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Ancient Greek Fortifications 500-300 BC
Ancient Greek Fortifications 500-300 BC
Fortress • 40
Ancient Greek
Fortifications
500-300 Be
"'
"'I' /air ......... for doe pu:'fIO>e ofpriY;lt< .tully,
. . . - . crio,,,m "'" _ ... pornom-d . . . - "'" COfIrri&h<. 000iIn> """ I'>t<n<> Str.lbo. When modem authors are referred [0 dlroUghOUl me
セNL 178S.no p.>nofdlis p<Jbl_....,. B BNャ」ッセ in. セ boo
'l"'""'- text die HMYolrd system of イ・ヲ イ・ョ\Zゥセ has been adopted. The
or <nmMInod In ..,.,.", "'"t>r ...,. I\'>eaM. eloctr<>rIi<, cloc>ri<:aI, セ 」 m_ formula used is 'author':publiatioro due· followed by page
ッ[^エゥ。ャNセ ........... "'" セ⦅オエ p r I O r _ perm_ 01
number(s). Thus ·Drews (1993: 1(6)' refers to page 106 of his
⦅ィ^ゥッupGB ャ\エ⦅ッ 「⦅セ⦅セGB
1993 publiation. that is. The end offhe Bronze Age: Changes; in
Warfare and !he ClJIastrophe <:../200 Be.
www.OOI""Jpubliol>ins·com The object of the FSG is to advance the education of the IX'blic in
the study of all upeca of fortifications and their armamenu.
especially worb constructed to moUnt or resist artillery. The fSG
holds an annual conference In September over a long weekend
with ¥isla and evening lectures, an annual tour abroad lasting
Artist's note about eight days, and an annual Members' Day.
The FSG journal FORT is 、・ィウゥャ「セー annually, and iu newsletter
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(CDSG)
Abingdon,
The Coast Defense Study Group (CDSG) Is a non-profit
OXI43DH,
corporuion formed to promote me study of co。セエ defenses and
UK fortifications. primarily but not exclusively those 01 the United
The Publishel"1 regret that they an enter into no cOfTeSpondetlce StateS of America; their history. architecture, technology, and
upon this matter. strategic and tactical employment. Membership in the CDSG
indudes four issues of the ッイァ。ョゥオエ ッョGセ twO quarterly
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Newslm:tl'!r. For mOf"e information about the CDSG pl.....,;e visit
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When classial author1; are referred to throughout the text the
standard form of reference has been adopted. The formula used is The Coast Defense Swdy gイッオーNャョ」セ 631 Silver Dawn Court,
·:l.Uthor·.ode' (if the author wrote more than one WOI't.) followed Zionsville. IN 160n_9088 (Attn: Glen wセヲゥッイ、I
l
Contents
Introduction 4
Building methods 9
Financing セ W>our • Planning • Xオセ、ゥョァ
macerAls • Making brida
Quarrying stone • Masonry $tyles . lifting stones
Fortifications 16
Athens (Attia.) • Gyphtoka$uo (Attica) • Mif>tineia (Arcadia)
Messene (Meueni:a) • Other fortific;.ltion$
Bibliography 62
Glossary 63
Index 64
Introduction
For the Greeks the characteristic form of political organization was that of the
city-state (POlis), the small autonomous community. with publicly funded
institutions, confined to one city and its hinterland. It was, as Aristotle so
neatly expressed it, 'an association of sc\'cral villages that achieves almost
complete self.sufficiency' (Politics I252b8). No 'city' in the modern sense was
created, for the association established a new and overriding citizenship in
which the political independence of the ancestral villages was submerged
forever. For Aristotle man was 'by nature an animal of the polis' (Politic.s
1253a9), being designed b)' his nature to realize his full potential through
living the good life within the framework of the polis. the key signifier of
civilization. Appropriately, Aristotle (Politics 1275a5-8) defined the citizen
(poJitm) as the man who share5 in political judgement and rule.
As an agrarian-ba5.cd society, the poliS controlled and exploited a t£'rritory
(cllOra), which was delimited geographically by mountains or sea, or by
proximity to another polis. The nearest and most powerful neighbour was the
natural enemy. Border wars were thus common, as were inter-polis agreemenu
and attempts to establish territorial rights o"er disputed areas. Autonomy was
jealously guarded, but the necessities of collaboration made for a proliferation
of foreign alliances, leagues of small communities, usually ethnically related,
and hegemonies. There was also constant interchange and competition
between poleis, so that despite their separate identities a common culture was
always maintained.
While the polis was defined in terms of its dti?.cns (e.g. the Athenians not
Athens) rather than geographically or through bricks and marble, its
development \'I.'3S also a proce.ss of urbanization and the walled city, for instance,
is common in HomeL Undeniably the archaeological remains of Bronze Age
Greece reveal fortifications of great strength and complexity, as at Mycenae,
Tiryns and Gla, yet these Mycenaean titade!s are the counterparts of medieval
castles rather than of walled dties. But when the residential fortress ceases to be
the citadel and becomes the dty, fortifications now protl'Ct the citizen body and
not merely the ruler and his household. Greek po/eis, to quote Winter, 'were
much more than fortresses, they were complete social, political and economic
units to a degree never achieved hy their modern successors' (1971: xvi).
Raised and maintained by the stale, the circuit, usually of sun-dried
mud-brick resting on a low rubble sode, was nOl very high or very strong. For
it did not yet neeu to be as pulis conflict was decided by spear and shield,
though some attempt was made to give protection to city gateways. In
Anatolia, amongst the East Greeks, stronger fortifications are well attested by
the results of excavation, though at the turn of the 5th century lie these could
not defeat the siegecraft that the Persians had learned from the Assyrians. But
in Greece proper, city walls, simple as they were, sufficed for their purpose, and
would remain so until the technology of attack (mechaniC$) had caught up
with that of defence (construction) through the Invention of the torsion-spring
catapult (kataptltes, 'shield-piercer') by military engineers in the employ of
Philip II of Macedon.
