to be
insulated from domestic political interference.99 According to the statute, NABU receives
funding directly from Ukraine’s state budget. Most appointments are required to go through
open competitions and be made in accordance with transparent results.100 Moreover, multiple
independent government agencies are involved in supervising NABU’s conduct, aiming to
prevent abuses of power.101 NABU personnel also receive training and supervision from the
US Federal Bureau of Investigation, adding another layer of external oversight to ensure
honest and independent investigations.102, 103
Partially due to these built-in safeguards to shield NABU from political influence, NABU
was able to investigate and prosecute some prominent officials for corruption. In August 2016,
NABU obtained convincing evidence against an allegedly corrupt district court judge.104, 105, 106
The NABU case alleges that the judge had regularly received court cases crucial to high-profile
political elites, inconsistent with the random case assignment system.107, 108 The judge consist-
ently ruled in favor of elites, such as Yanukovych’s and Poroshenko’s allies, and issued arrest
warrants against their opponents.109, 110 However, because NABU was legally required to wait
for parliament’s approval before being able to arrest any judges, this judge was able to flee to
Moldova in 2017.111 Since then, NABU had been working with the Moldovan government on
extradition for prosecution, but the case was still not resolved as of October 2019.112

NABU was set up to prevent domestic interference in its activities, however, its ability to
jail officials for corrupt behavior meant that many politicians and officials were incentivized
to rescind or restrict this “dangerous” power. Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO)
has clashed with NABU and obstructed NABU’s investigations on multiple occasions.113 In
November 2018, the PGO, along with the Security Service of Ukraine, disrupted NABU’s
corruption investigation on the State Migration Service by publishing the personal information
of NABU’s undercover agents.114 After having their cover blown, the agents were arrested for
“provoking an official to take bribes.”115 Moreover, members of the Ukrainian parliament have
also attempted to restrict NABU’s independence by submitting a bill that would enable the
parliament to fire the head of NABU without an audit of his performance.116 Fortunately, this
bill was eventually removed from the legislative agenda after Western criticisms.117
Ukraine’s effort to reform its police force has struggled, in spite of several promising devel-
opments early in the reform process. In 2015, following a model that had proven effective
in Georgia, Ukraine fired approximately 17,000 police officers and replaced them with new,
Western-trained patrol police.118 This community-oriented police force undertook a 10.5 week
training funded and guided by the US.119, 120 They were then equipped with uniforms, vehicles,
and other equipment funded by the United Kingdom, the US, and Japan. This reform also
raised the starting salaries of patrol police officers from 2,000 UAH (95 USD) a month to
8,000 UAH (380 USD).121
In the short term, this effort improved the image of the national police force, which had
been struggling to regain and maintain public trust. Within one year, the 23 cities across the
country that implemented this police reform had seen dramatic improvements in public sat-
isfaction with police activities.122 However, this reform did not install long-term measures to
curb political manipulation.123 The interior minister, Arsen Avakov, who orchestrated the plan
for the national police reform, centralized the power to control the police in his own hands.124
With this solidified power, Avakov appropriated Ukraine’s police force to promote the polit-
ical interests of his party, the People’s Front, and employed police officers to prevent family
members from being investigated.125
To more effectively litigate corruption-related cases in courts and close a substantial gap
in Ukraine’s anti-corruption apparatus, Ukraine launched the High Anti-Corruption Court
(HACC) in 2019, populated by 38 new judges charged with deciding criminal cases related to
corruption.126 However, the HACC faces many challenges, such as case overload and resource
constraints.127 Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, won the 2019 presidential elec-
tion on the promise of stamping out Ukraine’s entrenched corruption, but the HACC still has
not received adequate funding or staff.
OUTSOURCING OF STATE FUNCTIONS
Since its independence, Ukraine has undertaken multiple rounds of outsourcing and pri-
vatization to divest itself of state ownership or direct control of state-managed functions.
Unfortunately these processes have been misused by politicians to reward their supporters.128
In effect, the privatization process that was intended to enlarge Ukraine’s private sector and
improve competitiveness in the market has regularly functioned to increase market concentra-
tion in favor of politically connected businesses, especially in the most profitable industries.129
Selective privatization was also used as a tool to secure support from prominent oligarchs

ahead of elections, resulting in state assets being transferred to already dominant companies
and an increase in the conglomerates’ monopolistic powers.130
Many lucrative state-owned assets were sold to political insiders at a fraction of their
true value.131 Former president Leonid Kuchma’s son-in-law, Victor Pinchuk, purchased
his multi-billion dollar assets at far less than their fair market price during Ukraine’s early
privatization process.132 In 2004, Pinchuk began a partnership with Rinat Akhmetov, who
maintained deep political and economic links to a significant number of parliament members
as one of Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarchs, and was himself a member of parliament from 2001
to 2006.133, 134, 135 Through a consortium jointly controlled by Pinchuk and Akhmetov, they
acquired Ukraine’s largest steel producer, Kryvorizhstal, for the equivalent of 800 million
USD, despite much higher bids made by foreign companies, including Mittal Steel, one of the
world’s largest steel producers.136, 137 The deal was invalidated in 2007 because it was widely
criticized both domestically and abroad as an example of corruption and mismanagement of
state property.138
After securing major government assets in privatization auctions, well-connected oligarchs
would frequently use the resulting profits and political influence to secure additional privat-
ized assets, further increasing their already considerable influence in a vicious cycle. In 2005,
Metinvest and Privat, two companies owned by Akhmetov and another prominent oligarch,
Igor Kolomoisky, acquired iron ore production facilities and other multi-billion dollar strategic
assets at fire-sale prices in the closing months of Kuchma’s tenure.139 Ironically, these heavily
criticized auctions were approved by the Anti-Monopoly Committee, which was severely
underequipped with staff and resources.140 Similarly, after Akhmetov provided Yanukovych’s
2010 presidential campaign with substantial financial backing, Akhmetov quickly won five
major government privatization auctions.141 These privatized enterprises include some of
Ukraine’s biggest thermal and power generators and distributors, boosting Akhmetov’s wealth
by 3 billion USD in six months.142, 143
In recent years, Ukraine endeavored to address these issues by introducing pro-competition
and transparency reforms into its privatization process. In January 2018, the Ukrainian parlia-
ment passed a law that simplified existing categories of state-owned enterprises to only “small
objects,” which includes assets worth less than 250 million UAH (around 1 million USD), and
“large objects,” which include everything else.144, 145 The law was aimed at making the privati-
zation of over 3,000 mostly loss-making state companies more expedient and transparent.146, 147
This law represents a step in the right direction, but it is not a panacea for all issues that exist
in Ukraine’s privatization. While the Ukrainian government produces an annual budget plan
to sell assets and companies, it has not composed a comprehensive privatization strategy that
could help Ukraine maximize the value of privatization for its economy as a whole.148 Instead,
the government’s budget plans have been narrowly focused on raising money for the govern-
ment’s annual budget.149 Moving forward, a more holistic vision will be needed in Ukraine’s
upcoming fight to further deter corruption in state auctions and prevent oligarchic enterprises
from monopolizing the privatization process.
ISSUING OF PERMITS AND LICENSES
Permits and licenses are critical to starting and operating businesses. When the government
controls the entrance to a market with the issuance of permits and licenses, it is crucial to

ensure that officials wielding this power do not use this public function for private enrichment
or to serve the interests of oligarch businesses. Unfortunately, the issuing of permits and
licenses in Ukraine suffers from this type of corrupt abuse in various fields.
For instance, land allocation is often exploited by officials as a lucrative opportunity to elicit
bribes.150 In 2008, a township council member of Crimea elicited a 5.2 million USD bribe in
return for the government allowance to lease 17 hectares of land.151 In the same year, a village
council chair of Kyiv Oblast allegedly demanded 1.3 million USD for allocating land to select
businesses.152 The highly regulated nature of land use in Ukraine placed immense power in
the hands of the government, which made corrupt dealings on land a particularly attractive
money-making tool for officials.
In addition to land allocation, other licensing processes such as those for liquor sale, con-
struction, business registration, lottery, and gambling also suffer from opaque and corrupt
dealings. The application for construction permits in Ukraine is characterized by a lengthy
processing time and onerous procedures, making the business nearly impossible to enter
without connections and bribes.153 In 2008, a department director in charge of licensing the
sale of alcoholic drinks and tobacco goods at Ukraine’s State Tax Service was arrested for
taking 20,000 USD in return for issuing a liquor license to a private entrepreneur.154 While
gambling has been officially banned in Ukraine since 2009, gambling halls exist in almost
every city street.155
Ukraine’s oil and gas permits are probably most exposed to corruption, due to the industry’s
highly lucrative nature. Ukraine’s oil and natural resource extraction market has been shared
between politicians and oligarchs, and traditionally remained closed to domestic and interna-
tional competitors.156, 157 For instance, as of February 2018, Ukraine had issued 474 permits for
the use of oil and gas subsoil fields.158, 159 While over 70 percent of private companies own only
one permit each, almost all of the remaining shares of permits are concentrated in the hands
of 14 companies, all of which are controlled by the same person.160, 161 Additionally, Ukraine’s
State Service of Geology and Mineral Resources (State Geological Service) made the process
of obtaining new oil and gas licenses excessively difficult and lengthy, smothering any new
companies from competing in the market.162 While new players are blocked from entering the
market, established companies are allowed to hoard these scarce licenses without any plans to
undertake operation and production.163 These anti-competitive practices are not only corrupt,
but also detrimental to Ukraine’s energy security, which has already been under considerable
Russian interference.164
The regulation and issuance of oil and gas licenses are often abused by officials, ignoring
institutional and legislative requirements. In 2015, an oil depot of a company owned by the
former minister of energy and coal, Eduard Stavytsky, exploded with one of the biggest fires
in Ukraine’s recent history.165 Investigations after the fire revealed that the minister’s company
had been operating the oil depot without the necessary permits.166 A potential reason behind
this impunity may be that the State Geological Service has been vulnerable to political pres-
sure and resistant to reform. In 2017, the head of the State Geological Service, Ostap Semerak,
told the Kyiv Post that, despite his formal authority, he did not have the power to press the
agency to issue more licenses or open its geological data for public auction.167 Indeed, the State
Geological Service did not issue a single new license in 2017.168 It appears to Semerak that,
rather than the formal institutional structure, the only way to influence the State Geological
Service is political pressure.169

To alleviate these issues, in 2018, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that reduced the
number of approvals and permits required for oil and gas production.170, 171 This simplification
is undoubtedly encouraging progress. However, the effectiveness of its implementation is still
yet to be seen. There are also legislative actions in other fields, such as business registration,
that are intended to cut down the licensing requirements in recent years, but it is unclear how
much these statutes can free the licensing process from undue political influence.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Ukraine maintains a complicated web of government agencies that lack both well-maintained
records of financial flows and effective financial accountability mechanisms. The public sector
is often not able to keep track of how public funds are being spent and for what purposes,
which enables officials to expropriate government budget as slush funds.172 Additionally, the
government lacks the capacity to monitor the financial activities of private enterprises and
ensure that the appropriate taxes are paid, which results in large sums of tax evasion and falsi-
fication.173 Without access to accurate accounting information, identifiable paper trails, and the
technical ability to independently evaluate these sophisticated records, Ukrainian taxpayers’
money is more easily siphoned off into politicians’ and private companies’ accounts through
illicit activities.174, 175
Partially due to the lack of institutional capacity to track financial flows within the gov-
ernment, prominent officials are able to embezzle enormous amounts of public funds. Raisa
Bogatyrova, former minister of health before President Yanukovych was ousted in 2014,
embezzled 6.5 million UAH state funds through the medical procurement process.176 A cohort
of several ministers and a fuel and energy oligarch siphoned more than 1 billion UAH from
state enterprises and used a significant amount of the stolen funds to hire paid thugs known
as “titsuhki” to suppress the Euromaidan Revolution.177 Even officials of anti-corruption
institutes and the Tax Ministry were found to have taken money from the state. A former top
official of the National Agency for Preventing Corruption, Tetiana Shkrebko, and the tax and
revenue minister, Oleksandr Klymenko, were sentenced in 2016 for embezzling 3 billion UAH
using their offices.178 The leader of these corrupt ministers, then-president Yanukovych, was
estimated to have funneled around 70 billion USD out of Ukraine’s government budget in col-
lusion with his close circle of corrupt colleagues, leaving the state treasury virtually dry after
he fled out of Ukraine.179, 180, 181 Outside of Yanukovych’s 140 hectare, 40 billion USD estate,
very little of the stolen funds have ever been recovered.182
In addition to the challenges in regulating its own officials’ appropriation of state funds, the
Ukrainian government also faces difficulties in monitoring private companies’ financial flows,
which would enable it to more effectively combat tax evasion and the falsifications of income
documents. Serhiy Kurchenko, the fugitive oligarch who dominated the oil and fuel industry,
systematically evaded millions of dollars in taxes with the help of government officials.183, 184
One of Kurchenko’s schemes was to charge sales tax on all the gas he sold, but he never passed
on any of the taxes to the government.185 Another one of his illicit business practices included
creating fictitious export transactions using offshore companies, when in fact no gasoline
was exported, and no customs duties or taxes were paid.186 Sometimes even the registered
addresses of companies were false. Plagued by these tax evasion schemes, the government was
unable to effectively verify or regulate the private companies’ illicit conduct.

In 2015, Ukraine passed a series of legislative amendments to address these corruption

issues in financial management from a systematic level. This included amendments to the
Budget Code and Tax Code, which increased the internal communication and coordination
among ministries and strengthened data disclosure requirements as well as pricing control.187
The Ukrainian parliament also amended the Procurement Law which required the implemen-
tation of e-procurement, as discussed earlier in this chapter, and significantly improved the
procedural requirements of competitive bidding.188 The European Union (EU) has also been
working with Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance to improve its financial management capacity.
However, these reformative efforts stayed mainly on the strategic level, and additional
actions are needed to fully implement these legislative designs. The issue of uncollected tax
debts still existed after the reform initiatives. By August 2017, Ukrainian businesses owed 76
billion UAH (2 billion USD) to the state, which accounted for about 10 percent of Ukraine’s
2017 budget.189 According to a 2018 report of Spiegel Online, a large German news maga-
zine, Ukraine lost up to 750 million euros in taxes annually due to tax-evasion schemes.190
Moreover, senior officials are still being implicated in tax-evasion schemes after the legisla-
tive reforms.191 The head of the State Fiscal Service, which was tasked with fighting tax and
customs crimes, was criminally charged for unlawfully allowing a state-owned conglomerate
to delay tax payments, causing a loss of 2 billion UAH (74 million USD) tax revenue.192
A fugitive lawmaker who was involved in the case claimed that the delayed tax payments were
used to finance former president Poroshenko’s political campaigns.193 However, this charge
was unsuccessful due to a lack of hard evidence.194 Ironically, to support his presidential elec-
tion campaign in 2019, Poroshenko signed a new tax law aimed at helping Ukraine recover an
estimated 40–50 billion USD lost tax revenues per year.195 How effective this new legislation
is, and whether it will prove to be different and more effective than past legislative actions,
remains to be seen.
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Ukraine’s traditionally bloated, inefficient bureaucracy suffers from poorly equipped bureau-
crats, many of whom occupy positions that perform duplicative functions.196 While the legacy
of the chronically inefficient Soviet Union was certainly a contributor to this state of affairs,
this redundancy is also partially the result of corrupt hiring practices.197 The informal system of
political influence negatively affected the hiring, firing, promotion, and management of public
officials.198 Politicians and oligarchs ensured that candidates aligned with their factions were
promoted to prominent positions, whether with bribery or coercion, so that the strategically
placed loyalists could protect the cohort’s interests.199 Officials who were outside of the inner
circle or from opposing circles could be fired or investigated as a result of power struggles,
regardless of their competence.200 As politicians rose and fell out of favor, their associates and
loyalists’ positions waxed and waned with them.201 While the faces would change, the corrupt
scheme of political appointments did not change.
Public offices were handed out as rewards for obedience and loyalty without adequate
institutional shields against improper meddling. In 2002, Viktor Shokin made an unfathomable
leap in his career when he was promoted from a minor investigator to the deputy prosecutor
general of Ukraine.202 The prosecutor general who issued that hiring decision later revealed
that he only hired Shokin after serious lobbying by Petro Poroshenko, a minor oligarch and

then-deputy leader of a parliament faction.203 Following the Orange Revolution, Poroshenko

took control of Ukraine’s National Security Council, and Shokin was installed as the deputy
prosecutor general for the second time.204 A decade later in 2014, when Poroshenko emerged
from the Euromaidan Revolution as the president of Ukraine, Shokin was recruited as an
unemployed pensioner to the deputy prosecutor general position, for the third time, and was
then promoted to prosecutor general a year later.205 In 2015, David Sakvarelidze was appointed
to be the deputy prosecutor general of Ukraine.206 However, Sakvarelidze quickly infuriated
Shokin and was quickly fired after in 2016.207 Shokin also uses his official power to punish
this “uncooperative” deputy by open multiple criminal cases against Sakvarelidze, accusing
him of illegal conducts and embezzling funds provided by the US. All of these cases were later
determined to be unfounded.208, 209 The three inconceivable leaps of Shokin’s career serve as an
example of how promotions were exploited as tools to reward loyalty rather than professional
performance.
Determined to tackle the corruption issue in the government’s hiring and management of
officials, in June 2016, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers approved a Public Administration
Reform Strategy for 2016–20, as well as a plan of its implementation.210, 211 This reform
strategy viewed human resources (HR) reform as a critical component.212 The primary focus
of the reform included reducing the number of redundant government employees, increas-
ing officials’ wages to competitive labor market levels, and introducing modern personnel
management tools.213, 214 These reforms reduced the administrative burden on citizens and
improved transparency in government hiring by listing all available vacancies on the official
government recruitment website.215 However, the effectiveness of these advancements has
been limited somewhat by continued political interference in hiring results and the promotion
of officials already within the government.
To further reduce the room for corruption in the government’s HR management, Ukraine
launched an integrated electronic hub in 2019 called the Human Resources (and Payroll)
Management Information System (HRMIS), which automates a number of HR functions and
analytical tools.216, 217 With technical and financial support from the EU and World Bank,
HRMIS can track, store, and analyze government information on HR recruitment, case man-
agement, roster maintenance, etc.218 The Ukrainian government hoped to use HRMIS to replace
the traditional paper-based workflow of HR systems amongst all governmental entities, which
would significantly reduce the opaqueness in the government’s HR decision-making pro-
cesses, reducing the opportunity for corrupt practices in personnel management.219 However,
the extent of HRMIS’s effectiveness remains to be seen.
After President Volodymyr Zelensky was elected in 2019, he signed an amendment simpli-
fying the procedure for hiring and firing government officials.220 This move generated heated
debates and mixed reactions among both policymakers and the public.221 Supporters of the law
believed that it would reduce the procedural obstructions to firing corrupt and low-skilled gov-
ernment officials, whereas opponents of the bill argued that the statute rendered government
employees more vulnerable to political pressures as they could be fired with even less probable
cause.222 While the impact of this change requires more time to fully manifest, removing more
checks from the already vulnerable hiring and firing procedures is likely to serve the elites’
interests and be exploited as a tool to further centralize power rather than restrain power.

MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION
Ukraine’s government has traditionally been mysterious to most outsiders and independent
monitoring organizations, which allowed Ukraine’s ruling elites to thwart transparency
efforts and protect their business interests using state institutions.223 The lack of access
to decision-making processes and critical government documents contributed greatly to
Ukraine’s accountability and rule of law problems. In a 2015 report, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights described Ukraine as having an “accountability vacuum” in
its government, and a “widespread perception of impunity” among its officials.224, 225
After the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, the newly elected government introduced the
Open Data Law, which requires all government entities to make public information accessi-
ble in the form of open data for the wider public to view, share, and reuse for any purposes,
without restrictions.226 One of the primary focuses of this open data reform is the transition
to e-governance, which encompasses everything from creating electronic platforms for citi-
zens to engage in policy formulation, to improving access to public service delivery through
online programs.227 The State Agency for eGovernance of Ukraine was created especially
for the purpose of maintaining effective open data programs, under which national and local
governments can publish data publicly.228 The e-governance initiative utilized innovative data
technologies to increase public-sector accountability and reduce corruption.229
Continuing the string of innovative approaches that use technology to increase data trans-
parency in the public sectors, Ukraine launched an openly accessible electronic asset declara-
tion system in September 2016.230 Public officials are required to disclose their incomes and
assets via this public system, which was designed to reveal conflicts of interest, invite public
scrutiny of official earnings, and assist Ukraine’s newly created anti-corruption agencies in its
investigations.231 To ensure the integrity of the e-declaration system, its software development
was funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supervised by quality assurance
specialists and representatives from the World Bank and the UNDP.232 In October 2018,
the system’s managing organ, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, introduced
a verification software that automatically verifies uploaded electronic declarations.233 This ver-
ification software can significantly reduce the time needed to review e-declarations, flag any
inconsistencies or false information, and notify anti-corruption agencies when investigations
may be worthwhile.234
This suite of e-governance reforms has substantially improved Ukraine’s transparency
overall. The institutionalization of open data resulted in the disclosure of important gov-
ernment datasets, such as those on public spending, company registrations, court decisions,
and the beneficial owners of corporate entities.235 By 2018, Ukraine’s national Open Data
portal offered over 30,000 datasets.236 The 2016 United Nations e-Government Development
Index indicated that Ukraine improved 25 placements over its 2014 ranking, with significant
enhancement in e-government and e-participation.237 The Global Open Data Index, published
by the Open Knowledge Foundation, listed Ukraine among the top 50 most open nations,
ranking it at 31st in the world.238
The introduction of an e-declaration system also brought considerable improvements to the
transparency and integrity of public offices. In March 2017, and again in March 2018, about 1
million civil servants submitted their declarations, which has enabled anti-corruption agencies,
law enforcement bodies, journalists, civic groups, and ordinary citizens to hold public officials
accountable for their actions.239 A 2017 UNDP survey indicated that nearly three quarters of

Ukrainians have positive or somewhat positive opinions about the e-declaration system, and
two thirds of respondents expect the e-declaration to improve the situation in the fight against
corruption in Ukraine within the coming three to five years.240 A majority of participants of the
e-declaration system believe it will lead to more individuals being held accountable for corrup-
tion crimes.241 The adoption of the e-declaration system is an effective first step in increasing
the difficulties of corruption and improving public faith in public officials.
Nevertheless, despite this overwhelming public support, elements of Ukraine’s leadership
have gone out of their way to undermine the effective operation of the e-declaration system.242
One effort has attempted to undermine the independent technical audit of the e-declaration
system through discriminatory selection criteria that prevented reputable international audi-
tors from participating.243 The other is the attempt to exempt a substantial proportion of
state officials from the e-declaration requirement.244 Under the veil of protecting national
interests, some parliament members proposed legislative amendments that would exempt
nearly all law enforcement officials and the employees of numerous other state agencies
from the e-declaration requirement, rendering the e-declaration requirement toothless.245 The
amendments also proposed disclosing officials’ assets via paper forms to their leadership,
which would create the additional risk of supervisors blackmailing employees.246 While this
draft law was eventually removed from consideration, there is no guarantee that a similar
legislative effort would not be successful in the future.247 Finally, the implementing agency of
e-declaration, the National Agency for Preventing Corruption, is notably loyal to the ruling
elites and was involved in a number of scandals, as well as the politically motivated persecu-
tion of activists.248
LEGAL EDUCATION
Ukraine’s legal education system has been plagued by rampant corruption in law school
admissions.249, 250 After the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, Ukraine amended its legal frame-
works to ensure better quality assurance in higher education.251 However, Ukraine’s legal
education system still suffered from various corrupt admission practices, which has resulted in
a surfeit of law schools flooding the legal market with unqualified applicants. As a result, there
are nearly 300 licensed law schools in Ukraine, and more law school students graduate each
year than finance, economics, agro-engineering, and computer science graduates combined.252, 253
Only one in seven of these law school graduates were able to find employment in the legal
profession.254
Ukraine sought to address this lack of rigorous, standardized admissions criteria and
rampant corruption in law school admissions by creating a merit-based and transparent
admission process.255 Ukraine’s Ministry of Education and Science (MOE) and Ministry of
Justice, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) project coordinator collaborated to develop and
implement a Mandatory, External, Independent, Standardized Entrance Exam (MEISEE) for
master’s degree programs in law.256, 257, 258, 259 When MEISEE was first introduced in 2016
as an experiment, only nine law schools opted to replace their internal admission exams for
MEISEE.260, 261, 262 Each year after its introduction, MEISEE improved its rigor, comprehen-
siveness, and user-friendly design. By 2017, MEISEE was adopted nationwide and became
mandatory for admission to master’s degree programs in law.263

In addition to increasing the standards for law school admissions nationwide, MEISEE
provides a transparent admission standard for Ukraine’s legal education and provides law
students with a merit-based competition platform that is relatively resistant to corruption. The
minister of MOE, Liliia Hrynevych, praised MEISEE for enabling evidence-based policymak-
ing within the MOE and paving the way to create a corruption-free admission and graduation
exams for Ukraine’s higher education sector as a whole.264 It also limited the potential for
embezzlement and other illicit practices by transitioning from providing public funding to law
schools to directly providing tuition fee assistance to students based on public information of
academic performance.265 Due to the success of MEISEE, the MOE extended the foreign lan-
guage component of MEISEE to other graduate programs in 2018.266 Over 30,000 applicants
in 2018 and over 55,000 applicants in 2019 took the MEISEE as a part of their admission
requirements.267, 268
CONCLUSION
Ukraine has made extraordinary progress in the fight against public-sector corruption by
improving the transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of its government in many
different fields, ranging from public procurement reform to new asset declaration processes.
In many of the most successful instances, Ukraine blended modern technologies with sound
policy to detect and prevent corrupt activities. Furthermore, with the establishment of a network
of anti-corruption agencies that are designed to hold public officials accountable and promote
the rule of law, former regimes’ corrupt officials are gradually being investigated and punished
for their abuse of power. Despite many setbacks, challenges, and obstacles throughout its
post-Soviet history, Ukraine continued to make sustained, incremental progress on its goal of
creating an honest, accountable, and democratic government for future generations. While this
venture is full of uncertainties, and may find itself confronted with substantial resistance in the
future, the post-Euromaidan reforms give us hope that Ukraine is on the right path.
NOTES
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4. Ibid.
5. Hajda, L. A., & Yerofeyev, I. A. (2019, November 25). The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko
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7. Ibid.
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10. Interfax-Ukraine (2009, April 9). Interior Ministry registers Hr 43 million worth of bribes taken in
2009. Kyiv Post. Retrieved September 28, 2019, from www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine
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14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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20. Pifer, S. (2019, February 22). Ukraine: Looking forward, five years after the Maidan Revolution.
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24. Ibid.
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29. Anti-Corruption Action Center (2013). Who makes money on epidemics of HIV/AIDS and tuber-
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32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Interfax-Ukraine. Tymoshenko involved in fraudulent procurement of vaccines, says govern-
ment. Kyiv Post. Retrieved June 2, 2011, from www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/
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39. Ibid.
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41. Ibid.
42. Anti-Corruption Action Center (2013). Who makes money on epidemics of HIV/AIDS and tuber-
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43. Ibid.
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47. Ibid.
48. Quinn, A. (2015, November 5). Activists: Drug firms, officials colluding to harm patients.
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49. Anti-Corruption Action Center (2019, January 15). 90% of medicines from the Oncology for
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51. Anti-Corruption Action Center (2019, January 15). 90% of medicines from the Oncology for
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52. Ibid.
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54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.
56. 2015–2016 public procurement: Time for transformation, buy in a new way (2016, November
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57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Open Government Partnership (2019, January 3). Action plan on implementation of the Open
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61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
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86. Ibid.
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100. Ibid.
101. The newly established Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutors’ Office was responsible for super-
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111. Ibid.
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115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Interfax-Ukraine (2014, June 24). Interior Ministry: About 17,000 police personnel dismissed in
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120. Gessen, M., & Friedman, M. (2015, September 8). The cops who would save a country. Retrieved
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123. The main issues identified by the Council of Europe were the excessive influence on the police
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ability of police officers to take measures such as searches of property and vehicles, interrogation
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124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
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128. Andrusiv, V., & Ustenko, O. (2019, May 16). The future of Ukrainian oligarchs. Wilson Center,
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129. Marone, J. (2010, March 19). Monopolies thrive as toothless state bows to moguls. Retrieved
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130. Varfolomeyev, O. (2018, May 16). Ukraine to resume privatization according to new rules.
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131. Ibid.
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138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.

141. Salem, H. (2014, October 13). Ukraine’s oligarchs: A who’s who guide. Retrieved October 9, 2019,
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142. Ibid.
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149. Ibid.
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152. Ibid.
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164. Ibid.
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new-entrance-exam-levels-playing-field-for-ukrainian-graduate-law-students.
259. USAID. (2019, April). USAID efforts to support legal education reform in Ukraine. Retrieved
October 27, 2019, from https://newjustice.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/NJ_Brochure_Legal
_Education_Apr_2019_WEB_ENG.pdf.
260. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (2016, July 11). Introductory campaign 2016:
Launching a master’s law expertise using EIT technologies. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://
mon.gov.ua/ua/news/usi-novivni-novini-2016-07-11-vstupna-kampaniya-2016-zaprovadzhuetsya
-eksperiment-shhodo.
261. Ibid.
263. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (2017). Retrieved October 29, 2019, from https://
mon.gov.ua/ua/osvita/visha-osvita/vstupna-kampaniya-2017/vstup-na-drugij-magisterskij-riven
-vishoyi-osviti-za-specialnistyu-pravo-za-tehnologiyeyu-zno.
264. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (2017, November 3). Lilia Grynevych during
a meeting with regional education departments: By December 1, all schools must comply with
the Law on Education and publish information on the receipt and use of funds. Retrieved October
30, 2019, from https://mon.gov.ua/ua/news/usi-novivni-novini-2017-08-03-liliya-grinevich
-rozpochalosya-zno-obovyazkove-dlya-vstupu-na-magistraturu-z-prava.
265. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (2018, August 13). For the first time the state order in
the magistracy “law” and “international law” “followed the student” – recommendations for enroll-
ment received 2tys 48 applicants. Retrieved October 28, 2019, from https://mon.gov.ua/ua/news/
vpershe-derzhzamovlennya-v-magistraturu-prava-i-mizhnarodnogo-prava-jshlo-za-studentom
-rekomendaciyi-do-zarahuvannya-otrimali-2tis-48-vstupnikiv.
266. World Bank (n.d.). Review of the education sector in Ukraine: Moving toward effectiveness, equity
and efficiency (RESUME3). 122. Retrieved October 29, 2019, from http://documents.worldbank
.org/curated/en/884261568662566134/pdf/Review-of-the-Education-Sector-in-Ukraine-Moving
-toward-Effectiveness-Equity-and-Efficiency-RESUME3.pdf.
267. OSCE and Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (n.d.). Standardized testing in legal edu-
cation, MEISEE and a foreign language test. 5. Retrieved October 28, 2019, from https://mon.gov
.ua/storage/app/media/vishcha-osvita/190613_1652_StandartOsvVymir_A4.pdf.
268. Понад 55 тисяч майбутніх магістрів складали єдиний вступний іспит: Український центр
оцінювання якості освіти (n.d.). Retrieved October 29, 2019, from http://testportal.gov.ua/2019/
07/02/ponad-55-tysyach-osib-skladaly-yedynyj-vstupnyj-ispyt/.

23. Catharsis and reform: an Australian example
of building institutional integrity following
systemic corruption
Ken Smith
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of July 2019, 30 years after then lawyer and later distinguished judicial
officer Tony Fitzgerald delivered his report on corruption in the police force of the north-
ern Australian state of Queensland, a familiar ritual played out across the country’s news
pages and television. With regularity, the usual beats were struck. An academic analyses the
Fitzgerald ‘legacy’; a former state minister assesses the weaknesses of the current government
and finds it wanting; key figures in the broader public service are quoted; civil society leaders
chime in with dark warnings of any return ‘to the days before Fitzgerald’. What accounts for
the ongoing centrality and influence of this report, not only in Queensland, but nationally, 30
years after the fact?1
The Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police
Misconduct, universally referred to then and today as the Fitzgerald Inquiry, is perhaps the
most significant royal commission into the activities of a sovereign government in Australian
history. The immediate effect was dramatic enough: a premier deposed, multiple ministerial
resignations and by-elections with criminal activity exposed, the jailing of the then police
commissioner, Terry Lewis (who was also stripped of his knighthood), and serious charges
against other police and public servants. But the impact of the inquiry extended far beyond
this, fundamentally reshaping governance structures, while creating others which would dra-
matically transform the state. The inquiry itself is best seen as a cathartic moment in the history
of Queensland such that all accounts of the period since 1989 are seen as a sharp caesura.
A long-term Labor premier from 1998 to 2007, Peter Beattie would reflect that the inquiry was
‘like a line through history… there was a before and an after’ (quoted in Evans 2007, 249).
Two primary factors explain the impact of the inquiry. The first is the nature of the process.
Prompted by sensational local and national journalism, the inquiry established in 1987 was
ostensibly focussed on the question of corruption and illegal activity within the Queensland
police force. However, what was intended to be a short and limited investigation instead
spread across two years. Using police corruption as an entry point, the Fitzgerald Inquiry
would uncover systemic corruption throughout the major public institutions of the state as it
was then constructed. Not just the police force but the public service, the political class, and
a gerrymandered electoral system (built under both Labor and National Liberal governments)
were all implicated.
The second factor was the response of politicians. Following an election immediately
after the report was delivered, in late 1989, the victorious Labor government of Wayne Goss
committed to implementing the recommendations of the report. To some extent Labor allowed
331
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their policy strategy to be completely shaped by the report (they had not been in government
for over 30 years). Because of this strong commitment, the findings of the inquiry came to
seem, for some members of the opposition Liberal-National Coalition (LNP), as if they were
partisan and political, given that the immediate impact fell heavily on the LNP (then separate
parties in an often tenuous coalition until later merging in 2008) as the party in power when
this systemic corruption took root.
The delivery of the report marked just the first moment of catharsis. This was followed by
further purgative moments as movement towards institutional integrity and anti-corruption
reform was buffeted by the gales of political change, a problem exacerbated by a unicameral
parliament and a tradition of concentrated executive power in the hands of strong leaders, with
a consequent weakening of key aspects of Westminster traditions, especially the separation
of powers, and the independence of the public service. This chapter will examine the effects
of this dramatic period of review, change and backsliding. The focus is particularly on the
consequences for the bureaucratic apparatus of the Queensland government. I argue that
anti-corruption reform could be built resiliently only because a wholesale commitment to first
a review and then its implementation on the scale of the Fitzgerald Inquiry could force the
institutional change necessary to build long-term practices of integrity.
This chapter follows the chronology of events, beginning with a brief historical outline of
the state of Queensland on the eve of the Fitzgerald Inquiry and the factors that enabled sys-
temic corruption to flourish. Attention then turns to the inquiry itself, and the immediate after-
math of its delivery. This narrative introduces the Labor government of Premier Wayne Goss
(1989–96), exploring the major reforms undertaken to implement the recommendations of the
Fitzgerald Inquiry, along with the government’s own key initiatives in public administration.
After little more than six years in office the Goss government fell to a Rob Borbidge-led
minority coalition (LNP) government following a by-election in 1996. The policy preferences
of the new government damaged any attempt to establish the Fitzgerald Inquiry as a bipartisan
grounding for institutional integrity; Queensland’s unicameral parliament and concentration of
power in the executive often led politicians to take a narrow political victory as a mandate for
sweeping change. Finally, this chapter will explore Labor’s return to power in 1998 under the
leadership of Peter Beattie, and examine the ways in which this victory – as with Borbidge’s
win, a close-run thing – allowed the deepening of institutional integrity while entrenching the
Fitzgerald Inquiry’s status as both a totemic moment of political and cultural catharsis and an
area of ongoing partisan contestation.
Before proceeding, it is important to declare that the author had a strong personal involve-
ment in governance in this period, as a senior public servant appointed in 1990, during the first
term of the Goss government. I subsequently worked for the Queensland government for the
period 1990 to 1996 and then 1998 to 2017. The two year break in the period of the Borbidge
government followed termination of my contract, an experience I shared with most of the chief
executive service at the time.
THE DEEP NORTH IN DARK TIMES: JOH BJELKE-PETERSEN

AND THE LONG REIGN OF THE LNP
In 1963, five years before Joh Bjelke-Petersen would begin his near two decade reign as
Queensland’s premier, state parliament heard claims that senior police officers were drinking
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Catharsis and reform 333
after hours and condoning illegal prostitution and starting price bookmaking in the National
Hotel, a popular watering hole near the historic Customs House in Brisbane’s central business
district. Under media pressure, the government of the day gazetted a Royal Commission into
Allegations Made Against Members of the Police Force in Relation to the National Hotel,
known as the National Hotel Inquiry, led by then Supreme Court justice, and later High Court
chief justice, Sir Harry Gibbs. As Ransley argues, ‘The failure of the Gibbs Inquiry has been
described as monumental… not only because of what it did not uncover, but because it gave
tacit encouragement to the continuation and growth of police corruption in Queensland until
it reached the endemic proportions revealed by Fitzgerald’ (Ransley 2010, 27). That would
not be the last inquiry, nor the last failure. In the subsequent 25 years, a number of reports
and inquiries would be announced into aspects of police corruption, including the Southport
Betting Inquiry, the Lucas Inquiry, and the Sturgess Inquiry. All proved similarly ineffectual;
even when corruption was uncovered, recommendations were routinely ignored.
One reason for this lack of action was the electoral supremacy of what was then known as the
Country Party (later to be the National Party and then, in conjunction with its coalition partner,
the Liberal National Party), led since 1968 by Joh Bjelke-Petersen, a figure who would come
to function as a synecdoche for the regime he oversaw. The premier was, in the words of Orr
and Levy (2009), an ‘Agrarian strongman’. His power was enhanced by the unusual features
of Queensland’s electoral system. The state is one of the few Westminster-style parliaments
to abolish its upper house (strangely by resolution of the Upper House itself in 1922). Only
the Canadian provinces and New Zealand adopted a similar unicameral parliament, and then
under less contentious circumstances. Queensland remains alone amongst state and federal
governments in Australia in lacking a second chamber as a check on the executive. A premier
who could command an absolute majority thus had access to vast executive powers.
Furthermore, the Queensland parliament was marked by a malapportioned electoral system
that granted greater weight to the votes of those in remote and regional areas, at the expense
of voters in urban areas. Ironically, these twin pillars of support for Bjelke-Petersen’s rule –
a unicameral parliament with deeply uneven electoral divisions – were both introduced prior
to the Second World War by Labor governments, although the malapportionment was refined
further under subsequent rule by the Country Party.
With unchallenged power thus secured on a Country/National primary vote that never
passed 40 per cent, Bjelke-Petersen built a government marked by ‘an irrelevant and inef-
fective Parliament, unchecked conflicts of interest, poor administration, [and] a politicised
public sector’, containing few of the traditional agencies promoting institutional integrity and
resisting independent oversight of the executive or the bureaucracy (Lewis et al. 2010, 2).
This lack of oversight became a national issue in 1971, when the Bjelke-Petersen regime
used the Queensland police in a way that suggested a high degree of politicisation. A tour by
the South African rugby team was met elsewhere in Australia by vociferous anti-Apartheid
protests. These were
to be pre-empted in Queensland by the temporary declaration of a state of emergency, cancellation

of all police leave, and the large-scale mobilisation of police against protesters, resulting in violent
clashes. The electorate supported the government’s approach in subsequent by-elections, and the
government rewarded the police with an extra week’s leave, thus cementing a symbiotic relationship.
Further protests led to a government ban on street march protests, more violence, and an instruction
to then Police Commissioner Ray Whitrod not to investigate or take action against officers who had
assaulted protesters. (Ransley and Johnstone 2009, 534)
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This ‘symbiotic relationship’ would only deepen over the course of Bjelke-Petersen’s hold on
power, and led to a mutually reinforcing circle of malpractice, with the police and their political
masters both implicated. The Fitzgerald Inquiry neatly illustrated how this systemic malfea-
sance functioned: ‘There was a general policy of official encouragement for the Police which
has conveyed a message of approval for their attitudes and practices… Any criticism of the
Police Force was rejected, and the critic trenchantly attacked, often under Parliamentary priv-
ilege, sometimes with false information provided by the Police’ (Fitzgerald 1989, 201). This
corrupt intimacy with the police would ultimately lead to the downfall of Bjelke-Petersen, his
National Party government, and numerous senior police officers, including the commissioner.
The year of 1987 proved inauspicious for Queensland’s strongman. In January,
Bjelke-Petersen, encouraged by Queensland business interests close to his government,
travelled south to the New South Wales town of Wagga Wagga to launch his infamous ‘Joh
for PM’ campaign, promising to bring his brand of right-wing ‘no nonsense’ populism to
the nation (and revealing just how fundamentally he misunderstood his own appeal). Like
a figure in a Greek tragedy, this moment of hubris brought its own, perhaps inevitable, fall.
The premier missed the underlying change transforming the state he led: ‘A profound, if latent
mismatch had evolved between Bjelke-Petersen’s provocative and sometimes repressive
political rhetoric, sideshows and identification with a provincial zeitgeist on the one hand, and
the rapid development and urbanisation of South-East Queensland on the other. Ironically, his
government’s policies had been one stimulant to that development’ (Orr and Levy 2009, 655).
More urgently, Bjelke-Petersen could ignore efforts by local journalists and political activ-
ists to expose the systematic corruption operating throughout Queensland – but now his ‘Joh
for PM’ campaign gave critics a national audience. The immediate spark for the Fitzgerald
Inquiry came with a national outcry prompted by the reporting of Phil Dickie at Queensland’s
Courier Mail, and – especially – Chris Master’s The Moonlight State, a Four Corners report
screened by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. These stories revealed a multi-million
dollar illegal racket of industrial proportions – known as the ‘joke’ – overseen by senior police
officers, and involving ‘SP bookmaking, poker machines, massage parlours, underage prosti-
tution and drug trading’ (Evans 2007, 243).
Under immense public pressure, with Bjelke-Petersen out of the state undertaking his
Quixotic electoral campaign, the undoubtedly honest deputy premier Bill Gunn announced an
inquiry into the allegations of corruption, to be led by a former Federal Court judge, Gerald
(‘Tony’) Fitzgerald. According to Gunn, Bjelke-Petersen ‘later advised him to “knock it out
of the ring”‘ (quoted in Evans 2007, 244), but the deputy premier resisted. On this, at least,
Bjelke-Petersen showed some political nous. By the end of 1987 he would no longer be
premier.
THE FITZGERALD INQUIRY: ILLUMINATING THE SUNSHINE

STATE
Initial terms of reference for the Fitzgerald Inquiry were gazetted on 26 May 1987 and extended
in June. Public hearings commenced in July. What was initially intended to be a limited inves-
tigation into the recent claims about police misconduct and corruption quickly metamorphosed
into a wide-ranging inquiry that ‘found that police corruption was the product of corruption in
government – in the broadest sense of the word’ (Prenzler 2009, 577). Eventually the inquiry
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would run for just over two years, with 238 sitting days, 339 witnesses, and 2,304 exhibits
(Fitzgerald 1989, 40). As Ransley and Johnstone summarise:
Its terms of reference were expanded twice, extending a narrow investigation into a broad examina-
tion of the whole system of government. The Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 was amended four
times, significantly increasing the coercive powers of all Queensland inquiries… [T]he Fitzgerald
Inquiry employed its own investigative staff, numbering nearly 200 at its peak, and developed exten-
sive sources of information and intelligence managed in its own databases. (Ransley and Johnstone
2009, 536)
Consequences began before the report was handed down. Before the end of 1987, the assistant
police commissioner Graeme Parker had resigned. Even more dramatically, Bjelke-Petersen
was forced out in early December by his National Party colleagues, alarmed by the revelations
being aired through the inquiry. A more conciliatory and competent figure, Michael Ahern,
took over as premier, and committed the party to implement Fitzgerald’s findings ‘lock, stock
and barrel’ (quoted in Evans 2007, 249).
Because police corruption was tied to the style of governance and public administration that
flourished under Bjelke-Petersen, Fitzgerald was compelled into becoming the ‘pathologist’
of a diseased system (Finn, quoted in Lewis et al. 2010, 13). When the report was tabled in
parliament on 3 July 1989, it made over 100 recommendations including the establishment of
two major reform bodies, the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) and
the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), along with many specific recommendations to reform
the Queensland police force. The extensive publicity surrounding the inquiry, its methodical
approach, the grant of immunity for public testimony, and the immense professional and per-
sonal integrity of its commissioner ensured the final report operated as a largely uncontested
blueprint for change to the executive and bureaucratic arms of the Queensland government.
For many in the community, implementing the report became the crucial test for any future
government. As Sampford suggests, this kind of cathartic moment is crucial to anti-corruption
efforts: ‘In order to cause a mass exodus from an entrenched corruption system, a seminal
event or defining process is needed to alter expectations and incentives that are sufficient to
encourage significant numbers of individuals to desert the corruption system and assist the
integrity system in exposing and destroying it. Fitzgerald successfully pursued one’ (Sampford
2009, 568).
Meanwhile, politics rumbled on. Michael Ahern, seen as too conciliatory by his own side,
was overthrown just six weeks before the state election by his police minister, Russell Cooper.
The Labor Party, recovering from the disastrous election of 1986, had appointed in 1988
a young civil rights lawyer, Wayne Goss, as opposition leader. When parliament was dis-
solved on 2 November 1989, fealty or otherwise to the recommendations of Fitzgerald would
be a major feature of the campaign. With Goss’ victory a month later, an extended period of
Labor dominance began, with the LNP out of power for all but five out of 30 years. Here too,
the Fitzgerald Inquiry and its legacy would prove crucial.
‘A GOVERNMENT OF ROUTINES’: WAYNE GOSS’ REFORMS
In the dying days of National Party rule, with the support of Labor, parliament endorsed two
central planks of the Fitzgerald agenda. Legislation established the EARC and CJC to deal
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with, respectively, the distortions of Queensland’s electoral system and to ensure that some-
thing like a standing royal commission or commission of inquiry existed to prevent the return
of corruption. These will be discussed in more detail below. The National Party leader Cooper
saw this legislation as fulfilling the requirements of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and called a state
election. He had misunderstood the mood of the Queensland electorate. As Evans observes:
‘Goss charged that Cooper – a “closet Bjelke-Petersen” – was secretly planning a “sham” com-
mission to overhaul Fitzgerald’s recommendations. Wielding the Inquiry Report like a weapon
of retribution, Goss declared, “It is time for a real change. It is time to clean up the mess. It is
time for the people of this State to say, ‘We’ve had enough. You’re out’”’ (Evans 2007, 250).
On election day, 2 December 1989, Goss proved the better judge of Queensland sentiment.
Despite the rural bias in a still gerrymandered system, Labor achieved a swing of 8.97 per cent,
winning over 50 per cent of the primary vote and 24 new seats, giving his government 54 out
of 89 Legislative Assembly seats. Goss did particularly well in the fast-growing and urbanised
south-east and, in particular, the capital city, Brisbane, where Labor won all but five seats.
Though Goss inherited the centralised and powerful executive that had long characterised
Queensland, he needed to meet his promise to reform government from top to bottom and
make Queensland respectable again. Labor’s ambitious agenda for institutional reform could
now be implemented, but, paradoxically, Labor’s pre-election program, Making Government
Work, had promised to reduce the personal influence of the premiership, with its ‘erratic per-
sonal interest in people or issues, neglect of machinery issues and sometimes elliptic cabinet
procedures’ (Davis, citing Coaldrake, 1993, 34). Instead, Goss advocated ‘a recasting of the
architecture of government to match cabinet priorities and the introduction of modern person-
nel, budgeting and management systems’ (Davis 1993, 35). Goss understood that just as the
Fitzgerald Inquiry cast corruption as a whole-of-system malady, so administrative reform must
be whole-of-government. He described modernisation of the public service as a commitment
to, and extension of, the ‘Fitzgerald reform process’ (Ransley 1993, 107).
Upon taking office the Goss government pursued two interconnected reform agendas. The
first focussed on professionalising the executive and the bureaucracy and the legal architecture
they oversaw. The aim was to increase policy coordination and transparency while reducing
space for personal whim, nepotism, and partisan agendas to influence the processes of gov-
ernance. The second was a commitment to implement recommendations from the already
established EARC and CJC. Some EARC initiatives, such as electoral reform, were already
Labor policy but others were not; the ‘EARC’s brief went beyond the Labor party’s platform
and extended to examining the basic assumptions of executive government, and the power
relationship between government, parliament and the legal system’ (Ransley 1993, 107). This
section will turn now to these twin agendas, and explore how they provide a model for building
institutional integrity in the face of systematic corruption.
The Electoral and Administrative Review Committee
The EARC was fully constituted in 1990 under chairman Tom Sherman. Its task was remark-
ably broad, and would result in a number of crucial pieces of legislation throughout the Goss
government. As Solomon (a later EARC and Queensland integrity commissioner) summarises:
The Electoral and Administrative Review Act 1989 provided the EARC directly with the tasks it had
to undertake. Section 2.10 and the Schedule to the Act enabled it to inquire into the whole or part of
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the Legislative Assembly electoral system, the operation of the parliament, all or part of the public
administration of the states, all or part of the local authority electoral system and all or part of the local
authority administration. (Solomon 2009, 622)
Furthermore, the commission was to ‘to implement and supervise the electoral and adminis-
trative reforms recommended with the body of the Fitzgerald Report’ (Fitzgerald 1989, 348).
Fitzgerald had stressed the deleterious effects of unfair electoral boundaries on the Queensland
political system. As the commissioner observed, ‘A Government in our political system which
achieves office by means other than free and fair elections lacks legitimate political authority
over that system… The fairness of the electoral process in Queensland is widely questioned’
(Fitzgerald 1989, 127). Because of this, one of the crucial recommendations of Fitzgerald was
that: ‘a properly authorized and satisfactorily resourced Electoral and Administrative Review
Commission… which reports directly to a Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral and
Administrative Review be established by legislation to provide independent and comprehen-
sive review of administrative and electoral laws and processes’ (Fitzgerald 1989, 380).
From 1990, in line with its remit, the EARC issued a series of reports and recommendations
focussed on increasing the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the state. Two proved
particularly important. The first was electoral reform, the second enhancing the integrity of
state government through greater transparency, reporting, and accountability.
EARC reports shaped the Electoral Act 1992, which provided the fairest electoral system
for the state in 40 years, and aligned Queensland with the electoral systems of the rest of the
federation. In addition to significant electoral reform, the commission also provided advice
on the operation of the parliament, its links to public administration of the state and the local
government system. This work done, the EARC followed its own commitment to wind up,
and completed its programme in September 1993 under the leadership of David Solomon. His
involvement with the system was not over, however; Solomon would return as integrity com-
missioner in 2009, when I headed the Department of the Premier and Cabinet, and continued
to drive the many parliamentary and accountability reforms crucial in a unicameral system.
The Criminal Justice Commission
Of all the reforms that emerged directly from, or else were inspired by, the Fitzgerald Report,
perhaps the most durable has been the CJC. It has persisted since 1990, despite many name
changes and not inconsiderable political pressure (of which more below).
As a standing royal commission, the CJC and its later incarnations have proved a thorn in
the side of governments of all political persuasions. It has investigated alleged misconduct and
corrupt behaviour by elected and appointed officials within state and local government. Its
very existence has acted as a preventative deterrent, with operations uncovering instances of
corrupt conduct as well as breaches of public trust.
During the Goss years, a major investigation was carried out into parliamentary travel
entitlements of a senior minister, the late Terry Mackenroth. He would later serve in other
ministries (including as my minister in housing, local government and planning) and as deputy
premier in the Beattie government, but in 1991 police minister Mackenroth was forced to
resign following a CJC inquiry.
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Executive Coordination: Public Sector Management Commission
Though committed to implementing recommendations of the two bodies emerging out of the
Fitzgerald Inquiry, the incoming Goss government brought to office a broader agenda. The
Queensland public service had not been included in the terms of reference given to Fitzgerald,
but Goss and his advisers noted how processes of executive and public service coordination
had become unclear, corrupted, or otherwise damaged by the personalisation of politics in the
body of the premier. They judged that Westminster traditions of frank and fearless advice from
civil servants had been eroded. Indeed, Goss’ programme of changes to the public service was
entitled Return to Westminster (Hede 1993, 87). As Hede points out, the embodiment of these
reforms would be the Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) ‘touted as “a bold
Labor initiative” completing a “Fitzgerald trilogy”’ alongside the EARC and the CJC (Hede
1993, 87–8).
Like the two bodies recommended by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the PSMC, chaired by Peter
Coaldrake, later a long-term vice chancellor of Queensland University of Technology, would
be a body to reform the Queensland public service. The founding legislation specified three
primary functions –
●● review the purpose, structure, functions, and management of all Queensland public-sector
organisations;
●● establish and administer management and personnel standards and systems; and
●● administer and protect merit and equity principles (quoted in Hede 1993, 90).
The PSMC systematically reviewed the operations of the state public service, using a series
of ‘top-down’ capability reviews. Whilst professional in approach, the reviews and the PSMC
itself became a symbol of what many saw as an overly ‘clinical’ approach by the Goss govern-
ment to much needed reform in the public sector. This began with the very public removal of
most departmental heads who served under the LNP government and were clustered, briefly,
in a building that became known as ‘the gulag’. Led by Goss’ chief of staff and later Australian
prime minister Kevin Rudd, this action would reverberate as successive state administrations
employed the same approach. No longer secure in their roles, departmental heads could be
subject to arbitrary dismissal on a change of government or, sometimes, just a change of
minister.
While the PSMC oversaw a rejuvenation of the state public service and its senior echelons
in a comprehensive and professional way, its approach left deep scars on the public service and
has not been repeated. There is much in common here with the next administrative reform, the
creation of an Office of Cabinet.
Executive Coordination: Office of Cabinet
The Office of Cabinet was established in July 1991. Premier Goss was keen to develop policy
support coordination mechanisms, and impressed with the work of the New South Wales
Office led by Gary Sturgess (a previous chief of staff to premier Nick Greiner) (Davis 1993,
40). Queensland followed New South Wales practice and Goss appointed Kevin Rudd as its
first director general.
The office was created to enhance system, rigour, and order in the routines of government,
particularly coordinating aspects of the Cabinet process, and leading whole of government
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areas such as social, law and justice, economic, environment and women’s policy. The focus
on process and policy advice came at a price. Arguably it slowed down decision making,
sometimes to the detriment of the government. It certainly alienated some ministers and their
agencies.
But the reforms did ensure contestability, and a very focussed approach to development and
consideration of programmatic and legislative proposals. It enabled Queensland to become
a significant player in the Council of Australian Government forum, contributing to the
national policy conversation. Through publication of a coherent Cabinet Handbook, the Office
of Cabinet established processes which endured. These were later translated as The Australian
Policy Handbook, now in its 6th edition.
Rudd departed the Office of Cabinet in 1995 to contest, unsuccessfully, the federal seat of
Griffith (he was later elected at the 1998 election). His successor, Glyn Davis, led the agency
until the final days of the Goss government in early 1996, then resumed an academic career.
When he returned to the Queensland public service it was to lead an integrated central agency
as director general of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet following the election of the
Beattie minority government in September 1998.
Interestingly, neither the PSMC or Office of Cabinet was re-established by later Labor
administrations. Coalition governments had argued strenuously against both agencies. In
time the perception of both bodies became largely toxic, particularly in the public service,
and later Labor premiers made pragmatic decisions about further changes to the machinery of
government. Nevertheless, the PSMC and the Office of Cabinet stand as important markers
of the Goss government’s attempt to develop a whole-of-government response to systemic
governance failure.
THE TWILIGHT STATE: ROB BORBIDGE AND THE RETURN OF

