C H R I S T I A N N A D E AU

23
REPUBLICANISM
Christian Nadeau

Republicanism is, first and foremost, a theory of political liberty. According to the
republican theory, an agent is free if and only if he has a status equal to that of any other
citizen; furthermore, this status must effectively protect him from domination by other
citizens or by the State, i.e. from arbitrary interference with his choices. The greatest
obstacle to liberty, according to the republican view, is not interference but, rather,
domination, for the latter implies the individual’s being in an unacceptable state of vul-
nerability vis-à-vis another individual, a group of individuals, or a political organization
(Pettit and Braithwaite 1990; Pettit 1997a, b, c). The fundamental difference between
domination and interference stems from their logical independence: interference can
occur without involving the domination of an individual by another agent; conversely,
domination can occur even in the absence of interference, as an individual is considered
to be dominated just to the extent that he is compelled, for structural reasons, to obey
someone else (Lazzeri 2001).
According to the republican theory, having a political status recognized by eve-
ryone effectively protects or “immunizes” an agent against all attempts to dominate
him, as this presupposes a legitimate association among all citizens (Pettit 1997a:
108). Thus, far from advocating the isolation of individuals from one another, repub-
licanism values their cooperation, and views social institutions as tools necessary for
safeguarding the liberties of all; indeed, since it sees political and legal institutions
as necessary conditions for liberty, the republican theory posits an analytic relation
between the role of the State and the concept of political liberty, with the latter
consisting in non-domination. Liberty is not, as it were, a collateral effect of a soci-
ety’s laws, but is, rather, constituted by the institutions which aim to promote all
individuals’ rights and obligations in order to protect them from illegitimate interfer-
ence—just as, in the immune system, antibodies collectively react to the introduction
of a foreign body (Pettit 1996, 1997a). Now, these antibodies do not properly cause
the agent’s immunity; rather, they constitute this very immunity (Honohan 2009).
Using the above analogy, we might say that society’s institutions are the instrumen-
tal means guaranteeing the person’s liberty: the antibodies are the means whereby
someone becomes immune. In sum, a free individual is one who has institutional
guarantees that shield him from any and all arbitrary interferences that could thwart
his choices within the legitimate space of his liberty. Those institutional guarantees
must be deeply democratic in order to avoid the domination of the State over the
individuals that compose it.

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1. The Historiographical Debate

Republicanism is an intellectual tradition concerned with the concept of political liberty.
This tradition goes back to Antiquity, and has undergone many variations over the cen-
turies, making it difficult to establish clear logical connections between its contemporary
proponents and the models that they draw from this tradition. On the other hand, one
cannot separate recent theoretical developments within republicanism from the work
of numerous historians of political ideas, first and foremost Quentin Skinner. Indeed, it
is largely on the basis of Skinner’s work that Philip Pettit came up with the concept of
liberty as non-domination, which today lies at the heart of republican political theory.
Historians of political ideas have been studying the multiple traditions linked to the
history of republicanism for many years and especially the contrast between neo-Roman
republicanism as presented by Quentin Skinner (1998) and what Hans Baron called
“civic humanism” (Spitz 1995; Geuna 1998). Since Hans Baron’s (1955) seminal work
on civic humanism, two major families of political ideas have gradually emerged in
connection with one another; while they diverge significantly on several points, both
nevertheless emphasize the importance of political liberty as guaranteed by legitimate
institutions. Civic humanism can be traced back to a classical conception, originally
inspired by Aristotle, of “the good life” as a perfectionist ideal. It is based on the idea
that the agent fulfills himself by actively participating in the political life of his com-
munity. The citizen’s active presence makes it possible to establish adequate relations
between the State and the citizens, as well as between the citizens themselves (Arendt
1958; Baron 1955; Moulakis 2008; Pocock 1975). It should be added, however, that
this category is currently the subject of numerous disputes among historians (Hankins
2000). According to other authors, especially Quentin Skinner, another political tradi-
tion, neo-Roman republicanism, which is related to civic humanism but nevertheless
different in several key respects, emerged in the Renaissance—in the work of Machi-
avelli, in particular (Geuna 2009). While civic humanism looked to the political world
of Ancient Greece, this alternative tradition turned instead to the thinkers of Rome,
especially Cicero. This rereading of Machiavelli has engendered several studies tracing
the main historiographical and theoretical stages of republicanism (Viroli 1988, 1990).
The main difference between these two ways of conceiving the ideal relations between
citizens stems from the different values that each perspective grants to participation in
political life and civic virtues: for civic humanism, they are intrinsically good; for neo-
Roman republicanism, they are merely means for attaining liberty.
Civic humanism, thus, gives an essential role to the vita activa and to the vivere civile,
i.e. to a way of life dedicated to civic activities. The distinction between civic human-
ism and republicanism, however, should be understood neither in the same sense as
Benjamin Constant’s distinction between the liberty of the Ancients versus that of the
Moderns, nor as equivalent to Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) distinction between positive and
negative conceptions of liberty: that is, while the “liberty of the Ancients” and “posi-
tive liberty” fairly aptly characterize the principles defended by the authors associated
with civic humanism (such as Leonardo Bruni or Collucio Salutati), neither the “liberty
of the Moderns,” nor “negative liberty”—both of which underlie standard versions of
liberalism—adequately captures the ideal of liberty as non-domination.
In fact, the concept of liberty as non-domination emerges in response to dissatisfac-
tion with the seemingly false dichotomy between two traditional conceptions of politi-
cal liberty, namely “negative” and “positive” liberty.

