PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Parks, Rumble / RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL VALUES
Elements of Reciprocity and Social Value Orientation
Craig D. Parks
Ann C. Rumble
Washington State University
This study assessed the impact of social value orientation on the
ability of a reciprocal choice strategy to induce high rates of coop-
erative behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma. Prosocials, competi-
tors, and individualists played against reciprocal strategies for
which delay of reciprocation of both cooperation and
noncooperation were orthogonally manipulated. As predicted,
individualists cooperated most frequently against Tit-for-tat,
competitors when retaliation for noncooperation was delayed,
and prosocials when their cooperative choice was immediately
reciprocated. In addition, it was found that prosocials began
“behavioral assimilation” as early as the second of four five-trial
blocks and that changes in competitors’ rate of cooperation over
time were determined by immediacy of reciprocating cooperation.
Research on choice behavior in mixed-motive situa-
tions has long been a popular topic of study for psycholo-
gists. One particular type of mixed-motive situation that
commands attention is the social dilemma, a situation in
which there is a conflict between maximization of per-
sonal and collective outcomes (Komorita & Parks, 1995).
Regardless of how one’s fellow group members behave,
it is always personally most beneficial (in terms of out-
comes) to act selfishly rather than for the collective
good. However, this is also true for all other group mem-
bers, and if everyone succumbs to this selfish temptation,
all persons are worse off than if all had acted for the col-
lective good. An excellent example of a social dilemma is
public television. Public television is available to all view-
ers regardless of whether a viewer has made a contribu-
tion to the station. Thus, it is personally profitable to
keep one’s money and watch the station’s programs
rather than give one’s money and watch the programs.
However, if all viewers act in this way, the station will
receive no money, will be forced to cease broadcasting,
and all viewers are worse off than if all had contributed to
the station.
Although social dilemma researchers are interested
in many aspects of choice behavior, some investigators
1301
have focused on the use of strategic choice rules
designed to induce high rates of cooperation in others.
In particular, researchers have been interested in the
ability of reciprocal strategies to induce cooperation. In
its most basic sense, reciprocation involves behaving so
as to return to an exchange partner an outcome of the
same valence as was provided by the partner’s earlier
behavior (Parks & Komorita, 1998). A specific form of
reciprocation that has received much attention, at least
within the prisoner’s dilemma format, is Tit-for-tat. Tit-
for-tat involves cooperating on the initial encounter and
thereafter simply performing on trial t + 1 the behavior
that one’s partner performed on trial t. Although
research on Tit-for-tat has been conducted for many
years (see Patchen, 1987, for a summary of this early
work), recent research has been spurred by Axelrod’s
computer simulations of behavioral choice strategies in
prisoner’s dilemmas (summarized in Axelrod, 1984).
Axelrod pitted Tit-for-tat against a large number of alter-
native strategies and showed that Tit-for-tat returned a
greater mean pay-off than any other strategy. Axelrod
(1984) theorized that Tit-for-tat’s success was attribut-
able to (a) its niceness (one always begins with a cooper-
ative choice), (b) clarity (it is a simple strategy to perceive
and understand), (c) provocability (one immediately
responds to a noncooperative choice with noncoopera-
tion), (d) forgiveness (one always responds to a coopera-
tive choice with cooperation, regardless of the prior
actions of the opponent), and (e) lack of envy (no refer-
ence is made to one’s accumulated outcomes relative to
those of the opponent).
Authors’ Note: We would like to thank Shawn Scamahorn for his assis-
tance with data collection and Sam Komorita for his input on the de-
sign. Address correspondence to Craig D. Parks, Department of
Psychology, Washington State University, P.O. Box 644820, Pullman,
WA 99164; e-mail: parkscd@mail.wsu.edu.
PSPB, Vol. 27 No. 10, October 2001 1301-1309
© 2001 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
1302 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Empirical tests of some of these propositions by
Komorita, Parks, and colleagues (Komorita, Chan, &
Parks, 1993; Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991; Komorita,
Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn,
1996; Parks & Vu, 1994) have shown that (a) immediate
reciprocation of cooperative choice is crucial; (b) response
to noncooperation can be delayed but should still be
responded to; (c) clarity does positively influence rate of
cooperation, although opponent use of Tit-for-tat is not
as easily perceived as it seems; and (d) the effects of nice-
ness are not clear. To date, the effects of envy have not
been studied. Additional theoretical work has shown
that a modified version of Tit-for-tat can be successfully
employed in very large groups (Parks & Komorita, 1997;
but see de Hues, 2000).
