Aristotle’s Three Approaches to Essentialism

Christof Rapp, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

The problem I want to address

On the one hand, …

Aristotle’s treatise Categories is always referred to when it comes to the distinction of essential and accidental predication.
If P is SAID-OF S, it says what S (essentially) is.
If A is IN S, it characterizes S with respect to one of the nine non-substantial categories, i.e. says how S is, where it is, etc.
On the other hand, …
Aristotle’s Categories is a mostly classificatory treatise, most probably affiliated to Aristotle’s Topics, which is about dialectic, not about
metaphysics or (first) philosophy proper. As a treatise of this sort, is it likely to introduce the ‘ontologically loaded’ notion of essence (Paolo
Crivelli 2017) and able, in the first place, to carry the ‘heavy metaphysical baggage’ of essential predication (Stephen Menn 2018)?
More than that: To the extent that our knowledge about Aristotelian essentialism is informed by the presumably most authoritative work on
Aristotelian metaphysics, i.e. the work known as ‘Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, we have reason to expect essences …
− … to be identical with forms,
− … to be exclusive to substances (and are assumed to be one possible sense of ousia),
− … to be a cause or principle, e.g. in the sense that they are the cause/principle of the being of each substance.
While the Categories …
− … does not even mention forms (nor matter, since it does not include a theory of material constitution),
− … does not restrict the supposedly essential predication to substances,
− … does not speak of causes/principles and lacks any causal/explanatory language.

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The problem … continued

Apart from the discrepancies between Categories and Metaphysics mentioned, one reason to doubt the Categories’ essentialism derives from the
suspicion that in the Categories the predicates that are SAID-OF of a subject could include non-essential items, such as ‘a musician’ or ‘an Athenian’.
These are mostly philological quibbles I do not want to enter into today. However, in my paper Essential Predication in Aristotle’s Categories. A
Defence (forthcoming, deriving from a 2019 presentation in Banff, Canada), I tried to rebut such concerns.
Assuming that this rebuttal is conclusive (or not entirely flawed), what remains to do is to account for the afore-mentioned and undeniable
differences between the Categories’ and the Metaphysics’ essentialism. I will do so by distinguishing between different layers of or different
approaches to essentialism in different works of Aristotle’s.
Possibly, these different layers belong to different phases in the development of Aristotle’s thoughts about this issue. But this is not part of what I
claim. I am not interested in a thesis about Aristotle’s philosophical development. What I find more challenging is the idea that the different layers or
versions of Aristotelian essentialism serve quite different purposes and come with quite different presuppositions. Also, in one important respect, or
so I am going to argue, the different layers of essentialism imply quite different metaphysical background theories.
I will argue that the above-mentioned differences do not imply that the essentialism of the Categories and other works collected in the so-called
Organon (viz Topics and Analytics) is deficient (compared to the Metaphysics), especially since the essentialism of the Metaphysics rests upon and
presupposes the corresponding theorems in these former treatises.
As a consequence, one can buy one version of (Aristotelian) essentialism, e.g. the Categories’ relatively simple essentialism, without being
committed to the more demanding versions of it. This is what actually happened, most vividly in the case of Jonathan Lowe: he based his Neo-
Aristotelian substance theory (solely) on Aristotle’s Categories, but at the same time dismissed his theory of forms and material constitution.

Here comes the general picture I want to suggest:

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Categories Posterior Analytics

General term essentialism (incidental prominence of sortal general terms,
because of the prominence of the category of substance)
No explanation of attributes intended, no per se attributes or necessary
attributes
No explanation of species membership (‘explication rather than
explanation’)
Certain attributes require specific types of subjects
No forms, no theory of constitution
Both subject kinds (belonging to substances and quasi-substances) and
attributes have essences
Per se and per se2 predication
Essences are invoked, above all, in order to explain why certain attributes
belong to certain subject kinds
Some essences can be revealed by demonstrations
Interpretative issue: Are essences tracked (only) by what they explain
(explanationist view)?