4
Chronology of major events
499-479 Be, PERSIAN WARS 447/446 BC revolts in Boiotia, Euboia; battle of F"trSt
499-49"1 IIC Ionian Revolt Koroneia (ends Athens' 'onuol of Boiotia),
498 lie b<t.we of Sepeia (Sparta triumphs over Af:os); secession of Megan
Adleni<lJ\$ and Eretrlans bum Sardis 446 BC Spartan invasion of Attica; Perikles quashes
498/497 Be Persians ・ォセ Cyprus (fall of p。ャ ェセウI Euboian revolt
494 lie battle of lade (WI of Milews) 446/445 BC Thirty Year> Peace
491 Be Dareias I demands 'earth and water' from 440llc Samos rebels
Greeks; Gelon ryrant of Gela
490 Be Persians sack Naxos. Karynos. Eretria: baede of 440-432 BC, BETWEEN THE WARS
Marathon; accession of Leonidas 439 BC Samos surrenders
486 Be acceuion of Xerxes c.435 BC Perikles' Black Sea expedition
483/482 Be Persiarls dig Athas canal: Themistokles' 434 BC Corcyra and Corinth clash
naval programme 433 BC Athenian alliance with Corcyra: battie of
480 Be Xerxes crosses Hellespont: battles of Sybota
Thermopylai (Leonidas killed).Artemision, 433/432 BC Athenian alliances with Leontinl, Rhegion
Salamis; Gelon defeats Carthaginians 432 BC Potidaia rebels; conferences at Sparta and
at Himera ultimatum to Athens
479 Be battles of P1atai... (Mardonios killed), Mykale
432-421 BC, PElOPONNESIANWAR
479-460 Be, EMERGENCE OF IMPERIAL (Archidamian War)
ATHENS 431 BC Thebes attacks P1ataia; Sparta's first invasion of
479/478 ac Foundation of セiゥ。ョ League (anti-Persian) Attica
478 ac City VhIls of Athens begun: expeditions to 430 BC Potidaia surrenders
Bynntium, SetoS, Cyprus: Sparta INves 429 BC Phormio's r\i!V'3.1 victories; plague in Athens
Delian ャ・ZSセ (Perikles dies)
476/475 ac expeditions [ 0 Eion,Skyros (bones 429/427 BC siege of P1ataia
of Theseus) 428/427 BC Mytilene rebels
47411c Hieron of Syracuse defeats Etruscans at Kyme 426 BC Sparta sends colony to Herakleia Trachinia;
467 Be fall of tyranny in Syracuse Qemosthenes' Aetolian campaign
c.46611c Eurymedon campaign 425 BC Pylos campaign
46511c Thasos quits Delian League 424 BC battle of Delion; Brasidas' Thracian campaign
461/460 BC Athenian alliance with Argos, Thenaly, Megara 422 BC battle of Amphipolis (Brasidas and Kleon killed)
421 BC Peace of Nikias
460-440 BC, FIRST PElOPONNESIANWAR
460 BC Athenian expedition to Egypt 421-413 BC, PElOPONNESIANWAR
,.458 BC Long Walls of Athens begun (Phoney Peace)
458 BC Saronic Gulf conflict (siege of Aigina);Athenian 420 BC Alkibiades' quadruple alliance between Athens,
victories in Megarid Argos, Mantineia, Elis
458/457 BC battles ofTanagra, Oenophyu (Athens controls 418 BC battle of first Mantineia (opportunity to defeat
Boiotia);Athenian alliance with Egesta Sparta on land squandered)
45411c disaster f01'" Athens in Nile Delta 416 BC Athenians sack Melos (Thucydides' Melian
454/453 IIC Delian League tr"eOUury tnnsferred from Delos Diologue)
to Athens (metamorphosis of league to 41511c Athenian expedition to Sicily
empire complete) 414 BC Gylippos sent to Syracuse; second expedition
453 BC revolts of Erythrai, Miletos; first extant under Demosthenes
Athenian Tribute Ust 413 BC loss of Athenian armada Ol.t SynoCU5e
451 BC frve.year truce between Athens ;md Sparta,
Kimon campaigns (;md dies) on Cyprus 413-404 BC, PElOPONNESIAN WAR
449/448 Be Peace of Kallias (detente between Athens (Ionian War)
and Persia) 413 Be Spartans seize Dekeleia In Anica (epileich.i$mos) 5
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412 BC Spartan alliance with Persia and intervention 371-360 BC,THEBAN HEGEMONY
in Aegean 370/369 BC Epameir.ondas' first invasion of Peloponnese,
411 BC Fclur Hundred rule Athens (democracy (Messenia liberated, Mantineia re.founded)
overthrown); Euboia rebels: fleet at Samos 369 BC Epameinondas' see::ond invasion (reduces
under ThrasybooJlos remains loyal to Sparta's effective allies to Corinth, Phleious)
democracy (Alkibiades takes command); battles 367 BC Dionysios I sends second force of mercenaries;
of Kynossema. Abydos Sparta wins'Tearless Battle' against Ar<::adians:
410 BC battle of Kyz.ikos; democracy restored in Athens death of Dionysios I (son succeeds as
409 Be SparQrlS capwre Chios Dionyslos II)
4091408 BC SpartarlS retake PyIos 3671366 BC $;luaps'Revolt
408 BC Athenians capwre Byzantium: Carthaginians 3661365 BC Epameinondas' third invasion of Peloponnese
sack Himen. (final collapse of Peloponnese league)
4081407 BC failed coup d'etot of Hermokrates and Dionysios 365 BC Pelopidas killed
406 BC Cartm.ginians besIege Akragas.: battle of Notion 364 BC Thebes destrO)'S Orchomenos
(Alkibiades' see::ond downbll- flees to Thrace); 362 BC Epameinondas' last invaSIOn of Peloponnese,
battle of Arginousai (trial of Athenian stTutegoI) bude of Second Mantineia (Epa.meinondas
405 BC Akragas sacked: 1iege of Geb; Dionysios takes killed)
power in Syracuse as セ{ュエs oU!okn:nor
(treaty with Carthage); accession of Arr»:erxes 360-336 Be, RISE OF MACEDON
II Mnemon; bame of Aigospotami 3601359 BC AccesslOfl of Philip II of Macedon
404 BC A1kibiades assasSln.ate<l:Athens defeated 357-355 BC Social War (ends Second Athenian
(swean oath to follow Sp,arta 'by land and sea') Confederacy)
357 Be Euboia revolts from Thebes: Philip capwres
404-386 BC, SPARTAN HEGEMONY Amphipolis. tNnies Olympias of Molossia
4041403 8C Thirty Tyr.tnts rule Athens (SparQn garrison on 354 Be Philip capwres Methone (loses eye): Dion
Acropolis) assassinar.ed
403 BC Thrasyboolos captures Peiraieus (derTNXracy 353-346 BC Sacred War (shatterS Thebes)
restored) 352 BC Philip's victory at ·Crocus Field'
401 BC rebellion of Kyros the younger: battle of 348 BC Philip captures Ofynthos
Cunaxa (march ofTen Thousand - Xenophon's 346 BC Peace of Philokrates (detente between Philip
Anobasi$) and Athens)