Researchers, then, have made some progress toward
understanding the dynamics of reciprocation. However,
an important factor that may qualify many of these find-
ings is the social value orientation of group members. A
social value orientation is a tendency to prefer particular
patterns of outcomes for self and others (Messick &
McClintock, 1968). Although many different outcome
patterns have been identified, the most commonly
occurring orientations are prosocial—a desire to maxi-
mize joint gain; competition—a desire to maximize rela-
tive gain for self; and individualism—a preference to
maximize personal gain, irrespective of others’ pay-offs
(van Lange, Otten, de Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). A con-
siderable amount of research has been, and continues to
be, conducted on social value orientations. This
research has focused on their development (e.g., van
Lange et al., 1997); their influence across a variety of
interpersonal situations (e.g., Parks, 1994; van Lange,
van Vugt, Meertens, & Rutter, 1998); their relationship
to other individual difference constructs, such as trust
(e.g., Joireman, van Lange, Kuhlman, van Vugt, & Shel-
ley, 1997; Parks, 1994) and willingness to sacrifice (e.g.,
van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997); and
their interaction with personal characteristics of other
group members (e.g., van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; van
Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998). Relatively little
research has examined how people of different social
value orientations respond to strategic behavior of oth-
ers, and this research has been somewhat inconsistent.
For example, van Lange and Visser (1999) showed that
prosocials and individualists respond to Tit-for-tat with
high levels of cooperation but that competitors do not.
Similarly, de Dreu and van Lange (1995) found that, in a
negotiation setting, prosocials respond to opponent
concessions with concessions of greater magnitude than
those offered by individualists or competitors. However,
de Dreu and van Lange (1995) also found that competi-
tors and individualists are as willing to make concessions
on low-priority issues as were prosocials, and Sheldon
A B
A 3, 3 1, 4
B 4, 1 2, 2
Figure 1 A prisoner’s dilemma pay-off matrix.
NOTE: Values to the left of the comma are payoffs for the Row player,
and values to the right are payoffs for the Column player.
(1999) demonstrated that, through frequent repetition
of mixed-motive problems, competitors can be taught
the long-term benefits of Tit-for-tat.
These studies are important because they demon-
strate that people with different value orientations can
respond to the same behavioral strategy in different
ways, a factor not accounted for in the Axelrod (1984)
simulations but that would be present in almost any
mixed-motive setting. Furthermore, these data show that
the nature of responding is not straightforward. Thus,
for example, a competitor will not automatically respond
to a cooperative action with an attempt at exploitation.
Rather, there seem to be some situational factors that
influence response. Accordingly, the purpose of this
study was to assess the relationship between social value
orientation and a situational factor that is known to
affect response to a Tit-for-tat strategy; namely, delay in
reciprocating cooperative and/or noncooperative
choice. We orthogonally manipulated these delays to see
if particular patterns of delay were more or less influen-
tial on the choice behavior of prosocials, competitors,
and individualists.
Reciprocity and Social Values
Consider the basic prisoner’s dilemma matrix shown
in Figure 1. In this matrix, ”A” is described as the cooper-
ative choice because the “AA” choice combination pro-
duces the greatest joint pay-offs in the long run, and “B”
is the noncooperative choice because it will lead to
either consistent exploitation (if the opponent continu-
ally chooses “A”) or long-term suboptimal outcomes (if
opponent also keeps choosing “B”). A primary goal of
dilemma researchers is to discover techniques for
encouraging and maintaining mutual “A” choices and
discouraging exploitative choices. Indeed, one of the
primary benefits of a Tit-for-tat strategy is that the user
cannot be regularly exploited—if the opponent chooses
“B” when Tit-for-tat chooses “A,” Tit-for-tat will switch to
“B” on the next trial. Our focus in this study was to assess
the extent to which specific components of Tit-for-tat
interact with various social value orientations to affect
 Parks, Rumble / RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL VALUES
the induction and maintenance of cooperation. The fol-
lowing predictions were tested regarding these
interactions.
Competitors
Probably the greatest amount of theorizing involves
the induction of cooperation in competitors. There are
two schools of thought regarding how to accomplish this.
The first argues that one should be tough with competi-
tors and immediately retaliate against noncooperation.
In this way, competitors will come to learn the futility of
chronic noncooperation and will become cooperative
(Braver & Barnett, 1976; Kraines & Kraines, 1993). The
second school of thought suggests that one should be
somewhat lenient and tolerate occasional exploitations.
