Falsificationism

Scientists have universal statements (in truth because they care about predicition and
unification). And then comes Bacon and argues that this show that they're using the inductive
method. This immediately sounds bad, but with a couple of twitches we have an apparently
more kosher version of induction.

But then this runs into a series of problems:

doesn't describe scientific practice

no "objective" observations

induction gives conflicting indications, because it assumes that we can distinguish,

beyond theory, which is the relevant ways of varying the conditions of experiments

doesn't go beyond the observational level (?)

can't account for generalizations about ideal conditions (like Newtons laws) because
we can't observe the instances that would give rise to that generalization

the problem of induction (Hume)

data + P (the future is like the past) ⊃ theory

but P does not follow from data

you can generalize P to a more general principle of uniformity of nature

then popper, to avoid dependence on induction, switches to falsificationism

make risky predictions

otherwise not a science

don't proliferate adding background information

induction comes in only at theory formation stage

his anti science spiel is for marxists not for marx (who he thought was falsified)

"when a theory is falsified it should be replaced by a theory that entails all the true
basic statements entailed by the old theory, and that in addition ha some potential
 falsifiers that were not potential falsifiers of the old thoery. (The mor potenetial falsifiers
the better. Falsificationists prefer "bold conjectures")"

problem: duhem-style concerns about whether data can be theory independent; but
Popper needs this.

Maybe reconstructing Popper is something like this:

If S is a science, then S makes risky predictions.

If S makes a risky prediction, S makes a prediction that can be corroborate or

falsified independently of theory.

C: If S a science, S makes a prediction that can be corroborate or falsified

independently of S.

Duhem: No S can make a prediction that can be corroborate or falsified

independently of S.

So if we accept C, there are no sciences.

ask Valia about this reconstruction

the problem of induction (Goodman)