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For the apologists of positive liberty, on the one hand, the real problem is not so much
“how far” power can extend, but rather “to whom” it belongs. According to Berlin, the
advocates of positive liberty are not concerned with the question of the limits of power,
because it is encompassed by the larger, more pressing question, of determining “who”
holds power (Berlin 1969; Carter 2008; Spitz 1995).
The negative conception of liberty, on the other hand, is meant to answer the ques-
tion of the limits of civil institutions’ authority. According to the negative conception
of liberty, any interference by the State or by another individual in one’s choices of
action constitutes a constraint on liberty. Liberty, therefore, depends on the possibility
of making choices without being subject to real and effective constraints. Many liberal
authors, following Isaiah Berlin, see negative liberty as the only possible conception
of political liberty compatible with value-pluralism. For Berlin, the concept of nega-
tive liberty is to be preferred to the positive, for only the former is compatible with the
recognition of the plurality of values and their mutually incommensurable character,
without requiring individuals to forsake their own ends in the name of emancipation
and autonomy, which everyone would ostensibly obtain by way of their political com-
mitment to the common good.
Republicanism is sometimes characterized, according to the vocabulary of liberalism
(e.g. Rawls’s terminology), as a “comprehensive political theory,” based on an ideal of
the good life, which, however, is prima facie inconsistent with the axiological pluralism
defended by liberalism—but, as even Rawls himself remarks, such a characterization
improperly conflates civic humanism with republicanism (Rawls 1993).
Most republican authors refuse to assimilate their conception of political liberty to
positive liberty. On the one hand, as a deeply democratic theory, republicanism upholds
the value-pluralism proper to contemporary societies (Guérard de Latour 2009); on the
other hand, it must not, in so doing, simply join the ranks of the defenders of the tra-
dition of negative liberty—or at least not the version championed by Berlin and his
followers.
Conceived of as a normative theory, negative liberty calls for the reduction, or even
the total elimination, of “interference” by others, whereas, according to the republican
interpretation, the concept of political liberty involves the absence of arbitrary restraints,
but does not imply that citizens ought to be protected from all kinds of interference
whatsoever. The latter requirement would be misguided, in effect, as the State—suppos-
ing it to be legitimate, which is by no means assumed necessarily or for all cases—can
legitimately exercise interference as a, or even as the only, form of effective protection
vis-à-vis the arbitrary power relations among its citizens. This is still a negative form of
liberty—in the sense that liberty is conceived as the absence of something—yet on the
condition of not reducing all constraint of liberty to interference. Properly republican
political liberty is not the result of the elimination of the relations between agents; on
the contrary, it takes account of the fact that political union actually fosters the pro-
tection of all. Thus, if the State, qua democratic authority dedicated to promoting and
defending its citizens’ interests against the hegemony of others, intervenes to hinder or
block a particular action, one ought not to regard this “interference” as an obstacle to
liberty per se.
The main criticism that republicanism makes of the concept of negative liberty is
that the latter seems to lead to the idea that the best means for putting an end to agents’
mutual interference is to definitively separate them from one another. The republican
model of virtue, by contrast, emphasizes citizens’ mutual obligation to defend each oth-

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er’s liberty as if it were their own: what we have here is a version of an idea going back to
the eighteenth century, namely the “love of equality” (l’amour de l’égalité) promulgated
by Rousseau and his followers (Spitz 2000)—although this does not entail, for all that,
a return to positive liberty.

