Ascribed vs.

Popular Legitimacy: The Case of al-Walīd II and Umayyad ʿahd

Author(s): Abdulhadi Alajmi
Source: Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 72, No. 1 (April 2013), pp. 25-33
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Ascribed vs. Popular Legitimacy: The
Case of al-Walīd II and Umayyad ʿahd
Abdulhadi Alajmi, Kuwait University

Introduction portray a highly admiring picture of the Umayyads,

whom they believed to have been successful in build-
The issue of Umayyad legitimacy has been the fo-
ing an empire based on pragmatic practices rather than
cus of study for those trying to make sense of this
religious ideology.
very complicated yet extremely important period in
These views of how Arabs established control over
Islamic history. How did the Umayyads rule such a
non-Arabs dominated the field until Patricia Crone
large state, and what was the meaning of legitimacy
and Martin Hinds, more than a half century later,
during this time in early Islam? J. Wellhausen believed
argued that religion in fact played a significant role
that ethnicity was particularly significant in this mat-
in Umayyad legitimacy.3 For them, Umayyad caliphs
ter; the Umayyad caliph and the ruling elite were
established their authority by building a leadership
exclusively Arab, and their tribal affiliations allowed
institution whose holder was seen as the deputy of
this very small number of what might be considered
God on earth, “God’s caliph.”4 Here we see a shift
“Arab kings” to rule a vast kingdom mainly inhab-
from the ethnic dominance model to another model
ited by non-Arab subjects.1 This view was shared by
in which religion played a significant role in the po-
many of Wellhausen’s contemporaries, especially the
litical arena. Uri Rubin disagreed with how Crone and
Jesuit scholar Henri Lammens, whose presentation
Hinds defined the term “God’s caliph,” and accused
of this same model was somewhat exaggerated. For
them of manufacturing evidence to suit their general
him, the Umayyads were skilled Arab politicians with
argument.5 He rejected the claim that the title “God’s
almost no interest in religious affairs, and this was
the underlying factor behind their success in running
an empire with a mostly non-Arab and non-Muslim For more on Lammens (1862–1937), see K. S. Salibi, “Islam and
Syria in the Writings of Henri Lammens,” in Historians of the Middle
population.2 In general, such scholars attempted to
East, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962).
3 
Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph (Cambridge,
1 
J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, trans. Margaret 1986), 1–4.
Graham Weir (Calcutta, 1927), 150, 157–58, 165–67, 174, 176, 4 
Ibid.
185–86. 5 
Uri Rubin, “Prophets and Caliphs: the Biblical Foundations of
2 
See especially H. Lammens’ “Le Califate de Yazid 1er,” in his Umayyad Authority,” in Method and Theology in the Study of Islamic
Études sur le siécle des Omayyades (Beirut, 1930), 259–60, 266–69. Origins, ed. Herbert Berg (Leiden, 2003), 88–93.

[JNES 72 no. 1 (2013)] © 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 022–2968–2013/7201–003 $10.00.

25

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26  F  Journal of Near Eastern Studies
caliph” was created to give the Umayyads a monopoly
on religious authority, disconnecting them from early
prophetic tradition and holding them less accountable
to its high ideals. Nevertheless, Rubin was more in-
clined to support the thesis of Crone and Hinds over
Wellhausen’s; he believed that Umayyad legitimacy
originated in their religious claims rather than in any
secular affiliations. Thus, Rubin argued that the title
“God’s caliph” carried exactly the same meaning as the
title “the Prophet’s caliph,” and that the Umayyads
saw themselves as a continuation of the legacy of a
chain of prophets and caliphs.
Steven Judd took up this same issue by focusing on
one Umayyad caliph, al-Walīd b. Yazīd (r. a.h. 125–
26/743–44 c.e.).6 He presented an exaggerated form
of Crone and Hinds’ thesis, coupled with their defini-
tion of “God’s caliph,” though he never responded
to Rubin’s criticism. For Judd, al-Walīd’s contribu-
tion to Umayyad political thought, as reflected in
his belief in predestination, was to present the caliph
as an embodiment of God’s will on earth, such that
the enemy of the caliph became the enemy of God.
Like Crone and Hinds, Judd claimed that this title
separated Umayyad caliphs from prophetic tradition
and gave them God-like authority over their subjects.
Judd went one step further and argued that al-Walīd
took up titles in addition to “God’s caliph,” such as
al-nāṣiḥ (“counselor”) and al-nadhīr (“warner”), in
order to gain religious authority higher than that of
the Prophet himself.7 According to Judd, the poetry
and letters of al-Walīd reveal that he was a level-headed
caliph, whose understanding of Umayyad legitimacy
presents a highly reliable account of the subject—even
though historical narratives have tarnished his moral
character.
