PART A prope

r oe n a

CRIMINAL TRESPASS
unau
Section 44l ofthe IPC defines 'criminal trespass, while s 447 provides
thereof. They read as under: the punishme
Section 441. Criminal trespass.-Whoever enters into or upon
\men
n
possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to property
intimiidate, in the
annoy any person in possession
of such property, insult or anc

or, having lawtully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully cO

with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or there pr

commit an otence, tent t

is said to commit "criminal trespass
Section 447. Punishment for criminal trespass.-Whoever commits c
trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a termwnina
may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
which
or with both. rupees,
The object of s 441 (as well as of the succeeding sections) 1s to protect
possession of
property. The essence of the offence of criminal trespass is entrv into property under
possession of another with intention to commit an offence. Section 441 is concemedwith
the exclusive possession, and not ownership, of the propertry on which an unauthorisd
entry was effected into."

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS
Section 441 has two limbs. The first limb refers to an entry into property in the
possession of another with intention to commit an offence or to intimidate, insut or
annoy the person in possession and the second to the remaining in possession having
lawfully entered into the property with the intention of intimidating, insulung or
annoying the person in possession of such property, or with the intention ot committ
an offence. Thus, the essence of the offence of criminal trespass lies in an unauthornss
an oftenr
entry or an unlawtully retention of the lawful entry with intention to commit
or to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property.
n
The essential ingredients of criminal trespass are: (i) entry into or upon propenuy
the possession of another; (i) if such entry is lawful, then unlawfully remainingi
such property; (ii) such entry or unlawful remaining must be with intent: (a) to h
of the
an oftence; or (b) to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possessio

property.
Whoever Enters
The opening words of the section is 'whoever enters', meaning that upon

constitute an offtence under this section, there must be an actual personai

Sahebrao Kisan Jadhav v State ofMaharashtra (1992) Cr LJ 339 (Bom).

5 SCR 916.
3 Mathri v State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 986, (1964)
844
 Criminal I resp
spass
cised. Constructive
the accused.
property by
entry,
prorry within the meaning of the section.'
to entry withi
for
instance, by a servant will not amount
eed not
0ainstnecessarily
The entry need be
The entry and against the will or by
use
of force. It is sufficient
orised without the consent of the
if the entry is
person in
the property.
possession of
Property
Aae of the essential ingredients of this
Another person. The section uses the section is entry into or upon the of
uet both movable and immovable general term property'; hence, it is wideproperty enough to
property. The accused should enter into or
nroDerty with the intention stated in the upon
trespass. Hence, there can be criminal provision, to constitute the
offence of criminal
trespass to motor car, aeroplane,
or a boat. In
Dhanonjoy v Provat Chandra Biswas,a a person railway carriage
had leased out a boat.
accused attacked the lessee of the boat, drove him The
He then plied it across the river away and took possession of the boat.
and collected the
that it would amount to money. The Calcutta High Court held
committing criminal trespass.
However, the word 'property does not include
collect tolls. A incorporeal property, such as right to
person had taken on lease the right to collect tolls
entering upon a certain public road for selling their wares. The accusedleviable from persons
sold his wares in
the street without paying the toll. It was held that the right to collect toll could not be a
subject of an offence of criminal trespass.
Possession of Another
ror an offence of criminal trespass to be committed, the entry into or upon the
property
d be in respect of a property in possession of a person other than the trespaser.
C Section contemplates actual physical possession to the exclusion of all other persons.
order to constitute criminal trespass, che legality of the possession of the property is
not material. As stated earlier, the object of the provision is to protect possession and nor
ownership. So, if a trespaser is in setled possession of a property, then he can maintain
dCtion for criminal trespass even as against the true owner.