The theoretical basis for this argument stems largely
from Camerer and Ho’s (1998, 1999) experience-
weighted attraction-learning model of cooperative
choice. This model suggests that people select an initial
choice strategy at the outset of the game and then adopt
new strategies as a function of outcomes, estimations of
the outcomes that other strategies would have pro-
duced, and changing expectations about how oppo-
nents will act in the future. Strategy selection is assumed
to follow the principle of “better responding,” which, in
a manner akin to satisficing, implies that people will
favor strategies that produce high, but not necessarily
the best, outcomes. Competitors enter into a mixed-
motive situation with the expectation that others will be
similarly competitive (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Accord-
ing to Camerer and Ho, tolerating some exploitation
would lead competitors to alter their expectations about
one’s future behavior, and this alteration, coupled with
mental simulation of alternative courses of action,
should provoke competitors into changing their choice
strategies and becoming more cooperative. That choices
are driven by “better responding” can explain why the
competitor would move away from an action that has the
potential to return the single best outcome (through
exploitation). Also, experience-weighted attraction
learning implies that being tough will be ineffective,
because toughness will simply confirm the competitor’s
initial beliefs and will not produce any alteration of
expectations.
We have, then, two contrasting viewpoints on how to
induce more frequent cooperation in competitors.
Regarding toughness, van Lange and Visser (1999)
found competitors to have low rates of cooperation
when playing against Tit-for-tat. Because Tit-for-tat
always immediately retaliates against noncooperation,
its ineffectiveness at inducing competitors to be more
cooperative is evidence against the “be tough” argu-
ment. However, the second argument, which we shall
call a “slow to anger” approach, is still viable. In refer-
1303
ence to the Komorita et al. (1991) paradigm, being slow
to anger means delaying response to a noncooperative
choice—instead of responding to noncooperation on
the next trial, one responds at some point in the future.
Thus, if the slow-to-anger argument is accurate, it should
be the case that a delay in responding to a competitor’s
noncooperative choice should induce greater rates of
cooperation than an immediate response. Komorita and
colleagues found that delaying a retaliation for as little as
one trial (i.e., a noncooperative choice on trial t was
reciprocated on trial t + 2 rather than t + 1) nonetheless
induced greater rates of cooperation in participants
than did an immediate retaliation. Hence, we
operationalized “delay” in our study as a one-trial lag in
responding.
Individualists
Individualists are motivated to maximize their own
gain, irrespective of the outcomes for others. As a result,
the individualist will tailor his or her choices to fit the
environment. In a hostile environment where others are
not cooperative, the individualist is faced with the choice
of either being exploited (i.e., choosing “A” while others
choose “B”) or entering into a series of mutual “B”
choices. The latter option is more attractive than the
first; thus, it follows that an individualist will be
noncooperative when playing against similarly
noncooperative others. Less straightforward is how an
individualist will behave in a cooperative setting. If the
other is uniformly cooperative (i.e., always chooses “A”),
then it becomes possible for the individualist to consis-
tently exploit the other by being noncooperative (i.e.,
always choosing “B”), and it follows that the individualist
should have a low rate of cooperation. By contrast, if the
other is employing a reciprocal strategy, then consistent
exploitation of the other becomes impossible. In this sit-
uation, the individualist will gain the largest pay-off by
being cooperative. Because of this, Tit-for-tat should be
very effective at inducing cooperation in individualists, a
prediction supported by van Lange and Visser (1999).
However, it also should be the case that any deviation
from strict reciprocity will lead to decreased rates of
cooperation by individualists. A delay in retaliation for a
noncooperative choice should create a perception that
the other is exploitable, and a delay in responding to
cooperative choice should suggest that the environment
is hostile. Because individualists enter an interaction
focusing only on how to maximize long-term selfish
interests (van Lange, 1999), a perception that the envi-
ronment is either hostile or exploitable should make the
noncooperative choice more attractive as a long-run
strategy, and it follows that the individualist should
respond with a decrease in the frequency of cooperative
choice. Note that we expect delay of retaliation for
1304 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
noncooperation to have different effects on competitors
versus individualists. For competitors, a delay should
produce a violation of expectations, which promotes
strategy switching, but for individualists, a delay should
make noncooperation more salient as a means of maxi-
mizing long-term personal gain.