THE NATIONALS
As this chapter has argued, building institutional integrity in Queensland has been driven by
a series of cathartic moments for the body politic. Cathartic here refers to moments revealing
great malfeasance, to genuine reform breakthroughs, and to moments when the fragility and
contingency of reform became clear. Integrity requires not just ongoing vigilance, but also
a bipartisan political buy-in. This is especially crucial in a political system where any party
able to control the Legislative Assembly – by however thin a margin – has immense power to
shape the institutions of state. This was dramatically illustrated by the short-lived government
led by National’s Rob Borbidge.
The origins of Borbidge’s administration reside in the 1995 state election which, initially at
least, seemed like another loss for the Nationals and the Liberals, now running as a coalition.
However, the Goss government had been damaged leading into the election, and faced issues
with an unpopular federal Labor government. Yet it was the CJC relationship which helped
sour public opinion. A CJC inquiry into parliamentary travel rorts had damaged both parties,
sparking the resignation of National leader Russell Cooper as well as, crucially, two Labor
ministers and the deputy speaker. The Goss government’s relations with the CJC deteriorated,
and this, coupled with an attempt to build a toll road that would likely endanger Australia’s
largest koala sanctuary, raised questions about the government’s commitment to transparency
and integrity. The government lost the two-party preferred vote, largely due to landslide votes
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against it in rural areas, but held on in Brisbane. Goss was re-elected premier by the narrowest
possible margin, winning 45 seats in a parliament of 89.
Crucially, one electorate retained by Labor was Mundingburra, an urban seat in the North
Queensland regional centre of Townsville. When results were declared, Labor had held the
seat by just 16 votes. Unsurprisingly, the result was challenged by the Liberal Party candidate,
decisively citing the uncounted votes of 22 military personnel deployed in Rwanda. When
it was ruled that the election was to be run again, both parties went to the polls knowing
a Liberal victory would mean a hung parliament, and an independent would decide who
formed government.
Following a comfortable Liberal win in the by-election held on 3 February 1996
the independent member of parliament, Liz Cunningham, indicated she would support
a National-Liberal minority government. Goss promptly resigned, and opposition leader Rob
Borbidge was sworn in as premier. Yet Russell Cooper’s earlier tangle with the CJC would
echo throughout the Borbidge government, and lead to another cathartic moment in the history
of institutional reform in Queensland. For soon after the Mundingburra by-election, the
Courier Mail revealed that Cooper, a previous premier and now police minister, had signed
a memorandum of understanding with the Queensland Police Union, granting them a series of
demands in exchange for a donation to help fight the by-election. Interestingly, Cooper, when
premier, had also been asked by journalist Quentin Dempster on an Australian Broadcasting
Corporation report, what he understood as ‘the separation of powers’. The response, or lack
thereof, was embarrassing and this attitude to a core tenet of Westminster governance would
mark the entire term of the Borbidge government.
The Borbidge government reversed many public service reforms instituted by the Goss
government. No doubt in response to ‘the ‘gulag’ of 1989/90, the newly elected government
sacked numerous directors general (the equivalent of permanent secretaries in the United
Kingdom), including a highly respected under treasurer, Gerard Bradley, who was famously
locked out of his office. It was alleged the new government acted on a ‘hit list’ of senior public
servants seen as sympathetic to the other side. The author was one of those identified, and
whilst I lasted about three months more than many of my colleagues, my contract was also
eventually terminated without reason, while I was returning from a United Nations Habitat
Conference held in Istanbul. This prompted a senior minister, Santo Santoro, to describe me in
Parliament as ‘the turkey from Turkey’. Santoro subsequently lost his safe seat of Clayfield,
found a place in the Senate, and was then required to resign from the federal ministry over
a controversy about a share transaction.
The incoming Borbidge government invited back a number of long-term ‘sympathetic’
individuals who had worked in previous Coalition administrations. A number were quite
mature, and it didn’t take long for the term ‘dad’s army’ to be applied to the new public sector
leadership.
Professing concern about the conduct of the Goss government, the Borbidge cabinet
established what became known as the Connolly–Ryan Inquiry into the ‘future role, struc-
tures, powers and operations’ of the CJC (Lewis 2000, 33). This became a symbol of the
government’s intent to reprosecute the past rather than look forward to the future. After all,
as the Fitzgerald Inquiry recommended, the CJC was already overseen by a parliamentary
committee with statutory obligations to monitor and review its operations. After sitting for an
embarrassing ten months, the inquiry was brought to an end when the CJC brought an action
to the Supreme Court alleging bias by Connolly and Ryan. Justice Thomas closed down the
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inquiry in August 1997, castigating the inquiry for its failure to address reasonable accusations
of bias (Lewis 2000, 33–5).
Within two years the Borbidge government faced major scandals which eventually claimed
four serving ministers – Connors, Perret, Hobbs, and Lingard. As with the Connolly–Ryan
Inquiry, these controversies raised questions about whether the conservative government
accepted the new expectations of personal ethical conduct. The nadir perhaps came with reve-
lations that the minister for primary industries was involved in a police investigation about the
murder of a prostitute. In politics, though, when your luck is failing it fails big time.
DOMINANCE CONTINUED: PETER BEATTIE AND THE STRANGE

VICTORIES OF LABOR
While the government struggled with political scandal, it also faced a potent new political
force. The September 1998 Queensland election was characterised by the rise and rise of the
right-populist One Nation. During the election campaign, the National Party decided to pref-
erence One Nation. Borbidge was opposed to this decision, understanding the likely electoral
consequences. In fact, it is reported he considered resigning as leader during the campaign. On
election day, One Nation achieved almost 23 per cent of the primary vote. They won 11 seats –
their best electoral performance to date in any jurisdiction – largely at the expense of Coalition
support in urban areas. Labor leader Peter Beattie, a long-term Labor player and former health
minister, won 44 seats. He was able to convince independent member of parliament (and
previous National and Liberal Party member) Peter Wellington to support a minority Labor
administration. This was the start of 15 continuous years of Labor administration, first under
Beattie and then, from 2007, Anna Bligh, until she lost to Campbell Newman in 2013.
One Nation was led by a retired member of the Queensland Police Service. Their first action
in the Parliament in 1998 was to seek a censure motion against the remaining members of the
Goss cabinet over an obscure controversy about the destruction of documents authorised by
the early Goss cabinet on advice from the then solicitor-general. The so-called Heiner Affair
preoccupied both the Queensland parliament and the senate for many years, and became an
issue I had to address as director general of the Department of Family Services during the
Forde Inquiry into Institutional Abuse.
The Beattie years no doubt learned much from the experience of the Goss administration.
Beattie was also a consummate communicator who was described by one opposition leader as
being ‘able to sell ice to Eskimos’. He even described himself confidently as a ‘media tart’.
More concerned with timing and communication than clinical policy processes, Beattie had to
manage a number of significant integrity issues in his term.
While there were individual, usually unrelated incidents, there was no evidence of
a return to systemic corruption such as Fitzgerald uncovered. Beattie’s support for the CJC
never wavered, given his deep political history in Queensland over the preceding decades.
Importantly, he set out to redress the attempts under the LNP coalition to hobble the CJC. In
2002, Beattie amalgamated the Crime Commission (created by Borbidge arguably to weaken
the CJC, who appointed Tim Carmody as its head, about whom more below), the Crime and
Misconduct Commission, and the CJC itself to make the Crime and Corruption Commission
with the broad remit of overseeing integrity in all areas of government and the public sector.
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Coupled with the strengthening of institutions of integrity, Beattie also expanded account-
ability mechanisms. His community engagement strategies included state-wide community
cabinets and annual regional parliaments (where parliament was convened, not in the state
parliament house, but in regional centres such as Cairns, Townsville, and Rockhampton).
It was required that ministers and senior public servants attend and respond to issues raised
by individuals in the community. Undoubtedly, this was partly in response to concern at the
sudden rise of One Nation, but it also reflected a genuine talent for understanding the way
Queenslanders conceptualised their state, which is what made Beattie politically impregnable
after his first narrow victory.
This is not to suggest that Beattie’s government persisted without scandal. Indeed, key
Labor figures in parliament like Bill D’Arcy – who was tried and convicted of paedophilia –
and minister Gordon Nuttall – who received the longest jail term for corruption in the history
of the Commonwealth – both fell dramatically during Beattie’s time in power. In the latter’s
case, his corruption was first revealed by institutions that emerged directly from the Fitzgerald
report.
What marked Beattie’s approach as different was the way in which none of these instances
of personal corruption were allowed to infect the broader system of governance. Unlike ten-
sions that developed at times between the Goss government and the CJC, Beattie was deter-
mined the integrity commission be seen as impartial and bipartisan. This commitment allowed
Beattie, and later Bligh, to maintain the confidence of the public despite some substantial
scandals. Eventually, though, public trust faded, political gravity reasserted itself, and over
a decade of Labor rule concluded with the election of a Liberal government.
POSTSCRIPT: THE RISE AND FALL OF CAMPBELL NEWMAN
What lessons can be drawn from divagations of reform in the first decade following the
Fitzgerald Inquiry? This chapter has argued that though institutional integrity has been built in
Queensland following the Inquiry, it has impacted all sides of politics differently. This differ-
ential impact has played out in a series of cathartic moments that encouraged central questions
around corruption to be aired publicly and discussed. This openness allowed reform efforts
to succeed. Yet the nature and timing of those cathartic moments, especially the Fitzgerald
Inquiry, meant that they harmed the LNP more substantially than Labor. The conservative
parties had developed methods and habits of rule during their long post-Second World War
reign that were antithetical to both institutional integrity and the traditions of a Westminster
style of government. This resulted in large sections of the centre-right refusing to take the
lessons of Fitzgerald to heart or to align themselves to the new paradigm of integrity the
Fitzgerald Inquiry inaugurated. This has resulted in an unprecedented exclusion from power in
the state where the LNP is strongest federally.
The story of Campbell Newman, the only centre-right leader to lead a majority LNP gov-
ernment in Queensland in the 30 years since the Fitzgerald Inquiry, is illustrative. Newman
came to power riding a huge wave of support, with Labor reduced to a paltry seven seats in
an 89-seat parliament. He had been a successful lord mayor of Brisbane, and came to the state
parliament – he was sworn in as premier before he had stepped into Parliament – with neither
a sound understanding of just how Queensland worked regionally, nor an understanding of
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Cabinet and Westminster traditions. These limitations would reveal themselves dramatically
over a tumultuous three years in power.
Unlike Beattie, Newman – from a family of senior national Liberal politicians based in
the much smaller state of Tasmania – lacked an understanding of the regional specificities of
Queensland. He was unable to translate his undoubted strengths as a lord mayor of the state
capital to the more complex and gradated job of running such a large state. This meant, for
example, that Newman brought an ideological approach to cutting public service budgets,
not realising their centrality and political support in regional Queensland. More gravely, the
LNP’s ambiguous commitment to the separation of powers emerged once again as the dark
reflection of the years before Fitzgerald.
One example will suffice: the elevation of Tim Carmody (significantly, a former police
officer). After nine months as a chief magistrate, and having never served on the Supreme
Court, Carmody was sworn in as Queensland’s chief justice in July 2014. His career was
inseparable from the LNP, and many of his rulings, especially relating to controversial new
powers given to the police, were seen to be unreasonably supportive of the LNP. It wasn’t long
before Carmody’s fellow judicial officers refused to work with him, and he resigned just a year
after his appointment, unable to withstand a gale of public and professional criticism.
Most tellingly, it was what happened in the election that followed the Newman government’s
first term that reveals the ongoing centrality of these questions of integrity to the Queensland
polity. At the election held in January 2015, Labor, unable even to achieve enough seats to be
officially deemed the opposition after the 2012 election, came roaring back, winning 34 seats
off the LNP and forming a minority government with the support of an independent, just as
Beattie had done in 1998. It was yet another moment of catharsis. As it had done throughout
the previous decades, the Fitzgerald Inquiry was still setting the parameters of politics in
Queensland.
NOTE
1. I wish to thank Dr Rory Dufficy for his invaluable support in the research and preparation of this
chapter. I also thank my colleague, Professor Glyn Davis, for providing detailed comment. In the
end, though, I take full responsibility for the content and its accuracy.
REFERENCES
Davis, Glyn (1993), ‘Executive and Policy Formation’, in Bron Stevens and John Wanna (eds), The Goss
Government: Promise and Performance of Labor in Queensland, Melbourne: Macmillan Education
Australia, pp. 31–50.
Evans, Raymond (2007), A History of Queensland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fitzgerald, Gerald E. (Tony) (1989), Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities
and Associated Police Misconduct, Brisbane: Queensland Government.
Hede, Andrew (1993), ‘Managerial and Equity Reform of the Public Sector’, in Bron Stevens and John
Wanna (eds), The Goss Government: Promise and Performance of Labor in Queensland, Melbourne:
Macmillan Education Australia, pp. 87–105.
Lewis, Colleen (2000), ‘The Politics of Civilian Oversight: Serious Commitment or Lip Service’,
in Andrew J. Goldsmith and Colleen Lewis (eds), Civilian Oversight of Policing: Governance,
Democracy and Human Rights, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 19–40.
Ken Smith - 9781789900910

Lewis, Colleen, Ransley, Janet, and Homel, Ross (2010), ‘The State We Were In’, in Colleen Lewis,
Janet Ransley, and Ross Homel (eds), The Fitzgerald Legacy: Reforming Public Life in Australia and
Beyond, Brisbane: Australian Academic Press, pp. 1–21.
Orr, G. and Levy, R. (2009), ‘Electoral Malapportionment: Partisanship, Rhetoric and Reform in the
Shadow of the Agrarian Strong-Man’, Griffith Law Review, 18 (3), 638–65.
Prenzler, T. (2009), ‘Reform in Politics, Criminal Justice and the Police in Post-Fitzgerald Queensland:
An Assessment’, Griffith Law Review, 18 (3), 576–95.
Ransley, Janet (1993), ‘Legal and Administrative Reform’, in Bron Stevens and John Wanna (eds),
The Goss Government: Promise and Performance of Labor in Queensland, Melbourne: Macmillan
Education Australia, pp. 106–16.
Ransley, Janet (2010), ‘Fitzgerald: A Model Investigative Inquiry’, in Colleen Lewis, Janet Ransley, and
Ross Homel (eds), The Fitzgerald Legacy: Reforming Public Life in Australia and Beyond, Brisbane:
Australian Academic Press, pp. 22–38.
Ransley, J. and Johnstone, R. (2009), ‘The Fitzgerald Symposium: An Introduction’, Griffith Law
Review, 18 (3), 531–43.
Sampford, C. (2009), ‘From Deep North to International Governance Exemplar: Fitzgerald’s Impact on
the International Anti-Corruption Movement’, Griffith Law Review, 18 (3), 559–75.
Solomon, D. (2009), ‘Reform Fatigue Following the Fitzgerald Report’, Griffith Law Review, 18 (3),
621–37.
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24. Corruption and ethics in public administration
in Croatia
Gordana Marčetić and Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička
DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION
Context
Croatia was one out of six republics and two autonomous provinces of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), before its independence in 1991. In former Yugoslavia,
self-governed socialism was in place (Doležal 2010, 59–62; Roksandić Vidlička 2017). From
1990 Croatia shifted to capitalism, which changed from state- or socially owned property to
the private property concept. The privatization process slowly started in 1990 when Croatia
was still part of Yugoslavia, but the full process started after Croatia became independent. The
process of privatization occurred throughout four phases, from 1991 to 1994, from 1994 to
1998, from 1998 to 2000 and from 2000 onwards (Doležal 2010, 59–62; Roksandić Vidlička
2017). Negative effects of this process were: “irrational transformation of the biggest cor-
porative systems without clear cost-benefit analyses” and “allowing individuals (very often
on the nepotism basis) to buy state-owned companies with no clear strategy for developing
them further, and investing in them” (Doležal 2010, 62; Roksandić Vidlička & Dragičević
Prtenjača 2017). Alongside two phases of privatization Croatia had experienced homeland war
and peaceful reintegration (until 1998). During that time war-profiteering crimes as well as
economic crimes (including political white-collar crimes) committed in the process of privat-
ization and ownership transformation occurred that were not prosecuted. This all contributed
to a prevalence of corruption within Croatian society, especially within public administration,
but also efforts to eradicate it. Still today, the findings of different anti-corruption surveys
indicate the following: moderate to high corruption risks, political patronage and inefficient
bureaucracy are among the challenges companies may face when doing business in Croatia.
Corruption and bribery are especially prevalent in the judiciary, public procurement and
the building and construction sector (GAN 2017). In addition, according to the Report of
the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) from January 2019,
GRECO regrets that its recommendation to the Croatian Parliament to adopt a code of conduct
for its members in 2014 still has not been realized (Council of Europe 2014). Croatia’s
Anticorruption Strategy 2015–2020 set the last quarter of 2015 as a deadline to adopt such
a code, but the draft is still in Parliament.
Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime
The Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International for Croatia in 2018 is 48/100.
As also underlined by the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (2017), Croatia has made con-
siderable efforts to improve the anti-corruption framework, “although implementation has still
345
Gordana Marčetić and Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička - 9781789900910
to demonstrate sustainable results”. In the field of law enforcement Croatia has centralized the
fight against corruption under one organization, the Office for the Suppression of Corruption
and Organized Crime (USKOK), with a broad mandate to investigate and prosecute corruption
offences and organized crime. A specialized unit within the police, the National Police Office
for Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime, has been formed as well. USKOK is
also responsible for international cooperation and exchange of information in complex inves-
tigations. Special court departments were established in four counties that have the subject
matter and territorial jurisdiction of criminal cases under USKOK’s competence. However,
USKOK has no single financial investigator permanently employed which makes its work
more demanding, difficult and less efficient.
Independent Control Bodies
In Croatia, there are four independent control bodies that have emerged because of institu-
tional development and responses to the demands of Europeanization and the fight against
corruption. Those bodies are special integrity institutions that ensure control over the admin-
istration and serve the prevention of corruption. At the heart of their actions, these institutions
rest on the principle of transparency, which enables citizens to be informed about the results
of their work and thus indirectly exercise control over the administration. These bodies, estab-
lished by different laws, are: (1) State Audit Office (1993/94) – for the area of public finance;
(2) State Commission for Public Procurement Procedure Control (2003) – for economic area
(2003); (3) Conflict of Interest Commission (2004); and (4) Information Commissioner (2013),
both in the area of the political system and administration. All four bodies have changed over
time in a way that the original institutional solutions improved in terms of strengthening the
independence of institutions, capacity development and expansion of powers.
Other Relevant Bodies
In addition to the ethics commissioners and ethics committees, there are a number of other
bodies which carry out various activities for the purpose of promoting openness, transparency,
integrity and/or ethics of public administration. Among them are the ombudsman, as assignee
of the Croatian Parliament for the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms.
He/she considers complaints about the existence of illegality and irregularities in the work
of state bodies, local and regional self-government (LRSG) and legal persons with public
authority, as well as some legal and natural persons. Then, the State Election Commission,
an important body promoting open government and transparency by monitoring elections,
holding a referendum and political party financing. In addition, there are special working
bodies within Parliament: the National Anti-Corruption Monitoring Council, the Croatian
Parliament’s Committee on Petitions and Complaints, and the Security Intelligence Agency
Civilian Oversight Council, as well as the Ministry of Justice’s Anti-Corruption Sector, but
they lack independence and jurisdiction and scope determined by law. There is also a Personal
Data Protection Agency, which protects citizens’ constitutionally guaranteed rights, but its
competences extend to the private sector (Musa 2016, 16, 20–2).

Corruption and ethics in public administration in Croatia 347
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Croatian Criminal Code
Croatia has incriminated corruption offences mainly in two chapters of its Criminal Code,
one against official duty and the other against business dealings. Therefore, in the Croatian
Criminal Code the core corruption offences are the classical offences of bribery: taking a bribe
(Art. 293 CC), giving a bribe (Art. 294 CC), receiving bribes in business dealing (Art. 252 CC),
giving bribes in business dealing (Art. 253 CC), receiving or giving bribes during insolvency
proceedings (Art. 251 CC) but also unlawful favouritism (Art. 292 CC), trading in influence
(Art. 295 CC), giving a bribe for trading in influence (Art. 296 CC) and bribing representatives
(Art. 339 CC). As the criminal offences under the USKOK jurisdiction are strictly enumerated
in Art. 21 of the law on USKOK, in the area of corruption (and corruption-related) offences the
USKOK has jurisdiction over the following crimes from the Criminal Code: accepting a bribe,
offering a bribe, trading in influence, abuse in performing government duties, abuse in bank-
ruptcy proceedings and unfair competition in foreign trade operations. In addition, USKOK is
also responsible for some types of criminal activity which under specific conditions includes
corruption offences: crimes committed by a group of persons or by a criminal organization;
offences for which a prison sentence in excess of three years is prescribed and the offence has
been committed in two or more countries or a significant part of its preparation or coordination
has taken place in a foreign country; or if the offence has been committed in connection with
the activity of a criminal organization active in two or more countries. It has to be mentioned
that in Croatia criminally responsible along with natural person could also be legal entities.
Although legal entities may be made accountable for any crimes, a legal entity will be pun-
ished for a criminal offence of a responsible person if such offence violates any of the duties
of the legal entity or if the legal entity has derived or should have derived illegal gain for itself
or third persons (Art. 3 of the Law on Responsibility of Legal Entities for Criminal Offences).
Conflict of Interest Act
Additionally, the Conflict of Interest Act regulates the conflict of interest of public officials.
The main goal of this act is primarily to prevent the conflict of interest, and then to sanction
offenders if such conflicts of interest occur. The law provides for the establishment of a special
commission for the prevention of conflicts of interest. In case of violation of the provisions
of this law, the commission may issue a reprimand, suspension of payment of part of the net
monthly salary and may order the publication of the commission’s decision (Art. 42 para 1).
Whistleblower Protection Act
One very important law for anti-corruption legislation is the recently enacted Whistleblower
Protection Act which entered into force on 1 July 2019 (Government of the Republic of
Croatia 2018). Under this law, a whistleblower is defined as a person who exposes corruption,
violations of law and malpractice in the management of public goods and assets. The wide
statutory definition comprises not only persons employed in the private or public sectors,
but also persons outside of typical working relationships, such as volunteers, students and
job applicants who are still in the hiring process (more in English in Valinčić & Drašković

2019). This law establishes a protection mechanism for the whistleblowers from negative
consequences. For example, the law strictly forbids employers from using revengeful tactics,
such as termination of the employment contract, non-payment of wages, transfer to another
workplace, prevention of promotion, harassment and other unlawful behaviour and measures.
In case whistleblowers do need to seek protection against such acts before courts, they are
exempt from paying court fees and the employer bears the burden of proof that its act is based
on reasons other than retaliation against the reporting of irregularities (Central Government
Portal, 27 September 2019). It is expected that more corruption cases will be revealed and
more evidence collected for the successful prosecution of those offences.
Challenges with Enforcement
Nevertheless, one can conclude for Croatia, although high-level corruption offences often
resulted in a substantial loss of profit in the overall economy and in society and contributed
to the disillusionment of citizens and their faith in the rule of law, they have not been widely
and effectively prosecuted. Croatia is here not an exception to other Central-Eastern Europe
and Balkan countries. All countries in this region have been through changes to their political
and economic systems, and some of them have simultaneously experienced armed conflict
(Roksandić Vidlička 2017a, 853). This, as underlined, contributed to the present state in
Croatia and to the prevalence of corruption in public administration. To understand the
phenomenology of occurrence of corruption among public administration, it is necessary to
describe the Croatian phenomenon and the failure to effectively address transitional economic
crimes (including political white-collar corruption cases).
CASE STUDY: IVO SANADER, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF

CROATIA
Croatia’s Reaction to Transitional Economic Crimes
It must be underlined that Croatia tried to address the phenomenon of war-profiteering crimes
as well as crimes committed in the process of the privatization and ownership transformation
that occurred in the first two phases of privatization alongside homeland war and peaceful
reintegration (referred to as serious transitional economic crimes) by proposing unique legal
solutions to combat them in 2010 (Roksandić Vidlička 2017a, 852; 2017b, 343). In order to
explain why corruption is still pertinent to Croatian administration, this phenomenon has to
be briefly explained while it addresses and explains how the new “elite” was created or main-
tained in power from the 1990s.
While transitional economic crimes (including connected corruption offences) were not
prosecuted during the period in which they occurred, in 2010 Croatia abolished the statute
of limitations for transitional economic offences with retroactive effect (Constitutional
Amendments Official Gazette 76/2010, Art. 31(4) of the Constitution),1 based on the justi-
fication that these crimes are regarded “as extremely grave crimes for which it is necessary,
right and justified to rule out application of statute of limitations, particularly keeping in mind
circumstances of perpetration and consequences caused” (Decision Proposal to Amend the
Constitution of Croatia 2009, p. 8). A specific catalogue of crimes is listed in the Law on

Exemption from the Statute of Limitations for War Profiteering and Crimes Committed in
the Process of Ownership Transformation and Privatization (hereinafter: Law on Exemption),
which was passed in May 2011 (Official Gazette, No. 57/11) and applies where such crimes,
committed by abusing the situation of war, resulted in excessive gains. According to the expla-
nation given by the legislator for this constitutional amendment, such crimes are considered
extremely serious while they continue to undermine Croatian society; such crimes – and their
offenders – should therefore not be afforded privilege under the country’s statute of limita-
tions. However, on 24 July 2015, almost five years later, the Constitutional Court limited the
scope of application of this provision. According to the Constitutional Court’s 2015 decision
(No. U-III-4149/2014, 24 July 2015), the abolition of retroactivity cannot apply to those tran-
sitional economic crimes for which the statute of limitations had expired before 16 June 2010
when the constitutional amendment was introduced. Therefore, the constitutional amendment
and the Law on Exemption did not seem to be enforceable in their entirety and those crimes
would remain unaddressed. This led to a new disillusionment in the population and contributed
to the perception of high-level corruption between public administration and state officials
alongside a distrust of the judiciary.
The Case of Ivo Sanader
Limitation of the scope of application of the Law of Exemption came in the decision con-
cerning the most renowned case symbolizing the debate in Croatia on corruption among the
highest state officials – in the case against the former prime minister of Croatia, Ivo Sanader
(Indictment No. K-US-48/11, IS-US-6/11, 31 August 2011). Judgment against Mr Sanader
was the only one based on the above described constitutional change that became final. As
the judges pointed out in the first judgment against Sanader, the former prime minister of the
country abused his position for his own enrichment and not for the common good. The convic-
tion was confirmed by the Supreme Court (also in Roksandić Vidlička 2017).
This legal saga started in August 2011 when USKOK indicted Ivo Sanader over negotiations
regarding the terms of a loan to be granted by Austrian bank Hypo-Alpe-Adria International
AG to the government of the Republic of Croatia. As Croatian deputy minister of foreign
affairs, Sanader allegedly made a deal that the bank pay him, in return for that bank’s entry into
the Croatian market, a commission in the cash amount of 7 million Austrian schillings, which
the bank indeed paid over the course of 1995. The crime was classified as a war-profiteering
crime and an abuse of office and authority. The contextual link necessary for the application
of the Law on Exemption from the Statute of Limitations existed since he abused his office to
“obtain for himself an unlawful property gain in the amount of HRK 3,610,528.18 [approx.
€500,000] in a difficult situation the country was going through… during the Homeland War
due to a high inflation and extremely high interest rates on loans which made it difficult to find
banks ready to grant favourable loans”.
In addition to these charges, in September 2011 prosecution charged Sanader for receiv-
ing a €10 million bribe, while serving as prime minister of Croatia, from Zsolt Hernadi, the
chairman of the management board of the Hungarian oil company MOL, in return for trans-
ferring the controlling rights from the Croatian oil company INA to MOL (Indictment No.
K-US-48/11, IS-US-6/11, 31 August 2011). These two indictments merged into one trial and
the trial judgment was rendered on 20 November 2012. As the judges pointed out in the first

judgment against Sanader (Zagreb County Court Judgment 2012) he, as the former prime min-
ister of the country, abused his position for his own enrichment and not for the common good.
According to the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in the Sanader case handed down in the
final judgment, priority has to be given to the protection of the principle of legality and retro-
active application of the Law on Exemption is not in accordance with the principle of legality.
By doing that, one can say that in balancing and interpreting the Constitution “as a whole”, the
Constitutional Court disregarded the Constitution’s principle of social justice (which roughly
corresponds to the German Sozialstaatsprinzip) that is also a value clearly underlined in the
Croatian Constitution. In any case, Croatian society will apparently no longer have the oppor-
tunity, at least not in criminal proceedings, to seriously confront the transitional crimes com-
mitted by perpetrators who clearly took advantage of a situation of war and disorder when the
offences were committed. This created an incentive, in our opinion, for maintaining corruption
within public administration and companies, although many policies have been introduced in
order to overcome this phenomenon as already described.
According to the opinions of the authors of this chapter, effective struggle with corruption
could not be won without strengthening the ethical infrastructure and the ethical behaviour of
public servants and political functionaries in public administration: the next two sections are
devoted to this phenomenon in Croatia.
SURVEY ON THE PERCEPTION OF UNETHICAL CONDUCTS IN

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Context
Croatia has started in the last two decades with a somewhat more complex approach to
combating corruption and implementing measures for the strengthening of ethical conduct
in the public sector. The first steps towards the development of ethical standards at the
central state level were made at the end of the 2000s primarily within the scope of the wider
Europeanization of Croatian public administration. This phase encompassed certain legal and
organizational changes in central state administration (SA), which further strengthened the
pursuit of ethical standards and enforcement procedures in central SA. However, there is still
no systematic approach for this general phenomenon. On the regional and self-government
territorial administrative level, as well as in other public services, little to nothing was done.
Limitations of Existing Efforts
A combination of (hard and soft) laws, institutions and management mechanisms are com-
monly used to try to prevent and suppress the corruption and other innumerable forms of
deviations from the ethical behaviour of public servants. However, how useful and effective
are normative ethics measures and codes of ethics? In the Croatian reality, declarations of
politicians and normative attempts to develop ethical standards in public service frequently
fall down when faced with politicization, a lack of professionalism, authoritarian administra-
tive tradition, bureaucratic organizational culture and poor economic standards. Therefore,
it is questionable whether those measures have real effect in public administration practice.

Citizens of Croatia usually do not believe in such institutional-normative attempts and their
view of public servants’ ethics are pretty low.
Findings from Surveys
However, the perception of unethical conducts in public administration is not unique, so one
can see different views, which depend on the viewpoint of observers. The survey research
conducted by Marčetić (2013) shows how different groups of citizens, civil servants in SA
and public servants in local units’ administrative bodies (as “observers” or/and “participants”
of unethical activities) see unethical conduct and ethical measures in Croatian SA and local
self-government bodies (LSG). Does their perception depend on subjective factors such as the
views of observers, or on objective, real facts, or both?
The survey refers to the perception of unethical behaviour of civil and public servants, as
well as political functionaries, employed in SA and LSG bodies. The author made anonymous
questionnaires for three groups of examinees (1,420 of them), both sexes, all professional qual-
ifications (basic to PhD) and ages (18 and up) with the same, similar or comparable questions
about ethics, unethical conducts and desirable ethical measures. The first group comprised of
citizens from different regions of Croatia (411). The second group were public servants and
heads of administrative departments employed in local units’ administrative bodies (138 – 1%
of all employees in LSG bodies). The third group were civil servants, managers and political
executives employed in the central SA bodies (871 – 1.5% of all employees in SA).2 Below we
present the main findings of the research.
More than half of citizens (58.4%) encountered some form of unethical behaviour by public
servants or political functionaries in the municipality/city administration in their local units.
Most of them encountered unethical behaviour between the years 2005 and 2011 when the
Croatian Democratic Party (in Croatian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica) was in power.
At the end of the period, the media and some official institutions uncovered corruption and
political scandal within the party (see the case of Ivo Sanader above). Therefore, unethical
and unlawful activities weakened citizen trust in government and their administration. Half
of citizens (49.4%) think that everyone is equally prone to unethical behaviour while most
others believe that political functionaries (21.7%) or higher public servants and heads of
administrative departments in local units (18.5%) are more prone to unethical behaviour. In
addition, half of citizens (49.9%) believe that unethical behaviour is often found in both LSG
bodies and SA, 22.1 per cent are not sure, but only 3.2 per cent think that it is uncommon in
both. This is a different perception than of both groups of employees in SA and LSG. Half of
them do not know where unethical behaviour occurs, but a significant number of employees
in LSG bodies consider that unethical behaviour is more often in SA (17.4%) and vice versa
(23.5%). Public servants in LSG and SA have a worse opinion of political functionaries than
of the higher public servants while citizens do not see any significant difference between them.
As regards the group of public servants and heads (group no. 2) employed in LSG, 39.9 per
cent of them encountered some form of unethical behaviour while 54.3 per cent did not. People
employed in LSG believe there is less unethical behaviour than the public believes. Similarly,
33.7 per cent of civil servants (group no. 3) met with some form of unethical behaviour in their
organization while 52.7 per cent did not. Both groups encountered the most unethical behav-
iour between the years 2005 and 2011 (a little less than 40%) but many of them experienced
it in two or more periods.

Very significant answers were made to the question: Over the last five years of your service,
have you been offered a bribe or asked (by intimidation, extortion, etc.) to act unlawfully,
contrary to the professional rules or contrary to the principle of equality (e.g. to speed up the
procedure or give preferential treatment against other parties to the procedure, etc.)? One
third of employees (28.3% in LSG and 32% in SA) answered “yes”, which is quite disturbing
if we take into account that these are severe forms of unethical behaviour and/or criminal
acts. More than 65 per cent of them (in both groups) experienced it several times. As well as
local officials, civil servants often emphasize that citizens – parties/clients – are those who
offer bribes and display other unethical behaviour (almost 50% in both groups). The second
largest percentage of employees (25%) received unethical offers from their superiors, which
is very worrisome, while the rest received offers from their colleagues or all listed. Had they
reported the unethical behaviour to the head of the body/supervisor or denounced criminal
offences to the competent institution? Mostly not. Only 12.8 public servants in LSG and 13.6
in SA reported it, but few were satisfied with the results of denunciation. Most of them did not
receive any relevant response (67.5% in SA and 40% in LSG) or, worse, they had detrimental
consequences (15% in SA and even 40% in LSG) due to reporting it. Responses from both
groups clearly indicate a lack of confidence in the institutions and institutional weakness.
DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION
The establishment of socialism after the Second World War in most countries of Central and
Eastern Europe led to an abandonment of the civil service tradition and civil service systems,
which were remodelled in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles. Yugoslavia main-
tained a heavily politicized version of the traditional civil service system3 until the late 1960s.
After that, Yugoslavia continued to be connected with the mainstream continental European
civil service tradition (Verheijen & Kotchegura 1999, 328–9). It should be mentioned that in
1984 the Yugoslavian Association for Administrative Sciences and Practice adopted a code
of ethics for administrative workers in the SFRY, which applied to the whole of the former
Yugoslavia. The code contained only a brief statement of fundamental values, broad principles
of ethical conduct and no provisions regulating enforcement mechanisms.4
Central State Administration
After the breakdown of the SFRY, Croatia started to adopt its own civil service systems. The
first law regulating the problems of administrative staff in the post-socialist period was the
1994 act of civil servants and employees and salaries of judicial officials. It ceased to be valid
on 30 March 2001, i.e. as of the day of the enactment of the act on civil servants and employ-
ees. On 1 January 2006 Croatia obtained a new Civil Servant Act (CSA) as a component of
the CARDS 2001 project.5 In the same year the first code of ethics for civil servants in Croatia
(CoE) was adopted. However, the real steps towards the development of ethics standards came
two years later, after the Anti-Corruption Strategy (2008) and the Action Plan for Combating
Corruption had been issued. These documents have stimulated certain legal and organizational
changes in central SA and, consequently, the Civil Servants Act and the CoE (until then the
code was just a pure declaration) were amended in 2008. Arts 15–24 of the CSA regulate the

abuse of authority, refusal of proffered gifts, unwarranted rewarding of other civil servants,
providing information and explanations on administrative affairs, timely and cost-efficient
performance of duties, non-disclosure of official secrets and respect for privacy, professional
conduct, presence at the workplace and use of property. Apart from these, Art. 25 establishes
that the civil servants must behave in a way not to diminish the reputation of the civil service
or their personal impartiality. In addition, the code clearly states that the government regulates
the proper behaviour of civil servants by way of issuing the CoE.
According to the amendment to the CoE from 2008, every central state body has to appoint
one servant as the ethics commissioner.6 The amendment to the code in 2008 also established
a new independent body, the Ethics Committee, with the function of promoting ethics prin-
ciples in central state bodies by issuing notices and warnings and deciding as a second-tier
body on complaints from civil servants and citizens regarding the unethical behaviour of
civil servants. For further promotion of ethics standards, the ethics commissioners and Ethics
Committee are expected to closely collaborate with the Ethics Section established by the
Department for Human Potential in the Ministry of Administration.7 Similar to the role of
ethics commissioners, the role of the Ethics Section is to promote ethical standards in the
behaviour of civil servants and employees and impede conflicts of interest, acceptance of gifts
and other corruptive and unethical behaviour. The Ethics Section is expected to collaborate
with other state bodies and deal with the complaints from civil servants and citizens regarding
the unethical and possible corruptive behaviour of civil servants.
The new code was adopted in 2011 (amended in 2012). As stated earlier, the first code only
stated some main principles and enforcement mechanisms. The main purpose of the new code
was to set the values and principles that need to be respected by the servants in their interaction
with citizens and with each other. Although this code does not cover all the fields indicated
in international recommendations,8 it contains the most detailed norms on enforcement
procedures. However, in general, the code is too normative and without a clear vision of its
real purpose. Ethical principles are simply copied from the Civil Servants Act and numerous
procedural provisions are unnecessary. The role and purpose of the Ethics Committee, as an
independent body, is downgraded and its relationship with the Ethics Section is not clear.
Competences of both bodies are mixed and are not established according to the real feasibility
and role of these bodies. Finally, the main drawback of the code is its scope. Namely, it applies
only to the category of civil servants in SA and does not include other employees (e.g. clean-
ers, drivers, etc.), nor politically appointed persons (ministers, their deputies and other heads
of office who are politically appointed).
Local and Regional Self-Government Units
As for personnel in LRSG units, the Act on Public Servants and Employees in LRSG (APSE),
which was adopted in 2008, contains far fewer provisions about proper behaviour than the
CSA. One article explicitly prescribes the duty of keeping confidential information, while
another regulates the duty to report possible conflicts of interest. Inappropriate behaviour,
which damages the reputation of the service, is one of the severe breaches of official duties
(Art. 46 para 11). Similar to the CSA, this law contains detailed disciplinary procedures, meas-
ures, investigating bodies and sanctions for breach of official duties. However, unlike the CSA
on the central state level, it does not establish an obligation for LRSG bodies to adopt a code
of ethics or codes of conduct, which has resulted in different regulations of this issue in local

and regional units. Since there has not been much information about ethical standards on the
LRSG level in Croatia, Marčetić and Vukojičić-Tomić conducted research (2016) to examine
the extent of LRSG codes of ethics/conduct (CoE/Cs) conformity with European standards,
as well as the role and scope of ethics bodies. Additionally, the possibility for public scrutiny
was examined.
Research findings show that 142 LRSG units adopted CoE/Cs but no more than 97 (68.3%)
documents were published on official websites or official gazettes and were therefore availa-
ble for the analysis.9 This result also indicates that only 16.8 per cent of LRSG units out of 576
units in Croatia adopt and disclose CoE/Cs and thus make them easily accessible to all citizens.
From a formal point of view, the analysed codes are partially adjusted to European Union
standards given that more than half of the areas in the Recommendation of the Committee of
Ministers of Council of Europe to Member States on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials
(CoCM) are covered in analysed codes. However, they differ substantially from each other
since CoCM contains provisions about areas such as conflicts of interest, confidential informa-
tion, gifts and improper offers or political activity of public servants that are elaborated largely
in opposite to the CoE/Cs in Croatian LRSG units in which they are only briefly defined.
The situation with provisions regulating enforcement mechanisms and sanctions is differ-
ent. While CoCM contains only one explicit provision about observance of the code and sanc-
tions, codes in LRSG units regulate enforcement mechanisms in detail, very similar to the CoE
at the central state level which has 23 (out of 40 provisions) about enforcement mechanisms.
LRSG units establish separate ethics bodies – an ethics committee and ethics commissioner,
or a public official whose role is primarily coercive. The vast majority of LRSG units (78.1%)
establish “watchdog” bodies with the authority to receive complaints, investigate and decide in
the first instance, while in the rest of them ethics bodies perform both watchdog and promoter
roles. In addition, enforcement mechanisms are very often overlapping with disciplinary
breaches prescribed in civil service legislation and the Act on Public Servants and Employees.
DISCUSSION
The Public Sector Needs to Be More Professional
The first comprehensive comparative analysis of the civil service system in nine Central and
Eastern European states (Verheijen & Kotchegura 1999) showed that public confidence in
civil servants was consistently low. Post-socialist countries are becoming aware of this issue
with the beginning of the new millennium, evidenced by the newly adopted civil service acts,
laws on conflicts of interest, anti-corruption strategies and a massive production of CoE/
Cs during the 2000s. These activities are mainly the result of a desire for European Union
membership and the set of requirements for strengthening administrative capacities and har-
monization with European Union standards. Therefore, those standards have been of particular
importance to the development of the civil servant system and legislation in the new European
Union member countries and in those in process of accession. However, there are different
ways of public administration reform and solving problems. It is obvious that a radical man-
agerial approach is not appropriate for post-socialist countries whose transition to the new
social and political systems is burdened with numerous political, economic and social issues
(Marčetić 2005). The development, democratization and modernization of the Croatian public

administration system should be seen as the process of creating a responsible, transparent,

law-abiding and politically neutral public administration. The basic orientation ought to be
towards the professionalization of public servants at all territorial levels, the depoliticization
of top positioned managers and the introduction of the merit principle in public servants regu-
lations and the practice of administrative organizations.
More Effective and Efficient Laws Needed
The problem of corruption and unethical behaviour in public administration is very complex
and requires numerous measures, which are not only normative. It is questionable what the
benefit of that normative production is. Are the norms efficient and effective in practice and
can they significantly influence individual and organizational behaviour? Some authors have
warned that in the absence of institutional reforms, new laws and rules aimed at combating
corruption often have perverse effects. Moreover, “in regimes that are not fully based on legal
rules, they can contribute to increasing the potential for corruption” (Kaminski and Kaminski
2001, 1). However, we can agree that although enhanced normative production and the estab-
lishment of new institutions do not always lead to a reduction in corruption and illegality, they
are a significant indicator of a changed view of the state and public administration. The change
of paradigm was particularly visible in Croatia with constitutional amendments and the Law
on Exemption from 2010 and 2011. Nevertheless, we have to do much more.
The Contested Role of Codes of Ethics
Some scholars maintain that the code of ethics/conducts improve and promote ethical behav-
iour and guide individuals in resolving ethical problems. Others contend that codes are irrel-
evant to practitioners and are not useful for promoting ethical conduct, because they are too
legalistic and restrictive and are not based on systematic moral judgement or a firmly grounded
and well-developed ethical theory (Grundstein-Amado 2001, 462). The CoE, as well as CoE/
Cs in the LRSG of Croatia, are arguably too normative and coercive, lacking a value-oriented
approach, which indicates a lack of understanding or unbelief in the preventive role of soft
laws. This statement coincides with the above-mentioned survey findings of Marčetić (2013)
in which, out of 11 proposals, a small percentage of examinees chose measure “G” (“adoption
of a Code of Ethics towards citizens that should be signed by all civil servants and political
functionaries”). On the other side, all three groups of examinees opted for measure “A”,
which is “stricter supervision and more severe sanctions for public servants and political
functionaries”, as one of the three best methods of preventing public servants’ unethical
behaviour. Similar results were obtained by an earlier survey conducted among citizens of the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ukraine (Miller et al. 1999, 235–49). In all countries,
coercion reforms based on stricter controls and penalties have received the most support while
there is scepticism about codes of ethics and citizen charters.
A More Educated Public Sector Is Part of the Solution
Since Croatian public servants on both territorial levels considerably opted for measure “D”,
that is “enhancement of public servant’s level of education”, as a preventive measure, it
should be given more attention in the future. Education should include all population groups

– citizens (from the kindergarten period onwards), public servants (in SA, LRSG and public
services) and particular politically appointed persons at all levels and institutions. So far, the
State School of Public Administration has mostly maintained education programmes for ethics
commissioners in SA bodies and only a few for commissioners at the lowest territorial level
(regional or local).
More Citizen-Level Education
On the other side, citizens mostly opted for measure “F” – “providing greater opportunities
to the citizens for filing complaints on the work of civil servants and political functionaries”,
which again coincides with the third part of research from 2016 (Marčetić & Vukojičić-Tomić)
about public scrutiny. Although in more than half of LRSG units CoE/Cs are available on
official websites (on average 68.3%) and accessible via official website search engines (on
average 54.2%), all of the websites examined failed to provide information about citizens’
complaints and to enable citizens to scrutinize public servants’ behaviour using online com-
munication services or phones.
Bureaucratic Limitations Need to Be Addressed
In addition, all three groups from the 2013 survey recognized another measure as very
important. Lengthy bureaucratic procedures and too many formal documents (measure “F”)
undoubtedly bother citizens and explain why some of them resort to unlawful and unethical
actions (e.g. bribes to speed up the process, etc.). Bureaucratic organizational culture, which
includes poor work organization, inefficiency, rigid formal procedures, tardiness and demo-
tivation to work (due to low salaries in civil service, underappreciation of the profession in
favour of political and/or personal interests), is among the major problems of the Croatian
public administration. However, these problems cannot be solved by mechanically introducing
new managerial methods (e.g. performance-related pay) because they do not fall on fertile
ground for at least two reasons. The first is a small public budget because of a poor economy
and the second is omnipresent politicization, which produces a chain of negativity such as
employment and promotion in public service, according to political, friendly or kinship crite-
ria, rather than professionalism and quality of performance.
CONCLUSION
We can conclude that regarding “young democracy” countries, including Croatia, regulations
and laws are certainly not sufficient, especially because citizens do not have confidence in
their implementation (see Roksandić Vidlička 2017). Norms should be morally and emotion-
ally, cognitively and emotionally responsive to those who socialize norms as their own criteria
for behaviour. In view of this, it is necessary to change the general attitude towards citizens
and towards the government, state and public administration, which will be reflected through
the acceptance of new values. Different views and habits are needed to support the construc-
tion of efficient ethical infrastructure and trust in government and its administration, especially
in building the integrity and ethics of public administration. Criminal law as an ultima ratio
response comes when the corrupt behaviour has already occurred and, as described, it is not

per se effective enough to combat corruption in public administration. A change of attitude is

effective and placing more value on building integrity and ethics is what is needed.
NOTES
1. The statute of limitations shall not apply to the criminal offences of war profiteering, nor any crimi-
nal offences perpetrated in the course of economic transformation and privatization and perpetrated
during the period of the Homeland War and peaceful reintegration, wartime and during times of
clear and present danger to the independence and territorial integrity of the state, as stipulated by
law, or those not subject to the statute of limitations under international law. Any gains obtained by
these acts or in connection therewith shall be confiscated.
2. Citizens answered the questions with regard to the unethical behaviour of public servants for the area
of the local unit in which they had residence. Questions for the second and third groups of respond-
ents referred to perceptions of unethical behaviour in local unit administrative bodies and central
state administration bodies where they are employed. The survey was completed during December
2012 and January 2013 and covered the periods before 2000, 2000–2005, 2005–11 and 2012.
3. As early as in 1923, Croatia had, while still a part of the former Yugoslavia, a special Act on Civil
Servants and Other Civil Officers and Act on State Communication Staff (Krbek 1932, 135–6).
During the socialist Yugoslavia continuity of civil servant legislation this was preserved in the form
of the federal Civil Servants Act of 1948 and the subsequent Public Servants Act of 1957 (Marčetić
2005, 302).
4. The code only prescribed, “Workers who break down principles established in that Code have moral
responsibility” (Coe-SFRY, Art. 16). In a way, this code could be identified as a “moral code”,
which consists of values predominant for culture and society in that period.
5. The CARDS 2001 project Public Administration Reform: Support the Reform of the Civil Service
had the overall objective to modernize civil service legislation, strengthen civil service management
and set up the civil service training system. The Civil Servant Act from the 2006 has been amended
16 times, most recently in 2019.
6. The role of the ethics commissioner is to supervise the application of the Code of Ethics in a central
state body, promote ethical behaviour in relations among civil servants and in civil servants’ rela-
tions with citizens, advise civil servants on issues related to ethical behaviour, receive complaints
from civil servants and citizens regarding unethical and possible corrupt behaviour of civil servants,
carry out procedures investigating whether the complaints were founded and keep records of all
complaints received.
7. According to the Decree of Internal Organisation, Official Gazette No. 118/2009.
8. Among the more important ones are: (1) International code of conduct for public officials – UN
Resolution adopted by the general assembly (A/RES/51/610) Action against Corruption, 12
December 1996; (2) Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service
Including Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service, C(98)/70, 23 April 1998; and
(3) Recommendation No. R (2000) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on codes of
conduct for public officials, 11 May 2000.
9. In total, 97 CoE/Cs (out of 576 local and regional self-government units in Croatia) were analysed
in the following types of local and regional self-government units: counties – 16; towns – 41; and
municipalities – 40.
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Whistleblower Protection Act, Official Gazette 17/2019 (in Croatian).
Indictment and Judgments
Croatian Constitutional Court Decision No. U-III-4149/2014, 24 July 2015.

Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime Indictment No. K-US-48/11, IS US-6/11,
31 August 2011.
Zagreb County Court Judgment No. K-Us-26/11, 20 November 2012.

25. Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe:
lessons for other countries
Jon S.T. Quah
INTRODUCTION
Corruption was a serious problem in Singapore during the British colonial period (1819–1959),
especially during and after the Japanese Occupation from February 1942 to August 1945. The
People’s Action Party (PAP) government assumed office on 5 June 1959 after winning the
30 May general election in Singapore. The British colonial government failed to minimise
corruption because it lacked political will and made two major mistakes in its anti-corruption
strategy. By contrast, the PAP government succeeded in combating corruption because of its
strong political will and learning from the two mistakes of the British colonial government.
Singapore’s success in combating corruption is reflected in its consistently high performance
on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 1995 to 2018.
Singapore is the least corrupt country in Asia and was ranked 3rd among 41 countries on
the CPI in 1995 and also ranked joint 3rd among 180 countries with Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland on the CPI in 2018 (Transparency International, 1995, 2019).
Three important features of Singapore’s public administration are its reliance on meri-
tocracy in recruiting and promoting civil servants, its low level of corruption and its public
bureaucracy’s effectiveness in policy implementation (Quah, 2010, 250). As corruption is
both a cause and consequence of poor governance in a country, a well-governed country is
unlikely to suffer from corruption if its government implements the anti-corruption measures
impartially (Quah, 2009a, 125–6). Singapore’s public bureaucracy has played a key role in
national development during the past 60 years of PAP rule. The high quality of Singapore’s
public administration is reflected in its top ranking among 215 countries on the World Bank’s
governance indicator on government effectiveness with a score of 2.21 and 100 percentile rank
in 2017 (World Bank, 2019). This chapter demonstrates that the major reason for Singapore’s
effective public administration is its success in minimising corruption.
What is the secret of Singapore’s success in combating corruption? Why has the PAP gov-
ernment succeeded in minimising corruption while the British colonial government failed to
do so? What lessons can other countries learn from Singapore’s experience in curbing corrup-
tion? This chapter addresses these questions by explaining the British colonial government‘s
failure and the PAP government’s success before identifying the ingredients of Singapore’s
effective anti-corruption recipe and assessing its relevance for other countries.
360
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910
Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe 361
THE BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO CURB

CORRUPTION
The British ruled Singapore for nearly 140 years from its founding in January 1819 by
Stamford Raffles until the attainment of self-government in June 1959. Corruption was made
illegal in 1871 with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca,
Penang and Singapore. In 1879, a Commission of Inquiry into the causes of inefficiency of the
Straits Settlements Police Force found that corruption was widespread among the European
inspectors and the Malay and Indian junior officers. Similarly, the 1886 Commission of
Inquiry into the extent of public gambling in the Straits Settlements confirmed the existence
of systemic corruption in the police forces in Singapore and Penang (Quah, 1979, 24–6).
However, the British colonial government did nothing to combat corruption for the next 66
years until the first anti-corruption law – the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) –
was enacted on 10 December 1937.
Relying on Corrupt Police to Combat Corruption
In spite of the findings of the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry that police corruption
was a serious problem in Singapore, the British colonial government decided in 1937 that
the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the
Singapore Police Force (SPF) would be responsible for combating corruption. This was
a serious mistake because the ACB was ineffective as a result of its limited resources, its per-
formance of many functions including anti-corruption and the prevalence of police corruption.
The ACB’s first limitation was that it was understaffed with only 17 personnel, which were
inadequate for curbing corruption in the civil service, including the SPF. This weakness was
highlighted by Elizabeth Choy in her speech to the Second Legislative Council on 20 February
1952, when she criticised the government’s “weak and feeble attempt” to fight corruption
because the ACB had only four officers and 13 rank and file to deal with the “vice” of cor-
ruption, which had “gripped, and is waxing fat on the Government, and, in some instances,
commercial enterprise” (quoted in Quah, 1978, 14).
An anti-corruption agency (ACA) is a specialised organisation established by a govern-
ment to minimise corruption in the country. There are two types of ACA, depending on the
scope of their functions: (1) Type A: those dedicated ACAs that perform only anti-corruption
functions; and (2) Type B: those diffused ACAs that perform both anti-corruption and other
non-corruption-related functions (Quah, 2017a, 7). The ACB’s second weakness was that it
was an ineffective Type B ACA responsible for curbing corruption and 15 other functions.
Apart from combating corruption, the other duties of the CID’s assistant commissioner
were: secret societies, gambling promoters, fraud (commercial crime), anti-vice (traffickers),
pawnshops, second-hand dealers, narcotics (traffickers), criminal records, banishment, nat-
uralisation, missing persons, fingerprints, photography, Police Gazette and house-to-house
and street collections (Colony of Singapore, 1952, 31). As the CID was primarily concerned
with detecting and solving serious crimes like murder and kidnapping, corruption control was
accorded lower priority. This meant that the ACB had to compete with the other branches
within the CID for limited manpower and funding (Quah, 1978, 15).
Finally, as police corruption was widespread, the ACB’s Achilles’ heel was that, as part
of the CID, its personnel faced a conflict of interest and could not investigate impartially
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

corruption complaints against other police officers. The British colonial government violated
the “golden rule” that the police should not be “responsible for investigating their deviance
and crimes” (Punch, 2009, 245). It only realised this mistake after the Operation Hijacking
scandal involving a gang of robbers, including three police detectives, robbed a shipment of
1,800 pounds of opium worth S$400,000 (US$133,333) on 27 October 1951 (Tan, 1999, 59;
Straits Times, 1952, 5).
The British colonial government appointed a team led by a senior ACB officer to investigate
the robbery. The ACB team found that some senior police officers were implicated in the
protection racket with both the robbers and importers of the opium (Tan, 1999, 59). However,
when the investigation resulted in only the dismissal of a senior police officer and forced
retirement of another senior officer, the government was dissatisfied with the ACB’s failure
to prosecute the other officers involved because of insufficient evidence. Consequently, the
government appointed a special team in May 1952 to review the investigation conducted by
the ACB team. The special team completed its inquiry in September 1952 and the government
replaced the ineffective ACB with the special team, which became the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) during the same month.
CPIB’s Initial Limitations
The British colonial government corrected its mistake by establishing the CPIB as a Type
A ACA outside police jurisdiction to replace the ACB in September 1952. However, in doing
so, the government committed another error when it failed to provide the CPIB with sufficient
legal powers and resources during its first eight years. The CPIB began operating in October
1952 with R. Middleton-Smith as director and a small team of 13 personnel that was expanded
two months later with an additional nine members (CPIB, 2012, 18).
The CPIB was ineffective during its early years because of its inadequate legal powers and
limited personnel. The POCO was deficient because its offences were not seizable and limited
the powers of arrest, search and investigation of police officers as warrants were required
before arrests could be made. Furthermore, the penalty of imprisonment for two years and/
or a fine of S$10,000 for those persons found guilty of corruption were inadequate deterrents
(Quah, 2011, 215). The POCO was amended in 1946 to make its offences seizable but it was
still ineffective as CPIB officers faced problems in collecting evidence which hindered their
investigations.
The second problem was that the CPIB’s personnel were mainly drawn from the SPF on
short secondment. This staffing arrangement was unsatisfactory because the “officers’ short
secondment and limited time and capacity to conduct thorough investigations, coupled with
the social stigma of investigating fellow police officers, undermined the effective operations
of the CPIB” (CPIB, 2012, 18). Apart from facing a conflict of interest and difficulty in inves-
tigating corruption complaints impartially against other police officers, the secondment of the
CPIB officers was also disruptive if they were posted back to the SPF before completing their
investigations.
The CPIB’s establishment in September 1952 as a Type A ACA independent of the SPF
removed to a large extent the conflict of interest faced by the ACB officers in investigating
corruption offences committed by police officers. However, the CPIB’s reliance on seconded
police officers during its first 11 years meant that these officers faced the same problem of
conflict of interest in investigating corruption complaints involving other police officers. This
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

problem was only resolved in 1963 when all the seconded police personnel were replaced with
civilian staff (Tan, 1967).
LEARNING FROM FAILURE: PAP GOVERNMENT’S

ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
After assuming office in June 1959, the then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew explained in his
memoirs why he and his colleagues were determined to keep Singapore free from corruption:
We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders… We had a deep
sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. When we took the oath of office… in
June 1959, we all wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolise purity and honesty in our personal
behaviour and our public life. (Lee, 2000, 182–4)
As corruption was widespread in Singapore when the PAP leaders assumed office, they
learned from the mistakes of the British colonial government in combating corruption and
demonstrated their strong political will by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA)
in June 1960 to replace the ineffective POCO and to strengthen the CPIB by providing it with
more legal powers, personnel and funding.
Prevention of Corruption Act
On 13 February 1960, the minister for home affairs, Ong Pang Boon, explained the rationale
for the Prevention of Corruption Bill when he moved for its second reading in the Legislative
Assembly:
The Prevention of Corruption Bill is in keeping with the new Government’s determination to
stamp out bribery and corruption in the country, especially in the public services… Therefore, this
Government is determined to take all possible steps to see that all necessary legislative and admin-
istrative measures are taken to reduce the opportunities for corruption, to make its detection easier
and to deter and punish severely those who are susceptible to it and who engage in it shamelessly.
Therefore, in this Bill, the Government is asking for new and wider powers to fight bribery and
corruption. As stated in the Explanatory Statement, the object of this Bill is to provide for the more
effective prevention of corruption by remedying various weaknesses and defects which experience
has revealed in the existing Prevention of Corruption Ordinance. This Bill, while directed mainly at
corruption in the public service, is applicable also to corruption by private agents, trustees and others
in a fiduciary capacity. (State of Singapore, 1960, cols 376–7)
The bill was supported by both government and opposition members in the Legislative
Assembly and was committed to a Select Committee after the second reading and was passed
on 17 June 1960.
The POCA has three important features that remove the POCO’s weaknesses, enhance
the CPIB’s legal powers and increase its personnel. First, the POCA has a broader scope
with 32 sections compared with the POCO’s 12 sections. The POCA’s second feature is that
corruption is defined explicitly in section 2 in terms of five forms of gratification. The third
and most important feature of the POCA is that it gives the CPIB more powers and a new
lease of life. Section 15 gives CPIB officers powers of arrest and search of arrested persons.
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

Section 18 empowers the public prosecutor to authorise CPIB officers to investigate “any bank
account, share account, purchase account, expense account or any other account, or any safe
deposit box in any bank” of any person suspected of having committed an offence against the
POCA. Section 20 enables CPIB officers to inspect a civil servant’s banker’s book and those
of his wife, child or agent, if necessary. Section 21 empowers the public prosecutor to obtain
information on an individual’s property, income tax and bank accounts from the relevant
government departments and banks. Police officers and CPIB officers are given powers of
search and seizure by section 22, which enables them to enter any suspected place and search,
seize and detain incriminating documents under a warrant issued by a magistrate or the CPIB’s
director. Section 24 is perhaps the most important asset for CPIB officers in their investigation
of corruption offences because it requires accused persons to account for their “pecuniary
resources or property” that are disproportionate to their known sources of income (Quah,
2011, 219–20). In short, the POCA has given the CPIB a new lease of life by entrusting it with
additional powers for performing its duties.
To ensure the POCA’s continued effectiveness, the PAP government has introduced, when-
ever necessary, amendments or new legislation to deal with unanticipated problems or to plug
legal loopholes. In 1963, the POCA was amended to include section 35 that gave the CPIB
officers the power to require the attendance of witnesses. The POCA was amended in 1966
to ensure that, according to section 37, Singapore citizens working for Singapore embassies
and government agencies abroad would be prosecuted for corrupt offences committed outside
Singapore and would be dealt with as if such offences had occurred within Singapore. In
1989, the POCA was amended to increase its deterrent effect by increasing the fine for corrupt
offences by ten times from S$10,000 to S$100,000 (Quah, 2011, 220–1). Teh Cheang Wan,
the minister for national development, committed suicide on 14 December 1986, 12 days
after he was interrogated for 16 hours by two senior CPIB officers regarding a complaint of
corruption made against him by a building contractor (Straits Times, 1987, 11). Teh’s suicide
led to a Commission of Inquiry and the enactment of the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits)
Act on 3 March 1989 that was designed “to provide for the confiscation of benefits derived
from corruption and for purposes connected therewith”. Section 4 stated that the court should
issue “a confiscation order against the defendant in respect of benefits derived from him from
corruption if the court is satisfied that such benefits have been so derived”. If a defendant is
deceased, the court would issue a confiscation order against his estate (Quah, 2011, 221).
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
The CPIB was established as a Type A ACA in September 1952 to prevent corruption in both
the public and private sectors in Singapore by performing these functions: (1) receiving and
investigating corruption complaints; (2) investigating corrupt malpractices and misconduct by
civil servants; and (3) preventing corruption by examining public service practices and proce-
dures to minimise opportunities for corrupt activities (CPIB, 2004, 3). The CPIB’s preventive
function was strengthened by its screening of candidates for appointment in the public sector
to ensure that only those candidates without any taint of corruption or misconduct are recruited
for positions in the civil service and statutory boards in Singapore (Quah, 2007, 21–2).
The CPIB adopts a “total approach to enforcement and investigation” by dealing with all
complaints of public- and private-sector corruption, regardless of the amount of the bribe, or
the rank or status of the bribe givers or takers, including anonymous complaints if there is
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Table 25.1 CPIB’s investigation of corruption complaints, 2010–17
Year No. of complaints No. of cases registered

received by CPIB for investigation (%)
2010 876 206 (23.5)
2011 757 138 (18.2)
2012 906 179 (19.8)
2013 792 152 (19.2)
2014 736 136 (18.5)
2015 877 132 (15.1)
2016 808 118 (14.6)
2017 778 103 (13.2)
Total 6,530 1,164 (17.8)
Source: Compiled by the author from CPIB (2011–18).
Table 25.2 CPIB’s talks to students and employees and hosting of foreign visitors,
2010–17
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Students 533 971 409 639 699
Employees 9,249 5,928 8,575 10,489 5,518
Foreign visitors 2,538 973 643 793 841
Total 12,320 7,872 9,627 11,921 7,058
Year 2015 2016 2017 Total (%)
Students 532 809 597 5,189 (7.1)
Employees 6,170 8,515 6,265 60,709 (82.0)
Foreign visitors 801 783 736 8,108 (10.9)
Total 7,503 10,107 7,598 74,006 (100)
sufficient information to initiate an investigation (Soh, 2008, 2–3). All corruption complaints
received by the CPIB are evaluated by the Complaints Evaluation Committee to determine
whether they fall under the CPIB’s purview and whether there is sufficient information for
investigation or other follow-up actions. Complaints that are beyond the CPIB’s purview are
referred to other relevant agencies in Singapore (CPIB, 2019). Table 25.1 shows that the CPIB
received a total of 6,530 complaints from 2010 to 2017 or an annual average of 816 complaints
during this period. However, only 1,164 cases (17.8 per cent) of these complaints received
were registered for investigation.
The CPIB’s preventive function also includes conducting prevention and education talks for
students and employees in the public and private sectors and hosting foreign visitors interested
in learning about Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy. Table 25.2 provides details of the
number of students and employees from the public and private sectors attending CPIB’s pre-
vention and education talks as well as the number of foreign visitors hosted by the CPIB from
2010 to 2017. Table 25.2 also shows that a total of 74,006 persons participated in the CPIB’s
outreach activities during this period, with the 60,709 public- and private-sector employees
(82%) constituting the largest group, followed by 8,108 foreign visitors (10.9%) and 5,189
students (7.1%).
Apart from Singapore’s consistently high performance on the CPI, which reflects its low
perceived extent of public-sector corruption, the CPIB’s effectiveness is also manifested in
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Table 25.3 CPIB’s clearance and conviction rates, 2012–17
Year Clearance rate (%) Conviction rate (%)

2012 76 98
2013 67 97
2014 77 96
2015 86 97
2016 80 100
2017 84 99
Average 78 98
Table 25.4 Public perceptions of CPIB’s effectiveness in 2016
Statements on the CPIB’s effectiveness Percentage of respondents in agreement (%)

The CPIB is effective in maintaining a low level of 78
corruption in Singapore
The CPIB has done well in solving corruption cases 76
The CPIB is impartial/fair in its investigations 71
I can trust the CPIB to keep Singapore corruption free 71
Source: CPIB (2017, 10).
its high clearance and conviction rates. Table 25.3 shows that the CPIB’s average clearance
rate is 78 per cent from 2012 to 2017 and its average conviction rate is 98 per cent for the
same period. The public perceptions survey of 1,001 respondents conducted during May to
June 2016 found that 89 per cent of the respondents rated Singapore’s anti-corruption efforts
positively (CPIB, 2017, 9). Table 25.4 provides further evidence of the respondents’ positive
assessment of the CPIB’s effectiveness.
LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
Bearing in mind the contextual differences between Singapore and other countries, there
are five lessons which these countries can learn from Singapore’s success in minimising
corruption.
Strong Dose of Political Will
Political will refers to the sustained commitment of political leaders to implement anti-corruption
policies and programmes to address the causes of corruption in their countries. The lack of
political will is the most important reason why many countries have failed to minimise cor-
ruption in spite of their anti-corruption efforts during the past six decades (Quah, 2015a, 53).
The first lesson is that a strong dose of political will is needed for effective corruption control
because politicians can change a culture of corruption by enacting the laws and allocating the
necessary resources for the ACA to enforce these laws. Indeed, Robert Rotberg (2017, 297,
299) contends that “political will is the single most crucial variable in any effective campaign
against corruption” and the “key ingredient in any recipe for corruption reduction is consum-
mate, resolute, political leadership”.
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Table 25.5 CPIB’s budget and personnel, 2011–17
CPIB 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Budget 18.9 20.3 23.4 29.3 25.2 27.4 30.1
(millions US$)
Personnel 123 138 156 205 212 210 217
Per capita 3.64 3.82 4.34 5.36 4.55 4.89 5.36
expenditure (US$)
Staff–population 1:42,146 1:38,493 1:34,609 1:26,682 1:26,108 1:26,700 1:25,862
ratio
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the CPIB’s budget and personnel provided in Republic of
Singapore (2013–19).
As combating corruption is expensive, the ACA needs adequate budget and personnel to
implement the anti-corruption laws impartially without political interference. There are two
indicators for assessing whether an ACA has been provided with sufficient resources by the
government to perform its functions: (1) per capita expenditure: the ACA’s budget for a year
divided by the total population in the country for the same year; and (2) staff–population
ratio: the population in the country for a year divided by the number of ACA personnel for
the same year (Quah, 2009b, 182). The PAP government’s strong political will is reflected in
the increase in the CPIB’s per capita expenditure from US$3.64 in 2011 to US$5.36 in 2017
and the improvement of its staff–population ratio from 1:42,146 to 1:25,862 during the same
period, as shown in Table 25.5.
A comparison of the budgets and personnel of seven Asian ACAs in 2014 in Table 25.6
confirms that the strong political will of the governments in Hong Kong and Singapore
is reflected in the higher per capita expenditures of the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC) and the CPIB, respectively, and their favourable staff–population ratios.
By contrast, the weak political will of South Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights
Commission (ACRC), Taiwan’s Agency Against Corruption (AAC), the Philippines’ Office
of the Ombudsman (OMB), Indonesia’s Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) and India’s
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) can be seen from their lower per capita expenditures and
unfavourable staff–population ratios. Furthermore, Table 25.6 also shows that the CPI scores
for Singapore and Hong Kong are much higher than those of the other five countries in 2018.
Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Legislation
The second lesson is that the government must enact comprehensive anti-corruption laws
to provide the ACA with the required legal powers to perform its functions effectively.
Singapore’s experience shows that there was a 66 year delay from the introduction of the
Penal Code, which made corruption an offence in 1871, to the enactment of the POCO in
1937. However, the POCO had only 12 sections and was ineffective because its offences were
not seizable and limited the powers of arrest, search and investigation of police officers as
warrants were required before arrests were made. The second weakness was that the penalty of
imprisonment for two years and/or a fine of S$10,000 for those found guilty of corruption did
not deter corrupt behaviour. These limitations of the POCO were rectified with the enactment
of the POCA in 1960 which entrusted the CPIB officers with the necessary legal powers for
performing their duties effectively. As no anti-corruption law is perfect no matter how com-
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Table 25.6 Budgets and personnel of seven ACAs in 2014
Anti-corruption Per capita

Budget Staff–population CPI 2018
agency Personnel expenditure
(in millions US$) ratio rank and score
(US$)
ICAC
120.14 1,358 16.59 1:5,333 14th (76)
(Hong Kong)
CPIB
29.30 205 5.36 1:26,682 3rd (85)
(Singapore)
ACRC
58.30 465 1.15 1:108,430 45th (57)
(South Korea)
AAC
14.40 240 0.61 1:97,641 31st (63)
(Taiwan)
OMB
38.80 1,214 0.39 1:81,631 99th (36)
(Philippines)
KPK
50.17 1,102 0.19 1:230,943 89th (38)
(Indonesia)
CBI
65.50 5,676 0.05 1:228,206 78th (41)
(India)
Note: The CPI 2018 covers 180 countries and its score ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the budgets and personnel of the ACAs; Transparency
International (2019, 2–3).
prehensive, Singapore’s experience also illustrates the importance of reviewing periodically

the anti-corruption legislation when necessary to introduce amendments or new laws to plug
legal loopholes or deal with unintended consequences.
Unlike Singapore, Japan has a plethora of anti-corruption laws but no ACA to implement
these laws. More specifically, Japan relies on chapter 25, Crimes of Corruption, Articles
193–8 and provisions for bribery in laws such as the Horse Racing Law, the Cycle Racing
Law, the Bankruptcy Law and the Corporate Reorganisation Law, to mention four examples.
Other important laws include the National Public Service Ethics Act of 1999, the Political
Funds Control Law of 1948 and many laws regulating public bidding and public procurement
in Japan (Quah, 2011, 61–4). Similarly, Taiwan, which was colonised by Japan from 1895 to
1945, relies on the Anti-Corruption Statute of 1963, the Government Procurement Act of 1998
and Articles 142–8 of the Criminal Code and electoral laws making vote buying an offence
(Quah, 2011, 188–90).
Learning from Singapore’s experience, Japan should introduce a comprehensive
anti-corruption law like the POCA instead of relying on chapter 25 of the Penal Code and
many specific anti-corruption laws. Japan signed the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC) on 9 December 2003 but has still not ratified the UNCAC after accept-
ing it on 11 July 2017. Japan’s 16-year delay in ratifying the UNCAC reflects its government’s
reluctance to minimise structural corruption among the politicians, bureaucrats and business-
men by continuing to rely on the inadequately staffed Special Investigation Departments of
the Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya to investigate bribery cases
(Quah, 2011, 64–5). As Articles 6 and 36 of the UNCAC require its signatories to establish an
independent ACA with trained personnel and resources to perform anti-corruption functions,
Japan’s inordinate delay in ratifying the UNCAC indicates its government’s reluctance to
create an ACA. When the Japanese government decides to ratify the UNCAC it should intro-
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Table 25.7 Type of ACAs in Asian countries and their performance on the CPI 2018
Type A anti-corruption agencies (N=15) CPI 2018 rank and score

Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 3rd (85)
Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption 14th (76)
Brunei Darussalam’s Anti-Corruption Bureau 31st (63)
Taiwan’s Agency Against Corruption 31st (63)
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission 61st (47)
Indonesia’s Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 89th (38)
Sri Lanka’s Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption 89th (38)
Mongolia’s Independent Authority Against Corruption 93rd (37)
Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Commission 99th (36)
Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau 117th (33)
Maldives’ Anti-Corruption Commission 124th (31)
Nepal’s Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority 124th (31)
Myanmar’s Anti-Corruption Commission 132nd (29)
Bangladesh’s Anti-Corruption Commission 149th (26)
Cambodia’s Anti-Corruption Unit 161st (20)
Type B anti-corruption agencies (N=8) CPI 2018 rank and score
South Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission 45th (57)
India’s Central Bureau of Investigation 78th (41)
China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 87th (39)
Philippines’ Office of the Ombudsman 99th (36)
Timor-Leste’s Commission Against Corruption 105th (35)
Vietnam’s Government Inspectorate 117th (33)
Lao PDR’s Government Inspection Authority 132nd (29)
Afghanistan’s High Office for Oversight and Anti-Corruption 172nd (16)
Note: The CPI 2018 covers 180 countries and its score ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Source: Compiled by the author and Transparency International (2019, 2–3).
duce a comprehensive anti-corruption law to establish an independent ACA and include other
relevant articles on its legal powers and resources.
Establish a Type A ACA as an Independent Watchdog
When a government decides to establish an ACA, it has three decisions to make. The first
decision is that it should learn from the experiences of Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan,
Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam and avoid establishing multiple ACAs. Second, it has to
establish a Type A ACA that focuses exclusively on the performance of anti-corruption func-
tions instead of a Type B ACA that performs both anti-corruption- and non-corruption-related
functions. Table 25.7 shows that there are 15 Type A ACAs and eight Type B ACAs among
the 23 Asian countries. Except for Singapore’s CPIB and Hong Kong’s ICAC, both of which
are Type A ACAs with respective CPI scores of 85 and 76, all the remaining Type A ACAs
and Type B ACAs have lower CPI scores in 2018. Singapore’s experience shows that estab-
lishing a Type A ACA does not guarantee success unless the government has the political will
to provide it with the necessary legal powers, resources and operational autonomy to perform
its anti-corruption functions effectively.
Third, the government has to decide what role the Type A ACA should play. If the govern-
ment has the political will to curb corruption, it should ensure that the Type A ACA is provided
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Table 25.8 Three roles of anti-corruption agencies
Role of anti-corruption agency Examples

Singapore’s CPIB
Independent watchdog Hong Kong’s ICAC
Indonesia’s KPK
Bangladesh’s ACC
Cambodia’s ACU
China’s CCDI
Attack dog India’s CBI
Myanmar’s ACC
Pakistan’s NAB
Vietnam’s GI
Afghanistan’s HOOAC
India’s CBI
Paper tiger Philippines’ OMB
South Korea’s ACRC
Taiwan’s AAC
Source: Compiled by the author.
with the required legal powers, resources and operational autonomy to act as an independent
watchdog that enforces the anti-corruption laws impartially, without fear or favour. This most
desirable role of an independent watchdog is performed by Singapore’s CPIB, Hong Kong’s
ICAC and Indonesia’s KPK, as shown in Table 25.8.
On the other hand, if the government lacks the political will to minimise corruption, it is
likely to succumb to the temptation to rely on the Type A ACA as an attack dog to discredit
political opponents and settle political scores. This role of the Type A as an attack dog is
undesirable and should be avoided because it undermines public trust in the government and
its legitimacy. Unfortunately, Table 25.8 indicates that the reliance on ACAs as attack dogs is
a common practice in Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and Vietnam.
For example, in China, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is used as an
attack dog by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders against their political opponents to
undermine their power base (Quah, 2015b, 74–81).
The third role of a Type A ACA as a paper tiger is also undesirable because it reflects
the government’s weak political will to combat corruption by not providing the ACA with
the necessary legal powers, budget, personnel and operational autonomy to enforce the
anti-corruption laws impartially. South Korea’s Independent Commission Against Corruption
(KICAC) was established on 25 January 2002 as a “poor cousin” or weak replica of Hong
Kong’s ICAC, because it could not investigate corruption cases. A similar problem afflicted its
successor, the ACRC, which was formed in February 2008 with the merger of the KICAC with
the Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals Commission. The ACRC inherited the KICAC’s
Achilles’ heel of being unable to investigate corruption cases and became a Type B ACA.
South Korea’s inability to improve its CPI score beyond the range 53 to 57 between 2002 and
2018 reflects its failure to curb corruption and an indictment of its futile strategy of relying on
such paper tigers as the KICAC and ACRC during these 16 years. South Korea’s experience
confirms the futility of establishing a “toothless” ACA to combat corruption.
Another example of a paper tiger is the OMB in the Philippines, which was severely hand-
icapped by a staff shortage of 980 vacant positions (or 45% of its establishment), a low per
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

capita expenditure of US$0.39 and an unfavourable staff–population ratio of 1:81,631 in 2014.

Table 25.8 also shows that India’s CBI has the distinction of being the only Type B ACA that
is both an attack dog and a paper tiger. The CBI is an attack dog as it is perceived by the public
as “a pliable tool of the ruling party and its investigations tend to become cover-up operations
for the misdeeds of ministers” (Gill, 1998, 238). Furthermore, according to the former central
vigilance commissioner N. Vittal (2012, 133–4), the CBI lacks independence and credibility
because it is “a football between the party in power and the party in opposition” as the cases
initiated by one regime are neutralised by the next. The CBI is also a paper tiger because it was
handicapped by a staff shortage of 1,000 vacant positions (or 15% of its establishment), a low
per capita expenditure of US$0.05 and an unfavourable staff–population ratio of 1:228,206 in
2014 (Quah, 2016a, 23–4).
In short, the third lesson is that a government concerned with minimising corruption should
establish a Type A ACA as an independent watchdog and not as an attack dog or a paper tiger.
Police Should Not Be Used to Curb Corruption
Police corruption was widespread in Britain in 1829 because police officers were “so ill paid”
(Doig, 1984, 50). Police corruption was also rampant in Singapore during the British colonial
period as documented by the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry. As police corruption
was a problem in both Britain and Singapore during the nineteenth century, it is surprising and
puzzling that the British colonial government decided to make the ACB of the SPF responsible
for corruption control. The folly of this decision was exposed by the ACB’s failure and the
Opium Hijacking scandal, which resulted in the establishment of the CPIB in September 1952.
Singapore’s breakthrough in combating corruption resulted from its rejection of the British
colonial government’s dependence on the police to curb corruption and its reliance instead on
a Type A ACA – the CPIB – that is independent of the police. Similarly, the British colonial
government formed the ACB in 1948 as part of the CID of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force
(RHKPF) to combat corruption (Kuan, 1971, 24). The ACB was separated from the CID in
1952 but was still part of the RHKPF and upgraded into an Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) in
1971. However, the ACO’s credibility was undermined on 8 June 1973, when a corruption
suspect, Chief Superintendent Peter F. Godber, escaped to Britain while he was under inves-
tigation. Godber’s escape angered the public and the government responded by appointing
the Blair-Kerr Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances leading to his escape.
Consequently, Governor Sir Murray MacLehose was forced by public criticism to accept the
Blair-Kerr Commission’s recommendation to establish an independent agency, separate from
the RHKPF, to fight corruption. Accordingly, the ICAC was formed on 15 February 1974
(Lethbridge, 1985, 82–103).
Police corruption remains a chronic problem that hinders the effectiveness of the ACAs in
many Asian countries (Quah, 2017b, 19–20). Singapore took 15 years (1937–52) and Hong
Kong took 26 years (1948–74) to learn this important lesson: do not rely on the police to
curb corruption, especially when police corruption is rampant as “this would be like giving
candy to a child” and expecting him or her not to eat it (Quah, 2004, 2). According to the
Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the police are the second most corrupt institution in India
with a 4.1 score after political parties with a 4.4 score (Hardoon and Heinrich, 2013, 36).
Unfortunately, the government of India has not learnt this important lesson even after 56 years
as it still relies on the CBI, which is a police agency formed in April 1963 to combat corruption
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

in the midst of widespread police corruption in India. Apart from being a Type B ACA that
is a paper tiger and an attack dog, the CBI is also handicapped by the conflict of interest in
investigating and prosecuting police officers accused of corruption offences.
Thus, the fourth lesson is that the government should not rely on the police to combat cor-
ruption in those countries where police corruption is rampant.
Punish Corrupt Offenders
As corruption is an offence, the most effective way to minimise it is to punish those found
guilty of committing corrupt acts. Singapore’s experience illustrates the importance of pun-
ishing corrupt offenders, regardless of their status, position or political affiliation, in order to
deter others from being involved in corruption. During the British colonial period, corruption
was perceived by the population in Singapore as a low-risk, high-reward activity as the proba-
bility of being detected and punished for corrupt offences was low because of the ACB’s inef-
fectiveness. However, the empowerment of the CPIB by the enactment of the POCA by the
PAP government in June 1960 transformed the public perception of corruption in Singapore
to a high-risk, low-reward activity. In other words, Singapore has succeeded in minimising
corruption during the past six decades because the CPIB has enforced the POCA impartially
so that those persons found guilty of corrupt offences are punished, regardless of who they are.
In 1979, the late prime minister Lee Kuan Yew identified the important lesson of staying
clean and dismissing the venal after 20 years in government (Lee, 1979, 38). The CPIB
enforced the POCA impartially by not hesitating to investigate allegations of corruption
against political leaders and senior civil servants in Singapore. Table 25.9 provides details of
the five PAP leaders who were investigated for corruption offences by the CPIB from 1966
to 2016 and the results of the investigations. The most notable case involves Phey Yew Kok,
the president of the National Trades Union Congress and the PAP member of parliament
for Boon Teck constituency, who was accused in May 1979 of a criminal breach of trust of
S$101,000. However, he jumped bail in January 1980 and escaped to Thailand and remained
a fugitive until his surrender at the Singapore Embassy in Bangkok in June 2015. Even though
Phey was 81 years old, he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in January 2016. He
was released in October 2018 after spending a year in home detention. Phey’s conviction and
imprisonment after being a fugitive abroad for 35 years illustrates the consistency and strength
of Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy.
The CPIB and the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) investigated eight senior civil
servants in Singapore for corruption offences from 1991 to 2014 (Quah, 2015c, 81). In 1995,
Choy Hon Tim, deputy chief executive (operations) of the Public Utilities Board, was accused
of accepting bribes of S$13.85 million from contractors. He was found guilty and sentenced
to 14 years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay back S$13.85 million. The other important case
was the conviction of Edwin Yeo, the CPIB’s assistant director, who was found guilty of
misappropriating S$1.76 million during 2008–12, and sentenced to ten years’ jail in February
2014. Yeo’s misappropriation of S$1.76 million without being discovered for almost four
years indicates the ineffectiveness of the CPIB’s internal controls and tarnished its reputation.
On the other hand, the CAD’s impartial investigation of Yeo’s misconduct in July 2013 and
his conviction in February 2014 shows that there is no cover-up of Yeo’s scandal and that
anyone found guilty is punished according to the law regardless of his or her position, status
or political affiliation.
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

Table 25.9 CPIB’s investigation of five PAP leaders in Singapore, 1966–2016
Name and designation Details of offence Results of investigation

Tan Kia Gan, Minister for Accused in August 1966 of helping his Tan was not convicted as the witnesses did not
National Development friend in the sale of Boeing aircraft to testify against him but he was stripped of all his
Malaysian Airways. public appointments in November 1966.
Wee Toon Boon, Minister of State for Accused in April 1975 of accepting Wee was found guilty and sentenced to 4.5
Environment bribes from a property developer. years of imprisonment and a fine of S$7,021.
His jail sentence was reduced to 18 months
on successful appeal against one of the five
charges.
Phey Yew Kok, President of National Accused in May 1979 of criminal Phey jumped bail in January 1980 and fled to
Trade Union Congress and PAP breach of trust of S$101,000. With Thailand and was a fugitive for 35 years until
Member of Parliament for Boon Teck the 28 additional charges in July he surrendered at the Singapore Embassy in
constituency 2015, Phey faced a total of 34 charges Bangkok in June 2015. He was sentenced to five
involving more than S$450,000. years’ imprisonment in January 2016 and was
released in October 2018 after serving the last
year in home detention.
Teh Cheang Wan, Minister for National Accused in November 1986 of Teh was interrogated by CPIB officers but he
Development accepting S$1 million in bribes from committed suicide in December 1986 before he
two property developers. could be charged in court.
Choo Wee Khiang, President of Accused in 1999 of cheating. In Choo resigned from his position and the PAP in
Singapore Table Tennis Association and December 2011, he was charged with 1999 before pleading guilty. He was sentenced
PAP Member of Parliament from 1988 three counts of corruption and one to two weeks’ jail and fined S$10,000. He was
to 1999 count of criminal breach of trust. acquitted in July 2013 of criminal breach of
trust, and in April 2014 of the three corruption
charges.
Source: Compiled by the author from CPIB (2003, 6.45–6.47); Sim (2011); Chong (2014, p. A2); and Seow (2016).
Corruption is perceived by the population as a low-risk, high-reward activity in South Korea

because those persons found guilty of corruption offences are not punished severely as they
are usually pardoned by the president. For example, President Lee Myung-bak granted special
pardons on 29 January 2013 to 55 persons who were imprisoned for bribery. The lenient
punishment of South Korean corrupt civil servants and political leaders sends the wrong
signal to their honest counterparts and the population at large because it makes a mockery of
the anti-corruption laws and encourages others to become corrupt as the probability of being
caught and punished is low (Quah, 2017c, 25–7). Learning from Singapore’s success in com-
bating corruption, South Korea’s president should refrain from pardoning convicted corrupt
politicians and officials and granting them amnesty as this makes corruption a low-risk,
high-reward activity. In other words, the fifth lesson for governments to minimise corruption
in South Korea and other countries is that they must punish those persons found guilty of cor-
ruption without exception and reward those persons who have abstained from being corrupt.
CONCLUSION
Singapore has succeeded in minimising corruption because the PAP government has avoided
the two mistakes of the British colonial government and has the strong political will to provide
the CPIB with the necessary legal powers, budget, personnel and operational autonomy to
Jon S.T. Quah - 9781789900910

enforce the POCA impartially by punishing corrupt offenders regardless of their position,
status or political affiliation. In other words, Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe con-
sists of a strong dose of political will, comprehensive anti-corruption legislation, relying on
the CPIB instead of the police as an independent watchdog and punishing those persons found
guilty according to the law, without exception, fear or favour.
Policy makers interested in applying Singapore’s anti-corruption recipe to minimise corrup-
tion in their countries must first ascertain the contextual differences between Singapore and
their countries. Singapore is an affluent politically stable city-state with a land area of 719 sq.
km, a population of 5.63 million and gross domestic product per capita of US$64,581 in 2018.
The relevance of Singapore’s anti-corruption recipe would depend on the extent to which the
policy contexts in other countries approximate Singapore’s policy context. This means that
larger countries like China and India with huge populations would have difficulty in adopting
in toto Singapore’s recipe for curbing corruption.
The second and more important consideration is whether those policy makers interested
in applying Singapore’s anti-corruption recipe have the strong political will to allocate the
required resources and mobilise the needed support from the various stakeholders in their
countries. For example, is India willing to learn from Singapore’s experience and replace
the CBI with an independent Type A ACA? (Quah, 2016a, 25–6). Similarly, learning from
Singapore’s experience, China will only succeed in minimising corruption if the CCP leaders
are willing to introduce checks on their power and initiate reforms to address the causes of cor-
ruption. It is highly unlikely that President Xi Jinping and other CCP leaders would be willing
to pay the exorbitant price required for minimising corruption in China because the implemen-
tation of the necessary anti-corruption reforms could lead to the CCP’s demise (Quah, 2016b,
209). In short, do political leaders elsewhere have the strong political will to pay the high
political and economic costs of implementing Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe in
their countries?
Finally, Singapore’s experience in combating corruption confirms the importance of having
an effective civil service and sound public administration. When the PAP leaders assumed
office in June 1959, they had to contend with improving Singapore’s economic growth to
address the high unemployment rate, reforming the civil service to contribute to national
development by removing its “colonial mentality” and to minimise the widespread corruption
by enacting the POCA in June 1960 to empower the CPIB’s capacity as a Type A ACA.
Singapore’s success as an affluent city-state today is reflected in its high gross domestic
product per capita of US$64,581, its top ranking on the World Bank’s governance indicator
on government effectiveness in 2017 and its status as the least corrupt Asian country on
Transparency International’s CPI from 1995 to 2018.
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CPIB (2011–18), Annual Report 2010–2017, Singapore: Prime Minister’s Office.
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CPIB (2012), The Journey: 60 Years of Fighting Corruption in Singapore, Singapore: CPIB.
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Penguin.
Gill, S.S. (1998), The Pathology of Corruption, New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India.
Hardoon, Deborah and Heinrich, Finn. (2013), Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Berlin: Transparency
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Kuan, H.C. (1971), “Anti-corruption legislation in Hong Kong: A history”, in Rance P.L. Lee (ed.),
Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 15–43.
Lee Kuan Yew (1979), “What of the past is relevant to the future?”, in People’s Action Party, People’s
Action Party, 1954–1979, Singapore: PAP Central Executive Committee, pp. 30–43.
Lee, Kuan Yew (2000), From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965–2000, Singapore: Times
Media.
Lethbridge, H.J. (1985), Hard Graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, Corruption and the ICAC, Hong Kong:
Punch, Maurice (2009), Police Corruption: Deviance, Accountability and Reform in Policing, London:
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Quah, Jon S.T. (1978), Administrative and Legal Measures for Combating Bureaucratic Corruption in
Singapore, Singapore: Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, Occasional Paper
No. 34.
Quah, Jon S.T. (1979), “Police corruption in Singapore: An analysis of its forms, extent and causes”,
Singapore Police Force, 10 (1), 7–43.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2004), “Best practices for curbing corruption in Asia” Governance Brief, 11, 1–4.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2007), Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Countries,
Baltimore, MD: School of Law, University of Maryland.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2009a), “Governance and corruption: Exploring the connection”, American Journal of
Chinese Studies, 16 (2), 119–35.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2009b), “Benchmarking for excellence: A comparative analysis of seven Asian
anti-corruption agencies”, Asian Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 31 (2), 171–95.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2010), Public Administration Singapore-Style, Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2011), Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? Bingley:
Emerald Group Publishing.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2015a), “The normalisation of corruption: Why it occurs and what can be done to minimise
it”, paper prepared for the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2015b), Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015), Baltimore, MD: Carey School
of Law, University of Maryland.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2015c), “Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau: Four suggestions for
enhancing its effectiveness”, Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1), 76–100.
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ness”, Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal, 19 (2), 10–30.
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Agencies, Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Maryland.
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Performance and Challenges, Berlin: Report prepared for Transparency International.
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mendations for South Korea”, Asian Education and Development Studies, 6 (1), 17–29.
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Singapore: Budget Division, Ministry of Finance.
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Straits Times, 22 January.
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26. The Netherlands: an impression of corruption
in a less corrupt country
Willeke Slingerland and Gjalt de Graaf
PUBLIC-SECTOR CORRUPTION IN THE NETHERLANDS
Typically, the Dutch have always approached the prevention of corruption through integrity
policies that aim to prevent unethical behavior and misconduct and to promote an ethical
(working) environment (Huberts and Hoekstra, 2016).1 The Netherlands has consistently been
high on the Corruption Perceptions Index and, comparatively speaking, there is still signifi-
cant attention paid to integrity. Yet, many Dutch citizens are critical of public administration
and are cynical about politics (De Graaf and Huberts, 2011). Although bribery appears to be
uncommon in the Netherlands, there are growing concerns that the country is more corrupt
than one would think at first glance. This chapter will provide a short overview of the current
state of corruption in the Netherlands where, since 2012, several cases have hit the headlines.
These have been major cases concerning corruption in municipalities and provinces and where
prominent municipal and provincial politicians and others (family, friends, or fellow politi-
cians) have been convicted of corruption after it became known that they had taken bribes. The
bribes, from private organizations such as project developers and banks, have taken various
forms (e.g. money, leisure activities, or confidential information). Other recent cases concern
corruption within the national police force, the defense sector, and the port of Rotterdam. The
corruption scandals within the national police force and the defense sector mostly concerned
the payment of bribes by the private sector in order to “win” public contracts, while the
corruption which takes place at the port of Rotterdam is related to subversive crime, a crime
which is relatively “new” in the Netherlands. Here, bribes are paid to border control staff to
allow drug trafficking to take place. Although the corruption examples vary, there are some
characteristics to be distinguished in these Dutch manifestations of corruption.
Profile of the Dutch Corruptor
In general, those Dutch civil servants who are found to be susceptible to corruption tend not
to be low-profile officials, but rather personalities with a reputation within the civil service
organization for being noticeable, flamboyant, and astute “fixers” (De Graaf et al., 2008).
They frequently already possess or else demand the freedom to make arrangements on their
own authority and are known as thorough and enterprising individuals.
The research material further shows that the briber and the bribed usually know each other
well before the violation of integrity occurs. Their acquaintance is not confined to business or
instrumental relationships, because an element of friendship or affection is regularly involved.
Trust plays a role in this context and is pivotal to prolonged corruption relationships. It is no
coincidence that bridges are sometimes built between civil servants and the outside world via
partners, family members, or friends. Corruption in these situations does not so much stem
377
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Table 26.1 Perceived violations per category
Type of violation Frequency Percentage

Conflict of (private or public) interest
13 1.0
through gifts
Private time misconduct 31 1.0
Conflict of (private or public) interest
128 6.0
through sideline activities
Misuse of information 137 6.0
Corruption/bribery 147 7.0
Fraud, theft, or embezzlement 176 8.0
Waste or abuse of resources 427 20.0
Abuse of authority 527 24.0
Inappropriate behavior 568 26.0
Total 2154 99.0
from a civil servant who is out to make a profit, but more likely ensues from a conflict between
the moral obligations in the official’s own micro-sphere (the circle of family and friends) and
the ethics of public administration. As such, its nature is similar to that of conflict of interest.
Taken-for-granted close relationships between governmental organizations and the private
sector also play a role in several cases (Van den Heuvel et al., 2002). There is a collision of
moral values and expectations, each with its own logic and comprehensibility. If a civil servant
or politician is unable to deal with this situation, there will be the risk of a conflict of interest,
one that is unacceptable in terms of the public interest.
The close interweaving of the public and private sectors also plays a role in some cases.
Having professional and private dealings with stakeholder businesses creates blurred dividing
lines and problems, with the inevitable risk of corruption. The relationship between doing
something and something being done in return is often an indirect one. Services or favors are
exchanged in a prolonged relationship, but the exchange does not occur at the same time or as
a direct quid pro quo.
Corrupt officials, including those who operate outside so-called corrupt networks, usually
do not limit their corruption to one incident.
Recent Empirical Research
Recent evidence suggests corruption is not the largest category of integrity violations in the
Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2018). This evidence comes from a survey of Dutch civil serv-
ants. Of the total of 7,315 respondents who completed the survey, 2,035 respondents reported
suspicion(s) of integrity violations in their direct working environment in the preceding two
years (nearly 28%), corruption is about 7 percent of the perceived violations, see Table 26.1.
Corruption is seen in this research as an abuse of power that involves bribery and yields
personal benefits. When a public servant is corrupt, they operate in the interest of an external
or third party because certain benefits were promised or given to them. Those benefits might
have been offered by the third party or requested by the public servant. Additionally, benefits
need not only be monetary, but can also be indirect personal favors or gains; for example for
one’s political party, family, or friends. Corruption in the form of cronyism involves behavior
that yields benefits for family, friends, or acquaintances.