2. Questions and Debates

The concept of liberty as non-domination has given rise to numerous debates since
Philip Pettit’s first writings on the subject. Quite a few liberal authors, on the one hand,
view this concept as being perfectly compatible with the liberal tradition, yet as not
effectively adding anything especially interesting or substantive to the traditional lib-
eral conceptions of political liberty developed since John Stuart Mill. On this view,
republicanism amounts at most to an amendment to standard theories of political lib-
erty or to a kind of warning serving to draw theorists’ attention to the threats to liberty
(instead of focusing exclusively on what directly contravenes it); as such, republicanism
could have an impact on how we think about the institutionalization of liberalism, say,
but does not change the latter’s internal logic in any way. Republican authors, on the
other hand, present their project as a bona fide option, distinct from the different vari-
ants of liberalism, and also directly confront their model with those of other traditions,
such as Marxism or libertarianism.
We must first consider the core concepts of the republican theory, the most impor-
tant of which is without doubt the concept of domination. If we regard it as the possible
yet uncertain effect of social relations, then domination can hardly be seen as a genuine
problem; more importantly, there seems to be no way to thereby distinguish it from
other forms of coercion. Now, the distinguishing mark of domination is that it implies
a structural relation between agents, such that some have the capacity to arbitrarily
interfere in the choices of others (Lovett 2010). And these structural relations—rather
than contingent social relations that actually determine agents against their will—are
the true forms of domination.
The classic example is the relation between the good master and the slave: if domi-
nation is assessed according to a given social structure, then it might not be possible to
identify the effects of domination in certain cases, for example, if the master’s good-
ness extends so far as to allow his slave to be free in all practical respects—yet a slave
nonetheless. But the essential thing is that the structure of their relation matters more
than the contingent fact of the master’s good or bad disposition, for, regardless of the
master’s goodness, the relation between him and his slave implies a hierarchical order,
such that it is always only the former who decides whether or not the latter shall live
decently. Indeed, even if the slave were to outwit his master and to succeed in living
well by this means, he would nevertheless remain subject to the former’s will, because,
given the hierarchical order that binds them, any victory by the slave can never be more
than provisional. In the Marriage of Figaro, for example, the valet desires Susanna, the
Countess’s chambermaid, and he must use cunning to conceal her from the eye of the
Count, his master; yet only when he is no longer in the latter’s service can his victory
become definitive.
On the other hand, while domination stems from perverted social structures, these
structures themselves are not agents of domination per se; rather, it is agents who dominate
each other, for without them, those social structures would have no effect whatsoever. In
a society characterized by domination, one master may die and be replaced by another,

