This is a repository copy of Structure-integration relationships in oil and gas supply chains

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Version: Accepted Version

Article:
Ebrahimi, S.M., Koh, S.C., Genovese, A. et al. (1 more author) (2018) Structure-integration
relationships in oil and gas supply chains. International Journal of Operations and
Production Management. ISSN 0144-3577

https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-02-2016-0089

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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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Page 1 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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The traditional post industrial classification of organizational structures as ‘mechanistic’ or
8 ‘organic’ has evolved significantly in the last few decades. This can be attributed to emerging
9 trends like globalization, outsourcing, unstable market dynamics, and socio political
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10 uncertainties (Wilden et al., 2013). Today, there are several definitions of organizational
11
12 structure (OS) across different disciplines, but the general consensus is that OS determines a
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13 firm’s internal/external relationships, authority, and communication (Huang et al., 2010;
14 Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015). Although theorists have used different typologies to describe the
15
dimensions of OS, they can be generally grouped into ‘structural’ or ‘structuring’ dimensions
16
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17 (Daft, 2012; Dalton et al., 1980). Structural dimensions are the physical characteristics of an
18 organization, such as the size, span of control, and hierarchical arrangement of functions
19 (flat/tall) (Koufteros et al., 2007). In contrast, structuring dimensions refer to the policies and
20
21 organizational processes, which encourage or limit the behavior and roles of employees
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22 (degree of formalization and centralization of tasks) (Thompson, 2011). Studies have shown
23 that OS directly affects the performance and competitiveness of organizations and supply
24
chains (SCs) (Cosh et al., 2012; Foss et al., 2015), however the relationship is not altogether
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25
26 straightforward, because it is contingent on the ‘fit’ between OS, and the operational and
27 business strategies adopted (Koufteros et al., 2007; Wilden et al., 2013).
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28
29
30
With the emergence of global and interconnected markets and an increase in cross regional
31 collaborations, competition can no longer be viewed as just among different companies, but
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32 also among SCs (Flynn et al., 2010). During this time, companies focused on developing their
33 core competencies, and outsourced some functions that were previously done in house.
34
35 Recent conceptualizations view SCs as ‘complex adaptive systems’, with path dependent
36 outcomes, self organization, and susceptibility to slight changes at individual nodes (Carter et
an

37 al., 2015). In highly complex SCs, the increased embeddedness and complementarity among
38
nodes could significantly affect performance outcomes. Consequently, supply chain
39
40 integration (SCI) has been heralded in theory and practice as an important strategy for
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41 managing the information asymmetries and uncertainties that arise in complex networks. In
42 the extant literature, SCI is predominantly defined as the degree of strategic collaboration and
43
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44 sharing of intra and inter organizational processes/routines between partners for efficient
45 flows of tangible/intangible resources and better synchronized SC processes (Flynn et al.,
46 2010; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Schoenherr and Swink, 2012). While there are still on
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47
going debates on the degree of integration required to optimize performance (if any), studies
48
49 have shown that SCI generally improves operational performance by promoting joint
50 planning, value creation, and problem solving capabilities (Flynn et al., 2010). SCI has been
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51 studied quite extensively in the manufacturing and service sectors (Nahm et al., 2003),
52
53 however it has received far less attention in the extraction and energy sectors, despite the
54 relevance of energy SCs in every industry.
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55
56 Oil and gas (O&G) SCs drive global economic development by providing energy and other
57
58 essential inputs required in nearly all production operations. Generally speaking, the O&G
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 2 of 27
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'43 '4 Taking into consideration the
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importance of the O&G industry, as well as the impact of uncertainties on OS and strategy
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26 choices, it is important to understand how OS and SCI affect the operational performance of
27 O&G SCs. Using a global sample of 181 O&G firms, this study examines the mediating role
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28
29 of internal, supplier, and customer integration on the relationship among three main
30 dimensions of OS the degree of centralization, formalization, and hierarchical relationships
31 and operational performance. Operational performance in the surveyed O&G SCs is
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32 captured using widely adopted measures of cost, lead time, quality, and flexibility. These
33
34 measures have been used in previous studies to capture aspects of strategic (flexibility),
35 tactical (lead time), and operational (quality and cost) performance in SCs (Gunasekaran et
36 al., 2004; Neely et al., 1995).
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37
38
39
40
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41 Although governments and businesses have made great strides in developing alternative
42
43 energy sources, long term global energy consumption trends show that O&G consumption is
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44 steadily increasing and will continue to account for a significant portion of the global energy
45 mix (BP, 2016). Today, O&G companies scout the globe for high yielding offshore acreage
46
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across several new frontiers in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, and deep water
47
48 blocks off the coast of Africa, Brazil, and Australia (Chima, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2012).
49 These exploratory activities present technological, geographical and political challenges
50 because unlike manufacturing counterparts, O&G exploration requires cooperation and
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51
52 complementary inputs from National oil companies (NOCs) and privately run international
53 oil companies (IOCs) (Mitchell et al., 2012). NOCs primarily act as gatekeepers for national
54 O&G reserves, but also participate actively in exploration endeavours upstream. IOCs and
tio

55
servicing companies on the other hand, compliment the NOCs with the necessary know how
56
57 for exploration, refining, and distribution owing to their comparatively advanced technical
58 capabilities. Consequently, collaboration between the two, in terms of logistics and
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Page 3 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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18 Thus, project performance is directly or invariably linked to the degree of SCI between O&G
19 companies and their key partners on each project.
20
21 The predominant view on SCI in the extant operations and supply chain management
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22 literature is that it measures the degree of synchronization of tangible material flows

23 (Frohlich and Westbrook 2001, Schoenherr and Swink 2012), intangible information and
24
knowledge flows (Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015), and strategic relational flows across a SC
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25
26 (Flynn et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011). SCI is either pursued across the functional
27 units of a focal firm, or with relevant tiers of customers and suppliers (Wiengarten
tio

