SOPHIA ALAWI v. ASHARY M.

ALAUYA, AM SDC-97-2-P, 1997-

02-24

FACTS:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari
M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City. They were classmates and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above-mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long
afterward, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on

the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent" and closed with the
plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform
you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do
not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against
my interest be... annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to
annul the controversial contract."

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consihal," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

ISSUES:

1. On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, bearing the
typewritten words in the envelope, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, may
that constitute an unauthorized franking privilege?

2. Whether or not he is allowed to use the title of "attorney," being a member of sharia
court, in lieu to be called as counsel.

RULING:

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to...
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in... this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His... disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar... or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
IN RE: ALMACEN, 31 SCRA 562

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest against to what he calls a tribunal
“peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong
words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”. The
petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in
the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence.
In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute
resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that
this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as
soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:

YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:

It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but
Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence . Even if the intentions of his accusations
are so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the
sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary.
Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local
jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between
disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted
until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume
the practice of law.
PAULINO VALENCIA v. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Adm.
Cases Nos. 1302, 1991-04-26

Facts:

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint
against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. On January 22, 1973, the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
Serapia Raymundo. Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to
provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial
court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case
has already become final and executory. On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters
of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel,
Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April 25, 1973.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of
the New Civil Code.

Ruling:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another: (5)  xxx this prohibition includes the
act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession. Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved.  It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client.   Greed
may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness.  Any violation of...
this prohibition would constitute malpractice

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is
pending. In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the
lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding.  A thing is said
to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in... court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.  (Gan Tingco
vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court
may either grant or dismiss the petition.

Principles:

Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has
terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected
therewith is still in progress.  Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in... this
case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics.