Lee vs Tambago 544 SCRA 393 (2008)

FACTS:

1. Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with

violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will.
2. The will was alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his
father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also
questioned for the absence of notation of the Residence Certificates that are known to
be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit.
3. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated
January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and
Arts (NCAA).
4. Respondent refuted that all allegations were falsely given because he allegedly exercised
his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of
existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his
duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a
criminal case against him filed by complainant in the Ombudsman that did not prosper.
5. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of
NCAA.
6. In a resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which found
respondent guilty of violations of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in
the Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics,
particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
7. Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
8. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modifications, the
recommendation of the CBD and ruled that Atty. Tambago is suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified
from reappointment as Notary Public for two years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Tambago acted negligently in exercising his duties as Notary Public.

RULING:

No. Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties
of his office. The Court finds that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission and his perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

The Civil Code requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and
separate provision.

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or
her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay
and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence
certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by
respondent invalidated the will.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized
deeds will be undermined.

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid.
This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will,
considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify
the instrument and to confirm its contents. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable
for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach
of duty.

These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a
lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01of the CPR.
In Re: Dacanay, B.M NO. 1678, December 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for hisailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’sfree medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.On July 14, 2006, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES

Held:

Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of
law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to
RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.Before he can can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned
on:o the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;o the payment of professional tax;o
the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and do the retaking of lawyers oath.

DECISION: GRANTED.
SOPHIA ALAWI v. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, AM SDC-97-2-P, 1997-02-24

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state
on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal
action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be... annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issues:

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free

Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.

Ruling:

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who... has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to... those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in... this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His... disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar... or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562, 02/18/1970)
FACTS: 

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed
on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."

He alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that
"the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
vs. Antonio H. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court,
after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen
received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the
latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both
motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to
which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond,
the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title.
HELD: 

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right, nor is he
“professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the
practice of law until further orders.
 IN RE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (49 SCRA 22
01/09/1973)

FACTS: 

The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation

that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible
through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in
Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after
due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. Arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. The Court has closely observed and followed
significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar.

ISSUES: 

(1) Whether or not the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar.

(2) Whether or not the integration of the Bar be constitution.

(3) Whether or not the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time.

HELD: 

(1)

YES. The Court may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII,
Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar,"
Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a
mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

(2)

YES. The Court quotes discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration. To compel a
lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate (or the corollary right not to associate). For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by
the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated
Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. A lawyer is free, as he
has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such
views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers
already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it
will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through
which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed,
and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able
to do in the past.

(3)

YES. In the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local
Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will
not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
The national poll conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine
Bar shows that 96.45% voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 2.51% against it. The Court
is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in
the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
 PAULINO VALENCIA v. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Adm. Cases Nos. 1302,
1991-04-26

Facts:

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint
against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages.

On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision
in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo.

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction
before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution
concerning his house.

While the petition was pending, the trial court, on

March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already
become final and executory

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and
the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April 25, 1973.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the
New Civil Code.

Ruling:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:

(5)  xxx this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved.  It is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client.  Greed may get the better
of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness.  Any violation of... this prohibition would
constitute malpractice

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is
pending.

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after
finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding.  A thing is said to be in
litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in... court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.  (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit,
35 Phil. 81).
Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the
petition.

Principles:

Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated
when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still
in progress.  Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in... this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics.