PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, 

petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.

Trial Court- Vestils were not the owners. Rendered a decision on favour of Vestils.

Court of Appeals- Reversed the decision of the trial court, since possession NOT ownership was necessary. In
favour of Uy.

Supreme Court- Sustains the findings of the CA, with deductions in hospitalization expenses. In favour of Uy.

Facts:

 Theneses Tan Uy died when she was 3 years old because she was bitten by Vestil’s dog while playing
with their child. Incident occurred at the house of Vestil’s father.
 Theneses Tan Uy was rushed to the hospital and was discharged after 9 days but died a week later
from vomiting of saliva caused by broncho-pneumonia. Broncho-pneumonia is a complication of
rabies which was caused by the dog bite.
 Vestil’s were in possession of the house and the dog at the time of the incident. However, they were
not the owners since it is their deceased father’s, and the estate is not yet partitioned.

Issues:

 Whether or not Art.2183 applies to Vestil even if they are not the dog’s owner
 Whether or not the cause of death was the dog

Ruling:

 Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so they should be responsible under Article
2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog, since it gives liability towards the possessor
of the animals and not the owner. Furthermore, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor
liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does
not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked
by the child into biting her
 The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been
satisfactorily established. The cause of death was broncho-pneumonia which can be a complication of
rabies, which was then caused by the dog bite.
ALFREDO MALLARI, SR. and ALFREDO MALLARI, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

Trial Court- Proximate Cause was the driver of BULLETIN’s negligence. Decision in favour of Mallari.

Court of Appeals- Caused by Mallari’s negligence. Modified Trial Court’s decision in favour of BULLETIN.

Supreme Court- Affirmed the decision of the CA in favour of BULLETIN.

Facts:

 A passenger jeepney owned by Mallari SR and driven by Mallari JR, collided with a delivery van owned
by BULLETIN publishing corp.
 Mallari JR overtook a Fiera in the curve of a highway, even though this was in though he saw the van
from BULLETIN coming, which caused the collision.
 A passenger of the jeepney, Israel Reyes, died due to injuries sustained.
 Claudia Reyes, the widow, filed the complaint for damages against both Mallari and BULLETIN.

Issues:

 Whether or not the Proximate Cause was the negligence of Mallari.

 Whether or not the legal presumption of negligence in Art. 2185 should be upheld

Ruling:

 Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the
jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.,
who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic
rules.
 Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to
overcome this legal presumption.

Note: Mallari contested that there was no evidence that he overtook a vehicle at a curve on the road at the
time of or before the accident. However, he himself testified that such fact indeed did occur
JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, Respondent.

Trial Court- Añonuevo is liable for the injuries. In favour of Villagracia.

Court of Appeals- Affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. In favour of Villagracia.

Supreme Court- Affirmed the decision of the Trial Court and CA. In favour of Villagracia.

Facts:

 Villagracia was travelling in his bike when he was crashed into by Añonuevo who was driving a lancer
in the opposite lane.
 Witness claimed that Añonuevo was speeding or “umaarangkada”
 Añonuevo claimed that a jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn. He still claimed that
he saw Villagracia 10 meters ahead.
 The injuries of Villagracia forced him to undergo 4 operations
 Villagracia‘s bike had no safety devices such as a foot-break, a horn or a bell, or headlights which was
needed according to the 1948 ordinance. The bike was also not registered as required by the same
ordinance.

Issues:

 Whether or not Art.2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles

 Whether or not the proximate cause was Añonuevo’s negligence

Ruling:

 Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize the higher standard of diligence and care placed upon
drivers of motorized vehicles. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal
footing with other types of vehicles. If the framers of the law intended to include non-motorized
vehicles to the scope of the provision, they would have done so.

 Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of
the accident. This reckless behaviour would have endangered anyone unlucky enough within the path
of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection.
 The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have
sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal
consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. Furthermore, the fact
that Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility that the
absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Court of First Instance- Amended initial complaint, damages charged against City of Manila. In favour of
Teotico.

Court of Appeals- City of Manila is liable. In favour of Teotico.

Supreme Court- Affirms the decision of the CA. In favour of Teotico.

Facts:

 Teotico, while trying to board a jeepney, fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole/catchbasin
in P.Burgos, Manila. Teotico was injured due to defective streets or public works.
 Due to the fall he hit his head and impaired his vision due to his glasses breaking and piercing his
eyelid. He also suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip
and an abrasion on the right infra-patella (knee) region.
 The City of Manila claims to have been monitoring lost lids and covers of manholes and replacing
them immediately and that there was no report on the date of the accident.