The Netherlands 379
Within the sample, 147 cases of corruption were discerned, the majority of which (133) can
be classified as cronyism. Relative to the dataset, the total number of corruption cases is quite
substantial and can be described as what Van den Heuvel et al. (2002) refer to as “corruption
in the polder” (meaning typical Dutch corruption). Instances that were reported in this cate-
gory relate to jobs or assignments that were granted to acquaintances and friends. Examples
include: “Appointing people who are acquaintances of the policy makers”; “A colleague was
deliberately assessed negatively in order to open the way for the appointment of the (unem-
ployed) partner of another colleague”.
When respondents describe cases where certain commissioned work was granted to
acquaintances, they often mention that the “perpetrators” did not comply with (European)
procurement regulations. This was also mentioned a few times within the category of abuse of
authority. Combining both categories, there are in total 22 cases where respondents reported
a violation that related to non-compliance with procurement regulations. An example is:
“Favoring a partner of an executive by granting them an assignment outside of the procure-
ment and acquisition rules”.
The last subcategory created was that of corruption in the form of bribery involving money
or goods (14). “A high level manager went on a trip to the USA under the guise of customer
research at the invitation of, and paid by, a supplier. Reported it to the board and a confidential
counsellor, nothing was done with it. Subsequently, millions were spent in trade with this
supplier”; “Junkets that could be linked to sizeable commissions”.
What stands out is that a substantial proportion of respondents say that they have experi-
enced inappropriate and ill-mannered behavior and relatively “small” violations such as prof-
iting at the expense of the organization (fraud, abuse of resources) through non-compliance
with working-hour regulations, or by abuse of the organization’s resources. When one thinks
of integrity violations in public governance, the first thing that often comes to mind is fraud
or corruption; the sample demonstrates that integrity violation is wider than that and that other
areas merit attention. Fraud and corruption together amount to 15 percent of the violations
described in the sample. In the research among council clerks by Huberts et al. (2012), 23
percent of the internal investigations were seen to be about corruption or fraud. In the research
mentioned, it was demonstrated that the majority of investigations were into different types
of violation, mainly inappropriate behavior, followed by fraud, abuse of resources, and trans-
gressing rules.
HOW CORRUPTION AFFECTS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
In the Netherlands, integrity policies are in place in most public-sector organizations. This
ranges from the duty requiring civil servants and public office holders to register additional
attendance at functions, gifts received, or travel at the request of third parties, to a code of
conduct for civil servants and public officials and the implementation of the public procure-
ment rules. These diverse integrity instruments all aim to prevent public administration being
influenced in a way which is unlawful or undue. As such, there is a focus on the individual
responsibility of a public official to act with integrity. This individual responsibility is some-
thing which we can comprehend. We also tend to categorize integrity violations by consid-
ering what a specific public official actually did in a certain case. In reality it is not always
possible to distinguish the action of a corrupt individual in large corruption cases.

Struggling with Corruption-Related Definitions
From a legal point of view, it is already considered (passive) bribery if one receives a gift or
a promise of any sort that raises the receiver’s suspicions that it is being done with the intent
of extracting a favor in return in the future.2 In practice, such provisions create difficulty in
prosecution and sentencing in the Netherlands. This has led to a well-known case where the
court of first instance convicted a candidate for the position of mayor for bribery, without any
concrete proof of a return favor. This candidate had received a phone call from a party affiliate
who was part of the advisory committee giving confidential information about what to expect
during the interview. The Dutch court convicted the candidate on the ground of corruption,
and imposed a sentence of 120 hours’ community service because, even though he had not
asked for the information, he should have ended the telephone call he had received. However,
during the appeal case, the applicant for the position of mayor was convicted of complicity in
breaking confidentiality agreements, but the appeal court ruled that it had not been established
that the party affiliate sought anything in return for the information and therefore passive
(public) corruption could not be proven (ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:533). This case was not
a stand-alone case. It was part of a larger case in which many key figures were involved and
in which corruption and other integrity violations took place. The public prosecutors described
the case as indicative of a “world of favoritism, bribery, and corruption” (De Stentor, 2017).
This phrasing is interesting because it distinguishes bribery from corruption.
Such corruption cases, relating to any of the other integrity violations, have a serious impact
on public trust in public administration. In the Netherlands, integrity is regarded as one of
the most important values in good governance. It is strongly related to public trust in the
government and the legitimacy of its institutions and actions (Hagedoorn and Hermus, 2016).
All integrity violations harm public trust in government, with corruption having the greatest
impact.
With the delayed quid quo pro in mind which is typical of the Dutch “polder corruption” it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish an act of cronyism from bribery, the violation of procurement
rules, and even conflict of interest. Each example of preferential treatment could potentially be
labeled as corruption. This raises questions about the role of networks, dense relationships, and
connections in which this corruption and other forms of abuse occur. Dutch integrity policies
aim to prevent corruption that emerges in close personal relationships or from the ties between
governmental organizations and the private sector. From a Dutch criminal law perspective, it
is difficult to address networks and dense relationships in which corruption emerges.
Bribery and That Other Form of Corruption – Trading in Influence
The Dutch Criminal Code does not provide a definition of corruption. Most international
conventions against corruption include provisions on the criminalization of the various forms
of corruption, thereby distinguishing public-sector from private-sector bribery, active from
passive bribery, and bribery involving civil servants from non-civil servant bribery. Those
common forms of bribery are all laid down in the Dutch Criminal Code.3 Trading in influ-
ence, or influence peddling, is a separate form of corruption defined in the United Nations
Convention against Corruption4 and the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (1999).5 According to the Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe, trading in
influence was included in the convention “to reach the close circle of the official or the politi-

The Netherlands 381
cal party to which he belongs and to tackle the corrupt behavior of those persons who are in the
neighborhood of power and try to obtain advantages from their situation, contributing to the
atmosphere of corruption” (Council of Europe, 2009). There are no such specific provisions
on trading in influence in the Dutch legislation. The Dutch government considers the crimi-
nalization of bribery in the Criminal Code to provide sufficient possibility of prosecuting the
improper exercise of influence in order to obtain undue advantage. However, both the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime review team and the Council of Europe Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO) continue to encourage the national authorities to reconsider
establishing trading in influence as an offence under Dutch legislation (United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, 2004).
It is clear that the call to criminalize trading in influence is an attempt by the United Nations
and GRECO to capture corruption which is more sophisticated and collective in nature than
bribery. The Dutch authorities maintain that certain forms of influence (whether financial
or not) over the decisions made by public officials or politicians may indeed be lawful, for
instance where representatives of interest groups perform lobbying activities. The bounds
of propriety are only overstepped when the lobbying or the attempt to exert influence results
in holding out the prospect of specific advantages to public officials who are involved in the
decision-making process (Slingerland, 2011). This element of “specific advantage”, “specific
reciprocity”, or “quid pro quo” seems to be contrary to the definition of passive bribery in the
Dutch Criminal Code.
Empirical research has shown that bribery is not taking place on a large scale. On the con-
trary, cronyism, favoritism, collusion, and conflict of interest are more of a concern. Although
trading in influence/influence peddling is an ambitious and not fully developed concept with
the United Nations, the Council of Europe and its member states, its description is a step in the
direction of the corruption with which the Netherlands is confronted: corruption that is linked
to informal social networks (Slingerland, 2019). The legal definitions in the United Nations
and the Council of Europe’s Conventions are formulated in such a way that bribery is brought
back to an individual act, and trading in influence seeks to include an element of the collective
or a form of organization.
Although it is common to seek to place the blame on the individuals closest to the act of
integrity violation or corrupt conduct, the fact that many individuals might have been con-
nected, be it family, friends, or other connections or bridges, and that it was these connections
that led to various serious wrongdoings, is difficult to process. While the categorization of
integrity violations in the survey provides a valuable overview of the number of cases linked
to corruption in comparison with, for instance, conflict of interest, this overview does not take
into consideration the fact that in most corruption cases or alleged corruption acts, the corrup-
tion in itself is not an isolated act and coincides with other integrity violations such as conflict
of interest or the misuse of information or infringement of procurement rules. This is also true
for the major corruption cases in the Netherlands, one of which will be examined below. In
these cases, national public prosecutors hinted that the misconduct was part of a collective
behavior or reflected the culture of the context in which the abuse could emerge. These affairs
result in very few prosecutions, or the prosecutions fail during trial.

Network Corruption
The complexity of corruption prosecution in the Netherlands and the fact that the Dutch
authorities continue in their reservations about criminalizing trading in influence was the
starting point for research into the links between networks and corruption (Slingerland, 2019).
This research contributed to the understanding of how networks generate social capital as well
as forming unacceptable social structures.
Individuals have organized themselves into networks that function as a social system in
which the interaction of various individuals results in corruption but in which the behavior
of the individual is not necessarily corrupt and can best be seen as a form of abuse of power,
favoritism, conflict of interest, etc. The real corruption is in the nature of these networks
in which network members favor other network members, thereby developing the norm of
generalized reciprocity which results in the exclusion of non-network members. This will be
referred to as “network corruption” (corruption by the network) in addition to the corruption
networks (corruption in a network) or “corruption in the polder”. The recent study on the links
between social networks and corruption defines network corruption as: “Informal collective
cooperation in which professional roles are misused for network interests to such an extent that
the dominant norm is that of generalised reciprocity, leading to the exclusion of others, while
the members’ awareness of their network is reflected in their common attitude” (Slingerland,
2019).
Such networks often start off as normal healthy networks and can be seen as a valuable
form of social capital in our society. But those features that allow networks to achieve positive
results can also have a downside that leads to the deterioration of the networks (Box 26.1). The
result of the decision making that has been influenced by undue interests is the core aspect of
the corruption, and not the actual exchange of interests. This way, corruption is not something
which can only be attributed to an individual. Here corruption is the outcome or result of a
(social) process. Instead of assessing the nature of individual actions, this definition seeks
to look at the outcome of a process before labeling something as “corruption” (Slingerland,
2019).
BOX 26.1 THE FOUR FEATURES OF NETWORK CORRUPTION

1. An informal collective cooperation → misuse of professional roles for network
interests.
2. Shared interest → generalized reciprocity (previous, present, or future favor from the
network).
3. Common attitude → self-consciousness of the collective.
4. Closed character → exclusion (harming the rights of outsiders).
The four features outlined in Box 26.1 help us to see the mechanisms that cause networks
to deteriorate. Although the exact tipping point for network deterioration is hard to discover,
these features interplay in such a way that certain observable mechanisms start to work. The
misuse of professional roles for network interests leads to the preferential treatment of network
members, thereby preventing proper professional interests being served. In the process,
the actual role in the network takes over from the professional role that had been formally

The Netherlands 383
accepted. As a result of the social process of these networks, preferential treatment becomes
the norm, thereby creating a norm of generalized reciprocity. This implicit norm steers
behavior to reinforce the norm, and network members are purposefully blinded, no longer
perceiving that they have a choice between a commitment to the network or to third parties
(Heffernan, 2011). The norm steers their behavior to such an extent that they act, refrain from
acting, decide, and think in the interest of the network collectively, and in this way the network
becomes closed, to the detriment of the rights of outsiders. This common attitude is strength-
ened by the network members increasingly identifying themselves with the network, and its
closed nature leads to the absence of internal criticism and correction mechanisms. That, in
turn, reinforces all the other features. The mutual reinforcement of these features corrupts the
network (Slingerland, 2019).
By introducing the idea of “network corruption”, the structure that nurtures the development
of corrupt practices receives more attention, and this is a step in the direction of considering
corruption as a complex collective behavior, the prevention of which requires alternative
approaches.
RECENT EXAMPLES OF CORRUPTION IN THE NETHERLANDS
For more context on Dutch corruption, we describe two actual cases of corruption in the
Netherlands. The first case, the Roermond case, is well documented and has unfolded since
2012. It concerns corruption that emerged through a friendship between two men who had
grown up together. Over time a network emerged and became a structure in which tens of
individuals played a role. Although their network was large and had ties with other networks
across the country, the public prosecution services decided to prosecute only a few of the
high-profile figures (“fixers”) because the connections were too intertwined to find proof of
each individual’s corruption or conflict of interest. This example is a good example of network
corruption and polder corruption. The favor is offered to a network member and does not need
to be paid back immediately; it is often a matter of deferred expectation that this person, or
another network member, will do something in return when the occasion arises.
The second case is still unfolding at the time of writing. It concerns corruption in the port
of Rotterdam. Corruption in this context does not emerge slowly within networks of friends.
On the contrary, this corruption is part of a large-scale organized crime network. The mayor of
Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, the police, and the public prosecution services in Rotterdam are
very concerned about drug trafficking at the port and the corruption that goes with it.
The Roermond Corruption Case
The corruption case in the Dutch city of Roermond is recent, and can be considered represent-
ative of the “typical” Dutch corruption cases of the last decade. This city, with approximately
57,000 inhabitants, has been subject to years of investigations into corruption. The allegations
were made public in 2012 and concerned two main suspects who had grown up together and
had been friends ever since. One of the main suspects was a senior council officer, Van Rey,
who was responsible for economic affairs, real estate planning, and housing. Van Rey was
a member of the political party VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy). He was
also a member of parliament for the province of Limburg and a senator, and he was the owner

of a large amount of real estate. The other main suspect was Van Rey’s friend, the city’s
largest project developer, Van Pol (Goossen and Sniekers, 2014). The project developer is
thought to have been awarded projects in the municipality estimated to be worth hundreds of
millions of euros by paying bribes, among others to Van Rey. Public procurement procedures
were set aside. Van Rey took bribes from the project developer in the form of cash which he
transferred to a consultancy bureau, Liba Adviesbureau BV (owned by his son and daughter).
Liba used the money to finance the campaigns of political party candidates. Other bribes came
in the form of holidays spent in Van Pol’s home in France and other foreign trips. Van Rey
also leaked confidential information to a VVD party affiliate and the candidate for the vacant
position of city mayor of Roermond, Offermanns.
Increasingly, the intertwined connections between Van Rey and his VVD party affiliates
came under scrutiny. There were many examples of alleged favorable treatment within this
network. Van Rey had been invited to the Ministry of Finance when he sought advice on the
best way to set up his real estate in order to avoid unnecessary taxation. The state secretary
for finance, Weekers, was at that time a party affiliate. Weekers had received a donation from
the consultancy fund Liba BV in the form of a large billboard to promote him as a candidate
during the election campaign. Another link between Weekers and Van Rey was the unforeseen
decision by the Ministry of Finance to deviate from the original plan to close the regional
office of the Tax Authority in Roermond. The state secretary was responsible for this decision
and now chose instead to close down another regional office (Slingerland, 2019). Many other
connections between key local and national figures in this network were scrutinized, not only
by the media but also by the public prosecutors. However, the public prosecutors decided
to focus on Van Rey who was summoned to appear before court for suspected corruption
(active public bribery, passive public bribery, money laundering, and election fraud). Van
Pol, the project developer, and a senior council officer, Tilman Schreurs, were summoned for
suspected bribery.
In December 2017, the Court of Appeal sentenced Van Rey to a suspended prison sen-
tence of 12 months because he was found guilty on three counts, namely corruption, ballot
box fraud, and violation of his civil servant’s secrecy. He is also no longer allowed to hold
a position of public office. The court expressed the view that real imprisonment for longer
would have been the proper sentence, but refrained from sentencing him in this way because
of Van Rey’s seniority and the fact that he had also done good things for the municipality of
Roermond. It also took into consideration the fact that Van Rey was being seriously punished
by having to step down as a senior council officer and senator. Contrary to the Court of First
Instance, the Court of Appeal did not want to distinguish between trips and gifts accepted
by Van Rey in his professional capacity and those accepted as a friend of Van Pol. Because
Van Rey and Van Pol were friends, Van Rey should have been more cautious about what he
accepted. The Court of Appeal considered it proven that Van Rey had used his influence to
reach official decisions during informal talks. This concerned not only the informal talks Van
Rey held to ensure Van Pol won the local procurement bids, but also the informal influence he
used to arrange the billboard for the other VVD candidate, through the transfer of Van Pol’s
money to Liba Adviesbureau BV (ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:3702).
The Court of Appeal sentenced Van Pol to a suspended prison sentence of nine months and
he received a fine of 40,000 euros or 235 days in jail for being found guilty of bribing two
senior council officers.

The Netherlands 385
The court held it proven that Tilman Schreurs had received gifts from Van Pol when he
joined Van Rey, Van Pol, and others in accepting the offer to watch the Dutch team play
during the 2006 World Cup and 2008 European Cup (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277: 4.3.10).
As a senior council officer he should have known that these gifts were being made to influ-
ence his decision making at some point further down the line. Although the court considered
Tilman Schreurs to have criminal responsibility for passive corruption, he did not receive
a sentence, because the court was not convinced that the acceptance of these gifts had led to
Van Pol receiving direct favors in return. There is only an appearance of conflicts of interest.
The court described this suspect as a “small fish who became part of a massive trial with all
consequences that coincide with this” (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277: 4.3.10). The public
prosecutors had asked for a sentence of 180 hours of community service and a two-year prohi-
bition on taking on any official government position.
The public prosecutors characterized the local government culture as “one of favoritism,
in which things were arranged between parties and in which the democratic decision-making
process had become a theater play, where few realize that it was a performance” (Van der
Steen and Dohmen, 2016).
Corruption at the Port of Rotterdam
The second corruption case, which is ongoing, is related to corruption at the Port of Rotterdam.
The Dutch government has launched a broad-based offensive to fight the subversive crime
(undermining) that has become a major concern in the Netherlands. There is no universal
definition for subversive crime but it can best be described as the underworld getting access
to, and becoming intertwined with, the legitimate world. Slowly criminals find ways of
influencing public officials and thereby undermining the integrity of the entire public admin-
istration and private sector. There are sectors of the economy vulnerable to subversive crime.
Transport, logistics, financial and legal services are particularly susceptible to being used for
both legitimate and illegitimate purposes. In this case, the public institutions, including the
justice system, can be affected. Together with various sector partners the Dutch government
will take action to prevent criminals from abusing the economic structures and services in
the Netherlands in order to gain influence in lawful society by involving large sums of dirty
money, violence, and intimidation. According to the Dutch minister of justice and security,
ignoring this serious problem is no longer an option (Government of the Netherlands, 2019).
The port of Rotterdam is one of the largest ports in the world and is currently confronted
with a major drug-trafficking problem. The amount of cocaine intercepted at the port has
increased significantly over the past five years. In 2016 more cocaine was intercepted than
in the previous two years put together. In 2017, several customs workers received prison
sentences ranging from 3 to 14 years for accepting bribes and in return allowing drugs to
land on Dutch soil (De Graaf, 2017). In April 2018 the Public Prosecution Service arrested
eight civil servants suspected of corruption. One of them was a civil servant from the Tax
Authority (Robert and Bootsma, 2018).The criminal investigations involving the bribery of
these border control officials for the purposes of exporting drugs is ongoing and the number of
customs officials believed to be taking part in the corruption and drug trafficking is increasing.
Research by the police and the Social Media Lab shows that one in seven port workers and
one in ten truck drivers had been approached by criminals. The fact that this Dutch port has
state-of-the art logistics also makes it vulnerable for drug trafficking: containers and their

content will always be delivered on time and the means of transport changed over swiftly (De
Graaf, 2017). A scientific research on the scope of corruption and collaboration with organ-
ized crime at the port of Rotterdam was obstructed and eventually terminated by the board of
Dutch Customs. At the time of writing, the project researchers have delivered a more detailed
reconstruction of this course of events, without mentioning Dutch Customs by name, stating
that probably only a parliamentary inquiry will suffice to shed light on the integrity issues at
the port of Rotterdam (Rovers and Moors, 2019).
Both cases illustrate that the Netherlands, being among the least corrupt countries in the
world, has its own concerns when it comes to corruption. The fact that in the major corruption
cases individuals had organized themselves in networks in which various integrity violations
occurred is something which is increasingly recognized. The network corruption or corruption
in the polder requires a different way of approaching corruption. These networks are informal
and loosely organized and consist of public officials with a certain type of reputation, their
family members, friends, party affiliates, and acquaintances. Although this form of corruption
is seriously harming democracy and the market economy, we would not refer to it as “sub-
versive crime” related to drugs production, trafficking, and intimidation. Subversive crime
is a form of organized crime in which networks are established with the goal of committing
serious crimes, among other reasons, in order to make money. Both forms of corruption are
related to networks. This distinction can be useful when exploring the ways in which the policy
makers, law enforcement agencies, and public administration can prevent corruption. Before
discussing the Dutch responses to corruption, it is important to realize that public administra-
tion as a whole, and the public official as an individual, are vulnerable in many ways. Caution
and awareness are needed both in their relationship with family, friends, political party
affiliates, and acquaintances but also when being approached by others who try to bribe them
in order to be able to commit their subversive activities. This requires, foremost, a network
awareness.
DUTCH RESPONSES TO THE CORRUPTION

With corruption continuing to make the headlines in the Netherlands, greater priority will be
given to the prevention and repression of corruption. There are various things to anticipate or
expect from public administration.
First, there will be greater attention paid to the coherency of the integrity instruments. These
instruments used to be principally aimed at the integrity of civil servants. Both of the recent
corruption scandals as well as the GRECO recommendations, which call for the implementa-
tion of integrity instruments for central governments and law enforcement agencies, will have
an effect on the integrity system available to government itself, to members of parliament, sen-
ators, and to the heads of ministries and law enforcement agencies (Council of Europe, 2018).
These recommendations call upon the respective actors to ensure supervision and enforcement
of the existing and yet to be established declaration requirements and other rules of conduct,
and for the establishment of a specific source of confidential counselling and training on how
to deal with ethical dilemmas.
The importance of knowing how to deal with ethical dilemmas is once again on the Dutch
agenda. In 2016, research by the Dutch Bureau on the Promotion of Integrity within the Public
Sector concluded that even in the bachelor and master programs in public management and

The Netherlands 387
their equivalents, there is scarcely any attention paid to (professional) ethics, Bildung, or
integrity (Hoekstra et al., 2016). When courses on professional ethics are taught, it is likely
that their focus is more on creating network awareness (Slingerland, 2019). We tend to judge
an action retrospectively, but the examples of corruption indicate that it is important to learn
to use a forward-looking ethics or prospective ethics. This forward-looking ethical approach
could examine the goal and function of a network, its norm development, and the roles that
network members have in the network. It is likely that ethics, as such, will then get the atten-
tion needed, both in the training of students and professionals.
The response to both network corruption and subversive crime will also entail the use of big
data to detect red flags or the risk of corruption at an early stage. The public prosecution ser-
vices continue to recruit internet inspectors, data analysts, and artificial intelligence inspectors
who can use (big) data, algorithms, etc. to be deliver greater success and efficiency in their
investigations (VNO-NCW, 2018). New legislation will also make it easier to share informa-
tion between investigating services (Rijksoverheid, 2019).
NOTES
1. Partly based on Slingerland, 2019. Also adapted parts from De Graaf et al., 2008, 2018.
2. The passive corruption provision is Article 363 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
3. Articles 126, 328ter, 328quater, 177, 363, 178, 364, 84, 178a, 364a Criminal Code.
4. Article 18 United Nations Convention against Corruption.
5. Article 12 Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.
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Council of Europe 1999. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No.173). Available from: http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/173.htm (Accessed 2 October 2019).
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at its 81st Plenary Meeting).
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Report, the Netherlands (Adopted by GRECO on 7 December 2018 at its 81st Plenary Meeting).
Available from: https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting
-integrity-i/1680931c9d (Accessed 7 October 2019).
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De Graaf, G. & Huberts, L. 2011. Integriteit in het Nederlands openbaar bestuur. In: Andeweg, R. &
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De Graaf, G. & Huberts, L. & Nelen, H. 2008. Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? Perceptions of the
Scale and Nature of Corruption in the Netherlands. Perspectives on European Politics and Society,
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binnenland/twee-jaar-cel-geeist-tegen-vvd-er-jos-van-rey~a6c8f7bc/ (Accessed 9 October 2019).
Goossen, H. & Sniekers, T. 2014. El Rey. Van jager tot prooi. Media Groep Limburg.
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Rechtbank Rotterdam, 12 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277.

27. What works: global experiences in public
administration
Anga R. Timilsina and Charlene Lui
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the United Nations.
HOW BIG IS THE CORRUPTION PROBLEM IN PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION?
Corruption is a complex problem due to its multi-faceted nature and interconnections with
various political, economic, social and culture factors. Measuring all types of corruption at
the same time is not only difficult, it is also not feasible. Moreover, quantifying all types of
corruption – such as cronyism, nepotism, illicit enrichment or favouritism – is not easy.
Regardless of these limitations, there is no doubt that the cost of corruption is high. The
World Economic Forum estimates that the cost of corruption equals more than US$2.6 trillion
annually, with more than US$1 trillion paid in bribes every year.1 Accumulated, lost budgetary
resources amount to more than the US$10 trillion (estimated by the World Economic Forum)
required to end poverty by 2030.2 While there are undoubtedly limitations and methodological
challenges in measuring the cost of corruption, the large estimated figures give a sense of
the magnitude and consequences of corruption, providing a strong impetus for tackling and
preventing corruption.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines corruption as the ‘misuse of
entrusted power for private gain’. While the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC) does not provide a universal definition of corruption, it captures the types of corrupt
conduct that may occur (Figure 27.1).
Figure 27.1 Different forms of corruption
390
Anga R. Timilsina and Charlene Lui - 9781789900910
What works: global experiences in public administration 391
No matter which form of corrupt conduct occurs, corruption is generally both a symptom
and a cause of weak public institutions characterised by a lack of inclusion, transparency,
accountability and integrity. The effect of corruption on public administration can be par-
ticularly damaging. When corruption is a norm in the public sector and in the way agencies
operate, the damage goes beyond the loss of misallocated resources; public administration
loses its effectiveness and citizens lose trust in the corrupt use of public resources and author-
ity (UNDESA, 2012).
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2019 finds that out of
more than 47,000 citizens surveyed in 35 countries across Africa, 55 per cent of all citizens
think corruption is getting worse in their country and that their government is doing a bad
job at tackling corruption – almost 40 per cent of all citizens think most or all government
officials and parliamentarians are corrupt. Similarly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
GCB 2019 finds that more than half of 17,000 citizens surveyed think that most or all elected
politicians and their officials are corrupt and favour private over public interests.3
It is clear that the misallocation or misuse of resources and funds impacts public service
delivery and neglects the needs of citizens. The GCB 2019 finds that approximately 130
million citizens in the 35 African countries surveyed paid a bribe in the preceding year to
access public services such as healthcare and education. The poorest people, in particular, are
twice as likely to pay a bribe for essential public services compared to the rich.
Aside from the negative consequences of corruption on citizens, a particularly damaging
institutional consequence for public administration is that competent and honest employees
can be lost or deterred from working for government altogether. This further reduces its capac-
ity for integrity and effectiveness to serve the needs of all citizens (Quah, 2007). Accumulated,
these negative effects have harmful long-term consequences on countries’ development
outcomes.
Overall, corruption is a complex issue propagated by a confluence of factors such as govern-
ance structures, power relations, social and cultural practices, and a concentration of political
and economic power. Any efforts to address and prevent corruption in public administration
and drive public service towards excellence should pay close attention to the overall political
economy environment, governance capacity and strength of institutions.
Public sector excellence and the prevention of corruption4 are inextricably linked and each
is a means to an end, aimed at furthering human development for the greater good. UNDP
(2018) presents the four levels that influence and link public-sector excellence and the preven-
tion of corruption (Figure 27.2).
WHAT ARE MAJOR HISTORICAL TRENDS ON THE RESPONSES

TO CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?
Over the past two decades, anti-corruption efforts have proliferated; the 2030 Agenda has also
recognised the importance of anti-corruption as an accelerator to achieve the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), all of which rely on strong and effective institutions to meet the
needs of all people.
It can be observed that there have been two generations of public sector reforms to improve
government effectiveness, including measures to strengthen the prevention of corruption
(Figure 27.3). In the first generation, which adopts a ‘good management approach’, the focus

Source: UNDP, 2018, p. 18.
Figure 27.2 Four levels reinforcing public-sector excellence and the prevention of
corruption
is on efficiency and effectiveness to deliver public services. In this regard, strategies include
streamlining government functions, reforming recruitment and promotion processes, reducing
the size of the government (by identifying and removing redundancy), reforming salaries and
focusing on performance management.
Moving towards the second generation of public-sector reform, we see a ‘good governance
approach’, focused on improving ethics, integrity, transparency and accountability. This
approach tried to correct the deficiencies in government such as lack of transparency, ethics
and integrity, existence of rigidity and low levels of competitiveness. The idea is that changing
the attitude and conduct of government officials can improve the quality of government ser-
vices (such as by being responsive and accountable to the public) and ensure that no one is left
behind – one of the core principles underpinning the 2030 Agenda.
Recognising the strengths and weaknesses of both the first and second generations of
public-sector reform, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, through SDG 16 (Peace,
Justice and Strong Institutions) Target 16.6, specifically aims to ‘Develop effective, accounta-
Figure 27.3 Two generations of public-sector reform

ble and transparent institutions at all levels’. In other words, it brings together two approaches
to enable public institutions to be more effective in delivering services as well as enable them
to be more transparent and accountable through high standards of ethics and integrity.
Singapore is one successful case of public administration reform that has emphasised
accountability and zero tolerance for corruption. With rampant corruption, high levels of
crime, labour unrest, housing shortage and budget deficits in the 1950s, the government of
Singapore implemented a comprehensive reform of the Singapore civil service, introducing
meritocracy, ensuring a clean government through anti-corruption measures and competitive
salaries, among other institutional and attitudinal reforms (Quah, 2007).5
Over the past decades, due to various transparency movements, governments have increas-
ingly been more open and transparent – key components for building accountability and
trust, and a means to fight corruption. For example, many governments around the world are
increasingly disclosing more budget information to their citizens on how public funds are
collected and spent; and public participation in budgeting (including women’s participation
in gender budgeting) and more accountability in terms of budget oversight have also been
a priority.
Scandinavian countries have long widely practised openness in government and consist-
ently ranked highest in open government indices; in fact, a distinguishing feature of Swedish
public administration has long been its emphasis on openness and accountability. In 1766,
Sweden had become the first country in the world to have a Freedom of Press Act, which broke
ground for the principle of public access to information. The principle is simple: all documents
that come into, are stored at or leave an administrative agency, or that are produced as a result
of agency activities, are public documents and must be accessible to any person who wishes
to see them (Levin, 2009).6
With the rise in global norms, standards and initiatives on transparency including
UNCAC, the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Transparency Code, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Best Practices for Budget Transparency,
International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Survey, Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, Open Government Partnership, International Aid Transparency Initiative and
others, the transparency movement has contributed to making the public sector more inclusive,
open and accountable. These ultimately encourage and enable governments to not only be
more effective and efficient to deliver public services, they also improve overall governance to
achieve development outcomes. For example, International Budget Partnership (2011) found
that countries that exhibit high levels of budget transparency tend to achieve positive devel-
opment outcomes and also realise the economic and social rights of their citizens more fully.
In today’s context, with the increasing adoption of information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) and new technologies to improve government effectiveness, transparency and
accountability, there is great potential in predicting, detecting, analysing and deterring corrupt
activities; and to advance and transform the public sector and improve public administration
and service delivery, such as by allowing for increased participation available to citizens in the
process of governing.

WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T IN PREVENTING

CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION? UNDERSTANDING
DIFFERENT APPROACHES THAT DRIVE PUBLIC-SECTOR
EXCELLENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
Motivation
Motivation is ‘the ability of people, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve prob-
lems and set and achieve objectives’ (UNDP, 2006). It has two elements – intrinsic and extrin-
sic. Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something that one enjoys, while extrinsic motivation
refers to doing something in order to receive a particular outcome. Intrinsic motivation can be
manifested in many ways, such as the attraction to public policymaking, commitment to public
interest and civic duty, willingness for self-sacrifice and inherent compassion. On the other
hand, extrinsic motivation can be influenced by incentives for joining an organisation, whether
they be financial or non-financial in form (UNDP, 2014). Motivation of public officials is
crucial for the effectiveness of the public sector, which is critical to achieving development
goals (UNDP, 2006).
One of the obvious factors affecting extrinsic motivation is public servants’ salary. USAID
(2017) highlights that there is ‘near consensus across disciplines that poverty-level wages for
civil servants contribute to corruption’. Moreover, efficiency wage theories posit that higher
levels of salary induce higher productivity in two ways: increasing motivation and selecting
higher-quality employees. Studies have complemented these theories for public-sector cor-
ruption – that raising salaries can be a mechanism to deter corruption (e.g. Van Rijckeghem
and Weder, 2001). On the one hand, higher wages may motivate public servants and/or
attract more quality citizens into politics. On the other hand, not all individuals respond in
the same way to the same incentives. For example, a simple correlation analysis between the
World Bank’s measure of control of corruption and public-sector wage premium shows that
a higher public-sector wage premium is not associated with lower corruption (Jakiela, 2018).
Moreover, solely relying on increasing salaries may not only be ineffective to deter corruption,
it can be very costly. An and Kweon (2017) show empirically that for the level of corruption
in non-OECD countries to be reduced to that in OECD countries, the government wage would
have to be increased by about seven times.
Policies increasing salaries may also not have the desired effect on decreasing corruption, if
not accompanied by strong and accountable institutions. Foltz and Opuku-Agyemang (2015)
conducted a public-sector reform experiment in Ghana, where the salaries of police officers
were doubled in part to mitigate petty corruption on its roads. Rather than decrease petty cor-
ruption, the salary policy significantly increased police efforts to collect bribes and the value
of bribes. What was critically missing to complement such efforts to curb corruption were
stronger institutions and monitoring mechanisms.7 Moreover, USAID (2017) emphasises that
‘adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for control
of corruption’.
Importantly, UNDP (2014) highlights that ‘one size will not fit all and that the motivation
of public service workers… differs between countries and settings’. Incentives that reflect the
needs of staff by means of both financial and non-financial components can help ensure that,
given the right incentives, individuals will be motivated to perform effectively with integrity
rather than acting in corrupt ways.

Meritocracy
Meritocracy offers a fair system, which results in better outcomes for both the individual and
society. The research evidence is clear on the benefits of meritocracy in the civil service – includ-
ing with respect to linkages with higher economic growth and reduced corruption (UNDP, 2015).
A UNDP (2015) study highlights that evidence suggests merit-based recruitment and promotion
through predictable, rewarding career ladders improves civil servants’ capability and performance
and is valued by citizens as an accountability mechanism. A merit-based system can also help
attract well-educated individuals. This is important as higher educational attainment among civil
servants is linked to higher tax revenue mobilisation, reduced corruption, better public financial
management and higher economic growth. For example, meritocracy has been a key tenet of the
Singaporean society, where meritocracy, particularly in education, has been the way of effectively
developing talent to where it is most needed, especially for key leadership positions in government.8
However, there are also concerns that meritocracy can leave unaddressed questions about the
welfare of those whose talents and abilities are not in areas deemed the most meritorious, who do
not succeed for other reasons and who do not have equal access to opportunities (UNDP, 2015).
For example, those from lower-income and disadvantaged backgrounds often find it harder to
access the same opportunities as those who come from more advantaged family backgrounds.
Thus, meritocracy should be accompanied by society’s efforts to reduce inequalities and provide
equal opportunities to those from lower-income and disadvantaged backgrounds.
Moreover, in meritocratic systems, the need remains for transparency mechanisms that
allow people to be held to account. The case of China emphasises this need. The Chinese civil
service exam system has often been held up as a model of meritocracy and objectivity through
which leaders are chosen to run the country. Yet, while economic success may suggest that
China has been remarkably well governed, ‘corruption, the gap between the rich and the poor,
environmental degradation, abuses of power by political officials, harsh measures for dealing
with political dissent… seem to have become worse while the political system has become
more meritocratic’.9
Citizen Engagement to Prevent Corruption in the Public Sector
Engaging citizens can be a powerful approach to prevent corruption in the public sector. By
making government information (e.g. budgets, expenditure, asset declarations, government
policies and decisions, etc.) more easily accessible and transparent, citizens can observe and
hold the public administration to account. ICT has transformed the ways in which citizens
and the government interact (see Box 27.1 for an example); it is also effective in reducing
corruption risks in manual and face-to-face transactions, reducing the need and opportunity
for discretionary decisions.
BOX 27.1 PHONES AGAINST CORRUPTION (P@C) INITIATIVE

IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
In Papua New Guinea (PNG), Phones Against Corruption10 is a corruption reporting tool
based on anonymous mobile messaging, launched by UNDP and PNG’s Department of
Finance in 2014. While the abuse of public trust for individual benefit is generally seen as

inappropriate, most citizens in PNG do not know where and how to denounce corruption
and often fear violent retribution. Effective and safe corruption reporting mechanisms are
therefore needed across the country.
To date,11 more than 38,000 SMS texts reporting corruption have been received. All re-
ported cases are referred to the Department of Finance’s Internal Audit and Compliance
Division for further investigation in collaboration with relevant state bodies responsible for
criminal investigations and prosecution. 850 cases have been recorded, with 214 still under
investigation. Seventeen cases have been completed, with seven cases taken to the courts.
The success is significant to PNG, where corruption severely impacts and derails the
country’s development. The use of simple technology means that corruption reporting can
be easier, quicker and more accessible for targeted groups. With support from telecom part-
ners, the tool does not cost users any money or credit to send messages to the system, and
also does not require internet access.12
Citizen engagement is ‘one of the essential ingredients’ in corruption prevention, be it through

‘using public services, consulting or lobbying, monitoring and scrutinising, being regulated in
commercial relationships such as for the procurement of goods and services by government,
or they may be reporting corruption’. Each of these interactions has implications on corruption
and corruption prevention in public administration. These interactions ‘can encourage social
trust, an understanding of public sector values, compliance with anti-corruption regulation and
reporting of suspected corrupt conduct’ (UNDESA, 2012). Importantly, citizens form the soci-
etal values and expectations that can help or hinder anti-corruption strategies; and the crucial
role of citizens in improving public administration cannot be ignored.
Openness and Transparency
Openness and transparency are key ingredients to build accountability and trust. An ‘open’
government is transparent, accessible to anyone, anytime, anywhere. Promoting greater
transparency is a means to fight corruption – corruption tends to rely on secrecy, thus, open
government, enabling citizens to exercise their knowledge and rights, improving access to
information and enabling citizens’ participation and engagement for accountability are crucial
for anti-corruption efforts and demanding better public administration.
For example, transparency in human resources management is related to information
disclosure of policies, procedures and practices of personnel. A lack of transparency in the
wage bill or in personnel rosters may obscure the presence of ‘ghost employees’ that represent
a substantial proportion of salary costs. Measurement of transparency in public administration
would focus on elements of openness and access in procurement, tax, revenue, budgets and
human resources (UNDP and Global Integrity, 2015).
The transparency movement has gained momentum because of growing empirical evi-
dence that there is a positive impact of transparency on economic performance. For example,
fiscal transparency tends to increase the likelihood of having a credible and reliable budget:
improved transparency is associated with higher budget execution rates in the health and the
education sectors, and better projections of gross domestic product growth and inflation (Sarr,
2015). On the contrary, according to the Open Budget Survey 2015, weak budget accounta-
bility ecosystems, which are measured in terms of budget transparency, public participation in

the budget process and oversight by strong formal government institutions, ultimately threaten
national development outcomes and the success of global initiatives such as the SDGs.
Today, open data is gaining popularity as a means of addressing corruption challenges in
public services and public administration. Open data for anti-corruption efforts allows third
parties to analyse and use the data published online by governments, such as to monitor
budgets, projects and government activities. Published data can range from information on
public services and government service performance statistics, to government budgets and
expenditure, public contracting and procurement processes and environmental monitoring
data (Transparency International, 2017).
However, the Open Data Barometer 2018 finds that while some governments are advanc-
ing towards open government data, open data remains the exception, not the rule. Without
good data, it is impossible to hold governments to account for the decisions that they make,
the policies they pass and the money they budget and spend. Many governments have yet to
introduce the reforms required to make open data a part of day-to-day governance. They must
start investing significant resources to build the infrastructure, policies and practices necessary
to drive this transformation.
E-governance
Over the past two decades, ICT has evolved dramatically in transforming economies, societies
and cultures. The rapid advancements in technology have made profound changes and impacts
on the ways people interact with one another, with businesses and with governments. The 2030
Agenda has also embraced the spread of ICT and global interconnectedness as having great
potential to accelerate human progress, to bridge the digital divide and to develop societies.
Governments worldwide now recognise the power of ICT and e-government for the advance-
ment and transformation of the public-sector landscape.
The appeal of ICT owes to its enormous potential to improve public administration and
service delivery by making services more citizen-centric, soliciting citizen input to improve
public services and tapping citizens to help deliver better services at a lower cost. It also allows
for increased participation available to citizens in the processes of governing, and increased
transparency and accountability in government agencies (Ear-Dupuy and Serrat, 2017).
Although efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery and public administration are
two of the main benefits of e-government, it also enables government operations to be more
accessible, transparent and intelligible to citizens, opening up more opportunities for account-
ability and citizen oversight. Moreover, the efficiency gains of e-government are often secured
through the automation of certain services; this removes human discretion (for instance in the
processing of permits and licenses), which can also make processes fairer and less vulnerable
to corrupt practices (GIZ, 2018).
Empirical research has demonstrated the association between increases in the use of
e-government and reductions in corruption (see Box 27.2 for an example). Andersen (2009)
and Elbahnasawy (2014) find a causal relationship, implying that implementing e-government
significantly reduces corruption and acts as a powerful anti-corruption tool. Elbahnasawy
(2014) highlights that this is due to the expansion of access to information and raising the level
of corruption awareness, both of which increase transparency and improve accountability.
However, Nam (2018) notes that the anti-corruption effect of e-government significantly
decreases in cultures where individuals perceive an unequal distribution of power and are

uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. Furthermore, Kochanova et al. (2016) note
that the extent to which government processes can be automated will likely impact the capacity
of e-government tools to reduce corruption and improve public administration.
BOX 27.2 E-GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH KOREA
South Korea was one of the early pioneers in introducing e-government to reduce corrup-
tion. In particular, the following three examples demonstrate South Korea’s great strides in
anti-corruption efforts.
The Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications (OPEN) Initiative13 is a sys-
tem where governmental procedures of civil affairs administration (e.g. applications for
licenses, permits, inspections, services, etc.) are made public. It allows applicants to track
their applications as well as raise questions in the event any irregularities are detected. The
OPEN initiative focuses on the simplification of regulations and procedures, transparency
in procedures and effective communication with citizens. Technology has been an enabler
in preventing corruption, particularly in building a transparent tracking system for permit
and license applications. OPEN is often regarded as a model for how e-government can
reduce graft and corruption, and has reportedly contributed to a notable decrease in cor-
ruption levels and enhanced the credibility of municipal bodies amongst citizens in South
Korea (Basel Institute on Governance, 2017).
The Korea ON-Line E-Procurement System (KONEPS)14 is a nationwide, web-based sin-
gle window system that provides comprehensive information on public procurement of all
public organisations in South Korea. According to the South Korean Public Procurement
Service,15 KONEPS has saved the public sector US$1.4 billion in costs and the private
sector $6.6 billion, compared with the previous paper-based system. The time it took to
process the bids dropped from an average of 30 hours to just two. KONEPS handles all pro-
curement works electronically, which eliminates potential corruption resulting from human
discretion. This also ensures the highest level of transparency and fairness in procurement
administration.
The Seoul Metropolitan Government in partnership with the private sector launched
the Anti-Corruption Clean Construction System (CCS)16 in 2012, as an effective way to
prevent the practice of shoddy construction work. The CCS consists of the One-Project
Manager Information System (One-PMIS) for construction project management and oper-
ations, Construction Information Disclosure System (Allimi) for disclosure of information
on construction projects, Subcontractor Payment Management System (sPMS) for auto-
mated subcontractor payment system and Electronic Human Resource Management system
(E-HRM) for the management of construction workforce and benefit services (UNDP and
Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2016). The CCS has not only increased the efficiency
of the administrative aspects of construction projects by 30 per cent, it has also raised the
user satisfaction of subcontractors, businesses and government bodies (Basel Institute on
Governance, 2017).

Risk Management in Anti-Corruption and Public Administration
Risk management is increasingly prominent in development management, and public insti-

tutions not only have to adopt risk management approaches and tools, they should also adapt
their cultures and ways of operating in order to embed risks considerations in their daily
business. Public administration plays a central role in managing risk across all development
areas. Risk management in government and public administration is distinct from that in the
private sector; in public policy, common types of risks include those linked with the stability
of regulation, for example expropriation, contract breaches, regulatory capture and corruption.
Strategies put in place by public administration to address risk in various areas also impact the
most vulnerable groups in society (UNDESA, 2019).
Public institutions and public administration processes to manage risk have evolved over
time, driven both by broader paradigm changes in governance and by the development of
knowledge and practice of risk management in different fields (Figure 27.4).
Source: Adapted from UNDESA, 2019.
Figure 27.4 Trend of risk management in anti-corruption and public administration
There are clear linkages between anti-corruption and risk management in public admin-
istration. Risk and vulnerability analyses are basic elements of effective anti-corruption
approaches, while weaknesses in legal frameworks, accountability frameworks, integrity
standards and gaps between policy and practice can all be seen as manifestations of ineffective
risk management. The UNDESA World Public Sector Report 2019 clearly states that it is well
documented that corruption risks are higher in industries where risk management is weak or
lax (e.g. extractive industries).
In many countries, risks are mostly managed on a sectoral or thematic basis. For example,
corruption risk assessments identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within a system (e.g.
health system, education sector, water and sanitation sectors, extractive industry, etc.) which
may present opportunities or are susceptible for corruption to occur, and evaluate the likeli-
hood of corruption occurring and the impact of corruption should it occur.

A corruption risk assessment is a preventive tool for identifying corruption and integrity
risks in the public sector. Once corruption risks have been properly identified (in terms of
people who may corrupt or become corrupt, organisational processes that could be compro-
mised, as well as organisations that could be penetrated), then risk management should occur
in response – specific measures should be taken to prevent such corruption risks. A strong
corruption risk mitigation system puts in place a system of periodic reviews of the corruption
risks, to determine whether they have been effectively mitigated and to ascertain whether new
risks need to be addressed (UNDP, 2018).
For example, the South Korean Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission has
developed two tools in assessing the integrity of public organisations. The Anti-Corruption
Initiative Assessment, introduced in 2002, gives public-sector agencies information and
experience-based evidence about gaps in their anti-corruption measures so that they can focus
their corruption prevention efforts more efficiently. It now covers more than 250 public insti-
tutions in South Korea. The Integrity Assessment, also introduced in 2002, is a comprehensive
index which indicates the integrity levels of public institutions assessed by public service
users, employees and policy customers, and presents statistics of corruption cases of each
institution. Since it was introduced, the ‘overall integrity index’ of the South Korean public
sector has increased consistently and the level of corruption experienced by citizens dealing
with public service is declining (UNDESA, 2012). Countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar and
Kosovo have benefitted from adopting various anti-corruption tools from South Korea in their
countries.17
There are many challenges associated with risk management in public administration,
including insufficient coordination, collaboration and integration among national and sub-
national governments, public institutions, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders.
Siloed approaches to risk management can treat risk as a mere compliance issue rather than
as a cross-cutting policy that needs to be integrated in development policymaking. Moreover,
a lack of shared methodologies and a lack of adequate data for assessing risks is often an
impediment to the comparability of risks and for the design of coherent policy responses
(UNDESA, 2019).
In this regard, a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is deemed necessary
in effective risk management. UNDESA (2019) highlights three enablers of effective risk
management in public administration:
1. A high-level ownership of risk management by the senior leadership and governing bodies
towards building credibility and legitimacy;
2. Policy integration across government departments/agencies at various levels, and engaging
with non-state actors through inclusive online and offline platforms; and
3. Effective communication channels and methods, such as open forums to discuss issues
freely without fear.
THE WAY FORWARD
Preventing corruption in public administration is most likely to work in contexts where

demand and political will for reform is high. In general, countries should also take into account

the following key building blocks to effective prevention of corruption and public-sector
excellence.
Innovation
If a public sector is to remain effective, transparent and accountable, it must be dynamic at

the state, institutional and individual official levels. With ever changing national contexts
and challenges arising, complacency could undermine the effectiveness of the public sector;
innovation is needed and ‘problems need to be identified, and ideas translated into projects
that can be tested, implemented and shared. To do so, public sector organizations must iden-
tify the processes and structures that can support and accelerate innovation’ (OECD, 2017).
In an increasingly digitised and innovative world, public administration would also need to
effectively manage information, data and knowledge. At the same time, risk has to be weighed
in the balance, appropriately assessed and managed. It is also important to recognise the com-
plexity of the public sector, and pay attention to ever changing national contexts, keeping in
mind that there is no one-size-fits-all approach (UNDP, 2018).
Strengthening Overall Ethics and Integrity Infrastructure
Integrity is essential for building strong and effective institutions and is crucial in delivering
sustainable responses to corruption and in fostering trust among the population. Integrity
building should be understood as a whole-of-society approach, and not just within the public
sector, i.e. a holistic approach including also the private sector, individuals and organisations,
all of whom interact with the public sector.
Effective training for civil servants can be an important entry point to strengthening overall
ethics and integrity; for instance, such training can be a part of performance assessment (reten-
tion and promotion). However, it cannot, alone, lead to an efficient, transparent and account-
able public sector – occasional training may not result in changing public-sector behaviour
and norms if the entire political environment is corrupt. Capacity-building measures should
pay attention to the broader political economy context, as well as institutional and individual
motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic), to result in a sustainable impact of any ethics or integrity
training for civil servants.
Transparency International developed the model National Integrity System comprising key
‘pillars’ in a country’s governance system that are required for effective corruption prevention.
Each pillar is important, but the individual pillars should be complementary and mutually rein-
forcing. Ultimately, strengthening the national integrity system promotes better governance
across all aspects of society and contributes to building peaceful, just and inclusive societies
(Figure 27.5).
Engaging Citizens and Civil Society to Prevent Corruption
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has emphasised the importance of partnerships
and multi-stakeholder collaboration to achieve all the SDGs. Moreover, fighting corruption
requires collective action and a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach. The ways
in which citizens and civil society organisations interact with government are thus crucial in
the prevention of corruption in public administration.

Figure 27.5 Transparency International’s National Integrity System model
These non-state actors play an important role in raising awareness, providing checks and
balances with government and private-sector involvement in corrupt practices, and exerting
pressure or demanding for political commitment and action against corruption. There are also
many opportunities for civil society organisations to participate in monitoring corruption or
service delivery, and contribute to monitoring their countries’ progress on the SDGs such as
parallel reviews and shadow reports. Citizens’ actions are important, such as reporting inci-
dences of corruption, fostering a zero-tolerance attitude towards corruption and refusing to
engage in acts of corruption and bribery.
The effective and active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector
requires measures to support their efforts, such as:
●● Enhancing transparency of and promoting the contribution of the public to decision-making

processes.
●● Ensuring that the public has effective access to information.
●● Undertaking public information activities that contribute to non-tolerance of corruption, as
well as public education programmes, including school and university curricula.
●● Respecting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive, publish and dissemi-
nate information concerning corruption.
●● Relevant anti-corruption bodies should be made known to the public and accessible for
reporting (including anonymously) incidents that may be construed as acts of corruption.

