VOL. 74, No.

5 NOVEMBER 1970

Psychological Bulletin
BARGAINING AND RECIPROCITY*
CHARLAN NEMETH 2
University of Chicago

Numerous studies in the area of bargaining have attempted to raise the usual
low level of cooperation between players by programming one person's play
as cooperative. Implicit in the design of such studies is a notion of reciprocity,
namely, that subjects will feel obligated to return benefits. The failure of such
attempts to raise the level of cooperation suggests an apparent contradiction
between the norm of reciprocity, which is postulated as a universal norm, and
findings of the bargaining studies which show little or no reciprocity. The
present paper attempts to resolve such a contradiction by addressing itself
to several variables intrinsic to the particular paradigm used in the bargaining
studies. A selective review of the two literatures suggests that such variables
intrinsic to the paradigms all operate in such a way as to inhibit a norm of
reciprocity, and indeed help giving in general. Thus it is concluded that the
lack of reciprocity typically found in bargaining games is not because reciproc-
ity is inoperative, but is rather due to the paradigms normally employed for
the study of cooperation and competition.

Players observed in bargaining studies, par-
ticularly those employing variations of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, often are remark-
ably uncooperative toward their partners. This
low level of cooperation is surprising both
from the point of view of maximization of
gain, and from theorizing in the area of reci-
procity. In a typical Prisoner's Dilemma game
as depicted in Figure 1, outcomes for each
person depend on the joint play of the two
participants. If both players play C, termed
the cooperative choice, each receives 3 points.
A D choice by one and a C choice by the
other results in 4 points for the one who
played D and no points for the one who
played C. A joint D choice results in 1 point
for each. A short-term (i.e., one trial) strategy
for each person would be to play D since the
expected outcome is greater. However, if both
play in such a fashion, each will win only 1
point, which is obviously less than the 3-
point outcome accruing from a joint C choice,
l
The preparation of this paper was supported by
grant GS-1378 from the National Science Foundation
to Leonard Berkowitz.
2
Requests for reprints should be sent to Charlan
Nemeth, University of Chicago, Department of Psy-
chology, Chicago, Illinois 60637.
297
© 1970 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
which should be the long-range strategy. Thus
one would expect that subjects, over a period
of time, would realize that cooperation is the
best way to maximize their gains. One would
further expect that subjects would utilize the
cooperative strategy since they may well as-
sume that cooperation on their part will be
reciprocated by their partners. Such an as-
sumption could be partly based on an implicit
recognition of a norm of reciprocity. This
social ideal, postulated by Gouldner (1960),
as a universal norm, prescribes that people
should reciprocate for benefits received or
anticipated. Thus one would expect that sub-
jects would both initiate and reciprocate co-
operation, the result being a high level of
mutual cooperation. This expectation of mu-
tual cooperation, however, is strikingly dif-
ferent from the results usually obtained in
bargaining studies, since subjects generally
cooperate on approximately one-third of the
trials.
It is possible of course that subjects may
initially operate on the basis of short-term
strategy which means exploiting their part-
ners. If even one player, whom we will call
Player A, initially uses such a short-term
298 CHARLAN NEMETH

strategy, this may have the effect of engender-
ing distrust and may culminate in a "tit for
tat" strategy by Person B—a strategy which
also lessens the losses for Person B if Person
A continues to play in a noncooperative fash-
ion. Such initial play could account for the
lack of cooperation typically found in the
literature, and the norm of reciprocity may
not be applicable since subjects are not pro-
viding benefits for one another.
Player II
C D
C 3,3 0, 4
Player I
D 4,0 1, 1
FIG. 1. Format of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game.
If, however, Person A initially cooperates,
the reciprocity literature would lead one to
predict that Person B would feel obligated to
return such benefits and joint cooperation
would then ensue. On the basis of such the-
orizing, numerous studies in the Prisoner's
Dilemma literature have programmed one
person's plays as cooperative, thus predicting
a rise in the partner's level of cooperation over
the usual one-third level obtained when sub-
jects are left to their own strategies. As Table
1 shows, however, such programmed coopera-
tion does not generally lead to a higher per-
centage of cooperation by the partner. In fact
the partner shows essentially the same level of
cooperation, that is, approximately one-third,
whether he is playing against a very coopera-
tive or a very uncooperative person.
Such studies in the bargaining literature
suggest a basic contradiction with the research
on reciprocity. Since the norm of reciprocity
is assumed to be a universal norm, it should
also be operative in bargaining situations
where one player is repeatedly providing bene-
fits for the other by cooperating—which is the
case in the programmed cooperation studies.
As stated earlier, however, findings do not
support such a contention. One possibility of
course is that such studies with variations of
the Prisoner's Dilemma demonstrate a limita-
tion on the operation of the norm of reciproc-
ity, that is, such a norm is totally inoperative

TABLE 1
RECIPROCITY OF COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Percentage of cooperation by Percentage11 of

Authors and date programmed partner cooperation by
subject

Bixenstine & Wilson (1963) 95 29.2

5 21.8
Sequence: 95, 50, 5, 5, 50, 95 34.4
Sequence: 5, 50,95, 95, 50, 5 24.5
Bixenstine, Potash, & Wilson (1963) 83 33.2
17 29.2
Sermat (1964)
Experiment I 20 33
40 44
60 42
80 42
Experiment III 100 30
0 58
Swingle & Gillis (1968) 95 30
(unspecified relationship condition) 5 10
Swingle & Coady (1967) 100 32.9
0 28.3
Oskamp & Perlman (1965) 100 54
Scodel (1962) 100 42
(first 10 trials only) 0 34
McClintock, Harrison, Strand, & Gallo (1963) 85 35.7
50 40.8
15 37.6

« Percentages are roughly calculated from graphs In many of the studies.