398 BC Penia builds fleet for Athens (Admiral Konon) 344 BC Philip campaigns in Thrace, Epeiros,Thessaly
3981397 BC Dionysios I besieges Motya (elected togas for 1111"): Dionysios II overthrown
396 BC battle of Sardis (retires to Corinth);Timoleon of Corinth
394 BC battles of Nemea River, Second Koroneia, arrives in Sicily
Knidos 343 BC Carthaginians capture Syracuse
391 BC rebellion of Evagoras of Salamis 342/341 BC Philip and Athens clash in Chersonesos
390 BC Iphikrates defeats Spartan mora at Lechaion 341 BC Timoleon defeats Carthaginians at Krimisos
387 BC Dionysios I captures Rhegion (reconstructs Sicily as outokrator):Athens
intervenes on Euboia
386-371 BC, DEFEAT OF SPARTA 340 BC Alexander regent in Macedon, Philip besieges
385 BC Agesipolis captures Mantineia Perinthos, Byzantium, seizes Atheniat1 grain-ships:
382 BC Phoebidas captures Kadmeia Athens abrogates Peace of Philokrates
379 BC Spartans punish Phleious, capture Olynthos 339 BC Philip bypasses Thermopylai (garrisons Elateia):
(apogee of Sparta'S power) Athenian alliance with Thebes
3791378 BC Kadmeia liberated (Thebes new 'superpower') 338 BC battle of Chaironeia
378 BC Sphodrias raids Attica 337 BC league of Corinth (Philip proclaimed hegemon
378/377 BC Thebans 'liberate' Thespiai; foundations of of Greeks): Lykourgos comes to prominence
Boiotian league; Second Athenian Confederation at Athens
377 BC Agesilaos invades Boiotia 336 Be Philip assassinated (army acclaims Alex.ander III)
376 BC Peloponnesian fleet defeated off Na:<.os
375 BC lason of Pherai elected tag05 ofThessal; 336-323 BC,ALEXANDER III 'THE GREAT'
Tlmotheos' expedition to Corcyra (victory off 336 BC Alex.ander hegimon of Greeks
Alirela): Sacred Band (under Pelopidas) defeat 335 BC campaigns in Thrace, Illyna, sack of Thebes
Spartans at Tegyra 334 BC Antipater regent of Macedon,A1ennder
371 BC Athens and Sparta become allies, but Spartans crosses Hellespont (visits Troy). battle of
defeated at leuktn by Ep.;.meinondas Granikos: sieges of Miletos. HilJibrnassos 7
3J3 BC Gordian knot;Alexander defeats Dareios III at 323-30 I Be, WARS OF THE SUCCESSORS
luos; Darei05o' flnt-peace offer 32J BC Krateros, Perdikkas., Ptolemy, Seleukos et al.
332BC submissiorL5 of Byblos. Sidonaiege5 ofTyre, divide empire into rival spheres of power
GilZ3;AJexander crowned Pmraoh 313-311 BC Greek mercenaries revolt (&ctria); lamian War
JJlac vr;illo Siwah; foundation of Alexandria; Dareio5' J 1113 16 ac Kas.sandms (Antiparer's wn) holds Macedon
final peace-offier;A1exander defeats d。セッウ al (Demeuios of Pholleron puppet.ruIer in Athens);
Gaogamela;AJexander enters Babylon foundations of Kassandreia. ThesWonib
no BC deslTl.lction of Persepolis: Darelol; rTMJrdered, 316 BC Antigonos' victory at Gabiene (Eomenes
Beu05 (sauap of Bactlia) proclaims hirrnelf execoted);Anligooos acclaimed 'King of all Asia'
'GrNt King' 311 BC Ptolemy and Seleukos defeat Demetrios
329 BC Hindu Kush U05Sed: Bessos captured Poliorkete5 (Antigonos' son) at Gan; Seleukos
318 ac campaigns againn Spitamel'les (Baana. Sogdia) returns to Babylon
317 ac Sogdian Rock Qpwred 307 BC Demetrios 'liberates' Athens (Demetrios of
316 BC Swat valley GUTlpaign;AJexander defeats Poros Phaleron exiled)
at Hydapses; mutiny n Hyphasis, siege of 305-304 BC Demerrios' fruidess siege of Rhodes
Multan (Alexander WOtlnded) 304 BC Kassandros besieges Athens
315 BC Alexander crosses Gedrosia; Nean;hos sails to 303/]01 BC Agathokles invades southern Italy
Persian Gulf ]01 BC coalition of Ptolemy, Seleukos, L.ysimachos against
n3 BC Alexander dies in Babylon Antigonids: battle of Ipsos (Antigonos kliled)
The site of the dry should likewise be convenient both for political
administration and for WilL With view to rhe latter it should afford easy
egress to the citizens, but difficult to approach or blockade for any enemies.
Thus the ideal site was lIlt' tip of a spur, which ran out from the flank of iI
mountain and was Iinkro to the main mass by a narrow ridge.
However, as Circuits did not ix'corne common till the 601 century 1\(;, or
normal till the 5th century He, walls lended to be loosely flunl{ round the whole
city at a wmpMatively late stage of its deVelopment, that is, when urban growth
was in some sense comptele. As Wychertey says, a circuit 'was not the frame into
which the rest fitled' (1976: 39) and some cities would remain un-walled in the
classical period, Sparta and [lis for example. Also, the military value of the
acropolis d('CTeased and would gradually disappear as an essential feature in the
plan of a 5th- and 4th-century city. Hence Aristotle HpッOゥエ」⦅セ 133Ob5) discusses
the acropolis from the political rather than the military view point.
Building materials
Timber セカ・エ ゥョァ reinforces this Materials employed in Greek fortifications lIlay be divided into two main
mud-brick wall in the village of ァイッオセZ sun-dried mud-brick on a stone socle. and walls built entirely of Slone.
Delphi. Ancient Greek-. likewise
Completion in mud-brick unquestionably saved a great deal of time and
employed amber to hold brickworl<
together. thereby preventNll the money. The bricks could be made rapidly with little apparatus and by
$tnJcru.-e lrom bPeoming weak n it unskilled labour. :-.ior were speed and cheapness the only advantages brick
uuined heicht. (Author·s colle<:tion) offered. Mud-brick is fireproof and practically indestructible to the weal her
when lhe surface is properly protected. Also. a brick
construction is not affC1:ted by minor earthquake shocks.
Demoslhcnes speaks (3.25-26, 23.207, d. 13.29) of the
brick ィッオNセ」ウ of Themistokles, Miltiades and Aristides as
still inhabited in his day. nearly ISO years later; indeed
they were eVidently in good condition and quite
indiStingUishable from their neighbours.