Prosocials
On the surface, it seems that we should be unconcerned
with induction and maintenance of cooperation in
prosocials because these individuals are oriented toward
maximization of joint gain. However, although it may be
true that concerns over how to induce cooperation in
prosocials are unwarranted, maintenance of sustained
cooperation is in fact an issue. Kelley and Stahelski
(1970) argued that prosocials will eventually tailor their
choices to fit the situation; thus, if prosocials are behav-
ing within a hostile environment, they will initially
attempt to convince others to cooperate by themselves
engaging in repeated cooperation, but if their overtures
are not reciprocated, prosocials will eventually become
noncooperative. Kelley and Stahelski termed this
“behavioral assimilation.” Behavioral assimilation sug-
gests that, with prosocials, immediate reciprocation of
cooperation will become more important as time goes
on: At the start, the prosocial is oriented toward frequent
cooperation, but he or she will eventually lose patience
with an uncooperative other. We thus expect that a delay
in reciprocation of cooperation will lead to lower rates of
cooperation than immediate reciprocation but only in
the latter stages of the dilemma.
Summary of Hypotheses
We expect to observe the following patterns of
choices:
Hypothesis 1: Competitors will cooperate more frequently
when retaliation for a noncooperative (“B”) response is
delayed rather than immediate.
Hypothesis 2: Individualists will cooperate most frequently
when reciprocation of both cooperation and
noncooperation is immediate. A delay in either or both
will lead to decreased rates of cooperative choice.
Hypothesis 3: Prosocials initially will be unaffected by any de-
lays in reciprocation, but in the later stages of the di-
lemma they will cooperate more frequently when
reciprocation of a cooperative choice is immediate
rather than delayed.
METHOD
Participants
The participants were 240 undergraduates enrolled
in introductory psychology courses. Participation was in
partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Design
There were three independent variables: niceness
(yes or no), Lag-A (one or two trials), and Lag-B (one or
two trials). There was also one classification variable,
value orientation, with three levels (prosocial, competi-
tor, individualist). These were combined in a 2 ´ 2 ´ 2 ´ 3
completely crossed design. Niceness reflected whether
the programmed opponent’s Trial-1 choice was “A” or
“B.” It was included as a factor because Komorita et al.
(1991) had found some evidence for its influence on
cooperative choice and we wanted to investigate whether
similar effects would show up in our data. There were 10
participants per cell.
Procedure
In the first phase, 1,100 students enrolled in introduc-
tory psychology courses were given a social values ques-
tionnaire as part of a mass testing session that counted
toward the course’s experiment participation require-
ment. Students were told that people with particular
scores on the questionnaire would be contacted and
invited to participate in a second phase of the study for
additional credit. All questionnaires were scored and 80
prosocials, 80 competitors, and 80 individualists,
selected at random from the master list of students, were
called and invited to the second phase, which was the
experiment proper. Students who declined the invita-
tion, or who did not show up for a scheduled session,
were replaced by randomly selected others from the mas-
ter list.
The social values assessment instrument used was the
shortened Decomposed Game (DG) measure devised by
van Lange and Kuhlman (1994) and based on a longer
form created by Messick and McClintock (1968). This
measure requires participants to imagine that they and a
randomly selected, anonymous other person will be allo-
cating points to themselves and each other. Participants
are presented with sets of three choice options (an exam-
ple of which is shown in Figure 2), with each option pre-
senting one particular allocation of points to self and
other, and are instructed to select which of the three
options they most prefer. One of the options represents
the “maximize joint gain” motive (in Figure 2, this is
Option B), a second the “maximize personal gain”
motive (Option C), and the third the “maximize relative
gain” motive (Option A). Nine such sets are presented.
The questionnaire is scored by tallying how many times
each motive is selected, and a value orientation is
assigned if the respondent selects the same motive at
least six times. Thus, a prosocial is someone who chose
the joint-gain option at least six times, an individualist
will have chosen the personal-gain option at least six
times, and a competitor will have chosen the relative-
gain option at least six times. The DG measure was
 Parks, Rumble / RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL VALUES
A B C
You get 500 500 550
Other gets 100 500 300
Figure 2 Sample social value orientation questionnaire item.
selected because it seems to be an effective technique for
measuring value orientation. Liebrand and Van Run
(1985) administered four different DG forms and
obtained a mean Spearman-Brown reliability of .93.
Parks (1994) found it to be unrelated to a measure of
interpersonal trust. Finally, Eisenberger, Kuhlman, and
Cotterell (1992) found the DG to be predictive of behav-
ior that was observed up to 6 weeks after administration
of the questionnaire.