 BARGAINING AND RECIPROCITY
in such bargaining situations. It may be that
subjects are motivated to "win" or to "beat"
the other person and do not thereby feel
themselves obligated to return benefits as they
normally would in social interaction. Another
possibility, which is the one favored by this
paper, is that there are potent variables in-
trinsic to the typical bargaining paradigm
which tend to inhibit the norm of reciprocity.
The second of the preceding possibilities
seems more likely since some studies such as
Pruitt (1968) do find reciprocity in a mixed-
motive game situation, and, more importantly,
subjects in the Pruitt study actually stated
that they were responding to the level of giv-
ing of their partner. Thus, one can assume that
reciprocity is not inoperative in bargaining
games, which tends to refute the first possibil-
ity mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Further, Pruitt's study differs in significantly
important ways from the usual Prisoner's Di-
lemma type of bargaining situation. For ex-
ample, the type of choice is different; subjects
are not instructed in the usual way to "win,"
and players play for real money. Such a find-
ing suggests that analysis from the point of
view of the second possibility stated (i.e., the
variables intrinsic to the bargaining paradigms
employed), may be more fruitful. This is the
purpose of the present paper. It is an attempt
to resolve the apparent contradiction between
the areas of reciprocity and the Prisoner's
Dilemma types of bargaining situations with
the second of the aforementioned possibilities
as its starting point. The present paper takes
the position that the norm of reciprocity is
not inoperative in the bargaining situations,
and that the lack of reciprocity typically
found is a result of variables intrinsic to the
paradigm usually employed. Six variables in-
trinsic to such games are singled out for atten-
tion and include contrient interdependence be-
tween subjects, the instructions typically used
in these studies, the lack of monetary incen-
tive, the anonymity of the players, the am-
biguity of a player's motives on the basis of
his choices, and the absence of communication
between players. Typically, subjects in these
situations are in a position of contrient inter-
dependence with their partners, that is, they
have partially conflicting goals. They are given
299
individualistic instructions to play a matrix
game for imaginary money against a person
whom they do not know and whose motives
are ambiguous. Further, they are not allowed
to communicate. The available evidence, re-
viewed in this paper, indicates that such varia-
bles act in opposition to the norm of reciproc-
ity as well as help giving in general. By selec-
tively reviewing the two areas on the basis of
the preceding theoretical assumptions, it is
hoped that each of the two areas will be clari-
fied, and a resolution of the apparent contra-
diction between the two areas will be achieved.
Cantrient Interdependence and Partner's
Power Over Subject
One speculated reason for the lack of coop-
eration in the Prisoner Dilemma type of bar-
gaining situations is that the two players are
completely interdependent and, to some ex-
tent, contriently interdependent, to use
Deutsch's (1949) term. One aspect of such
interdependence is that subjects indepen-
dently have little control over the outcomes of
their plays. The outcomes are determined by
the joint plays of the two players. To the
extent that the subject cannot be certain of
the outcomes of his actions, either for himself
or for the other person, he may be less in-
clined to act cooperatively out of a desire to
help or to return benefits to another person.
This may be one reason why decomposed
games such as those used by Evans and Crum-
baugh (1966) and Pruitt (1968) result in
higher mutual cooperation than ordinarily
found with the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In
the Evans and Crumbaugh study, for example,
the resulting payoffs of the decomposed matrix
A. Matrix presentation
Plaver P
C D
C 3,3 4,0
Player S
D 0,4
B. Nonmatrix presentation
"Give me 1"
versus
"Give him 3"
FIG. 2. Paradigm used by Evans and Crumbaugh,
1966. (Copyright by the American Psychological
Association.)
300 CHARLAN
are identical to the Prisoner's Dilemma, but
subjects choose "give him 3" or "give me 1"
rather than C or D. A matched "give him 3"
results in 3 points for each, which is the same
outcome as a matched C choice. "Give him 3"
by Player A and "give me 1" by Player B
results in 4 points for Player B and nothing
for Player A, which is the same outcome as a
play of C by Player A and a play of D by
Player B. A joint "give me 1" play accords 1
point to each, as does a joint D choice. Yet,
comparison of the two formats shows higher
cooperation by subjects playing the decom-
posed matrix form. It appears likely that sub-
jects, in specifying points, may feel they have
more control over the outcomes. "Give him 3"
appears to specify a reward more than a choice
of C. To the extent that the rise in coopera-
tion in the decomposed form is at least par-
tially due to the perception of increased con-
trol over outcomes and the ability to specify
a reward, it is possible that subjects in the
usual Prisoner's Dilemma form are less likely
to initiate or return cooperation because they
do not perceive control over the outcomes.
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding
outcomes, the interdependence of the players
in a Prisoner's Dilemma game further means
that the subject may in fact be hurting him-
self in an attempt to cooperate or return bene-
fits. If the partner plays D in conjunction
with the subject's play of C, the subject will
receive the lowest outcome possible. Recent
theorizing in the help-giving area (Berkowitz,
1970; Darley & Latane, 1968) has stressed
the importance of cost to the individual who
considers helping another. Presumably, fears
of future costs, for instance, time and money,
inhibit the feelings of responsibility toward
another.
