KMU vs Garcia

FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to
charge passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year.
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed
by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and
unreasonable.
ISSUE:Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates
based on the order of the LTFRB
HELD:
The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of
public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to
adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A
further delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to
change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators.
PASEI vs Torres
FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong”. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying
Hong Kong bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly
licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for
Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to
prohibit implementation.
ISSUES:
whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars;
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is
constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of
proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2
of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with
the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days
after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party
or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Prohibition granted.
Santiago vs COMELEC
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional
provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three
systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two
latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions
were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former
Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
“Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . .
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is
obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress
for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.
US vs Ang Tang Ho
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG
issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at
which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the
EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the
said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD:
First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the
place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves
the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details
in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457

Facts:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike
— but hear me first!'" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The said executive order reads in full as follows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626
particularly with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and.
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above
measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case,
the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, * which upheld the trial court, **
and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His
claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the
improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution.
Issue:
won EO 626-a is unconstitutional. Won police power has been properly exercised
Held:
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts. And while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if
there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to
make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise,
courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law
when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in
the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its
function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and
eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which
affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the
tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the
public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the
justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending
the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the
small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure.
In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps
to protect and preserve them.
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070

Facts:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing
agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) 1 their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, a new
agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL)of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, 2 this
Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents
filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. On December 21, 1992,
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that
it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. 4 Petitioner
ignored their request. then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order 7 partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits
outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing
purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. DTAHEC
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied. 8 They filed a notice of
appeal 9 with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for
exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz
Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Issue:
Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum
retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?
Held:
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued
DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its
mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform.
Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners
have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the
agrarian reform program.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules
and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in
modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial
review. 12 They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body
concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution. 13 The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the
authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of
their regulations
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or
"agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It
is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock
farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has
exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

The Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782,

Facts:
Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic
violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18, 1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the
Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek
damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints. Another
letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against
the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in
Mandaluyong. This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a
lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N.
Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the
Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by
Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District. Required to submit a
Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of
Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of
motor vehicles for traffic violations. For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's
license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the
Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain
conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his
own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a
memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated
February 28, 1991. Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited
only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses. On May 24, 1990, the
Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as
reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be
detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received
several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic
violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed
under PD 1605.
the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fee in the measure was that it violated existing law,
specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and
the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention,
however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal
challenge to its validity.
Issue:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 arevalid in the
exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only asagents of the national legislature?
Held:
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and
provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What
only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient
standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus
"prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the
"convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is
an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority.
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we
must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal.
To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a
valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the
first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does
not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing
the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such
sanctions.
Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. v. De La Serna, G.R. No. 92174, 102552,
Facts:
Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 851, the Thirteenth Month Pay Law, read as follows:
SEC. 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more
than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later than
December 24 of every year.
Sec. 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by
this Decree.
A routine inspection was conducted on May 2, 1989 in the premises of petitioner Boie-Takeda
Chemicals, Inc. by Labor and Development Officer Reynaldo B. Ramos under Inspection Authority No. 4-
209-89. Finding that Boie-Takeda had not been including the commissions earned by its medical
representatives in the computation of their 13th month pay, Ramos served a Notice of Inspection
Results 1 on Boie-Takeda through its president, Mr. Benito Araneta, requiring Boie-Takeda within ten
(10) calendar days from notice to effect restitution or correction of "the underpayment of 13th month
pay for the year(s) 1986, 1987 and 1988 of Med Rep (Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of 13th
month pay # 5) in the total amount of P558,810.89."
Boie-Takeda wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results, and
expressing the view "that the commission paid to our medical representatives are not to be included in
the computation of the 13th month pay . . . (since the) law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR
or BASIC salary and therefore exclude all other remunerations which are not part of the REGULAR
salary." It pointed out that, "If no sales is (sic) made under the effort of a particular representative, there
is no commission during the period when no sale was transacted, so that commissions are not and
cannot be legally defined as regular in nature."
Regional Director Luna C. Piezas directed Boie-Takeda to appear before his Office on June 9 and
16, 1989. On the appointed dates, however, and despite due notice, no one appeared for Boie-Takeda,
and the matter had perforce to be resolved on the basis of the evidence at hand.
A motion for reconsideration 4 was seasonably filed by Boie-Takeda under date of August 3,
1989. Treated as an appeal, it was resolved on January 17, 1990 by then Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio
de la Serna, who affirmed the July 24, 1989 Order with modification that the sales commissions earned
by Boie-Takeda's medical representatives before August 13, 1989, the effectivity date of Memorandum
Order No. 28 and its Implementing Guidelines, shall be excluded in the computation of their 13th month
pay.
Issue:
won the revised guidelines on the implementation of the 13th month pay law issued by then
Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of commissions in the 13th month pay, were issued in excess
of the statutory authority conferred by PD 851
Held:
Contrary to respondents' contention, Memorandum Order No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or
abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of Memorandum Order No. 28, it merely
"modified" Section 1 of the decree by removing the P1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month
Pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement
to said benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than
P1,000.00, said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basic salary of the employee-recipient as
provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851
applies equally to "basic salary" under Memorandum Order No. 28.
In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5
(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the
concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot
add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.