Participants were scheduled in groups of 4 After
entering the lab, each person was seated in a cubicle that
contained the pay-off matrix shown in Figure 1 and a
tripole switchbox labeled “A,” “B,” and “OFF.” After all
participants were seated, the nature of the game was
explained. Participants were told that they and an
unidentified other participant, with whom they would
have no contact, would be working together to earn
points for themselves. Each person would choose either
“A” (the cooperative choice, although it was not
described as such to participants) or “B” (the competi-
tive choice) on each of a series of trials (20, although the
actual number was left unspecified). The combination
of the participant’s choice and other’s choice would
determine how many points each person received. Sev-
eral examples of how to read the matrix were given at
this point. Participants were told that at the end of every
trial, each person would receive a slip of paper identify-
ing the participant’s choice, the choice of the other per-
son, and the participant’s pay-off. Every 10 points accu-
mulated by a participant earned one ticket in a $50 cash
lottery to be conducted at the end of the experiment.
Next, it was explained that choices would be made by
using the switchboxes. Moving the switch either up (to
make an “A” choice) or down (“B” choice) would illumi-
nate a light on a central control panel seen only by the
experimenter. Moving the switch to the center “OFF”
position turned off all lights. To demonstrate, partici-
pants were asked to move the switch to one position or
the other, and the experimenter gave them written feed-
back indicating which choice they had made. Partici-
pants were told that, at the end of every trial, their
switches needed to be moved to the “OFF” position to
clear the control panel. The experimenter would
1305
announce when they were to make their choices and
when they were to return their switches to the “OFF”
position.
The game then began, and the experimental manipu-
lations were implemented at this point. Although partic-
ipants were led to believe that their opponent would be
another participant, in truth all participants competed
against one of the eight programmed strategies that
resulted from the combination of the independent vari-
ables. The lags were implemented following the proce-
dure used by Komorita et al. (1991). If Lag-A was equal
to 1, a participant’s A-choice was reciprocated on the
next trial, and if it was equal to 2, the participant’s A-
choice was reciprocated two trials later. The same rules
applied to the Lag-B variable and a participant’s B-
choice. Particular choice patterns by participants could
produce conflict between the lags. To address this possi-
bility, we established the following priorities: (a) The
programmed opponent chose “A” on the second trial in
all conditions except (Lag–A = 1, Lag–B = 1), which is the
Tit-for-tat condition; (b) a repeated choice was always
immediately reciprocated; and (c) when there was a con-
flict between a one-trial lag and a two-trial lag, the one-
trial lag was followed. Each of these priorities follows
those used by Komorita et al. (1991).
After the 20th trial, the experimenter announced that
the game was over. A short questionnaire, assessing indi-
vidual perceptions of the game, was distributed. After a
participant had finished the questionnaire, he or she was
given a debriefing sheet, which included a thorough dis-
cussion of the deception, and was dismissed. The master
list from the mass testing session was used to contact lot-
tery winners and was then destroyed.
RESULTS
Choices were divided into four blocks of five trials
each. Within each block, rate of cooperation (propor-
tion of cooperative choices) was calculated for each par-
ticipant by dividing the total number of cooperative
(“A”) choices within that block by five total trials. These
block rates served as the dependent variable.1 The data
were analyzed with a 2 (niceness)´ 2 (Lag-A) ´ 2 (Lag-B)
´ 3 (social value) ´ 4 (block) ANOVA, with repeated
measures on the last factor.2 The Type I error rate was set
at a = .05. No effects of niceness were found; neither the
main effect nor any interactions involving niceness was
significant. To simplify the analyses, we collapsed across
niceness and reanalyzed the data with a 2 ´ 2 ´ 3 ´ 4
repeated-measures ANOVA.
