First Division: Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares, Complainant, vs. Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra, Respondent. Decision

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
FIRST DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016 ]
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.
GUEVARRA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-
Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01
and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws[2] and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.[3] On the other hand,
respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an
allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.[4]
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site, insulting and
verbally abusing complainant. His posts include the following excerpts:
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo.
Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick
some ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will go down in Medical History
as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18pm) [5]
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in Taytay
Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang
kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa
kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)[6]
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na kung sino-
sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at
10:31pm)[7]
Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG MAGKANONG

PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola
budget daw niya runs into tens of millions.... (September 15 at 3:57pm)[8]
Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a picket demonstration in
front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the story when the next rallies will
have the following numbers 100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in
front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)[9]
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is worth that much. Aba ako
kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince editors to pin me down with
something eh alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa
utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na
reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung
mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)[10]
Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national television to expose the Reyna
ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that the much needed partial
restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain
permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am) [11]
Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI
BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)[12]
Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be taking- just pay Ms. Josie
Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)[13]
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin
BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause,[14] to wit:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

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Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of all
her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good response – 70% decrease in her July
sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm) [15]
Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all. With only 2
surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs
which have been performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going wrong with the
procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am) [16]
Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors, they nearly killed a client
of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who
had a simple facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm) [17]
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a
boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not a certified plastic surgeon:
Boycott Belo, Flawless Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)[18]
Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making machines, dapat convert them
into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at
2:16am)[19]
Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga
kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)[20]
Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a place
where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out more about our anti-quack doctor
campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm)[21]
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!
BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)[22]
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang
pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am) [23]
Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my friends and comrades, please
stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled their lipo from belo. Please help
me shut down the Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie
Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)[24]
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened complainant with criminal
conviction, without factual basis and without proof,[25] as follows:
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for plunder; Vicky Belo
will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will
have a Philippine version. By October and November, some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing summons to
Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery! (September 22
at 11:31pm)[26]
Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo after she gets convicted
too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)[27]
Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its criminal negligence which
nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr. Belo herself
marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine
Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm)[28]
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women,[29] to
wit:
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick there nowadays?
haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-and-below naprends
diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)[30]
Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the belo clinic there, can u tell
me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)[31]
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na against me. to thwart them,
being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like your type? at yung preferred ko lang
ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)[32]

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Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort money from her, as apparent from
the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook post:[33]
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo,
quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)[34]
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her
reputation, and to close BMGI and all its c+linics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his
demand letter[35] dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense,[36] respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,
[37]
asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be shared
only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part.[38] He also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his
freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against
complainant.[39] He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred
against complainant.[40] He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter
as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. [41] Finally,
respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment.[42]
After the mandatory conference had been terminated,[43] the parties were directed to file their respective position papers.
[44]
Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for clarificatory hearing. [45] Upon termination
thereof, the case was deemed submitted for report/recommendation.[46]
IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation[47] dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.[48] It held respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03,[49] Rule 8.01,[50] and Rule 19.01[51] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for having posted the above-quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke
the "private" nature of his posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the
IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for
insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not
been established.[52]
In a Resolution[53] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[54] arguing that there was no specific act attributed to him that would warrant his
suspension from the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an employee of BMGI had already
been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.[55]
In a Resolution[56] dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty
from one (1) year to six (6) months suspension.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations of the verified complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except as to the penalty imposed on
respondent.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about
complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were
"private remarks" on his "private account"[57] that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the
same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71
billion monthly active users.[58] Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to
generate and share content. There are various classifications[59] of social media platforms and one can be classified under the
"social networking sites" such as Facebook.[60]
Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum
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enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another."[61] Users register at this site,
create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including
automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can
be made visible to anyone, depending on the user's privacy settings.[62]
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed
to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,[63] the South Gauteng High
Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but with
the cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to protect a user's information, these
privacy settings are however not foolproof."[64]
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity - in this case,
Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.[65]
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists
were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of
Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive
evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his
circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.[66]
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only,
there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile - will be
safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any
conceivable way";
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former,
despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. [67]
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of
another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."[68] Under the circumstances, therefore,
respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and
expression.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.
[69]
While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the
Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.[70] As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast
lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.[71]
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to
insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna
ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad
faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed
criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling
BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases
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that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence
and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the
reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a
lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must
behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent . Instead, he acted inappropriately and
rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and
maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism [72] does not
justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. [73] In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for
which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.
"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their
want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and
for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them."[74] Accordingly, the Court finds
that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-
CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,

vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus
each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy
with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social
norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M.
No. 08-1-16-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012
1
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their
2
habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material,
graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing
into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took
digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.
3
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they
readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed
her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
4
viewable by any Facebook user. 5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation,
STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student
Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