28
29
et al., 2015). By developing a framework comprising of five “arcs of integration”, Frohlich
30 and Westbrook (2001) demonstrated that high degrees of external integration with customers
31 and suppliers results in better SC lead time, quality, cost, and flexibility. Although there are
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32 some notable exceptions, other empirical studies on SCI have since validated this claim (see
33
34 Childerhouse and Towill, 2011; Schoenherr and Swink, 2012).
35
36
Internal or cross functional integration is also critical for complex adaptive SCs operating in
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37 uncertain industries (Carter et al., 2015). O&G projects are prone to several interconnected
38 elements of risk, which affect all material, information, and strategic interactions (Revilla and
39 Saenz, 2017; Wiengarten et al., 2015). These risks include financial (e.g. costs recovery risks,
40
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41 invoicing/payment risks, lawful levies), technical (e.g. engineering design risks; procurement
42 risks, construction, fabrication and installation risks), and economical (e.g. enterprise risks,
43
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liquidity and settlement risks, economic lifecycle management risks) issues, amongst other
44
important risk factors (e.g. commercial, legal, fiscal, environmental, technological).
45
46 Proponents of internal integration in O&G projects have argued that it is more efficient to
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47 identify and manage the different elements of risk concurrently at the supplier selection and
48 contracting phases, with the help of capable cross functional teams (Ebrahimi and Shiravi,
49
50 2009; Shiravi and Ebrahimi, 2006). However in practice, many of these risks are appraised
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51 independently in different functional units (departments) and this increases the tendency to
52 misidentify the overlapping aspects of such risks. Nonetheless, there are mixed findings
53
regarding the impact of SCI on operational performance. While most authors have
54
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55 empirically demonstrated the positive impact of SCI (Flynn et al., 2010), other studies
56 produced mixed findings (Schoenherr and Swink, 2012) and some have even reported
57
58
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 4 of 27
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20 conceptualizations of the dimensions of OS, however despite differences in terminologies,
21
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they can be broadly categorized as ‘structural dimensions’, such as the level of hierarchical
22
23 relationships in an organization, and ‘structuring dimensions’, such as formalization and
24 centralization. Structural dimensions determine the physical structure of organizations and
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25 ascribe a hierarchical order to the functions within it. Structuring dimensions by contrast,
26
27 dictate the policies and actions adopted to encourage or limit the behaviour and roles of
employees (Daft, 2012; Dalton et al., 1980).
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29
30 Generally speaking, structural and structuring dimensions have been used to classify
31
organizations as either “organic” or “mechanistic”, and viewed as polar extremes with
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33 contrasting levels of formalization, centralization, number of layers, and horizontal
34 relationships (see Daft, 2012). Firms with mechanistic structures have highly centralized
35
36
authority, formalized tasks/routines, and several hierarchical layers. The employees in such
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37 firms are mandated to act in line with their job descriptions, with minimal cross functional
38 engagements (Cosh et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2010; Koufteros et al., 2007). These
39 organizations typically need tight supervision from high level managers and function under
40
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41 rigid regulations and well defined procedures. Organic structures on the other hand, have
42 lower levels of centralization, formalization, and fewer layers of organizational hierarchy (Ji
43
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and Dimitratos, 2013). Although previous studies have provided useful insights into the
44
dynamics of mechanistic and organic OS, there are still mixed findings regarding the optimal
45
46 structure for effective operational performance based on these broad categorizations (Cosh et
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47 al., 2012; Daft, 2012; Huang et al., 2010).

48 Drawing on the structural contingency theory, OS, strategy (SCI), and context (e.g.
49
50 environment, suppliers, customers) must fit in order to achieve better performance outcomes
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51 (Csaszar, 2012; Lin and Germain, 2003; Wilden et al., 2013). Thus, rather than taking the
52 deterministic logic that O&G firms need a particular structure to implement SCI successfully,
53
or assuming that “all cases differ”, this study takes a contingency approach to examine how
54
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55 the fit between structure (OS) and strategy (SCI) impacts the performance of O&G SCs
56 (Cosh et al., 2012; Germain et al., 2008).
57
58
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Page 5 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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are two main aspects: first, the extent to which employees are free to carry out assigned tasks
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18 without interruptions from superiors; secondly, the degree to which employees participate in
19 decision making processes (Huang et al., 2010; Ji and Dimitratos, 2013; Koufteros et al.,
20 2007). With the exception of a few studies (e.g. Lin and Germain, 2003), the main body of
21
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22 literature suggests that lower centralization improves organizational performance at

23 functional, organizational, and SC levels (Cosh et al., 2012; Daugherty et al., 2011; Foss et
24 al., 2015; Huang et al., 2010). The main argument is that low centralization encourages
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25 communication, improves job satisfaction, and fosters employee creativity and intuition
26
27 (Csaszar, 2012; Huang et al., 2010). This encourages “lateral and vertical” communication,
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28 and allows ‘expert opinion’ to precede ‘designated authority’ when necessary (Daugherty,
29 2011; Hempel et al., 2012; Ji and Dimitratos, 2013). Experts in such organizations may feel a
30
31
greater sense of empowerment and responsibility, and would more likely generate innovative
solutions to operational problem as they arise. Accordingly, companies with centralized OS
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32
33 tend to have greater communication and information asymmetries across functional units and
34 in their collaborations with other firms (Spiliotopoulou et al., 2015).
35
36
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37 In relation to operational performance, it has been reported that low centralization improves
38 lead time by reducing the bottlenecks in reporting lines for decision making (Nahm et al.,
39 2003). It further enables efficient internal communication (Csaszar, 2012; Huang et al.,
40
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2010), and increases employee participation and creativity (Ji and Dimitratos, 2013;
41
42 Koufteros et al., 2007). O&G companies usually have multiple concurrent projects, so they
43 sometimes adopt a temporary organizational and financing structure called ‘special purpose
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44 vehicles’ (SPVs) to distinguish project assets and operating structure from those of the focal
45
46
firm/sponsor, and to enable the financing and assessment of each project based on the
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47 resource flows they generate (Mitchell et al., 2012; Silvestro and Lustrato, 2014). Therefore it
48 is important to empower employees to engage in teamwork both within and outside their firm
49 boundaries. However, the bureaucratic structuring of decision making in highly centralized
50
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51 firms could reduce the speed and efficiency of resulting SPVs, and impact long term project
52 success (Huang et al., 2010; Wilden et al., 2013). It has also been suggested that low
53 centralization increases organizational flexibility, responsiveness, information distribution,
54
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knowledge gathering, and ability to cope with external uncertainties (Cosh et al., 2012;
55
56 Hempel et al., 2012). In highly centralized structures, line managers are required to refer the
57 smallest operational matters to someone higher up the hierarchy for a final decision, which
58
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This enables the generation of knowledge beyond
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18 departmental boundaries, and encourages managers to make highly informed and integrated
19 decisions (Koufteros et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011). The close interactions between O&G
20 companies and their external partners occur in oilfields and project sites, usually involving
21
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22 operational and mid level management. When operational decisions are highly centralized,
23 the efficiency of managers is hampered since they may not be permitted to use their latent
24 experience for timely decision making. A routine breakdown of some drilling equipment, for
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25 instance, would require the sourcing manager to get approval from other departments and
26
27 supervisors, before orders are made to suppliers. Through supplier integration, the efficiency
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28 of critical information, material, and relational flows with suppliers is improved, and this
29 fosters better coordination, cooperation, and communication among operational level experts
30
31
located at different nodes within a SC (Droge, et al., 2012; Koufteros et al., 2012).
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33 Similarly in such structures, the delivery time of equipment could be prolonged, if line level
34 experts are not given authority to effectively deal with customer request. Having a good level
35 of customer integration allows customers to directly contribute to the focal company’s
36
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37 strategies by providing information on changing preferences to improve decision making