However, it essential that the person

is not in possession of the property
who is
a trespass with
nould be present in the property when the trespass takes place. So, or annov rhe
tcntion to commit an offence or with intention to 1nsult, intimidate
is sufficient to constitute
the
ottence of criminal trespass, even if
PErson in possession,
concerned was
absent from the property
the time of actual entry, the person

Intention
commit an offence o r
intinsld..
to
intention
of another with or criminal trespass, The w in tent
Cntry into property

is the essence
of the
ofence

Or annoy the person

AIR 1960 C 89
IJ 415; Stase v Abdul Sukur
Emperor (1905) Cr 29.
4 Shwe Kun v
ILR 26
Mad
Pattivada 949 (Cal).
Batakala
(1935) Cr LJ
1934 Cal 480, Cr 353 (All).
LJ
6 AIR
LJ 1204 (Raj);
(Raj); see
s ee also, Stute
:
of Rajasthan v Duular Sieh
ATR 1920All 20, (1921)Rajasthan (2000) Cr
1920 All 20, (1 Cr
athan (2000) L)
7 AIR
Ram v State of
8
Dhanna 3464(Raj). 1964 Mys ll; Ma Suhubuddin v Sayed Monouur tlsuin
(2001) Cr LJ Iyengar AlR
eerathaiah v Ramswany
(Gau).
(1999)
Cr LJ 349
845
 Criminal Law

its etymology, scems to have metaphorical allusion to archery and implies 'ai nd
a
by casual or mercly possible
result foreseen perhans
not a
thus, connotes
the one object for wh:not
incidcnt, but not desired, but rathcr connotes
the
improbable what has been called the dominant
eftort is made and thus has reference to otive,
becn takcn.
without which the action would not have
Thus, according to s 441, the dominant object of
intention, aim or the tresnas.

ottence, or to intimidate, insal.

the property of another should be to commit
an
or
thc in possession of the propcrty. In Mathri v State of Puniah the
annoy pcrson
accused, along with others, armed with warrants for delivery of possession in exees.cution
of another. At the time ofh.
of several decrees, cntercd upon the property in possession
entn, warrants had ccascd to
be executable in law. The Supreme Court held that the
accused and others had cntered the property only with the intention of executing the
warrants and not with the intention to commit an oftence or to intimidate, insultr
annoy any person. A lay pcrson could not be expected to know that a warrant has
become inexecutable in law. Under the circumstances, it was held that since the requisite
intention contemplated under the section was absent, the act did not constitute an
12
offence of criminal trespass.
In Punjab National Bank Lid v All India Punjab National Bank Employes
Federation," the employees of the Punjab National Bank Ltd went on strike in support
of certain demands made by them. The employees of the bank entered the bank
premises, sat in their places and refused to work. They refused to vacate their seats
either, when they were asked to do so by their superior officers. in other words, they
resorted to a pen-down strike. It was contended by the management that workers had
licence to enter the bank premises, subject to the condition that the employes are
willing to work. If the employees had decided not to work, they to
have licence to enter and hence, their acts amounted to trespass. Further, it was
were not entided
contended that the employees had trespassed with intent to insult or annoy their
superior officers and hence, it amounted to committing the offence of criminal uespass.
The Supreme Court rejected their argument and held that even assuming the entry o
the employees in the premises was unlawful, it is difficult to accept that the said entry
was made with intent to insult or annoy the superior officers. The sole intention ot the
strikers was to put pressure on the bank to concede their demands. Even if the strikes
had knowledge that their strike might annoy the senior officers, such knowledge cannot
necessarily lead to the inference of intention. Knowledge and intention are rwo distinct
aspects, the difference of which has to be borne in mind in deciding whether a partic
act was covered by s 441 or not. The court held that the acts of the employees did not
4
amount to criminal trespass."

In Rash Behari Chatterjee v Fagu Shaw," the complainant after prolonged litiga
obtained a decree for ejection of the respondent in respect of a particular proper
nazir
When the respondent retused to give permission, the complainant along with the
of the court and the police obtained actual physical possession. The land was

10 Mathri v Stase of Punjab AlR 1964 SC 986, (1964) 2 Cri L.J 57 (SC).
5 SCR 916.
11 AIR 1964 SC 986, (1964)
12 See also, Hathi Singh v Stase of Rajasshan 1979 SCC (Cri) 976.
SC 160.
13 AIR 1960 s ofa
14 However, in Sahebrao Kisan Jadhav v State of Maharashtra (1992) Cr LI 339 (Bom), the woormed
factory, who, having no ight toenter in cabins of factory officers without their permission,

SC 20, (1970) Cr LJ4 (SC), (1969) 2c iminal trespass.