Another aspect of the interdependence
found in the Prisoner's Dilemma game is that
the other has some power over the subject. In
such a situation, it may be that the interde-
P in Absolute Power 1 P in Absolute Power 2
C D C D
C 30, 30 -30, 30 30, 30
D 20,30 -10,30 20,30
FIG. 3. Matrices used by Solomon, 1960. (Copyright by the American Psychological Association.)
NEMETH
pendence causes the subject to fixate on his
partner's power over him, and/or his threat,
rather than his partner's dependency and need
for help. Assuming for a moment that the
contrient interdependence in the Prisoner's
Dilemma game carries implications of power
threat, subjects perceiving this may become
less cooperative. Several experiments in the
bargaining literature indicate that increases in
power lead to decreases in cooperation, a find-
ing suggesting that the presence of power in
the typical Prisoner's Dilemma game is an im-
portant variable decreasing the level of coop-
eration. In one study, Solomon (1960) uti-
lized three matrices which gave either abso-
lute or partial power to the partner (P). Ab-
solute Power 2 differs from Absolute Power
1 in that the partner is given greater gains
for noncooperation in the former situation.
The partner in the Absolute Power 2 condition
receives 40 points for playing D as compared to
30 points in the Absolute Power 1 condition.
Thus, the partner in the Absolute Power 2
condition has more to gain by not cooperating.
The Partial Power condition differs from the
other two in that retaliation on the part of the
subject is possible. In the Absolute Power
conditions, the subject cannot help or hurt
the partner; the partner is certain of his own
outcomes on the basis of his own decision. In
the Partial Power condition, however, the sub-
ject can help or hurt; his choice joins with the
partner's choice in determining the outcomes
for both. Findings indicate that subjects were
more cooperative toward a partner in the
Absolute Power 1 condition than toward a
partner with Absolute Power 2. Presumably,
the subjects were less likely to trust a part-
ner, or expected a partner to play noncoop-
eratively, since it was to his advantage to do
so. More important for the purposes of power
per se, however, is the finding that there was
more cooperation toward a partially powerful
partner than toward the Absolute Power 2
Partial Power
C D
-30, 40 30, 30 -30, 40
-10,40 20, 10 - 10, 20
 BARGAINING AND RECIPROCITY
partner. One might conclude from this that
the existence of greater power on the part of
the partner leads to suspicion of him and/or
resentment toward him. The result is increased
defensive or noncooperative playing even when
the other has been highly cooperative. A
further possibility is that the other person's
absolute power lessens the likelihood of per-
ceiving him as dependent on the subject. This
may reduce the probability of either a social
responsibility norm being invoked since the
subjects, even if motivated to return benefits,
do not feel they are in a position to do so.
Other observations supporting such a con-
tention have been reported by Mulder, Van
Dijk, Stelwage, Verhagen, Soutendijk, and
Zwezerijnen (1966). Their findings point to a
paradox of power which the authors explain
as follows: In "conditions in which it is un-
profitable . . . to do so (that is when O's
[observer's] power is large . . . in relation to
the subject's power) that the subject tends to
manifest resistance against 0 [p. 36]."
Schellenberg (196S) offered further evi-
dence in an experiment where partner's out-
comes were double those of the subject.
Schellenberg found 22.5% cooperation with a
partner whose payoffs were doubled and 32%
cooperation to a partner of equal power.
These findings again point to the conclusion
that subjects are more cooperative when the
partner's power is small relative to their own
and corroborates the notion that the presence
of power by virtue of the subjects' interde-
pendence may be an inhibiting factor for help
giving and reciprocity of cooperation.
Instructions
Another reason for the lack of cooperation
and reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma
game may be that subjects want to do better
than their partners because of the instruc-
tional set given them. In most of these studies,
subjects are explicitly told to consider their
own welfare only. In giving such individual-
istic instructions, the experimenter may be
implicitly fostering competition with the other
person. As Becker and McClintock (1967)
pointed out, instructions can define what is
rational in providing rules of the game. Thus,
while subjects are not acting "rationally" on
301
Partner's payoff Equal
doubled power
C D C D
C 3,6 0, 10 3,3 0,5
Player S
D 5,0 1, 2 5,0 1,1
FIG. 4. Matrices used by Schellenberg, 1965. (Re-
produced with permission from an article by J. A.
Schellenberg published in Sodomelry, 1965, Vol. 28.
Copyright by the American Sociological Association.)
the basis of utilities by competing, they may
be acting rationally according to the rules
defined by the experimenter. In most of the
studies, the experimenter makes salient a
strategy of winning and further suggests that
the subject not take into account the welfare
of the other player. Thus, even if a subject
felt obligated to cooperate on the basis of
reciprocity, he might not do so since it would
defy the rules of the game as set out by the
experimenter.
In support of such a contention, Deutsch's
(1958) study varied the introductory set by
providing some subjects with cooperative in-
structions (the subject was to consider the
welfare of both himself and the partner),
others with individualistic instructions (the
subject was to consider the welfare of him-
self only), while still others were given
competitive instructions (the subject was
to consider the welfare of himself and de-
feat the other). Curves showing percentage
of cooperation over blocks of trials had nearly
equal slopes with cooperatively set subjects
being significantly more cooperative than
either individualistically or competitively set
subjects. The latter two conditions did not
differ significantly from one another. Such a
finding has been corroborated by Kanouse and
Wiest (1967). An instructional set emphasiz-
ing how well the subject and his partner could
function as a cooperative team led to signifi-
cantly more cooperation than did a set empha-
sizing how well the subject could do for him-
self. Cooperatively set subjects cooperated on
67.3% of the trials while individualistically
set subjects cooperated on only 37.3% of the
trials.