Issues:

 Whether or not Sec 4 of RA 409 or Art.2189 should govern the case

 Whether or not City of Manila should be held liable since the incident took place in a national highway

Ruling:

 Art.2189 of the civil code should apply. Sec 4 of RA 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Art.2189 governs liability due to "defective
streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
 P.Burgos Avenue was under the control or supervision of the City of Manila. The article applies
regardless of ownership or to whom the public works belongs to, what is important is the control or
supervision of such.
BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents

Court of First instance- Complaint dismissed in favour of Asiatic Integrated Corporation and the City of Manila

Intermediate Appellate Court- Asiatic Integrated Corporation is solely liable. Reversed the decision of the CFI
in favour of Jimenez.

Supreme Court- Asiatic Integrated Corporation and the City of Manila are jointly liable. Modified the decision
of the CA in favour of Jimenez.

Facts:

 Jimemez went to Sta. Ana public market when it was flooded with ankle deep rainwater, wherein he
stepped on an uncovered opening which could not have been seen because of the rain water.
 A 4-inch nail pierced his left leg. The injury caused him intense pain and caused him to be confined for
20 days. Furthermore, after discharged, he required the use of crutches.
 Sta. Ana public market is within the City of Manila, but under the supervision of Asiatic Integrated
Corporation under virtue of a management and operations contract.


Issues:

 Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in making Asiatic Integrated Corporation
solely liable and absolving the City of Manila.
 Whether or not Jimenez should be blamed for going to the market knowing that there was flood.

Ruling:

 There is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating
Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of
the City of Manila. The contract between the two specifically states that Asiatic Integrated
Corporation needs prior approval from the city before conducting its duties. Control over the Sta. Ana
market was also admitted by the Mayor and Market Master.
 Jimenez had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if
any, that they were adequately covered. Had the opening been covered, he could not have fallen into
it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered.

 City of Manila is jointly liable for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having
retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tortfeasor under Article 2176
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON, Petitioners,
vs.
FULGENCIO DACARA*, Respondent.

Trial Court- Quezon City was liable due to negligence. Decision in favour of Dacara

Court of Appeals- Affirmed the Trial Courts ruling. In favour of Dacara

Supreme Court- Modified previous ruling by removing Moral Damages. In favour of Dacara

Facts:

 While driving, the Dacaras’ rammed into a pile of earth diggings in Matahimik St. Quezon City. The
diggings were due to repairs being conducted by Quezon City.
 The car turtled when it hit the diggings and Dacara JR allegedly sustained injuries, but no evidence
was provided.
 Quezon City claims that there were sufficient barricades to warn people. They claim that they were
exercising due care by providing the area with the necessary measures to avoid incidents.

Issues:

 Whether or not the negligence of Quezon City to properly secure the diggings was the proximate
cause of the accident.
 Whether or not Art.2189 is applicable to cases without death or physical injury, only property
damage.

Ruling:

 Evidence indicates that Quezon City failed to show that they placed sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb under the
circumstances since none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and adequacy of said
contention.
 It is illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury only as argued by appellants in the case at
bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an act that damages, harms or hurts and mean in
common as the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain,
distress, or impairment.

Note:

 Moral damages = not awarded since no proof of injury; meant as compensation not a penalty.
 Exemplary damages = awarded since QC showed gross negligence through failing its responsibility;
wanton disregard for public safety.
 Dacara’s negligence/speeding = was not brought up in the first trial, cannot be considered based
principles of fair play and due process
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LAURA BIGLANG-AWA, METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
SYSTEM (MWSS), and KWOK CHEUNG, Respondent.

Trial Court- Municipality of San Juan and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System are jointly liable.
Decision in favour of Biglang-awa.

Court of Appeals- Affirmed previous decision with modification to charges as well as making KC liable. in
favour of Biglang-awa.

Supreme Court- Affirmed previous decision. In favour of Biglang-awa

Facts:

 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System hired KC Waterworks. KC was tasked with the
installation of water service connections, tapping of the service pipe connection and mounting of
water meter, etc.
 KC was given a job order by MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M.Paterno and
Santolan Road in Metro Manila. (National Road)
 Before excavations was finished, Priscilla Chan along with Biglang-awa was driving at a speed of
30km/h while it was raining. The rain caused the road to be flooded.
 The car’s front wheel suddenly fell on the uncovered manhole left by KC’s excavations, which caused
Biglang-awa’s injury to her right arm.
 Police witness did not see any barricades at the scene.

Issues:

 Whether or not Art.2189 applies to the Municipality of San Juan, since Santolan is a national road.
 Whether or not the Municipality of San Juan should be absolved from liability since MWSS and KC
were the contractors.

Ruling:

 Under Article 21898 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality
has control or supervision thereof.
 Even if KC was the one conducting the excavations San Juan was still mandated to undertake the
necessary precautionary measures to avert accidents and insure the safety of pedestrians and
commuters. They cannot validly shirk from the obligation to maintain and insure the safe condition of
the road merely because the permit for the excavation may have been issued by a government entity
other than them or that the excavation may have been done by a contractor under contract.