Yel there weJC comparatively few sites where bricks could
be made in sufficient quantities. The process reqUired a
copious water supply as well as a vast amount of clay of a
type that would not crumble or crack in a wall. Also, tll('
manufacture of brick when limestone was around in
abundance mad\' the latter a more viable proposition. As a
rule in Greece the ground was both encumbered with
fragments of convenient size and interrupted by bare
escarpmenU and outcrops - architects missed no oppor-
tunity for including stretches of bedrock in a wall - often so
layered and cross·fissured that scmi.rectangular blocks could
be detached by means of wedges and crowbars alone. Under
these conditions, if stone was left untrimmed, it could be
gathered and put togcthE'T in less time than would be spent
in making and laying an equivalent number of bricks.
r\cvertheless, if a fortification was intended to be per-
manent, m350ns were employed at least to knock off the
worse excrescences and, if financially possible. to dress some
Making bricks
An Eleminian inscription of 329f328 llC hints that the clay for bricks reqUired
long preparation before it was put into wooden moulds, for there is no other
way of explaining the "ery mOdcsr Output of 1ZS bricks per day implied by the
document's data. Still, with regards to financial matters the inscription is more
informative. Clay to make 1,000 bricks cost four Attic drachmas, while the same
numlX'r of bricks could be purchased ready made for 36 drachmas. Additionally,
the dail)' wage for a skilled labourer w.u given .u 2.5 Attic drachmas, while that
of his assistant was 1.5 drachmas (lG ii 2 1672, :\iaicr 1.20, 101).
Bricks were formed in wooden frames with a number of compartments.
These were open at the top and bottom, which often resulted in a considerable
difference in height of the bricks, while their length and width were regular.
Several standard sizes and half-sizes were recognized, though each differs
slightly from one locality to another. Kevertheless, the commonest sizes range
from 0.4 to 0.5m, with a height of roughly O.08m_ The bricks that have been
preserved in the fonifications at Corinth and Eleusis, for example, art' almost
identical in size (Corinthian bricks 0.45 x 0.45 x O.09m, Eleusinian briCks
0.45 x 0.45 x O.IOm). According to the aforementioned Eleusinian document,
「イゥ」ォNセ belonging to Ihe Kimonian lVall were 'one and one-half foot bricks'
(lG ii z 1672.55-57, cf. Vilruvius 2.3.3), which suggests that the standard
measurement employed al E1cusis and at Corinth was the 'shari foot'
(cO.296m). Surviving bricks from Olynthos, on the other hand, are somewhat
largt'r (0.49 x 0.49 )( O.09m). It appears, therefore, Ihat Olynthos was using Ihe
'long foot' (cO. 326m). Both units arc probably of prehistoric origin.
Masonry styles
The Greeks believed that utility and beauty were inseparable (Xenophon
Memorabilia 4,6.9), and Ihis almost casual combination of exquisiteness and
llsefulness we find in their polygonal, trapezoidal and ashlar masonry. Though
austerely utilitarian, fortiflcation walls could still often be <:ounted among the
<:ity's architl"Ctural glories. Aristotle says (POlitks 1331a11) that the whole
circuit ought to be an ornament as well as a protection. It would be the first
Sight to impress a vi5itor, and it was meant to have a depressing effect on an
approaching enemy.
Briefly, the masonry of any wall belongs to one of three main groups: un-hewn,
roughly he\vn, or carefully hewn and jointed. The distinction between the first two
styles is at bt.'st one of degree, and both may be classed simply as rubble masonry.
The third group, which Invariably mnsistcd of faces of finely jointed masonry
l'nclosing a fill of earth and broken stones, may be subdivided as follows:
Masonry styles
Ashlar nus.onry. ean w.all of Phyte. earth and rubble together. The top and bottom resting surfaces of the block were
Rectangular ,n form, all the blocks always dressed to a plane. The vertical joint surfaces were treatt>d with
are longer d1an they are tall. but the {/lIutllj'rosis, n'amely, only a llarrow band along the vertical edges and top was
length ma.y vary along the course.
When the courses ;Ire uniform in
finished smooth, while the rest of the surface was recessed sllghtly and left rough
heilht.;oJ; here, the stonewor1< is
picked. As the Greeks laid their blocks absolutely dry, without bonding material,
1W<IomK:. (Author's collection) this trl.'atment allowed a tight Ioint with a minimum of effort and expcnS(' since
only the narrow strip of slone ncedro to make close contact with its neighbour.
"
)
Lifting stones
There were a variety of means for lifting blocks into place. Most commonly
employed WeTe lifting bosses (tmko/1('s), rectangular protrusions of the original
protective envelope that wefe retained on opposite faces of the block when the
Tcst of the surface was worked down. Such bosses, located at the centre of
gravity, served as handles with either rope slings or iron tongs. Once the block
was in place these bosses were removed in the final stages of construction.
As an alternative to lifting bosses, a deep U·shaped groove could be cut inlo
each end of a block for lifting ropes. These could be easily pulled from the
イッー・セァイッ カ・ウ after placement. Another lifting device was the 'lewis bolt', a set
of one flat and two wedge-shaped iron bars. These bars were set into a
trapewidal cutting on the top surface of the block and pinned together, the pin
also passing through a stirrup-ring for attaching the hoisting rope (Heron
Mfclwllika 3.8). All cuttings for these various lifting devices were placed in such
a way as to be hidden in the fmished wall.
Vlorkers lifted the block into place by means of a high tripod, windlasses,
multiply pulleys and rope. Once in its proper course, the block was moved
closer to its correct location on wooden rollers. Crowbars were needed for the
final positioning; to give them purchase, shallow indentations, or pry-holes,
were rut inro the top of the course below.
1
15
Fortifications
TIle life of the polis was founded upon agriculture and remained dependent on
it. This was recogniled by Aristolle (Pulitics 125637) who contended that most
Cill7..ens made their living by farming. The central task of fortifications,
therefore, was the defence of the polis' territory (cIWra) rather than its urban corc
(astll). This is not to deny the polltlcal and religious importance of the latter.
However, given the limitations of tactics and ideology, territorial invasion could
achieve the 、・ウゥイセ result by bringing abollt a single battle at a far lower cost
than a direct assault, that is, in the type of warfare at which hopliles excelled on
the kind of ground to which their arms and tactics were most suited. Funher,
practical considerations in the form of the expense of siege warfare also
curtailed its use. These diffio.lIties persisted into the early 4th century Be and are
reflected in the slow development of Greek fortifications as compared with
those of the Near East. Hence Greeks tended to rely on the circuit itself as a
vertical barrier, punctuated by simple-opening gateways, whose primary
purpose was to counter hopllte attack and not elaborate siege techniques.
Around 500 BC a major innovation, perhaps borrowed from Near-Eastern
sources, appears with the addition of two-storeyed towers at vital points along
the clrcuit to prOVide more convenient and numerous opportunities for
tlanking fire. These towers were rectangular in shape in accordance with
eastern practice, with a covered chamber in the second storey and an open
fighting platform protected by a parapet at roof level. Gateways were aho better
protected, being sheltered by a tower or towers, or by a deep inward jog, or by
both these features to form entranceways of the fmecourt type. Sprawling,
contour-hugging fortifications (Geliilldelllaller circuits) now began to
encompass the whole built-up area of the city, though financial considerations
often limited the extent of the circuit. This concept of defending the urban area
replaced the concept of a defensible strongpointlike the acropolis.