38 (Beheregarai et al., 2014). Therefore, customer integration helps focal firms to better
39 understand the service requirements, preferences, and policies of different tiers of customers.
40
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This study proposes that internal, customer, and supplier integration mediates the adverse
41
42 impact of centralization by improving material, intangible, and relational flows at strategic,
43 tactical, and operational levels among a focal O&G company and its partners.
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44
45
46
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48
49
50
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52
53
54
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56
57
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Page 7 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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14 both forms of formalization on operational performance. Some argue that if a minimum level
15
of formalization does not exist, it could result in role ambiguity (Cosh et al., 2012; Hempel et
16
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17 al., 2012). Similarly, others have suggested that formalization reduces conflicts in routine
18 practices because roles are clearly documented (see Thompson, 2011).
19
20 However a rich stream of literature indicates that highly formalized structures have a negative
21
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22 impact on staff motivation, autonomy, innovation and performance (Daugherty, 2011;

23 Ingvaldsen, 2015). This is because high formalization could limit individual freedom and the
24 discretion needed to carry out tasks in dynamic environments (Koufteros et al., 2007; Wilden
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25 et al., 2013). In highly formalized organizations, employees may be discouraged from

26
27 actively generating new ideas (Ingvaldsen, 2015; Liao et al., 2011). Likewise, it has been
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28 suggested that high formalization could also constrain flexibility, communication, and
29 employees’ ability to adjust to non standardized/non routine job environments (Daugherty et
30
31
al., 2011; Hirst et al., 2011). O&G companies frequently face non routine challenges (e.g.
drilling failure or reservoir leaks), and it is sometimes essential to be able to make speedy
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32
33 decisions using informal rules (Hempel et al., 2012). Nevertheless, due to high risk levels,
34 O&G companies are known to implement rigid routines and processes. While there are clear
35
36 benefits of formalized routine processes, the evidence from previous studies overwhelmingly
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37 supports lower formalization of non routine processes, particularly in volatile environments.

38
39
40
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41 Highly formalized OS tend to create greater isolation among senior management, functional
42
43 unit managers, and operational field employees (Ingvaldsen, 2015; Liao et al., 2011). By
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44 codifying responsibilities and closely supervising individual roles, formalized firms may
45 restrict the propensity of operational or mid level managers to take initiative when faced with
46
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47
challenges at offshore locations. It has been noted that internal integration enables the
48 development of systematic coordination between departmental functions, which improves
49 risk identification and problem solving (Shiravi and Ebrahimi, 2006). Therefore with high
50 internal integration, employees in formalized organizations may be empowered to share
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51
52 knowledge through cross functional interactions, which could mediate the negative impact of
53 high formalization on operational performance.
54
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55 It has also been argued that highly formalized structures tend to constrain communication and
56
trust, and significantly affect the “human touch” in the relational dynamics between focal
57
58 firms, suppliers and customers (Daugherty, 2011; Hirst et al., 2011; Wilden et al., 2013).
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10
11 industry is fraught with political, regional, supra national, and economic uncertainties,
12 therefore formalized non routine policies/procedure could limit the effectiveness of
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13 operational or mid level managers in the frontline with clients and suppliers. Internal,
14
15
customer, and supplier integration could thus help O&G companies to better manage
16 uncertainties, build relationships, and establish more trust. Even in cases where some degree
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17 of formalization is required, this study argues that internal, supplier, and customer integration
18 could serve to counter or mediate the negative impact of high formalization on operational
19
20 performance.
21
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23
24
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26
27
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29
30
31
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32
33
34
35 &
36
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37 Hierarchical relationship is the extent to which a firm has a few (flat), or many levels of
38 reporting (tall) within its organizational hierarchy (Huang et al., 2010; Ji and Dimitratos,
39
2013). In simpler terms, it refers to the number of managing levels in a company’s chain of
40
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41 command (Jacobides, 2007; Nahm et al., 2003).

42
43 In taller OS, decisions have to pass through several layers of management that are not directly
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44 in the ‘trenches’, which could affect decision quality and lead time (Huang et al., 2010;
45
46 Koufteros et al., 2007). Furthermore hierarchical relationship could negatively impact
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47 communication, control, and coordination, amongst organizational members (Jacobides,

48 2007; Ji and Dimitratos, 2013; Koufteros et al., 2007). With more layers of hierarchy,
49 communication channels become complex and the quality of feedback from supervisors to
50
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51 subordinates is standardized and diminished (Foss et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2010). The
52 disadvantages of a taller OS are more evident in uncertain environments where several issues
53 need to be resolved concurrently. In tall structures, the aptitude to identify, report, and resolve
54
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55
potential challenges at operational level is weakened. For example, a well manager who is
56 more knowledgeable on well consolidation processes by virtue of his/her role, would need
57 several levels of approval in order to present optimization suggestions to top management.
58
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18 This could serve to counter the effect of multiple
19 reporting lines on operational decision making processes (Huang et al., 2010; Ji and
20
21 Dimitratos, 2013).
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23 Similarly, high levels of hierarchy affect the relationship between focal firms and customers.
24 For example, when there are changes in customers’ specifications and requirements, field
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25 experts may often need to pass through multiple levels of departmental approval, which could
26
27 adversely affect project lead times (Droge et al., 2012; Jacobides, 2007). However, through
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28 high customer integration, different levels of management can concurrently access vital/time
29 sensitive information, thereby improving the problem solving capabilities and response time.
30
31
Thus it is proposed that internal, supplier, and customer integration mediates the negative
impact of hierarchical relationship on operational performance.
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33
34
35
36
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45 Figure 1 below illustrates the theoretical framework with the direct and mediating hypotheses
46 proposed.
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54 The O&G companies surveyed for this study included NOCs, IOCs, contractors, sub
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55 contractors and other oil servicing companies, which were identified using databases such as
56 RIGZONE, Pegasus, O&G Directory Middle East, O&G UK, and also the research teams
57
58 own high level industrial contacts. The questionnaire items for all variables were measured
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22 The tests conducted showed no significant difference in