Topics Metaphysics

General (non-sortal) term essentialism Exclusive essentialism: only substances have essences in the strictest sense
No explanation of attributes, no per se attributes or necessary attributes Form essentialism: forms are the essences of a compound substance and
(only propria, peculiar attributes) the cause of its being
No explanation of species membership Explanatory essentialism: A thing’s essence (its form, in the standard case)
is supposed to explain why it belongs to a certain species.
No forms, no theory of constitution
Sortal essentialism: the forms that are essences (are not themselves
The notion of essence (to ti ên einai)
general terms), but correspond to general terms that are sortal
Some sort of priority of the essence

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Categories Posterior Analytics

General term essentialism (incidental prominence of sortal general terms,
because of the prominence of the category of substance)
No explanation of attributes intended, no per se attributes or necessary
attributes
No explanation of species membership (‘explication rather than
explanation’)
Certain attributes require specific types of subjects
No forms, no theory of constitution
Both subject kinds (belonging to substances and quasi-substances) and
attributes have essences
Per se and per se2 predication
Essences are invoked, above all, in order to explain why certain attributes
belong to certain subject kinds
Some essences can be revealed by demonstrations
Interpretative issue: Are essences tracked (only) by what they explain
(explanationist view)?

Topics Metaphysics

General (non-sortal) term essentialism Exclusive essentialism: only substances have essences in the strictest sense
No explanation of attributes, no per se attributes or necessary attributes Form essentialism: forms are the essences of a compound substance and
(only propria, peculiar attributes) the cause of its being
No explanation of species membership Explanatory essentialism: A thing’s essence (its form, in the standard case)
is supposed to explain why it belongs to a certain species.
No forms, no theory of constitution
Sortal essentialism: the forms that are essences (are not themselves
The notion of essence (to ti ên einai)
general terms), but correspond to general terms that are sortal
Some sort of priority of the essence

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One significant consequence:

There is an often noted parallel:

Categories Metaphysics

The species (eidos) horse that is SAID-OF the particular horse is a The species-specific horse form (eidos) is the essence of (and, thus,
secondary substance; it ‘reveals’ the primary substance or makes it the ousia-of) the particular horse.
known/knowable (gnôrimon) by signifying its What-it-is (essence).

Arguably, the horse-form in the Metaphysics takes the place of the species horse in the Categories.
However, if the general picture I suggested is along the right lines, there is a significant difference:

In the Metaphysics, whereas in the Categories,

the horse form (eidos) is thought to be ‘the cause of being’ of a
particular horse, and thus provides a fact about the particular horse
on account of which the particular horse is a determinate, countable,
identifiable particular that belongs to a certain species (here: horse),
the species term horse just ‘reveals’ or ‘makes it obvious’ or
‘explicates’ that a given primary substance is a member of the species
horse, but does not explain the species membership, i.e. does not
provide a cause on account of which the particular qualifies as a
horse.

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Section 1: Explanatory essentialism

1.1 Explanatory essentialism at work (Aristotelian sciences)

General idea: Unqualified scientific knowledge includes knowledge of the cause of the facts to be known. Phenomena belonging to a certain
science are known in the unqualified sense if and only if they can be referred to their proper causes. The phenomenon that attribute A
belongs to subject S is known if and only if the belonging of A to S can ultimately be explained by the essence (or a part of the essence) of S
(i.e. the essence of all subjects of the same kind).

First example (Parts of Animals IV 12): All birds have two legs. Having two legs belongs to all birds. Why is this so? By (their) nature (i.e.
essence) birds are blooded animals and winged animals. As all blooded animals they have four moving points. Being at the same time winged
animals two of their four moving points are already used up by the wings. Hence, there are two and only two moving points in birds that can
be and, in fact, are used for the legs. This is why, by necessity, birds have two legs.

Second example (Parts of Animals IV 10): Human beings and only human beings have an erect posture. Erect posture belongs to human beings
and only to human beings. Why is this so? By their nature human beings are animals that are capable of thinking and being intelligent.
Thinking (or so Aristotle says and thinks to have proven) takes place in the heart (even though the heart is, of course, not the organ of
thinking), however thinking is impaired or even made impossible if the region where the heart is located, the thorax, is overly bulky and heavy.
Animals whose thorax is overly bulky and heavy (compared to the lower part of the body, i.e. the pelvic region and the legs) are inclined
towards the ground (due to the weight of the thorax) and hence need front legs for stabilization. Human beings whose thorax has a well-
proportioned weight (because they have fleshy legs and buttocks) don’t need front legs, but have arms and hands instead, and thus have an
upright posture. So, ultimately their posture can be explained by a part of their essence, because their specific anatomy is required by their
intelligence, which is part of their essence, and it is owing to the same anatomic characteristics that they stand and walk uprightly.

