ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO, Respondents. Concepcion, J: Facts: Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made the following disposition: Victorino executed a will, with all formalities required by law, wherein he made the following bequests: Ernesto Guevarra (son) – gold ring, furniture, pictures, statues, religious objects Rosario Guevarra – a pair of earrings Candida Guevarra (step daughter) – a pair of earrings and gold chain Pio Guevarra (step son) - ring Angustia Posadas (second wife) – various pieces of jewelry He also made the following devise: Rosario, Ernesto, Vicencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida and Pio – 960 sq. m residential lot in Pangasinan with its improvement Angustia Posadas – he confirmed the donation propter nuptias of 25 ha. of a 259 ha.parcel of land (large parcel of land); additional 5 ha. of the same parcel of land. Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond. On July 12, 1933, Victorino executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto, whereby Victorino conveyed to Ernesto the southern half of the large parcel of land, in consideration of P1 and other valuable considerations (e.g payment of all his debts and obligataions, his maintenance up to his death, and expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses). A title to the said lot was issued in the name of Ernesto. September 27, 1933 – Victorino died. However, his last will and testament was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. There was no record on whether the legatees received their respective legacies. But, it was known that Ernesto possessed the adjudicated land and had disposed of portions thereof to pay off debts left by his father. On the other hand, Rosario, who was in custody of her father’s last will and testament, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made in her favor. However, four years after her father’s death, Rosario commenced an action against Ernesto to recover from the latter what she claims to be her strict legitime as an acknowledged daughter of the deceased (i.e a portion of the large parcel of land). It was only during the trial that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated, but to prove that Victorino had acknowledges her as his natural daughter. In claiming her share of inheritance from Ernesto, her theory was that Victorino died intestate. She claimed that she was acknowledged as a natural daughter, and because Victorino’s will was not probated, the assumption is that he died intestate. Hence, the betterment (the sale?) made by the testator in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded. Trial court and CA ruled in favor of Rosario. Issue: 1. Whether or not the procedure adopted by Rosario was proper. Held: No – The procedure adopted by Rosario was in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. Presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts arid the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others. In other words, even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. o Nothing shows that the legatees had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. o Their rights under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian (Rosario) of the will to present it to the court for probate. o Ernesto, who was named executor in the said will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because according to him, the said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, Petitioners, vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR
Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, at January Term, 1832, Delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the Case of Samuel A. Worcester, Plaintiff in Error, versus the State of Georgia
With a Statement of the Case, Extracted from the Records of the Supreme Court of the United States
American Transport Lines, Inc. v. Jorge Wrves, Maria Wrves, Miami General Supply, Inc., Anauco Corp., Occidental Fragrances Corp., Imex, Usa, Inc., 985 F.2d 1065, 11th Cir. (1993)