We obtained significant main effects for Lag-A, value
orientation, and block. Also, 2 three-way interactions
were significant: Orientation ´ Lag-A ´ Block and Orien-
tation ´ Lag-A ´ Lag-B. Tukey’s honestly significant dif-
ference (HSD) post hoc analyses were conducted on the
1306 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

TABLE 1: F Ratios and Effect Sizes for All Significant Effects TABLE 2: Mean Rates of Cooperation and Standard Deviations for
2
Lag-A by Lag-B Across Different Types of Value Orientation
Effect df F p<
Lag-B
Lag-A 1,227 44.94 .01 .17 One Trial Two Trials
Orientation 2,227 60.89 .01 .35
Block 3,681 27.88 .01 .13 Value Lag-A M (SD) M (SD) Grand M
Orientation ´ Lag-A ´ Lag-B 2,227 3.77 .05 .03
Orientation ´ Lag-A ´ Block 6,681 3.58 .05 .05 Prosocial One trial .62a (.15) .62a (.22) .62 (.18)
Two trials .47b (.12) .44b (.17) .46 (.15)
NOTE: a = .05. Mean .55 (.15) .53 (.21) .54 (.18)
Competitor One trial .25b (.08) .44a (.12) .35 (.14)
Two trials .09c (.07) .34a,b (.13) .22 (.17)
Mean .17 (.11) .39 (.14) .28 (.17)
means associated with all of the significant effects;3 the Individualist One trial .61a (.15) .28b (.19) .45 (.24)
between-participants MSE was .022, and the within- Two trials .41b (.16) .31b (.14) .36 (.16)
participants MSE was .068. The F ratios and effect sizes Mean .51 (.18) .29 (.16) .40 (.21)
are in Table 1. We shall discuss the main effects first. The
NOTE: Within each level of value, means with differing subscripts are
block main effect shows that cooperation declined over significantly different from one another. For each grand mean, each
time (M = .48, .37, .39, and .38; SD = .24, .25, .25, and .26, value is significantly different from the other value(s).
respectively), a relatively common pattern in prisoner’s
dilemma research (cf. Komorita & Parks, 1996). The
cooperation was delayed (Lag 2), all three value orienta-
decline is significant only between the first and second
tions showed declines in cooperation, with individualists
blocks, after which rate of cooperation stabilizes. The
declining at a slower rate than the other two. The
Lag-A main effect shows that cooperation was more fre-
response patterns for prosocials support our third
quent when it was reciprocated on the next trial (M = .47,
hypothesis.
SD = .22) rather than two trials later (M = .34, SD = .19).
This replicates the finding of Komorita et al. (1991). The
value orientation main effect shows that prosocials were DISCUSSION
more cooperative (M = .54, SD = .18) than individualists The goal of this study was to demonstrate that differ-
(M = .40, SD = .21), who in turn were more cooperative ent aspects of the Tit-for-tat strategy have differential
than competitors (M = .28, SD = .17). This is as expected. effects on rate of cooperation, depending on the target’s
Note that the failure to obtain a main effect for Lag-B is social value orientation. As predicted, we found that
consistent with Komorita et al. (1991). They found delay (a) cooperation is best induced in competitors by delay-
of retaliation to have some effect on the rate of repeti- ing retaliation for a noncooperative choice, (b) individu-
tion of competitive choice, but it had no overall effect on alists are most cooperative when both cooperative and
rate of cooperation. noncooperative choices are immediately reciprocated,
The Orientation ´ Lag-A ´ Lag-B interaction speaks and (c) prosocials eventually respond to delayed recip-
directly to our second hypothesis. Cell means are shown rocation of cooperation by decreasing their own rates of
in Table 2, where differing subscripts identify means that cooperative choice. Thus, the results extend the previ-
differ significantly. We predicted that individualists ous work of Komorita and colleagues on the basic prop-
would cooperate most frequently when both cooperative erties of Tit-for-tat, as well as recent work by van Lange
and noncooperative choices were immediately recipro- and Visser (1999) on how individuals with different
cated and that competitors would cooperate most fre- value orientations respond to Tit-for-tat.