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but if all of the masters were to disappear and only the slaves to remain, the very notion of
domination would lose all significance; that is to say, domination implies both dominat-
ing and dominated agents. But, as we have just seen, no agents can be so qualified without
reference to the structure of the relation that regulates their mutual interactions.
The republican theory has provoked much criticism, particularly of its concept of
liberty as non-domination. Most objections consist in denying that this concept adds
anything significant to the traditional liberal conceptions of political liberty. Others
recognize its distinctiveness, yet deem it either incoherent or unacceptable on the
ground that it is, ultimately, too closely tied to a conception of “the good life” and hence
incompatible with the pluralism intrinsic to contemporary democratic societies. These
two types of criticism are mainly voiced by liberal theorists (Goodin 2003; Larmore
2004; Patten 1996; Waldron 2007).
Another group of critics, while favorable towards the republican project, nevertheless
doubt whether it can become truly relevant unless it distinguishes itself more clearly
from liberalism. These critics argue in various ways for the need to appeal to a substan-
tive moral conception of the relations between individuals—a strategy that, in extreme
cases, can lead to giving up the concept of liberty as non-domination altogether, in
favor of positive liberty. Other “internal” critics of republicanism attempt to differen-
tiate it from liberalism by advocating more radical mechanisms for contestation and
participation by citizens, without, for all that, regarding this conception as a means for
guiding citizens towards a putative ideal of the good life (Maynor 2003).
According to the first group of critics, then, republicanism does not, in fact, offer any-
thing especially new or distinctive compared to the standard liberal positions: at most,
it serves to highlight certain kinds of arbitrary, hierarchical relations that the liberal
theory may have neglected—yet these could simply be added to the latter’s standard list
of obstacles to liberty (Goodin 2003; Larmore 2004). Many other authors (e.g. Bren-
nan and Lomasky 2006) are skeptical regarding the pertinence of a strong distinction
between liberalism and republicanism (social goods versus communal goods; political
participation versus political liberty; etc.). Finally, if other liberal critics endorse the
republican theory as an original political project, they nevertheless do not regard it as
opposed to liberalism at all, but rather as the best version of the latter (Dagger 2006).
For a second group of critics, republicanism can constitute a new political language,
provided that it remains true to its radical heritage, close to both Machiavelli and Marx
(Bellamy 2002).
A third group of critics rejects the contemporary formulation of the republican the-
ory, deeming it incompatible with the political virtues endorsed by civic humanism.
For without the moral perfectionism proper to civic humanism, one loses any relevant
separation between republicanism and liberalism. Consequently, if republicanism is to
distinguish itself from the liberal tradition on this score, it must embrace the strong
moral values that have emerged over the course of its own history.
Although this line of criticism ends up neglecting liberalism’s own perfectionist ele-
ments, invoked by numerous authors (Raz 1986; Galston 1991), it nevertheless has the
merit of bringing to the fore the question of the role of moral character in the republican
theory: Ought one to regard republicanism in the same way that Rawls sees liberalism in
this respect, namely as a political theory independent of moral debates, or rather as tied,
by definition, to a particular ethical conception?
Pettit and Skinner have always emphasized that republicanism must be clearly distin-
guished from any and all forms of communitarianism or neo-Aristotelian ideal of civic

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virtue that could lead to paternalism, for the latter would not only be anachronistic
but could even impinge on individual liberties (Bellamy 2002), whereas the advantage
of the republican theory is supposed to be just to protect against all forms of arbitrary
interference, be it by individuals (dominium) or by the State (imperium)—even if the
latter intervenes for the sake of an ideal of “the good life.” At issue here is the moral
perfectionism bound up with the model of civic virtue upheld by communitarianism
(Etzioni 1993). By renouncing the primary role ascribed to civic virtues within a politi-
cal conception of the good life, republicanism, it would seem, would not be compat-
ible with the idea that the public good ought always to be considered superior to the
private good. Now, if neo-republicans close to Pettit and Skinner reject such an idea,
it is precisely because they regard the enjoyment of individual liberties, protected from
arbitrary interference from other individuals and from the State, as a primary good (in
the Rawlsian sense of the term), rather than as a homogeneous conception of the good
hostile to axiological pluralism.
Paul Weithman (2004) suggests that there are two models for thinking about the
civic virtues proper to republicanism. According to the first model, civic virtues do not
depend on the agents’ character traits, but are instead the derivative effects of institu-
tional rules and practices. The “excellence” proper to civic virtue does not, therefore,
consist in the overall “excellence” of the agent; instead, what matters for civic virtue
is only the quality of the relations between the agent and his community. According
to the second model, by contrast, the only way to give a proper account of the civic
virtues invoked in the republican project is to recognize that it is, indeed, based on a
conception of the good life, which, in turn, involves a tight bond between the agent’s
virtues and their realization within society: in order to flourish, the agent must actively
engage in politics, and the effects of his actions must further be recognized by his fellow
citizens as civic virtues (e.g. patriotism). Thus, if the social conditions are favorable,
the agent’s excellence will completely realize itself within his society, in whose eyes
he will in turn appear as a good citizen. Weithman links this strong version of civic
virtues with what he calls “perfectionist republicanism.” This interpretation of civic
virtue seems to conflict with the pluralism inherent to contemporary societies, however;
for this reason, many authors would rather link republicanism to a weaker—and hence
less controversial—moral conception. Others call for associating the republican theory
with a moral conception that would make no claim to the axiological neutrality typical
of liberal theories, while still recognizing the “quasi-perfectionist” character of liberty
as non-domination (Maynor 2003). According to Maynor, a strictly instrumental view
of civic virtues would make it impossible to account for the kind of exchanges between
individuals that republicanism ought to aim for: if one grants that the latter seeks to
protect citizens in such a way as to make them less vulnerable to the arbitrary power
relations that they maintain amongst themselves, then one must concede that the pro-
tections tied to the status of non-domination do indeed have an intrinsic value; one
must not, therefore, underestimate the important link between a person’s development
and flourishing, on the one hand, and his status as a free citizen, on the other.
On the other hand, this whole debate has perhaps been skewed by the stress laid
on the idea of virtue, whereas the real problem might lie in the normative issues sur-
rounding the concept of citizenship—in which case, we should refocus the debate on
the question of whether or not the basic structural conditions tied to citizenship are
sufficient to exhaust the meaning of what a properly republican—as opposed to, say, a
liberal—citizen is and ought to be.