It is noteworthy that the above scholars dealt with
the issue of legitimacy mostly for the period after the
caliphs came to power, that is, in their aspiration to
maintain legitimacy. The only difference among these
scholars concerned the means used to attain this par-
ticular end; thus, some argued that the caliph used
secular means while others argued that he used vari-
ous religious claims. The thesis that the caliph faced
occasional opposition from his subjects and that a
type of secular or religious support was thus needed
for a smooth operation of leadership is valid. How-
ever, there was one issue that challenged the caliph’s
6 
Steven Judd, “Reinterpreting al-Walīd b. Yazīd,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society 128/3 (2008): 442–44.
7 
Ibid., 447–48.
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individual power, such that neither his secular nor
religious maneuvering could assure that his will was
obeyed: the issue of ʿahd (“pledge”). This was the
practice through which the caliph would designate
his chosen successor, walī al-ʿahd (“heir apparent,”
but literally “successor by compact/oath”). Some-
times several successors were named at once to reign
consecutively one after the other. Although these ap-
pointments were made by the caliph himself, they had
to be met with the consensus of the Umayyad elite.
Once a candidate was chosen as walī al-ʿahd by the
acting caliph in collaboration with the Umayyad elite,
this candidate would become the legitimate heir to
the caliphate.
This ʿahd had to be honoured by all members of the
elite, including the caliphs themselves, who sometimes
came to power while other, less desirable candidates
previously appointed as walī al-ʿahd still remained.
(According to Ibn al-Athīr, ʿAbd al-Malik wanted to
impeach his brother from his position as successor and
appoint his son, but Qubayṣa b. Dhuʾayb advised him
to rethink this position and wait until ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
died. ʿAbd al-Malik took this advice and appointed his
two sons upon ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s death.) This means that
Umayyad caliphs achieved their legitimacy before ever
reaching the caliphate through the political institu-
tion of succession; their appeal to either religious or
secular means of support when exercising power was
only secondary. Indeed, the appointment of a walī al-
ʿahd would provide full legitimacy for the immediate
exercise of political power, while the aforementioned
claims of authority, whether secular or religious, would
be sought only when conflicts arose. This means that
Umayyad legitimacy is best described as comprising
two different types: one originated in being approved
as walī al-ʿahd, which legitimized the appointment
of the caliph in the eyes of the Umayyad elite, while
the other originated in being called “God’s caliph” or
“the Prophet’s caliph,” which legitimized the exercise
of power in the eyes of ordinary people, especially in
the face of religious opposition. I would like to term
the first type “acquired legitimacy,” since the caliph
acquired it through the deliberations of other people,
whereas the second type of legitimacy was a popular
one, which I will term “aspired legitimacy,” since it
was invented by the c­ aliph himself and reflected his
aspiration to overcome opposition.
One need not make an intricate argument to con-
clude that the means employed to attain acquired
­legitimacy differed from those used to to attain aspired
legitimacy and vice versa. Indeed, the caliph needed
 Ascribed vs. Popular Legitimacy: The Case of al-Walīd II and Umayyad ʿahd  F 27
no universal approval for choosing his successor, nor
could he be expected to gain the support of the elite
on this issue simply by calling himself God’s deputy.
Again, acquired legitimacy was much more signifi-
cant than aspired legitimacy; the former embodied
a process that involved various people and interests
responsible for bringing the caliph into power, while
the latter rested entirely in the hands of the caliph. The
only exception to the above exposition is the case of
the Umayyad caliph al-Walīd b. Yazīd, who attempted
to use aspired legitimacy in place of acquired legiti-
macy. He exercised his choice of ʿahd by appealing
to his religious authority—aspired legitimacy in this
case—in an effort to establish acquired legitimacy for
his sons. This means that al-Walīd decided to appoint
candidates as walī al-ʿahd without the required col-
laboration of the elite. The results were disastrous,
and the whole Umayyad dynasty suffered turmoil.
Accordingly, the focus of this paper is to assess the
appointment of the walī al-ʿahd, with special focus
on the case of al-Walīd, in order to show the extent
to which it constituted the foundation of legitimacy
for Umayyad caliphs.
The Problem of Islamic Sources
Dealing with the question of ʿahd requires a major
effort in selecting historical accounts that allow us
to get a deeper understanding of this complex affair.
The problems characterizing Muslim historical narra-
tions are well known to all the specialists in the field.
Although the early scholar Wellhausen believed that
one could accurately reconstruct a particular histor-
ical event on the basis of a narrative account, later
scholars grew more skeptical of the overall tradition.