15 AIR 1970
 Criminal Trespass

vacant
after
complainanttook possession. About a
fortnight after taking possesion.
spondent trespassed into the land and was found
rhe respo The
making preparation for
high
resp

structures. court held that

ction
construr
of bamboo a
complaint under s
441,at
maintainable, because the complainant was not in possession of the land
maintai
not
was
IPC,rlevant
che relevant time.
time. Reversing the judgment of the high court, the Supreme Court held
s obvious
obvious that the intention of the respondent was to annoy the complainant,
a s in possession of the property. The law does not require that the intention must
he to annoy a person, who is actually present at the time of trespass.

In order to commit an offence under this section, it is not necessary that the person
Concerned should actually commit an offence, or intimidate or annoy or insult the
It is sutficient that he has the intention to do so. No
person in possession upon trespass.
Overt act is required to complete the offence, though the overt act may sometimes be
fraudulent act or intention will not constitute criminal
part of intention. However, every
enters an exhibition hall without a ticket,
trespass. For instance, if a person clandestinely not criminal trespass,
though the act is a fraudulent act, it will be only civil trespass, and
because his intention was to evade payment for ticket, but not to insult or annoy anyone
16
in possession."
An intention to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy, thus, is sine qua
to
non of the oftence of criminal trespass. It is, therefore, necessary for the prosecutionhis
accused to record
prove the existence of such intention on the part of the an
Further, it is required to show that such
Conviction for committing criminal trespass." from
The intention may be inferred
intention was actual and not just probable one.
an his intention or from the attending
acts of the accused, if any, expressing of annoying or insulting
ne an intention
Curcumstances." in the absence of
However, becomes
tor criminal trespass
conviction
offence,
neone or of committing
an

impossible.
Lawful Entry
Kemaining Unlawfully After of the section
deals with a person

constituents to
it. The first part o r unlawBully, with the intention
ocction 441 has two
another, either
lawfully
person in
possession of
into the p r o p e r t y of i n t i m i d a t e , insult or annoy any the
Cnters
ot the person itselt
should be with
of Onmitting a n offence o r t o the entry
such in the first part,
p r o p e r t y . Thus, the of a person
wherein entry
object stated above. situation unlawful.
deals with
a there becomes
of the
section presence be with the
Tne second part
is lawful,
but his continuing unlawtul,
bur it
should
commit an
become intent to
upon the
property with
into> or presence
person
or
continuing such
N should the any
Ot only i n t i m i d a t e , insult or annoy
was a
vice-chuirm
to the accused
nt Kumbi, had quarrelled

offence. Sadadhio two boys, who the

Tanba and
bcat up Subsequcntv,
v
Mabharashrra the school no present. he shoul
In State of He
entered
headmaster
was a
respectable
person,
committee.
the that as
school time, accused

Oa Ar that the
nephew. reprimanded
his and
ith rerurned
neadmaster

BHCR. 671.
6 All
Bejanji I928
Mehervanji
Emperor AlR 1929
P'at
111.
16 Bai v
AlR
Mathura
Emperor 157.
17 v All
M1stry 1950 56.

18
Ramzan
SingBv Rx AlR AIK
1923
Pat
39S (Bom)
Keshar
1 Cr 1J
Emperor
v
19 Das (1964)
Damoaar
Bom 82,
20
AlR
1964
847
21
 Criminal Law

not have into the school and beaten the boys. The accused was
trespassed
abused the headmaster and tried to manhandle him. The headmaster pushed Sed,
and subsequently the accused left threatening physical harm to the headmaster.
he came out of the school. The Bombay High Court held that this case would beSOOn
ld be c as
covered
by the second part of s 441, IPC.
However, if the remaining is unlawful, but not with the requisite intention tOto
commit an offence or to intimidate, insult orannoy the person in possession, thenit wil
22
not amount to an oftence under this section.
Section 447 provides punishment for criminal trespass of imprisonment of either
description for a term up to three months, or fine that may extend to five hundred
rupees, or both.