UNDP (2018) summarises the following good practices regarding the participation of society:
1. The use of ICT and new technologies has been a growing trend worldwide in terms of
opening up the space of citizens and civil society to report corruption and contribute to the
prevention of corruption.
2. The access to information/right to information movement provides a conducive environ-
ment to enhance the participation of society to prevent corruption.
3. There is clear recognition that collective action is needed to fight the complex issue of cor-
ruption. There is no monopoly of a single actor (be it the state or civil society); rather, the
fight against corruption must engage multiple stakeholders for collective action, including
governments, the private and public sectors, civil society, media and more.
In conclusion, there is no ‘silver bullet’ for anti-corruption. Anti-corruption measures in the

long term, medium term and short term are all necessary to prevent and tackle corruption and
change the interests and attitudes of those who are acting in corrupt ways. In this regard, the
empowerment of all sections of society is crucial to sustain the anti-corruption movement;
innovative ways should be adopted in the fight against corruption; more efforts are required
in measuring and monitoring corruption to drive evidence-based policymaking; and capacity
development for different actors is important to effectively participate in anti-corruption
efforts.
NOTES
1. http://reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/anti-corruption/?doing_wp_cron
=1553840437.4626851081848144531250
2. www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/the-world-can-defeat-poverty-by-2030-but-only-if-it-does
-this/
3. GCB 2019 LAC Report, p.5.
4. According to UNDP (2018), ‘The terms PSE [public-sector excellence] and “prevention of cor-
ruption” are often defined as being aspirational, rather than providing an achievable expectation.
It might be said that “excellence” and “prevention” are each, in their own ways, an expression of
perfection or a gold standard, the attainment of which might be entirely unrealistic for many states
and state institutions in the short term… [However,] to be “excellent”, there is certainly an expec-
tation that a public administration must be effective, accountable and transparent and an immediate
link with corruption prevention is thereby discernible, with an obvious measure or indicator being
the perception among the population of the level of public sector corruption.’
5. www.jonstquah.com/images/PA%20Singapore%202007.pdf
6. www.joaag.com/uploads/4-_4_1___LevinFinal.pdf
7. https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/higher-salaries-can-worsen-corruption and http://cega
.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous _files/118_-_Opoku-Agyemang_Ghana_Police_Corruption
_paper_revised_v3.pdf
8. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/is-meritocracy-still-working-in-asia
9. See note 4.
10. www.phonesagainstcorruption.org/
11. According to UNDP Papua New Guinea’s project reports on Phones Against Corruption.
12. www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/ourwork/development-impact/innovation/
projects/png-phone-against-corruption.html
13. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/other/unpan022127.pdf
14. www.pps.go.kr/eng/jsp/koneps/overview.eng

15. w w w . e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / d o c u m e n t / a c t i v i t i e s / c o n t / 2 0 1 2 0 7 / 2 0 1 2 0 7 1 0 A T T 4 8 6 2 0 /
20120710 ATT48620EN.pdf
16. www.undp.org/content/dam/uspc/resourcebook_final.pdf
17. www.undp.org/content/seoul_policy_center/en/home/development-solutions-partnerships/anti
-corruption.html
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pii/S0304387801001390

28. Regulating conflicts of interest in public office
Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a ‘conflict of interest’ is core to our understanding of what it is to act with
integrity in public office and of how corruption occurs. Individuals who hold public office
inevitably have multiple interests, not only financial but also associational. These interests
relate to different aspects of their private lives, as well as to associations formed as a result
of their public office role. Public officeholders also have duties associated with their public
office, which they are expected to carry out in the public interest. The concept of ‘conflict
of interest’ refers to the risk that some of their many interests might conflict, distorting the
decisions that they make or the way in which they carry out their public duties. Since public
officeholders are entrusted to act in the public interest, when a private interest induces an
officeholder to change the way they exercise their power or carry out their duties, this will, in
most cases, meet the definition of political corruption (Philp, 1997).
Regulating conflicts of interest is, however, not straightforward. The concept relates to
a risk of inappropriateness, not inappropriateness itself. Implicit in the concept is the belief
that the conflict may – but equally may not – distort the officeholder’s decision. We expect
officeholders to recognise conflicts and to construct cognitive Chinese walls to shield their
decision making from improper influence. Put differently, a conflict of interest does not nec-
essarily lead to corruption, though it may create a risk of corruption. Over-regulation should,
therefore, be avoided. Yet deciding when an apparent conflict is inappropriate and necessitates
action requires a complex judgement. As Stark points out in his seminal work on conflicts of
interest in American public life, ‘we cannot directly peer into an officeholder’s mental state
as she comes to judgement, cannot gauge the extent to which she remained impervious to – or
else was all-too-fallibly mindful of – her own interests’ (Stark, 2003: 4). Barring self-aware
confessions, any post hoc assessment of whether a conflict has occurred would require access
to a counterfactual which is impossible to attain. Regulation cannot rely on knowing whether
an actual conflict occurred, but must be largely pre-emptive and preventive, to remove poten-
tial conflicts.
Yet preventive regulation is hindered by an asymmetric information problem. It may be
only the individual officeholder who knows about their own interests and any potential con-
flicts. Hence we must to some extent trust public officeholders to regulate their own conflicts
of interest, to identify potential conflicts themselves and make accurate judgements about the
risk they represent and what action they need to take. To the extent that we do this, we are
trusting individuals to self-regulate, to make accurate and impartial judgements about their
own conflicts and the ways in which they might influence their own behaviour. This assumes
that individuals are capable of making such thoughtful, considered assessments of their own
conduct, but research from psychology tells us that, most of the time, humans engage in
automatic or ‘fast thinking’ rather than ‘slow’ deliberation (Kahneman, 2011). Moreover, it
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Regulating conflicts of interest in public office 407
assumes that individuals are good judges of their own behaviour, when research tells us that in
fact we are prone to ‘blind spots’ and ‘motivated reasoning’.
Another complication is that the conduct of public officials is – to some extent – observable
by the public, who make inferences about the integrity of officials. Their perceptions about
whether conflicts of interest appear to exist also matter – despite being based on incomplete
information and potentially inaccurate – because they affect public trust in officials and hence
the legitimacy of the political system. It is therefore often regarded as reasonable to assess
conduct on the basis of how it looks to the public. This ‘appearance standard’ has become
a fundamental aspect of conflict-of-interest regulation. However, given that we rely to some
extent on self-regulation of conflicts of interest, this creates a further layer of complexity for
officeholder self-regulation. We ask them not only to identify and evaluate their own conflicts
of interest, but also to estimate how the risk will appear to the public.
Some countries have all but given up on trusting individuals to make such judgements,
preferring instead to try to remove conflicts of interest through defining ‘incompatibilities’,
i.e., banning the holding of certain types of private interest or additional public offices. In
many countries, officeholders are banned from owning companies, holding second jobs,
employing relatives as staff members, or becoming members of political parties. Members of
parliament are often prohibited from simultaneously serving as mayors. Yet Stark points out
a tension with this solution, arguing that it reflects diverging approaches to the two elements
of the concept: the conflict and the interest. Regulators regard themselves as objective in
defining what kinds of roles constitute a conflict, but at the same time adopt a subjective view
of what constitutes an interest. Overall, this leads to an increased tendency to ban activities
on the grounds that they are potential conflicts without regard for whether individuals facing
those circumstances would actually be influenced in culpable ways (Stark, 2003). Upholding
the appearance standard has gained precedence over consideration of whether or not there is
a risk of corruption. Yet upholding the appearance standard is arguably more difficult in our
modern societies, where boundaries between public and private are blurred, policy-making
increasingly complex, media coverage of misconduct contested and distrusted, and individual
careers more varied and versatile. In contemporary democratic societies where transparency
is prized, apparent conflicts appear everywhere and trust in public officials and politicians is
generally low and in decline. Perhaps it is time to rethink our approach.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it discusses how trends in public administration
and public office careers have increased the frequency and complexity of conflicts of interest,
and reviews the evidence about how these situations play out. Second, it evaluates existing
regulatory solutions, focusing on transparency and disclosure, and considers the demands they
make both on officeholders and on those seeking to hold them to account. Finally, the chapter
discusses the evidence about implicit biases in judgement and reasoning, and explores what
this means for our capacity to self-regulate.
MODERN ADMINISTRATIONS FACE MOUNTING RISKS

Since the 1980s, the public administrations of many countries – particularly the United States
(US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia but also a number of other Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and increasingly lower-income
countries too – have adopted forms of ‘new public management’ (NPM) for their public admin-

istrations. This involves the introduction of market forces into public administration with the
aim of capturing efficiency gains, and is achieved partly through outsourcing the provision of
public services and encouraging private companies to compete in tenders to win contracts, as
well as by using performance management practices developed in the private sector to monitor
and evaluate public service provision. The latter is associated with league tables and aggregate
indicators that facilitate comparison across providers, thereby informing ‘consumers’ about
differences in service quality and, assuming they are willing and able to ‘shop around’, thereby
creating a market incentive for providers to improve their scores and rankings.
The rise of NPM has blurred the distinction between the public and private sectors, and
created more opportunities and reason for private companies to lobby or otherwise seek to
influence public officeholders. Governments increasingly outsource the provision of public
services to private companies, often using competitive tender processes to award contracts
that are paid for with public money. Those private companies are interested in gathering
information about when contracts will be let and how they will be specified, meaning that
the public officials designing policies and procurement plans frequently find themselves the
target of lobbying by private providers. Since the contracts are paid for with public money,
the state retains the responsibility to oversee service provision, and yet – and especially given
that NPM is intended to cut costs and increase efficiency – as it downsizes its own capacity
in the relevant area, the state risks losing the knowledge, skills, and resources necessary for
effective oversight.
In the civil service, the need to learn private-sector management practices leads to man-
agement consultants being hired to oversee civil service or local government reforms or
seconded into a government department for months at a time. This provides an opportunity
for firms to influence public policy, even though they may later benefit from winning public
contracts let as a result of their reforms. This issue is sometimes exacerbated when the same
professional services firms – particularly the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms – provide different
kinds of services to government clients, such as consultancy advice and audits. This has also
raised questions about conflicts of interest. We trust companies to provide an effective audit
of clients for which they are also dependent on consultancy business. In one recent UK case,
when a major private-sector provider of public services, Carillion, collapsed, questions were
raised about why KPMG had signed off Carillion as a going concern in March 2017, only four
months before the company issued a profit warning.
Extensive outsourcing has blurred the distinctions between public and private sectors on
which our regulatory models about avoiding conflicts of interest have typically been based.
It creates new types of relationship between public officials and private-sector organizations,
and calls into question our ability to monitor or prevent conflicts of interest across a range of
public services. This is perhaps most evident in healthcare. A recent report by the UK National
Audit Office reviewed the practices of clinical commissioning groups that make purchasing
decisions on behalf of the National Health Service in local areas. It noted that ‘[a] British
Medical Journal investigation in 2013 found that 426 (36%) of the 1,179 GPs on the govern-
ing body of new clinical commissioning groups have a potential conflict of interest because
they have directorships or shares in private healthcare companies’.1 Moreover, there is evi-
dence that such conflicts are not being managed appropriately. In 2013, the UK Competition
Commission investigated private hospitals’ provision of incentives and rewards to physicians
in exchange for patient referrals and found that it was leading to ‘the distortion of referral

decisions to particular hospitals and the distortion of patient choice of diagnosis and treatment
options’ (Competition Commission, 2013).
Healthcare is a sector where parallel public and private provision creates many
conflict-of-interest risks. From a system perspective, public money is invested in building
facilities and training medical staff, but private companies in the same market often benefit
from these resources. Physicians work in both sectors at the same time, holding down steady
jobs in the public sector whilst ‘moonlighting’ by carrying out surgeries or procedures in the
private sector. Sometimes the public-sector equipment and facilities are used for private work
and individuals with control over the allocation of resources may have great discretionary
power. Weaknesses in public provision may create ‘demand’ for more private-sector referrals,
raising questions about whether access may be distorted by strategic manipulation. In addi-
tion, the provision of healthcare is influenced in many ways by the powerful pharmaceutical
sector, leading some scholars to identify a whole range of practices as ‘institutional corruption’
(Lessig, 2013). Within pharmaceuticals companies, efforts to prevent corruption risk being
stymied by systemic conflicts between different departments, with individuals working in
compliance facing entirely different motivations and goals to the individuals working in sales
whose behaviour they seek to control (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2017).
The blurring of private and public sectors is not only a feature of OECD countries. In
transition and developing countries, too, where budgets are weak and there is limited capacity
to borrow, greater reliance on the private sector to provide public services is often especially
attractive (Batley and Larbi, 2004). Infrastructure, for example, is key to economic devel-
opment but requires major up-front investment, which low-income countries with a weak
tax base and capital markets that demand punitively high rates of return for state borrowing
struggle to finance. Private financing of transport infrastructure can enable states to launch
major projects that would not otherwise be feasible and in so doing promote job creation
and economic growth. However, such partnerships also bring opportunities for politicians
and bureaucrats to exploit their power for private gain (or to solicit party finance), and may
give companies unwarranted leverage in certain areas of public policy. In contexts where
clientelism is already prevalent, NPM trends may exacerbate and entrench conflicts of interest
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2005; Tompson, 2007; Manning, 2001).
The Revolving Door
All over the world, public policy has become more complex and this has undermined the old
model of a professional bureaucracy where individuals have transferable skills and move
among government departments in the course of their careers. More commonly now, civil
servants lack relevant expertise for the policy-making tasks with which they are entrusted. Yet
at the same time they are increasingly required to base policy on detailed evidence (Cairney,
2016). The combination makes them more reliant on consulting external actors (whose
independence is difficult to guarantee) and more exposed to concomitant lobbying pressures
and conflicts of interest. These macro-level developments are reflected in individual career
patterns. Management consultants sometimes join the civil service as temporary secondees,
before returning to work in private-sector roles that benefit from knowledge of upcoming
regulatory developments or contracting opportunities. And while the civil service used to be
a job for life, it is now more common for individuals to seek employment in the private sector

Table 28.1 Types of conflict of interest arising from the revolving door
Description Problem/offence
Abuse of power to ingratiate oneself with potential future employer Abuse of office, potentially bribery
Influencing former associates to implement or shape policy to benefit new employer Undue influence or state capture
Profiting financially from stature or knowledge gained while in public office Profiteering
Representing a policy position in direct opposition to government’s position, having Switching sides and using privileged
previously represented the government on the same issue information
Using one’s powers while in public office to favour a company or industry in which one Regulatory capture
was previously employed
Source: Adapted from Dávid-Barrett, 2011.
for at least part of their career. They can often earn much higher salaries in the business world,
and may regard this as a justified reward for long years of relatively poorly paid public service.
The practice of public officials moving between public- and private-sector roles, through the
so-called ‘revolving door’, leads to a range of potential conflicts of interest (see Table 28.1).
First, an official might use his or her power while in office to shape a policy or decision in
favour of a certain company, with a view to ingratiating himself or herself with that company
and thus opening up a path to future employment. This would be an abuse of office, occurring
while the official is still in public employment, and is an offence regardless of what happens
once the individual has left public employment. Private benefits accrue to the official, who
gains employment, and also to the company, which secures some kind of privilege as a result
of the official’s altered behaviour, and it may even be interpreted as constituting bribery.
Second, a former official now employed by a company might influence his or her former
associates to make a decision in a way that favours the company. In this case, he or she (and
the company) are exercising undue influence. The former official is no longer employed by
the government and it is the judgement of his or her colleagues that is impaired. Indeed, the
former official might not even intend to exercise any undue influence; her former colleagues
may wish to please or simply trust her with information. A similar problem occurs relating to
pre-public employment, where individuals recruited into public office from the private sector
promote the interests of the former employer whilst in their new role. Again, this does not
necessarily involve intent to exercise undue influence, but might simply occur because the
individual is deeply steeped in the culture and norms of the previous employer.
Third, an individual might profit from public office by drawing on knowledge or stature
derived from his or her public role in order to profit financially. This profiteering could occur
while an official is still in public office or after they have left it. However, since some kinds of
private gain from office are legitimate – receiving a salary, for example – the question of defin-
ing what constitutes a legitimate profit is a matter of debate. It is commonplace for high-profile
former officials, particularly diplomats and ministers, to write their memoirs upon leaving
office, perhaps generating considerable financial profit in doing so. At the other extreme, prof-
iteering could take the form of insider trading, i.e., acquisition or disposal by someone with
inside information of securities whose price would be affected by the public disclosure of this
inside information on a regulated market. This is prohibited by law, while public officials who
disclose insider information also risk breaching the Official Secrets Act.
Fourth, an individual might leave public office to take up employment with a private-sector
organisation in a role that requires him or her to oppose the government’s position on an issue
where he or she had previously represented the government. This is known as switching sides.

It can be regarded as problematic because the individual may have had access to privileged
information in government which is later used to frustrate the government’s aim.
Fifth, government officials may be overly sympathetic to sectors and industries they have
a responsibility to regulate, if they were recruited from that industry. This is a problem related
to pre-public employment in the private sector. There are often good arguments for recruiting
individuals from the private sector to perform regulatory or policy-making roles in a particu-
lar area, for example where specialist expertise is necessary for regulation to be adequately
designed and implemented. However, it can also mean that regulators – perhaps unwittingly
– are inclined to be sympathetic to the industry at the expense of the public interest.
Regulating the revolving door through banning civil servants from taking certain jobs when
they leave public office is an option, but carries a number of disadvantages. Most evidently,
it would risk deterring people from joining the civil service or becoming ministers in the first
place, since doing so would constrain their career opportunities and, importantly, their earning
potential. Instead of banning officeholders from post-public employment, most countries rely
on softer approaches. It is common to have a temporary ‘cooling off’ period, in which individ-
ual officeholders are not permitted to take certain kinds of jobs. The length of the period can
be adapted depending on the risk associated with the officeholder – more senior officials can
be banned for longer. Similarly, the type of activity from which the official is excluded can be
specified, to prevent someone from engaging in lobbying specifically, for example, or working
on projects for their private-sector employer that relate to their previous job.
However, it is difficult to monitor compliance with cooling-off periods, or even to ensure
that the need for them is identified. In the UK, for example, rules around the revolving door
have tended to be very light-touch and to depend greatly on trusting public officials and pol-
iticians to do the right thing. It is only since 2010 that ministers have been prohibited from
lobbying the government after leaving office (for two years), and the system for monitoring
compliance is very weak. Ministers are required to consult the Advisory Council on Business
Appointments (Acoba) on employment after leaving the cabinet, as are senior civil servants
when they wish to leave their posts, but the body has no statutory basis.
The risk of conflicts may be particularly high when ministers leave the cabinet but stay in
politics as backbench members of parliament, a role in which – in the UK, at least – they are
permitted to earn income from second jobs and own shares in a company. Some ministers treat
the rules in a rather cavalier manner, and without much consequence. In July 2019, it emerged
that UK home secretary Priti Patel had, when on the backbenches, taken a consultancy job with
a company called Viasat and, despite becoming a minister again, had failed to consult Acoba
until a month after she had started the role. By the time she received the body’s guidance, she
had already earned £10,000 (for ten hours’ work). It subsequently emerged that Viasat was
planning to bid for a highly lucrative government contract.
This latter case highlights the difficulty of judging whether conflicts of interest have
occurred. The public sees a financial relationship between a company and a government
minister. The company is clearly paying for a service, but nobody can be sure of the details of
the service they are receiving. The timing of the consultancy appears to be connected to the
company bidding for a government contract, and it seems plausible that the minister is privy
to information about that contract or may even be part of discussions and have the potential
to influence. And the whole relationship appears more suspicious because of the minister’s
failure to comply with the regulatory framework set up to manage such conflicts. Yet still,
there is no evidence of an ‘actual’ conflict, of improper influence having occurred.

Scholars can use rigorous methods to evaluate the empirical evidence on whether the
revolving door does indeed lead to inappropriate or corrupt conduct, rather than just the
appearance of it. One approach to the question centres around trying to establish what the
private-sector companies are ‘buying’ when they hire individuals from the public sector, and
particularly to assess whether it is their expertise or their contacts that is valued. Much of the
evidence suggests that companies are more interested in connections than expertise (Blanes
I Vidal et al., 2012; LaPira and Thomas, 2014). Lobbyists who used to work for a congress-
man make less money once their former employer leaves office (Blanes I Vidal et al., 2012)
while lobbyists who used to work in public office represent clients on a wider range of issues
than non-revolvers, suggesting that it is contacts rather than expertise that matters (LaPira &
Thomas, 2014).
There is also evidence that hiring public officials brings material benefits to the new employ-
ers. Companies that hire former public officials gain more government contracts, often while
the individual is in public office, suggesting that abuses of office aimed at ingratiation may be
common (Canayaz et al., 2019; Lazarus et al., 2016). This was certainly the case for Dorleen
Druyun, once principal deputy undersecretary for the US Air Force. After she took up a role
at Boeing, it emerged that in her Air Force role she had overseen the lease of 20 aircraft and
purchase of 80 tankers from Boeing, had inflated the price and had passed Boeing information
on rival bidders. In 2004, she received a nine-month sentence for corruption, while the chief
financial officer of Boeing was fired and the chief executive officer resigned. The company
was fined $615 million. However, this is one of very few cases where the evidence is clear;
it seems likely that many more cases go undiscovered. Moreover, the frequency with which
allegations about conflicts of interest relating to the revolving door arise may be undermining
public trust in government and in public service provision.
THE APPEARANCE STANDARD
Given the difficulties of identifying conflicts, regulatory systems often set out conflict-of-interest
rules in ‘soft’ codes of conduct and rely heavily on transparency and disclosure about interests
and assets, which implies a high degree of self-regulation by individual officeholders. For
parliamentarians, codes of conduct are usually written and enforced by their peers within
parliament; alleged breaches may be investigated externally, but it almost always remains the
privilege of parliament to decide whether to impose sanctions. This reflects historical concerns
to maintain the legislature’s independence from the executive and its freedom to hold gov-
ernment to account without fear of retribution (Dávid-Barrett, 2015). However, it puts great
emphasis on the officeholder’s ability to make a judgement about whether conflicts exist and
what action should be taken, e.g., whether to declare an interest and when to recuse themselves
from certain meetings or decisions.
In making this judgement, officeholders are required to consider not just whether they
think that an interest might prejudice the execution of their duties, but also whether members
of the public might perceive such a risk – in other words, their behaviour must also meet the
‘appearance standard’. According to the Guidelines on the Code of Conduct for Members of
Parliament in the UK, for example, parliamentarians should declare a financial interest if it
‘might reasonably be thought by others to influence the speech, representation or communica-
tion in question’ (paragraph 74).2 This means that parliamentarians may be required to declare

interests even where they personally think that there is not a conflict, if they judge that an
interest of theirs ‘might reasonably be thought by others’ to influence their conduct.
This approach can be controversial in practice, as emerged in 2014, when the parliamentary
commissioner for standards investigated an alleged failure by a member, Peter Lilley, to declare
a conflict of interest.3 The allegations related to Lilley’s contributions to two Westminster
Hall debates in 2013, one on the Climate Change Act and one on energy, prices, profits and
poverty. His speeches concerned the rise in energy bills and the cost of renewable energy.
The commissioner argued that Lilley, although he had declared in the Register of Members’
Financial Interests that he held a non-executive role with Tethys Petroleum Limited, a gas and
oil exploration company, had failed to declare his interest when speaking in these two debates.
Lilley subsequently wrote to the commissioner, explaining that there was no conflict because
Tethys Petroleum operated only in Central Asia and had no interest in UK energy policy. The
commissioner accepted this, but argued that Lilley’s failure to make a declaration nonetheless
breached House Rules, arguing that ‘the correct test is not whether a Member has a conflict of
interest but whether a financial interest “might reasonably be thought by others to influence
the speech, representation or communication in question”’. In other words, the commissioner
invoked the appearance standard and argued that Lilley should have based his decision on this,
rather than his own judgement as to whether a conflict in fact was likely. This accords with
a case discussed by Stark where an employee of the US Department of Housing and Urban
Development was dismissed on the grounds of violating the department’s code prohibiting
appearances of official impropriety (Stark, 2003: 207). The conduct regarded improper in this
case was that Lawrence Wild had allowed some private rental units that he owned to deteri-
orate badly, such that it became the subject of newspaper coverage. Judge Richard Posner,
who presided in the US Court of Appeals case, Wild v. US (1982), identified the ‘irony’ of
a professional employee of a housing department being regarded as a ‘slumlord’ as relevant
to undermining public confidence in the agency. This suggests that, if Wild had worked for
a different department, his behaviour would not have carried this risk.
The appearance standard is controversial. It gives discretion to the officeholder to decide
whether there is the appearance of a conflict, but they can be subject to a sanction if someone
else disagrees with their judgement. It appears to pre-judge the facts (i.e., whether an interest
actually influences conduct) and yet is also applied retroactively. As a principle of regulation,
it seems to impose rather ambiguous and sometimes perverse obligations on officeholders.
Returning to the case of Peter Lilley, for example, the awkward implication of the commis-
sioner’s ruling was summed up in his response, thus: ‘I was astonished that you should be
minded to rule that I should nonetheless have been obliged to declare that I did NOT have
a conflict of interest, still more that I should apologise for not declaring that I did NOT have
a conflict of interest.’ Lilley later suggested that the appearance standard is a way of overcom-
ing the inevitable subjectivity of judgements made by officeholders about their own conflicts
of interest. He wrote,
[The rule] says ‘it is the responsibility of the Member… to judge whether a financial interest is suf-
ficiently relevant to a particular debate… to require a declaration’. The phrase ‘sufficiently relevant’
implies that the financial interest is known in sufficient detail to be evaluated and its impact assessed.
To avoid relying on the MP’s subjective introspection on whether the interest may affect what he
says he is given an objective test ‘might [the financial interest] reasonably be thought by others to
influence the speech… in question’.

Yet this latter test is hardly ‘objective’. Indeed, regulating conflicts of interest seems to require
a series of judgements that can only be subjective.
One more recent case in the US has highlighted difficulties around invoking the appear-
ance standard as the basis for conflict-of-interest judgements. Former Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) director James Comey was staunchly criticised for his decisions, in July
2016 and October 2016, to hold press conferences giving details of the FBI investigation
into then presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server. However, he
explained his decision to do so as being motivated by a wish to avoid being seen as partisan,
underpinned by a belief that impartiality was not only fundamentally important to the purpose
of the FBI but also that the organisation’s reputation depended on its being seen to be impar-
tial. Yet Comey would later be criticised for acting in contravention of organisational norms
which would have dictated that he did not speak openly about an ongoing investigation. On
another reading, his behaviour was consistent with trying to uphold a higher-level principle,
that he should avoid the organisation appearing partial. Perversely, in seeking to avoid being
seen as partial, he increased the perception that he was acting partially. In this case, his attempt
to comply with the appearance standard backfired.
IMPLICIT BIASES AND THE COGNITIVE CHALLENGE OF

SELF-REGULATION
It is necessary to rely to some extent on trusting individual officeholders to arrive at their

own judgements; the appearance standard does not obviate this need. Yet our confidence in
self-regulation for this critical aspect of integrity stands in direct contradiction to our concern
about the risk that such conflicts pose. We want to regulate conflicts of interest because we
think that public officeholders are embedded in a social context with interests and responsibil-
ities that pull them in different directions and may distort the execution of their public duties,
but in our regulatory approach we assume that officeholders are able to isolate their decisions
from such influence. While anti-corruption policy always grapples with the fundamental chal-
lenge of ‘who guards the guardians?’ or, as it is sometimes framed, the danger that we lack
‘principled principals’, the risks are exacerbated when the guard and guardian are the same
individual.
The idea that individuals can regulate their own conflicts of interest makes an assumption
that may be misplaced: that individuals can screen out biases in making judgements. The
ethical officeholder is expected to identify a potential conflict of interest and take appropriate
action to ensure that it does not influence the execution of his or her duties. Fundamentally,
this assumes that their actions are based on conscious choices and deliberate decisions. Yet
insights from psychology suggest, on the contrary, that human behaviour is often the product
of ‘automatic’ or ‘fast’ thinking. As such, they may be influenced by ‘implicit biases’, auto-
matic associations that influence action without triggering reflective awareness. Such biases
can negatively influence individual evaluations and judgements of individuals in stereotyped
groups – for example, based on gender, race, religious identity or age – and may reinforce
patterns of discrimination (Amodio et al., 2003). This raises questions as to whether office-
holders’ judgements about their own impartiality can be trusted. Officeholders may not be able
to put aside or overcome the unconscious processes that influence their behaviour, leading
some scholars to characterise wrongful decisions as ‘ethical blind spots’ (Chugh et al., 2005;

Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011). On the other hand, research has also found that individuals
can both exhibit implicit biases and at the same time internalise an ‘anti-prejudice norm’
(Ivarsflaten et al., 2010). Such individuals may be able to overcome the ‘fast thinking’ biases
and activate their ‘slow thinking’ to act in a way that avoids that bias; this seems a fruitful
avenue for conflict-of-interest research.
Certain characteristics of situations make it easier for people to justify the ethicality of their
own behaviour, as the famous Milgram experiment first demonstrated in which subjects were
persuaded by subtle manipulations of the context to inflict what appeared to be potentially
lethal electric shocks on fellow volunteers. Notwithstanding later concerns about the way
that Milgram had himself framed the result, the set of experiments ‘reveal: that the subjects’
response to the morally most important aspect of the situation, the requests to inflict high
levels of electric shock on another person, vary significantly with the other aspects of the
situation, many of which seem to be of no moral importance at all’ (Webber, 2016: 135).
Psychologists have also identified the phenomenon of ‘motivated reasoning’, where an indi-
vidual’s self-interest changes their understanding of reality and individuals are able to justify
corrupt actions to themselves and others (Redlawsk, 2002; Snow, 2009).
In public office, these risks may be especially acute, because of a range of situational effects
including the frequency with which officeholders face acute ethical dilemmas and the often
ambiguous or complex nature of the decisions they must make. The ambiguity and subtlety
present in many of the conflict-of-interest situations pertaining to public office may mean that
officeholders justify potential breaches of integrity by characterising problems in certain ways
or noting that there is a lack of clarity about which course of action would be the most appro-
priate (Feldman and Halali, 2019). Thus, ambiguity appears to provide ‘cover’ for individuals
to engage in questionable actions but claim plausible deniability. Experimental work in this
area seeks to understand how individuals in public office rationalise the dissonance between
their self-interest-maximizing corrupt behaviour and their overarching aims to serve the
public interest. Drugov et al. (2014) find that people are less reluctant to engage in corruption
where the corruption is channelled through an intermediary. This suggests that individuals are
aware that the corrupt course of action is undesirable and seek to distance themselves from
it. However, it remains unclear whether they take this course because they think they are less
likely to be caught or because the existence of a third party weakens their sense of responsibil-
ity for violating norms, or both.
These situational effects interact with the character of politicians and public servants. The
work of Feldman and others suggests that some individuals identify as ‘good people’ and see
themselves as far more moral, unbiased, and law abiding than they actually are (Feldman,
2018). People with such views of themselves may be particularly good at ignoring or justifying
their own unethical behaviour, and do not respond to ordinary forms of regulation (Feldman,
2018). If politicians and public officials are more likely to see themselves as ‘good people’,
as seems plausible, this may affect their ability to accurately judge their own behaviour.
Individuals also tend to process information in ways that fit with their pre-existing beliefs,
which may inhibit their ability to see how they are being influenced.
The evidence about whether public officeholders are more oriented towards the public
interest is in fact mixed. Some studies find that there is self-selection into the public sector
and that this results in organisations whose staff are disproportionately motivated by prosocial
concerns (Georgellis et al., 2011; Perry, 1996). However, in countries where corruption is
widespread, a more malevolent form of self-selection may occur; some scholars find evidence

that citizens driven more by personal financial gain than a sense of public service self-select
into government bureaucracies – with the intention of using public office for illicit enrichment
(Barfort et al., 2015; Klašnja et al., 2016). An alternative interpretation is that officials in
highly corrupt societies are simply corrupted once they are in office. Gans-Morse et al., in
a study in Russia, find that students who report that they would prefer a public-sector career
display less willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games and exhibit higher levels of
altruism (Gans-Morse et al., 2017).
Research does suggest that officeholders are sometimes sensitive to the perceptions of the
public and that this can affect their own conduct. Zamir and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2018) find that
the clearer it is to an officeholder that his or her interests diverge from those of the public at
large, the less likely he or she is to give precedence to his or her own interests. This suggests
some level of affinity with the public, which might provide a foundation for the approach of
asking officeholders to consider the appearance standard. On the other hand, a large body of
work suggests that individuals are more likely to cheat if they think that this is the norm in
their reference group. In an experiment where a confederate cheats ostentatiously in a task,
the impact on other participants’ propensity to behave ethically differs depending on whether
the confederate is seen as part of the in-group or the out-group. If the cheater is a member of
the out-group, other participants are motivated to behave more ethically, but if the cheater is
one of their own, they behave less ethically (Gino et al., 2009). This is consistent with other
research which finds that psychological closeness to a scoundrel prompts others to behave less
ethically themselves (Gino and Galinsky, 2012) and that unethical behaviour is more likely
to be accepted by others if there is a gradual erosion of ethical standards rather than an abrupt
shift – a ‘slippery slope effect’ (Gino and Bazerman, 2009).
All of this suggests that perceptions and expectations about the conduct of peers are
likely to be an important influence on individual conduct. If officeholders perceive that
their peers sail easily back and forth through the revolving door, apparently unencumbered
by conflict-of-interest concerns or ostentatiously failing to comply with rules about seeking
advice or disclosing interests, this may affect their judgements about their own conflicts
of interest. This is in line with work which sees systemic corruption as a collective action
problem (Rothstein, 2011): in contexts where corruption is the norm, even individuals who
wish to behave ethically may lack motivation to do so, since they expect that they will act
alone and hence simply incur short-term costs (foregoing receipt of bribes or access to favours)
without achieving any progress towards social change (Peiffer and Alvarez, 2016).
More optimistically, it might be possible to cultivate group identities which adhere to high
professional and ethical standards to help individual officeholders guard against improper
influence. Kirk et al. (2011) conducted an experiment about the effect of sponsorship on
professionals with a certain area of expertise – in this case, art critics. Their findings suggest
that individuals within a profession may be better able than laypersons to act impartially
and to avoid their judgement being influenced by other interests, even financial sponsors.
It is unclear whether the art critics’ apparent impartiality derives from personal attachment
to professional ideals or from concerns to maintain a shared identity and group membership
with other members of a profession. Whichever is the case, the experiment suggests that there
may be scope to build on the idea of professional standards or membership of a professional
community to encourage certain kinds of judgement. One policy path for anti-corruption
efforts might therefore be to increase the professional prestige associated with being a public
official, invoking professional norms and standards that apply to the vocation of public office.

Alternatively, we might try to invoke a sense of the in-group as the citizenry, emphasising the
dual role that politicians play as both representatives of the citizens and citizens themselves,
aiming to reinforce their link with the public – whose interests are harmed by corruption –
rather than that with other colleagues who also benefit.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed a number of contemporary debates which relate to conflicts of
interest and how they should be regulated. In the first part, it was argued that trends in public
service have increased the frequency and complexity of conflict-of-interest regulation, making
the task of separating out interests and potential influences on conduct much more complex,
both for the individuals involved and for observers. Focusing on the revolving door, the chapter
identified five different types of conflict that may arise and surveyed evidence about how they
play out in practice. Conceptually, conflict of interest relies on a distinction between public
and private duties. That distinction used to be replicated by spatial and temporal distinctions
between public and private duties, but increasingly those distinctions have fallen away. In
a world of outsourcing, secondments, and performance indicators, public/private distinctions
are blurred and the task of separating them has become much harder.
In the second part, concerns were raised about the use of the ‘appearance standard’ to regu-
late conflicts of interest. Our approach to regulating conflicts of interest has sought to manage
the difficulty of truly judging whether a conflict occurs by emphasising instead a risk-based
approach that gives great weight to the appearance of a conflict. While this reflects a real
concern to uphold public confidence in public administration, it increases the regulatory
burden and, in practice, may have unintended consequences. If our concern is primarily with
avoiding corruption, the appearance standard does not necessarily serve us well as a regulatory
tool. Even as a method of ensuring public confidence in the institutions, it seems to be failing.
The third section turned to the problem of needing to rely on individual judgement and
self-regulation to mitigate the risks associated with conflicts of interest. Research from
psychology and behavioural science has alerted us to some harsh realities regarding the
challenges of ethical decision making even for people who prize professional ethics. When
we set requirements for officeholders to avoid conflicts of interest, we entreat them to ignore
a whole range of personal motivations and social obligations. Yet we know that humans are
prone to situational biases and are bad at dealing with ambiguity, both conditions which are
intrinsic to public service in our complex societies. Even if they deeply wish to do so, public
officeholders may struggle to construct the cognitive Chinese walls needed to shield their
decisions from unconscious biases. Moreover, the kind of people who go into public office
may be more likely to regard themselves as ‘good people’, intrinsically motivated to serve the
public interest. Ironically, this may make them less likely to recognise their own behaviour as
corrupt and hence less sensitive to traditional regulatory approaches based on enforcing rules
and sanctions.
This discussion forces us to question the implicit assumption made in mainstream
anti-corruption theories that corrupt behaviour can be deterred by manipulating incentives.
Most public officeholders go into public service careers because they wish to do just that,
serve the public. If behaviour diverges from that goal once in office, we need more research
to understand the reasons why. In many contexts, particularly where corruption is systemic,

officeholders do not recognise their behaviour as wrongful and may be able to provide exten-
sive accounts of why it is not only acceptable but also beneficial to society.
Conflicts of interest in public office are inevitable, and so is the complexity that troubles
our efforts to manage them. However, the evidence suggests that individuals are capable of
observing and avoiding their biases to a greater degree when they are made aware or reminded
of them, and prompted to engage in constant deliberation. Clear codes of conduct and rules,
registers of interest and asset declarations may serve a purpose in establishing the standards
expected and signalling that compliance is valued, but professional standards training for
public officeholders should focus more on the inherent human difficulties of avoiding bias in
public office. It should allow individuals opportunities to role-play situations in which they
might find themselves and to think through how to behave in safe contexts where the stakes
are lower than in real life. Building on learning about the importance of reference groups, it
should seek to create support networks of peers that can provide advice as new dilemmas arise
and help socialise members into internalising norms of integrity. Such softer approaches are
not a substitute for rules and sanctions but might enhance the utility of the latter, by helping
individuals to become more self-aware and better able to make the deliberate decisions about
their conduct on which such traditional approaches rely.
NOTES
1. NAO, ‘Conflicts of interest’ (January 2015), p. 5.
2. See: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmstandards/951/95105.htm.
Accessed 12 April 2020.
3. The excerpts given here, while extensive, represent only a fraction of the exchange between Peter
Lilley and the commissioner. A fuller account can be found here: https://publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmstandards/951/95105.htm. Accessed 5 July 2018.
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29. Whistleblowers counteracting institutional
corruption in public administration
Marianna Fotaki
INTRODUCTION
While freedom from corruption is a near universal measure of functioning public administra-
tions worldwide (Perry, 2015), evidence reveals widespread systemic wrongdoing in govern-
ment agencies and public institutions entrusted with providing healthcare services (Kennedy et
al., 2001; Francis, 2013), in charities (Brown, 2018), and even in the spiritual establishments
to which many people turn for moral and religious guidance (Savage and Smith, 2003). Their
failure to live up to their purpose both undermines the principles of good governance (Della
Porta and Mény, 1997) and has corrosive effects on the public trust on which all institutions
depend for their legitimacy (O’Neill, 2002). A prevailing perception of endemic corruption in
public institutions may jeopardize the entire governance system (Ashforth et al., 2008). Why,
then, do public institutions fail to uphold their proclaimed values; how does this divergence
occur; and how can these public institutions be restored to their original purpose?
Comprehending its dynamics and mechanisms is essential to prevent corruption and
redress the damage caused by loss of public confidence. However, the systemic character of
corruption-inducing logics, unconcerned with individual wrongdoing or insulated organiza-
tional practices, are difficult to identify and uncover. This suggests that a different approach
may be needed to better understand why such failures and breaches continue, frequently
involving egregious forms of professional misbehavior.
This chapter aims to address this gap by focusing on forms of corruption beyond the
actions of delinquent and self-interested individuals or the influence of organizational norms
as such. We draw on the theory of institutional corruption (IC) developed by political phi-
losopher Dennis Thompson (1995, 2010, 2019) and legal scholar, Lawrence Lessig (2011,
2013), which differs from that of conventional corruption in both its individual and structural
forms. The original theorization focuses on the corrupting effect of influence and money in
politics, calling attention not simply to IC, but to distinctive ways in which institutions can
be corrupted. It examines the corrosive effect of different types of policy incentives on public
institutions, raising questions about their purpose and casting doubt on their functions. These
may also encourage employees and leaders to act wrongfully in performing their institutional
roles, often without recognizing their own implication in corrupt behavior. This form of cor-
ruption is found not only in government, but also in many other kinds of institutions in a wide
variety of contexts (see Thompson, 2019 for a review). It is thus an appropriate lens through
which to study private-sector organizations, and to focus on roles, rather than remaining at the
level of institutional fields or individual organizations (Kenny, 2014). Crucially, the chapter
deploys the notion of IC to explicate how legal forms of corruption thwart an institution’s
purpose by weakening its effectiveness and public confidence in its integrity (Lessig, 2011,
2013; Thompson, 1995).
421
Marianna Fotaki - 9781789900910
Overall, the concept of IC can be usefully applied to better understand how organizations
tasked with protecting the public interest may lose credibility if they depart from their original
mission by engaging in activities that endanger it, even if these activities are not illegal. This,
we suggest, eventually can lead to deviation from the institution’s original purpose and corrupt
behaviors by organizational members. The chapter combines insights primarily from political
philosophy and legal studies with organization studies and behavioral ethics perspectives. It
contributes to the organizational wrongdoing literature, by highlighting the impact of policy
incentives and regulation on organizational culture, and how they may cause organizations
to diverge from their original purpose. According to IC theory, this is central to the notion of
corruption in public institutions. The chapter brings these macro-level influences into conver-
sation with research on public organizations, where various forms of wrongdoing are report-
edly high (Miceli et al., 2008), allowing for better understanding of the influence of policy
incentives on the emergence of (un)ethical organizational outcomes that jeopardize their core
organizational purpose. Undermining the core goal of the public institutions, it argues, further
contributes to the perversion of professional ethics and diminishes the organization’s ability
to perform its tasks.
The second, related contribution is to the literature on whistleblowing. The chapter high-
lights the role of whistleblowers as insiders who have intimate knowledge of, and commitment
to, the values of the profession (Kenny et al., 2020), which is crucial in their decisions to
oppose wrongdoing. Thus, we depart from the hero/villain dichotomy and offer the perspec-
tive of whistleblowers as change agents passionately attached to their organizations (Grant,
2002). Instead, it considers the role of whistleblowers within such organizations who, through
speaking up, attempt to alter these situations and bring the organizations back to their core
mission. In addition to theoretical developments, the chapter concludes with practical recom-
mendations on whistleblower protection and the need for appropriate internal speaking-up
arrangements in organizations to prevent IC.
In the remainder of the chapter, the key premises of the theory of IC are outlined, before dis-
cussing evidence on how whistleblowers contribute to counteracting and preventing various
forms of IC and wrongdoing. The chapter then concludes by outlining some theoretical and
practical implications.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION

AND WHISTLEBLOWING
Transparency International (2009, p. 14) defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power
for private gain’. Corruption may take many forms – petty or grand, covert or open, limited
or extensive, black, grey or white, individual or systemic (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Olken
and Pande, 2012; Dimant, 2013). It may be acceptable, harmful, or simply routine (Graycar
and Prenzler, 2013). Other important forms of corruption occur in government and the public
sector, both supporting and diverging from Transparency International’s definition (Lessig,
2011, 2013). Emerging scholarship on corruption in public administration includes research on
the public cost of corruption (Liu and Mikesell, 2014), the importance of ethical codes (Svara,
2014), education for integrity in government (Perry et al., 2014), and ethics more generally
(Belle and Cantarelli, 2017). Other recent works consider issues of ethical leadership (Downe
et al., 2016) and the structure and management of executive government (Meyer-Sahling et

Whistleblowers in public administration 423
al., 2018). Yet, little research has been carried out on forms of corruption that may be legal,
or even ethical, and yet harmful to institutional legitimacy and public trust (for an exception,
see Kobrak, 2002; and for a historical analysis of corruption in the United States (US), see
Teachout, 2014).
To redress this, we must shift away from illegal activities concerning individual wrongdoing
that diminishes the standing of public institutions, exemplified by bribery and similar illegal
offenses (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016) or different forms of organizational misconduct
(see Gabbionetta et al., 2018 for a review). The focus is not on how lax regulation and its inad-
equate implementation may give rise to or tacitly condone illegal activities (Rose-Ackerman
and Palifka, 2016), but on how individuals without corrupt motives participate in quid pro
quo exchanges (Thompson, 2019) and end up corrupting and undermining their own insti-
tutions. Instead, we should focus on examining connections between patterns of corruption
and the legitimate purpose of institutions, as well as on explaining how individuals who may
not necessarily have corrupt motives end up contributing to corruption, serious violations of
professional ethics, or other forms of wrongdoing in their organizations. For example, unlike
bribery, campaign fundraising serves a legitimate function and is perfectly legal, since polit-
ical institutions rely on campaign donations for their functioning. However, the influence of
money damages democracy by circumventing and/or bypassing the legislative process and
breaking the link between representation and power. Such a reorientation may explain the
intractability of corruption by shifting the focus from deterring and removing corrupt individ-
uals (acting alone or systematically) to changing the rules and procedures of the institution
and the incentives for individuals who may not be corrupt (Thompson, 2019). This may also
help adequately target policy and legislative interventions towards finding alternatives to the
functions that corruption serves.
Institutional Corruptions: One or Many?
Thompson (2010, p. 6) defines the term ‘institutional corruption’ as ‘political gain or benefit
by a public official under conditions that in general tend to promote private interests’, but this
includes other interests and agents outside the institution and does not require that the gain an
official receives be private (Thompson, 2019, p. 496). Specifically, this describes the perverse
systemic influence of money in politics and its damaging effect on democracy, whereby legal
donations by powerful interests bypass the legitimate legislative process by breaking the link
between representation and power. For instance, Kobrak (2002) demonstrates that the rich
routinely finance interest groups to push their agendas through Congress and influence the
US president. Such incentives, though perfectly legal and possibly even ethical, corrupt the
government’s mission by leading it to serve the affluent few rather than the interests of the
many citizens whom it is meant to represent. Politicians being ‘less responsive to the people’
(Lessig, 2011, p. 231) and voting in accordance with donors’ interests may lead to loss of trust
in the public institution and damage to democracy. Consequently, IC occurs even if such activ-
ities are legal (Lessig, 2013), as in the case of lobbying and donating to political parties. For
political philosopher Dennis Thompson (1995), such ‘cozy relationships’ between money and
government lie at the root of IC. According to legal scholar Lawrence Lessig, who extended
its application to a wider range of institutions, this form of corruption:

is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the insti-
tution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose,
including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or
the institution’s inherent trustworthiness’ (Lessig, 2011, p. 553). Under this framing, organizational
members are often trapped in finance-related institutional dependency, relying on money from major
donors and special-interest groups for election and retention in office (Lessig, 2013).
However, ethical failures and individual misbehaviors do not, on their own, constitute cor-
ruption without systematic deviation from the organization’s socially sanctioned purpose,
although they may often coexist with and thrive under IC.
The theory of IC proposed by Thompson (1995, 2010) and further developed by Lessig
(2011, 2013) has sparked vigorous interest among political scientists, legal scholars, and
ethicists, and several scholars have developed their own working definitions (see Amit et al.,
2017 for a review). For some, IC refers to the corruption of institutions supposed to serve the
public interest (Draca, 2014), while others imply that divergence from institutional purpose is
sufficient, without necessarily serving the greater good (see Lessig, 2011). There is also debate
on whether the origins of IC lie in the system, the donors, or individual behavior (Amit et al.,
2017). Many variations have been identified in diverse organizational settings such as health-
care (Light, 2013), the pharmaceuticals industry (Rodwin, 2012), food safety (Marks, 2013),
lobbying, and insider accounting (Gray, 2013). In addition to legal frameworks enabling polit-
ical corruption and the corruption of government agencies described by Lessig, private-sector
organizations may actively engage in gaming the rules of society and perverting the intent of
the law, thus contributing to the persistence of IC (Salter, 2010).
Lessig’s novel and persuasive definition of IC emphasizes the potential impact of an
‘economy of influence’ in undermining institutions’ ability to perform their core tasks,
putting their long-term survival at risk. However, such a macro-level approach is insufficient
(Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018), as it ignores aspects of organizational culture (Kaptein, 2011)
and individuals’ motivations and values (Brewer and Selden, 1998) that often enable corrup-
tion to be institutionalized, reproduced, and embedded. This is also important for counter-
acting organizational wrongdoing. We turn to organizational analysis frames, allowing us to
bring together different levels to explain how policies are implemented and how they affect
individuals’ behaviors in organizations in terms of personal/motivational/behavioral aspects,
to explain how IC takes root in public institutions.
Institutional Corruption: Organizations and Individuals
The organization is the basic unit in which such practices can be observed and addressed
(Luo, 2004). Organizational scholarship theorizes wrongdoing through the concepts of con-
structive deviance (Warren, 2003), emotional contagion (Smith-Crowe and Warren, 2014),
normalization of collective corruption (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), and institutionalization
of wrongdoing (Palmer, 2012). Corruption or its absence is closely intertwined with social
relations and forms of exchange among individuals, relating to the notions of obligation,
reciprocity and gift culture, as well as interpersonal trust (Torsello and Venard, 2015). Hence,
it is neither universal nor stable, and is variously accepted depending on the locale in which
it is encountered. Cognitive bias (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009), unconscious motivation
(Bazerman and Banaji, 2004), and moral emotion (Smith-Crowe and Warren, 2014) are also
useful for explaining the delinquent behavior of individuals in organizations.