Starting with I. Goldziher8 and J. Schacht,9 early his-
torical traditions were viewed as literary accounts re-
flecting the political as well as the religious biases of
later generations. The greater the need to invent early
traditions to confer legitimacy on later practices, the
larger the corpus of Islamic traditions grew. Schacht
termed it the “living tradition” and viewed this early
living tradition as highly unreliable for the historian,
whose primary task is to determine an accurate and
fixed account of individuals and events.
8 
Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, trans. C. R. Barber and S. M.
Stern (London, 1971).
9 
Joseph Schacht, Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence (London,
1950).
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Although Schacht’s view stemmed from his focus
on legal traditions, we find that it is equally relevant
when looking into early historical traditions, espe-
cially those dealing with the character of the Umayyad
­caliphs. Several narrations from this early tradition are
nothing more than polemics reflecting the interests
of one party involved in a major conflict with a dif-
ferent party. Gerald Hawting cleverly exposed these
anti-Umayyad attitudes characterizing early Muslim
tradition,10 the historical tradition that has come down
to us and first circulated through the work of scholars
already hostile to the Umayyad regime. This tradition
reached its final shape, as we know it today, through
scholars living under the supervision of an Abbasid re-
gime that was even more hostile towards the Umayy-
ads than the proponents of the earlier tradition. Most
certainly, this early tradition was full of accounts about
how the Umayyad caliphs were illegitimate and un-
just, not to mention character attacks on individual
caliphs who allegedly spent most of their time pursu-
ing worldly pleasures rather than devoting themselves
to religious affairs.
Proposed Solutions
These setbacks should not deter us from pursuing
­Islamic history, since the importance of the subject
­necessitates that we overcome these obstacles in or-
der to elucidate the nature of this very significant
Umayyad period. Yet we must approach the period
cautiously; we need to gather concrete facts about
­particular events and avoid sweeping generalizations.
For one thing, we may safely assume that traditions
with a polemical nature resulted from conflicts dur-
ing which certain characters launched moral attacks
against other characters or events. Our job here is to
define these polemics, look beyond them, and uncover
the actual events necessary for understanding the is-
sues in question. This means that our analysis should
not focus on character attacks levied by one party on
another, but on the sources of conflict that gave rise
to these attacks and the extent to which they shaped
political events. A second tool to help us overcome
the problem of early Islamic sources is to base our
analysis on documents received by most contempo-
rary scholars as authentic. If these documents have
received the stamp of approval of most scholars, even
10 
G. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam (London, 1986),
44–49; also see his article “Umayyads” in The Encyclopaedia of
­Islam, 2nd edition (Leiden, 1960–2005; hereafter EI2).
28  F  Journal of Near Eastern Studies
those most skeptical towards the tradition, then we
may ­accept them as an accurate account of a given
historical event. Finally, our investigation must situate
these documents in light of the overall historical events
characterizing the period. Again, we have to rely on
events known and agreed upon by most scholars. With
these methods we may reach certain conclusions that
allow us, as well as future historians, to benefit from
this very difficult early historical tradition.
Perhaps an example shedding light on the above
criteria is now in order. What we have in mind here
is the letter of al-Walīd b. Yazīd.11 This document is
authentic according to most researchers, even scholars
regarded as skeptical of early Islamic tradition. This
authentic document can help us understand the issue
of ʿahd, which we view as an integral part of Umayyad
legitimacy. However, we must assess the letter in light
of the historical events taking place at the time of
its composition (i.e., the al-Walīd era). First, history
shows us that the Umayyad caliphs in collaboration
with the Umayyad elite were responsible for choosing
a successor. The authenticity of these events is widely
agreed upon. Again, we must assess al-Walīd’s motive
in composing this letter, while being mindful of the
polemical nature of historical accounts dealing with
his character. Here we should take these polemics as
a reflection of an underlying conflict that must be as-
sessed in light of surrounding political events. Finally,
looking into the content of the letter and the audience
to whom it was directed should help our historical
investigation reach its conclusions.
Historical Background
Let us start by turning to the historical background of
the issue of Umayyad ʿahd. Most certainly, it is best ex-
plained in light of the development of the notion that
the Umayyad elite had to agree on the caliph’s choice
of a successor. The meeting of al-Jābiya is particularly
significant in this case.12 This meeting took place in the
aftermath of the reign of Muyʿāwiya II (r. 64/683); it
aimed to select a leader to take control of the caliph-
ate, since the caliph himself had decided to leave no
successor. According to al-Ṭabarī, Muʿāwiya II was
11 
For the full content of the letter in Arabic, refer to al-Ṭabarī,
Tarīkh al-Rusul wa-l-Mulūk, vol. 4, 55; for an English translation
refer to Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, 112, or Rubin, “Prophets
and Caliphs,” 88–93.
12 
See Henri Lammens and J. Sourdel-Thomine, “al-Djābiya,”
EI2.