23
the t test of mean scores between early and late respondents. Table 1 shows a demographic
24
distribution of the study respondents.
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27
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29
30
" ( ! )
31
Centralization was measured in terms of the level of participation (of operational managers)
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33 in decision making and hierarchy of authority items were adapted from Koufteros et al.
34 (2007), Huang et al. (2010) and Liao et al. (2011). Formalization was measured in terms of
35
36 level of job codification and rule observation items were adapted from Lee and Grover
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37 (1999) and Liao et al. (2011). Hierarchical relationship was measured in terms of the degree
38 of ‘tallness’ or ‘flatness’ determined by the average span of control. The items used were
39
adapted from Nahm et al. (2003), Koufteros et al. (2007), Huang et al. (2010) and
40
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41 Turkulainen and Ketokivi (2012). For internal, supplier, and customer integration, the items
42 were adopted from Flynn et al. (2010). To measure operational performance, four qualitative
43
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and process based measures were explored as a single construct (Gunasekaran et al., 2004;
44
45
Neely et al., 1995). This included qualitative measures of operational cost (ISO, 2001),
46 process lead time (Tersine, 1994), process quality (Kim et al., 2012) and process flexibility
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47 (Sanchez and Perez, 2005). The study controlled for the size of the O&G operations
48 measured in terms of the number of suppliers/customers, average sales and operational
49
50 expenses. While most studies measure size in terms of number of employees, organizational
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51 size can also be measured in terms of: 1.physical capacity, 2.number of personnel available,
52 3.inputs or outputs, and 4.number of discretionary resources available (Kimberly, 1976).
53
Since the aim of this study is to understand the impact of OS and SCI on operational
54
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55 performance in O&G SCs, size is conceptualized in terms of the scale of operational inputs
56 and outputs in the companies sampled. The study also controlled for the region (location) of
57 upstream O&G operations/resources.
58
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12 The final data sample was sufficiently symmetric and all the variables
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13 fell within the acceptable range for skewness ( .5 + 5) and kurtosis (>/< +/ 1)(Pallant, 2010).
14
15
16 " $ *+ %
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17 A total of 68 items (4 centralization, 4 formalization, 4 hierarchical structure, 9 internal
18 integration, 11 customer integration, 13 supplier integration, 23 operational performance)
19
20 were subjected to an EFA. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy (0.964) and Bartlett’s
21 test of sphericity were also adequate, thus rejecting the null hypotheses that the correlation
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22 matrix was proportional to an identity matrix (χ2 (2278)=17957.406, P<.001). Subsequently,

23
a principal component analysis using Varimax rotation was carried out on the 68 items.
24
Varimax rotation was chosen because it maximizes the extent of variance explained by the
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25
26 factors, while minimizing the correlation amongst the factors. The communalities for all
27 items were above the 0.50 benchmark.
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28
29 Using the Kaiser Guttman criterion to retain components with eigenvalues greater than 1, a
30 seven factor measurement component matrix was extracted, which explained about 83.58%
31 of the total variance in the model (Hair et al., 2006). Complimentary scree plots also
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32 confirmed the seven factor structure (Figure 2). As shown in Table 2, the factor loadings for
33
34 all components based on the rotated component matrix were above the theoretical benchmark
35 of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2006).
36
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37
38
39
40 "& %
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41 The overall fit of the seven factor measurement model was acceptable based on the adequacy
42
43 and cut off criteria by Byrne (2013) of key parsimonious and non parsimonious fit indices.
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44 They include; Chi square (χ2)=3237.482, degrees of freedom (df)=2169, chi square goodness
45 of fit (χ2/df)=1.493, comparative fit index (CFI)=0.942 parsimony comparative fit index
46 (PCFI)=0.897, Normed fit index (NFI)=0.843, root mean squared error of approximation
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47
48 (RMSEA)=0.052, and PCLOSE=0.154. After the measurement model was identified by
49 constraining an item for each construct to 1, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all
50 construct was within the cut off point of 10 for multicollinearity (Byrne, 2013).
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51
52
53
54 "& , ' )
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55 In testing for convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) for all the constructs
56
57 measured was above the 0.50 benchmark, with the lowest construct having an AVE of 0.874.
58 This implies that each construct explains more than half of the variance among its items. The
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 12 of 27
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Table 3 below.
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11 The single latent factor approach was used to check for possible common methods bias from
12
using a single questionnaire for all the variables explored (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The results
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13
14 did not indicate a significant difference in the standardized regression weights when the
15 common latent factor was added, thus indicating that there was no common methods bias.
16 Additionally, metric and configural measurement model invariance tests were conducted to
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17
18 examine if the factor structure of the measurement model was consistent for multi groups
19 within the data sample (e.g. Sector=upstream and midstream/downstream; ownership=public,
20 and public/private). A non significant chi squared difference was obtained for both the
21
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22
unconstrained (χ2=19056.6; df=10845) and the fully constrained models for the tested multi
23 groups, signifying good metric invariance. In addition, a comparison of the standardized
24 regression weights and critical ratios for the differences in regression weights also yielded
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25 non significant z scores for all the items at p value <0.05. The direct and mediation tests were
26
27 conducted independently on the full model while controlling for operational size, and region
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28 to ensure accuracy and clarity in reporting.