United BF Homeowner's Association v. BF Homes, Inc.,

G.R. No. 124873,
[July 14, 1999], 369 PHIL 568-582

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) under
receivership to undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program due to its financial difficulties. Petitioner
UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1989,
and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the BF Homes
Parañaque Subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the
administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space in 1989 and 1993,
respectively. In 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of
respondent BFHI's eleven (11) members of the board of directors was appointed. Petitioner UBFHAI filed
with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging
that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver.
Without filing an answer to the petition with HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to
enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for
prohibition and also ordered HIGC's hearing officer to refrain from hearing and to dismiss it for lack of
jurisdiction. Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
whether or not the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the HIGC, specifically Section 1(b), Rule II
of the "Rules of Procedure in the Settlement of Homeowners' Disputes" is valid
Held:
No. The power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to
what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed for an administrative
agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot
be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is
the former that prevails.
In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it
promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions
of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the law, insofar as the association's franchise or corporate
existence is involved, it is only the State, not the "general public or other entity" that could question
this. The appellate court correctly held that: "The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER
ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do . . . ." The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as
with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting
statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution." It is axiomatic that a rule or
regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or
regulation is to be valid.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77372
[April 29, 1988], 243 PHIL 107-1006

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)

issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following
pertinent provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination
day including the examination day.
"Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8,
Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission." 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed in their
own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution
and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of
October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was granted in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has Jurisdiction over the case or whether or not the PRC is co-equal
with the RTC
Held:
The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with respect to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide for the procedure that need be
taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for
the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional
Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is
no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission,
that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the
enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be
unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the
Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is
attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court.
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
ALSO Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P.
Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
"SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from
proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's
Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi- judicial adjudication would mean a determination of
rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation. 14 This
does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to
implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by
the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

People v. Que Po Lay

G.R. No. 6791
 [March 29, 1954], 94 PHIL 640-644

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him
guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S.
dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published
in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said
circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both
require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and
2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation
of a law in order to have force and effect.
Issue:
Whether or not Circular no. 20 is enforceable
Held:
No. We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication
of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All
that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two
Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably,
for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of
Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after
the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20
of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U. S.
vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and
regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle
and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and especifically informed of
said contents and its penalties.
In the present case, although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it
was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said Circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession within one day following his taking possession
thereof.

Tañada v. Tuvera,
 G.R. No. L-63915
(Resolution)
[December 29, 1986], 230 PHIL 528-540

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided,"
as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect."

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the
supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency or for particular persons
did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."
Issue:
Whether the phrase “unless otherwise provided” means that the publication of the law may be
dispensed with if stated by the said law
Held:
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless
it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. cdphil
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
 It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

||| (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, [October 18, 1977], 169 PHIL 437-453)

Facts: Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del
Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to
electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor
banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray
or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as 'senso' with a somewhat webbed
copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was
attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru
electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its currect reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace"

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that
it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The
lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

Issue: whether or not the 1967 regulations penalising electro fishing in fresh water,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and natural resources and the commission
of fisheries under the old fisheries law and the law creating the fisheries commission is
valid.
Held: No. In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in
accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law
itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2)
unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine mollusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6)
other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of
"other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next
lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in
Section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations
fixed in Section 83 of the Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations,
of course, the law itself cannot be extended.

