EUGENIA MENDOZA vs. ATTY. VICTOR V.

DECIEMBRE

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as

demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this
Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession
after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.

The acts of respondent lawyer in demanding excessive

payments from his borrowers, then filling up his borrowers’ blank
checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his
material gain, and then using said checks as bases for filing unfounded
criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them manifest
his perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal
profession.

FACTS:

Complainant Augenia Mendoza, a mail sorter at the

Central Post Office Manila, borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc.,
through respondent Atty. Victor Deciembre, the amount of
P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by
12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn
against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully
pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances,
however, to respondent’s Metrobank account from November
11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00.
Claiming that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover
the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned
complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253
filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of
P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court,
complainant made good said check and respondent was able to
encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant
made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of
respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999, thereby
paying respondent the total sum of P35,690.00.

Respondent filled up two of the postal checks she

issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the
amount of P50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15,
2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent
claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that
complainant received on November 15, 1999. Complainant
insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from
respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would
lend her such amount. Complainant also claimed that
respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by
filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as
condition for loans.
Respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were
done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when
he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.
Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights
as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant
who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment
to their November 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00
and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason
“account closed”; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a
separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the
disbarment case against him to get even with him for filing the
estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant’s
claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by
complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks
referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her
signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would
issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried
employee, since she was able to maintain several checking
accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he
would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of
only P50,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Victor Deciembre is guilty of guilty

of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and therefore should be disbarred from the
practice of law.

HELD:

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege

bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. A high sense of morality,
honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members
of the bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety,
and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at
all times. The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship
in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent
were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as
a lawyer, from liability.

A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in

his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on
the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of
the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in a lawyer’s private life or in his
professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his
personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.
In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to
live up to the standards required of members of the legal
profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

* CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the

laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

As manifested [in the Olbes and Acosta] cases,

respondent’s offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive
payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers’
blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial
documents for his material gain; and then he uses said checks
as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his
borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest
respondent’s perversity of character, meriting his severance from
the legal profession.

While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution

and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the
end desired, the seriousness of respondent’s offense compels
the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the
Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.
This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.

As respondent’s misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the

legal profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law
for life is in order.
 OCA vs Judge Cader Indar
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232

Misconduct; “Simple Misconduct” and “Grave Misconduct,”

Distinguished. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 639 SCRA
633 (2011), the Court explained the difference between simple
misconduct and grave misconduct, thus: The Court defines misconduct
as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.”
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.

Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity
in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for gross

misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P.
Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar). This case originated from reports
by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received
an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on
annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
To verify, the OCA conducted a judicial audit where the Audit
Team found that the list of cases does not appear in the
records of cases received, pending or disposed the annulment
decisions did not exist in the records.

The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers

in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within
the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books. The
Audit Team made the following conclusions: the cases are not
found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in
the Regional Trial Court, nor in the records of the Office of
the Clerk of Court. Thereare apparently decisions of cases
which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular
process. There is a possibility that more of these spurious
documents may appear and cause damage to the Courts
Integrity.

The OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed

as a regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned
to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and
Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively
suspended, pending investigation. The first notice of hearing
directed Judge Indar to submit in affidavit form his
explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was
delivered to Judge Indar’s official stations was received;
however, Judge Indar failed to attend the hearings. This Court
directed Investigating Justices to conduct further investigation
to determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions
allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain marriages.
In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to
verify the authenticity of the records of the listed decisions,
judgments and orders, it was issued that the records are bereft
of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had
on these cases.

The Investigating Justices determined that the cases

allegedly decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were clearly
doubtful. There is no showing of compliance on the rules
prescribed. In a Report, a certain Justice determined whether
the requirements of due process had been complied with since
there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually
received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the
investigation. It was noted that all possible means to locate
Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him
were resorted to, and also concluded that the requirements of
due process have been complied with. Judge Indar was aware
of a pending administrative case against him. The Investigating
Justices proceeded to determine Judge Indar’s administrative
liability, and found the latter guilty of serious misconduct
and dishonesty.