Athens (Attica)
The city walls of Athens, with their thick stone soele and frequent use of towers,
established a pattern that was to be copied in other fortifications of the period.
Also Athens, which was capable of deploying the far larger resources necessary
for the expensive business of defence, started the trend for a nCl'l form of
fortification in the 'long wall'. Connecting a city to its port, such fortifications
produced <l new str<ltegy associated with the name of Perik1cs. At the outbreak
of the I'cloponnesian War he persuades his fellow citizens to look upon the city
of Athens, with its port, the Peiraieus now linked to it by the Long Walls, as an
island, and not try to defend the clUJ,a of Attica. At the same time, the fleet was
to be used to maintain the empire (Thucydides 1.143.5, 2.13.2).
Perikles was a statesman deeply committed to a purdy maritime empire. As
war now threatened he expected his fellow citizens to simply man the wails
and the fleet, and the rest of Attica would have to look after itself- Yet the
majority of the Athenians, as Thucydides says (2.14.2), normally lived in the
countryside, and Aristophanes in the AclJUmiallS (32-33) and elsewhere
(Knigllts 40-43, Pax 1320-1328, FanlleTS [Dindorf frs. 162, 163J, fslands
[Dindorf fro 344]) gives vivid glimpses of the deep attachment of a large section
of the population to the セゥャ of Attica. So when Perikles takes the radical step
of breaking the rules of agonal warfare by shifting the entire population behind
the city walls, there are cries of anguish from the Attic countrymen since 'each
16 of them felt as if he was leaving his native city' (I·hucydides 2.16.2).
The kエAセ・ゥォoウL 'the most buutiful
suburb of Adlens' (Thucydides
231.5), is named wr I<t!ramo$.
the son of Dionysos md Ariadne
(Pluuniu U.I).lt is here tNt die
best-preserved section of the City
Wall, induding the Dipylon Gue
and Sacred Gate. stands.
(Author'S collection)
Epiteichismoi
During the Pel0p0nnesian War
an innO¥<ltWe use of se<tpOWer
was the esa.blishmem of
a permanent fortified base
(epiteKhismos,
'ro-planl4.fonifiution-ill-enemy-
terrirory') on or off die enemy's
seaboard from which troOps
could damage. harass. and
discourage and demOl<llize the
enemy. s...ch bases were planted
Topography by the Amenians at PyIos
(125 Be). a headland on die west
Andent Athens consisted of the City itself and Attica, the large triangular peninsula coast of Messenia, and on
jutting southward into the Aegean Sea. The dty sat on a large coastal plain in Kythen. (113 Be). the island JUSt
north-west Attica, surrounded by four mountains (Aigalcos, Parnes, Pentele, off the south-nstem tip of
Hymcttos). Running through the plain in a north-east to south-\\1!:St orientatkm is Lakonia (Thucydides 1.3--5.7.26.
a long limestone ridge. l'\ear ils south-western end, this ridge comprises the d.1.5J-51).The establishment
Acropolis, the Mouseioo (Philopappos Hill) and the Hill of the Nymphs, ""'ith the of these Adlenlan strongholds
within enemy territory did stir
f>nyx, the meeting place of the Athenian assembly, lying in bet\vccn.
up trouble for the Spartans as
The classical city developed around the Acropolis, which now served as the they led to an increase in helot
centre for civic and cultic activity. Beyond its slopes, a circuit, running some unrest. Yet such a scheme does
6.Skm in circumference, enclosed the urhan area. The latter Thucydides tells us not appear ro be a component
(2.15.3-4), shreWdly ming the evidence of public monuments, was on the of the Perikleiln stn.tegy. and die
south side of the Acropolis originally; however, by the time it was fortified it Corinthians first advocaU'd the
use of epiteichismoi in 132 Be
had spread all round, forming. in the words of Heroootos, a 'Wheel-shaped City'
(ThuCY'llldes 1.1221 ).In truth
(7,140.2) with the Acropolis as hub. Perikles only envisaged the use
Like many older Greek communities, Athens had gTm...n around an acropolis of epiteichismoi as a
several kilometres inland 'in order to protect themselves from piracy' countermove if the Sputans
(Thucydides 1.7.1). Later, when the need for an outlet to the sea was attempted to establish a base in
imperative, the nearest suitable point on the Attic coast was developed. Attica (Thucydides 1.142.2-1). as
they eventually did. on Alkibiades'
Flourishing to be<:ome a sort of duplicate city, the Peiraieus lay some 6km to
recommendation. at Dekeleia on
the south-west, a low rocky peninsula (AI-:te) with three well-protected, deep, Mount Parnes (113 bcINvゥセ「{・
natural harbours (Kantharos, Zea and Mounychia). Here ship sheds housed the from Athens itself. this 'fort was
triremes of Athens' fleet. built to threaten and control the
pbin and the rich<m parts of the
Chronology chora' (Thvcydides 7.19.2). The
Thucydides reports the hasty erection of the city walls 'in all directions' position was well chosen. For,
in contrast to their annual
(1.93.2), which indicates an attempt to enclose the whole urban area of Athens.
ineffective invasions of Attica
In 478 IlC, follOWing the defeat of Xerxes, the Spartans had nOI only urged the (131 IIC, 130 Be,12811C, 127 Be
Athenians to refrain from building their own fortifications, but also wanted all and 425 llC). the raids made by
Greek ーッO」ゥNセ outside of the Peloponnese to demolish their existing the Spartans and their allies were
fortifications. Themistokles held the Spartans off with foot.dragging now unremitting. Occupied
diplomacy, haVing instructed the Athenians to raise a circuit. And so, according year-round. Dekeleia became the
・ーゥエ・ 」ィゥウュッセ par excellence
to Thucydides (1.90.3), no public building and no private house were to be
(Andokides 1.101.Lysias 14.30.
spared, and everything that could be of use in the fortifications was torn dowo. lsokrates 16.10. Hellenika
The rushed work and the use of old material, Including grave markers, is Oxyrhynchio 12.3).
evident in the remains themselves, but the truth behind the story must be that 17
00
1
navy, aM \\, '\\
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Peimieus
some of the walls wcre thrown together so that the city could be defended at a A&OVE lEFT The City W;all survives
pinch, and tho'll when the threat passed they were completed at greater leisure. ;as succ:es.sive rodes. seen here in
It is, of course, all part of the Themistokles myth. No doubt Thucydides was two c:oorse.s of poros bIock:s
(ThemIsmkleu! scx:lt» 、ョセ one of
right to characterize the great man as 'supreme at doing ーイ・、セャケ the right
well-fOinted polygoouI bIol:ks in blue
Ihing at precisely the right moment' (I. !:i8.3). Iimenone (KononQn sode).Abovl!.