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appointed to the caliphate but regarded himself unfit
for the job, so he called on the elite after Friday prayers
in a speech indicating his disinterest in the caliphate
and his inability to appoint a successor.13 Muʿāwiya II
indicated that he was neither able to do what Abū
Bakr did in finding a strong successor such as ʿUmar
b. al-Khaṭṭāb, nor was he able to do what ʿUmar did in
appointing six qualified candidates to choose a caliph.
This led Muʿāwiya II to abandon the whole process,
returning to his home and allowing the elite to choose
whomever they saw fit for the caliphate.
The Umayyad elite gathered and selected Marwān
b. al-Ḥakam (r. 64–65/684–85) as the most suitable
candidate for the job. This selection was not easy; it
met with resistance from some of the parties partici-
pating in the gathering. According to al-Ṭabarī, the
impromptu selection of a new caliph became prob-
lematic when Mālik b. Hubayra supported Khālid b.
Yazīd as the new caliph while al-Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr
supported Marwān b. al-Ḥakam.14 Mālik argued that
Khālid b. Yazīd was a nephew who would further their
interests, whereas al-Ḥuṣayn argued that it would be
inappropriate to favor a young boy over an older and
more experienced man for the caliphate.15 Finally,
the discussion led the contending parties to choose
Marwān b. al-Ḥakam as the new caliph, and Rawḥ b.
Zanbāʿ al-Juzāmī announced this result in a speech.
He praised Marwān as the most suitable candidate
for the position, denounced ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr
as a hypocrite and a rebel, and then suggested that
13 
innī naẓartu fī amrikum fa-ḍaʿuftu ʿanhu fa-abtaghaytu ra-
julan mithla ʿUmar ḥīna faziʿa ilayhi Abū Bakr falam ajidhu fa-
abtaghaytu lakum sittatan fī al-shūrā fa-lam ajidhā fa-antum awlā
bi-amrikum fa-khtārū lahu man aḥbabtum (Al-Ṭabari, Tārīkh al-
Rusul wa-l-Mulūk, vol. 7, [Beirut, 1998], 21: [Muʾawiya II is speak-
ing]: “He praised God and extolled Him and then said, ‘To come
to the point, I have considered the matter of authority among you
and I do not have the strength for it. I sought for you somebody
like ‘Umar b. al-Khattab [God’s mercy be upon him] when Abu
Bakr had recourse to him, but I have not found such a man. And I
have sought for you six men to consult among themselves like the
six appointed by ‘Umar, but I have not found them. You are best
fitted to decide your own affairs, so choose for them somebody you
love.’ Then he went into his residence and did not again come out
to the people, remaining absent until he died” (ibid., vol. 20, 49).
14 
fa ammā Mālik b. Hubayra al-Sakūnī fa-kāna yahwā hawā
Banī Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya wa-yuḥibbu an takūna al-khilāfa fīhim,
wa-ammā al-Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr al-Sakūnī fa-kāna yahwā an takūn
al-khilāfa li-Marwān b. al-Ḥakam. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 24.
15 
halumma nubāyiʿ li-hādhā al-ghulām. . . . fa-innahu yaḥmi­
lunā ʿalā riqāb al-ʿarab ghadan. . . fa-qāla Ḥuṣayn lā la‘amr Allāh
lā ta’īnā al-ʿarab bi-shaykh wa-na’tīhim bi-ṣabī. Ibid.
 Ascribed vs. Popular Legitimacy: The Case of al-Walīd II and Umayyad ʿahd  F 29
Khālid b. Yazīd be designated a successor to Marwān
b. al-Ḥakam since he was too young to be caliph.16
The particular way in which Marwān b. al-Ḥakam
became caliph established a unique precedent; it gave
the Umayyad elite the privilege not only of choosing
the caliph but also of being the sole body from which
the caliph was selected. Thus the Umayyad elite had
become a significant part of the process of choosing
a caliph: its members were the only qualified candi-
dates for the job, and their choice of a given candidate
gave legitimacy to future caliphs. Unlike the Sufyānid
era, in which caliphal appointments resulted from a
choice of a walī al-ʿahd who belonged to Muʿāwiya’s
family alone and who was directly chosen by the ca-
liph himself, the Marwānid era allowed for greater
participation of the Umayyad elite, both as qualifying
candidates and as members of an unofficial council
ensuring that the caliph’s choice would be honored
by future caliphs.17
The meeting at al-Jābiya resulted in the appoint-
ment of Marwān b. al-Ḥakam as the Umayyad caliph,
and he later selected ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 65–86/685–
705) as his first successor and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as his
second successor. ʿAbd al-Malik chose his two sons,
al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik and Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-
Malik, to be his first and second successors should
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz die.18 Al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 86–
96/705–15) tried to change the ʿahd by choosing his
son as successor for the caliphate instead of his brother
Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik.19 However, al-Walīd was
unable to undermine the ʿahd, and Sulaymān b. ʿAbd
16 
This is a summary of a very long speech; for the full text, see
ibid.