Judge Indar’s act of issuing decisions on annulment of

marriage cases without complying with the stringent
procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court
for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Issues:

Whether or not Judge Indar is guilty of gross

misconduct and dishonesty.

Ruling:

The Court agree with the findings of the Investigating

Justices. In this case, Judge Indar was given ample
opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there
is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of
hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two
notices of hearing were received by authorized and capable to
receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Judge Indar cannot
feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him
suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension
was reported in major national newspapers.

Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the

charges against him. This constitutional principle requires a
judge, like any other public servant and Moreso because of his
exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the
highest degree of honesty and integrity. A judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the
respect and confidence of the people. Judge Indar miserably
failed to live up to these exacting standards.

Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is the

disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. The Court defines dishonesty as a
“disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”

In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on

numerous annulments of marriage cases when in fact he did
not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even
the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear
in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the
stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict
statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages,
when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge “perform
official duties honestly.”

The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of

issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not
only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing
consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of
truth, justice, and due process. The Court imposes
on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the
service.

And considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross

misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the
Lawyers Oath, and Code of Professional Responsibility,
Judge Indar deserves disbarment.
 ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988

Attorneys; Contempt; Disbarment; Authority of the Supreme

Court to discipline officers of the Count and members of the bar.

Statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the

Court in gross disrepute and to cause public scorn for and distrust in
the judicial institution of the Republic.

The Supreme Court is compelled to hold that the statements

made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for
its exercise of disciplinary authority.

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to

discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme
Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys.

The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s

constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law
Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority
of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power
incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an
orderly discharge of judicial functions.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for

contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of
ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons
connected in any manner with a case before the Court The power to
punish for contempt is “necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of justice” “[it] is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the party’s litigant.”

FACTS

Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, governor of Antique, was

one of the several defendants in Criminal Cases for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
 
Petitioner filed a case against both the Sandiganbayan
and respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman.
 Petitioner alleged that the latter, as Tanodbayan was
no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and
corruption against public officials and employees, under the
1987 Constitution, hence the cases filed were all null and void.
The Court then issued a TRO ordering respondents Gonzalez
and Sandiganbayan to cease and desist in further investigating
and arrest of the petitioner.

However, Gonzales continued filing a case against

Zaldivar and also issued allegedly contemptuous statements to
the media in the November 30, 1987 issue of the “Philippine
Daily Globe,” explicitly stating that SC is favoring rich and the
influential persons over the ordinary litigant. The latter also
said, that while the President had been prodding him to
prosecute graft cases, even if they involve the high and mighty,
the SC had been restraining him to do his official duties. This
prompted Zaldivar to file a motion for contempt to Gonzales.
 
SC ordered Gonzales to explain himself. The principal
defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also
invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged
communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

ISSUE

Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD

YES

The Court has inherent power to punish for contempt

the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a
case before the Court. This power is necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due
administration of justice, and not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the party’s litigant.
 
A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he shares the responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede
and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconducts calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power of the court.
 
With regard to respondent Gonzalez’ contention of free
speech, he is entitled to this constitutional guarantee and no
one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court.
However, this freedom is not absolute, and needs, on occasion,
to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.
 
The Court is compelled to hold that the statements
made by Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Respondent’s statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision,
necessarily implying that the justices of the Court betrayed
their oath of office, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect
for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade
the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country.
Respondent’s statements which accuse the Court of
dismissing judges without rhyme or reason and disbarring
lawyers without due process, are also completely baseless and
unfounded.
 
 
 Had respondent undertaken to examine the records of
the two (2) judges and the attorney he later identified,
he would have discovered that the respondents in those
administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain
their side and submit evidence in support thereof.

 Due process as a constitutional precept does not,

always and in all situations, require the trial-
type proceeding, that the essence of due process is to
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence one may have in support
 of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
 
 Lastly, the statements issued in the Philippine Daily
Globe asserting that the Court was preventing him
from prosecuting rich and powerful persons, can only
be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an
extremely bad light.

 His accusations constitute a violation of Canon 10,

which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and
good faith to the court. In re: Almacen, the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action.
 