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On the other hand, the principle of non-domination might be taken to mean that all
citizens are called upon to participate in public life and to determine the rules in accord-
ance with which they shall achieve their common objectives themselves. But what non-
domination implies, above all, is not strong civic participation so much as a number of
institutional protections designed to shield individuals from attempts to dominate them.
Judicial institutions are therefore at the heart of the republican project. It is still neces-
sary to guard against any form of imperium by the State against individuals, of course,
but well thought-out institutions ought to make it possible to avoid such problems. The
role of judicial institutions is to guarantee citizens’ liberty, so that everyone can enjoy
them to an equal extent (Honohan 2009). Whether it be a matter of political liberty or
of the rights of individuals, both cases are inextricably bound to political interactions
between citizens; hence the crucial importance of individuals’ right to have a say in and
oversee political issues that concern them (Sunstein 1988). The question that arises
is then to determine the precise role of the judicial review process regarding measures
adopted by the legislative or executive powers. In principle, judicial review is meant to
provide citizens with a number of protections from arbitrary or authoritarian decisions
on the part of the legislative and executive powers. Conversely, even if citizens are able
to both protect themselves against excesses by these powers as well as to exert a certain
influence on them, do they not still remain at the mercy of the constitution itself (Wal-
dron 2004, 2006)? Is there not an unjustifiable and undemocratic inequality between
the constitutional and other kinds of power? That is, either the constitutional power
operates above and beyond the will of the citizens, ostensibly in order to guarantee that
their fundamental rights be respected—in which case it is deeply incompatible with the
ideal of non-domination, as it itself is beyond the reach of the citizens’ powers—or, on
the contrary, it is viewed as a public forum where debates can be had on behalf of all
citizens (Bellamy 2007, 2009; Honohan 2009).

3. Republicanism and Democracy

Thus, if non-domination consists in not being subjected to arbitrary interferences by the
State, then citizens must be regarded as participants on an equal footing in all decisions
concerning the public sphere. The question is then to determine whether this implies
a strong conception of democracy, whereby the citizens’ real contribution to collective
choices is the true measure of their power. For certain authors, including Pettit himself,
while this conception does contain an ideal of self-government, republicanism never-
theless does not favor the participative model of democracy over the representative one.
Political liberty does require the existence of a constitutional and judicial system, yet
it also requires the possibility of contestation: given that legislators, along with judges
and deputies of the public administration (i.e. the executive power), have a certain dis-
cretionary power over the content of the laws, it is crucial to prevent this kind of power
from progressively becoming abusive.
Since it claims to be a political theory of the normative foundations of political rela-
tions as well as a theory of government, moreover, republicanism must give an account
not only of the legitimacy of political decisions, but also of the proper functioning of
democratic mechanisms. On the one hand, the ultimate goal of the republican gov-
ernment is the common good. On the other hand, everyone will not necessarily agree
on one particular conception of what that is. So, if pluralism itself is considered to be
intrinsic to the common good, then the latter can only be pursued through some form of

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dialogue between the various parties, which in turn presupposes divisions that must be
accounted for without thereby losing sight of the republican State’s proper objectives.
For this reason, republican theorists, such as Philip Pettit, distinguish between two
models of democracy: the “electoral model” and the “contestatory model.” The primary
objective of the government is to seek non-domination; consequently, the govern-
ment cannot claim the banner of republicanism if it gives priority to the will of specific
groups over the common interest—even if the groups can most stimulate the economic
development of the society. By means of electoral mechanisms, the government acts in
accordance with the group as a whole—assuming, of course, that that electoral model
itself does not give rise to structural discrimination from the outset. Overall, the govern-
ment cannot claim to be above the people, however, as the latter effectively control it
by means of elections. Yet every election involves a certain division amongst the people:
the individuals who voted against a certain government may afterwards find themselves
incorporated, arbitrarily and against their will, into “the people,” conceived as a single
and indivisible entity. One does not cease to be a citizen simply because one is opposed
to the majority; on the other hand, one does not cease to be a minority as soon as the
election has passed. Without monitoring by the citizens, the government can act on the
people without the people’s being able to act on it. This public system of control as such
nevertheless does not imply that citizens must exclusively devote themselves to the busi-
ness of self-government. For one thing, such an arrangement would not be realistic. Fur-
thermore, it would not be necessary, as long as the government’s actions can be submit-
ted to critical scrutiny by the citizens—this is what Pettit calls the “contestatory model”
of democracy. While the framing of laws and public policies remains the government’s
responsibility, the citizens may intervene and oversee the latter in two ways, just as an
editorial committee oversees a newspaper: either ex post, i.e. by demanding that certain
measures be modified after the fact according to various standards, or ex ante, i.e. before
these measures are even developed, by means of public consultations. To Pettit’s eyes,
electoral democracy and contestatory democracy can and must be complementary.
The possibility of contestation or “contestability” makes it possible to give a better
account of the legitimacy of public institutions than the notion of consent vis-à-vis a
supposedly legitimate authority, e.g. an authority that claims to embody the will of the
majority (Pettit 1999, 2000). All individuals, as well as, especially, the most vulnerable
groups in society (for ethnic, sexual or cultural reasons), must be able to defend their
interests (Pettit, forthcoming).

4. New Issues
In spite of the numerous criticisms that it has provoked, republicanism can no longer be
seen as just a trend, but must now be reckoned among the major political theories, along
with liberalism and libertarianism. So far, however, many sectors of political activity
have not yet been studied from the republican perspective, or only to a limited extent.
The neo-republicans’ answer to the problems of domination is essentially based on a
conception of the State and of government whereby the institutions’ primary mandate
is to protect, guarantee or “immunize” individuals against any and all forms of arbitrary
interference. To repeat, what constitute domination-relations are not just actual inter-
ferences, but the mere possibilities of arbitrary interference. Hence, what needs to be
combated, by means of institutional mechanisms, is the individuals’ state of vulnerabil-
ity, although it remains to be seen whether institutions suffice to adequately protect the