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1.2 Explanatory essentialism codified (Posterior Analytics)

General idea: The decisive vehicle for scientific knowledge is scientific demonstration. Scientific demonstrations are deductions derived from
necessary premisses, and these premisses are necessary because they include predicates that belong to their subjects per se (APo I 6).
Per se predication and per se accidents (APo I 4):
Per se1 predication: P belongs to S per se1, if and only if P belongs to S and P is part of the what-it-is (essence) of S.
Per se2 predication: P belongs to S per se2, if and only if P belongs to S and S is part of the what-it-is (essence) of P.
Relatedly, Aristotle refers to per se accidents (sumbebêkota kat’ hauta):
Per se accidents: A is a per se-accident of S, if A belongs to S necessarily, without being part of the what-it-is (essence) of S.
Both per se2 attributes (i.e. attributes corresponding to per se2 predicates) and per se accidents are demonstrable through
the subject’s essence.
For example, having two legs is not mentioned in the birds’ essence, but this attribute belongs to birds because of their
essence.
Similarly, having an upright posture is not mentioned in the definition of human beings, but this attribute belongs to human
beings (ultimately) because of their essence.

Two models for demonstration (according to Bronstein 2016):

P belongs to S because of the essence of S P belongs to S because of the essence of P

Non twinkling belongs to all celestial bodies near to the earth. Leaf-shedding belongs to whatever undergoes coagulation of sap.
Nearness to the earth belongs to all planets. Coagulation of sap belongs to all broad-leafed plants.
Non twinkling belongs to all planets. Leaf shedding belongs to all broad-leafed plants.

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Two side remarks on essences within the explanatory model

What-it-is (ti estin) and essence (to ti ên einai)

Scholars used to be fascinated by Aristotle’s artificial expression for essences: to ti ên einai – the what it was said to be.
However, to ti ên einai and ti estin are often used interchangeably.
Ernst Kapp 1920: ‚Frage nach der Definition‘, ‚Warnung [dahinter] … irgend welchen Tiefsinn zu suchen.‘ It is meant to exclude
two possible answers to the unqualified what-is-it-question: (i) mentioning the genus only, (ii) repeating the name itself. [Possibly,
(iii) also to avoid quasi-sortal, permanent identifiers, such as ‘the-one-who-is-knowledgeable-in-grammar’ or ‘the Athenian’.]

Do we need to have essences in order to track and to demonstrate attributes or do we need to know demonstrable attributes in order
to identify essences?

‘Knowing the in itself accidents of something contributes a great part to knowing its essence. For whenever we are able to
give an account in conformity to what is apparent concerning all or most of its (per se) accidents, at that time we will be
able to speak best about the essence (ousia). For in every demonstration the essence (of that kind?) is a principle (archē).
Hence, whichever definitions are not such that our knowing the (per se) accidents follows but instead do not even make it
easy to form a plausible conjecture about these (per se accidents), it’s clear that all these definitions are stated in a
dialectical and empty manner.’ (De Anima 402b21-403a2).

The first part of this quote suggests that knowledge of the per se accidents is at least useful for identifying the essence (though
not, perhaps, necessary), while the second suggests that scientific definitions are inevitably expected to give a clue to the per se
accidents.

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Section 2: Explanatory Form Essentialism (Metaphysics)

2.1 Essence and ousia in the Metaphysics

Two main senses of ousia (according to Metaph. V 8): A the substrate ‘(it is not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of it’).
B ‘that which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of animals’.
People are divided on what this is (parts? numbers?), one option is: essence (to ti ên einai). => ‘essence’ as one sense of ousia (or ousia-of);
looking for the essence means to look for a cause/principle.
At the same time, having an essence in the full/unqualified sense becomes a criterion for identifying ousia, for only primary things are said to
have an essence in the full/unqualified sense (where essences in the unqualified sense do not mention beings of a different kind). As a
concomitant of the exclusive notion of essences, essences become primarily connected with sortal general terms.