With the city itself secure. Themistoklcs then persuaded the Athenians 10 in c:te;l1Tl)' times«>ne.;an! two
complete Ihe development and fortifications of the Peiraieus, which, according courses from the rebuilding of
to Thucydides (1.93.3), had started during Themistokles' archonship of 493 Be. 307-304 Be. (Authors collection)
Thucydides adds (1.93.5) tho'll this circuit was unusual even in the author's day.
AllOVE fUGHT The S<lcred Gate
l1uilt entirely of squ3T(.>(\ blocks, doweled and damped together, the walls wen'
spanned the Sacred Way セョ、 the
so high and thick that th{'y could be defended by a relatively small number of Eridanos. the stream carried by
second-rate troops. a vaulted channel (right). The
The Tllr.'mistoklcan circuit (phase I) was to protr.'ct Athens throughout the forecourt. with inner and outer
I'eloponncsian War, which pitted Athens and its empire against Sparta and its !»SS;lgeS. is 18m deep. with a キセQi
allies (known collectively as the Peloponnesians). The Long Walls, sometimes on the flank oppmite the channel
{'alled 'legs' (skae, Plutarch KilllOll 13.7), were added before this conniet, first laid and corner towers. (Author's
collection)
out under Kimon and completed under Perikles (".458-440 DC). Initially there
were two long walls (Thucydidcs 1.107.1), one (north) running from Athens to
th(' Peiraieus, the other (phaleric) to Phaleron, a broad open bay and site of
Athens' earliest harbour (llerodotos 6.116). Later a third (south) long wall was
added, the 'middle wall', aboul 180m from and parallel to the first
City-I'eirajeus wall (plato GOTXias 4SSe with scholion '" Fornara 79A). Between
these walls was a roadway. Another, probably the carriage-road mentioned by
Xenophon (He//miku 2.4.10), ran outside the northern wall. These fortifications,
built of well·cut ashlar masonry, were an important clement in Athenian naval
strategy, securely joining landlocked AI hens to the thrcr fortified harbours of its
port. The totai circuit of Athens (City \Vall), the Long "Valls, and the l'ciraieus 19
was over 30km (178 stadia, Thucydides 2.13.7), which made the Athenians
virtually impregnable to sieg£" provided they retained control of the sea.
Having r£"Covered from th£" d£"f£"at by Sparta, Konon, with Persian gold, was
able to rebuild sections of the Long Walls and the City Wall (phase 2) tom
down at the end of the Pcloponnesian War (Xenopholl HrJlmika 2.2.20, 23,
4.8.9-10). Several inscriptions have been found recording payments to
contractors for material and labour for different sections of these fortifications.
TIley are dated by year, from 393 He to 390 fie, and werc apparently actually set
into the brickwork. However, the rebuilding work was probably finished only
after 346 OC (Demosthenes 19.125, d. Xenophon Porai 6.1).
Possible repairs to the fortifications took place in order to protect Athens
against the Macedonians after Chaironela (338 Be). The great haste with which
this building work was executed is reminiscent of the original Themistoklean
circuit, and contemporary speeches imply it was completed in a similar fashion
(Lykourgos Against Lookmres 44, Aischines 3.236). It is perhaps at this time that
the outer wall (praleicllisma) and ditch were added outside the original line. The
expected attack, however, did not take place.
Demetrios Poliorketes, haVing 'liberated' Athens from Kassandros' garrison
(Plutarch Demctrios 8-10), completely overhauled the City Wall (phase 3),
while at the same time the Dipylon Gate and prvteiclli.mw were rebuilt from the
ground up (307-304 t>c.). The building decree of 307/306 lie not only covers
repairs to the existing brickwork but also gives specifications for rebuilding the
City Wall, including the roofing of the wall-walk or f'Oroclos (lG ii z 463.52-74 ==
Harding 134). Winter (1971: 141) sees the roofed p{lrodos as the simplest means
of protecting from the elements the small torsion-spring catapults, probably
bolt-shooters, mounted on the curtains: the Athenians were certainly building
torsion artillery by 306/305 8e (lG jiz 14878.84-90. ct. 14671\.48-56,
16276.328-329). The improved fortifications enabled the Athenians to
withstand the siege mounted by Kassandros in 304 IlC (Plutarch Dcmerrios 23.1).
City Wall
ThemistokleaJl sode Four counes (n,obble '" poIygomI); possible that uppermost tourw
(polygonal: 'lu:orry) belongs to the (.420 Be repain
393-190 8C KonOJllllJl sode One cours<:' blue Pei",elC limestone (coursed polygonlll: brollthed '" poInted.
bevelloo): possible repllin 338 tIC
f'tlllSe 3 307_104 8C Hellenistic so<:lc Two counes poros stnotd'ers. reused blocks llfld small stOr><!! fllIen (quite
regular isodomic セDィャイZ アオセイ ケI
S<lcred Gille
It was here that the ーイッ」・Nセウゥッョ for the goddess Demeter gathered before it made
its way along the Sacred Way from Athens to ElellSis. The name 'Sacred Gate'
(II/em pyle) does not appear in the literary sources before Plutarch, who writes
that Sulla's troops broke through the curtain 'between the Sacred Gate and the
Peiraicic Gate' (Silf/O 14.5, ct. Appian MitJlfitlateios 149) and thus took Athens
and laid it to waste (86 oc). Ilowever, Sacred Gate, like Sacred Way, is probably
a much older name.
The Sacred Gate was a forecourt gateway with four rectangular flanking
towers, the entranceway being recessed some 18m behind the line of the City
Wall and furnished wilh two passages, one for the Eridanos stream, and one for
the Sacred Way. Attackers would have been compelled to advance along the
latter passage, shut in between the southem flanking wall and lhe stream, with
their right (unshielded) side, moreover, exposed to flanking fire from the top of
the wall along the northern bank. 21
The Dipylon Gate siu at the end of
a forecourt. open on セ we$t and
proteued by ヲッオセ corner towers
and twO flanking walls. A centn.1
pie<" separ.l.tes the double ptes. The
outet". Y;l.ulted &ates we,.., added in
the I セエ cenrury 1lC. (Author's
collection)
Sacred Gate
pャオセ・ I セWX 8C Themiuoldun ーエセ Two entrances with forecotll"t, each crowned with parodas to deff!nd p,a...age
of eイゥ、。ョッセ セョ、 n,.."et セ・ーイNエャケ[ sode of two ヲッオョ、セエゥッョ courses paros. and
two オー ・セ couセャ・L hard limestooe; repall'S c.420 Be
Phase 2 393-390 Be Kononian gateway Extensi.e altcr.l.tions: Eridano, re.channelled to provide セ wider ,treet:
「セNャエゥッョbuilt (concept of ウ」ーセイ エ・ defence for stream and ,treCI ab3ndoned):
.oele of three courSeS reddi,h limestone (header< & stretchers: quarry>
tooled. dr.tftC'd margins): possible n:p;lirs 338 IlC
307-30<1 IS'; Hellenistic: ptew3y Complete overhaul: brter coc-ner N ョ セ fenestn.led and labl.,...roofe<l
(i.e. artillery)
Oipylon Gate
The term 'Dipylon' first appears in a decrC<' (lG ii 2 6738.4) dated to 278/277 1lC;
Originally the gateway was called the Thriasian Gate (or Gates) as the road out
of it led to the Thriasian plain at Eleusis (Harpokration Ll'xicol1 NセiG
Anthemokritos, d. lsaios [Forster fro 24]). This forecourt gateway, the largest in
Grccre (1 ,800m 2), was the principal entrance of Athem. The fact that it was
used during the Pallathcnaic Festival is probably the main reason for its size.