Ruling:

Respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court

in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Accordingly, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of
law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court,
the suspension to take effect immediately.
 MAGLASANG VS. PEOPLE
190 SCRA 308

Contempt of Court; Criticisms towards the Court should be

bona fide, and should not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of

justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics.

To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from

criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the
Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it
may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari entitled Maglasang vs. People

was filed with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of the Court, specifically the non- payment legal
fees and the non-attachment of with the requirements of the
Court, specifically the non- payment legal fees and the non-
attachment of the copies of the questioned decision, the Court
dismissed the petition. Atty. Castellano, as counsel of the
copies of the questioned decision, the Court dismissed the
petition. Atty. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved
for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition.
However, the motion for reconsideration was denied “with
FINALITY.”

Thereafter, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a

copy of a complaint filed with the Office of the President
whereby Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court’s
Second Division with “biases and/or ignorance of the law or
knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution. By reason
of the strong language of the with the Office of the President,
complaint and its improper filing Atty. Castellano was required
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or
administratively dealt with for improper conduct. Atty.
Castellano claimed that the complaint “was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and
very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Castellano should be punished for

contempt.

RULING:

Yes, notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a

“constructive criticism,” the Court finds the various statements
made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint scurrilous and
contumacious. It went beyond the bounds of “constructive
criticism.” They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On
the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court’s integrity as a
neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought
before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not
to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates. To
be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from
criticisms. After all, it is composed of fallible mortals, hopes to
correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed.
But then again, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

The Supreme Court is supreme no other department or

agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust",
not even the President of the Philippines. We further note that
in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's
Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government
system the separation of powers between the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty.
Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again
remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'"
Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the
President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass
judgment on any of the Court's acts.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of

CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the
finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the
municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails
to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice
of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as
this Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a
repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more
severely.

 
 SANGALANG vs GASTON
177 SCRA 87

Motions and Pleadings; Atty. Sangco’s remark in his

motion for reconsideration found to be disparaging, intemperate
and uncalled-for.

Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion but not to a license

to insult the court with derogatory statements and recourses to
argumenta ad hominem.

FACTS

The incident before the Court refers to charges for

contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the
petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang.
 
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution,
requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt for using intemperate
and accusatory language. On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed
an explanation. The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his
motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:

This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case

reads more like a Brief for Ayala the Court not only put to
serious question its own integrity and competence but also
jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption
undeniably pervading the judiciary. The blatant disregard of
controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in issue,
such as those summarily ignored in this case; the
extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and
the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn
therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of this Court it is
submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the
Court's competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest
partiality towards Ayala Are all these unusual exercise of such
arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the current campaign of
this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be
enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts?
ISSUE:

W/O Atty. Sangco is entitled to resort to such boldness

in defending the interests of his clients.

HELD:

NO. His suggestions that the Court might have been gu
ilty of graft and corruption in acting onthese cases are not only
unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the
Court’s honor and integrity. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of
an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation,
one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments
of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because
of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the
integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the
administration of justice in general. Atty. Atty. Sangco is
entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court
with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad
hominem. The Court is not unreceptive to comment and
critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and
dignified.

Motions and Pleadings; Atty. Sangco’s remark in his

motion for reconsideration found to be disparaging, intemperate
and uncalled-for.

The Court finds Atty. Sangco’s remarks in his motion

for reconsideration, disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for.
His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft
and corruption in acting on these cases are not only
unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the
Court’s honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the
Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone,
and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any
of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior
court, should know better that in any litigation, one party
prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery
by the other party. He should be aware that because of his
accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the
integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the
administration of justice in general
 The court sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt,
specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to
disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of
Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also
constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces

punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice. Atty.
J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
 TING-DUMALI v TORRES
427 SCRA 108
Adm. Case No. 5161 April 14, 2004

Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; The Lawyer’s Oath, to which all

lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves
to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable
at all times.

Disbarment; Dishonesty; Falsification; Where, instead of

advising another to secure a written special power of attorney and
against committing falsification, a lawyer presented such document to
the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of said
person and said lawyer’s wife, the lawyer himself may also be held
liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the
complainant and her other co-heirs.