[G.R. No. 9876. December 8, 1914.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant
1. ANIMALS; REMOVAL OF CARABAOS FROM QUARANTINE. — Act No. 1760, entitled "An
act to prevent the introduction into the Philippine Islands of dangerous communicable animal
diseases, to prevent the spread of such diseases within the Islands, and for other purposes,"
does not punish the removal of carabaos, which had been exposed to a dangerous
communicable disease, from a quarantine established on a portion of the premises of the
accused, said carabaos having been simply removed from the corral in which they were
quarantined and worked upon the adjoining lands of the accused, and they, at the time, not
suffering from a dangerous communicable disease, or being recently imported, and the
Secretary of the Interior not having made the declaration provided for in section 5 of that Act,
and the said animals not having been driven or taken by the accused upon the highway, or from
one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another

2. ID.; QUARANTINE REGULATIONS OF BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE. — While Act No.

1760, entitled as aforesaid, authorizes the Director of Agriculture, among other things, "to
require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been
exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by
him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease," a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture made in pursuance of such authority will not be held to be criminal unless the statute
expressly makes it so and provides a punishment

3. ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF. — Said Act, although it authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do
certain things, as aforesaid, nowhere makes a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture unlawful or criminal, nor does it provide a punishment for such violation
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — Although the Act provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of
this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or
by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court, for each offense," such provision is not broad enough to cover a violation
of an order of the Bureau of Agriculture lawfully made and promulgated under the authority
conferred upon said bureau by said Act, the violation of such an order not being a violation "of
the provisions of this Act.”

5. ID.; ID.; ID. — Orders of the Bureau of Agriculture issued in pursuance of the authority
conferred by Act No. 1760, while they have, in a sense, the force of law, are not penal statutes,
and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense under said Act, the statute itself not
expressly making it so.

6. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLAINT; CONVICTION OF OFFENSE INCLUDED IN CHARGE. —

While the acts charged .in the information do not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of
Act No. 1760, they do constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and,
while the information charges that the acts set forth therein constitute a violation of Act No.
1760, the accused may be convicted of a violation of the Penal Code.

Facts: "That on or about the 22d day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the
above-named accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known
as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of a duly-authorized agent of the Director of
Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico,
Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said date and at said place, the said accused, Adriano
Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine
against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from
the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by
virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the
said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them.” The
defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not
constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded
not guilty.

Issue: whether or not a violation of an order by the Director of Agriculture constitutes a

penal sanction.

Held: No. The only sections of Act No. 1760 which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful
are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. There is no question here of
importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a
dangerous communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration
provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said animals from one island,
province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged in the information and
proved on the trial that the animals had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease
and that they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that
he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and worked them upon the
lands adjoining. They had not been in the highway nor moved from one municipality or
settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined,
and there worked by the servants of the accused.|

[G.R. No. 44291. August 15, 1936.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. AUGUSTO A. SANTOS, defendant-appellee.
Facts: On June 18, 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed against the accused-appellee
August A. Santos an information which reads as follows: "The undersigned Provincial Fiscal
accuses Augusto A. Santos of violation of section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order
No. 2 and penalized by section 29 thereof committed as follows:"That on or about April 29,
1935, within 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point, Corregidor Island, Province of Cavite, P. I., the
said accused Augusto A. Santos, the registered owner of two fishing motor boats Malabon II
and Malabon III, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have his said boats,
manned and operated by his fishermen, fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce within three (3) kilometers from the shore line of the
Island of Corregidor over which the naval and military authorities of the United States exercise
jurisdiction.

The above quoted provisions of Administrative Order No. 2 were issued by the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, now Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of
the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 which reads as follows: "SEC.
4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. — The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources shall from time to time issue such instructions, orders, rules and regulations
consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions
thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions."

Issue: whether or not the order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is valid.

Held: Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from
fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission
from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and
naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such
instructions, orders, rules and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and
proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising
under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions
similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative
Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to
him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now
to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only
an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and
therefore said conditional clause is null and void and without effect

[G.R. No. 159149. June 26, 2006.]

The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Energy, petitioner, vs. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
||

Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders. 3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a
maximum of P50,000. On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to
implement B.P. Blg. 33. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the
DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. After trial on the merits, the trial court
nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law. 6 The
court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation,
might exceed the maximum penalty under the law.
Petitioner argues that the penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are
sanctioned by Sections 1 9 and 3-A 10 of B.P. Blg. 33 and Section 23 11 of Republic Act No.
8479. 12 Petitioner adds that Sections 5(g) 13 and 21 14 of Republic Act No. 7638 15 also
authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular. Respondent counters that
the enabling laws, B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479, do not expressly penalize the acts and
omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638,
respondent claims, since the said law does not pertain to LPG traders. Respondent maintains
that the Circular is not in conformity with the law it seeks to implement.

Issue: whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular
null and void, and prohibiting the Circular's implementation.

Held: For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute
itself. 16

The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal
trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this
general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular
merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no
price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no
authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no
distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders,
tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts
and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb
the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.

As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under
B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts
aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular,
the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, 17 an amount within the range
allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any
maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on
a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes
are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving
petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding
penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum
pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular
contravenes the law.