Although structurally embedded corruption differs from individuals using positions of influ-
ence for personal gain, the two are often linked (Light, 2013). As Light observes, institutional
members have considerable discretion over their level of involvement in IC, ranging from
extracting maximum benefit to minimal compliance. Organizational leaders may purposely
manipulate administrative structures and organizations’ cultural carriers to control corruption
(Luo, 2004). Individuals may also behave corruptly on behalf of the institution (Pinto et al.,
2008), engaging in self-deception to ensure that their interests are best served (Salter, 2010).
However, others may choose to speak out and engage in various activities to oppose corrup-
tion. The focus on whistleblowers’ normative actions and their deep embeddedness from
an organizational perspective, where wrongdoing can best be observed (Lange, 2008) and
opposed (Fotaki et al., 2015; Kenny et al., 2020), is crucial, as shown in our empirical exam-
ples. Below, we summarize evidence of whistleblowers acting to defend the public interest in
various sectors, linking their actions to the concept of IC defined above.
Whistleblowers as Defenders of the Public Interest
A commonly accepted definition of whistleblowing is ‘the disclosure by organization members

(former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action’ (Near and Miceli,
1984). The UK’s National Audit Office defines whistleblowing as ‘making a disclosure in the
public interest’ and recognizes whistleblowers’ importance for safeguarding effective delivery
of public services and ensuring value for money (NAO, 2014). Whistleblowers report infor-
mation on wrongdoing at work, helping to prevent damage and detect threat or harm to the
public interest that may otherwise remain hidden. Whistleblowing may be internal or external
(Near and Miceli, 1995): employees, suppliers, or contractors may report suspected wrongdo-
ing at work, through internal processes set up by the organization or through external bodies
such as regulators or the media. Theoretical and empirical investigations of different forms of
wrongdoing reported by whistleblowers (see, for example, Ash, 2016; Vandekerckhove, 2006;
Alford, 2001; Miethe, 1999; Glazer and Glazer, 1989) therefore provide important insights
into organizational conditions that enable corrupt practices to flourish.
Corruption may be discovered by chance, but intervention by whistleblowers and the media
(Dimant, 2013) is key to disclosing it. Employees are an important means of detecting various
forms of institutional fraud (Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009; Miceli et al., 2008; Miceli and Near,
2005) because they are the first to witness it in their workplaces (Miethe and Rothschild,
1994). For instance, in 2017 more than 50 percent of cases were uncovered with the help of
information provided by employees, more than twice the percentage of any other detection
method (ACFE, 2018). Whistleblowers in a wide range of sectors, such as health and social
care, environmental protection and food safety, banking and financial services, have reported
various forms of wrongdoing, thus saving many people’s lives and money (Devine, 2012;
Kenny et al., 2019).
Whistleblowing is not only the main route for uncovering fraud and other forms of wrong-
doing, but ‘whistleblowers cluster in public rather than private or not-for-profit sectors’
(Miceli et al., 2008, p. 85). However, although it has prevented many disasters (Devine and
Maasarani, 2011), including health and safety scares and nuclear threats (Alford, 2001),
research on the role of whistleblowing in counteracting corruption in public institutions is
scarce (see De Graaf, 2010). The impact of whistleblowing may be far-reaching. Disclosures

may stop or deter wrongdoing in the short term, while helping to restore the core institutional
purpose of an organization in the medium and long term. This can be achieved both by engag-
ing organizational members in good governance and by bringing about required legislative
changes. Prominent examples of institutional changes have emerged from major whistle-
blower disclosures in various sectors in the US and elsewhere. For instance, Mark Felt’s expo-
sure of the Watergate scandal that brought down President Nixon unleashed discontent and
public outrage, helping to transform the FBI, the relationship between president and Congress,
and public attitudes towards the state as a whole (Gage, 2012). Sherron Watkins’ exposure
of the Enron scandal led to wider questioning of accounting practices, contributing to the
passing of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to protect investors from potentially fraudulent activities
by corporations. The Libor affair in the UK, focusing on Barclays Bank, led to the European
Commission adopting new rules on operating market benchmarks intended to prevent future
rigging scandals.
In the context of public services in the UK, whistleblower reports led to a radical overhaul
of the National Health Service (NHS) in the late 1990s (Bolsin et al., 2011; Kennedy et al.,
2011). More recently, a campaign led by a deceased patient’s daughter and the disclosure
by a nurse Helena Donnelly prompted a government inquiry into the failings of the Mid
Staffordshire NHS Foundation (Francis, 2013). Both cases led to the introduction of specific
policy measures, not only to prevent future care failures but also to reform the entire system,
as discussed next.
DISCUSSION
We have drawn on the notion of IC to argue that systematic deviation from organizational
purpose constitutes a form of corruption in its own right, especially when public mission and
money are involved. We have focused beyond ‘illegal’ or unethical forms of wrongdoing in
order to reconsider how forces both within and outside organizations cause them to deviate
from their core purpose, perverting their moral fabric and raising questions about their raison
d’être. An integration of insights from various research domains and levels of analysis may
be essential to a better understanding of how corruption becomes systemic, deeply embedded,
and intractable (Ashforth et al., 2008), often without individuals fully acknowledging their
implication in these processes. The institutionalist perspective helps acknowledge the systemic
character of corruption-inducing logics, which are unconcerned with individuals and are hard
to identify and uncover (Thompson, 2019). However, an approach that is sensitive to the poli-
tics of corruption must go beyond studying political institutions or politics per se.
We have thus extended the original institutional theory, developed separately by Thompson
(1995) and Lessig (2011), by showing how policy pressures on hospitals to become com-
petitive market entities led to unethical choices. For instance, under neoliberal policies, the
overarching goal of reducing public spending was translated into meaningless and unachiev-
able business targets. The Conservative government’s focus on getting the most out of the
NHS by introducing a market ethos (Hood, 1991), with inadequate resources and quality
control systems and complacent professionals, undermined the organization’s ‘effectiveness
in pursuing its primary purposes, and the confidence of the relevant publics that it is doing so’
(Thompson, 2010, p. 5). This was already observed in the UK in the Royal British Infirmary
scandal which shook the National Health Service foundations (Kennedy et al., 2001).

Incompetent, unscrupulous, and heavily pressurized managers enforced targets by setting

goals that their staff could not fulfil as the scandal abusing the elderly in Mid Stafforshire hos-
pital in the UK has shown (Francis, 2013). Organizational research confirms that when explicit
targets are coupled with strong incentives (and/or disincentives), people will strive to meet
them, even at the expense of common sense (Schwartz, 1987). Employees may internalize or
quietly evade them, depending on their motivation (Brewer and Selden, 1998), but high work-
loads remain the most common cause of patient neglect (Reader and Gillespie, 2013). While
moral responsibility for any action rests ultimately with the individual, widespread failings
in care standards cannot be attributed simply to callous and uncaring staff. Most employees
joining the NHS, and the public sector more generally, are motivated by a public service ethos
(John and Johnson, 2008). But the introduction of the New Public Management reforms into
an underfunded system provided institutional conditions fostering corruption at many levels
(see Von Maravic and Reichard, 2003 for a discussion).
It is therefore important to consider the role of individuals engaging in professional mis-
conduct, and those who have attempted to alter such situations by speaking up, by integrating
insights from behavioral ethics (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Treviño et al., 1998). Behavioral
ethics research (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004) suggests that almost anyone may engage in
unethical behavior, resulting from a complicated and socially reinforced mixture of individ-
ual and organizational factors relating to mental framing, perceptions, and unconscious bias
or fear. Indeed, the Francis Report’s findings confirm the absence of ‘a sufficient sense of
collective responsibility or engagement for ensuring that quality care was delivered at every
level’ (Francis, 2013, p. 44). This example illustrates how the policy environment may create
fertile conditions for organizational wrongdoing by unscrupulous individuals: both leaders
(executives in Mid Staffordshire) and organizational members (nurses in Mid Staffordshire)
responded to policy incentives, thus contributing to the institutions’ divergence from their
legitimate purpose (Fotaki and Hyde, 2015), as predicted in Light’s (2013) discussion of IC in
healthcare. This suggests that managers and professional codes of conduct may play a critical
role in fostering ethical environments, yet the overall policy framework in which they operate
is even more important.
The usefulness of Thompson’s and Lessig’s conceptual developments is that it allows us
to frame such macro-level influences, as we make a case for their closer integration with
organizational approaches and ethical perspectives on individual wrongdoing. The proposed
IC frame is helpful for highlighting not only the conditions under which this divergence from
the organizational mission occurred, but also the role of whistleblowing in rectifying it. This
analysis indicates that alternatives to prevent such dependencies must be found if the institu-
tion is to function well (Thompson, 2019, p. 496), helping to avoid unethical outcomes and
loss of trust in public institutions.
The proposed framing therefore enriches existing research on what constitutes corruption
in the context of public health services by elucidating how organizations are influenced by
regulatory regimes, policies, and wider societal discourses, and how these may affect organ-
izational cultures and individual professionals’ behaviors. By drawing on these insights, we
extend the theorization to encompass ‘legal’ forms of corruption (Kobrak, 2002) that occur
through deviation from the institutional purpose of serving the public interest. The first case
of neglect and wrongdoing concerned the effects of New Public Management and the intro-
duction of cut-throat market competition into public services, at the expense of the hospital’s
primary institutional task of providing care, causing serious failures of care in the context of

inadequate resourcing. This shows how corruption may concern activities that are not illegal
(for instance, pursuing cost-effective services), yet still lead to unethical outcomes and damage
to society by making public institutions less able to perform their important functions (deliv-
ering quality of care). The proposed framing highlights the harm caused to institutions serving
the greater good when they diverge from their public purpose, for example in providing defi-
cient and/or negligent care motivated by narrow cost-saving considerations, or the network
club culture discussed above. In addition to undermining their purpose, cases of IC often
harm the very people who rely on them (Amit et al., 2017, p. 459). Paradoxically, this form
of corruption benefits the institution in the short term while undermining it in the long term.
Creating perverse dependencies and compelling individuals to act against the organizational
purpose (Lessig, 2011, 2013) while not in itself illegal, may have profound consequences in
terms of organizational corruption, which are often far greater than instances of individual
wrongdoing (Fotaki, 2020).
Combining institutional and organizational factors in the proposed framing, the chapter also
highlights the important role of individuals speaking up against wrongdoing, and how their
actions may stop various forms of IC. This enables us to highlight whistleblowers’ role in
addressing IC, acting as a conduit to bring public organizations back to their primary mission:
they remind organizations and help them find their lost good selves (Stein, 2019) when
wrongdoing becomes common practice. We have shown that, in each case, whistleblowers
acted as change agents (Miceli et al., 2008) in their own organizations (Pinto et al., 2008) and
beyond. We argue that whistleblowers’ disclosures can counteract IC by intervening at various
levels: (1) sparking macro-level policy changes, which (2) give rise to different organizational
arrangements, that together may contribute to (3) altering individual behaviors. We have pro-
vided examples of major policy shifts in public health systems following reports of systemic
care failures (Lewis et al., 2015; Francis, 2013; Bolsin et al., 2011), which may be relevant to
other public institutions. We have also examined whistleblower interventions in the context
of discretionary workplace behaviors manifested in avoidance of anti-social conduct and
engagement in pro-social behavior (Brewer and Selden, 1998). These, we suggest, were due to
strong attachments to both professional and altruistic values (Kenny et al., 2020), encouraging
individuals to speak out against medical negligence and unethical behavior, as demonstrated
by a nurse who became a whistleblower, Helena Donnelly at Mid Staffordshire (Donnelly,
2013). Finally, we have touched on the role of civic courage, represented by Julia Bailey
(Bailey, 2012), the relative who became a successful campaigner against the system’s failings.
In summary, the proposed framing, inspired by the notion of IC, allows us to consider the
intersection between integrity, ethics, and legality, which is often intrinsic to the workings of
public institutions (De Graaf, 2010), and how whistleblowers’ disclosures alert us to systemic
failures. Although whistleblowers have played a key role in publicizing wrongdoing in gov-
ernmental, public, and commercial organizations, their role in and contribution to bringing
wrongdoing organizations back on track has been insufficiently explored.
Important practical implications for policymakers and organizations emerge from this
theorization. Despite wide recognition of whistleblowing, as an effective tool against cor-
ruption and fraud and as a conduit for protecting the public interest, most individuals who
decide to speak up still do so at their own peril. Wrongdoing organizations often retaliate with
impunity against attempts to silence them (Bjørkelo, 2013; Miceli et al., 2008; Devine and
Maasarani, 2011). Whistleblowers are often seen as traitors (Hersch, 2002), unreliable tellers
of organizational secrets, and ‘vengeful troublemakers’ (Lewis, 2001). The key issue therefore

is adequate whistleblower protection, enabling individuals and organizational members to

report wrongdoing in their workplaces without fearing reprisals. Despite recognition of the
need for effective whistleblower protection to encourage reporting of misconduct, fraud,
and corruption, many legal approaches, initiatives, and measures designed to address these
issues (OECD, 2012; European Commission, 2018) do not extend to the organizations in
which many such activities occur. This raises the issue of protecting whistleblowers through
legislation, which must be meaningfully translated into organizational policies and structures.
It is equally important to dissociate whistleblowing from organizational disloyalty. Regarding
them as heroes or ‘saints of secular culture’ (Grant, 2002, p. 391) is also unhelpful, since this
implies that, rather than discharging their organizational and civic duty, superhuman endeavor
is required to report wrongdoing (Fotaki et al., 2015). This may deter other would-be whistle-
blowers from speaking up in their organizations. For instance, nursing staff may be less likely
to blow the whistle if doing so may result in retaliatory action by management (McDonald and
Ahern, 2000). Bringing unethical professional conduct to public attention should not become
a career- and life-destroying decision, as is the case for many whistleblowers, who face ostra-
cism, dismissal, or death threats (Rothschild and Miethe, 1999; Miethe, 1999).
One way to address this is to normalize the issue of raising concerns in organizations by
providing multiple and adequate channels to enable employees to do so (Vandekerckhove et
al., 2016). Speaking up against wrongdoing and reporting harmful divergence from the institu-
tional mission, whether intentional or not, must be seen as the responsibility of employees and
citizens. An ethical climate (Rothwell and Baldwin, 2006) and trust (DiPiazza, 2002) in organ-
izational speaking-up channels is essential for their uptake and functioning. Organizations are
increasingly implementing such speaking-up arrangements and producing relevant reports, but
employee satisfaction with the outcomes of raising concerns is very low and may even have
decreased (IBE, 2015). Adequate speaking-up arrangements may benefit the organization. On
a practical level, highlighting defective standards of professional practice and poor patient
care through legal routes may prevent or reduce the prospect of future harm (Vaughan, 2012).
Overall, raising concerns and whistleblower disclosures may provide an important means of
counteracting IC at the level of organizations by helping to reorient failing and wrongdoing
institutions back to their original mission. More importantly, indviduals who speak up teach
us lessons about moral courage as citizens in a democracy, with political obligations beyond
a duty to obey the law (Parekh, 1993). Despite powerful obstacles, they draw attention to
failures, sparking policy changes that may halt harmful institutional practices.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined ‘legal’ forms of corruption that occur when public institutions
systematically deviate from their core purpose, damaging their trustworthiness. We have
made a case for closer integration of the IC frame with organizational and ethical perspec-
tives on wrongdoing to better understand how policy influences managerial decisions and
individual behaviors in organizations. We have also highlighted the role of whistleblowers in
counteracting such forms of corruption, and their success in bringing about policy changes by
helping return organizations to their rightful course. Our analysis has accorded due attention
to the value of internal reporting, and of whistleblowing disclosures when the former are
disregarded. We conclude by arguing for full protection of those who alert us to institutions’

divergence from their mission and expose how this occurs, and for the introduction of ade-
quate and effective channels to allow employees to report wrongdoing safely. Without their
services, we may be unable to stop these phenomena or begin to work towards rebuilding lost
trust in public institutions.
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30. Criminological responses to corruption
Emile Kolthoff
CORRUPTION
Corruption can be observed in a public and a private manifestation, differing greatly at

a conceptual level (Albanese & Artello, 2019). If a person or business is the victim of private
corruption, the victim generally can choose to work with other companies, customers, or com-
petitors. When doing business with the state, the government has a monopoly over the goods
and services that one requires, for example licenses, business permits, or public contracts
(Bauhr, 2017). Similarly, if the police lacks trust to call on them for assistance about a crime,
there is no other agency to call. Instead, people may take protection into their own private
hands, leading to further violence. And that is precisely why, according to Denkers (cited in
van Beers, 2000), society originally set up organized police and justice not to catch criminals
and reduce crime but to do so less emotionally, less prejudicially, more decently, and less as
interested parties than citizens generally are. The antithesis of such police integrity is police
abuse of power in a manner contrary to the standards that govern it. Such power corrosion
includes corruption.
Much of what is considered corruption in the private sector is a form of white-collar or
organizational crime, usually involving frauds of some kind, that entail mistreatment of suppli-
ers, customers, or competitors (Benson & Simpson, 2018; Campbell & Lord, 2018; Johannsen,
Pedersen, Vadi, Reino, & Soot, 2016; Piquero & Albanese, 2012). Public corruption is a more
serious public threat because it undermines confidence in government, the legitimacy of
government institutions, and the ability of citizens to be treated fairly in their interactions
with government entities. It also entails elements of white-collar and organizational crime,
but we would rather label it state crime (Kolthoff, 2016). As a result, public corruption has
far-reaching societal implications beyond that of corruption in the private sector, because
private-sector corruption affects some people, whereas public corruption affects all people
(Albanese & Artello, 2019, p. 3). Controlling public-sector corruption can be seen as a pre-
requisite for controlling private-sector corruption because without government operations
characterized by non-corrupt transactions, it is impossible to regulate the private sector effec-
tively (see Andvig, Fjldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Soreide, 2001; Shekshnia, Ledeneva, &
Denisova-Schmidt, 2017).
Understanding the underlying behaviors of public corruption activities is a prerequisite
for effective detection and prevention. Different disciplines have different answers to this
question (Graycar & Masters, 2018, p. 183). In this chapter we approach the question from
a criminological angle and try to apply it to public administration. Albanese and Artello (2019)
analyzed more than 300 public corruption convictions occurring over a three-year period to
develop a typology of categories of corruption behaviors. Their examination shows that all
cases have one of two objects (theft or misuse of authority) and that in pursuing these objects,
eight types of corrupt behaviors could be empirically identified. Their results show that receipt
of bribery was the most common of the eight behaviors in the three-year sample of cases,
434
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Criminological responses to corruption 435
occurring in 23.1 percent of the cases as a primary, secondary, or tertiary behavior. Second
most common was embezzlement, which occurred in 19.1 percent of the cases, followed
by official misconduct, procurement fraud, regulatory law violations, bribery solicitation,
obstruction of justice, and extortion.
Graycar and Masters (2018) used situational crime prevention techniques to build a matrix
of corruption prevention. This tool can facilitate both research and practice for corruption
prevention and has great relevance for good governance, by providing a structured framework
to identify potential corruption risks by function and also strategies for developing contextu-
ally appropriate prevention techniques. Graycar and Masters (2018, p. 173) rightly state that
crime prevention and corruption prevention are similar but not identical. Their approach is
very much public administration and organization oriented, taking a positive starting point
with regard to the honesty of public servants. However, when prevention fails, individual
corrupt public servants can be considered criminals and criminological theory might help to
understand and explain their behavior. This can be seen as a supplement to the matrix Graycar
and Masters provide (2018, p. 182). Many links with criminological theory can be found in the
matrix already, but for example individual strain, opportunity and greed, and – connected to
leadership – differential association are not mentioned and can contribute to understanding the
origins of corruption and how to react to it.
Another important addition to the debate is the concept of organized crime. Many corrup-
tion cases are initiated or can be linked to organized crime. The amounts of money involved
in for example drugs production and trafficking are so high that criminals increasingly make
use of bribing, intimidating, and threatening public servants to conduct their criminal business.
The case studies and interviews in a recent research into serious integrity violations connected
with organized crime in law enforcement (Kolthoff & Nelen, 2019) confirm the picture from
the literature (Simpson and Piquero 2002) that officials involved in integrity violations can
be characterized as people with little self-control, are not good at dealing with adversity and
frustration (both professional and private), and are motivated by a desire for a more adven-
turous, more riveting, and (sometimes) a more luxurious life. All these elements have been
extensively researched in criminology.
This chapter, rather than focusing on the extent of the problem and on differences between
countries and cultures, asks why, in any specific organization in which both macro factors
(e.g., welfare and the political system) are the same for everyone, do some people engage
in corruptive activities while others in exactly the same situation do not. We do this from
a criminological perspective and include meso factors (for example organizational culture and
structure) in the analysis.
THEORIES THAT CAN HELP TO EXPLAIN CORRUPTION
Before discussing the theoretical framework, it is important to emphasize another important

distinction; that between behavior that satisfies the personal needs or motives of an individual
offender but is harmful to the organization, and behavior that seems to be initiated by the
organization itself. In the first case, the organization risks both financial and reputational
losses as a result of one employee’s behavior. Behavior that is clearly opposed to the interests
of the organization. Conversely, in the case of unethical behavior by organizations as an entity
or by representatives of the organization acting in its (assumed) interest, we speak of organi-

zational crime. When this latter refers to government, at its mildest, we label it “government
rule breaking” (Huberts, 2005; Mein & van de Bunt 2010) but “crimes against the state” or
“administrative evil” when the case is more severe (Adams & Balfour 2004). This latter,
although best exemplified internationally by such crimes as genocide, can also extend to such
violations as falsifying information to citizens to conceal governmental mistakes or the abuse
of authority by police officers (Kolthoff, 2016).
One gray area between individual misbehavior and organizational misbehavior may exist
when individual employees believe they are acting in the interests of their organization while
actually violating organizational values and rules. In these circumstances—as in noble cause
corruption—the intention of personal benefit is lacking but the dividing line between indi-
vidual and organizational misbehavior is thin because the organization and its culture almost
always play a role in such behavior, thereby running the risk of eventual systemic corruption.
The question then becomes who takes the blame.
In the next section we briefly summarize a selection of criminological theories that can help
to explain corruption-promoting elements.
Sutherland’s Differential Association Theory
Sutherland’s differential association theory, inspired by the symbolic interactionist movement,

assumes that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with others (social learning), thus
rejecting the idea that criminal behavior is genetically determined. Developed slowly over
four editions of his book Criminology (1924–47), Sutherland’s theory has remained basically
unchanged in its core belief: the most important part of the learning of criminal behavior takes
place in intimate personal groups and involves (a) the learning of the technical skills for com-
mitting crimes and (b) the directing of the motives, drives, rationalizations, attitudes, and more
generally definitions that are favorable to law violation (Sutherland, Cressey, & Luckenbill
1992). During this process of differential association, an individual becomes delinquent when
definitions that encourage the violation of legal rules exceed definitions that encourage obe-
dience to the law.
Like most theories, differential association has been subject to both support and criticism.
One important objection is that the theory ignores such individual differences as personality
traits, differences in amenability, and differences in ability, distinctions that play no role in the
theory but are extremely important in practice. Another objection put forward by many critics
is that the theory does not accurately define its concepts, making it extremely difficult to test
it empirically. In fact, Bruinsma (1985), in reviewing the empirical research on differential
association theory, identified no single study since 1947 in which Sutherland’s entire theory is
subject to review. Nevertheless, in his own research into the applicability of the theory among
Dutch youth, Bruinsma did find a lot of support for the theory, especially in the derived form
suggested by Opp (as cited in Bruinsma, 1985).
During the 1960s, Burgess and Akers (1966) re-evaluated Sutherland’s ideas within
a behaviorist framework and developed their model of “differential reinforcement,” which
incorporates the psychological principles of operant conditioning and suggests that even
non-social effects can reinforce criminal behavior (p. 146). More recently, Akers (1985)
reformulated Sutherland’s theory in terms of modern learning theory and argued that criminal
behavior is the result of either operant conditioning or imitation. Although since then most

research based on differential association theory has focused on juveniles, it is plausible that
parts of the theory may play a role in learning and unethical behavior in organizations.
Strain Theory
Another theory that may provide important insights is strain theory (Agnew 2006; Merton
1968), which built on Durkheim’s theory of anomie but in the specific context of the Great
Depression in the United States. Specifically, American sociologist Robert Merton (1968)
saw anomie as a result of the lack of synchronization between socially desirable aspirations
(cultural goals) like a certain level of prosperity and the legitimate means at people’s disposal
to achieve these goals. Merton thus looked for a more sociological explanation of crime, as
opposed to the then dominant individualistic explanations. Most particularly, he wanted to
discover how some social structures exert pressure on people to engage in non-conformist
rather than conformist behavior: “If we can locate groups peculiarly subject to such pressures,
we should expect to find high rates of deviant conduct in thesis groups, not because the human
beings comprising them are compounded of distinctive biological tendencies but because they
are responding normally to the social situation in which they find themselves” (Merton 1969,
p. 255).
Merton’s theory was partly based on his criticism of elements of American culture with its
huge emphasis on material needs and wealth, which he saw as a major cause of anomie. He
believed that a people’s reactions to anomie depend on their attitudes toward the objectives
formulated by the majority and the availability of acceptable means to meet these objectives.
According to Merton, most crime derives from behavioral adaptations labeled innovations;
that is, new, illegal means of achieving society’s cultural goals when these goals are recog-
nized but individuals lack the legal resources to reach them. Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould
(2010) adopted the “innovation” concept to explain certain forms of white-collar crime,
including fraud, tax evasion, and theft by employees at work (p. 157).
Despite wide adhesion to Merton’s theory, it has been subject to much criticism, especially
for its weak empirical foundation. Many critics, however, have attempted to improve on these
shortcomings by building on Merton’s ideas and applying the improved concepts to specific
situations. Agnew (1992, 2006), for instance, developed a more general strain theory, which
posits the actual or anticipated loss of positively valued stimuli (e.g., privileges, opportunities,
or relationships) as one cause of strain. If the strain is perceived as unfair or if people feel
unfairly treated—for example, employees who do not receive an expected promotion, are
assigned to a lower status job, or suddenly have to share an office—the tendency to anger
will increase, and anger, according to Agnew (1992), is associated with an increased risk of
delinquency.
Overall, strain theory remains a widely applied theoretical paradigm. For example, Agnew
(2010) combined general strain theory with research on terrorism to produce a terrorism-related
strain theory model. Langton and Piquero (2007) identified a significantly negative correlation
between strain and bribery.
Control Theories
Unlike most criminological theories, control theories, originally developed by Hirschi in the
1960s, are concerned not with the causes of delinquent or deviant behavior but with the factors

that encourage people to respect social norms and rules. Their basic underlying assumption,
therefore, is that criminal behavior is normal and to be expected unless certain control mech-
anisms are active that regulate the unbridled pursuit of needs and desires and enforce con-
formity to social norms. The real breakthrough in control theories came about with the 1969
publication of Hirschi’s Causes of Delinquency, which elaborates his social control theory
and its core belief: that opportunities for deviant behavior occur when the bonds between an
individual and society are weak or broken (p. 16). According to this perspective, what deters,
or at least constrains, people from committing crime are the bonds with social institutions like
family and school, and also with the legal system.
Despite the positive results reported for Hirschi’s (1969, pp. 97–9) survey research of
4,000 high school students in California, however, other researchers found more support for
alternative explanations (Thompson, Mitchell, & Dodder, 1984), leading to growing criticism
of Hirschi’s approach (Kempf, 1993). Meanwhile, Hirschi had distanced himself from his
social control theory and in A General Theory of Crime, co-authored in 1990 with Gottfredson,
argued that lack of self-control can explain all forms of crime, including white-collar crime.
Hence, in contrast to the multiple social controls in Hirschi’s original control theory, this later
paradigm was characterized by just one element: a weak self-control developed in early child-
hood that makes individuals more susceptible to temptations that generate a short-term “gain.”
Those that have such low self-control are more likely to satisfy their needs by illegal means
without looking at the long-term consequences; for example, the potential outcomes of drug
use or risky driving. Therefore, the major difference between those who develop a criminal
lifestyle as adults and those who do not is differential opportunity (some have more opportuni-
ties to commit crimes than others), although people with low self-control still tend to end up in
risky activities that satisfy short-term needs even if they do not proceed to actually committing
crimes. Low self-control gives the individual a lifelong predisposition to risky, uninhibited,
and possibly criminal behavior. In the original theory, such low self-control, once inculcated
by the age of seven or eight, remained stable over the lifetime and unaffected by external cir-
cumstances. More recent research, however, has refined this view to recognize that the level
of self-control may actually be altered in the course of life (Forrest & Hay, 2011; Meldrum &
Hay, 2011). In a research into serious integrity violations connected to organized crime in law
enforcement agencies we found indications of low self-control among many of the convicted
officers (Nelen & Kolthoff, 2017).
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory has yielded much discussion; especially, as
most studies on the validity of self-control theory identify a clear correlation between low
self-control and crime by young people, as well as by adults and various ethnic groups (Pratt &
Cullen, 2000). As yet, however, little research has been done on self-control and white-collar
crime. However, Marcus and Schuler (2004) found significant and strong relations between
low self-control and counterproductive behavior at work. An investigation into whether the
concept could be readily applied to white-collar crime found significant evidence for another
explanatory variable, “desire for control” (Piquero, Schoepfer, & Langton, 2010).
White-Collar Crime and Organizational Crime
Interest in white-collar crime— crime committed by people who are generally respected,
often because of their profession—has grown significantly since the end of the 1970s. Such
offenses, which are typified by abuse of position and trust through fraud and corruption, are

not considered traditional crimes and are often committed by those in higher positions who
wield a certain amount of influence. Today, however, the social stratification in society can
no longer be adequately described by the blue- versus white-collar division, so the concept
of white-collar crime has been slowly replaced by the term organizational crime, crime that
occurs in the context of an organization (public or privately held) or profession or in another
organized context. According to van de Bunt (1992), organizational crime refers to those
crimes committed—individually or in groups—by members of respectable and reputable
organizations in the context of the performance of organizational tasks (p. 6), a definition that
I expand to include “reputable professionals” like public notaries or self-employed lawyers
and accountants. Thus, organizational crime refers not simply to crimes committed solely for
the personal gain of individual members of an organization (e.g., corruption, fraud, or theft
that can damage the organization) but also to crime that benefits the organization itself.
Not surprisingly, many criminological explanations of organizational crime focus on
opportunities (Benson & Simpson, 2018) and organizational characteristics, such as the
bureaucratic nature of large organizations and their emphasis on performance (Brants, 2007).
In such a context, because production processes are broken down into small units, employees
need not worry about ultimate outcomes, managers are focused on achieving their targets, and
any damage is translated into a cost–benefit analysis. As a result, victims remain hidden from
company employees, a phenomenon that Slapper and Tombs (1999) term the “pathology” of
organizations.
Managers at the top of the organization, on the other hand, do have an important influence
on the organizational culture and hence on the conduct of its individual members (Shover
& Hochstetler, 2002). Such individuals, it appears, are not only influenced by their position
within the organization, the organizational culture, and the procedures set but behave differ-
ently within their organization than in private life (Huisman, 2010).
A last issue in this brief discussion on organizational crime concerns transparency. Kim
(2008) argues that many of the problems related to corruption in the public sector are related
to lack of transparency and accountability. According to Kim, the main characteristics of good
governance, such as transparency, accountability, participation, responsiveness, inclusiveness,
and consensus building, among others, can help to minimize the problem. Lyrio, Lunkes, and
Taliani (2018) argue that the fight against corruption and its relation to accountability and
transparency in the public sector is not configured as a purely technical issue, but involves
the government’s relationship with society and a need for greater citizen participation in the
control of the actions of public actors. Important issues regarding institutional factors and their
impact on transparency were raised by Arellano-Gault and Lepore (2011, p. 1031). They argue
that institutional, organizational, and behavioral factors have been neglected in the analysis
of public organizations and the issue of transparency. But, while democratic accountability
is widely expected to reduce corruption, citizens to a large extent do not use their right to
protest and voice complaints, and refrain from using their electoral right to punish corrupt
politicians. Using new regional-level data across 21 European countries, Bauhr and Charron
(2018) provide empirical evidence that the level of societal grand corruption in which a voter
finds herself systematically affects how she responds to a political corruption scandal. Grand
corruption increases loyalty to corrupt politicians, demobilizes the citizenry, and crafts a deep
divide between insiders, or potential beneficiaries of the system, and outsiders, left on the
sidelines of the distribution of benefits.

Neutralization Theories
Neutralization theories are particularly important in the context of this exploration because
they actually explain offender behavior following the criminal conduct. Specifically, organiza-
tions and their employees justify their behavior afterwards using the neutralization techniques
identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) in the context of juvenile delinquency. These include
denying damage or involvement, emphasizing the positive effects, claiming to be victims
themselves, invoking obedience to local authority, suggesting that “everybody’s doing it,”
appealing to higher interests, and blaming the accusers (Coleman, 1987, 1995; Benson, 1998).
Such techniques also play an important role in international crimes (Huisman, 2010; Maruna
& Copes, 2005; Slapper & Tombs, 1999), most particularly because managers of large inter-
national companies—usually highly educated, on successful career paths, and upper middle
or upper class in status—view themselves as respectable, law-abiding citizens. They therefore
use neutralization techniques in an attempt to justify their behavior to themselves and others
and maintain their self-image of respectable entrepreneur or manager. Such machinations
are amply reflected in the press or in legal proceedings following allegations of international
crimes.
Opportunity theory seems a general applicable theory that can explain the causes of corrup-
tion in combination with for example strain or control theories.
Opportunity Theories and Routine Activity Theory
In criminology, the conventional wisdom that “opportunity makes the thief” is particularly
well expressed by Felson’s (1998) opportunity theory, which posits that the extent of crime
is determined by three factors: the number of potential offenders, the number of attractive
targets, and the degree to which these targets are supervised and protected.
Opportunity theory was inspired by routine activity theory, developed earlier by Cohen and
Felson (1979, p. 589) to explain rising crime rates after the Second World War. These authors
attributed this rise to the enormous growth of potential victims accompanying increased pros-
perity together with a relative decrease in supervision. Routine activity theory, being a varia-
tion on the control theories that ask why people do “not” commit crimes, argues for a focus on
the situation or context rather than the perpetrator. In this sense, therefore, it is derived from
the rational choice approach.
The opportunity theory later developed by Felson and Clarke (1998), in contrast, was based
on one single principle: tempting and easy opportunities encourage people to commit crime.
Hence, according to Clarke (2009), opportunity is a major cause of any crime; even crimes like
murder that are usually thought to be driven by strong personal motives (p. 263). It is therefore
opportunity that explains why the risk of being murdered in the United States is six to eight
times higher than in the United Kingdom and most other European countries. More specifi-
cally, according to Farrington, Langan, and Tonry (2004), this likelihood can be explained by
one situational variable: the widespread availability of firearms in the United States.
The concepts taken from opportunity theories in general have been widely applied in pre-
vention, such as in the design of public spaces, store security, and police deployment, includ-
ing problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing. Benson, Madensen, and Eck
(2009) also used this theoretical framework to identify the underlying opportunity structures
in specific types of white-collar crime. Graycar and Masters (2018) argue that the principle

applies equally to public corruption. If any one of the three elements (a motivated offender,
a target, and the absence of a capable guardian) is missing, then there is no corrupt event.
Personality Theories
Before moving on to the last category of criminological theories, I devote a few words to
personality theories, which as yet play an all too marginal role in mainstream criminology
(Listwan, Piquero, & Van Voorhis, 2010). In fact, until the recent addition of personality as
a key component in social learning theory (Andrews & Bonta, 2003), strain theory (Agnew,
Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002) and life course theories (Caspi et al., 1994), the use of
psychological theories was limited to research into the treatment of institutionalized offenders.
Admittedly, such disregard for the psychological perspectives until the late 1990s may stem
partly from the methodological shortcomings of previous personality research (Miller &
Lynam, 2001). However, Listwan and colleagues (2010) clearly showed that personality type
is an important predictor of recidivism in crimes like fraud and corruption, with the neurotic
personality type being the greatest predictor. The interpretation of unethical behavior may
also benefit from another paradigm from a bygone era, Kohlberg’s (1976) moral development
theory.
Here a specific area of interest is worth mentioning, namely, the relationship between psy-
chopathy and organizational crime; also a subject that has been undervalued in criminology
as well as public administration until now. Traditionally, psychopathy has been associated
with violent and horrifying crimes like serial murders, violent robberies, and sex crimes.
Psychopaths are often identified with the inhabitants of forensic mental institutions, and most
available research is conducted on these populations.
However, there is no doubt that everyone has come in contact with, and possibly been
deceived by, a psychotic personality (Babiak & Hare, 2006). In fact, most disturbingly, it is the
nature of a psychopath to initially come across as very appealing and likable. The relationship
between psychopathy and organizational misbehavior and crime has only recently been placed
on the agenda. Modern organizations provide a safe home for executives and managers with
psychopathic traits and even need them. For example, it is easier to reorganize and downsize
an organization if you are less bothered by your conscience and empathic feelings, a charac-
teristic of the psychopathic personality. To a certain degree, of course. However, it appears
that psychopaths are difficult to recognize and can cause disastrous consequences for their
organization and employees. This process is extensively described by Boddy, Ladyshewsky,
and Galvin (2010). A comprehensive overview of research in this area with a focus on corpo-
rate crime was recently published in the Journal for Forensic Psychology (Pardue, Robinson,
& Arrigo, 2013). Palmen, Derksen, and Kolthoff (2018) used an analysis of the psychopathic
traits of Frank Underwood in the series House of Cards to present a new model of this psy-
chopathic leader.
Integrated Theories
The foregoing discussion of criminological theories suggests that they all contain clues for
explaining organization-related misconduct but that they also all have shortcomings. It thus
seems obvious that there is a need to combine the different theories into one explanatory model.
Doing so, however, presents challenges: first, many researchers are firmly entrenched in their

own disciplines, often dedicating an entire career to completely understanding and developing
a specific paradigm. For example, merely labeling Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory
as a “general” and thus all-encompassing explanatory theory of crime leaves little room for
alternatives. In addition, developing an integrated theory raises the methodological problem of
incorporating all the theories discussed above. How, for instance, can we determine how much
of the behavior under investigation is due to a low level of self-control, how much to strain,
how much to emerging opportunities, personality characteristics, or differential learning?
Yet that is exactly what Agnew (2011) proposes: an integrative theory of crime, covering
a broad spectrum of crimes and incorporating the key elements of all major theories, including
control and motivational theories; mainstream and critical theories; and classical, positivistic,
and constructionist perspectives. His argument is simple: there is reason to believe that each
of the theories in criminology has some relevance. Therefore, the best explanation of crime
will be one that incorporates all major theories and unifies biological, socio-psychological, and
social domains (p. 201).
REFLECTION
What, then, does the foregoing teach us about the mechanisms that lead to organization-related
misbehavior and corruption? Bureaucracy and authority are recurring notions in this debate.
As several scholars have pointed out, Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority (1974)
reveal less about authority per se than about the behavior of people in certain contextual sit-
uations (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, 2007; Zimbardo, Maslach, & Haney,
2000). That is, in certain circumstances, people obey; in others, they do not. Moreover, as
aptly pointed out by Russell and Gregory (2005), one of Milgram’s major contributions to
understanding the relevance of context for obedience to authority is that his experimental
setting mirrors the structural conditions of large bureaucratic organizations. In fact, his labo-
ratory exemplifies a hierarchically organized authoritarian system characterized by a division
of tasks, separation of the participants from the consequences of their actions, the need to
perform the task in a technical and structured manner, and working according to a standardized
procedure. All Weberian bureaucratic characteristics indeed. In addition, there was a high
degree of impersonal and emotionless communication in a directive manner, instrumental use
of advanced technology, and peer pressure, all under a binding condition (that is a contract)
that made subjects feel obliged to participate (Russell & Gregory, 2005).
The very fact that Western governments, like most large private companies, are organized
bureaucratically itself warrants further research to identify the elements in bureaucratic organ-
izations that may contribute to the development and maintenance of organization-related mis-
conduct and the means to address such violations. Yet to date, most governmental approaches
to developing integrity policy seem to be based on rational choice theory and the assumption
of a distinction between people who are and people who are not predisposed to commit unethi-
cal behavior (Weisburd & Waring, 2001, p. 139).
Also technological developments should be addressed here. An important development in
the opportunity structure is the digitization of society. This development is reflected in almost
all forms of organized crime; nearly every criminal partnership uses digital tools. Conversely,
the logistical processes of law enforcement organizations are almost entirely automated, and
investigation agencies have access to technological tools enabling the available databases,

which in any case have been massively expanded, to be consulted anywhere, and at any time.
Criminals can exploit the vulnerabilities of digital communication traffic with or without the
help of employees of law enforcement organizations.
De Graaf and Huberts (2008) studied ten Dutch corruption cases in depth, to discover the
nature of corruption. The cases allowed them to sketch a general profile of a corruption case.
They offer nine propositions to portray the nature of corruption and conclude that corruption
usually takes place within enduring relationships, that the process of becoming corrupt can
be characterized as a slippery slope, and that important motives for corruption, aside from
material gain, include friendship or love, status, and the desire to impress others. It may
be difficult to draw conclusions from detailed case studies, but in order to design effective
anti-corruption policies, it is important to expand our knowledge beyond what we know
from quantitative research. Cultural and organizational specific context should be taken into
account. Anechiarico and Jacobs state, “The right mix of corruption controls will undoubtedly
differ from governmental unit and from agency to agency within the same governmental unit.
Moreover, the optimal mix changes over time” (1996, p. 198).
DISCUSSION
In traditional criminology the focus is on the individual and its context. So on personality
traits and environmental circumstances. More critical criminology shifts the focus to organiza-
tional aspects and to aspects related to leadership. These factors together with the opportunity
perspective are mainstream in the study of organizational and white-collar crime and we will
conclude by briefly discussing them.
Structure
The structure of an organization has a decisive influence on the manner in which the work of
employees is carried out and is linked to aspects such as coordination, division of tasks, and
control. In scientific literature, a direct relationship is observed between the structure of, for
example, law enforcement organizations and corruption (Punch, 2000). Van Halderen (2019)
found that “too much freedom of acting, weak monitoring and leniency within the organiza-
tion, and the presumption that a convincing explanation makes a violation permissible (the
use of rationalizations for rule-breaking) can lead to task-related rule-breaking behavior.”
Clear rules (codes of conduct), separation of tasks in vulnerable processes, function rotation,
effective oversight, and a predictable and certain response from managers when one breaks the
rules are important instruments to prevent corruption.
Culture
The question whether an integrity policy can be rooted in an organization is, apart from the
aforementioned factors, dependent on the professional culture in the organization. A profes-
sional culture provides employees with a number of joint values and norms. Translated into the
domain of corruption, the individual official pays a higher price for an integrity breach when
his conduct is an infringement of his own moral beliefs as well as the group’s. The litmus test
for an effective anti-corruption policy is not only whether one can freely speak about certain

behavior within its own organization, but also whether individuals in practice address each
other on dubious behavior. Recent research into law enforcement agencies shows that a lot
of improvement can be made with respect to this aspect. It was striking that none of the 80
investigated cases of a serious breach of integrity came from a colleague or supervisor but all
were detected during ongoing criminal investigations or from criminal intelligence (Nelen &
Kolthoff, 2017).
Leadership
Leaders can consciously or unconsciously contribute to task-related rule-breaking behavior.

Leaders can condone or explicitly encourage certain violations. The knowledge and experi-
ence that management have about the executive operation, the manner in which the work is
coordinated (especially the autonomy given to public servants in performing their task), and
whether leaders have a predominantly authoritarian leadership style influence task-related
rule-breaking behavior. For moral management three aspects seem to be particularly important
for the way leaders can contribute to moral behavior: role modeling, discipline, and commu-
nicating about ethics (Huberts, Kaptein, & Lasthuizen, 2007; Lasthuizen, 2008). In a recent
study by van Halderen (2019) into the police, shortcomings were found on all three: leaders
did not always set a good example, sometimes did not address undesirable behavior, and were
often lenient towards rule breaking. In addition, when leaders were too authoritarian this
potentially widened the gap between management and the executive level.
Leaders at different levels can consciously or unconsciously contribute to integrity viola-
tions and corruption, for example by openly approving the conduct, rewarding it, explicitly
ordering it, or in subtler ways ignore or facilitate it. The unconscious contribution of managers
to non-integer behavior by employees is probably the most common in the Western world.
It mainly has to do with the side-effects of certain leadership styles and the flawed commu-
nication of the necessity to act ethical. The literature highlights the importance of ethical
leadership in creating and/or maintaining a more honest organizational culture, where the term
ethical leadership is described as “the character, the decision-making processes and the behav-
ior that leaders show to motivate employees to make decisions and to show behavior that is in
line with relevant moral norms and values” (Heres, 2014). An ethical leader on the one hand is
a moral person (trustworthy, respectful, honest, etc.) and on the other hand a moral manager
(Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000). In this last role, the supervisor carries out a clear ethical
message about which behavior is desirable and which is undesirable within the organization.
Care from executives for especially this last role seems to be sometimes limited (Heres, 2014).
As a result, employees often struggle to estimate how important integrity is within the
organization and how closely they need to meet certain frameworks when carrying out spe-
cific tasks. Communicating precisely the content of ethical behavior, together with exemplary
behavior and discipline, is an important means of opposing rule violations by employees
(Treviño et al., 2000). Leadership styles in which ethics plays a smaller role, but which,
for example, are specifically focused on effectiveness and efficiency, have a less positive
impact on the integrity of employees. Corruption and theft could increase among other things
(Lasthuizen, 2008).

CONCLUSION
In the foregoing we highlighted elements of criminological theory that could provide insights
into the causes of corruption. However, there is plentiful more research on undesired behavior
by and within organizations in many other scientific fields including public administration
(Caiden, 2001; de Graaf, von Marevic, & Wagenaar, 2010). The interested reader, however,
could find valuable information in the disciplines of organization sciences, clinical psychol-
ogy, human research management, and business administration and not least system thinking,
an approach already hinted at by Zimbardo (2007) and one that opens up many promising
perspectives (Meadows, 2008). In fact, because the causes of corruption and other undesirable
behavior in organizations are many, achieving a comprehensive view will require the combi-
nation of available knowledge in multiple disciplines. Yet, until now, each field has tended to
operate mostly on its own with little communication between disciplines.
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31. Building ethical organisations: the importance
of organisational integrity systems
Leo Huberts and André van Montfort
INTRODUCTION
In this challenging Handbook on Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration

the many chapters deal with a variety of topics, as almost by definition in a handbook.1
Nevertheless, it is also clear that this field of study seems to centre around the corruption phe-
nomenon (see the titles of the chapters in this book, as well as the title of this part: Responses
to corruption in public administration).
But what is corruption, how is it interpreted and what is the relationship with ethics and
integrity (the book title)? The next section will deal with those topics, with a brief sketch of
definitions.
Then, the central question concerning what helps to curb integrity violations (including cor-
ruption) and to stimulate and protect the integrity of a (semi-)public organisation will be dealt
with. An overview of the literature leads to an evaluation framework which can be utilised
for studying and assessing the quality of an organisational integrity system and is assumedly
applicable for all (semi-)public-sector organisations and most private-sector organisations.
Some important principles and elements of this evaluation framework will be summarised and
discussed in the concluding section.
CORRUPTION AND ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION
Public Administration and Public Governance
The topic of corruption, ethics and integrity is important for all sectors and organisations, also
the business sector and societal civil groups and organisations. However, the focus in this
book is on public administration, on governmental organisations. That is understandable of
course, corruption and integrity do matter in government and the topic of ‘public administra-
tion corruption’ is complicated and rich enough to deal with separately in our research. At the
same time research shows that politics and administration are very much connected and that
nowadays more – also private – organisations are involved in addressing societal problems for
and on behalf of communities. ‘Governance’ is nowadays the buzzword for that. This chapter
builds on this with corruption, ethics and integrity of governance in the centre.
Governance is seen as ‘authoritative policy making on collective problems and interests,
and implementation of these policies’ (Huberts, 2014, p. 68). Governance is about collective
problems and interests being addressed, possibly by one actor but also by a network of public
and private actors. The term ‘authoritative’ refers to the support offered and legitimisation
449
Leo Huberts and André van Montfort - 9781789900910
Source: Huberts, 2019.
Figure 31.1 System model of politics (governance)
by the organisation or community whose problems and interests are addressed (in line with
Easton’s (1953) famous definition of politics as the ‘authoritative allocation of values’).
Policy making and policy implementation processes are characterised by different aspects
and phases. Classic system models of politics (Easton, 1979) point to input (demands,
support), throughput (how the political and administrative system deals with input in order to
establish output), policy output and actual effects or results of the output (outcome). See also
Figure 31.1.
It is important to keep this distinction between input, throughput, output and outcome in
mind when reflecting upon what we see as corruption, integrity and integrity violations in
governance. To put it simply for now: ethics and morality are about everything including the
policy output and the outcome in society. But corruption and integrity are more specific. Both
concepts concern the behaviour of actors in governance (the throughput phase).
Ethics, Integrity and Corruption
Ethics and integrity

Integrity and integrity violations are the central concepts in research that has been done by
a group of public administration scholars from Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam in the last
20 years. A lot can be said about those concepts as well as about the many views on integ-
rity and their relationship with morality and ethics. However, given the focus in the present
chapter, only a very brief clarification is possible.
There are many different views on integrity (Huberts, 2018), with the definition here being
that integrity is a quality or characteristic of the behaviour of actors in accordance with rele-
vant moral values, norms and rules. It is about the process of governance (not the outcome, as
mentioned before). ‘Moral’ refers to values and norms about ‘right or wrong’, ‘good or bad’,
that people feel rather strongly about, because serious interests are involved that affect the
community they are part of (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002).

Building ethical organisations 451
Ethics can be interpreted as synonymous for ‘morals’ but it is more often seen as reflection
on morality. Ethical theory approaches focus on, amongst others, the virtues of actors and the
consequences of their decisions (teleology), as well as on the moral norms and duties for actors
(deontology) (Lawton, Rayner & Lasthuizen, 2013).
The last approach is directly connected to the concepts of integrity (interpreted as accord-
ance with relevant moral values, norms and rules) and integrity violations (conceived as
behaviour that violates relevant moral values, norms and rules). How do these concepts relate
to corruption, the type of integrity violation that is central in much of the literature, including
this book?
Corruption interpretations, theories, concepts

The concept of corruption has been, and continues to be, at the heart of much debate about the
moral quality of government (Huberts & Lasthuizen, 2019), with a lot of relevant literature
(including Klitgaard, 1988; Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002; Bull & Newell, 2003; Johnston,
2005; Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Graycar & Smith, 2011; Anechiarico, 2017; Andersson &
Anechiarico, 2019). That also applies to many global and international initiatives, including
Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption founded in 1993, and several
important conventions and treaties signed and implemented in international relations that
brought corruption and good governance to the forefront (Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbra, 2001;
Huberts, Maesschalck & Jurkiewicz, 2008; De Sousa, Larmour & Hindess, 2009). Not surpris-
ingly, then, the focus in research and policy on the dark side of government has clearly been on
corruption. Yet what is corruption, and what types of behaviour comprise it?
Many definitions and typologies of corruption refer to the misuse of power for private
interest. Transparency International defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for
private gain’ (www.transparency.org). Wikipedia’s definition of political corruption (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_corruption) is the use of power by government officials for
illegitimate private gain and many authors use a comparable terminology. However, there is
much less agreement in the literature and in public debate concerning the more specific types
of behaviour that are included in the corruption phenomenon. Just to illustrate that, Wikipedia
for example mentions: ‘Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism,
nepotism, parochialism, patronage, influence peddling, graft, and embezzlement… Misuse of
government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general
police brutality, is also considered political corruption.’
A number of those types of behaviour are more common in the literature on corruption,
in particular when they concern a conflict of interest between private interest and the public
interest. With bribery (a payment given personally to a government official in exchange for
his use of official powers) and favouritism (favours for relatives: nepotism; favours for friends
and associates: cronyism; favours for supporters in party or supporting group: patronage)
as examples. Other types of behaviour are also part of ‘corruption views’. This applies, for
example, to the misuse of power for personal benefit without the involvement of a third party
(embezzlement, theft and fraud).
The mentioned interpretations illustrate the diversity of the behaviours commonly thought
of as (or related to) corruption. But there are more approaches to consider. See, for example,
Michael Johnston’s (2005) work on four syndromes of corruption, defining corruption funda-
mentally as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit, but also focusing on sys-
temic corruption and distinguishing various forms of corruption: influence market corruption,

elite cartel corruption, oligarch and clan corruption and official moguls corruption. Johnston
thus focuses on inappropriate private interest influence, elite abuse of power, abuse of power
for extensive private gain and individual plundering of the economy. Johnston’s book is stim-
ulating because it manages to relate ‘corruption syndromes’ to the characteristics of wealth,
power and democracy in many countries. However, although all these aspects do indeed
concern corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit (Johnston,
2005, p. 12), they also add to the list ‘bad’ power regime-related characteristics such as ‘bad’
participation, ‘bad’ institutions and ‘bad’ development. Corruption then becomes an umbrella
term for ‘everything bad’, despite Johnston’s (2005, p. 13) wish to prevent just that.
An additional point for serious reflection stems from scholars who question the Western or
cultural bias in many perceptions of corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; De Graaf, Wagenaar
& Hoenderboom, 2010; Lawton et al., 2013). Sissener (2001), for example, in proposing an
‘anthropological perspective on corruption’, claimed that Western approaches to corruption
are often influenced by Weber’s famous ideal type of bureaucracy and are not easily applicable
to non-Western societies. The definition issue thus raises questions of cultural bias.
Types of integrity violations

What types of integrity violation, then, are useful to distinguish? How do we find our way
through the confusing landscape of the many types of corruption outlined previously, from
bribery to favouritism and from fraud and theft to ‘everything bad in governance’, including
reflection on the ‘Western bias’? And what might be missing concerning behaviour that vio-
lates relevant moral values, norms and rules?
The focus in the corruption literature is on ‘inappropriate private interests’ conflicting with
the public interest. This focus is always crucial, but also limited, given the broadness of the
moral standards relevant publics apply to the behaviour of governance actors and individuals
and given the character of the integrity scandals they are confronted with. Nowadays, also the
‘appropriateness of (personal) behaviour’ is very present in affairs concerning integrity. These
affairs concern discrimination, intimidation and sexual abuse (MeToo) in relations at work,
but also private time (mis)behaviour with consequences for someone’s credibility and integrity
in (public) office.
This led us to construct, step by step, a broad typology of ten integrity violation catego-
ries, useful for describing unethical behaviour in almost all (public) organisational contexts.
Nevertheless, they may have different concrete manifestations in different times and places.
Since its original formulation, the typology has been discussed and tested many times by
the VU Amsterdam research group using available (quantitative and qualitative) data on integ-
rity violations. Lasthuizen (2008) made a first successful attempt to empirically validate the
typology for standardised surveys within the field of ethics and integrity and for organisational
(mis)behaviour research (see also Huberts, Lasthuizen & Peeters, 2006; Sampford, Shacklock,
Connors & Galtung, 2006; Lasthuizen, Huberts & Heres, 2011). The resulting types of integ-
rity violations are outlined in Table 31.1.
In this typology, corruption is of course included, as the abuse of powers for private gain
involving external interests, with two types: bribery and favouritism. Other types of behaviour
that violate moral norms and values are also relevant to take into account. A number of them,
for instance conflict of (private and public) interest, are rather close to ‘corruption’. Some
types of behaviour, such as discrimination and intimidation, refer to the violation of other
relevant moral values and norms concerning a civil servant’s behaviour.

Table 31.1 Typology of integrity violations
Corruption: bribery Misuse of (public) power for private gain: asking, offering or
accepting bribes.
Corruption: favouritism (nepotism, cronyism, patronage) Misuse of authority or position to favour family (nepotism),
friends (cronyism) or party (patronage).
Fraud and theft of resources Improper private gain acquired from the organisation or from
colleagues and citizens, with no involvement of an external actor.
Conflict of (private and public) interest through ‘gifts’ Interference (or potential interference) of personal interest with
public/organisational interest because of gifts, services or assets
accepted or promises made.
Conflict of (private and public) interest through side-line Interference (or potential interference) of personal interest
activities with public/organisational interest because of jobs or activities
practised outside the organisation.
Improper use of authority Use of illegal/improper means or methods (possibly for ‘noble
causes’).
Misuse and manipulation of information Intended or unintended abuse of (access to) information, such as
cheating, violation of secrecy rules, breaching confidentiality of
information or concealing information.
Waste and abuse of organisational resources Failure to comply with organisational standards and/or improper
performance or incorrect/dysfunctional internal behaviour.
Indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers Unacceptable treatment that includes not only discrimination
(based on gender, race or sexual orientation), intimidation and
sexual harassment but also improper behaviour like bullying,
nagging and gossiping.
Misconduct in private time Conduct during private time that harms people’s trust in the
(public) organisation.
Source: Huberts, Pijl & Steen, 1999; Lasthuizen, 2008; Lasthuizen et al., 2011; Huberts & Lasthuizen, 2019.
Table 31.2 presents a broad typology. However, it is based on research of integrity viola-
tions in primarily ‘Western contexts’. This is a serious limitation to be aware of, also in reflec-
tion on ‘what helps’ to promote integrity and curb integrity violations (integrity management
and system).
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM
What helps to promote integrity and to curb integrity violations, including corruption? A lot
of research and bodies of knowledge are available and relevant to answer that question. With
for example important research and literature on national integrity systems (Pope, 2000;
Slingerland, Eijkelhof, Van Hulten, Popovych & Wempe, 2012), on local integrity systems
(Huberts, Anechiarico & Six, 2008; Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2012; Quesada, Jimenez-Sanchez
& Villoria, 2013; Macaulay, Newman & Hickey, 2014), on ethics and integrity management
(Kaptein, 1999; Maesschalck & Bertók, 2009), as well as on many specific methods and
instruments as ethics training (Van Montfort, Beck & Twijnstra, 2013), codes of conduct
(Kaptein & Schwartz, 2008), rules and regulations on conflicts of interest, whistle blowing
(De Graaf, 2010), confidential integrity advisors (De Graaf, 2019) and much more. However,
the focus in this chapter is on a ‘system approach’ concerning the ‘organisational level’ (Van

Montfort, Ogric & Huberts, 2018; Huberts & Van Montfort, 2019; and Slingerland, Six &
Huberts, 2012; Huberts, Six, Van Tankeren, Van Mortfort & Paanakker, 2014).
System Approach on Organisations
A system approach looks at the larger picture by taking into account all elements and con-
ditions that are expected to be important to the integrity of the organisation (Six & Lawton,
2010). Such an approach focuses on the connection between various components within and
outside the organisation, how they are interconnected and how they are jointly responsible
for the integrity performance of an organisation (Kolthoff, 2012). Slingerland et al. (2012,
p. 220) define an integrity system as ‘the whole of components, such as institutions, policy
instruments, actions in practice and integrity guards, whose aim is to contribute to the integrity
performance of an organisation in the heart of society’.
In recent years, the scientific literature has focused not only on specific integrity policies
and instruments, but on the entire integrity system. Elements are interrelated, and their effec-
tiveness depends on the working and credibility of the overall system (Six, Van der Veen
& Kruithof, 2012; De Graaf & Macaulay, 2014; Macaulay et al., 2014; Van Montfort et al.,
2018). Moreover, there are indications in the scientific literature that a complete integrity
system is a necessary condition for a high system of effectiveness. Many of all important inter-
nal or external elements of an integrity system must be present in order to have an effective
system. The completeness of an integrity system is considered a necessary condition for its
effectiveness (Slingerland et al., 2012; Van den Heuvel, Huberts & Van Montfort, 2017; Van
Montfort et al., 2018).
In addition to the focus on integrity systems, this chapter concentrates on organisations, on
what characterises an organisational integrity system that helps. We zoom in on that, with first
a brief overview of the relevant literature.
Government Integrity Systems
The scientific literature on what exactly creates an effective local integrity system is diverse,
with previously the conclusion that there is a lack of clarity on the combination or configura-
tion of elements that leads to a high integrity performance (Six & Lawton, 2010; Slingerland
et al., 2012). However, progress is clear, with some optimism, based on the research that has
been done and reflection on the differences and similarities of the framework(s) that have
been used in research. A brief sketch of the history of the research at the VU seems useful to
illustrate that development.
The VU research used insights from more general projects on national and local integrity
systems of government organisations (Huberts et al., 2008), then moving into more specific
projects addressing and evaluating the integrity systems of Dutch municipalities. We con-
structed a framework for the description and evaluation of a local, i.e. municipal, integrity
system, primarily based on (also our) research in the Netherlands (Van den Heuvel et al.,
2017). Local governments then described and self-evaluated their own municipal integrity
systems, followed by reflection on that by the researchers, with challenging meetings and
discussions afterwards on the completeness and effectiveness of the local integrity system.
That project was also used to progress our research on integrity systems of government
organisations, primarily through research by master students in public administration for

Table 31.2 Evaluation framework for assessing the completeness government integrity
system
Attention to integrity By administrators, managers and in-work meetings within the

civil service. Plus sufficient resources for safeguarding integrity
Regulations Known to civil servants for the acceptance of gifts, having
ancillary positions, declaring expenses, whistle blowing
Codes of conduct Presence of formally established codes of conduct, with
involvement of civil servants in the realisation, known to civil
servants and to be consulted on the intranet
Oath or official promise After appointment
Personnel policy Integrity part of application procedures, employment conditions
interviews, periodical performance interviews
Integrity training programmes For civil servants with follow-up meetings
Ethical leadership Managers set a good example in terms of integrity, propagate
the importance of integrity in the performance of task, enabled
to discuss moral dilemmas and call to account inappropriate
behaviour
Risk analyses and vulnerability studies Undertaken on a regular basis
Local integrity department or functionary Coordinates and implements integrity policy, and participates in
inter-municipal networks in the field of integrity
Local contact point for reporting suspected integrity violations Known to civil servants. Also clarity about who decides whether
the report is a reason to start an internal (or police) investigation
Confidential counsellor(s) in the field of integrity and/or sexual Known to civil servants
harassment
Registration of reports Containing suspicions of integrity violations and annual
management reports on the implementation of the integrity policy
Integrity investigations Internal investigations into high-profile suspicions of integrity
violations and clear communication on results/punishment to
civil servants
their doctoral thesis (e.g. Ogric, 2018). This first led to broadening the framework, taking
into account other national and international research on integrity systems of government
organisations, including interesting applied research on a framework to stimulate integrity
in organisations by the Dutch SIO Foundation of Nyenrode Business University (De Jong,
Jeurissen & Odijk, 2014).
This resulted in an overview of key internal elements from which a complete integrity
system of a government organisation should exist with 40 elements divided into 13 categories
(Van Montfort et al., 2018). The overview summarized in Table 31.2 constitutes an evaluation
framework through which the completeness (and therefore indirectly the effectiveness) of
a concrete government integrity system can be assessed.
Organisational Integrity Systems in the Public and Private Sectors
Next, the basics of this framework for a government integrity system were also used in
research in other sectors and organisations. This happened step by step, which applies to the
incorporation of more relevant literature as well. A number of those sources should have been
addressed earlier, we acknowledge, given their importance for theory and policy development
on organisational integrity systems.

In this respect, it is necessary to mention Maesschalck and Bertók’s (2009) overview,

‘Perhaps the most influential system approach, certainly at the organisational level… which
identifies the key components of the integrity management system (IMS)’ (Macaulay, 2018,
p. 282). Their integrity framework concerns ‘all instruments, process, structures and factors,
both within and outside public sector organisations that influence the integrity of the members
of an organisation’ (Maesschalck & Bertók, 2009, p. 9), with four functions: ‘(1) defining
integrity, (2) leading and guiding towards integrity, (3) monitoring processes of integrity and
(4) rewarding enforcing integrity’ (2009, p. 7). Manifold elements are part of the integrity
system, with a core of instruments, processes and actors with integrity as the primary aim and
complementary elements of integrity management that play a crucial role in shaping the organ-
isational members’ integrity (2009, p. 8).This results in checklists as a diagnostic instrument
for policy makers and managers to evaluate and update the existing organisational integrity
framework.
This has led to extended and revised frameworks to describe and evaluate integrity systems,
with research by master students of VU Amsterdam and their supervisors on local integrity
systems (big and smaller municipalities) (Van den Heuvel et al., 2017; Van Montfort et al.,
2018), political parties (Boer, 2018; Sanli, 2019), organisations for elderly care (Bus, 2019)
and the private financial sector (big banks) (Chaudry, 2018). This way, new and additional
information on the presence and functioning of the elements of an organisational integrity
system was obtained. It is work in progress, but also with challenging insights on the content
of integrity systems for organisations in both the public and private sectors.
In many private and public contexts, it is acknowledged that an effective integrity system
includes the elements mentioned in Table 31.3. For the specific organisations investigated, the
question about what matters most in their context for the ‘governance of integrity’ is always
raised. For example, for political party organisations, the element ‘regulations on the accept-
ance of gifts’ appeared to be crucial, given dilemmas and choices on party financing and pos-
sible conflicts of interest (Sanli, 2019). Nevertheless, the framework in Table 31.3 seems valid
for many public and private sector organisations. It builds on the framework for government
integrity systems (Table 31.2), but offers a more clear structure on the main elements of an
organisational integrity system in general (attention, clarity, leadership, strategies, instruments
and reflection).
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The presented elements of an effective organisational integrity system in the public or private
sectors, based on the state of the art in the literature and evaluated in manifold public and
private organisations, offers a challenging agenda for future research in different contexts and
on more and more diverse organisations. The integrity system is meant to protect integrity and
prevent integrity violations, including corruption. The brief sketch of the research available is
optimistic about the relevance of the framework as a starting point for further research, but also
for reflection on ‘what to do’ and ‘what helps’ in practice. Organisations that take integrity
seriously, and almost all do, should reflect on their own integrity system, taking into account
the elements presented. They should put and maintain elements such as ‘attention’, ‘clarity’,
‘leadership’, ‘balancing values and compliance’ and diverse instruments on their agenda. This
agenda setting must take place in the context of what really matters for their organisation.

Table 31.3 Evaluation framework for assessing quality organisational integrity systems in the public or private sector
Integrity as an important topic at all levels of the organisation, for managers and employees, discussed
Attention, integrity on the agenda during work meetings, in personnel evaluations and with sufficient resources made available for the
integrity system.
About what integrity is about (relevant moral norms and values), ‘integritism’ is avoided (being immoral
Clarity
means more than disagreement or making mistakes).
Managers set a good example in terms of integrity, themselves (moral person) and in their leadership/
Ethical leadership management (moral manager), including openness and interaction with employees/followers on moral
dilemmas and calling to account those who behave inappropriately.
A balance in strategies and instruments focusing on the bright side of ethics and integrity with the
Strategy: balancing value-based and compliance importance and awareness of integrity as a crucial organisational value, and clear norms on expected
behaviour and policies with procedures and sanctions on violations (dark side of integrity).

Code(s) of conduct
One or more formally established codes of conduct within the organisation, clarifying the values and
norms, resulting from broad involvement of employees and stake-holders, well known/made available to
all involved. In line with an oath or promise for new appointees.
Clear regulations on topics such as the acceptance of gifts, ancillary positions, declaring expenses,
reporting violations (whistle blowing) and making these regulations known to employees.
Integrity in personnel policy
Integrity is addressed in application procedures, and in regular periodical performance interviews.
Integrity training programmes
Employees and managers regularly participate in an integrity training programme, embedded in the
organisation, with follow-up meetings.
System for advice, reporting and investigation
A clear and well-known system for employees confronted with integrity dilemmas or experiences of
Relevant instruments and organisation possible integrity violations in the organisation. With confidential officers to consult, a unit to report
(suspicions of) integrity violations, clarity about the norms and procedures on when a report leads to an
internal (or external) investigation and how the result is communicated to the involved employees and
units.
Registration and reporting
Reports of suspicions of integrity violations and investigations are centrally registered resulting in annual
management reports, also relating that information to the progress and implementation of the integrity
policy.
Risk analyses or vulnerability studies
Within the organisation, awareness of the risks and vulnerability on possible integrity violations, with
regular studies/reflection on that topic.

Integrity unit or functionary
A unit or functionary coordinates and implements integrity policy, participating in and learning from other
organisations and networks with knowledge and experiences in the field of integrity.

What really matters and works in the context of the organisation, building on the presented framework,
Critical reflection
but taking into account the character of the organisation (values, risks).
The limitations of the presented overview of theory development and research on integrity
systems are clear. It concerns ‘work in progress’ during the last years, taking into account the
available literature, building frameworks for the evaluation of integrity systems in several con-
crete research projects in different contexts in the Netherlands (on local governments, political
parties, the semi-public sector (elderly care) and the business sector (banks)). This combina-
tion of theory and empirical research leads to the presented overview of crucial elements of
an organisational integrity system, but its limitations are obvious. It is rather ‘Western’, with
a focus on the ‘relevant moral norms and values’ and the integrity violations in that context.
The agenda for research should address those limitations, with specific empirical research in
other ‘Western contexts’ as well as in other countries on integrity or anti-corruption systems
that work.
NOTE
1. The chapter is based on several previous papers, books, book chapters and journal articles. In
particular, reference can be made to Van Montfort, Ogric & Huberts (2018), chapters of Huberts
(2014), Huberts & Van Montfort (2019), Huberts & Lasthuizen (2019) and Huberts (2019). We also
reuse and copy part of that work. In the present chapter, we have limited the number of quotes and
references to these publications for reasons of readability. We are grateful for the ‘food for thought’
of many colleagues and the valuable remarks of the reviewers of this chapter.
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32. From anti-corruption to building integrity
Nikolas Kirby
INTRODUCTION
Fighting corruption is an important public policy objective. However, recently, a number of

theorists,1 practitioners and organisations2 have started to recognise the limitations of this
agenda. According to them, aiming to merely make individuals and institutions ‘not corrupt’ is
a pretty low ethical bar. Instead, we should be aiming to build their public integrity. However,
what does this mean? And, how might one go about it?
This chapter aims to assess current answers to these questions.3 It is in four parts. First,
I set out the particular critiques of the ‘anti-corruption’ agenda that have motivated this
new ‘pro-integrity’ agenda. Second, I examine various accounts of the meaning of ‘public
integrity.’ Third, I set out the threads of an emerging field of integrity management. Finally,
I step back to look at systemic and constitutional implications, examining ‘integrity institu-
tions,’ ‘integrity systems,’ as well as emerging arguments for a fourth, ‘integrity branch’ of
government.
THE IMPERATIVE
Advocates of a pro-integrity agenda do not reject the importance of reducing corruption.

However, they reject its primacy as the ‘ethical’ goal of a good governance agenda. They offer
four kinds of arguments against such primacy.
The first argument is conceptual. On one view we will never be able to properly define the
meaning of ‘corruption’ for any individual or institution until we have first defined its integ-
rity. By definition, corruption must involve some form of deterioration from an ‘ideal state.’
We might call this a state of ‘integrity.’4 Thus, corruption is just a derivative concept defined
by reference to integrity. This kind of conception of corruption has good historical pedigree
(Ceva & Ferretti, 2017; Hill, 2006; Lessig, 2014, p. 102; Philp, 1997, p. 439; Thompson, 2018,
p. 502). It reflects the original, ‘republican’ sense of the term. However, as is also recognised,
today we have an alternative, ‘liberal’ conception of corruption. Leveraging a distinction
between ‘public’ and ‘private,’ it seeks to define corruption without reference to any ideal
state. Instead, it is simply the use of public power for private ends. We can define corruption
merely as a particular set of actions that we do not want public officers to do (Do not do X!),
rather than as a particular failure to do what we really do want them to do (Do not, not do Y!).
Arguably, therefore, the liberal conception is a standalone concept.5 The cost of this concep-
tual move, however, is vulnerability to our second argument.
The second argument is normative. If corruption is simply defined as a standalone set of
egregious behaviours that public officers are obliged to avoid, then not being corrupt is just
a minimum standard of public office. It does not tell us what we should want ethically from
public officers above and beyond that bare minimum. It does not help us define the more or
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less ethical use of discretion. In order to do this, we need some substantive, positive ideal
of ‘public integrity’ (Hall, 2018; Heywood & Rose, 2015, p. 102). On this view, therefore,
integrity has normative primacy, because it defines the ultimate ethical goal for public actors.
Not being corrupt is simply one, minimal step to achieving it. In response, some may concede
this second argument but argue that anti-corruption still has primacy operationally. Yes, ‘not
being corrupt’ is only the bare minimum we demand of public officers but for that very reason,
operationally, it should be the ‘first’ thing we demand of them. As such, in setting a good
governance agenda, eliminating it should still be our ‘first’ goal. It is a ‘need to have,’ whilst
integrity is merely a ‘nice to have.’
The third argument responds to this objection. It holds that giving operational primacy to
measures designed to prioritise reducing corruption above all else can impede the effective
pursuit of other aims, including overall integrity. Most plausibly, the best means of fight-
ing corruption in an institution may be the elimination of discretion, the development of
a compliance culture and many layers of oversight and accountability. These measures may
reduce corruption, but they are likely to come at the expense of efficiency, effectiveness,
employee morale and other aims that serve the public interest and ground the institution’s
legitimacy (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Banfield, 1975, p. 599). Reducing corruption is not
the be-all-and-end-all of any institution. Instead, it needs to be seen as one aim to be balanced
against the other aims of the institution. Pursuing public integrity implies that proper balance
(Kirby, 2018). Further, at least in some contexts, even the best means of reducing corruption
will not be to directly aim to reduce corruption (Kauffman, 2005, p. 88). Since the causes of
corruption often lie in low pay, poor recruitment, institutional culture, lack of capacity and so
on, aiming to fix these elements plausibly within a pro-‘institutional integrity’ agenda, may be
a more effective means of eliminating corruption anyway.
The final argument is political. It involves two almost paradoxical aspects. On the one
hand, it seems easier to sell ‘integrity’ rather than ‘anti-corruption’ initiatives to various
stakeholders. It is less accusatory, less negative, less threatening. For this reason many
anti-corruption initiatives are simply rebranded as integrity initiatives: ‘national integrity
systems,’ ‘Commonwealth Integrity Commission,’ ‘integrity officers’ and so on.6 One might
think that actually genuine integrity initiatives might garner even more, and sustained support.
On the other hand, once established, existing initiatives that focus on both tackling corruption
and building integrity always seem to find the urgent, reactive nature of the former objective
to draw resources from the important, proactive focus of the latter (see below). Thus, current
anti-corruption efforts should not merely be expanded to include additional, secondary integ-
rity objectives, but instead integrity efforts need to be given explicit primacy and/or independ-
ence from anti-corruption efforts.
WHAT IS PUBLIC INTEGRITY?
Our critique of the primacy of the anti-corruption agenda indicates the need for a more ambi-
tious, positive ethical public policy goal: one that entails an opposition to corruption but is
not reduced to it. We might call this goal ‘public integrity,’ but what exactly does that mean?
Talk of ‘public integrity’ is intended to introduce an analogy with ‘personal integrity.’
Personal (or private, or moral) integrity is the quality we may predicate of individuals inde-
pendent of any role they may have. Such personal integrity is a contested concept. But broadly

From anti-corruption to building integrity 465
speaking we might associate it with a robust disposition towards having internal coherence and
consistency between one’s normative beliefs, desires and actions,7 and a certain trustworthi-
ness,8 praiseworthiness9 and moral permissibility in action even if we disagree substantively
on that person’s beliefs. The task of defining ‘public integrity,’ therefore, is to define an anal-
ogous trait in public (rather than personal) agents (Kirby, 2018).
Competing conceptions of public integrity divide on three issues: the moral logic of integ-
rity; how to define the substantive moral content of integrity; and the relevant public agents
capable of integrity.
The Moral Logic of Public Integrity
According to our arguments above, the anti-corruption agenda is too limited because it sets the
ethical standard for public behaviour too low. A natural response, therefore, is simply to define
an integrity agenda by reference to ‘higher’ ethical standards. This has been the approach of
the Dutch theorists led by Leo Huberts. Nominally, Huberts defines integrity ‘as a character-
istic or quality that refers to accordance with the relevant moral values and norms’ (Huberts,
2014, p. 4). In practice, however, this is always cashed out as a list of minimum standards
that should not be violated. For example, they include conflicts of interest, side-line activities,
waste and abuse of resources and misconduct in private time (Lasthuizen et al., 2011). The
public integrity of an individual, or organisation, therefore, can simply be assessed by the
number of ‘integrity violations.’
The strength of this approach is clarity. It gives public officers a clear list of new, higher
standards with which they must comply. The weakness, however, is that it seems to repeat at
a higher level the same flaw as the anti-corruption approach. The ethical standards might be
higher, but they are still the minimum standards expected of public officers. They do not help
public officers think about, or others assess, what is most ethical to do with their remaining
discretion.
There are two possible responses to this problem. The first is simply to identify public integ-
rity with the abolition of discretion altogether. Ideally, we might have minimum standards, so
to speak, ‘all the way up.’ This seems to be the approach of the Hertie School of Governance,
which defines public integrity as ‘Administrative behavior associated with ethical univer-
salism whereby authority is exercised without discretion and partiality and without leading
to private undue profit’ (Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2015, p. 8). Most, however, are sceptical not
only about the possibility but even the desirability of eliminating discretion in public office.
Rules will always need interpretation, they will always be incomplete, ambiguous and invite
exceptions. Further, attempts to over-regulate exclude the agility, context sensitivity and
responsiveness necessary for good administration (Heath, 2014; Lipsky, 2010; Zacka, 2017).
The alternative response is to incorporate a different moral logic into integrity. Instead of
merely using the ‘deontic logic’ of minimal standards, others have sought to include a ‘telic’
component. A ‘telic logic’ entails setting a telos: a goal, purpose, end or objective, for the use
of one’s discretion. We can then assess an agent’s performance by reference to their pursuit
of that goal. However, a good performance does not always mean achieving that goal, since
some goals might be unachievable with current resources (e.g. curing cancer), or they might
be inexhaustible (e.g. improving living standards). In this vein, a number of conceptions of
integrity include the pursuit of institutional purpose, or the public interest as a component
(Brock, 2014; Kirby, 2018; Preston, 2002; Selznick, 1983; Terry, 1995).

The problem for such approaches, of course, is the inverse of the purely ‘minimum stand-
ard’ approach. It is much easier to assess compliance with minimum standards established ex
ante than whether or not someone has done well in pursuing a particular purpose. In response,
however, such ‘telic’ theorists may argue that this assumes that all kinds of accountability
must comply with a judicial model. Instead, accountability can also be administrative. Just
as employees in a firm can be assessed ex post in terms of their performance set against the
goals of the firm, so too can public officials be assessed against the ethical goals of public
institutions.
The Moral Content of Public Integrity
Regardless of the logic at play, ‘public integrity’ is often defined as compliance with or pro-
motion of moral concepts like ‘norms,’ ‘values,’ ‘ethics’ and so on. But how exactly should
we interpret these concepts?
First, some define the substantive content of these terms by reference to ‘public acceptance.’
For example, in its Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009) defined public integrity as the
‘application of generally accepted public values and norms in the daily practice of public
sector organisations.’ Others see public acceptance as a necessary but not sufficient condition.
For example, Heywood and Rose hold that integrity involves ‘doing the right thing in the
right way,’ but when interpreting ‘right’ hold that ‘an action taken by a public official that
a significant majority of people think is morally wrong is not an action taken with integrity’
(Heywood & Rose, 2015, p. 113). The problem with a ‘public acceptance’ standard is twofold.
On the one hand, it is often not clear what the public accepts and/or does not accept on any
particular manner. ‘Public opinion’ is often ambiguous, shifting, incomplete, ill-informed and/
or inconsistent. On the other hand, following public opinion might not be morally permissi-
ble. Constitutional democratic systems, for example, explicitly include counter-majoritarian
and representative structures in recognition of the threat of public opinion in the form of the
tyranny of majority and/or the mob. It is not clear why, in defining the higher ideals of admin-
istrative discretion, we would aim to reverse the impact of these structures.
The supposed advantage of a ‘public acceptance’ rule, however, is meant to be a kind of
neutrality between various conceptions of the morality. With this aim in mind, but accepting
our critique, a second approach to defining the substantive moral content of integrity is ‘impar-
tiality.’ This approach is taken by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and the Hertie School of Governance,
who define public integrity by reference to ‘ethical universalism’ which in turn is identified
with a kind of impartiality (Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2015, p. 8). This approach takes its cue from
Rothstein and Teorell (2008, p. 170) as defined as ‘impartiality,’ that is, ‘when implementing
laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything into consideration about the
citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated into the policy.’ Rothstein and Teorell explicitly
argue that their ideal of impartiality is a way of determining what public agents should ideally
do with their discretion. However, prima facie, their definition seems to exclude the prospect
of discretion altogether. It restricts public officers to merely relying upon considerations
beforehand stipulated in the law or policy. Hence, it either stands against giving such agents
discretion at all or is silent about how they ought to use it when it exists (Agnafors, 2013). At
points, however, Rothstein and Teorell, as well as Mungiu-Pippidi, seem to interpret ‘impar-
tiality’ as a principle merely excluding bias or other ‘partial’ reasons from decision making.

This would allow other considerations not beforehand stipulated in the policy to be relied
upon. This seems to be much more plausible; however, it then becomes only another kind of
minimum standard. Like not being corrupt, not being biased seems to be a fairly low adminis-
trative bar (Kirby & Wolff, forthcoming).
Third, responding to the moral relativism of the public acceptance approach, and the min-
imalism of the impartiality approach, others have sought to simply incorporate substantive
moral ideals into definitions of integrity: ‘Simply put, “integrity” means having a genuine,
wholehearted disposition to do the right and just thing in all circumstances, and to shape one’s
actions accordingly’ (Fleishman, 1981, p. 53). It involves acting with ‘justice,’ or ‘equity,’
‘doing the right thing’ and so on (Brock, 2014; Heywood & Rose, 2015). The problem with
this approach is that it appears to invite public agents to simply do what they happen to believe
is ‘morally best’ at one particular point. However, arguably, most public officers, where
required, should subordinate their own judgement of what is best for that of their superior, or
the law. They are public servants, who serve the public’s good, but as defined by the elector-
ally accountable leadership of the executive and legislative (in a democratic context at least).
In reply, some might introduce the qualification of ‘relevance.’ As Lasthuizen et al. state: ‘[I]n
research on the integrity of governance, integrity can be defined as the quality of acting in
accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules’ (2011, p. 387). However, this then
requires an account of ‘relevance,’ which is not itself ad hoc.
Finally, one response to this problem is to turn towards legitimacy as the particular moral
norm of the public realm (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, pp. 422–4; Grebe & Woermann, 2011;
Kirby, 2018). ‘Legitimacy,’ roughly put, is the ‘right to rule.’ A decision or action is legitimate
if we have moral reason to respect it, and obey it if necessary, even if we might substantively
disagree with it. Legitimacy is not the same as ‘legality.’ Instead, it is the quality that we
expect laws to have that explains when and why we have reason to obey them. On this view,
what makes public integrity an ‘ethical’ ideal is that it requires always making decisions that
are legitimate. Often this might require doing far more than being lawful, and sometimes it
might even entail acting unlawfully. What does legitimacy require? Legitimacy as a moral
norm is just as controversial as other moral norms like justice, equity, the public good and
so on. However, we do not need a comprehensive philosophical conception of legitimacy to
deploy it successfully in action. We can all agree on certain indicators of legitimacy, even if we
disagree as to why they are indicators and even if that list is incomplete and defeasible. These
markers might include due process, informed decision making, freedom from bias, democratic
input, natural justice principles, conformity with basic human rights and so on.
The Moral Agent of Public Integrity
Just as corruption, in our contemporary context,10 is paradigmatically a vice of individual

public officers, so public integrity is generally seen as their virtue. However, some have
argued that we may also sensibly think of institutions (or organisations) as having or failing to
have ‘integrity.’ The idea that institutions, rather than merely individuals, might have ‘integ-
rity’ in some sense is echoed in a contemporary popular discourse, legal decisions11 and also,
increasingly, political theory12 and related disciplines.13
For some authors, institutional integrity is merely a simple function of individual public
officer integrity. For Leo Huberts, for example, it seems to merely be the aggregate of public

officer integrity within any one institution (2014, p. 4). For Preston, it is merely the same
quality of public officers applied at the institutional level:
[Ethics] involves asking yourself hard questions about your values, giving honest and public answers,
and trying to live by those answers. If you do, you have integrity in the sense that you are true to your
values and true to yourself… Institutional ethics applies the same approach to institutions. It involves
an institution asking hard questions about its value and values, giving honest and public answers, and
living by them. Doing so for an institution is more complex than for an individual but it is both possi-
ble and necessary… An organisation has integrity if it lives by its answers. (Preston, 2002, pp. 47–8)
The problem that such approaches face is a fallacy of composition. For example, contra
the ‘aggregation view,’ trustworthy public officers do not necessarily make an institution
trustworthy. Two such public officers may earnestly make commitments on the institution’s
behalf, but if they are properly coordinated those institutions may be inconsistent, and hence
the institution must renege on at least one of them. Similarly, on the ‘same quality view,’ the
answers that a set of public officers might give to hard questions asked of themselves may well
be different to the answers given by an institution (or at least its leadership on its behalf). There
is no necessary alignment, and hence whilst everyone in an institution might be acting in a per-
sonally praiseworthy manner, they might fail to collectively achieve anything praiseworthy.
With this problem in mind, there is reason to define ‘institutional integrity’ first, in a stan-
dalone manner, and then define what we might want from public officers by reference to that
ideal. This is to set the integrity of the institution as the ultimate ethical goal of good govern-
ance, not the integrity of public officers. An early version of this approach can be found in the
1950s work of sociologist Philip Selznick, who defined institutional integrity as:
[T]he unity that emerges when a particular orientation becomes so firmly a part of group life [in an
institution] that it colors and directs a wide variety of attitudes, decisions, and forms of organisation,
and does so at many levels of experience. The building of integrity is part of what we have called
the ‘institutional embodiment of purpose and its protection is the major function of leadership’… the
defense of integrity is also a defense of the organisation’s distinctive competence. (Selznick, 1983,
pp. 138–9)
In public administration circles, this concept is picked up by Larry Terry in the 1990s in his
model of public management with leaders as ‘conservators,’ where their object of conserva-
tion should be the integrity of the institution roughly as Selznick has defined it (Terry, 1995).
Others such as Gillian Brock and myself have developed similar conceptions of institutional
integrity, but in explicit contrast to Lawrence Lessig’s conception of institutional corruption.
Lessig argues that institutions can be corrupt in a way that does not entail the corruption of
its public officers. He defines ‘institutional corruption’ as: ‘[W]hen there is a systemic and
strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s
effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose,
including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that
institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness’ (Lessig, 2013, p. 553). Taking such
corruption to an opposite, Gillian Brock then holds that an institution has integrity when:
1. An institution achieves its purposes effectively and equitably.

2. Insofar as an institution is properly dependent on P (or, parties P1, P2,…, Pn), is required
to promote the interests of P (or parties P1–Pn), or is required to be accountable to P (or

parties P1–Pn), it does so and does not improperly depend on or promote the interests of
other parties.
3. Because 1) and 2) are the case, public confidence in the institution is appropriate. This
confidence may assist the effectiveness of the institution.
4. Public confidence in the institution’s practices, operations, and policies can also survive
appropriate transparency and accountability tests. (Brock, 2014, pp. 5–6)
Similarly, I myself have argued that: ‘Public institutional integrity: is the robust disposition
of a public institution to pursue its purpose(s), within the constraints of legitimacy, consistent
with its commitments’ (Kirby, 2018).
Finally, in the context of global institutions, like the United Nations, Allen Buchanan and
Robert Keohane have held that:
Institutional Integrity. If an institution exhibits a pattern of egregious disparity between its actual
performance, on the one hand, and its self-proclaimed procedures or major goals, on the other, its
legitimacy is seriously called into question… If an institution fails to satisfy the integrity criterion,
we have reason to believe that the key institutional agents are either untrustworthy or grossly incom-
petent, that the institution lacks correctives for these deficiencies, and that the institution is therefore
unlikely to be effective in providing the goods that would give it a claim to our support. (Buchanan
& Keohane, 2006, pp. 422–4)
The advantage of this ‘institutional’ approach is that, plausibly, it gets the primary concern of
good governance correct. We care first and foremost about the quality of our institutions and
only derivatively about the quality of the public officers within them. The argument against the
institutional approach is that institutions are simply not the kind of entities that plausibly have
integrity or not. They are not moral agents. Therefore, they cannot truly be morally respon-
sible. Instead, we should focus on detailing more accurately the responsibilities and integrity
of individuals within them. A focus on collective institutional responsibility, for example, is
liable to let individuals ‘off the hook’ (Thompson, 2005).
Relationship with Personal Integrity
Finally, it is important to note briefly the relationship between public officers and personal
integrity. After all, the same individual must both fill the role of being a public officer some
of the time and being a person all of the time. Can one consistently maintain both public and
personal integrity? How do they interact?
First, an individual’s personal circumstances may undermine their reliability in their public
role, and thus their public integrity. For example, a conflict of interest, even innocently gen-
erated within one’s private life, may threaten one’s public integrity (e.g. one’s partner might
gain a new job with a company bidding on a government contract that one is overseeing).
Such scenarios can be managed in a principled manner through clear contractual principles,
disclosure rules and role flexibility.
Second, some theorists hold that it is acceptable to judge, in part, the public integrity of an
individual by the quality of their personal integrity. For example, Huberts and other members
of the Dutch School are willing to see drug use in one’s own personal time as an indicator
of public integrity (Huberts, 2014). However, arguably, this involves a kind of unacceptable
moralism (Coady, 2008). In theory, judgements about what we should most want from people

in their public lives should be consistent with liberalism about their private lives. Even on this
view, however, one’s private life might still be relevant for their public role: if it undermines
their reliability (they are a blackmail risk) or their behaviour threatens the reputation of the
institution.
Third, personal integrity might require acting on certain principles of conscience that are
inconsistent with the demands of public integrity. For example, someone working in an immi-
gration department may be utterly opposed to the refugee policies that the government of the
day is requiring them to implement. Broadly speaking, as Albert Hirschman famously argued,
such an individual might have three options available: exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman,
1970). They might seek to voice their concerns in a manner consistent with the demands of
their role in an attempt to change the policy, and thus draw alignment between personal and
public integrity. Alternatively, they might exit either their particular role or public office as
a whole. This would eliminate the inconsistent by eliminating the relevant form of public
integrity required. Finally, they might remain ‘loyal,’ sacrificing their personal for public
integrity.
This last option, however common, we might think is necessarily the wrong thing to do.
Surely one should always preserve one’s own personal integrity at all costs? This is the
default view in moral philosophy, but some have argued that on occasion we have a special,
overriding duty to act with ‘dirty hands’ (Coady, 2008; Hollis, 1982; Walzer, 1973). Typically
envisioned in these cases there is a clash between ordinary everyday moral principles like
‘do not kill the innocent’ and the need to contravene such principles to serve the greater good
(e.g. killing innocents to ensure the security of the nation against a plausible threat). In these
cases, one might be obliged to sacrifice one’s own ‘ethic of conviction’ and take on an ‘ethic
of responsibility’ (Weber et al., 1994).
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
The ‘pro-integrity’ agenda is still taking shape conceptually. However, presuming we can get
a clear idea of what ‘public integrity’ means, how might we aim to build it within a broader
good governance agenda?
The threads of a new model of ‘integrity management’ are beginning to emerge in theory
(Behnke & Maesschalck, 2006; Heywood et al., 2018; Heywood, 2012, p. 486). In short, they
can be seen as attempts to respond to some of the shortcomings of New Public Management
(NPM) without needing to return to traditional public management (see Denhardt & Denhardt,
2000; Hood, 1995; UNDP, 2015).
Problems with Current Public Management Models
According to the traditional ‘Weberian’ or ‘progressive’ public management model, public

institutions are understood as hierarchies. Legitimacy is secured through adherence to process.
The public service is a unified organisation, and its employees are largely generalists focussed
on policy. The profession is a vocation, with tenure, fixed pay scales and jobs for life. Whilst
process implies rules, in reality public servants are the masters of such rules and thus wield
a high degree of discretionary power based on trust. They are primarily accountable to their
public service peers in accordance with a common ‘public service ethos.’ There is a sharp

division between the public service and the private sector, and also a ‘buffer’ between public
servants and the corrupting influence of politicians.
Beginning in the 1980s in a number of jurisdictions, this model came under attack. It
was thought to be insufficiently responsive and accountable to both political leadership and
citizens. It was also thought to be inefficient and ineffective in policy implementation. In
response, various strategies broadly constituting NPM emerged. The basic hierarchical model
was replaced with a principal–agent model, and the primary goal of public management was to
achieve incentive alignment between the principal (the people, or at least the government) and
the agents (public servants) (Simon, 1957). Legitimacy was to be identified with outcomes,
rather than process. The public service was to be functionally divided up into various agencies
run by managers, who then would have great discretion over how they sought to achieve target
outcomes. A new focus on policy implementation arose, and client (or ‘citizen’) satisfaction.
Managers could dictate a variety of employee conditions and renumeration scales. The barrier
with the private sector was made permeable, first as a more private-sector performance ethos
was inculcated, second as many parts of government were themselves privatised and, finally,
as core functions of government, including policy advice, were contracted out.
Problems, however, have emerged with NPM. First, whilst it has increased accountability
and responsiveness to political leadership, the loss of tenure particularly at the top of depart-
ments has led to increasing politicisation, as public servants are deterred from offering ‘frank
and fearless advice,’ and appointments are based more on political alignment than merit.
Further, at least in Westminster contexts, there has been a collapse in the doctrine of ‘min-
isterial accountability’ as ministers have been willing to publicly distance themselves from
and blame their own departments, instead of taking responsibility for their actions. Second,
NPM incentivises managers to meet performance targets. It does not incentivise them to
ensure that their pursuit of those targets is aligned with the public interest. NPM disincentives
include taking wider responsibility for the unforeseen, dynamic and collective challenges that
fall outside of those targets. Third, the increase in contracting out has increased the risk of
corruption in procurement, policy capture, homophily and markets for influence. These last
two problems have led, somewhat ironically, to an increased reliance on compliance measures
(Hood, 1995). Finally, despite many improvements in the performance of public agencies, and
the delivery of public services, public trust in government is at an all-time low.
Four Principles of Integrity Management
In response to the problems, it is hoped that a new form of ‘integrity management’ might
offer an alternative without needing to return to traditional public management. Despite being
incomplete, we can discern at least four key principles.
The starting principle of integrity management is that bureaucratic discretion is inelimi-
nable, often desirable, and can rarely be controlled merely by financial incentives, such as
performance pay. Hence, the foundation stone of good bureaucratic decision making must be
shared public service values. The difficulty, however, is to avoid a return to the unresponsive,
inefficient, unaccountable, ‘Jesuitical corps’ of traditional public management (Hood, 1995).
One strategy is to incorporate ‘responsiveness,’ ‘efficiency’ and ‘accountability’ alongside
more traditional Weberian values such as being ‘apolitical,’ ‘impartial,’ ‘merit-based,’ and
offering ‘frank and fearless advice’ (Rothstein & Sorak, 2017). Together, these values are
meant to constitute a new identity for public servants as ‘stewards’ or ‘trustees’ of their insti-

tutions (Dobel, 2007; Kirby, 2018). Stewardship emphasises that one’s responsibility extends
beyond merely fulfilling one’s own particular stated role and/or performance targets. Instead,
one must to act as the situation requires to secure the integrity of the institution as a whole,
whether it is by ensuring consistency and coherence across the institution, addressing the
problematic behaviours of others or taking more heed of long-term structural considerations.
The reassertion of values, however, does not imply the wholesale rejection of ‘compliance’
mechanisms. Instead, integrity management rejects the ‘compliance values’ dichotomy (Paine,
1994). Rules (and incentives) are also seen as necessary and desirable. Values are thought to
complement compliance, as they provide a way for public officers to interpret the rules, justify
their actions within them, and be held accountable for the use of discretion left by them (see
also Blijswijk et al., 2004; Cooper, 2006; Heywood et al., 2018; Huberts, 2014; Maesschalck,
2004).
The second principle of integrity management is that new values will arrive stillborn
without a sustaining organisational culture. Such a culture must be created through training,
practices-dedicated ethics officers and leadership.
Many public institutions have values and codes of conduct, and they run ethics training
courses to inculcate them. Yet, there is little evidence that these courses have any measurable
impact (Menzel, 2015; van Montfort et al., 2013). The hypothesis of integrity management is
that such training fails because it tends to be (1) optional rather than mandatory, (2) general
rather than context-specific, (3) oneoff rather than a sustained intervention, (4) didactic rather
than interactive, and, most importantly (5) is run with groups of individuals rather than indi-
vidual groups. By this latter claim, I mean that often such courses are run with whatever set of
individuals happen to sign onto that course at a particular time and who may have little else
to do with each other day-to-day. Instead, such courses should be run with groups within that
organisation composed of individuals who will work closely together as a team and are thus
capable of reinforcing new collective norms over time. Values should not just be considered
another ‘skill’ or ‘knowledge set’ for employees to be added to their capabilities. Instead,
improving ethics should be seen as a sociological intervention done with groups. Immediate
group norms are generally the most powerful determinant of individual behaviour. ‘Ethical
reasoning’ training targeting individuals performs poorly (Weber & Green, 1991), compared
with activities that are group based (Cady et al., 2018) and focussed upon building a more
‘ethical organisational identity’ (Verbos et al., 2007).
Ethics training needs to be reinforced by institutional practices. Institutions need to ensure
that ethics is central to everyday discourse (Briggs, 2009; De Graaf, 2010, p. 777). There
should be a culture of naming and faming good behaviour, not simply shaming bad behav-
iour.14 Ethics should be central to the assessment of job performance as well as promotion.
And, modern behavioural science can be mined for practices to promote integrity, whether it
is in the form of ‘moral reminders,’ ex ante commitments, the avoidance of excessive moni-
toring and other techniques to deal with bias, temptation, lack of self-control, moral balancing
and poor reference points (OECD, 2018a). Further, an ethical culture should be supported by
specific, trained personnel. Such ‘ethics’ or ‘integrity’ officers can help with advice, imple-
mentation and internal assessment of performance.
The third principle of integrity management is the central importance of ethical leadership.
It is a key determinant in the ethical culture of any organisation (Demmke & Moilanen, 2012;
Hassan et al., 2014; Lasthuizen, 2008). Ethical leadership involves being both the ‘moral
person’ (demonstrating integrity in one’s own decisions and behaviour) and the ‘moral

manager’ (promoting such integrity in others through role modelling, reinforcement, commu-
nication and empowerment) (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Heres & Lasthuizen, 2012; Treviño
et al., 2000). Ethical leadership reduces unethical behaviour in followers (De Hoogh & Den
Hartog, 2008; Heres & Lasthuizen, 2012; Huberts et al., 2007; Lasthuizen, 2008; Mayer et
al., 2009); raises their moral awareness and judgement, and ‘fosters dedication, optimism,
initiative, extra effort, altruism, better work attitudes and willingness of followers to help
others with work-related problems’ (Brown et al., 2005; De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2008;
Mayer et al., 2009). In order to promote ethical leadership, an institution needs to prioritise it
in recruitment, promotion and internal training.15 However, this will all be for nought if senior
leadership continues to be politicised. On this basis, there are arguments for the return of
tenure and other protections at the top of civil service.
The fourth principle of integrity management is that accountability is a valuable means to
achieve public integrity, but not an end in itself (Bovens, 2007; Linaweaver, 2003; Mayer,
2013; O’Neill, 2002; Owens, 2015; Philp, 2007, p. 220). Unlike traditional public manage-
ment, integrity management accepts the value of internal and external accountability just like
NPM. However, it rejects the idea that such accountability, let alone any one particular form
of accountability (such as performance targets or market forces), are unconditionally valuable.
Accountability, as well as transparency, should be assessed in terms of how they promote
overall public integrity within institutions.16 In some cases, however, they foil public integrity:
leading to a ‘tick-box’ culture, risk aversion, playing the system, gaming performance targets
and so on.
Substantively, a few themes emerge with respect to an ‘integrity management’ approach to
accountability. First, trust rather than suspicion should be the default setting. Trust tends to
be ‘cunning,’ in that it often leads the trusted to trust the person trusting (Peel, 1998; Pettit,
1995) and encourages the trusted to in fact be trustworthy (OECD, 2018a). There is no need
to naively abandon allowing accountability measures, but they should lie beneath operational
view, like deeper layers in a ‘regulatory pyramid’ (Braithwaite, 1998). Second, the best asset
to combat corruption and misconduct by a public officer is the public integrity of their peers
(Brown et al., 2014; De Graaf, 2010; Huberts & Hoekstra, 2016, pp. 72–3). Peers are best
placed to know what is actually happening within an institution. However, they are often
disincentivised to speak out. They need to be supported with appropriate peer-reporting and
whistleblowing regimes. They also need an integrity culture that valorises using them, rather
than condemns such actions as ‘disloyal.’ Third, integrity performance should be self- and
independently assessed in an ongoing manner. This should be cross-referenced with other
aggregate data to identify integrity ‘risks.’ For example, ‘integrity violations’ tend to correlate
with high levels of sickness absence, austerity, low pay, downsizing, low levels of diversity,
geographical isolation and agencies pushing greater entrepreneurship (Demmke & Moilanen,
2012; Kolthoff, 2007). In this way, more onerous accountability measures can be targeted to
where they are most likely to be worth any cost to other aspects of public integrity. Finally,
specialised, independent ‘integrity agencies’ are required with the knowledge, powers and
resources to oversee the promotion of public integrity across the sector.