FACTS

 Isidra Ting-Dumali charges Rolando Torres with

violating his oath as a lawyer and canons of legal and
judicial ethics.
 Isidra’s parents died intestate and left many parcels of
land to their 6 children (Isidra, Marcelina, Miriam,
Eliseo and Vicente and Felicisima (married to Rolando
Torres))
 Torres consented to the forgery of Isidra’s signature for
an Extrajudicial settlement making it appear that his
wife and Miriam were the only sole heirs.
 Torres, on a reconstitution hearing, presented false
testimony that Miriam and Felicisima were the only sole
heirs.
 Torres presented the reconstituted deed to the RD to
enable them to profit by selling the land
 Torres contends that his acts were done in good faith
believing for himself that his and the siblings had
already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. That
the false testimony was a clear oversight. And that his
conformity through his signature was pro forma
because the property was a paraphernal property of
Marcelina and his wife.
  Investigating Commissioner of IBP suggested
disbarment

ISSUE

WON Torres should be disbarred?

HELD

YES

1. The lawyer’s oath, to which all lawyers have subscribed in

solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of
justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold
and keep inviolable at all times.
2. A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
profession to which society has entrusted the administration
of law and the dispensation of justice, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he
should make himself more an exemplar for others to
emulate and he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-

law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have
kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which
is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The
Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy
of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes. For a lawyer is
the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice. As such, he should make himself
more an exemplar for others to emulate. He should not,
therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain in the
profession who commits any such unbecoming act or
conduct. Ting-Dumali vs. Torres, 427 SCRA 108, Adm. Case
No. 5161 April 14, 2004
3. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.

Disbarment; Dishonesty; Falsification; Where, instead of

advising another to secure a written special power of attorney
and against committing falsification, a lawyer presented such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the
lot in favor of said person and said lawyer’s wife, the lawyer
himself may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified
document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-
heirs.

It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted

regarding the falsification of complainant’s signature in the
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot
1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of
her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed
complainant’s name in that document. Such act of
counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to make it appear
that the complainant had participated in the execution of that
document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power
of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented
such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title
for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself,
therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified
document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-
heirs. Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May
1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of
Lot 1603.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent

Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He
is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his
name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
 People vs Ricardo Rio
GR No. 90294
24 September 1991 201 SCRA 702

Attorneys; Accused-appellant seems unaware that the Court

can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his appeal pursuant to
Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. It seems that the accused-
appellant was unaware that this Court can appoint a counsel de oficio
to prosecute his appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court and the constitutional mandate provided in Section 11 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.

It is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right

to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the
aid of an attorney but it is essential that the court, should assign one de
oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own.

Fact that he merely volunteered his services or the

circumstances that he was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor
alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to his client.

FACTS

Accussed-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and

convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC of Makati City
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He filed an appeal and as a consequence, the branch clerk of
court forwarded the records to the CA.

The appellate court, however, forwarded the records to

the SC in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.
However, accused-appellant, in his two letters addressed to the
clerk of court, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal
“due to his poverty.”

Upon inquiry of the clerk of court of the trial court,

through the recommendation of the SolGen, the accused-
appellant submits that he was no longer interested in pursuing
his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. The Court
denied his motion to withdraw and appointed a counsel de
oficio for him. All the letters reveal that the only reason he
offered for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain
the services of a counsel de oficio on account of his poverty.
ISSUE

Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-

appellant ceased upon his conviction by the trial court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held in the negative. This right to

counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an
accused by the trial court. It continues, even during appeal,
such duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists
where an accused interposes intent to appeal.

Even in a case, where the accused has signified his

intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire
into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole
reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, the court must assign
a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to
protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
greater reason. After all, “those who have less in life must have
more in law.”

The Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more

conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients causes
whether acting de parte or de oficio for public interest requires
that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or defense of his client’s cause. Lawyers are an
indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice
in this jurisdiction.

And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and

candor not only protects the interests if his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and held
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
This is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar and to the public.

The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the

circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility
owed to his client. The ethics of the profession require that
counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty
irrespective of the client’s capacity to pay him his fees. Any
attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation
distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the

accused-appellant Ricardo Rio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties of the law,
is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court, however, increases the
amount of indemnity to be paid by the accused-appellant to
Wilma Phua to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in line with
prevailing jurisprudence on this matter. Costs against accused-
appellant.