17 
For further research and discussions on how the meeting
at al-Jābiya established the model that became the cornerstone
of Umayyad caliphal selection, see Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥamārina, “Marwān
b. al-Ḥakam wa-al-Khilāfa,” Majallat dirāsāt tārikhiyya: lajnat
kitābat tārīkh al-ʿarab 6 (1981): 48–51; Maḥmūd Rizq Maḥmūd,
“Shubuhāt ḥawla baʿḍ khulafā’ Banī Umayya: dirāsa mawḍūʿiyya,”
Majallat al-tārīkh wa-al-mustaqbal 2 (1992): 135–37.
18 
According to Ibn al-Athīr, ʿAbd al-Malik wanted to impeach
his brother from his position as successor and appoint his son,
but Qubayṣa b. Dhuʿayb advised him to rethink this position and
wait until ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz died. ʿAbd al-Malik took this advice and
appointed his two sons upon ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s death. Ibn al-Athīr,
­Al-Kāmil fī al-Tārikh, ed. Maktabat al-Turāth, 4th ed. (Beirut,
1994), vol. 2, 326–27.
19 
According to al-Ṭabarī, when al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik be-
came caliph he attempted to appoint his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz in place
of Sulaymān, who was the successor in place at the time. However,
Sulaymān refused and al-Walīd’s wishes failed even though he was
able to find the support of al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, a powerful governor
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al-Malik (r. 96–99/715–17) became caliph. Once
more, the issue of ʿahd became open, and Sulaymān
appointed ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Azīz (r. 99–101/717–20)
and Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 101–105/720–24) as
first and second successors. Both candidates ruled in
turn, and then Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik appointed his
brother Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 105–25/724–43)
and his son al-Walīd b. Yazīd (r. 125–26/ 743–44).20
Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik ruled for twenty years, and
he tried to change the ʿahd by appointing his son in
place of al-Walīd b. Yazīd. However, Hishām b. ʿAbd
al-Malik failed in this attempt, despite the fierce pro-
paganda campaign he carried out against the moral
character of al-Walīd b. Yazīd. In the end, the ʿahd
was honored and al-Walīd b. Yazīd became caliph.21
The issue of ʿahd was once more left open for a
new decision at this point, and al-Walīd appointed
both of his own sons as successors. This was met with
strong opposition from the Umayyad elite, and the
ensuing conflict resulted in the murder of the caliph
and his two sons at the hands of the elite. This cre-
ated a serious problem for the Umayyads, and the
choice of caliph became further complicated when
Marwān b. Muḥammad dismissed Ibrāhīm b. al-Walīd
and appointed himself caliph, thereby defying previ-
ous Umayyad practices. This caliphal crisis resulted
in major insurgencies in almost every region under
Umayyad rule; the end of Umayyad dominance be-
came imminent as the revolution in Khurasān became
unstoppable, giving rise to the Abbasids, a new regime
with a different view of legitimacy.
This historical exposition presents us with one sig-
nificant fact, namely that the process of choosing a
successor involved the decisions of the caliph as well
as other members of the elite. This is why we must dif-
ferentiate between acquired legitimacy and aspired le-
gitimacy: the first went beyond the scope of the power
known for his loyalty to the Umayyads. Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul
wa-l-Mulūk, vol. 4, 18.
20 
According to Ibn ʿAsākir, after the death of Sulaymān, the task
of choosing a successor fell in the hands of ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
after he was appointed caliph by Sulaymān himself. The appoint-
ment came in a letter indicating that Sulaymān appointed ʿUmar as
caliph and Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik as successor, and that all Muslims
must obey the caliph and obey his successor when he reached of-
fice. Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dīmashq, ed. ʿUmar b. Gharāma
al-ʿAmrawī (Beirut, 1994), vol. 2, 164.
21 
According to al-Ṭabarī, Hishām wanted to appoint his son
Maslama as successor and impeach al-Walīd for his immoral behav-
ior, but the force of ʿahd was too great to be undermined even in
al-Walīd’s case. Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa-l-Mulūk, vol. 4, 22.
30  F  Journal of Near Eastern Studies
of the caliph, while the second rested solely in his
hands. For instance, neither the title of “God’s caliph”
nor any other title would grant the caliph the acquired
legitimacy necessary for making a particular choice
for walī al-ʿahd. Rather, this choice had to meet the
approval of the caliph’s surrounding elite. Although
several Umayyad caliphs chose favorable successors,
most certainly after collaborations with members of
the elite, others were unable to do so because of an
existing pledge that was binding on them and their
supporters. Even those caliphs who attempted to cir-
cumvent their predecessors’ ʿahd eventually capitu-
lated to the will of the elites. As mentioned above,
al-Walīd b. Yazīd was the only exception to this rule.