quently when response to “B” was delayed by two trials In addition to the support for our hypotheses, we
rather than one. Both predictions are supported by our observed some other, unanticipated results. First,
data. In addition, these means reveal that prosocials prosocials had higher rates of cooperation when recipro-
cooperated more frequently when reciprocation of an cation of a cooperative choice was immediate rather
“A” choice was immediate rather than delayed; this was than delayed. This effect can largely be attributed to the
an unexpected pattern. fact that by the second block of trials, behavioral assimi-
The cell means for the Orientation ´ Lag-A ´ Block lation was already occurring. This is an important find-
effect are plotted in Figure 3. It can be seen that when ing, because it indicates that prosocials will not long tol-
cooperative choice was immediately reciprocated (Lag 1), erate exploitation. Komorita and Parks (1999) argued
prosocials maintained a constant rate of cooperation that knowing to what extent exploitation is tolerated can
over time, competitors increased their frequency of help shed light on the limitations of reciprocity as a strat-
cooperation, and individualists demonstrated a slow, egy for inducing cooperation, especially in larger
irregular decline; in addition, when reciprocation of groups. Our data indicate that even among those most
 Parks, Rumble / RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL VALUES 1307

Lag 1 need to be handled very carefully if one is trying to

0.8 induce them to cooperate. Basically, one needs to imme-
diately reciprocate their cooperative overtures and be
0.7 somewhat tolerant of noncooperative choice. This rec-
ommendation is sensible from the perspective of trying
Frequency of cooperation

0.6
to demonstrate to the competitor that one is trustworthy
and truly interested in cooperation. If one followed this
0.5
modified version of Tit-for-tat, one would begin with a
Prosocial cooperative choice; immediately respond to cooperative
0.4 Competitor
Individualist
choice with cooperation; retaliate only after the other
0.3
person had made a series of noncooperative choices;
and never unilaterally switch from cooperation to
0.2
noncooperation. This would create a friendly environ-
ment that should encourage competitively oriented oth-
0.1 ers to be more cooperative. This is consistent with Parks
and Komorita’s (1998) argument that a delay in retalia-
0
1 2 3 4
tion for a noncooperative choice—at least in a situation
Block in which all group members realize equal pay-offs—gives
the impression that one wants to be cooperative.
Finally, individualists showed slow declines in rate of
cooperation, regardless of whether reciprocation of
Lag 2
0.7
cooperation was immediate or delayed, although the
decline under immediate reciprocation was irregular.
This irregularity can perhaps be explained as the individ-
0.6
ualist’s “testing the waters” to determine to what extent
exploitation is possible. During the first block of trials,
0.5
both the individualist and the reciprocal other were fre-
Frequency of cooperation

quently cooperative. The individualist then significantly

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 2
Block
Figure 3 Mean rates of cooperation for Lag-A by orientation, across
four trial blocks.
inclined to be cooperative, willingness to be exploited
for eventual, greater gain is limited. This suggests that
even when working with prosocials, one must quickly
establish a reputation for being cooperative and
nonexploitative.
Next, we found that competitors are sensitive to a
delay in response to cooperation. Rate of cooperation
generally increased over time when reciprocation was
immediate and declined over time when it was delayed.
Combined with our finding that retaliation for
noncooperation should be delayed when interacting
with competitors, the data indicate that competitors
decreased cooperation during the second block, possi-
Prosocial
Competitor
Individualist
bly to see if the cooperative other could be exploited.
When he or she saw that consistent exploitation was not
possible, the individualist began moving back toward
mutual cooperation. Presumably, if we had collected
data beyond 20 trials, the individualist’s rate of coopera-
tion might have returned to that of the first block and
perhaps even exceeded that rate. The fact that a one-trial
delay in responding to cooperative choice produced a
3 4
consistent rate of cooperation in individualists is inter-
esting, although perhaps illusory. Participants in this
condition had decreased their rates of cooperation by
10% from the first to fourth blocks, and more trials may
have eventually produced a significant decline.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In addition to extending our understanding of how
Tit-for-tat works, our data also suggest an explanation for
inconsistencies between the findings of Komorita et al.
(1991) and Bixenstine and Gaebelein (1971), as well as
inconsistencies within the Komorita et al. (1991) article.
Bixenstine and Gaebelein found rate of cooperation to
be greatest when reciprocation of both cooperation and
noncooperation were delayed (.71), but Komorita et al.
(1991) found a delay-delay combination to inhibit coop-
eration (.28). It is possible that this discrepancy is attrib-
1308 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
utable to different distributions of value orientations
within the two participant samples. For example,
Komorita et al. (1991) may have had an inordinate num-
ber of individualists within their sample, who would have
reacted to a global delay in reciprocation by being unco-
operative. Note that our overall rate of cooperation in
the delay-delay condition (.36) is more similar to
Komorita et al. (1991) than to Bixenstine and
Gaebelein, suggesting that the latter’s reported rate may
have been unusually high.