INTEGRITY AGENCIES, BRANCHES AND SYSTEMS
Over the last 30 years, there has been an explosion in the number of anti-corruption agencies
around the world, many of them called ‘integrity commissions’ (OECD, 2013). They supple-
ment other oversight bodies like administrative tribunals, ad hoc royal commissions, public
accounts committees, ombudsmen, electoral agencies and auditors- and comptrollers-general.
In many cases, these bodies fall nominally under the control of one of the legislative, execu-
tive or judiciary branches, but in over 90 countries some such body is recognised within the
constitution (Ackerman, 2010).
Some argue that such ‘accountability bodies’ reflect an undertheorised but essential
‘fourth function’ of government – an integrity function – that should ideally be recognised
constitutionally in a fourth branch of government – an integrity branch (Ackerman, 2000;
B. Ackerman, 2010; J. M. Ackerman, 2010; Creyke, 2012; Field, 2013; McMillan, 2010;
Spigelman, 2004). Despite the name, the general assumption, however, is that the purpose of
such a branch would be to combat corruption.
Similarly, in the mid-1990s, Transparency International introduced the idea of an ‘integrity
system’ (Pope, 2000). However, once again integrity system is somewhat a misnomer. The
analytical tool put forward by Transparency International is an ‘anti-corruption system.’
It is a way of understanding how various institutions (legislative, executive, judiciary,
auditor-general, ombudsmen, watchdog agencies, public service, media, civil society, private
sector and international actors) interact with society’s general values and public awareness to
combat corruption within a society. The aim of this tool is to emphasise the holism required
to combat corruption, in contrast to a range of short-term, politically expedient, quick-fix
measures.17
A turn from anti-corruption to pro-integrity does not entail the rejection of such
anti-corruption agencies, their coordination within a branch of government or their analysis as
part of a society-wide system. Instead, it involves setting public integrity as the ultimate goal,
and assessing such anti-corruption structures by their reference to their contribution towards
it. Tentatively, given this reorientation, we might consider the following.
First, prima facie it would seem obvious that anti-corruption agencies should expand their
mandate, powers and resources to promote public integrity in a more fulsome fashion. On this
view, such genuine ‘integrity’ agencies would not merely react to corruption cases and engage
in investigation and invigilation, but would also proactively work to prevent corruption and
build systems of integrity. They would assess and monitor integrity performance, offer after-
care to institutions that have been through crises, develop and disseminate best practice, coor-
dinate other relevant institutions, and house various support systems. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, many ‘anti-corruption’ agencies already have some such powers. The problem is that
they are underutilised and under-resourced. The politics of corruption means that the urgency
of reacting to short-terms crises draws an institution’s gravity away from the importance of
long-term investment in capacity building (Kirby & Webbe, 2019; Kuris, 2017). Plausibly,
therefore, the mandate of anti-corruption agencies should not be expanded to include integrity
functions, but instead should be complemented and coordinated by new integrity agencies.
Further, anti-corruption institutions tend to be populated by officers trained in law and law
enforcement. Integrity institutions can focus upon recruiting public management specialists,
data scientists, sociologists, ethicists and behavioural experts.

Second, once the goal of an ‘integrity branch’ actually becomes public integrity rather than
merely preventing corruption, then a broader suite of institutions comes within its purview. For
example, a range of ‘epistemic’ institutions becomes central to ensuring the trustworthiness
of government: whether this involves bureaus of statistics, media regulators or even research
institutions. Furthermore, at least the ‘institutionalists’ would argue that the integrity branch
would expand its concern from individual public officer behaviour to oversight of structural
issues like campaign finance, policy capture and lobbying.
Finally, so-called ‘integrity’ systems are currently structured around lines of oversight.
A genuine integrity system will also map and assess who supports who: what institutions
offer aftercare, advice, confidential assessment and feedback to other institutions? Which
institutions – professional and educational – are responsible for driving the culture across
a public service and how? Who offers a powerful constituency to back integrity agencies when
they speak truth to power? Formal lines of oversight need to be complemented by substantive
sinews of support: information, operational, financial and political.
CONCLUSION: A CAUTIONARY NOTE
Why is it important to build public integrity in government? For many, including at times
myself, the answer is ‘trust’ (Heywood et al., 2018; Kirby, 2018; Murtin et al., 2018). Public
institutions are currently registering record low levels of public trust around the world. What
could be better to address such a problem than building public integrity? After all, by defi-
nition, integrity is a logical basis for trust. Relying only on this rationale, however, there is
reason to worry that the nascent ‘pro-integrity agenda’ is being set up to fail.
First, trust is a ‘fragile commodity’ (Dasgupta, 1988). It is much easier to lose than it is
regain. The trust return on integrity investment, if it indeed arises, is likely to come in the
long run. Second, in a related manner, many accountability measures required by integrity are
likely, if anything, to undermine trust further in the short run, as they bring current failures to
light. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, integrity might logically entail trustworthiness,
but trustworthiness does not entail trust. As political scientists have continued to emphasise,
public trust of government in general and its particular institutions, is affected by a wealth of
intermediating factors: the economy, the media, partisanship, national pride and so on (Citrin
& Stoker, 2018; Newton, 2009). Further, to some extent it will always be rational to distrust
powerful institutions, in fact that is the premise of much democratic and republican theory
(Warren, 2017). However, perhaps most depressingly, reported trust in public institutions,
even the most bureaucratic and apolitical, it seems is largely determined by people’s satisfac-
tion with the politics of the day. Advocates should be wary of promising to solve the problem
of trust in political institutions, with a broader campaign to improve trust in (mostly bureau-
cratic) public institutions.
However, the pro-integrity agenda should not stand or fall on its relationship with public
trust. At a minimum, having institutions that are robust, coherent, consistent, morally permis-
sible, trustworthy and praiseworthy should be value enough.

NOTES
1. Breakey et al., 2015; Brock, 2014; Heywood et al., 2018; Huberts, 2014; Menzel, 2015; Montefiore
& Vines, 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2015; Preston, 2002; Rose & Heywood, 2013.
2. Integrity Action, 2018; Grebe & Woermann, 2011; OECD, 2018b; Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2005.
3. In this chapter, I expand upon some of the structure and arguments that I used preparing a teaching
module for the United Nations Organisation against Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2019).
4. Kroeze et al., 2017, p. 5: ‘the word corruption has its origins in Classical Latin and was a synonym
for misuse of power, political perversion and loss of integrity.’
5. Note, however, Philp, 1997, p. 445.
6. E.g. Australian Government, 2019; Pope, 2000.
7. Williams, 1973; McFall, 1987; Monaghan, 2017; Montefiori, ‘A Philosopher’s Introduction,’ in
Montefiori & Vines (1999), p. 1; Korsgaard, 2009; Breakey et al., 2015.
8. Calhoun, 1995, p. 237; Philp, 2007, p. 152; Rose & Heywood, 2013, pp. 149–50; Heywood and
Rose, 2015, p. 112.
9. See Cox et al., 1999.
10. Not necessarily historically, see Thompson, 2018.
11. In Canada: R v Zalm [1992] BCWLD 1746 at [12]; R v Pilarinos (2002) 168 CCC(3d) 548 at
[40]–[46]: R v Hinchey [1996] 3 SCR 1128 at [15]; R v Pilarinos (2002) 168 CCC(3d) 548 at [43].
In Australia: Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA [23].
12. Brock, 2014; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, pp. 422–4; Philp, 2007, p. 229ff. Waldron, 2016, pp. 35,
36, 65ff.).
13. J. M. Ackerman, 2010; Rohr, 1986; Selznick, 1983; Sztompka, 1998, p. 26; Terry & Morgan, 2015.
14. See for example, Integrity Icon: www.integrityicon.org/about/.
15. Further, some have argued that public policy and government schools should play a larger role in
creating a relevant ‘professional ethos,’ just as other tertiary institutions have done for other profes-
sions (Anheier, 2019).
16. Of course, accountability may have other value for citizens: Przeworski et al., 1999.
17. A turn towards a genuine ‘pro-integrity’ agenda, however, suggests that such a valuable analytical
tool should evolve to actually assess the holistic promotion of public integrity. This is nominally
proposed by Brown et al. in their 2005 Transparency International assessment of Australia’s integ-
rity system (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2005). However, it is not substantially carried forward in
their analysis. Fighting corruption remains the substantive focus. Where the authors explicitly speak
of ‘promoting integrity’ instead of ‘merely combating corruption,’ their actual contrast is between
‘proactive, preventative measures’ against corruption rather ‘merely reactive measures.’
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Index
5Is framework 90 artificial intelligence 387

2030 Agenda 391–2, 401 Ashforth, B. E. 145
Asian Development Bank 16
Aboutaleb, A. 383 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 15
absenteeism 115, 118 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 124
Abu Ghraib military prison 202 Atta-Mills, J. E. 267
accountability 5–6, 21, 45, 57, 70, 72–3, 92, auditing 37, 72, 92, 99
94, 117–18, 120, 123–5, 155, 212, 252, austerity 10, 18, 212, 473
263–4, 268–9, 282–3, 296, 313, 316–18, Australia 5–6, 12, 14, 20, 64, 81, 88–9, 91, 93,
337, 342, 369, 391–3, 395–7, 399, 439, 139–45, 147, 171, 175–6, 178, 180–81,
466, 473–4 185, 207, 209, 331–43, 407
Addo, N. A. D. A. 267 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement
administrative corruption 29–30, 38–9, 139, 154, Integrity 81, 86–9
see also particularism Avakov, A. 310
Afghanistan 5, 43, 106, 108, 370 aviation 101, 109
Afrobarometer 256–7 Azerbaijan 118, 249
ageing 12–13
Agnew, R. 437, 442 Baez-Camargo, C. 265
Ahern, M. 335 Bahriy’s Group 306
Akerlof, G. 265 Baimenov, A. 244
Akers, R. 436 Balanced Scorecard 103
Akhmetov, R. 311 Bangladesh 120, 369–70
Akman, T. 90 Barber, B. 16
Albanese, J. S. 434 Barclays Bank 426
alcohol 5, 84, 93, 107, 207, 216–17, 222, 312 Batohi, S. 290, 299–300
Amnesty International 308 Bauhr, M. 439
An, W. 394 Beattie, P. 331–2, 337, 341–3
Andersen, T. 397 Beck Jørgensen, T. 44
Anechiarico, F. 140, 443 Beeri, I. 92
anonymity 6, 36, 181 Bekri, N. 230
Anthony, A. K. 239 Belarus 248–9
anti-corruption Bellow, A. 145
agencies 5, 31, 33, 57, 60–61, 64, 72, 87, 89, Benson, M. L. 440
101, 182, 234, 239, 241, 253, 283, Bernard, T. 437
295, 316, 318, 361–2, 366–70, 463–5, Bertók, J. 456
474 Bhagwati, J. 232
frameworks 29–40, 345 bid rigging 2, 116
legislation 182, 227–8, 239, 241, 257, 347, Biden, J. 52
361, 367–70, 373–4 big data 10–11, 19, 387
policy 30, 32–40, 93, 222, 240, 252, 283, Bjelke-Petersen, J. 332–6
366, 414, 443 blackmail 72, 87, 91, 317, 470
reforming reform 56–64 Bligh, A. 341–2
Apartheid 290, 292, 333 Bo X. 234
Aquaculture Stewardship Council 180 Boddy, C. R. 441
Arab Spring 11 Boeing 412
Arellano-Gault, D. 439 Bogatyrova, R. 313
Aristotle 46–7 Bolivia 171
Armenia 189 Bologna Process 135
Artello, K. 434 Borbidge, R. 339–41
483
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border control 84, 215–23, 385–6, see also Chaus, M. 308

customs Chavon, A. 238–9
Borgia, C. 47 Chile 56
Bosnia and Herzegovina 307 China 12–16, 86, 122–3, 178–81, 227–31, 233–4,
Botswana 56 237–8, 240–41, 281, 369–70, 374, 395,
Bowman, J. S. 48 406
Bozeman, B. 44–5, 53 Chinese Communist Party 228–30, 233–4, 238,
Bradley, G. 340 370, 374
brain drain 237, 255 Chipkin, I. 291–4
Brazil 13–14 Choo W. K. 373
Breytenbach, G. 297 Choy, E. 361
bribery 2–5, 29, 38–9, 62–3, 80–81, 85, 87, 108, cigarettes see tobacco
115, 118, 122, 131–4, 139–40, 146–7, CITES convention 181
155–6, 174, 177, 180, 215–17, 219–23, civil servants 2, 5, 7, 20, 34, 37, 91, 175, 181,
239, 244, 246–50, 255, 258, 264, 269, 228–9, 236, 239, 244–5, 247, 250–51, 290,
274, 276–7, 284, 305, 308, 310, 345, 347, 294, 316, 338, 351–6, 360, 364, 372–3,
352, 368, 372–3, 377–8, 380–81, 384–6, 377–80, 384–6, 394–5, 401, 409, 411, 452,
390–91, 402, 410, 416, 423, 453 455 see also public servants
Brock, G. 468–9 Clarke, R. V. 440
brokerage 215, 221–2 clientelism 4, 68, 70, 72, 263–4, 390, 409
Bruinsma, G. 436 climate change 10, 16–17, 69, 71, 174, 413
Brunei 369 Clinton, H. 414
Buchanan, A. 469 Coalgate scandal 236–7
Budak, J. 89 code of silence 186–91, 195–8
Bulgaria 83, 131, 246 codes of conduct 91–2, 412, 417, 443
Burgess, R. 436 codes of ethics 352–6
Burnham, D. 185 Cohen, L. E. 440
Buscaglia, E. 80–81 collective action 3, 58, 61, 63–4, 80, 401, 403,
Button, B. 120 416
Collier, P. 267
Calderon, F. 274, 283 Colombia 279–80
Cambodia 86, 122, 180, 220, 369–70 colonialism 235–6, 256, 259–60, 360–61, 368,
Cameron, D. 43, 51 371–4
Cameron, R. 291 Comey, J. 414
Campos, J. E. 91 Commonwealth Games 233, 236
Canada 88 Companies Defence Index 110
Caneppele, S. 90 Compranet 282
capacity 11, 14, 46, 48, 82, 120–21, 125, 153, conflict of interest 2, 4, 6, 33, 62, 72–3, 118–19,
227, 237, 243, 245, 255, 275, 289–90, 293, 121–2, 124, 139–40, 175, 209, 229, 283,
295, 307, 313–14, 346, 362–3, 374, 384, 316, 333, 346–7, 353–4, 361–2, 372, 378,
391, 398, 401, 403, 407–9, 464, 474 380–83, 385, 406–18, 451, 453, 456, 465,
Capacity to Control Corruption Index 275 469
capital flight 236 Connolly–Ryan Inquiry 340–41
car sitters 276–7 contention 60–61, 143
Carillon 408 Control of Corruption Index 246
Carmody, T. 341 control theories 437–8
cartels 62, 217, 275, 279–81, 305, 452 Convention Against Corruption (UN) 29, 80, 251,
Casa Blanca scandal 274–5 275, 368, 380, 390, 393
censorship 35–6, 178 Convention Against Transnational Organized
Centre for International Crime Prevention 81–2 Crime (US) 80
Centre for Security Sector Governance 109 Cook, T. 17
Centre for the Study of Democracy 83–4 Cooper, R. 335–6, 339–40
Chapman, S. 209 Cooper, T. L. 48
Chappell, D. 86 Copes, H. 207
Charron, N. 439 Cornish, D. B. 90
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Index 485
corrupt administration see administrative Council of Europe 109, 251, 380–81

corruption Group of States Against Corruption 345,
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 64, 381, 386
362–74 councils 36, 92, 139, 141–6, 148–9, 245, 260,
corruption 1–7, 387–9, see also anti-corruption 283, 312, 379, 383–5
administrative 29–30, 38–9, 139, 154 Covid-19 297
in border administration 215–23, see also Criminal Justice Commission 335–41
border control; customs criminology 91, 434–45
contested values of 43–4 Croatia 186, 190–92, 198, 246, 345–57
costs and harms of 1–3 Cronje, H. 299
criminological responses to 434–45 cronyism 4, 20, 139, 147, 274, 378–81, 390, 451,
dark side of policy-making 67–74 453
decentralized 279, 284 cross-over crime 177
definition of 1, 80, 103, 153, 305, 380, 382, Crown Agents 306
422, 449–50, 463–4 cultural change 48–50
in the education sector 129–35 Cunningham, L. 340
electoral 68, 264, 331, 384 CurbingCorruption 107
in environmental protection 174–82 customs 84, 101, 109, 175, 215, 217, 275, 385–6,
frameworks 29–40, 345 see also border control
global experiences in 390–403, see also cybersecurity 11
individual countries Cyprus 83
grand 58–9, 82, 147, 258, 275, 277, 279, Czech Republic 83, 246
422, 439
in heathcare 115–25, see also health systems Dahlström, C. 3
institutional 62, 83, 119, 247–9, 409, D’Arcy, B. 342
421–30, 468 Davis, D. 295–6
in local government 139–49 Davis, G. 339
network 382–3, 386–9 Davoodi, H. 153
and organized crime 274–84, see also de Graaf, G. 443
organized crime decentralized corruption 279, 284
petty 58–9, 215–16, 219–20, 223, 246, 248, deforestation 174, 178, 180, 182
265, 275, 281–2, 394, 422 Democracy Barometer 243
police 98, 109, 129, 185–98, 215, 222, 231, demographics 12–13, 86–7
257–61, 267–70, 309, 331–5, 361–4, Dempster, Q. 340
371–2, 377, 434 Derksen, J. 441
prevention 7, 37, 228, 243, 251–3, 255, 396, developing countries 12–14, 16, 38, 129, 162,
400–401, 435 255, 409
in prisons 201–12 Dickie, P. 334
of public officials by organized crime 80–94 differential association theory 436–7
redefining sectors 98–111 Donnelly, H. 426–8
reforming reform 56–64 Dooley, M. P. 236
risk mapping 153–72 Dowd, M. 185
risks 31–2, 61, 89–90, 92, 101–2, 104, 118, drug trafficking 204, 210, 217, 221, 377, 383, 385
121, 123–4, 140, 145, 154, 158, 160, Drugov, M. 415
162, 164, 167, 170–71, 215, 252, 345, drugs 5, 62, 81, 84–5, 87–8, 93, 121–2, 177, 185,
395, 399–400, 409, 435 201–12, 215, 217–18, 220–21, 267–8, 274,
in tax administration 153–72 279–81, 306, 334, 361–2, 377, 383, 385–6,
theories to explain 435–42 435, 438, 469
types 4, 29, 86, 102, 204, 217 Druyun, D. 412
Corruption Absence Index 246 Durkheim, É. 437
Corruption Perception Index 56–7, 106, 191, 227, Dye, K. M. 92
243, 245, 249, 256, 274, 345, 360, 374,
377 Easton, D. 1, 450
Corruption Vulnerability Assessments 91 Eck, J. E. 440
Costa Rica 56 ecology 177, 201, 203
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

economic growth 2, 12, 15–16, 62, 129–30, Foroohar, R. 13

231–3, 240, 289, 292, 374, 395, 409 Four Corners 181
ecosystems 111, 174, 396 fourth branch of government 474
education 104, 106, 108–9, 129–35, 231–2, 247, Fox, V. 274
275, 317–18, 355–6, 391, 399, 402, see France 83, 384
also higher education Francis Report 427
e-government 37–8, 120, 153, 160, 283–4, 316, fraud 58, 68, 71–2, 82, 85–6, 88, 91–2, 115–20,
397–8 124–5, 143, 153, 160, 162, 177, 179–80,
Ekblom, P. 90 216–17, 221, 233, 239, 274, 277, 295,
Elbahnasawy, N. 397 304, 306, 361, 378–9, 384, 425–6, 428–9,
Electoral and Administrative Review Commission 434–5, 437–9, 441, 451–3
335–8 freedom of the press 229–30, 275–6, 281, 393
electoral corruption 68, 264, 331, 384 free-ridership 67, 71
embezzlement 2, 4, 29, 38, 80, 116, 121, 124, Friedman, T. 17
153, 174, 216, 277–8, 281, 284, 297, 313, Fukumoto, E. 53
315, 318, 378, 390, 435, 450–51 fundraising 423
employee-vetting procedures 91, 94
Enron scandal 426 Gaebler, T. 21
environmental crime 174–82, 425 Galvin, P. 441
Environmental Protection Agency 179 gambling 93, 208, 312, 361
Estonia 56, 108, 245 Gandhi, R. 236, 239
ethical universalism 3, 465–6 Gandhi, S. 236
Eurobarometer 247–8 gangs 88, 203–4, 207, 210, 279, 309, see also
Euromaiden Revolution 304, 308–9, 313, outlaw motorcycle gangs
316–18 Gans-Morse, J. 416
European Commission 81, 83, 426 GDP 2, 13–15, 82, 153, 231, 280, 374, 396
European Union 12, 56, 83–4, 106, 179, 191, 217, Gee, J. 120
245–9, 314–15, 354 gender 46, 49, 61, 86–7, 129, 145, 393, 414, 453
Europeanization 346 genocide 436
Evans, R. 336 Georgia 56, 108, 132, 171, 248–9, 310
e-waste 178 Germany 215, 235
exploitation 56, 60–61, 70, 87, 174, 178–9, Gerould, A. 437
204–6, 210, 275, 308 Ghana 255–70
extortion 4–5, 32–5, 38–9, 59, 91, 162, 177, 216, Ghani, A. 108
218, 223, 277, 280, 308, 352, 435, 451 ghost workers 2, 118, 124, 130, 160, 396
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Gibbs, H. 333
110–11 gift giving 265, 308, 453, 456
GlaxoSmithKline 115, 122
Fabrizio, L. E. 186 Global Corruption Barometer 153, 248, 276, 304,
Facebook 88 308, 371, 391
Farrington, D. P. 440 global financial crises 82
favouritism 29, 38, 64, 104–5, 118, 144–5, 148–9, Global Integrity 110
205, 244, 347, 380, 382, 385, 390, 451–3 global warming see climate change
FBI 186, 309, 414, 426 Global Witness 85
Feldman, Y. 415 globalization 13, 15, 24, 264
Felson, M. 440 Godber, P. F. 371
Felt, M. 426 Goel, R. K. 89
Ferreira, C. 219 Good Governance for Medicines 120
fertility 12–13 Gordhan, P. 293–5
Finland 83, 248, 360 Gordillo, E. E. 278
Fischer, R. 43 Gorta, A. 89
Fisheries Industries Transparency Initiative 110 Goss, W. 331–2, 335–41
Fitzgerald, G. E. (Tony) 331, 333–7, 341 Gottfredson, M. R. 438, 442
Fitzgerald Inquiry 185, 331–2, 334–8, 340, 342–3 Government Defence Index 110
Foltz, J. 394 graft 229–30, 255, 398, 451
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Index 487
grand corruption 58–9, 82, 147, 258, 275, 277, inappropriate relationships 91, 202, 204–8
279, 422, 439 Independent Commission Against Corruption 64,
Granovetter, M. 144 142–5, 149, 251–3, 367–71
Graycar, A. 5, 62, 90, 103, 146, 435, 440–41 Index of Public Integrity 243, 246
Greece 83, 246, 248 India 13–14, 118, 140, 171, 178, 227–8, 230–33,
Gregory, R. 442 235–41, 367, 369–72, 374
Greiner, N. 338 individualism 11–12, 437
grooming 206–7, 212 Indonesia 176, 178, 180, 182, 279, 367, 369–70
Guarderia ABC case 278–9 infiltration 80–81, 90, 119
Guzmán, J. ‘El Chapo’ 281 informal payments 115–16, 118, 121–3, 276
Infrastructure Transparency Initiative 110
Haberfeld, M. R. 187 insider trading 390, 410
Habibov, N. 248 institutional change 31–2, 37, 276, 282–3, 426
hactivism 11 institutional corruption 62, 83, 119, 247–9, 409,
Hazare, A. 239 421–30, 468
health systems 1, 4, 12–13, 63, 98–101, 103, 106, institutional integrity 18–19, 331–3, 336, 339,
108–9, 115–25, 129, 203, 246–8, 275, 391, 342, 464, 467–9
399, 408–9, 421, 425–8 integrity management 453–6, 463, 470–73
Hearn, R. G. 92 integrity systems 101, 187, 335, 386, 401–2,
Hedge, S. 232 449–59, 463–4, 474–5
Heide, M. 29 integrity violations 116, 378–81, 386, 435, 438,
Heidenheimer, A. J. 145, 147 444, 449–53, 455–6, 458–9, 465, 473
Hernadi, Z. 348 interest groups 174, 176, 381, 423–4
Heywood, P. M. 140, 466 International Aid Transparency Initiative 393
Hicken, A. 264 International Civil Aviation Organization 101,
higher education 131, 133–4, 317–18, 395 109
Hirschi, T. 437–8, 442 International Maritime Organization 101, 109
Hirschman, A. 470 International Monetary Fund 2, 105, 153, 231,
history 51–3, 56, 58, 60–61, 63, 81, 132, 211, 393
218, 227, 243, 263, 274, 290, 298, 304, international organizations 29–30, 80, 98, 108–9,
312, 318, 331, 340–42, 454 135, 231, 251, 305–6
Hladkovskyi, O. 307 Interpol 182, 230
Hong Kong 12, 56, 64, 176, 178, 251–3, 367, intersubjectivity 53
369–71 Iraq 69, 202
Hood, C. 21, 45 Isham, J. 61
House, D. 11 Israel 92
Howlett, M. 30–31, 36 Italy 83, 90, 246, 281
Hrynevych, L. 318
Huang, R. 92 Jacobs, J. 443
Huberts, L. 379, 443, 465, 467–8 Japan 12, 14, 135, 176, 235, 310, 368–9
Hughes, P. 50 Jiba, N. 297
human resource management 6, 13, 23, 314–15, Jiwei, L. 15
396, 398 job security 19
human resources 31, 118–19, 144, 170 Johnson, B. 52
human rights 3, 6–7, 261, 294, 346, 467 Johnson, D. T. 139
human smuggling 82, 84, 217–18, 221, 280 Johnston, M. 43, 275, 282, 451–2
Hungary 220, 246 Johnstone, R. 335
Jonas, M. 289, 294, 300
IBAC 87–9
IBM 11 Kahan, D. M. 264
identity 44–5, 49–51, 264–7, 414, 416, 471–2 Kazakhstan 132–3, 135, 307
Igboin, B. O. 258 Kejwiral, A. 239
illegal activity 217, 331 Kenya 119
immigration 4, 12, 216, 221, 309, 470 Keohane, R. 469
implicit biases 407, 414–17 Kernaghan, K. 45
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Khan, M. 100 Lewis, T. 331

Khechumyan, A. 189 licenses 134, 217, 221, 231, 236, 311–12, 397–8,
kickbacks 5, 116, 120, 130, 193–7, 275, 390 434
Kim, P. S. 439 Liebert, S. 244
Kirby, N. 469 life course theories 441
Kirk, U. 416 Light, D. W. 425, 427
Klitgaard, R. 105 Lilley, P. 413
Klockars, C. B. 186–90 Ling J. 234
Klymenko, O. 313 LinkedIn 88
Knapp Commission 185 Listwan, S. J. 441
Knowles, J. J. 186 literacy 11, 19, 228, 232, 239–41
Kobrak, P. 423 Lithuania 83, 243–53
Kohlberg, L. 441 loans 34, 38, 68, 280, 349
Kolomoisky, I. 311 lobbying 72, 116, 156, 181, 314, 381, 396, 408–9,
Kolthoff, E. 441 411–12, 423–5
Korea 12, 56, 367, 369–70, 373, 398, 400 lock-in 73–4
Kosovo 400 Lumier Pharma 306
KPMG 1, 10, 13, 86, 408 Lunkes, R. J. 439
Kranton, R. 265 Lyrio, M. V. L. 439
Kravchenko, Y. 309
Kuchma, L. 311 Macaulay, M. 46–8, 50–51
Kudalor, J. 267 Machiavelli, N. 47, 70
Kurchenko, S. 313 MacIntyre, A. 47
Kurer, O. 147 Mackenroth, T. 337
Kutnjak Ivković, S. 186–9 MacLehose, M. 371
Kweon, Y. 394 Madagascar 119
Kyrgyzstan 122, 131–3 Madensen, T. D. 440
Madonsela, T. 295
Ladyshewsky, R. K. 441 Maersk 107
Lagunes, P. 92 Maesschalck, J. 456
Langan, P. A. 440 mafia see organized crime
Langton, L. 437 Mahbubani, K. 13
Lapuente, V. 3 maladministration 5–6
Lasthuizen, K. 452 Malaysia 176, 180, 369
Latvia 246, 248 Maldives 369
Lawton, A. 46–8 malfeasance 5, 123, 334, 339
Le, T. M. 2 Malta 246
Le Roux, M. 295–6 managerialism 47
leadership 5–6, 13, 16, 19, 23, 61, 101, 103, 105, Manning, P. 259
129–30, 143–4, 171, 211, 229, 234, 238, Mao Z. 228, 233
258–9, 261, 267, 293, 296–7, 299–301, Marčetić, G. 351, 354
317, 332, 337, 340, 366, 395, 400, 422, Marcus, B. 438
435, 443–4, 455–7, 467–8, 471–3 Mars, G. 218–19
values-driven 43–53 Martin, C. 186
Lee K. Y. 363, 372 Martocchia, S. 90
Lee M. B. 373 mass media 266
legislation 182, 227–8, 239, 241, 257, 347, 361, Masters, A. 5, 103, 435, 440–41
367–70, 373–4 Masters, C. 334
legitimacy 18, 21, 24, 60, 71, 227, 229, 255, 259, Matza, D. 440
298, 337, 370, 380, 400, 407, 421, 423, Mauritius 235
434, 464, 467, 469–71 Mbeki, T. 295
Lepore, W. 439 Mboweni, T. 300
Lessig, L. 421, 423–4, 426, 468 McKeown, C. L. 45
Levin, R. 292 Mdluli, R. 297
Levy, R. 333 Medicare 115
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Index 489
medicine 99, 109, 115–23, 131, 134, 176, 267, nepotism 4, 20, 106, 118, 139, 143–7, 157, 205,
306, see also pharmaceutical sector 216, 244, 274, 305, 336, 345, 390, 450–51,
Medicines Transparency Alliance 120 453
megacities 15–16 NEST model 182
Meng H. 230 Netherlands 83, 246, 377–87, 454–5, 459
mental health 88, 201 network corruption 382–3, 386–7
meritocracy 292, 395 neutralization theories 440
Merton, R. 437 New Public Governance 22–3
MeToo 452 New Public Management 5, 21, 23, 45, 244–5,
Mexican Peace Index 280 253, 407–9, 427, 470–71, 473
Mexico 62, 215, 220, 274–84 New Zealand 20, 45, 48–51, 178, 207, 246
Michener, G. 282 Newman, C. 341–3
middle classes 11, 13–14, 60 Ngcuka, A. B. 298
Middleton-Smith, R. 362 Nhema, G. 255
Milgram, S. 442 Nieto, P. 281, 283
Mills, C. W. 144 Niger 119
misconduct 5–6, 56, 131, 185–90, 206, 209, 211, Nigeria 43, 119, 269
266, 309, 337, 341, 364, 372, 377–8, 381, Nixon, R. 426
407, 423, 427, 429, 435, 441–2, 453, 465, Nkrumah, K. 260
473 non-existent employees see ghost workers
police 48, 186–9, 269, 331, 334 non-governmental organizations 37, 108,
sexual 51 110–11, 176, 180, 182, 231, 253, see also
Mitchell, J. 204 individual organizations
Mlambo, D. 296 Noone, G. P. 91
Modi, N. 235, 237, 239–41 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 108
Moldova 131, 307, 309 Nuttall, G. 342
Molina, A. D. 45
Mollen Commission 185 Obote, A. M. 261
money laundering 62, 82–3, 85, 177, 179–80, Obrador, M. A. L. 274
216, 275, 278–81, 283, 384, 390 Occupy Central 11–12
Mongolia 369 Ocheje, P. 269
Moore, G. E. 11 O’Connor, S. 43
Moore, M. 21, 44, 48 Odebrecht scandal 276
Morocco 179 OECD 99, 110, 115–16, 130–31, 134, 246, 251,
Morris, S. 276 275, 307, 393–4, 407, 409, 466
Moss, S. 91 Olden Group 306
motivation 394, 417 oligarchs 5, 275, 304–5, 308, 310–14, 452
Mugellini, G. 29 One Nation 341–2
Mulvaney, M. 52 Ong, P. B. 363
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 3, 6–7, 143, 282, 466 Open Data Barometer 397
Museveni, Y. 261, 267–8 Open Government Partnership 393
Musk, E. 17 Operation Fast and Furious 280
Mwenda, A. M. 261 Operation Heritage 88
Mwrebi, L. 297 Operation Hijacking 362, 371
Myanmar 107, 180, 369–70, 400 Operation Jungle Trade 85–6
Operation Newscaster 88
Nakrošis, V. 244–5 opportunity theories 440–41
Nam, T. 397–8 Opuku-Agyemang, K. 394
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 309 Orange Revolution 304
National Health Service 408–9, 426–8 Orbán, V. 70
National Prosecuting Authority 289–301 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
nationalism 14, 70, 293 Development see OECD
natural resources 18, 85, 175–9, 181, 275 Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Nel, G. 297 Europe 317
Nepal 176, 369 Organization of American States 275
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

organizational crime 434, 438–9, 441 anti-corruption 30, 32–40, 93, 222, 240, 252,
organizational integrity systems 449–59 283, 366, 414, 443
organized crime 80–94, 177, 185, 207, 215–17, design 67–8, 71–5
220, 274–84, 345–6, 383, 386, 435, 438, making 67–74, 104, 120, 177, 244, 407, 409,
442 411, 449–50
Orr, G. 333 tools 29–35, 37–40, 72
Osborne, D. 21–2 political will 57, 59, 99, 155, 180, 247, 251–3,
outlaw motorcycle gangs 81, 87–8, 207 284, 360, 363, 366–7, 369–70, 373–4,
outsourcing 4–5, 21, 310–11, 408, 417 400
overpricing 2, 4, 282 Polk, K. 86
Pollitt, C. 22
Pakistan 220, 369–70 pollution 174–6, 178, see also environmental
Palmen, D. 441 crime
Papua New Guinea 395–6 Pope, J. 139
Parker, G. 335 Poroshenko, P. 314
parochialism 450 Port of Rotterdam case 385–6
particularism 3, 139–49 Portugal 61
Patel, P. 411 Posner, R. 413
patronage 2, 4–5, 20, 62, 157, 244, 255, 263–4, poverty 134, 232, 256, 292, 390, 394, 413
274, 278, 289, 291, 300, 305, 345, 450–51, power shifts 10, 14–15, 18
453 Pratap, A. 236
peer pressure 6, 265, 268, 270, 442 press freedom 229–30, 275–6, 281
pension systems 12 Preston, N. S. C. 468
people smuggling see human smuggling PRIMED values 48–50
permits 4, 6, 39, 133, 175, 182, 231, 236, 247, principal/agent relationship 3–4, 262–3, 471
311–13, 397–8, 434 prisons 85–6, 185, 201–12, 219, 236, 259, 277–8,
personal information 80, 208–9, 310 283, 308, 347, 362, 367, 372–3, 384–5
personality theories 441 private sector 18, 20–21, 43, 80, 85, 89, 101, 119,
Persson, A. 3 123, 174, 227, 231, 252, 275, 285, 310,
petty corruption 58–9, 215–16, 219–20, 223, 246, 346, 364–5, 377–8, 380, 385, 398–402,
248, 265, 275, 281–2, 394, 422 408–12, 421, 424, 434, 449, 455–7, 471,
Pfiffner, J. P. 52 474
pharmaceutical sector 115–16, 119–24, 305–6, privatization 21, 23, 57, 236, 275, 304, 310–11,
409, 424, see also medicine 345, 348–9, 471
Pharmadis 306 problem-driven approach 98, 105–6
Phey Y. K. 372–3 procurement 2, 4–6, 34, 61, 72, 89–91, 93, 102–4,
Philippines 105, 176, 369–71 115–16, 119–24, 130, 155, 218, 252, 275,
Phones Against Corruption 395–6 282–3, 293, 295, 300, 305–8, 313–14, 318,
Pikoli, A. V. 298 345–6, 368, 379–81, 384, 396–8, 408, 435,
Pinchuk, V. 311 471
Piquero, N. L. 437 professional standards 129, 132, 135, 416, 418
Plato 129 prostitution 84, 280, 333
pluralism 11, 61, 142 protection money 5, 90
Poland 245 protectionism 13–15
police administration 186–7, 189–90, 195, 198, Pruitt, S. 179
256, 258–9, 261–2, 270 public administration 1–7
police corruption 48–50, 98, 109, 129, 185–98, global experiences in 390–403, see also
215, 222, 231, 257–61, 267–70, 309, individual countries
331–5, 361–4, 371–2, 377, 434 paradigms across time 19–23
police integrity 185–98, 434 trends and drivers of 10–24
police misconduct 48, 186–9, 269, 331, 334 virtue and morality in 43–53
police reforms 258, 260–61, 267–9, 310 public confidence 90, 297–8, 354, 413, 417, 421,
police services 255–70 469
policy public integrity 63, 243, 246, 463–75
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Index 491
public interest 18, 48, 67–70, 72, 124, 157, 175, Rose, J. 466
181, 378, 391, 394, 406, 411, 415, 417, Rothstein, B. 103, 466
422, 424–8, 451–5, 471 Rotondi, V. 147
public management 15, 18, 44, 48, 386, 468, routine activity theory 440–41
470–71, 473–4 Rowe, E. 90
public opinion 36, 142, 243, 247, 253, 266, 339, Rowe, M. 48
466 Rudd, K. 338–9
public perception 92, 145–6, 243, 247–52, 366, rule of law 1, 7, 60, 63, 107, 156, 230, 234, 237,
372 263, 284, 293, 295–8, 316, 318, 348
public sector 4, 10–11, 13–15, 17, 19–24, 43, Rumsfeld, D. 69
45, 61, 80–83, 86–90, 93–4, 101, 118, Russell, N. 442
130–32, 140–42, 147, 227, 230–31, 234, Russia 12–14, 179, 219, 244, 279, 416
237, 244–5, 249, 252–3, 258, 265, 267, Rutgers, M. 44
274–84, 295, 313, 316, 318, 333, 338–41, Rwanda 56, 340
347, 350, 354–5, 364–5, 377–80, 391–403, Ryan, P. 185
409, 412, 415–16, 422, 427, 434, 439, 449,
456, 459, 466 Sakvarelidze, D. 315
excellence 391–2, 394, 401 Sambiaga, R. 265
reform 391–2, 394 Sanader, I. 198, 348–51
Public Sector Management Commission 338–9 Santoro, S. 340
public servants 3, 10–12, 16–20, 22–4, Sarican, B. 2
47–8, 50, 90, 145, 175, 185, 229, Sauerman, A. 189
247, 270, 276, 280–81, 283, 289–90, Schonteich, M. 297
292, 300, 304, 308, 331–2, 340, 342, Schreurs, T. 384–5
350–56, 378, 394, 415, 435, 444, 467, Schuler, H. 438
470–71 see also civil servants Scott, D. 208
public services 21, 34, 245, 255, 262, 277, 308, Scott, R. 50–51
350, 356, 363, 391–3, 396–7, 408–9, Sea Shepherd 181
425–7, 471 sectors 98–111
public values 18, 43–5, 48, 50, 53, 466 self-control 438, 442, 471–2
public–private partnerships 236 self-interest 60, 67, 69–70, 145, 174, 293, 415,
purchasing power parity 14, 83 421
self-regulation 406–7, 412, 414–17
race 129, 203, 210, 290, 414 Sell, Y. 17
Raffles, S. 361 Selznick, P. 468
Rajh, E. 89 Semerak, O. 312
Ramaphosa, C. 289, 297, 299 Sen, A. 125
Ransley, J. 333, 335 Senegal 119
rational choice theory 442 Serbia 131
Rawlings, J. J. 261 Serpico, F. 185
reform movement 56–64 sex work 84, 86, 280, 333
Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative 345 Shkrebko, T. 313
regulatory capture 72, 178, 181, 305, 399, 410 Shokin, V. 314
rent seeking 2–3, 67, 158, 164, 170, 289 Sidebottom, A. 90
Renwick, R. 297 Simon, D. 179
resource curse 85 Singapore 56, 64, 180, 235, 360–74, 393
revolving door 117, 409–12, 416–17 Singh, M. 237
Rhodes, R. 19 Singh, V. K. 239
risk assessment 32, 89, 93, 167, 399–400 Sissener, T. 452
risk factors 80, 86–9, 91, 167, 210, 219 Slapper, G. 439
risk management 399–400 Slingerland, W. 454
risk mapping 153–72 Slonskaya, M. S. 231–2
Roermond case 383–5 Slovenia 83
Romania 246, 248 smartphones 11
Romero Deschamps, C. 277 Smith, K. 340
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Smith, R. G. 81, 90 Teh C. W. 373

Snipes, J. 437 Ten C. W. 364
social learning theory 441 Teorell, J. 466
social media 10–12, 19, 49, 52, 68, 88, 93, 132, terrorism 82, 215, 280
210, 220, 385 Terry, L. D. 19, 468
social networks 61, 63, 145, 221, 264–6, 381–3 Thailand 84, 86, 176, 180, 369
social norms 71, 144, 220, 264–6, 270, 438 Theobald, R. 276
socialization 148–9 Thomas, P. J. 233
Solomon, D. 336–7 Thompson, D. 421, 423–4, 426
South Africa 13–14, 178, 189, 198, 289–301, 333 three-actor model 262
Soviet Union 244, 249, 252, 304 Tibet 176
Spain 61, 83, 246 Timor-Leste 180–81, 369
Spicer, S. 52 tobacco 71, 82, 84–5, 107, 116, 216, 222, 312
Sri Lanka 369 Togo 119
Stanca, L. 147 Tombs, S. 439
Stanford Prison Experiment 201 Tomison, A. 90
Stark, A. 406–7, 413 Tonry, M. 440
state capture 62, 81, 289, 294–5, 297, 299–300, Torgler, B. 87
410 tourism 100–101, 110
state functions 310–12 trade unions 61, 277–8, 372
state-owned enterprises 2, 311 trading in influence 29, 347, 380–82, 390
Stavytsky, E. 312 transparency 6–7, 11, 37, 43, 56–8, 70, 72, 89,
Stevenson-Yang, A. 230 94, 98, 106–7, 117–21, 123–4, 130, 154–5,
Stiglitz, J. 13 170–71, 230, 234, 238, 243, 245–7, 252–3,
strain theory 437, 441 274–5, 282–4, 305, 307, 311, 315–16,
Sturgess, G. 338 318, 336–7, 339, 346, 355, 391–3, 395–8,
subsidies 2, 68 401–2, 407, 412, 439, 469, 473–4
Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. 416 Transparency International 43, 84–5, 103, 115,
Sundell, A. 262 231, 241, 245, 252–3, 276, 422, 474
Sustainable Development Goals 115, 391–3, 397, Corruption Perception Index 56–7, 106, 191,
401–2 227, 243, 245, 249, 256, 274, 345,
Sutherland, E. 436–7 360, 374, 377
Sweden 360, 393 Defence and Security programme 110–11
Switzerland 360 Global Corruption Barometer 153, 248, 276,
Sykes, G. M. 205, 208, 440 304, 308, 371, 391
National Integrity System 401–2
‘t Hart, P. 20 trends 5, 10–24, 231, 243, 245, 252, 391, 407,
Taiwan 56, 367–70 409, 417
Tajikistan 172 Trump, D. 51–2, 70, 179
Taliani, E. T. C. 439 Turkey 172
Tan K. G. 373 Turkmenistan 307
Tangri, R. 261 Twitter 52, 88
Tanzania 119, 265 Tymoshenko, Y. 306
Tanzi, V. 153 typology 10, 29–30, 32, 38–40, 99, 103–6, 189,
TASP framework 4, 62 217, 434, 452–3
Tassal 180
tax administration 2, 4, 153–72 Uganda 119, 179, 255–70
tax appeals 158, 164–70 Ukraine 52, 108, 124, 219–20, 304–18
tax audits 157, 161, 163–8, 170 United Kingdom 20, 43, 45, 51–2, 84, 99, 124,
tax evasion 156, 171–2, 180, 268, 313–14, 437 135, 185, 202–3, 205–6, 209, 211–12, 235,
tax refunds 160, 171–2, 217, 221 294, 310, 371, 407–8, 411–13, 425–7, 440
tax returns 158, 161–2, 172 United Nations 1, 81–2, 109, 118, 251, 316, 340,
taxation 2, 101, 130, 154–7, 165–6, 170, 175, 384 381, 469
value-added tax 160, 171–2, 217, 221 Convention Against Corruption 29, 80, 251,
Taylor, F. W. 20 275, 368, 380, 390, 393
Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Index 493
Convention Against Transnational Organized war-profiteering 345

Crime 80 Warren, M. 58
Development Programme 124, 306, 316–17, watchdogs 5, 60, 101, 230, 282, 354, 369–71,
390–91, 394–5, 403 374, 474
Habitat 109 Water Governance Initiative 110–11
Office on Drugs and Crime 81–2, 90–91, Watergate Scandal 426
182, 191, 381 Watkins, S. 426
Sustainable Development Goals 115, 391–3, Weber, M. 20–21, 263, 452
397, 401–2 Wee T. B. 373
UNDESA 399–400 Wei M. 230
UNESCO 109 Weick, K. E. 105
UNICEF 306 Wellington, P. 341
United States 5, 12–15, 20, 51, 53, 61, 69, 72, 81, whistleblowing 6, 36, 39, 72, 107, 124, 181–2,
88, 92, 115, 117, 124, 179, 185, 204, 215, 211, 223, 300, 347–8, 421–30, 473
221, 235, 274, 279–80, 282, 310, 315, 379, White, T. 204
406–7, 412–14, 423, 437–8, 440 white-collar crime 241, 345, 348, 434, 437–40,
universities 131–5, 402, see also higher education 443
urbanization 15–16 Whitrod, R. 333
Uruguay 56 Wild, L. 413
USAID 103, 317, 394 wildlife trafficking 85–6, 174, 176–7, 179–80
Uzbekistan 307 Wilson, W. 20
Wood Royal Commission 185
Valev, N. T. 87 World Bank 1, 7, 154, 231, 240, 305, 315, 360,
value-added tax 160, 171–2, 217, 221 374
van de Blunt, H. G. 439 World Customs Organization 101, 109
Van den Heuvel, H. 379 World Economic Forum 1, 390
Van der Steen, M. 23 World Health Organization 98, 101, 103, 109,
van Dijk, J. 80–81 115, 117, 120, 124
van Halderen, R. C. 443–4 World Values Survey 87
Van Pol, P. 384–5 World Wildlife Fund 180
Van Rey, J. 383–5 wrongdoing 156, 381, 421–30
Van Wart, M. 45 Wyatt, T. 179
Vargas-Hernández, J. G. 29
Varraich, A. 103 Xi J. 227, 229–30, 233–4, 238, 240–41
Venebles, J. 209
Venezuela 276 Yanukovych, V. 304, 308, 313
victimization 5, 178, 210 Yates, A. 146
Vielmetter, G. 17 Yeo, E. 372
Vietnam 84, 176, 178, 369–70, 400 Yushchenko, V. 304
Villeneuve, J. P. 29
violence 62, 82, 85, 201–3, 210, 212, 274, Zambia 121, 171, 267
280–81, 284, 304, 309, 333, 385, 434 Zamir, E. 416
Virtanen, T. 48 Zelensky, V. 310, 315
virtues 43–53, 58–9, 142, 451, 467 zero tolerance approaches 58–9, 171, 247, 268,
as ethical competence 47–8 393, 402
Vittal, N. 371 Zhang, Y. 29
vote-buying 68, 264, 279, 368 Zhao Z. 230
VUCA operating environment 10 Zimbardo, P. 201–3, 208, 445
Vukojičić-Tomić, T. 354 Zimmerman, M. E. 86
Zimring, F. E. 139
War on Drugs 279 Zondo, R. 295–6
Ware, G. T. 91 Zondo Commission 295–6, 299–300
warlords 5 Zuma, J. 289, 291, 293–7, 299, 301
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Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

1 Corruption and public administration 1

PART I PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ITS VULNERABILITIES

2 Trends and drivers of public administration in the twenty-first century 10

3 Typologies of anti-corruption frameworks 29

4 Virtue and morality in public administration: values-driven leadership in

5 Anti-corruption and its discontents: reforming reform 56

6 Dealing with the dark side of policy-making: corruption, malfeasance

7 Corruption of public officials by organised crime: understanding the

PART II CORRUPTION IN SECTORS

8 Redefining sectors: a more focussed approach to tackling corruption 98

10 Corruption in the education sector 129

11 Corruption and administration in local government 139

12 Curbing corruption in tax administration with enhanced risk mapping of

13 Corruption and administration in environmental protection 174

14 Studying police integrity 185

15 Prison corruption: an ecological framework 201

16 Corruption in border administration 215

PART III CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD

17 Features of corruption and anti-corruption work in China and India 227

18 Corruption in Lithuania: between institutions and perceptions 243

19 Public administration and corruption: a comparative case study of the

20 Corruption, organized crime and the public sector in Mexico 274

21 Public administration and integrity in South Africa: the case of the

22 Corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration in Ukraine 304

23 Catharsis and reform: an Australian example of building institutional

24 Corruption and ethics in public administration in Croatia 345

25 Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe: lessons for other countries 360

26 The Netherlands: an impression of corruption in a less corrupt country 377

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

PART IV RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

27 What works: global experiences in public administration 390

28 Regulating conflicts of interest in public office 406

29 Whistleblowers counteracting institutional corruption in public administration 421

30 Criminological responses to corruption 434

31 Building ethical organisations: the importance of organisational integrity

32 From anti-corruption to building integrity 463

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

COSTS AND HARMS OF CORRUPTION

●● In state-owned companies (and obviously in general services) corrupt bureaucrats negoti-

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

NOT ALL CORRUPTION IS THE SAME

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Table 1.1 Corruption in different dispositions (TASP)

Type Activities Sectors Places

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

●● delivery of services to the public;

●● First Line: A culture of integrity underpins everything we do.

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

Adam Graycar - 9781789900910

GLOBAL TRENDS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1 Corruption and public administration 1

2 Trends and drivers of public administration in the twenty-first century 10

3 Typologies of anti-corruption frameworks 29

5 Anti-corruption and its discontents: reforming reform 56

8 Redefining sectors: a more focussed approach to tackling corruption 98

10 Corruption in the education sector 129

11 Corruption and administration in local government 139

13 Corruption and administration in environmental protection 174

14 Studying police integrity 185

15 Prison corruption: an ecological framework 201

16 Corruption in border administration 215

17 Features of corruption and anti-corruption work in China and India 227

18 Corruption in Lithuania: between institutions and perceptions 243

20 Corruption, organized crime and the public sector in Mexico 274

22 Corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration in Ukraine 304

24 Corruption and ethics in public administration in Croatia 345

25 Singapore’s effective anti-corruption recipe: lessons for other countries 360

26 The Netherlands: an impression of corruption in a less corrupt country 377

27 What works: global experiences in public administration 390

28 Regulating conflicts of interest in public office 406

29 Whistleblowers counteracting institutional corruption in public administration 421

30 Criminological responses to corruption 434

32 From anti-corruption to building integrity 463