In a second experiment by Deutsch (19S8),
sequential moves were allowed. In this situa-
tion, subjects played second and the number
302 CHARLAN NEMETf!

of "double-crosses" was recorded, that is, Thus, when subjects receive cooperation from
where the subject played D in response to their partner, the concern over their own out-
partner's play of C. Cooperatively set subjects comes fostered by the instructional set may
double-crossed their partner 10% of the time, override any consideration of returning favors
individually set subjects, 71%, and competi- or even, as the Brehm and Cole study sug-
tively set subjects, 75%. Clearly, subjects in gested, make them even less cooperative.
Deutsch's experiments who were given indi-
vidualistic instructions felt that double-cross- Magnitude of Incentive for Cooperation
ing was appropriate. Looking out for oneself Another variable affecting cooperation
at the expense of the other was probably which has been suggested by several experi-
regarded as being in accord with the rules of menters is that subjects are not motivated to
the game. Similar findings of the effect of compete in these bargaining games since they
cooperative versus competitive instructions typically play for imaginary money or points
have also been obtained by Crawford and rather than for real money. The Gallo (1966)
Sidowski (1964). In their situation, subjects study, replicating the Deutsch and Krauss
were allowed to give or take away points. The (1960) bargaining experiment, offers evidence
findings show that cooperatively set subjects that subjects are more cooperative when real
gave away more points to their partners. On money as opposed to imaginary money is used,
the basis of these findings, one can conclude despite the threat arising from the presence of
that the individualistic set given to subjects barriers toward the players' goal attainment.
in the usual bargaining games is one more Thus, it appears that the possibility of gain-
variable that fosters competition rather than ing actual money was an added incentive for
cooperation. In order for subjects to exhibit cooperation, one which overcame the weaker
behavior consistent with norms of social re- impediments to cooperation created by the
sponsibility and reciprocity, one must assume relatively slight threat.
that the subjects are aware of such standards There is only equivocal support for such a
at the time that they are engaged in the hypothesis in the bargaining literature. Mc-
encounter with another person. An instruc- Clintock and McNeel (1967) found that
tional set fostering self-concern would appear Flemish subjects were more cooperative in
to make such norms less salient. Evidence by conditions of high reward than low reward in
Brehm and Cole (1966) in the reciprocity the Maximizing Differences game. However
literature offers some evidence for such a Crawford and Sidowski (1964) did not report
contention. In their study, subjects were either any effect of real versus imaginary money in
given an introduction to the study that played a situation where subjects are allowed to give
down its importance or were made to feel that or to take away one point from the partner.
their chances of being a success in life were While the data is somewhat weak, it appears
being assessed. All subjects were given a favor that where real as opposed to imaginary
by a confederate, in this case a soft drink. money is a significant variable, real money
Findings indicate that when subjects were operates in the direction of increasing coop-
made to feel the study was not very impor- eration. To the extent that real and important
tant, the favor increased the likelihood that outcomes are not involved, subjects may not
subjects would perform a favor in turn for consider cooperation on the part of their part-
the confederate. When subjects were made to ner as a benefit and may then not feel obli-
be concerned about themselves and their as- gated to reciprocate. Also, since they cannot
sessment by the experimenter, the favor ac- provide real benefits for their partner, they
tually reduced the likelihood that the subject may be less willing to make the gesture of
would perform the return favor. Self-concern cooperation.
fostered by individualistic instructional sets in
the bargaining game such as the Prisoner's Relationship between the Players
Dilemma may then decrease the salience of a In most studies utilizing the Prisoner's Di-
norm of reciprocity and further foster self- lemma game, subjects have no specified rela-
concern, which is antithetical to reciprocity. tionship to one another. They usually do not
 BARGAINING AND RECIPROCITY
know the person with whom they are playing,
and no information is given them which might
affect their liking for their partners. Although
the norms of reciprocity and social responsi-
bility are hypothesized to hold for all persons,
research in such areas indicates a correlation
between affect and help giving. Daniels and
Berkowitz (1963), for example, found more
help giving to a person who is highly liked
than to one who is less liked. In the Prisoner
Dilemma studies as well, Swingle and Gillis
(1968) reported greater initial cooperation by
subjects playing against a partner whom they
liked as compared to a partner whom they
disliked or with whom they had no specified
relationship. Kanouse and Wiest (1967)
showed a tendency, although not significant,
for subjects to cooperate more with an indi-
vidual who was presented as a fellow student
in the same course than with one who was
simply presented as another college student.
As Kanouse and Wiest themselves pointed
out, these two conditions differ very little
from each other. Therefore, it is surprising
that the levels of cooperation were affected at
all by such a manipulation, much less the
6.8% difference reported. McClintock and
McNeel (1967) further corroborated such
findings in a Maximizing Difference game.
They found that subjects having a friendly
relationship cooperated significantly more than
those who were either hostile or had no previ-
ous acquaintance. To the extent that no prior
acquaintance tends to operate in much the
same manner as dislike or hostility, the fact
that subjects in the typical Prisoner's Di-
lemma game have no specified relationship
appears to add to the other variables in fos-
tering competition rather than cooperation and
reciprocity.