His affair is thus particularly significant for under-
standing the importance of distinguishing between
the two types of Umayyad legitimacy. This takes us to
the second step outlined in our criteria, namely assess-
ing al-Walīd’s motives for writing his letter.
Al-Walīd’s Motive
Al-Walīd’s motive will only become clear when we
understand the nature of the political situation pre-
ceding his becoming caliph and deciding to write
this letter; for this, we have to go back to the era of
Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik. The sources present us with
a specific picture of this era: they show that Hishām
made a serious effort to help al-Walīd b. Yazīd estab-
lish moral integrity, both in actuality and image. Al-
Ṭabarī captured the nature of the exchange between
the caliph and his successor in the narrations dealing
with the biography of Hishām.22 According to him,
when Hishām became caliph, his relationship with al-
Walīd was on good terms. However, Hishām started
to hear about al-Walīd’s shameful behavior, associated
with heavy drinking and a careless attitude towards the
precepts of religion. Hishām tried to invite al-Walīd
to an upright path by sending him as the head of the
pilgrims during the hajj period. This proved to be
a disaster, since al-Walīd brought dogs and alcohol
with him on his trip to Mecca.23 This fiasco prompted
Hishām to order al-Walīd to impeach himself as the
caliph’s successor and to appoint Hishām’s son in his
place. Al-Walīd rejected these orders and in turn began
attacking the moral character of both Hishām and his
22 
Ibid., vol. 4, p. 222.
23 
Ibid., vol. 4, p. 223.
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son.24 The relationship between Hishām and al-Walīd
reached its lowest point when al-Walīd grew tired of
dealing with the pressure and went off to the desert,
where he remained until the caliph died.25
These historical narrations present al-Walīd as a
villain and Hishām as a good-hearted caliph aiming
to put his successor on the right path. This picture
painted by al-Ṭabarī’s collected narrations may reflect
the character of the participants in this particular affair,
but they do not tell us much about the source of their
conflict. Here we return to our criteria outlined above
for understanding historical accounts and avoiding the
pitfalls of relying on polemics. For us, the narrations
dealing with al-Walīd’s drinking and loose moral be-
havior are nothing more than polemics reflecting an
actual dispute with causes deeply rooted in a political
conflict of interest. Indeed, Hishām wanted the posi-
tion of walī al-ʿahd for his son, but al-Walīd’s refusal
paved the way for this exchange of moral accusations.
When al-Walīd became caliph, the previous conflict
between him and Hishām had already undermined his
political clout; an element of mistrust dominated the
relationship between him and the Umayyad elite. This
mistrust manifested itself in the elite’s vehement rejec-
tion of al-Walīd’s choice of successors to the caliph-
ate. Al-Walīd wanted to appoint his two very young
sons in the ʿahd, one succeeding him and the next
succeeding his brother. He consulted one of his ma-
jor supporters, Khālid al-Qasrī, a major tribal leader
with a long experience in military command. Al-Qasrī
rejected the idea, claiming that appointing someone
unqualified to lead prayers as a successor to the caliph-
ate was unacceptable.26 This resulted in the murder
of al-Qasrī, which caused the relationship between
al-Walīd and the Umayyad elite to deteriorate further.
Once more al-Walīd tried to engage the elite, hoping
to gain the approval of Saʿīd b. Buhays, another influ-
ential political figure. Saʿīd refused to give his support
to the caliph, and this resulted in his imprisonment
and eventual death. Al-Ṭabarī even narrated that the
conflict intensified still further, with the Umayyad elite
accusing the caliph of apostasy as he prepared a list of
one hundred names in order to go on a killing spree.27
24 
Ibid.
25 
Ibid.
26 
Ibid., vol. 4, p. 207.
27 
Ibid.
 Ascribed vs. Popular Legitimacy: The Case of al-Walīd II and Umayyad ʿahd  F 31
These accounts, in spite of their polemical nature,
show that the caliph was involved in a serious con-
flict with the Umayyad elite over the issue of ʿahd,
and this takes us to the motive for the writing of al-
Walīd’s letter. The exposition of the above historical
background makes the motive of the author clear in
this case; al-Walīd was publicly attempting to appoint
his two sons as successors after being rejected by the
Umayyad elite. In other words, al-Walīd had failed
to ensure the acquired legitimacy necessary for se-
curing his choice of walī al-ʿahd, and as a result he
tried to rely on his aspired legitimacy to achieve this
end. Al-Walīd attempted to show that his religious
authority—aspired legitimacy—granted him the moral
character necessary for making such a decision without
relying on acquired legitimacy, which originated in
the consensus of the elite. The strategy of undermin-
ing acquired legitimacy and relying instead on aspired
legitimacy tells us why al-Walīd wrote his letter and
devoted a significant portion of it to linking himself
with a prophetic legacy and an institution chosen by
God to rule over Muslims.