29
30
$ ' .
31
Table 4 presents the standardized path coefficients and p values for the direct relationships
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32
33 among the OS variables and operational performance. The results show that, as hypothesised
34 in H1a, H2a and H3a, centralization ( .31) formalization ( .197) and hierarchical relationship
35
36 ( 0.21) each had a significant negative impact on operational performance, in terms of the
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37 cost, quality, lead time and flexibility of O&G SCs. This finding implies that the operational
38 performance of O&G SCs is negatively affected where focal companies are highly
39
mechanistic in terms of the relative level of participation in decision making (centralization),
40
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41 level of job or task codification (formalization), and the span of control for decision making
42 (hierarchal relationships). Table 5 reports the mediated path coefficients through internal
43
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(H1b, H2b, H3b) supplier (H1c, H2c, H3c) and customer integration (H1d, H2d, H3d).
44
45
Findings indicate a significant drop in the path coefficients (β) when the SCI mediators were
46 introduced to direct relationships between centralization, formalization, and hierarchical
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47 relationship, and operational performance. The data was bootstrapped to 2000 samples and
48 the standardized indirect effects for all paths, which measures the strength of the mediation,
49
50 was significant at 95% confidence interval (Hayes and Preacher, 2013). As hypothesized, the
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51 results indicated partial mediation, suggesting that high internal, supplier, and customer
52 integration between O&G companies and their partners mediates the negative impact of high
53
centralization, formalization, and hierarchical relationship on operational performance. The
54
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55 overall fit of the hypothesized structural model was adequate (χ2=3398.686, df=2306,
56 χ2/df=1.474, CFI=0.941, NFI=0.837, RMSEA=0.051 and PCLOSE=0.277). These findings
57 are further discussed below.
58
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Page 13 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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8 &:; '4 This could imply
9
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that highly centralized O&G companies slow down or obstruct communication and
10
11 information flow. For example, if an O&G engineering manager had to refer the smallest
12 operational matters to someone higher up the hierarchy, this could diminish the process lead
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13 time of other departments like procurement and construction.
14
As argued, firms with high formalization rely on strict supervision of day to day operations.
15
16 In highly volatile operating environments, this constrains flexibility, risk identification, and
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17 proactive problem solving. Employees in the O&G industry are skilled and professional and
18 their experience, training, and academic/professional qualifications usually entitle them to
19
20 better judgment on non routine policies/processes in daily operations. For instance, if a valve
21 problem suddenly occurs at a remote offshore location, strict (rigid) supervision and
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22 formalized rules may be useful, but could also have costly effects when site commissioning
23 managers strictly adhere to protocol (waiting for approval). Such lengthy and formal
24
protocols may affect the entire process quality and lead time of the project, and could be
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25
26 costly in terms of damages.
27 Likewise, the study reported a negative relationship between hierarchical relationship and
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28
29
operational performance. This implies that O&G companies with several layers of hierarchy
30 could restrict the aptitude of operational level managers, to identify potential risks and initiate
31 process improvements. With a highly skilled workforce, many of the process improvements
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32 in this industry are adapted from best practice companies or developed locally amongst
33
34 operational experts and approved by top management. Several levels of reporting could lead
35 to higher costs, lead time and lower flexibility in adapting best practices or developing new
36 solutions for approval. For instance, a team of well/drilling managers and experts could
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37
modify and recommend more effective oil well consolidation practices based on their
38
39 collective experience (e.g. act of drilling from one to multiple wells from a single pad). In tall
40 OS, such individuals would need several levels of departmental approvals from
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41 regional/divisional heads, before such ideas are presented for consideration and possible
42
43 adoption by senior management. The layers of hierarchy serve to slow down communication
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44 and coordination, and may even affect the accuracy of reporting because ideas travel through
45 several layers of hierarchy.
46 It was found that high internal integration positively mediates the (negative) relationships
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47
48 between centralization operational performance, formalization operational performance, and
49 hierarchical relationship operational performance. O&G companies operate in unpredictable
50 environments and constantly struggle with several overlapping elements of risks as explained
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51
52
earlier. Interdepartmental integration through brainstorming, periodic meetings, and
53 collaborative planning using synchronized operating platforms, enables the development of
54 cross functional teams. As such, high internal integration encourages joint risk identification,
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55 appraisal and mitigation even in very centralized firms. For instance, in order to develop or
56
57 extend a firms drilling capabilities, high integration through cross functional teams would
58 allow operational managers from various relevant sub units to collaboratively develop the
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 14 of 27
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4
5
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6
7 This often hampers the ability of project managers to
8 take initiative and proffer solutions as soon as operational problems occur. Also, since most
9
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projects involve collaborations between NOCs and IOCs working under non routine
10
11 policies/procedures, high formalization can impose serious constraints on operational
12 performance due to the differences in operating policies and governance structures of NOCs
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13 and IOCs. By adopting internal integration strategies, cross functional teams are able to learn
14
15
and adapt faster; drawing on a wide assortment of expertise and experience. O&G firms with
16 several hierarchical divisions between strategic and operational managers (tall OS),
fO
17 experience obstruction in information flow and the ability of operational managers to identify
18 and overcome challenges in a timely/cost effective manner. To reduce exploration and
19
20 production costs, many O&G companies today source for services from low cost countries
21 like China. While these countries may have the required know how, the risk management
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22 requirements are accentuated because firms need to ascertain that the quality of the products
23
and services purchased meet the legal, social and ethical standards of the industry. Due to the
24
nature of O&G exploration, regulatory requirements are prone to constant changes and
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25
26 updates. High internal integration between the procurement department and the engineering
27 and technical departments is crucial for smooth communication of new standards and
tio

28
29 procedures. In the absence of strong cross functional integration strategies, firms with tall OS
30 would usually wait for longer periods for such crucial information to trickle down to
31 operational levels through stacks of bureaucratic layers. Internal integration thus serves as a
ns

32 cost effective by pass to bureaucracy; the alternative being an expensive organizational

33
34 restructuring.
35 High supplier and customer integration was found to positively mediate the (negative)
36 relationships between centralization operational performance, formalization operational
an

37
38
performance, and hierarchical relationship operational performance. As argued previously,
39 in O&G companies with high degree of centralization, operational level managers are not
40 given the necessary authority to deal with day to day challenges effectively. In such
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41 structures, something as common as a breakdown of routine drilling equipment (e.g. rotary