The I'anathenaic proc'cssion assembled besid{' the gateway, and poSSibly in
the forecourt itself. According to an inscribed document (IG ij2 :n4.24-2S), the
meat from the great sacrifice to Athena, the hecatomb, was distributed here.
I.arge numbers of postholes have been found in the for('("ourt and it seems that
these would have supported the tents in which the Athenians feasted, Likewise,
as the arterial roads to Thebes and Corinth started here, the spacious (orecourt
served as a convenient meeting and departure point. Here travellers could
purchase last minute provisions or souvenirs from hustlers, or refresh
themselves and their animals at the nearby fountain house. Thc Roman satirist
lucian records (DitIIOSIl/'S uf tl/(' CourteslIlIS 4.3) that lovers often scribbled their
erotic greetings on the forecourt walls.
ObViously contrivcd to impress citizens and visitors alike, the Dipylon Gate
also had the potential to frustrate would-be attackers. The forccourt was
covered at each of its four corners by rectangular towers, and between these ran
two flank walls I;'at'h crowned by a pawdoJ, In wartime, therefore, this
t"ul-de-sac functioned as a deadly trap for anyone approaching with hostile
22 intent, sllbjecting attackers to crossEre in every direction from high up, as were,
for example, the JX'nned troops of I'hllip V of セ ...lacedon when they attempted
to storm Athens in 200 lIC (Livy 31.24,9-16).
Although the ground plan essenlially remains the same throughout, the
Dipylon Gate does exhibit two major building phases, the construction phase
of 478 tIC and a rebuilding at the end of Ihe 4th century tIC. Initially a single
pair of gates located al Ihe inner end of the cul-de-sac - hence Ihe term
'I)ipylon' - secured the Themistoklean gateway. In the late Ilellenislic period,
however, a second pair of vaulted gales was added to the front, thereby
converting the cul-de-sac into a cage.
Oipylon Gate
P>,,,. I '178 IIC Themistoklean CileW<lY lnnu double F1tc= (non·vaulted); fOllr .null rKD.ngubr comc=r towc=n WIth
"'It·front (TOWllr C) proJllCting on unshielded side; poros sode. mud·bnck
.uperstruew....
307-30'l8(: Same plan but solid COflstruction (i.e. Irtillery) in cOflglomerate blocks
sheathed with blue PelnJelc limestone; iセイァ・ corner towers. fenestrated and
gable-roofed
.,
,, ,
1
\
PrQteic:1Ji,Sma
This was an outer line of defence 7 to 8m forward of the Themisloklean circuit,
consiSting of a stone wall (conglomerate; alternating headers and stretchers)
and thto' ditch, rectangular in section and about 8m wide and 4m deep,
associated with it. With the development of mechanical warfare by the
Macedonians the function of combined ditch and brea.'itwork is be.'il .'ieen as a
more positive countermeasure, other than by sallying forth and physically
destroying them, of keeping mobile .'iil:·gc machines away from th", City Wall,
or at least slowing down their approach. Additionally, the ditch would have
served as an effective deterrent to mining.
The proteichismfl, however, would not have afforded the City Wall much
protection against artillery as it still lay within the effective range of enemy
machines mounted on the outer edge of the defensive system. As already
noted, one of the aims of the bUilding programme of 307/306 Be was to prOvide
for the mounting of torsion-spring catapult.<; on the curtains to keep the
attacker'S machines as far away from the City Wall as possible. The confines of
the parodos limited the size of these catapults, but the height of their placement
ensured that they could allen targto't larger besieging machines, especially the
stone-throwing variety, before their own walls were in range. Military engineers
...
•, 10 minae
IS miooe
... 20 minae
..-
30 mitloe
""""
T 1 Went (lDlanron) '" 60 mirI<le
.T 10 minoe pkn; 1 Went (i.e. 70 rninat')
The above CIlljbre< are baled on the 353 stones discovered outside the al\Cie<1t circuit of Rhades.
The,e Rhodian shot of blue crystailine limestone were c",efully inscribed with letter, indic3ting
their weight. most af which ltill show trace. af red paint applied ta the il\Cilianl to make the
weight-marlts readily visible. Oolib",tion of shot was ケャ 。イ・ョセ one of a graduated series, which
rose by dift"erences of 5 or 10 rninoe up to a common rna><mum af 60 nMae by the mid-3rd
cenrury IlC (Philon セ 1.29, セケエイゥィtNIWMッ d>o<. CO\IId be 「Nオョ」セ most セ・」エイ ・iケ
0'1'0'I" ョ セ below 400m セL。」 ッイ、ゥョF to Philon (II. 200 1Ie),)O.rmna. enginn 1lave the mOst
appropriate dimensians and are maSl forceful in their blo-.;' (1'cIiCIrlt:itil1l 96.10). For inscol\Ce, an
the ba.is af the shot found, the most popubr calibre, at Rhodes appear tCI have been thase af
25 miMe (85 shot) and 30 mina" (83 shot).
14
Ring Street. viewed from Tower C.
Dipyloo ウゥィtN・エセg N・イセヲ^エァオッイ ィエ
which ran between the City Wall
(Mgt'll) and the protcichismo (left).
encompused Athens and セ。ァ
access to its suburos. Sokrates
famously used It to get from the
Academy to the Lykeion. (Author's
collection)
Topography
Gyphtokastro was built to crown a steep and rocky knoll on the south side of
the Dryoskephalai (Kaza) Pass, the major access route leading north-south
between the Klthairon and Parnes ranges, and guarded the road from Thebes
via Plataia to Athens. Anyone paSsing from central Greece to the Peloponnesc
had to come through this pass, which ,vas known in antiquity as the 'road by 25
26
1 Gyphtob.stro was svategical'y
I located above the Dr)'QskephaJai
Pass. the principal route leading
north-south between Mount Parnes
MId Mount Kithairon, througtl which
ran the highway from Athens to
Platllia. The fon is seen here looking
south-un from the modem road.