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citizens or whether the latter must not also share a certain common culture in order for
all to be equally respected. Clearly, it is difficult to get away from the debate concerning
the moral implications of normative principle of domination for the agent himself. Even
if the agent is shielded from certain arbitrary practices, what about the esteem in which
he is held by others or even by himself, especially if his value is relentlessly denigrated
by the majority or by a group in power?
As Pettit himself acknowledges, while domination can take many forms and calls for
great vigilance, the precise areas where it needs to be fought can, nevertheless, remain
difficult to identify. The problem is to determine (a) where and when the struggle against
domination is relevant, since institutions cannot be expected to intervene in situations
where certain domination-like relations arise merely by chance and could just as easily
have turned out differently, and (b) which criteria, accordingly, would enable us to dis-
tinguish a situation in which domination is really present from one in which it is not.
This goes both ways. How to avoid discrediting, from the outset, certain social demands
that are made despite the attribution of an identical social status for all but where the
dominated individuals may still tend to behave in a servile manner? In other words,
should the social struggles of excluded or rejected groups be favored just in order to
prevent the emergence of contemptuous attitudes—not only on the part of the majority
vis-à-vis the vulnerable groups, but also on the part of the latter themselves? Encourag-
ing such struggles does not imply a return to the paternalistic model rejected by Pettit,
Skinner, and the neo-republicans, however; the aim is, rather, to work towards public
forums’ guaranteeing a fair tribunal for claims that might otherwise go unheard.
It is for this reason that contestatory democracy, precisely in Pettit’s sense, is so
important, and also why it must be conceived not as a mere procedural mechanism, like
an editorial board, that puts the finishing touches on the work of the institutions below
it but, rather, as a nexus of social struggles whose normative framework must be thought
out by the republican theory.
One example of such social struggles is the fight against cultural discrimination.
While this kind of discrimination is most often linked to a claim for identity-recogni-
tion (e.g. minority linguistic rights), the resulting social struggles are often motivated by
the collateral effects of the discriminations involved. This becomes obvious when one
considers that, in many cases, the minority groups that suffer from cultural discrimina-
tion also suffer from social iniquities, as is the case, for example, with the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada.
On the other hand, neo-republicanism cannot deny that adding a widened concep-
tion of democracy to its program might either bring it back to the utopian and retro-
grade model of civic humanism, or else hinder the attainment of its core objectives by
the exaggerated importance of social struggles and factions, whereby the strongest and
most organized groups would gain the upper hand over weaker ones in terms of social
gains and visibility.
After having gradually proven its theoretical validity, and now improved by new the-
oretical approaches, such as critical theory (Laborde 2008; Le Goff 2007) republicanism
has now emerged as a promising tool for thinking about topics as varied as economic
theory, social struggles against poverty (Pettit 2007), immigration and multiculturalism,
feminism, education (Peterson 2011), or the environment. Also raised anew in light of
these issues is the problem of determining the most appropriate institutional design for
realizing the republican program and for promoting non-domination. While it is not
possible to present all of these topics here, we can nonetheless point to a few of the

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fields of study that will most likely move to the center of republican theorists’ attention
in the coming years.
The republican theory has met with a number of interesting criticisms from a feminist
point of view, yet none of these seem to radically challenge the idea that the theory of
liberty as non-domination could make a valuable contribution to theorizing women’s
claims (Friedman 2008; Philips 2000). But, for the moment, no comprehensive study of
properly feminist issues from the republican perspective has been produced. This field
promises to give rise to many new studies, however, concerning not only the funda-
mental issues surrounding women’s vulnerable state in society, but also the institutional
means employed to combat the forms of domination to which women in particular are
subjected—for these means must themselves be studied according to the republican
theory’s own parameters of justice and democracy.
As for ecology, there are not yet any important studies of the relevance of republican-
ism to what is now called “environmental justice.” Moreover, environmental struggles
often give rise to forms of contestation and activism (Young 2001) whose specific mode
of action seems to set them apart from the model of contestatory democracy envisaged
by Pettit. Although the framework of the republican theory of justice appears to be favo-
rable to ecologists’ claims, the political form that these claims actually take—i.e. reach-
ing beyond the level of State sovereignty in order to address international economic
institutions instead—suggests that the model of democracy adopted by many republican
theorists should perhaps be re-examined.
As we have seen, any interpretation of republicanism and of its program depends to
great extent on the moral conception that one associates with the objectives of non-
domination as well as on the role that one ascribes to civic virtues therein. The philoso-
phy of education thus plays a crucial role here, for it either shows that the moral values
associated with republicanism are substantive by definition, or else that republicanism,
together with the type of citizenship that it puts forward, points towards a conception
of civic education, based above all on the critical capacities of individuals within the
public realm—in which case one would have to then formulate the method and goals of
a civic pedagogy (Peterson 2009, 2011).
Last but not least, one must also mention the important studies of the contribution
of republican theories to the issues surrounding international relations and interna-
tional justice. As far back as Machiavelli, republican theorists have maintained that
no institutional reforms or policies can be effective in the long term if international
power relations subsequently undermine them. The problem is then to design regulative
mechanisms between States as well as alliances between similarly oriented countries
(Anctil 2009; Bohman 2007; Deudney 2007; Slaughter 2005).

Related Topics
Machiavelli, Liberalism, Feminism and the History of Political Philosophy, Environ-
mentalism, Perfectionism, Pluralism, Equality, Freedom, Autonomy, Power, Democ-
racy, Rights, Education

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Further Reading
Besson, S. and Marti, J. L., eds (2009) Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives, Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press.
Weinstock, D. and Nadeau, C., eds. (2004) Republicanism: History, Theory, and Practice, London:
Routledge.

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