Legarda vs. CA
GR NO/DATE: 195 SCRA 418

A lawyer should present every remedy or defense authorized

by the law in support of his client’s cause, regardless of his own
personal views.

The rule that mistakes of counsel bind his client should not be
applied, when as a result of counsel’s reckless and gross negligence,
the client was deprived of his property without due process of law.

FACTS

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of

land and the improvements located at 123 West Avenue,
Quezon City. On January 11, 1985respondent New Cathay
House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific
performance with preliminary injunction and damages in RTC
alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the
private respondent through its representative, Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr., of the foretasted property of petitioner.
Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to
petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and
sign the same despite demands of respondent.

Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her

case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion
for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days
from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the
answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for
private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare
petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on
March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25,1985, the trial
court rendered its decision. Said counsel for petitioner received
a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set
aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final
and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public
auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent.
The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.,
representative of private respondent, and a certificate of sale
was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after
one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in
favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the
same to private respondent.

During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When,

upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what
happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not
lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take
such appropriate action possible under the circumstances. As
above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of
judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that
was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against
petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did
not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a
reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this
Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon
repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from
the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had
unfortunately become final.

ISSUE

Whether or not the counsel was negligent.

HELD

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his

client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld
from his client except in accordance with the law. He should
present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in
support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal
views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the
lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public.

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case,

he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost
learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. It is not
only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate
court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that
his client was deprived of her property without due process of
law. The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case
appears to be so gross and inexcusable.

This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner

gave said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions
by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment
in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case
of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse
judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save
the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed
the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and
gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner.
Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus,
We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged
lease agreement of the property of petitioner, private
respondent went to court, and that because of the gross
negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as
well as the title and ownership of the property, which is worth
millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of the
property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned
to penury all because her lawyer appeared to have abandoned
her case not once but repeatedly.

As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete

fidelity to the cause of his client. He should give adequate
attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a
practicing lawyer should accept only so many cases he can
afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he
should do any less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
 VILL TRANSPORT SERVICE v. CA
193 SCRA 25
GR No. 76232, 1991-01-18

A lawyer should so arrange matters that official and judicial

communications sent by mail will reach him promptly and should he fail
to do so, not only he but his client as well, must suffer the consequences
of his negligence.

Losing a case on account of one’s counsel’s negligence is a

bitter pill to swallow for the litigant. But then, the Court is duty-bound to
observe its rules and procedures. And, in the observance thereof for the
orderly administration of justice, it cannot countenance the negligence
and ineptitude of lawyers who wantonly jeopardize the interests of their
clients. On his part, a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Thus, a lawyer should so arrange matters that official and

judicial communications sent by mail will reach him promptly and
should he fail to do so, not only he but his client as well, must suffer the
consequences of his negligence. Failure to claim registered mail of
which notice had been duly given by the postmaster is not excusable
negligence that would warrant the reopening of a decided case. The
same rule applies in cases like the instant one where the counsel,
through his negligence, caused the non-delivery of a judicial notice.

FACTS

Vill Transport Service, Inc. was held liable for damages

for breach of contract in favor of the plaintiff Energy
Corporation.
a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to Atty.
Amante Pimentel, counsel of record of Vill Transport. However,
it was returned to the court with the notation that the
addressee had moved out of his given address without leaving
a forwarding address.

Energy Corporation moved for execution of the decision

Vill Transport filed an urgent motion for reconsideration It
contended that the decision had not as yet become final
because it came to know of the decision only on October 21,
1985. It also claimed that the writ of execution was void as no
copy of the motion for execution was served on it. Before the
motion for reconsideration could be resolved by the court, Vill
Transport filed a motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence.
Court of Appeals... rendered a decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit. It held that petitioner's counsel was duty-
bound to notify the trial court of any change of address and
his... failure to do so could not be excused. It added that the
trial court had every reason to consider the service of its
decision completed upon the expiration of five days from notice
to counsel in the absence of prior notice by the latter of any
change of address.
Vill Transport interposed the instant petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUES

Whether or not notice of a decision served upon counsel

in a case who did not leave a forwarding address after he had
moved from his address of record, is a valid service thereby
making the decision final and executory after the lapse of the
period to appeal.