2.2 The definitional (logikôs) treatment of essence is based on the Organon

Essences are officially introduced in Z (VII) 4-6. Essences are indicated by formally correct definitions. The details of formal adequacy of a
definition are presupposed or taken to be familiar from the Organon. Most notably, essences are introduced through the difference between
per se1 and per se2 predications in Posterior Analytics.
The treatment of essences in these chapters focusses on problems posed by accidental compounds (‘white man’); the logos tês ousias must
not include too much (redundant parts) nor too little (when defining accidental compounds) – a problem that is familiar from Topics VI –
rather the definiens and definiendum must be identical – a problem familiar from Topics VII (see Castelli forthcoming). No mention (in these
introductory chapters) of constitution, hylomorphism or the causality of essences.
This might be taken to mean that the Metaphysics does not intend to introduce a new notion of essence; rather it presents itself as
using the familiar notion of essence (familiar from the Organon) either in a new context or for new purposes.

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2.3 While in the Organon essence is regularly discussed in the context of different kinds of predicates/attributes, in the course of Metaphysics Z (VII)
essence is discussed in the context of material constitution and is identified with one element of the constitution of a hylomorphic compound
(Metaph. Z (VII) 10-11).
In these chapters Aristotle discusses which parts of a substance need to be included in the logos tês ousias, i.e. in the definiens that fixes the
essence. In the course of this discussion Aristotle distinguishes formal and material parts; while the former are mentioned in the definition,
the latter are not – or only in the definition of the compound. Essence is thus applied to questions of material constitution, and just like the
Organon (and Z 4-6) distinguished between essential and non-essential predicates/attributes, the Metaphysics distinguishes between essential
and non-essential elements of constitution.
As a conclusion from this discussion Aristotle identifies – for the first time in Book Z – essence and form.

2.4 It is widely agreed upon that it is the purpose of Z (VII) 17 to apply certain results from the Posterior Analytics to sensible substances (while there
is no general consensus to what extent the explanatory theory in the Analytics is meant to pose constraints for the explanation of the being of
sensible substances)
‘Why does it thunder? Because the fire in the cloud is extinguished. Cloud C, thunder A, extinction of fire B. B holds of C, the cloud (the fire is
extinguished in it); and A, noise, holds of B – and B is indeed an account (logos) of A, the first extreme” (APo II.8.93b7-14).’
The explanatory middle term in the example is ‘extinction of fire’. How to apply this to compound substances?
‘The question is why the matter is some definite thing (τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστιν). For example: “Why are these things (τάδε) a house?”
– “Because there belongs what it is to be [a] house (ὅ ἦν οἰκία εἶναι)” – “Why is this (τοδί) – or [better], this body, thus-and-so conditioned (τὸ
σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον), a man?’ (Metaph. Z 17, 1041b3-7)
Communality with the Analytics: Essences provide the explanatory middle term. Difference to the Analytics: Essences are not invoked to
account for per se attributes, but to explain why something is something of a particular species.
Example: Why does housespecies belong to these bricks & stones? Answer: Because the essence-of-house belongs to these bricks & stones. Put
it other words: It is in virtue of possessing this essence-of-house (houseform) that this something qualifies as a member of the species house.
Why does human beingspecies belong to this heap of flesh & bones? Answer: Because the essence-of-human being belongs to this heap of
flesh & bones. Put in other words. It is in virtue of possessing the essence-of-human being (human beingform = soul) that this something qualifies
as a member of the species human being.

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Transition to non-explanatory versions of Aristotelian essentialism

How do we get from here, i.e. from the rich and demanding picture suggested by the Metaphysics, to the kind of essentialism represented by the

Categories or the Topics?

According to my suggestion, we have to remove, as it were, those layers of essentialism …

- that use the concept of form in the sense of hylomorphism,

- that identify a thing’s essence with an element of a thing’s material constitution,

- that are exclusive in the sense that it is only applicable to substances,

- that are linked up with a causal theory or a theory of explanation.

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 Sepp
Heidi
Section 3: General term essentialism and sortal essentialism (Categories)

3.1 The Categories’ idiom

Sepp and Heidi are primary substances.

A particular horse is also a primary substance.
‚Human being‘ and ‚horse‘ say what the primary substances are.
The species ‚human being‘ and ‚horse‘ are secondary substances.
The genus of human being and horse, say animal, is also a secondary substance.
‘Human being’ is SAID OF Sepp and Heidi.
‘Horse’ is SAID OF the particular horse.
Sepp looks a little pale today (or ‘Sepp is pale’).
Paleness is PRESENT IN Sepp (‘inherence’).
The horse is brown.
Brownness is PRESENT IN the particular horse.