The Content of al-Walīd’s Letter and Its Audience
After assessing the author’s motive in writing the let-
ter—to use his aspired legitimacy to exercise a power
that solely originated in acquired legitimacy—we turn
to the content of the letter and its intended audience.
This is the last step in our methodology for studying
the letter. Analyzing the content will shed light on
certain aspects of al-Walīd’s strategy to assert his suc-
cession appointment, while defining the audience will
show how he attempted to use his aspired legitimacy
to secure it.
The letter contains six sections.28 The first section
praises the religion of Islam and the early prophets up
until the prophet Muḥammad, who brought the final
message. This section puts forward al-Walīd’s view of
history, as he outlined an understanding of history
typical of scholarly beliefs in this and later periods:
that the religion of Islam was the final revelation in
a long list of revelations starting with man’s creation.
28 
For full content of the letter in Arabic, refer to al-Ṭabarī,
Tarīkh al-Rusul wa-l-Mulūk, vol. 4, 55; for an English translation,
refer to Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, p. 112, or Rubin, “Proph-
ets and Caliphs,” 88–93.
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The significance of this introduction was to outline
that authority lay in the hands of prophets.
The second section deals with how God chooses
certain people to become successors of his prophets as
heads of their respective communities, in order to es-
tablish the precepts of Islam and enforce its laws. This
section shows that these successors were not always
protected by God, though He would destroy their
enemies and had ordained that anyone disobeying the
caliphs had gone astray. Here al-Walīd emphasized
the primary lesson to be learned from history: that
anyone deciding to take up arms against God’s chosen
successors or refusing to obey their orders would pay
a high price.
This paves the way for the third section. This section
starts with a major emphasis on the role of obedience
to the institution of the caliphate. The letter argued
that those who obey it received salvation in this life
and the hereafter, while those who went against it were
doomed until the Day of Judgment. Here the letter
portrays the caliphate as an extension of the institu-
tion of God’s chosen successors; those who obeyed the
caliphate were good and those who disobeyed were
evil. This meant that those who obeyed al-Walīd were
good and those who disobeyed him were evil. Indeed,
this section is particularly significant, as it implied that
the elite had declared itself to be on the side of evil
by refusing to obeying the caliph. Perhaps this sec-
tion presented a first attempt to undermine acquired
legitimacy (especially in the role of the elite).
The fourth section of the letter emphasizes the ca-
liph’s right to appoint his successors. For al-Walīd,
God invested the institution of the caliphate from
its early inception with the power to make such ap-
pointments, and this had protected the community
from falling into heated disputes and bloodshed. This
section is clearly significant; it argued that the caliph
has the sole right to choose a candidate as successor.
It indicated that the wisdom of allowing one person
rather than a group to decide the issue was clear, as this
would prevent disputes and bloodshed. This section
clearly shows that aspired legitimacy should trump
acquired legitimacy, for al-Walīd claimed that he alone
has the legitimate right to choose a successor, without
the interference of the elite.
The fifth section begins by asserting that the caliph
was particularly concerned with the issue of succession
and has rightly chosen the most appropriate successor
for the caliphate. In this section, the caliph announced
32  F  Journal of Near Eastern Studies
his two sons as successors, one after the other, and
this brought good tidings because the conflict over
succession would be put to rest for a long time to
come. This section represents the actual motive for
writing the letter, which was the public appointment
of al-Walīd’s two sons as successors.
The sixth section strongly emphasized the legitimate
right of the caliph to choose other successors from
among his sons or even his subjects, namely Muslims
outside Umayyad circles, in case the chosen candidates
should perish or become ill. Finally, the letter closed
with a prayer, asking God to protect the caliph and all
the Muslims. This section is the most important section
in the whole letter; it demonstrates al-Walīd’s strategy
to seek public (non-elite) backing in order to compen-
sate for the loss of Umayyad support. This was a clear
boost for aspired legitimacy at the expense of acquired
legitimacy. In a sense, the audience of the letter may be
seen as the public—it had been sent to all mosques to
be read aloud as part of the Friday sermon, according
to Al-Ṭabarī—to whom al-Walīd appealed for support,
or the Umayyad elite themselves, whom al-Walīd at-
tempted to push out of the process. In a way, al-Walīd
was letting the elite know that he was not interested in
their support and was prepared to strip them of their
status by letting the whole umma be involved in the
issue of succession. That is, he was no longer relying
on the collaboration of the Umayyad elite—through
acquired legitimacy—for choosing a successor, nor did
he see their members as the only qualified candidates
to be chosen for the position. This strategy failed, as
historical events indicate; al-Walīd failed to override
the power of the elite, he failed to undermine acquired
legitimacy, and he became the first Umayyad caliph to
be killed by the Umayyads themselves. He was not able
to challenge the very system that brought him to the
caliphate and gave him legitimacy to exercise political
power in the first place.