RULING

We find for the private respondent. Section 8, Rule 13 of

the Rules of Court provides that "service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to
claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the
date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at
the expiration of such time."

To our mind, petitioner's contention is sufficient... proof

that indeed a first notice was sent to its counsel of record. Its
nonreceipt by the addressee, however, was due entirely to his
neglect in informing the court of the fact that he had moved
and had a new address. Court categorically stated that the
requirement of conclusive proof of receipt of the registry notice
"presupposes that the notice is sent to the correct address as
indicated in the records of the court.

Losing a case on account of one's counsel's negligence

is a bitter pill to swallow for the litigant.  But then, the Court is
duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures. On his part, a
lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Thus, a lawyer
should so arrange matters that official and judicial
communications sent by mail will reach him promptly and
should he fail to do so, not only he but his client as well must
suffer the consequences of his negligence. Failure to claim
registered mail of which notice had been duly given by the
postmaster is not excusable negligence that would warrant the
reopening of a decided case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED FOR

LACK OF MERIT. This decision is immediately executory. 
Costs against the petitioner.

 
 Nakpil v. Valdez
286 SCRA 758

Attorneys; As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client
but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost
honesty and good faith.

FACTS:

Jose Nakpil and Carlos Valdes were friends since the

1950s. Due to their friendship, respondent (CPA-lawyer)
became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the
Nakpils. In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing
a summer residence in Moran St. Baguio City. For lack of
funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the
property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it
back. Pursuant to the agreement, respondent obtained 2 loans
from a bank, in the amounts of P65, 000 and P75, 000, which
he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then
issued in respondent’s name. Nakpils occupied the summer
house.

When Jose Nakpil died in 1973, respondent acted the

legal counsel and accountant of Jose’s widow. Respondent’s
law form, Carlos J. Valdes & Assoc. handled the proceeding for
the settlement of Jose’s estate.
Ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the
intestate proceedings. Respondent excluded the Moran
property from the inventory of Jose’s estate. He transferred his
title to the Moran property to his company, Caval Realty
Corporation. Complainant sought to recover Moran property by
filing with the them CFI Baguio an action for reconveyance
with damages. During the pendency of the action for
reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to
disbar the respondent. 

Allegations of complainant:

 Respondent maliciously appropriated the property in

trust knowing that it did not belong to him
  Respondent’s auditing firm excluded the Moran
property from the inventory YET included the Moran
property in the claims against the estate the amounts
P65k and
 P75k which respondent represented as complainant’s
husband’s loans applied “probably for the purchase of a
house and lot in Moran”
 
Conflict of interest-Respondent’s law firm filed the
petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in court,
while respondent’s auditing firm acted as accountant of both
the estate and two of its creditors. CFI dismissed the action
for reconveyance CA reversed the trial court. Respondent was
the absolute owner of the Moran property

OSG submitted report on disbarment complaint:

 NO trust agreement between Nakpil and respondent

 Respondent was the absolute owner of the property
 No conflict of interest
 Recommendation: dismissal of administrative case

ISSUE1:

WON respondent violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility (CANON17).

YES.

HELD

Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed on him.

Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge

by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the
list of the estate’s liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of
the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his
accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these
two loans should be treated could have only come from
respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence,
the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging
respondent’s loans against the estate could not have been
committed without respondent’s participation. Respondent
wanted to “have his cake and eat it too” and subordinated the
interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent
violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause
and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him.

Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his

client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.

It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the

Moran property from the estate which his law firm was
representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client.
If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to
him, he should have at least informed complainant of his
adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership,
respondent should have formally presented his claim in the
intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his
own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the
judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his
legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is
clearly unethical.