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3.2 The famous fourfold ontology

Beings that are not SAID-OF anything Beings that are SAID-OF a substrate

Beings that are not PRESENT IN anything A primary substance, A secondary substance,
e.g. Sepp or Heidi e.g. human being or animal

Beings that are PRESENT IN a substrate A non-substantial particular, A non-substantial universal,

e.g. particular paleness e.g. paleness

Secondary substances signify/indicate the what-it-is of a primary substance. Both the name (‘human’) and the definition (say ‘biped animal’) of
a secondary substance can be SAID OF the primary substance. If one looks for essences in the Categories, it is usually among the (definitions)
of secondary substances.
Beings that are PRESENT IN a substrate (‘accidental attributes’) also have a what-it-is. What is this particular shade of paleness? Paleness.
What is paleness? A quality.
This is why one might ascribe general term essentialism to the Categories (which would be compatible with the Topics).
Problem: the Categories does not develop on the what-it-is of accidental attributes, in particular we do not really know what the
definitions of accidental attributes look like. By contrast, the Categories has a good deal to say about the relation of primary and
secondary substances. This is the reason why we will focus on this relation and on secondary substances, thus zooming in on sortal
essentialism.

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3.3 Being SAID-OF something vs. being PRESENT in something (as basis for the distinction of essential vs. accidental predication)

Being SAID OF something Being PRESENT IN something

If X is SAID OF Y, X says what Y is. If X is PRESENT IN Y, it would be impossible for X to exist in separation
from Y – i.e. from its substrate.

If X is SAID OF Y, both the name and the definition of X can be If X is PRESENT IN Y, the definition of X can never ever be predicated
predicated of Y. (name & definition test) of Y, but sometimes or rarely its name can. (name & definition test)

If e.g. human being is predicated of Sepp, both the name and the If e.g. paleness is PRESENT IN Sepp, the definition of paleness can
definition of ‚human being‘ is predicated of Sepp. never be predicated of Sepp, nor can its name – only the paronymous
‘pale’ can.

Suggestion: The idiom of being SAID-OF (as well as the project of dividing categories) derives from the context of an early disambiguation of
the copula and is meant to indicate what something really is. People might have been puzzled about the fact that we use ‘is’ to predicate
many different things of a subject, even though it is only one thing really and essentially (compare Plato, Sophist 251A: ‘Surely we’re speaking
of a man even when we name him several things, that it, when we apply colours to him and shapes, sizes, defects, and virtues’).

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3.4 The Categories’ sortal essentialism with regard to primary and secondary substances

My thesis is that taken together several theorems in the Categories imply a sortal essentialist claim to the effect that particular substances are
essentially the member of one certain species (and that the essence of this species can be pinpointed by an appropriate definition.
Here are three/four such hints:
‘The species in which the things primarily called substances are (ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν), are
called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species.” (Cat. 5, 2a14-16)
Remarkably, he describes the relation between primary substances and their species by saying that the former ‘are in’, ‘belong in’, or
‘are found in’ (huparchein en) the latter. Clearly, this is not meant to be the IN of inherence. Here the preposition ‘in’ rather hints at the
relation of being included in a class or being a member of a class. It presupposed hence that each primary substances is always included
in such a class or is the member of a species.
A particular substance is called what it is called – e.g. ‘a particular man’, ‘a particular horse’ or ‘this man’ – in accordance with what is
SAID OF it. In the Categories, primary substances are always denoted like this, i.e. by a sortal term and not e.g. by a proper name such as
Socrates or Bucephalus (except in the Postpraedicamenta).
‘Every substance seems to signify a certain this (τόδε τι). As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of
them signifies a certain this (τόδε τι); for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one (ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ
δηλούμενόν ἐστιν).’ (Cat. 5, 3b10-12).
That the notion of tode ti is crucially linked up with specificity or sortal determinacy is also clear from the way it is constructed, for
either we understand it as ‘a certain this’ (so that the ‘this/tode’ is meant as a placeholder for a noun such as anthrôpos) or as ‘this
something’ or ‘this something of a certain kind’ (where tode is the demonstrative pronoun and ti stands for a kind that needs to be
specified).
The species ‘man’ is instantiated by particular, countable men, the species ‘horse’ by particular, countable horses, etc. It is ‘obvious at
once’, Aristotle says (Cat. 5, 3a10), that secondary substances are not IN a substrate. Why is this obvious? Probably because the
instantiations of the species man and horse are just men and horses – and nothing else. In this sense, no one would mistakenly think
that a general term such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘colour’ signifies tode ti (while people mistakenly think that the general terms ‘man’ and
‘horse’ do), for the instantiations of knowledge and colour are not countable, separate or independent objects.

