HUMAN RELATIONS

B. Human Relations

Abuse of right (2006 BAR)

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the norms enshrined in Art. 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

This principle is based upon the famous maxim summum jus summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest
possible wrong) (Arlegui v. CA, G.R. No. 126437, March 6, 2002).

Rationale: The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another or offends morals or good customs (Pineda, 2009).

Elements of abuse of right (L-B-P-A)

1. There is a Legal right or duty;

2. Such duty is exercised in Bad faith;

3. It is for the sole intent of Prejudicing or injuring another;

4. The Absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right (Rabuya, 2009).

Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria

It means damage without injury. One who merely exercises one’s rights does no actionable injury and cannot be
held liable for damages (Amonoy v. Guitierrez, G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001).

INJURY is the illegal invasion of a legal right; DAMAGE is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered (Panteleon v. American
Express, G.R. No. 174269, August 25, 2010).

There can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone (Ibid.)

Article 19, 20 and 21 in the enforcement and sanctions of abuse of right

While Art. 19 lays down the rule of conduct for the government of human relations, it does not provide a remedy
(Rabuya, 2006).

Generally, an action for damages under either Art. 20 or Art. 21 of the NCC would be proper. Art. 21 deals with acts
contra bonus mores or contrary to good morals and presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which one may
suffer as a result of such violation. Under Arts. 19 and 21, the act must be intentional (Rabuya, 2006).

Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their
own sanction. Article 21 on the other hand, speaks of act which is legal but is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order or public policy and is done with intent to injure.

Sanction for abuse of right under Article 20 of the NCC

Generally, laws provide for their own sanctions and methods of enforcement thereof. Article 20 applies only in cases
where the law does not provide for its own sanctions.

Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for
the same (NCC, Art. 20). The said article provides for a general sanction – indemnification for damages (Pineda,
2009). (1996, 2006, 2009 BAR)
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In view of the general sanction provided for under Art. 20, a person however does not have an absolute right to be
indemnified, it is essential that some right of his be impaired. Without such, he is not entitled to indemnification
(Pineda, 2009).

Contra Bonus Mores (1996, 1998, 2006, 2009 BAR)

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage (NCC, Art. 21). It fills countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they suffered material and moral damages
(Tolentino, 1987).

Elements of an action under Art. 21

1. There is an act which is legal;

2. Such act is contrary to morals, good customs, public order or policy;

3. It is done with intent to injure.

Civil liability for moral negligence There is no civil liability for moral negligence. A person is required to act with
prudence towards others, but not with charity; the law imposes diligence and not altruism. Hence, the failure to
make sacrifices or egoism does not constitute a source of liability (Tolentino, 1987).

Illustration: A person who fails to render assistance to a drowning person or to the victim of an accident, cannot be
held liable for damages (3 Colin & Capitant 826).

While a person can be absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. The failure
of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling
that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable
(Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009).

Breach of promise to marry

GR: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

There is no provision in the NCC authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

Exception: When the act constitutes one where damages pursuant to Art. 21 of the NCC may be recovered and is not
a mere breach of promise to marry, such as:

1. Where the woman is a victim of moral seduction (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19,
1993).

2. Where one formally sets a wedding and go through and spend for all the preparations and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony was about to be solemnized (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26,
1964).

3. Where the woman is a victim of abduction and rape, and thereafter the accused promised to marry her to avoid
criminal liability but later reneged on his promise (Buñag, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992).

A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. But where a man's promise to marry is the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that the promise was only
a deceptive device to inveigle her to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
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been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R.
No. 97336, February 19, 1993).

Q: Soledad a high school teacher used to go around together with Francisco who was almost ten (10) years
younger than her. Eventually, intimacy developed between them after Soledad became an underwriter in
Cebu. One evening, they had sexual intercourse in Francisco’s cabin on board M/V Escaño, to which he was
then attached as apprentice pilot. After a few months, Soledad advised Francisco that she was pregnant,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Later their child was born. However, subsequently, Francisco married
another woman. Soledad filed a complaint for moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. May
moral damages be recovered for breach of promise to marry?

A: NO. It is the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry. Francisco is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately 10 years younger than the
complainant — who around 36 years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with him, than a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the Court of First Instance found that, complainant “surrendered herself” to Francisco because,
“overwhelmed by her love” for him, she “wanted to bind” “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy (Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L14628, September 30, 1960). ---

NOTE: To constitute seduction there must be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction.

Prohibition against Unjust Enrichment

No one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another (Pacific Merchandising Corp. v. Consolacion
Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-30204, October 29, 1976).

NOTE: The article applies only if:

1. Someone acquires or comes into possession of “something” which means delivery or acquisition of “things”; and

2. Acquisition is undue and at the expense of another, which means without any just or legal ground.

Accion In Rem Verso

It is the remedy for unjust enrichment. It is an action for recovery of what has been paid or delivered without just
cause or legal ground. If a person acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of another without
just or legal ground through an act or of performance by another or any other means has the obligation to return the
same (NCC, Art. 22).

Accion in rem verso can only be availed of if there is no other remedy to enforce it based on contract, quasicontract,
crime or quasi-delict.

Requisites(E-L-W-A)

1. The defendant has been Enriched;

2. The plaintiff has suffered a Loss;

3. The enrichment of the defendant is Without just or legal ground; and

4. The plaintiff has no other Action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

Accion in rem verso v. Solutio Debiti

In accion in rem verso, it is not necessary that there should have been mistake in the payment unlike in solution
indebiti where mistake is an essential element (Rabuya, 2006).
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Liability without fault or negligence

Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited (NCC, Art. 23).

PRE-JUDICIAL QUESTION UNDER ART. 36 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

Q: On November 2002, XYZ Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased from ABC Homes, Inc., residential lots situated in its subdivision Quezon City, containing a total
area of 10, 000 square meters for the aggregate price of P56,250,000.00. The transactions were embodied in
two separate deeds deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first deed were fully delivered
to XYZ Corporation, but 5 TCTs covering 5 of the 10 parcels of land with a total area of 4, 500 square meters
purchased under the second deed of sale, for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of P25, 230, 000,
were not delivered to XYZ Corporation. XYZ Corporation filed a case for specific performance before the
HLURB and a criminal case charging respondent directors and officers of ABC Homes with non-delivery of
titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 before the OCP
of Quezon City. The OCP suspended the filing of the criminal case stating that the case pending in HLURB
poses a prejudicial question. XYZ Corporation alleges that there is no prejudicial question between the two
cases because prejudicial question only exists when one case is civil and the other is criminal and the case
pending before HLURB is an administrative one. Is the argument of XYZ Corporation tenable?

A: NO. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to XYZ
Corporation’s submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the
prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524
of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in
nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive
and original.

According to SC, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether San Miguel was
legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether
BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former
must obviously precede that of the latter, for the HLURB hold San Miguel property to be not entitled to the delivery
of the TCTs because lawyer did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale to his receivership having
been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for violation of Sec. 25 of PD 597 would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case (San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Sec. Perez, G.R. No.
166836, September 4, 2013). (BERSAMIN, J.)