If he truly believed that it was his, he should have

formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings
instead of transferring it to his own company and concealing it
from complainant. His misuse of his legal expertise to deprive
his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical. To make
things worse, respondent through his accounting firm, charged
two loans against the estate as liability for the purchase and
renovation of the property he claimed for himself.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or

disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
 In the case at bar, complainant is not charging
respondent with breach of ethics for being the common
accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged
for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of
the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to
represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims
were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and
undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty
under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent’s
misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not
prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the
Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to
the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer actively participating in

both professions. He is the senior partner in his law and
accounting firms. Complainant is not charging respondent with
breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate
and the two creditors. He is charged or allowing his accounting
firm to represent two creditors of the estate, and at the same
time allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the
proceedings where these claims were presented.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY.

CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
 Mercado vs Vitriolo
(A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005)

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on

him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly
personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such
delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity
and public interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a
person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney.

The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in

a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a
client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of justice.

One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client

privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client’s secrets or
confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to
preserve his client’s secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of
the attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the client’s
death. It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client
can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation
with absolute assurance that the lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever
disclosing it. With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to
his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the
ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense
of the client’s cause.

FACTS

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative

complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged
that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for
falsification of public document against her, a former client,
based on confidential information gained from their attorney-
client relationship. It appears that the respondent filed a
criminal action against complainant before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Pasig City. Respondent alleged that
complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth
of her children. More specifically, she allegedly indicated in
said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized
on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to
Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11,
1978.According to the respondent, hi action does not violate
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client because the bases of the falsification case are two
certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no
way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent violated the rule on

privileged communication between attorney and client when he
filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against
his former client.

HELD

No, In engaging the services of an attorney, the client

reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their
relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and
confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise
a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential. Applying all these rules to
the case at bar, they hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainants’ allegations.

Complainant did not even specify the alleged

communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against
her for falsification of public documents because the criminal
complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however,
spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. Also, The complainant had failed to appear during
the hearings of IBP. Without her testimony it is impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. The case was dismissed against the
respondent was dismissed due to lack of merit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty.
Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Periquet vs. NLRC

186 SCRA 724
(GR No. 91298 [1990])

DOCTRINES:

Attorneys are dutybound to advice clients not to make

untenable claims. As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation
to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims
like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up
the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government
Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired
employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client,
however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert
appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and
jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

FACTS:

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the

Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines,
private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and
unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly
found in her purse during a surprise inspection.

Claiming she had been “framed,” she filed a complaint

for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter,
who ordered her reinstatement within ten days “without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages to
be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of
her actual reinstatement. On appeal, this order was affirmed in
toto by public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980.On March
11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The
motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order
dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to the petitioner
of the sum of P205,207.42 “by way of implementing the
balance of the judgment amount” due from the private
respondent. Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished
by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989.On September 11, 1989,
however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set
aside the order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of
execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of garnishment.
The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the compromise agreement was invalid

barring the motion for execution.

HELD

The Compromise agreement was valid. The original

decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from
receipt thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC on August
29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded herein
statement or that she complained when her demand was
rejected. hat appears is that she entered into a compromise
agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to
reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of
P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her
dismissal to the date of the agreement.

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner

now claims she was actually reinstated only on March 16,
1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period
beginning November 28,1978, date of her dismissal, until the
date of her reinstatement. In sum, first she signed a waiver and
then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she
also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived.
In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the
judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after
accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged full
settlement of the same judgment.

But now she is singing a different tune. Not all waivers

and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not
later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms
of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable transaction.
 But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what
he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as
a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case. Why did the
petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16,
1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in
consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must be
remembered that on that date the decision could still have
been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was still
the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided
that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for
the compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving,
it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum
of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of
eight years.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs

against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
 CANOY vs. ATTY. MAX ORTIZ
(Problem Areas in Legal Ethics)
[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]

Lawyer-Client Relationship; The Court is sensitive to the

difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income
litigants; The efforts of private practitioners who assist in the goal of
providing legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford
the services of lawyers are especially commendable, owing to their
sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without
expectation of pecuniary reward; The problem of under-representation
of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of non-
representation.

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer

owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there

is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully
informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the
dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being
defended.

FACTS

Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz

(Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that
Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former
employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was
filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.[2] Atty. Ortiz
appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In1998, the
labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to
submit their respective position papers.

Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and

records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.
Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of
Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final
visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which
Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present,
Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC.
 He was shocked to learn that his complaint was
actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute,
the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy
alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about
the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to
submit the position paper. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the
period within which to file the position paper had already
lapsed.

He attributes this failure to timely file the position

paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod
City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a
local government official and as a practicing lawyer. He claims
not being able to remember whether he immediately informed
Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as he could
recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a
lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist on
refiling the same. Eventually, the investigating commissioner
concluded that clearly, the records show that Atty. Ortiz failed
to exercise that degree of competence and diligence required of
him in prosecuting his clients (sic) claim, and recommended
that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Canoy violated Canon 22 of the Code of

Professional Responsibilities.

RULING

Yes, assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in

terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and
leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02
requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property
to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the matter.

 
Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no
further action on the case was that he was informed that
Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming
that were true, there was no apparent coordination between
Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
 Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of
Atty. Ortiz’s election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his
adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of
his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility
does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer
is elected or appointed to a public office. Statutes expressly
prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging
in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, and in
such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
However, city councilors are allowed to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation except during session
hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject
to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case.

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion

of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed
by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five
hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six
months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases.

Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty

recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends
Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The
graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an
admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz’s
undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper
was compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact,
and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is

ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month
from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same
negligence will be dealt with more severely.
 PINEDA VS. ATTY. TEDDY C. MACAPAGAL

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion

to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his rights and exertion of his utmost learning and ability. Public interest
demands that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability to preserve
his client’s cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client
likewise serves the ends of justice.

A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to

every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly warrants that he possesses
the necessary diligence, learning and skill to handle each case. He
should exert his best judgment and exercise reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of his client’s cause.

FACTS

Complainant alleged that respondent was absent 11

times out of the total 15 scheduled hearings in Civil Case No.
23744, despite due notice in open court.  Complainant alleged
that every time he would inquire from respondent regarding
any development in the case, the latter would either pretend to
be busy, or that he has a prior commitment, or would just fail
to show up during the scheduled meeting; that complainant
was surprised when upon inquiry from the court about the
status of the civil case, he was informed that the same was
dismissed for failure of respondent to attend the scheduled
hearings.

As regards the criminal case for libel, complainant

alleged that when the decision convicting him was
promulgated, he instructed respondent to file an appeal.  While
respondent filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals,
he failed to submit an appeal brief, hence, the lower court's
decision became final and executory.

In his Comment, respondent claimed that in the civil

case for abatement of nuisance with damages, he tried to settle
the case amicably and to help the parties settle their
differences out of court; that the order of dismissal was without
prejudice and it can be reinstated within reasonable time; that
complainant was not harmed when the case was dismissed
without prejudice.
ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Macapagal violated the Lawyer’s

oath, and Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Code of Professional
responsibility.

HELD

Yes, Failure of a lawyer to file an appeal briefly certainly

constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. In the present
case, Records show that respondent was negligent in handling
the civil case which led to its dismissal.  In the libel suit,
respondent failed to file an appeal brief, hence, the lower
court's decision convicting complainant of libel became final
and executory.  The failure of a lawyer to file an appeal brief
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.

Further, respondent lacked candor in dealing with his

client.  He not only omitted to apprise him of the status of the
cases; worse, he avoided any meeting with the complainant. 
He failed to keep the latter informed of the status of the cases
and to respond to request for information.
Failure of a lawyer to communicate to his client important
matters of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to
his requests for information is tantamount to unjustifiable denial
of his right to be fully informed of the developments in and the
status of the case. In failing to inform his client of the status of
the cases, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and
diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.  The
relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is
a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed as to
the mode and manner in which his interests are being
defended.  It is only thus that their faith in counsel may
remain unimpaired.

Indeed, it is the duty of a lawyer to encourage his clients

to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement. However, the same must be done in a manner that
will not cause prejudice to the other party.  In this case,
respondents’ failure to attend several hearings on the pretext
that he was exploring the possibility of amicable settlement
between the contending parties, resulted in the dismissal of
complainant's suit.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Teddy C. Macapagal is
found GUILTY of violating his Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period

of one year, with a WARNING that commission of similar act or
acts will be dealt with more severely.