42
43 hose and water tanks) would require the sourcing manager to get approval from departmental
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44 heads and supervisors, before orders can be placed to suppliers, with adverse consequences
45 on process quality and lead time. One major issue affecting the industry is scarcity of inputs
46
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in terms of qualified labor, raw materials and metals, rigs, vessels and other services. For
47
48 instance, the demand for steel currently far outweighs the supply in the industry, and it
49 usually attracts a high premium to secure enough steel for new projects. Consequently,
50 mismatches between supplier’s lead time and project lead time could be very costly.
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51
52 In addition, highly centralized O&G firms may lack the flexibility required to alter order lot
53 sizes in sync with supplier’s output. However, through customer and supplier integration,
54 even highly centralized firms can align their processes and demand to their supplier’s
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55
capabilities, thus dampening the costly effect of high centralization on lead time. Through
56
57 effective supplier integration (synchronized ordering systems), sourcing managers and their
58 external counterpart are better equipped to coordinate and manage processes, despite the
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Page 15 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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20 8 This
21 can have adverse effects on key performance measures like cost, quality, lead time and
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22 flexibility, particularly when there are disruptions to normal process flows. By implementing
23
supplier integration strategies, mutual understanding is fostered between focal companies and
24
key suppliers, and the transactive memory acquired from previous interactions can be applied
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25
26 to problem solving by operational experts on both sides (e.g. strategic partnerships with
27 major suppliers). For example, if a drilling failure occurs, such companies could react more
tio

28
29 effectively by including hands on well and drilling managers. If new equipment are required,
30 the well manager could interact with suppliers on specifications without the need for higher
31 departmental approval. Customer integration can also have a dampening effect on the
ns

32 negative consequences of tall OS. If there are sudden alterations to customer specifications
33
34 (supply disruptions or changes in demand), the first individual to know of such changes and
35 its implication would be the operational manager dealing directly with the clients. With high
36 customer integration, information about such sudden changes would be available to all
an

37
38
concerned levels within the OS simultaneously, which reduces the overall response lead time
39 in tall OS. Therefore a good level of customer integration fosters the development of
40 operational capabilities beyond hierarchical distinctions.
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41
42
43 & /
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44 By including insights from the contingency theory, this study developed and validated a
45 framework to explain the effect of SCI on OS and performance in O&G SCs. Results of the
46
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study indicated that as O&G companies develop SCI capabilities, the negative impact of
47
48 highly mechanistic structure on operational performance is diminished. In line with previous
49 studies, it was found that lower levels of centralization (Cosh et al., 2012; Foss et al., 2015),
50 formalization (Daugherty, 2011; Ingvaldsen, 2015, Wilden et al., 2013), and hierarchical
uc

51
52 relationships (Huang et al., 2010; Koufteros et al., 2007) improve organizational
53 performance. Contrary to some authors that have argued for more rigid structures (Lin and
54 Germain, 2003), this study shows that internal, supplier, and customer integration mediate the
tio

55
negative relationship between OS and performance. This resonates with previous studies that
56
57 have used strategies such as SCI as mediators to improve organizational performance (Droge
58 et al., 2012; Koufteros et al., 2012). The study contributes directly to the organizational
n

59
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15
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 16 of 27
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7 The study further adds to operations management literature by
8 demonstrating the role of internal and external SCI on performance improvement, especially
9
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in uncertain and volatile operating environments, with implications for practitioners.
10
11 Restructuring and reforming rigid OS could be expensive and difficult to implement in
12 practice. However it was demonstrated that, by investing in internal and external integration
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13 strategies, firms could mediate the negative impact of highly mechanistic OS on operational
14
15
performance. As inter and intra firm integration and communication improve, mechanistic
16 firms can gradually become more organic in their operations without the associated lead time
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17 and cost implications of re structuring the entire organization.
18
19 Although this study offers significant insights, there are some limitations and opportunities
20
21 for future research. First, while findings suggest that integration helps mediate the adverse
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22 effect of mechanistic OS, it may be useful for future researchers to conduct longitudinal
23 studies to monitor the effect of long term internal and external integration on OS and
24
performance. Secondly, it would be interesting to expand the scope of study beyond the O&G
ra

25
26 industry to include other extraction based industries. Lastly, future studies may examine the
27 impact of the interaction effects between the SCI dimensions (internal, customer, and supplier
tio

28 integration) on OS (centralization, formalization and hierarchical relationships) and

29
30
operational performance to better understand how each dimension of integration affects the
31 performance of other dimensions.
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32
33
34 '
35
36 Adler, P. S. and Borys, B. (1996),“Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive”,
an

37 $ % ,Vol.41No.1,pp.61 89.
38
39 Beheregarai F. A., Flynn, B. and Laureanos P.E. (2014),“Anticipation of new technologies:
40
d

supply chain antecedents and competitive performance”, & '

41
42 () * ,Vol.34No.6,pp.807 828.
43
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44 BP (2016), “Energy Outlook 2016”, available at:

45
46
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy economics/energy outlook 2016/bp energy
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47 outlook 2016.pdf, (Accessed 02/02/2016).

48
49 Byrne, B. M. (2013), + , $*' - .
50
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51 , Routledge.
52
53 Carter, C. R., Rogers, D. S. and Choi, T.Y. (2015),“Toward the Theory of the Supply Chain”,
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tio

& * ,Vol.51No.2,pp.89 97.

55
56
Childerhouse, P. and Towill, R. (2011),“Arcs of supply chain integration”,
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16
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Page 17 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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1
2
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3 4 4 < !"##% @' A&
4 . (0 / L ,9 B !2 $B
5
ur
6
7
4 T. Y., Dooley, K. J. and Rungtusanatham, M. (2001),“Supply networks and complex
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na
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11
12 Claver Cortés, E., Pertusa Ortega, E. M. and Molina Azorín J. F. (2012),“Characteristics of
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13 organizational structure relating to hybrid competitive strategy: Implications for
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Cosh, A., Fu, X. and Hughes A. (2012),“Organisation structure and innovation performance
fO
17
18 in different environments”, . 0 ,Vol.39No.2,pp.301 317.
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20 Csaszar, F. A. (2012),“Organizational structure as a determinant of performance: Evidence
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from mutual funds”, * & ,Vol.33No.6,pp.611 632.
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26 Dalton, D. R., Todor, W.D., Spendolini, M.J., Fielding, G.J. and Porter L.W.
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tio

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29 / ,,Vol.5No.1,pp.49 64.
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31 Daugherty, P. J., Chen, H. and Ferrin, B. G. (2011),“Organizational structure and logistics
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32 service innovation” 1 & 2 * ,Vol.22No.1,pp.26

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41 Ebrahimi, S. N. and Shiravi, A. (2009),“Legal and Regulatory Environment of LNG Projects

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44 Flynn, B. B., Huo, B. and Zhao, X. (2010),“The impact of supply chain integration on
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49 Foss, N. J., Lyngsie, J. and Zahra, S.A. (2015),“Organizational design correlates of
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Frohlich, M. T. and Westbrook, R. (2001),“Arcs of integration: an international study of
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K The moderating effect of demand unpredictability”, &
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10 Gunasekaran, A., Patel, C. and McGaughey, R.E. (2004),“A framework for supply chain
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No.3,pp.333 347.
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15 Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E. and Tatham, R. L. (2006),
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18 Hayes, A. F. and Preacher, K. J. (2013),“Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical
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20 independent variable”, . & *
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23 Hempel, P. S., Zhang, Z.X. and Han, Y. (2012),“Team empowerment and the organizational
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context decentralization and the contrasting effects of formalization”, &
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tio

28 Hirst, G., Knippenberg, D. V., Chen, C. H. and Sacramento, C. A. (2011),“How does

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ns

32 & ,Vol.54No.3,pp.624 641.

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39 Ingvaldsen, J. A. (2015),“Organizational learning: Bringing the forces of production back in”,
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41
42
43 ISO (2001),“ISO 15663 2Petroleum and natural gas industries Life cycle costing”, available
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44 at:http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=28626.
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47
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Jacobides, M. G. (2007),“The inherent limits of organizational structure and the unfulfilled
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uc

51 Ji, J. and Dimitratos, P. (2013),“An empirical investigation into international entry mode
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55 Kim, D. Y., Kumar, V. and Kumar, U. (2012),“Relationship between quality management

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Kimberly, J. R. (1976),“Organizational size and the structuralist perspective: A review,

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3 8 A$ % L !#9 D ,2# ,/2
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5 1 ' 4 I ; - 7 6 . !""0% @=7> 33K The involvement, benefits
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and impediments of collaborative information sharing”, & )
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10 Koufteros, X. A., Nahm, A. Y., Cheng, T.C.E. and Lai, K. H. (2007),“An empirical
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12 assessment of a nomological network of organizational design constructs: From culture to
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13 structure to pull production to performance”, & )
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Koufteros, X. A., Rawski, G. E. and Rupak, R. (2010),“Organizational integration for product
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Koufteros, X., Vickery, S. K., & Dröge, C. (2012),“The effects of strategic supplier selection
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on buyer competitive performance in matched domains: does supplier integration mediate the
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25
26
Lee, C. and Grover, V. (1999),“Exploring mediation between environmental and structural
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relationship between environment and organizational structure”, & .
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44 Mitchell, J., Marcel, V. and Mitchell, B. (2012), 5 6

45
46 Royal Institute of International Affairs.
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47
48 Nahm, A. Y., Vonderembse, M. A. and Koufteros, X. A. (2003),“The impact of
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55 * ,Vol.15No.4,pp.80 116.
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57
58
Pallant, J. (2010), $ 7 7 ) - )
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 20 of 27
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15 7 = ' < H !"#2% AThe impact of risk management on the frequency of
16 supply chain disruptions: A configurational approach. & ' (
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17 ) * ,Vole.37No. 5,pp.557 576.
18
19
20 Sanchez, A. M. and Perez, M. (2005),“Supply chain flexibility and firm performance A
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22 ' () * ,Vol.25No.7,pp.681 700.

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Schoenherr, T. and Swink, M. (2012),“Revisiting the arcs of integration: Cross validations
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25
26 and extensions”, & ' * ,Vol.30No.1,pp.99 115.
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28 Shiravi, A. and Ebrahimi, S. N. (2006),“Exploration and development of Iran's oilfields

29 through buyback”, 8 ,Vol.30No.3,pp.199 206.
30
31 Silvestro, R. and Lustrato, P. (2014),“Integrating financial and physical SCs: the role of
ns

32
33 banks in enabling supply chain integration”, 9 (
34 ,Vol.34No.3,pp.298 324.
35
36
Spiliotopoulou, E., Donohue, K. and Gürbüz, M. C. (2015),“Information reliability in SCs:
an

37
38 the case of multiple retailers”, ) ' * ,pp.1 20.
39
40
d

Tersine, R. J. (1994), ) , Prentice Hall.

41
42
43
Thompson, J. D. (2011), ' -
Pr

44
45
46 Turkulainen, V. and Ketokivi, M. (2012),“Cross functional integration and performance:
od

47 what are the real benefits”, & ' ( )

48
49 * ,Vol.32No.4,pp.447 467.
50
uc

51 Wiengarten, F., Humphreys, P., Gimenez, C. and McIvor, R. (2015),“Risk, risk management
52 practices, and the success of supply chain integration”, & )
53 0 ,Vol.171No.3,pp.361 370.
54
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55
56 Wilden, R., Gudergan, S. P., Nielsen, B. and Lings, L. (2013),“Dynamic capabilities and
57 performance: strategy, structure and environment”, 2 / ) ,Vol.46No.1,pp.72
58
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Page 21 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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14 relationship commitment on external integration”, & '
15 * ,Vol.29No.1,pp.17 32.
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23 The power to make considerable operational decisions is concentrated in the organization
24 Even small operational matters have to be referred to someone higher up the hierarchy for a
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25 final decision
26 Your firm senses that staff would need a great level of control over their responsibilities
27
Your company encourages lower level (middle managers) participation in operational
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28
29 decision making process where problems occur
30
31
% #
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32
33 Your firm has formal strategic planning processes, which result in a written mission, long
34 range goals and strategies for implementation
35 Your company has strategic plans (coded&put in writing) to respond to customer/supplier
36
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37 Your firm relies on strict supervision (rules&procedures) in controlling day to day operation
38 If a written rule does not cover some situation, staff make up informal rules for carrying out
39 their tasks
40
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41
42
43 A large hierarchical distance exists between operational managers and senior executives
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44 We have a tall OS
45
46 There are many levels in our organizational chart
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47 Our organization structure is relatively flat

48
49
50
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51 “Data integration among internal functions”

52 “Enterprise application integration among internal functions”
53 “Integrative inventory management”
54
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55
“Real time searching of the level of inventory”
56 “Real time searching of logistics related operating data”
57 “The utilization of periodic interdepartmental meetings among internal functions”
58
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3 @The use of cross functional teams in process improvement”
4 “The use of cross functional teams in new product development”
5
“Real time integration and connection among all internal functions from raw material
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6
7 management through production, shipping, and sales”
8
9
na
10
11
12 “Information exchange with our major supplier through information networks”
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13 “The establishment of quick ordering systems with our major supplier”
14 “Strategic partnership with our major supplier”
15
“Stable procurement through network with our major supplier”
16
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17 “The participation level of our major supplier in the process of procurement and production”
18 “The participation level of our major supplier in the design stage”
19 “Our major supplier shares their production schedule with us”
20
21 “Our major supplier shares their production capacity with us”
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22 “Our major supplier shares available inventory with us”