Final Thoughts on the Letter
This letter has been a focal point for many scholars
aiming to understand Umayyad legitimacy. Both
Crone and Hinds as well as Judd believed that this
document was very useful for understanding how the
Umayyad caliphs sought legitimacy. For these authors,
the Umayyad caliphs presented themselves as God’s
caliphs or the deputies of God on earth. They argued
that the Umayyads did not see themselves as an ex-
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tension of the early Muslim community (the umma),
but as kings directly accountable to God rather than
prophetic tradition. Rubin, as mentioned above, dis-
agreed with this particular argument, claiming that
al-Walīd’s letter aimed to forge a position for the
Umayyad caliphs as one link in a long chain of proph-
ets and caliphs; the Umayyads sought legitimacy by re-
garding themselves as a continuation of this legacy of
upright men commanding good and forbidding evil.
Crone, Hinds, Judd, and Rubin all elaborated on
certain contents of the letter and believed it to be
a significant document for a general understanding
of how Umayyad rulers understood legitimacy. This
is partly true, for the letter may be used to extract
some hints about a general understanding of the is-
sue. Most certainly, this is a document written by a
caliph trying to justify the exercise of Umayyad power
in the eyes of his subjects. However, understanding
the nature of Umayyad legitimacy and assessing the
historical events leading to the writing of the letter
are particularly significant in this case. Upon becom-
ing caliph, al-Walīd tried to appoint a successor but
failed to muster the support of the Umayyad elite for
his particular choice. He was unable to obtain the
acquired legitimacy necessary to bring his candidates
to power, yet he would not surrender. He attempted a
new tactic that had never been tried prior to his reign:
he relied on his aspired legitimacy at the expense of
acquired legitimacy. This is why al-Walīd appealed to
the masses in an effort to reinforce his aspired legiti-
macy by writing this letter.
It is this historical background that one needs to
understand before dealing with this letter. Consid-
ering this letter to be a general blueprint for the
political theory of the Umayyad caliphate would un-
dermine its actual historical significance. We must see
this letter as an effort made by al-Walīd to achieve
through aspired legitimacy what had previously been
achieved through acquired legitimacy. The letter is
far from a proposal designed to outline the legiti-
macy of all Umayyad caliphs from beginning to end.
Rather, it presents a specific personal interest for a
specific person at a specific time in history. The pur-
pose of this letter was to boost al-Walīd’s aspired
legitimacy at the expense of acquired legitimacy, as
outlined in our assertions about the author’s motive
and his intended audience, whom he needed in order
to bestow upon himself the legitimacy necessary for
deciding ʿahd.
 Ascribed vs. Popular Legitimacy: The Case of al-Walīd II and Umayyad ʿahd  F 33

Conclusion laboration with the elite gave al-Walīd strong grounds

for asserting his position as the legitimate successor
The thesis that Umayyad legitimacy consisted of ac-
and rejecting the caliph’s wishes for making any new
quired and aspired legitimacy has now been made
appointments. Hishām himself recognized al-Walīd’s
clear. The first type was acquired outside the control
legitimacy; he was not able to impeach al-Walīd but
of caliph, while the second was obtained through his
insisted that al-Walīd impeach himself. This shows
own efforts. The issue of ʿahd is central to explain-
the extent to which the ʿahd gave legitimacy to the
ing how both types of legitimacy functioned. Indeed,
candidate who was chosen by the caliph and the elite.
understanding legitimacy requires that we understand
Al-Walīd attempted to change this system adopted by
the limits of exercising political power. The caliph may
previous Umayyad caliphs, but he failed; he lost his
have enjoyed the title “deputy of God,” yet this title
life for his miscalculations about the role of acquired
would not have been sufficient to secure the consen-
legitimacy in choosing ʿahd. As a result, we can con-
sus necessary for appointing a successor. We saw that
vincingly argue that the foundation of legitimacy for
Hishām stayed in power for more than twenty years;
the Umayyad caliphs and their successors rested on
he was called “God’s caliph” and enjoyed the status
the ʿahd, which carried with it a particular type of le-
of belonging to this prophetic legacy throughout his
gitimacy—legitimacy acquired through the consensus
reign. However, he was not able to appoint his sons
of the Umayyad elite.
as successors or even to impeach al-Walīd. This failure
shows that the choice of the previous caliph in col-

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