Contents

People vs. Villanueva 14 SCRA 109 (1965)...............................................................................................2

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.....................................................................................................................4
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378..................................................................................................6
DOMINADOR P. BURBE v. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Adm. Case No. 99-634, 2002-06-10................9
MARCOS V. PRIETO, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and JUDGE FERDINAND A.
FE, respondents.....................................................................................................................................11
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,..................................................................................................15
vs...........................................................................................................................................................15
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.................................................15

1
 People vs. Villanueva
14 SCRA 109 (1965)

FACTS:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva

with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney  Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice
of law.

RULING:

No. 

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public,
as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644, 647).

In this case, Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of
the offended party, his appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. And, it has never been refuted that
City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at bar who is a relative.

Practice of Law as defined:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services

2
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services.

3
 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.

Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying.

Taking into consideration the modern definition of practice of law and the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

FACTS:

Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments.
Commission on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and
challenged the nomination and the subsequent confirmation of the Commission because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of
COMELEC.

RULING:

Yes, Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position.

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.

In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”

4
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution.

In this case, Atty. Monsod has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. After passing the Bar, he worked in his father’s law office. Monsod also worked as
an operations officer for World Bank Group (1963-1970). Upon his return to the Philippines, he
worked as Chief Executive officer of Meralco Group, and subsequently rendered service to
various company either as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. He also
served as former Secretary General (1986), and National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as
Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

Therefore, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a

lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- legislator of
both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

1987 Constitution - Article IX-C

Section 1.

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.

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Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes
`A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services “through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines’’. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,

2. Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.

RULING:

1. Yes.

The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice
of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.

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 Monsod, as defined: Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services
requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law."

In this case, the respondent merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore.
With its attorneys and so-called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice,
contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling.

2. Yes

According to (CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his

profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law
is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for
a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

In this case, it is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. In fact, the Legal Clinic Inc. argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State

7
 Bar of Arizona a US jurisprudence but obviously that is not applicable in this case.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, as to this
case publishing a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for
the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether
in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. jurisprudence that is not applicable due to custom of nature of practice.

Therefore, the Legal Clinic, violates the provision of (CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods.

Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

CANON 2 Code of Professional Responsibility- A lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity
and effectiveness of the profession.

8
 DOMINADOR P. BURBE v. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Adm. Case No. 99-
634, 2002-06-10

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is
accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

FACTS:

Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against
a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful
and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the
lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status
of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer,
to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the
Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the
prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the
case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent
that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court
to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay
was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for
his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing
two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Alberto C. Magulta of misusing the fund entrusted to him
amounts to disbarment offense.

9
RULING:

No.

According to Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

In this case, it is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the
Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client.

Thereupon the respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the
complaint promptly. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.

Therefore, the Supreme Court finds the respondent Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty
of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

10
 MARCOS V. PRIETO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and JUDGE FERDINAND A. FE, respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against respondent Judge
Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and respondent Atty. Oscar B.
Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity
and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court relative to the latter's actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG
entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG
entitled, Yolanda Marquez Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.

FACTS:

An administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against respondent Judge

Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and respondent Atty. Oscar B.
Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity
and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court relative to the latter's actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG
entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled,
Yolanda Marquez Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.

Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to the records of
Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge. Invoking the principle of res ipsa
loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the
respondent Judge, who was the former counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-
BG. He insists that the fact that respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which
the plaintiff was his former client and which complaint was copied from the complaint he
himself prepared does not speak well of his intention as to the disposition of the case.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court referred the instant
administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.

Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005, and directed
the complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to
submit documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after the marking
and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they would not be
adducing any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period of thirty (30) days
within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution.

On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the other
hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his
Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

11
In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondents, and that complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous complaint.

A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present administrative case is
unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioner's
allegations in support of his complaint against the respondents should be treated for what they
really are, mere allegations founded on speculation and conjecture.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the respondents violate the provision of Section 27, Rule 138 and
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2. If not, may the complainant be held liable for filing frivolous suit.

HELD:

1. No!
According to Sec. 27. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office.

In this case, it clearly shows that the present administrative case is unfounded, he
doesn’t even produced iota of evidence, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis.
Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioner's allegations in support of his complaint against
the respondents should be treated for what they really are, mere allegations founded
on speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it must be stressed that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents committed
the act complained of rests on the complainant.

Therefore, failing in this, the complaint must be DISMISSED.

2. YES!

According to Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

mandates that "all lawyers must conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor
towards their colleagues and should avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel' and commands all lawyers "to observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

In this case, Atty. Prieto use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party
and misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. We cannot countenance complainant's act of misleading
this Court into believing that respondent judge was still conducting the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1518-BG. What is evident is that even complainant was well aware of
respondent judge's inhibition therefrom.

12
 Therefore, complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing frivolous
suit with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

RULE 137
Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that a lawyer may
be removed or suspended from the practice of law, among others, for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court on what grounds. — A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

Definition 

Res Ipsa Loquitur - for "the thing speaks for itself."  

13
A frivolous suit is a kind of lawsuit without any legal merit. In some cases, a few individuals or
companies file lawsuits to harass, annoy, or disturb the defendants and opposite parties. It
could be defined as any lawsuit where the plaintiff knows that it is almost little or no chance of
the lawsuit succeeding if pursued in court.

14
 SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

FACTS:

Sally Bongalonta filed charges with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, againts Pablito M. Castillo
and Alfonso M. Martija, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a
separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by
virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection
of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
against the Sps. Abuel.

In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps.
Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in
favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property
previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same
IBP receipt number, Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio
Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the
money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-
89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
 

15
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents violate the lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD:

YES

Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers owe candor, fairness, and
good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule 10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice."
In this case, Atty. Castillo for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt
number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National
Office, Atty. Castillo paid as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20,
1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

16