23 “We share our production plans with our major supplier”
24
“We share our demand forecasts with our major supplier”
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25
26 “We share our inventory levels with our major supplier”
27 “We help our major supplier to improve its process to better meet our needs”
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28
29
30
31
“Linkage with our major customer through information networks”
“Computerization for our major customer’s ordering”
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32
33 “Sharing of market information from our major customer”
34 “Communication with our major customer”
35
36 “The establishment of quick ordering systems with our major customer”
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37 “Follow up with our major customer for feedback”

38 “The frequency of period contacts with our major customer”
39
“Our major customer shares Point of Sales (POS) information with us”
40
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41 “Our major customer shares demand forecast with us”

42 “We share our available inventory with our major customer”
43
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“We share our production plan with our major customer”

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46
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51
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53 0
54 Rate the level of your company’s ability in utilizing information/data from quality programs
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55 Rate the level of your company’s supplier surveys, which indicate the level of qualities set or
56
met by your suppliers
57
58 Rate the level of your company’s quality systems, which measure and monitor the standard of
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3 8
4 * 8
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8 1
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7
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12 7 (
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13 7
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21 8
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31 7
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32 7 8
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34 7
35 7
36 7
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43 7
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 24 of 27
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24
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Page 25 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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3 Background characteristics of sample (N=181)
4
5
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6 !& ' ( )
7 Strategic C+Level 96 53
8 Manager
9
na
Supply chain and 85 47
10 purchasing
11 professionals, project
12 and operations
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13 managers
14 * ( High input/output 73 40.3
15 * + & , Low input/output 108 59.7
16 Middle+East 83 45.9
fO
17
18 Africa, Asia(pacific), 98 54.1
19 Europe&Eurasia,
20
North&South
21
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America
22
-& ( ./ Service Provider 70 38.7
23
24
Manufacturing/service 111 61.3
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25
26
provider
27 01 Upstream 109 60.2
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29 Downstream 72 39.8
30 2 '& Public+companies 76 42
31 Public&Private 105 58
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32 partnership
33
34
35
36 Rotated Component Matrix
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37 "
38 !
39 Ccost1 #
40
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Ccost3 #
41
Ocost2 "$"
42
Ccost5 "#$
43
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44 Ccost7 "#$
45 Qlty1 "#"
46 Ccost4 "#
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47 Ocost3 "#%
48 Flex4 ""$
49 Ocost1 ""$
50 Ltime2 ""#
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51 Qlty2 ""
52 Flex3 ""
53 Ccost2 ""
54
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Ccost6 ""%
55 Qlty4 "
56 Qlty3 "
57 Ltime1 "
58
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 International Journal of Operations and Production Management Page 26 of 27
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3 Ltime4 " %
4 Ocost4 "
5 Flex1 "
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6 Ltime3 "
7 Ltime2 " $
8 Sintg8 #
9
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Sintg4 #
10 Sintg12 #
11
Sintg10 #
12
Sintg5 # %
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13
14 Sintg9 # "
15 Sintg2 # "
16 Sintg11 #
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17 Sintg3 #
18 Sintg7 #
19 Sintg6 #
20 Sintg13 #
21 Sintg1 "$"
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22 Cintg7 #
23 Cintg11 # $
24 Cintg6 # "
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25 Cintg5 #
26 Cintg4 #
27 Cintg10 #
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28 Cintg8 #
29
Cintg9 #
30
Cintg2 #
31
Cintg3 "#
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33 Cintg1 ""
34 Iintg7 #%"
35 Iintg9 "$
36 Iintg5 "#
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37 Iintg2 "#
38 Iintg6 ""#
39 Iintg8 ""
40 Iintg1 " "
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41 Iintg4 "
42 Iintg3 "
43
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44 Hierstr1 # #
45 Hierstr2 "#
46
Hierstr4
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Form2 " %
48
Form1 $$
49
50 Form3 ""
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51 Form4
52 Cent3 "
53 Cent1 "
54 Cent2 "%
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55 Cent4 $
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Page 27 of 27 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
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3 Mean values, standard deviations, Composite reliability(CR), Average variance
4 extracted(AVE) Cronbach’s alphas(α) and bivariate correlations between study variables
5 (diagonal bold numbers=square root of AVE)
ur
6
7 CR AVE α Form OP SI CI II HR Cent

8 Form 0.822 0.815 0.945 0.903

9
na
OP 0.987 0.764 0.987 -0.698 0.874
10 SI 0.987 0.850 0.986 -0.614 0.638 0.922
11 CI 0.982 0.831 0.982 -0.592 0.655 0.551 0.911
12
II 0.980 0.845 0.980 -0.669 0.686 0.606 0.585 0.919
lo
13
HR 0.814 0.798 0.939 0.565 -0.570 -0.578 -0.513 -0.586 0.893
14
15 Cent 0.797 0.776 0.931 0.618 -0.724 -0.585 -0.587 -0.664 0.570 0.881
16
fO
17 Relationship OS and OP
18 Independent Path Dependent Standardized path coefficient
19 Cent OP +.313**
20 Form OP +.197**
21 HR OP +.29*
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*Significant at 0.05level, **Significant at 0.005level, ***Significant at<0.001
22
23
24
Mediation effect of SCI
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25
26 Relationship Direct effect Direct effect with+ Indirect t+value Bootstrap confidence interval
without+mediator mediator effect
27 Upper Lower
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28 H1b Cent II OP +.445*** +.311*** .013** +5.169 +.162 +.501

29 H1c Cent SI OP +.445*** +.309*** .013** +5.731
30 H1d Cent CI OP +.445*** +.309*** .013** +5.646
31 H2b Form II OP +.350*** +.190** .007** +3.395 +.068 +.351
ns

32 H2c Form SI OP +.350*** +.188** .007** +3.476

33 H2d Form CI OP +.350*** +.187** .007** +3.493
34 H3b HR II OP +.120 +.023 .17** +0.327 +.126 +.152
H3c HR SI OP +.120 +.022 .17** +0.323
35
H3d HR CI OP +.120 +.021 .17** +0.331
36
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*Significant at 0.05level, **Significant at 0.005level, ***Significant at<0.001

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