Interpretation of the Other's Motives
Research in the help-giving and reciprocity
literatures suggests that one of the more strik-
ing reasons for the lack of reciprocity and
cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game is
that the partner's motives for cooperation in
the Prisoner's Dilemma game are quite am-
biguous. Not only may cooperation on the
part of one's partner not be seen as stemming
from a motive to help or to cooperate, but it
may in fact be interpreted as a strategy on
303
the part of the other to exploit the subject. If
the subject makes the latter interpretation,
cooperation by the other may not dictate reci-
procity and may instead serve to elicit resent-
ment or retaliation. Available evidence in the
bargaining literature suggests that subjects do
not interpret cooperation on the part of their
partner as stemming from a motive to coop-
erate. Solomon (1960) reported that his sub-
jects in the equal power conditions tended to
check the category "out of field" rather than
"cooperation" or "individualistic" as the mo-
tives for the other person's playing in an un-
conditionally cooperative manner (i.e., play-
ing cooperatively on 100% of the trials). Pre-
sumably "out of field" refers to the fact that
subjects could not understand why their part-
ners were playing in this manner. At least
they did not check the category "cooperation"
as the partner's motive. The subjects' seeming
defensiveness when faced with a cooperative
partner may be realistic, however. Subjects do
tend to exploit their partners. Deutsch's
(1958) experiment clearly indicates that dou-
ble-crossing occurs a large percentage of the
time, at least in sequential moves. Rapoport
and Chammah (1965) also reported a rela-
tively great amount of double-crossing, as do
the studies which consistently show exploita-
tion of an unconditionally cooperative part-
ner. Since many subjects evidently do exploit
their partners, they may realistically expect
the same exploitation from others.
Available literature suggests that when an-
other person's benefits are not seen as stem-
ming from a benevolent motive, reciprocity
of such benefits is significantly decreased.
Goranson and Berkowitz (1966), for example,
reported that subjects work harder on behalf
of another person when that person had
previously helped them voluntarily, rather
than when the help had been made compulsory
by the experimenter. The subjects receiving
the voluntary help could reasonably conclude
that their partner had really wanted to aid
them. In the compulsory-help condition, on
the other hand, the partner's motives were
unclear because of the constraint on him. This
finding has subsequently been corroborated by
Nemeth (1970) who found that benefits
must be seen as intended by an individual for
liking or reciprocity to be invoked. Further,
304 CHARLAN
evidence by Dickoff (1964) suggests that even
where an ulterior motive is only passible, sub-
jects tend not to return favors. In one part of
this experiment, subjects were given positive
evaluations by an interviewer. In one condi-
tion, subjects were told the purpose of the
experiment was to discover how accurately
people form impressions of one another. In
another condition, subjects were also told the
experiment was designed to discover how
people formed impressions of one another, but
it was added that the interviewer wanted them
to participate in an experiment of her own
following the present session. Subjects were
found to rate the interviewer much more
favorably in the accuracy condition as com-
pared to the ulterior motive condition. When
the possibility of an ulterior motive was
present (i.e., when the interviewer wanted the
subject to participate in an additional experi-
ment), subjects saw the interviewer as "not
too bright and defensive."
These studies indicate that reciprocity of
benefits occurs only when the original benefit
is seen as intentional and altruistically based.
If the possibility of an ulterior motive is
present, subjects may not feel it necessary to
return the favor. To the extent that subjects
in the typical Prisoner's Dilemma situation
have reason for assuming the possibility of an
ulterior motive on the part of a cooperative
partner, and further report that they do not
perceive the cooperation as altruistically
based, the preceding studies would not predict
reciprocity. This is in fact what the bargaining
literature shows.
Such reasoning may also account for the
previously reported findings such as Evans and
Crumbaugh (1966) with matrix and non-
matrix forms of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
In their experiment, the Prisoner's Dilemma
game was presented in its usual matrix form
for some subjects; for others, however, an
"equivalent" but simpler two-choice form was
presented, as in Figure 2. As indicated earlier
in this paper, the choice "give him 3" is quan-
titatively equivalent to the choice of C in the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, while "give me 1"
is quantitatively equivalent to the D choice.
Although these two forms offer equivalent
outcomes, Evans and Crumbaugh (1966) re-
ported significantly greater cooperation by
NEMETH
subjects playing the nonmatrix form, a finding
which has been corroborated by Pruitt
(1967).
In addition to the subjects perhaps perceiv-
ing greater control over outcomes in the de-
composed form that was discussed earlier, the
nonmatrix form may also make the motives of
the players more clear. On the one hand,
perhaps the socially proper behavior for the
subject becomes clearer, that is, the subject
recognizes that giving 3 points is generous and
"good," while keeping 1 point for himself is
selfish and "bad." In this sense, the non-
matrix form may well make the subject more
cognizant of social norms such as social re-
sponsibility or reciprocity so that he is more
aware of what he himself "ought" to do. Simi-
larly, the other's motive may also become
clearer. When a partner chooses "give him
3," perhaps the subject is more likely to
interpret that behavior in terms of voluntary
help-giving or cooperation. Moreover, the
partner's behavior is seen as being in accord
with social standards. If the partner chooses
"give me 1," on the other hand, his action is
clearly a violation of the social norms, and
selfish motives are readily attributed to him.
To the extent that this reasoning is correct, it
implies that subjects tend to return coopera-
tion or help to another, even in a Prisoner's
Dilemma game, if they believe the other's
cooperation was motivated by generosity and
was not governed by some hope of selfish gain
or exploitation. Komorita, Sheposh, and
Braver (1968) used similar reasoning in their
experiment with the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Their findings showed greater cooperation to
a benevolent person who has greater power
over them than towards a benevolent person
who has equal power. They suggested that a
benevolent powerful person conveys the im-
pression that he has benevolent intentions,
presumably because he has more choice in the
situation. Under such conditions, "trust de-
velops and cooperative behavior is facili-
tated."