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3.5 The peculiar role of secondary substances: ‘revealing’/’disclosing’ the primary substances

Primary substances are called ‘substances’, because they are the substrates for anything else (including secondary substances), while they are
not predicated of any other substrate. They are ultimate – as opposed to transitory- substrates and they are substrates for inherence. Without
them nothing else would exist (even secondary substances need to be instantiated in order to exist: ‘Aristotelian realism’).
Why is it then that secondary substances qualify as substances at all?

‘It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called secondary
substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance (μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν
κατηγορουμένων). For if one is to say of the particular man what he is, it will be appropriate to give (οἰκείως ἀποδώσει) the species or
the genus — though it makes him better known (γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει) to give man than animal; but to give any of the other things
would be inappropriate (ἀλλοτρίως) — for example, to say that it is white or runs or anything like that. So it is reasonable that these
should be the only other things called substances.’ (Cat. 5, 2b29-37)

dêloun: make obvious, reveal, disclose. In the Topics definitions are said to reveal a thing’s essence. Non-causal language. No attempt to make
the secondary substances ‘causes of being’ of the primary substances (which, among other things, would turn the priority relations within the
Categories upside down). Secondary substances reveal a basic fact about particular substances that makes them determinate and suitable
objects of knowledge.
Suggestion: While in the Metaphysics the forms and essences are meant to explain how a particular must be constituted in order to qualify as
a particular substance of a certain kind, the Categories consider it a basic, unanalysable fact that primary substances instantiate certain
general kinds. Rather than being causal or explanatory, the role of the Categories’ secondary substances seems to be restricted to ‘reveal’ or
‘disclose’ a fact that is already given.
In this sense, the project of the Categories is not competing with the project of the (central books of the) Metaphysics, which again explains
why both projects imply different types of essentialism.

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3.6 No account of per se2 predicates or necessary attributes, but an interest in non-arbitrary relations between attributes and subjects

Having suggested that the Categories’ secondary substances lack the causal the role of the substantial forms in the Metaphysics, I would like
to look now into the relation between subject-kinds and attributes.
The basic requirement for an explanatory (but not form-based) essentialism à la Posterior Analytics is a notion of demonstrable attributes.
As a matter of fact, the Categories nowhere define anything like per se2 predicates or necessary attributes.
Nor does the Categories explicitly use subject-kinds or their species to explain why certain attributes belong to S.
However, there are contexts in which the Categories displays an interest in non-arbitrary relations between attributes and subjects:
First example: in several contexts the Categories presupposes what I would call a ‘proper subject’ theory, i.e. that certain inhering
attributes are always PRESENT IN a certain type of subject: e.g. colours in bodies, health in living bodies, knowledge and virtues in souls
(does that mean that their definition would have to mention they kind of substrate they are PRESENT IN?)
Second example: Aristotle insists that there are pairs of contraries one of which must always be PRESENT IN their proper subject, e.g.
healthy or sick (for living bodies), odd or even (for numbers). Anticipation of necessary attributes?
Third example: Might the previous example be used for generically necessary attributes/predicates. Along these lines, there is a
traditional interpretation (not mine) that sees the categories as holding the place of generically necessary predicates in the sense that
each primary substance must have some quality, quantity, etc.
Fourth example: It is a peculiar characteristic of primary substances that are able to receive contraries, while remaining numerically
identical. Does each kind of substance receive the same couples of contraries? Or do we have to refer to the species in order to account
for the range of possible contraries?

What to make of all this? Unsure. Maybe, these are anticipations of the notion of per se2 predicates and necessary attributes; however, they
are not explicitly used for unfolding an explanatory account. Rather, both the Categories and the Topics are interested in spelling out the
conceptual implications given by the profile of each predicate. If we know that some predicate belongs to the category C, we also know that it
either can or cannot allow of degrees or that it does or does not have contraries; or if we know that some P is the proprium of something else,
we know that it cannot belong to some other subject-kind. Along the same lines: if we have predicates like healthy-sick, odd-even, we
immediately know that they can only apply to certain subject-kinds and that something is wrong if they are applied to different kinds.