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3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages,
language or symbols; and
6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to
the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM Directress. They claimed
6
that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference,
including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed
their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises
scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. In it, 7
Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On
March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the
photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the
students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on
the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB on the basis of the following considerations:
8
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed
into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard
the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has
been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their
memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay
of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas
databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been
illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of
habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following
grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are
engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be
no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the
Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas
Data. 10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual
milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
11
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age." The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
13
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s
14
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended. 15

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not
prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users,
sans the spatial barriers, bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
16
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing
the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." As such, it
17
is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to
the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases
18
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of
a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of
the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her
family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something." It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that
19
the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not
prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group,
i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the
effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part
therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to
Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
20 21
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
22
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. 23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each
system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said
flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that
given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. In the same
25
vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W, promulgated on January30, 2013,
26
recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or
else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed
as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation
of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that
occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational
privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information, some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
27
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members
of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards
or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner
can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she
allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has
paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and
family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them." 28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend request,"
the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of
the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and
shares certain information to the latter.
29

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
30
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the
31 32
South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this
caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy
settings are not foolproof." 33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility
of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences." Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the
34
opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information.
Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular
post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many
OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto. 35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his
or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case
the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
36
the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the
user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile
detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise,
38
using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any
personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the
user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to
limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of
his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether the
disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the
images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded
upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them,
FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited
39
since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of
them, although who these five are do not appear on the records.
40
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin
41
brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their
friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of
these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there
the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not
confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the
students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of
them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
43
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
44
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself. 45
Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
46
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent
to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard,
the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the
zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and
share in any conceivable way;" 47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share" the former’s post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with
49 50
the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s
Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting).
As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and
socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been
said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame." Thus, it is
51
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be
said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort
to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the
photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the
actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection
with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights,
52
contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students
scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in
a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed
the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they
have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only"
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom"
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." This means that self-regulation on the
53
part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. As a 54
cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that
55
many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes" on the part
56
of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far
since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to
educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and
organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective
programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities. Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers
58
that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged
by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision." 59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings
and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student
Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
1âwphi1

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware
that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more
importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not
be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they
desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS
RULING
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5713. June 10, 2002.]
(Adm. Case No. 99-634)
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, v. Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a
Sworn Statement alleging the following: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x x x
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero
Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim
and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand
letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch,
however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file
the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A,
the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as
Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta
but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and
he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked;
and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not
yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building
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at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor
at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes
with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of
Court was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of
the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta’s complaint to personally verify the progress of
my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta at his office the following day; May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"
x x x. 1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
2 respondent filed his Answer 3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being
totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one
of the former’s law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand
letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. — a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said
Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested
that another demand letter — this time addressed to the former — be drafted by respondent,
who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process
server of the former’s law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent
drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case)
and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the
following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant’s wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed
him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid
by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that
these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant
promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent’s secretary and told
her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the
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acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the
amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing
of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental
Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries.
The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant
proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent’s acceptance and legal
fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer
returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing
extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly.
Respondent’s checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if

anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP’s Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was
for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that
was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the
complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees
deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which
caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his
part, unbecoming a member of the law profession: The subsequent reimbursement by the
respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the
respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the
gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year." 4
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Commission’s recommendation.
Main Issue: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Misappropriation of Client’s Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
hence, the former’s failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the
amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney’s fees and not
for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client’s cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only
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protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar
and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. 5 Members of the bar
must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him
and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that
he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former’s business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former’s fees. 8 Hence,
despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that
respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the
lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare — and had actually
prepared — at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client’s interest. Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client,
they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in them. 9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and the defense of the client’s rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally
applied. 10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" —
if indeed it was one — respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He
should have lost no time in calling complainant’s attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law — a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business. 11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration. 13 Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much
money. 14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant — as evidenced by the
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receipt issued by the law office of respondent — the latter also violated the rule that lawyers
must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.
15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they
have a lien upon the client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into
their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements.
However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any
event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. 18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing
fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the
former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be
imposed as a penalty. 19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all
courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondent’s file. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., abroad, on official leave.

First Division: Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares, Complainant, vs. Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra, Respondent. Decision

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FACTS

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG MAGKANONG

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Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)

IBP's Report and Recommendation

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The defense is untenable.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

habeas data petition.

viewable by any Facebook user. 5

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

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Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

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Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

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STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

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contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

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[A.C. No. 5713. June 10, 2002.]

(Adm. Case No. 99-634)

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, v. Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant’s wife

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if

The IBP’s Recommendation

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the Commission’s recommendation.

Main Issue: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Misappropriation of Client’s Funds

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

The Practice of Law — a

Profession, Not a Business

Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., abroad, on official leave.

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