On the basis of this reasoning, then, one
would expect reciprocity of cooperation in
bargaining games, including the Prisoner's
Dilemma, when the partner is seen as inten-
tionally benefiting the subject. Some evidence
for such a contention comes from a study by
 BARGAINING
Nemeth.3 In this study, 14-year-old boys
chose from a matrix that allocated points to
their own group and to another group, whose
points were worth one penny each. The
matrix was set up in such a way that giving
points to the other group meant losing points
for one's own group. After the first play,
subjects were given information about how a
person from the other group played. Three
such feedback conditions were manipulated,
one being a mirror image of the subject's own
choice, another being the most selfish choice,
and a third being the most generous choice
possible. On the second play, after feedback
had been given, results indicate that subjects
were most generous when the other player had
been generous. Such reciprocity of generosity
is in contrast to the usual Prisoner Dilemma
findings but may be explained on the basis of
motive attribution. While subjects in the
Prisoner's Dilemma game do not see coopera-
tive behavior as stemming from cooperative
intentions, subjects in the Nemeth (1970, see
Footnote 3) study reported that the gener-
ously behaving other was a generous person.
Thus when they viewed such behavior as
altruistically based, they tended to reciprocate
generosity even when it meant losing money
for themselves.
Such reasoning is also consistent with the
findings of bargaining games allowing more
than the two choices available in the Priso-
ner's Dilemma situation. As previously men-
tioned, a D choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma
game may be based on any one of a number
of motives such as maximization of one's own
gain, aggression against one's partner, defense
against exploitation and loss, or simply con-
fusion. The subjects understandably report
they do not know the motives of their partner
on the basis of his plays. Even when he has
been consistently cooperative, subjects may
think him foolish or lacking in understanding
of how to play the game, rather than benevo-
lent. When more alternatives are available, a
player has at his disposal a more subtle means
of communicating his motives or strategy.
From the point of view of the perceiver, a
choice out of a number of alternatives rather
8
Nemeth, C. Unpublished paper, Similarity, Altru-
ism, and Reciprocity, 1969.
AND RECIPROCITY 305
than from two alternatives more clearly speci-
fies a given motive since other conceivable
motives would be reflected in a different
choice.
An experiment by Deutsch, Epstein, Cana-
van, and Gumpert (1967) is one such multi-
choice situation which is quite similar to a
Prisoner's Dilemma format. In this situation,
six choices were available, as follows:
Black: 4^ to the subject, regardless of what
his partner chose.
Blue: 9$ to each if matched, that is, if both
players chose Blue: 1$ to the subject if his
partner played anything but blue.
White: 7$ to the partner regardless of how
the partner played.
Red: attack move, that is, 6<j; is taken from
the partner unless the partner played green,
the defensive choice. In the latter case, no
points are given or taken from either player.
Green: defense move, explained above.
Beige: play of disarming, that is, the sub-
ject destroys all the red pegs he has accumu-
lated.
Orange: attack indicator.
Deutsch et al.'s findings indicate that subjects
did link specific plays with specific motives
and characteristics of the player. From a list
of adjectives, subjects considered a play of.
blue as "cooperative," "mutual," and "co-
working." They saw a play of black as "cau-
tious," "independent," and "selfish." A white
play was seen as "benevolent," "philan-
thropic," and "foolish."
In such a situation where the play desig-
nated as cooperative (i.e., blue) is actually
perceived as cooperative by the subjects,
Deutsch et al. found that programmed coop-
eration on the part of one player does lead to
returned cooperation by the other. In one
condition, called "Turn the Other Cheek," one
player's programmed choices were blue, white,
blue on the first three trials. Thereafter he
consistently chose blue. This is very close to
the unconditional cooperation condition em-
ployed by a number of experimenters with the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, which manipula-
tion generally failed to increase cooperation
on the part of the subject. In Deutsch's study,
the Turn the Other Cheek strategy led to
approximately 60% cooperation by subjects, a
306 CHARLAN
percentage considerably higher than that typi-
cally found in Prisoner Dilemma studies with
programmed unconditional cooperation.
Even more striking findings resulted from
Deutsch's condition of Reformed Sinner-Turn
the Other Cheek. In this situation, one play-
er's choice was programmed as orange on
Trials 3, 9, and 12. Otherwise his choices were
red on the first 15 trials. On the sixteenth
trial, he disarmed completely by choosing
beige and thereafter used a Turn the Other
Cheek strategy. Cooperation by the subject
during the "sinning" period, that is, the first
IS trials, was only 15%, whereas cooperation
during the reform period was approximately
73%. Subjects were clearly reciprocating.
They attacked (red), defended (green), and
were cautious (black) when the other was
being aggressive, and cooperated (blue) when
he cooperated. In Wilson's (1969) study us-
ing the Prisoner's Dilemma game itself, fur-
ther evidence is given that subjects will re-
ciprocate cooperation if they perceive the oth-
er's actions as benevolent. In his study, the
unconditionally cooperative partner was per-
ceived to be "generous," "cooperative," and
"not greedy." Subjects reciprocated this co-
operation on 56% of the trials, a percentage
again considerably higher than the usual
Prisoner Dilemma findings with uncondition-
ally cooperative partners.
Thus the findings of such studies clearly
indicate that reciprocity of cooperation will
be found, even in bargaining games, so long
as the plays are interpreted as stemming from
a motivation to cooperate. Multichoice games
appear to be a better vehicle for specifying
the motive than are two-choice games which
leave the perceiver puzzled as to the motives
of his partner.