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Section 4: General term essentialism plus priority requirement (Topics)

4.1 Survey

There are reasons for thinking that the Categories and the Topics are closely related and derive from a similar context.
The Topics attempts to unfold a method of dialectical discourse. To a considerable extent, this method relies on classifications of types
of predicates, of opposites, of linguistic cognates, etc. The system of the 10 categories, presented in the Categories, provides one such
classificatory scheme that is important (not only) for the dialectical method.
Accordingly, the two treatises seem to be close to each other and seem to agree on some core assumptions. For example, the
classificatory scheme of the 10 categories is endorsed right at the beginning of the Topics and is invoked several times in the course of
the treatise.
Even though the Topics does not use repeat the ‘idiom’ of the Categories (primary, secondary substances, being SAID-OF, being PRESENT IN,
etc.), it seems to make similar assumptions about the what-it-is, about definitions through the genus and the differentia specifica, etc.
The Topics is less interested though in particular substances and in the question of whether a general subject-term is instantiated or not.
Typically, the dialectical method works with propositions/premises that have general terms as their subjects. Sortal terms or substance terms
do not seem to be privileged throughout. In accordance with the practice of definition in Platonic dialogues, the dialectical method is suitable
to examine the what-it-is of all kinds of terms. In the famous, but controversial Chapter I 9, Aristotle affirms that we can ask about non-
substantial items what they are.
Also, it is worthwhile noting that, since the dialectical method is meant to be applied to all sorts of problems and positions, the notion of
essence that is used in the Topics cannot meant to be part of a particular metaphysical theory; rather it is thought to be part of a topic- and
position-neutral method.

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4.2 Essences within the scheme of the four predicables

(perhaps the chronologically first context where the technical term to ti ên einai occurs.)

Non-convertible with its subject Convertible with its subject

Not included in the what-it-is / accident proprium/idiom (peculiar property)

does not signify the ti ên einai

Included in the what-it-is / genus definition

Signifies the ti ên einai

According to this account, essences are indicated by correct definitions.

In a sense, the definition must match the criteria of all other predicables:

- like accidents it must hold of the subject (need to be true),

- like idia it must be peculiar to the (kind of) subject,

- like the genus it says what the subject is.

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4.3 The priority requirement

There is a way in the Topics in which a definition can fail to indicate an essence even though it is formally correct with regard to all other
criteria:
In Chapter VI 4 Aristotle says that the to ti ên einai can be missed even by a correct definition (a definition that successfully picks out its
definiendum – and neither more things nor fewer), if one defines through what is posterior and ‘less familiar (gnôrimon)’. As a consequence,
only definitions defining through what is prior and ‘more familiar (gnôrimon)’ will capture the to ti ên einai – for this claim Aristotle also refers
to the practice of scientific demonstration (apodeixeis: 141a30). At this point Aristotle has to qualify his claim by distinguishing the relative and
the unqualified sense of being gnôrimon, for definitions that are supposed to capture the to ti ên einai need to define through what is
gnôrimon in an unqualified and not just in a relative sense.
As an example for defining through what is more familiar to us, but not in an unqualified sense, he mentions the practice of defining lines
through bodies, because bodies are more familiar to us. The problem with this practice is, he points out, that different things might be more
or less familiar to different people, which would lead, among other things, to an unwelcome plurality of definitions. Therefore, he requires
that the definitions must be given – as in scientific demonstrations – through what is prior and more gnôrimon in an unqualified (even though
he concedes that not all addressees might be capable of understanding this kind of definition).

What to make of this priority requirement? It is plausible to regard this as a precondition for the explanatory approach as we know it from the
Posterior Analytics. Still, within the Topics this approach is not further developed. Most notably, it is not clear which attributes are meant to be
explained by the essences, i.e. there is no notion of per se2 attributes and, to the best of my knowledge, no attempt to define necessary, non-
essential attributes. There is a traditional interpretation that (trying to smoothen the differences between the several treatises of the
Organon) that regards the propria as a kind of per se attributes avant la letter. However, the propria in the Topics are not introduced with this
intention. And it is only a subclass of propria that are explicitly said to be necessary.

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