We noted earlier that the data suggest a very particu-
lar way in which to interact with competitors if one is try-
ing to induce cooperation. In effect, one is trying to in-
directly communicate the value of cooperation as well as
one’s willingness to be cooperative. This is consistent
with goal/expectation theory (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977),
which states that prosocials possess the goal of mutual
cooperation and the expectation that others will be simi-
larly cooperative. If others act noncooperatively, the
prosocial will eventually retreat into a “defensive” mode
and become noncooperative. Thus, the prosocial has
faith in others but also needs evidence that this faith is
warranted. Competitors have neither the goal of cooper-
ation nor the belief that others will cooperate and need
to develop both to become cooperative. Our data sug-
gest that this information can be transmitted through a
specific set of actions. However, it is also possible to com-
municate this information through the sharing of state-
ments of intended behavior, which are known to influ-
ence the choices of others (Chen, 1996; Parks et al.,
1996). Both goal/expectation theory and our data imply
that people with different value orientations will react to
different types of information in such statements. Spe-
cifically, it should be the case that prosocials need only to
be told that others intend to be cooperative to induce
them to cooperate, whereas competitors need this infor-
mation and need to be taught why mutual cooperation is
beneficial.
Our hypotheses were derived from the experience-
weighted attraction-learning model (Camerer & Ho,
1998, 1999), which offers an explanation for why a per-
son might alter his or her choice strategy over time.
Although our data were consistent with the predictions
of that model, we cannot say for certain that expecta-
tions were violated or that participants were engaging in
mental simulations of alternate courses of action. For-
mal tests of these propositions would help us better
understand the processes by which choices are made in
multitrial, mixed-motive interactions, an understanding
that is currently very limited (Messick & Liebrand,
1995).
Finally, it should be noted that our conclusions apply
only to dyadic, prisoner’s dilemma–type situations. It is
known that reciprocation in general becomes less effec-
tive as group size increases (Komorita et al., 1992), and
the inclusion of value orientation adds complexity,
because the larger group will contain a range of value
orientations. We have earlier demonstrated that, in the-
ory, a basic Tit-for-tat strategy can be modified to be
applicable to large groups (Parks & Komorita, 1997), but
our model does not address delay of reciprocation.
Extension of this article’s results to large-scale groups
first requires an investigation of how delays in reciproca-
tion of choices affect widespread cooperation in such
groups. Regarding dilemma type, with occasional excep-
tions (Komorita et al., 1991; Kramer, McClintock, &
Messick, 1986; Parks, 1994), researchers have not investi-
gated how either value orientation or reciprocity influ-
ences choice in more general social dilemmas such as
resource dilemmas and public goods. Given the preva-
lence of these types of dilemmas in society, and given the
evidence for both social values and reciprocity as influ-
ences on behavior, this lack of research is surprising. The
study of reciprocity in other types of dilemmas would be
intertwined with the group size issue, because public
goods and resource dilemmas almost always involve
more than two people, but the role of value orientation
could be addressed in a straightforward manner. Both
Kramer et al. (1986) and Parks (1994) found value orien-
tation to be predictive of harvesting behavior, and Parks
(1994) also showed that it was unrelated to public good
contribution. However, these two studies raised many
additional questions that have yet to be answered. In
conclusion, our data extend our understanding of how
reciprocity works, as well as the limits of a reciprocal
approach. We have seen that simply applying a Tit-for-tat
strategy in any interdependent situation, irrespective of
the distribution of value orientations within the group,
may or may not lead to long-term mutual cooperation.
Instead, one needs to ascertain the orientations within
the group and then tailor one’s choice strategy
accordingly.
NOTES
1. Proportional data are susceptible to variance deflation problems
resulting from the squaring of decimal data, producing an inflated
Type I error rate. To check for this, arcsine transformations of the data
were also analyzed. The results were the same as those obtained from
the raw data, indicating that none of the significant findings were
attributable to variance deflation. For ease of explanation, we report
the original raw results.
2. During data entry, it was discovered that a programmed strategy
had been incorrectly applied to one participant, an individualist in the
(not nice, 2-trial Lag-A, 2-trial Lag-B) condition. This person was dis-
carded from the data set.
3. A test for homogeneity of variance indicates consistency of vari-
ance across cells of the design, making Tukey’s honestly significant dif-
ference (HSD) an appropriate post hoc test. Because we had to discard
one participant, producing unequal cell counts, the general form of
 Parks, Rumble / RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL VALUES
the Tukey procedure was used, which can accommodate unequal ns.
This involves calculating the value
2 nal of Personality, 54, 576-591.
n g n h Yg Yh
F (1),
ng n h MSE
for each pair of means and then comparing F against the critical value
2
q /2. Any pair of means for which F exceeds the critical value are sig-
nificantly different from one another (see Maxwell & Delaney, 1990,
pp. 184-185, for more information).
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Received January 3, 2000
Revision accepted October 11, 2000