Communication between Players
One last variable, related to attribution of
motives, which is seen as contributing to the
lack of mutual cooperation in the Prisoner's
Dilemma game, is the absence of communica-
tion. In most studies utilizing the Prisoner's
Dilemma game, subjects are not allowed to
talk to one another. They only learn how the
other chose on each trial. Available evidence
suggests that opportunities for communication
increase cooperation in the Prisoner's Di-
NEMETH
lemma game. Bixenstine and Douglas (1967),
for example, found that groups composed of
six "normal" persons became more cooperative
after a session of communication. Persons
exhibiting psychopathic tendencies, however,
did not utilize the communication session to
increase cooperativeness. It seems that the
"normal" persons took the opportunity to dis-
cuss the various strategies possible and set-
tled upon the mutually advantageous solution,
namely, joint cooperation. Persons with psy-
chopathic tendencies, however, tended to mis-
trust the cooperative agreement and, as a
result, refused to go along with that sugges-
tion.
Rapoport, Chammah, Dwyer, and Gyr
(1962) further illustrated the importance of
communication for cooperation in a three-
person Prisoner's Dilemma game. In their
study, subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma
game for 2 to 3 hours completing 300-500
trials. They then had a meal and a rest period
for 1^ to 2 hours after which they again
played the game for a total of 1,200 trials.
One interesting finding of this experiment
was that subjects cooperated significantly
more in the second part of the session, that is,
subsequent to the rest period, than they did
in the first part of the session. Rapoport et
al. reported that subjects took advantage of
the rest period to decide on a mutually coop-
erative strategy. Thus, when communication
was possible, subjects utilized it in the direc-
tion of increased cooperation. Terhune
(1968) similarly found significantly more
cooperation between subjects who were al-
lowed to communicate via written notes dur-
ing a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Terhune sug-
gested that the communication reduces the
ambiguity of intentions. "With less ambiguity
the players need to be less defensive, so that
those willing to cooperate can readily do so
[Terhune, 1968, p. 21]."
The importance of communication is also
consistent with the findings of the multichoice
games used by several experimenters (Deutsch
et al., 1967; Fouraker & Siegel, 1963; Pilisuk,
Shalnick, Thomas, & Chapman, 1967). Their
results usually show higher reciprocity of co-
operation with multichoice games than is nor-
mally found in the two-choice situations such
as the Prisoner's Dilemma game. While verbal
 BARGAINING AND RECIPROCITY
communication is still absent, the alternatives
available in a multichoice game undoubtedly
allow a subject to convey more subtly and
accurately his motives and strategies. In that
sense the multichoice games allow subjects to
communicate which may be one reason for the
increased cooperation.
It should be mentioned, however, that the
importance of communication may be re-
stricted to situations in which individualistic
instructions are used. Deutsch (19S8) offered
evidence that the opportunity for communica-
tion makes little difference when subjects are
under cooperative or competitive instructions.
However, under individualistic instructions,
communication makes a significant difference.
In his study, subjects under individualistic in-
structions cooperated on only 3 5.9% of the
trials when communication was not allowed
whereas, with communication, they cooperated
on 70.6% of the trials. Thus it appears that
in the typical Prisoner Dilemma game, where
individualistic instructions are generally em-
ployed, the absence of communication is a
significant factor promoting competition
rather than cooperation. The absence of com-
munication apparently further heightens the
ambiguity already surrounding the partner's
intentions in the game. As indicated in the
preceding section, such ambiguity serves to
lessen the tendency for reciprocity or altruism.
Summary
In summary, the repeated findings of lack
of reciprocity in studies employing the Priso-
ner's Dilemma games are, at least in part, due
to the specific paradigm used. A number of
variables intrinsic to this paradigm have been
shown to lessen the tendency for reciprocity
or altruistic behavior. Subjects are in a con-
triently interdependent situation in which they
play against persons whom they do not know
and whose motives are ambiguous. They are
instructed to consider their own welfare only
and play for imaginary money without the aid
of communication. Available evidence in the
areas of reciprocity and help giving, which
were reviewed earlier, suggests that all these
variables reduce reciprocity and altruism.
The usefulness of such an approach is
further supported by a recent study by Wil-
son (1969). Using a Prisoner's Dilemma for-
307
mat, Wilson found 56% cooperation by sub-
jects playing an unconditionally cooperative
partner, a percentage considerably higher than
the usual 3Q%-40% cooperation. However, a
reading of his methods section shows that a
number of variables considered in this paper
have been removed from the usual experi-
mental procedure. In the Wilson study, sub-
jects were not instructed to play individual-
istically; in fact, there was no mention of
"game" or "win." Subjects faced one another
and were allowed a minimum of verbal inter-
change. Further, unconditional cooperation on
the part of the partner was interpreted as
cooperative by the subject. The present the-
orizing would predict that such deviations
from the pattern of the usual Prisoner's Di-
lemma studies would lead to increased reci-
procity of cooperation. This prediction is sup-
ported by Wilson's findings.
Thus it is believed that viewing the lack of
reciprocity of cooperation in bargaining games
such as the Prisoner's Dilemma from the point
of view of variables intrinsic to the paradigms
used, sheds some light on the findings of both
the bargaining and reciprocity literatures. One
conclusion that can be drawn from this ap-
proach is that attempts to induce reciprocity
of cooperation by programming the choices of
one player as cooperative will not be effective
unless such programmed strategies also reduce
the impact of the variables considered in this
paper which tend to decrease reciprocity. It
is hoped that by attempting to relate the two
areas of bargaining and reciprocity, the ap-
parent contradiction between the two areas
has been resolved and that understanding in
each has been enhanced.
REFERENCES
BECKER, G. M., & MCCLINTOCK, L. G. Value: Be-
havioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psy-
chology, 1967, 18, 239-286.
BERKOWITZ, L. Beyond exchange: Ideals and other
factors affecting helping and altruism. In R.
Willis & M. Greenberg (Eds.), Social exchange.
New York: Wiley, 1970.
BIXENSTINE, V. E., & DOUGLAS, J. Effect of psycho-
pathology on group consensus and cooperative
choice in a six-person game. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 1967, 5, 32-37.
BIXENSTINE, V. E., POTASH, H., & WILSON, K. V.
Effects of level of cooperative choice by the other
player on choices in a prisoner's dilemma game.
308 CHARLAN
Part I. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
1963, 66, 308-313.
BIXENSTINE, V. E., & WILSON, K. V. Effects of level
of cooperative choice by the other player on
choices in a prisoner's dilemma game. Part II.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963,
67, 139-147.
BREHM, J. W., & COLE, A. H. Effect of a favor which
reduces freedom. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1966, 3, 420-426.
CRAWFORD, T., & SIDOWSKI, J. B. Monetary incentive
and cooperative competitive instructions in a mini-
mal social situation. Psychological Reports, 1964,
IS, 233-234.
DANIELS, L. R., & BERKOWITZ, L. Liking and re-
sponse to dependency relations. Human Relations,
1963, 16, 141-148.
DARLEY, J. M., & LATANE, B. Bystander intervention
in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, (4,
Pt. 1) 377-383.
DEUTSCH, M. A theory of cooperation and competi-
tion. Human Relations, 1949, 2, 129-152.
DEUTSCH, M. Trust and suspicion. Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, 1958, 2, 265-279.
DEUTSCH, M., EPSTEIN, Y., CANAVAN, P., & GUMPERT,
P. Strategies of inducing cooperation. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 1967, 11, 345-360.
DEUTSCH, M., & KRAUSS, R. The effect of threat upon
interpersonal bargaining. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 181-189.
EVANS, G. W., & CRUMBAUGH, C. M. Effects of
Prisoner's Dilemma format on cooperative be-
havior. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 1966, 3, 486-488.
FOURAKER, L. E., & SIEOEL, S. Bargaining behavior.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.
GALLO, P. S., JR. Effects of increased incentives upon
the use of threat in bargaining. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 14-20.
GORANSON, R. E., & BERKOWITZ, L. Reciprocity and
responsibility reactions to prior help. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 3, 227-
232.
GOULDNER, A. W. The norm of reciprocity: A pre-
liminary statement. American Sociological Review,
1960, 25, 161-178.
KANOUSE, D. E., & WIEST, W. M. Some factors af-
fecting choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 1967, 11, 206-213.
KOMORITA, S. S., SHEPOSH, J. P., & BRAVER, S. L.
Power, the use of power, and cooperative choice
in a two-person game. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 134-142.
McCLiNiocK, C. G., HARRISON, A. A., STRAND, S., &
GALLO, P. Internationalism-isolationism, strategy
of the other player, and two-person game behav-
ior. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
1963, 67, 631-636.
McCLiNTOCK, C. G., & McNEEL, S. P. Prior dyadic
experience and monetary reward as determinants
NEMETH
of cooperative and competitive game behavior.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
1967, 5, 282-294.
MULDER, M., VAN DIJK, R., STELWAGE, T., VERHAGEN,
J., SOUTENDIJK, S., & ZWEZERIJNEN, J. Illegitimacy
of power and positiveness of attitude towards the
power person. Human Relations, 1966, 19, 21-37.
NEMETH, C. J. The effects of free vs. constrained be-
havior on attraction between people. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, IS, 302-
311.
OSKAMP, S., & PERLMAN, D. Factors affecting coop-
eration in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 1965, 9, 358-359.
PILISUK, M., SHALNICK, P., THOMAS, K., & CHAPMAN,
R. Boredom vs. cognitive appraisal in the develop-
ment of cooperative study. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 1967, 11, 110-116.
PRUITT, D. Reward structure and cooperation: The
decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 7, 21-27.
PRUITT, D. G. Reciprocity and credit building in the
laboratory dyad. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1968, 8, 143-147.
RAPOPORT, A., & CIIAMMAH, A. M. Sex differences in
factors contributing to the level of cooperation in
Prisoner's Dilemma games. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 831-838.
RAPOPORT, A., CHAMMAH, A., DWYER, J., & GYR, J.
Three person and non-zero-sum non-negotiable
game. Behavioral Science, 1962, 7, 39-58.
SCHELLENBERG, J. A. Dependence and cooperation.
Sociometry, 1965, 28, 158-172.
SCOOEL, A. Induced collaboration in some non-zero
games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962, 6, 335-
340.
SERMAT, V. Cooperative behavior in mixed motive
games. Journal of Social Psychology, 1964, 62, 217-
239.
SOLOMON, L. The influence of some types of power
relationships and game strategies upon the develop-
ment of interpersonal trust. Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 223-230.
SWINGLE, P. G., & COADY, H. Effects of the partner's
abrupt strategy change upon the subject's respond-
ing in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 1967, S, 357-363.
SWINGLE, P. G., & GILLIS, J. S. Effects of the emo-
tional relationship between protagonists in the
Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 160-165.
TERHUNE, K. W. Motives, situation, and the inter-
personal conflict within Prisoner's Dilemma. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8
(3, Pt. 2).
WILSON, W. Cooperation and the cooperativeness of
the other player. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
1969, 13, 110-117.
(Received July 24, 1969)