(Auth<;>r"s collection)
Athenian or Boiotian?
The fort features in discussions of the defences of Attica (Obcr 1985: 160-163),
though a case can be made that it is aClually Hoiotian, built when £pameinondas
Ie(] the Thebans to the hegemony of Greece (371-362 ue). The trapezoidal
masonry in hard grey limestone blocks with quarry faces finds its best parallels
in Ikliotia rather than Attica (Cooper 1986: 195, Harding 1988: 61-71, camp
1991: 199-202, d. Ober 1987: 601-603, 1989: 294-301). On the other hand, the
north wall, studded \"ith rectangular lowers every 30m or $0, faces towards
Boiolia not Attica, and its defenders could fire projectiles at ('n('my soldiers
coming through the pass. In comparison, the south wall has only three towers.
Across the plain some 5km 10 the soulh.cast OIl ゥコ。セ siands lhe remains of
a free-standing tower. This five-storey tower once commanded the route into 27
LHT A good セエイ・」ィ of the! north
wall of Gypht0k3stro stands well
preserved, with recungular towers
every 30m or so. Seer! here, looking
RSt-south-east from the gr;,vel
tr.lck up to the セェエ・L are To_rs 2
to ... (Author"s collection)
セ .
.",,'
AtUca from the Dryoskephalai Pass. Along the same road and about 2.5km ASOVE Towers 2 to Shave
further north-cast, was the fortified Attic dl'll!e of Oinoc (MyoupoliS), which ground-floor chambers without
had been walled by the start of the l'cloponnesian War at the latest (Thucydides loops or windows, and se<:ond
2.18.2). To the north-cast, some 400m higher on Mount Parnes (Parnitha) and chamber$ at pllrlldll5 level with
arrow slits. They were not,
overlooking a fertile upland valley (Skourta plain), is the slight remains of the
therefore, designed to house
Attic border fort of Panakton (Kavilsala). This stronghold was taken by Cou:apults but is bawe·sutions for
treachery by the Boiotians during the Peloponnesian Wilr ilnd demollshe(l archers. Tower S is seen here from
before it was returned to the Athenians as part of the settlement of the Peace tッキ・イセN (Author's collection)
of J'\ikias in 4221421 IlC (Thucydides 5.3.5, 18.7, 355, 36.2, 40.1-2, 42.1-2,
44.3, Plutarch Afkibi(/(It!s 14.4). Several inscriptions (IG ji2 1299, 1303-05, 2971,
d. Demosthenes 19.326,54.3-5) mention the Athenian garrisons that manned
18 the rebuilt fort during the "th and 3rd centuries Be_
Garrison A80VE LEFT The porodos running
By the 3705 RC (Aischines 2.167) lhe Alheniam. had introduced epl/ebeia, a between Towers 3 3nd " on the
two.-year paramilitary service for all 18- and 19-year-old citizen youths or north wall of Gyphtokasuo. Seen
here is the side door Wt g3ve
ephebes (t'pllt'b{)/). FoUowing the defeat at Chaironeia (338 oc), lpJu'beia was
access to the second chamber of
formalized by Epikrates' iaw of 336/335 Be (I Iarpokration Lexicon s. v. Epikrates), Tower 4 from the porodos. which
and from then at least, if not before, service as an ephebe was not oniy would haVll been protected by
compulsory but also involved garrison duty. a crenellated parapet. (Authors
The Aristotelian AthellaiOIl {Joliteia (42.3-5) describes in detail the training collection)
ephebes underwent. Thc first year was takcn up with a cycle of athletic
contcsts, mainly footraces such as the hoplirodmmos, a 4(X)m racc in which thc "'!lOVE RIGHT The postern. external
view, hard by Tower 2. north wall
competitors carried a hopiite shield and wore a hclmct and, originally, grcaves. of GyphtokastrO. When used for
There werc also competItions for the pyrrl,idle (pyrrhic dance), a kind of sorties. troops leaving the fort
military ballet described by Plato as 'movements that evade blows and missilcs would have had their right
by dodging, yielding, leaping, landl crouching, and the opposite offensive (unshielded) side covered by the
postures of striking with missiles, arrows, and spears, and all sorts of blows' tower and those stationed witl1in.
(Laws 815a). As well as USing athletics as a military preparation, the ephebes (Author·s coile<:tion)
also received from their instructors training in the use of hoplite weapons as
well as the bow, the javelin and the sling (AlhellaiOIl politeia 42.3).
At the beginning of the second year the cphcbcs wcrc issucd, at state
expensc,.a shield, a spear, a military cloak (clila",ys) and a broad-brimmcd hat
Hー・ャ。⦅セッウIN The ephebcs were now ready to practise their newly acquired sklUs in
the field. According to the Atl/i'/I(/ioll po/iteia (42.4) they proVided permanent
garrisons for the border forts and walchtowers. Some also patrolled the
mountainous borderlands and were called penpoloi ('those who travel about'),
as did the orator Aischines, who, after boyhood, 'became a perip%s of this
clJiJra for two years' (2.167). 29
,-.- j
30
Mantineia (Arcadia)
Following Sparta's defeat at Leuktra CUI Be) the scattered Mantinei'lnS, with
The-han aid, returned to the city previously destroyed t>y til ... Spartan king
AgC$ipoliS. As well as raising the extensive fortifications whose ruins we see
today, they also rearranged the course of the Ophis so that it hecame a defence
instead of a danger. The Mantineians WNe obviously concerned with a\'oiding
a repetition of tht' disaster of 385 ftC, when Agesipolis
damned the river and the rising waters caused a slrelch
of the mud-brick fortifications 10 collapse.
Topograph)'
The existence of Mantineia was important because the
security of its city walls encouraged Manlineian
autonomy in foreign policy and the development of an
independent democratic political system that was
hostile 10 Sparta (Xenopholl Helfmika 5.2.1-2, cf.
Thucydides 5.29.1). II was ShOTtly after the Persian
Wars, according to Straoo (83.2), that the Mantineians
left their fin' village settlements (ko",m) and united as
one polis, an event that can be linked with the
establishment of democracy in Mantinl'ia (Aristotle
Politics 1318lW-5). If political and physical union
(splOikismos) led to the adoption of a democratic
constitution, then life in village settlements fostered
oligarchic rule that encouraged loyalty to Sparta's own
interests (pausanias 8.8.9, 10, Xenophon lleUmika
5.2.7,6.4.18, d. 53-5).
As an artificial foundation Mantinl'ia lacked an
acropolis. Thus, albeit with some natural protection
from a small river, the セᄋi。ョエゥ ャNGゥ。ョウ built their city on
what was, for Arcadia, praetiGllIy level ground. Situated
in eastern Arcadia, the cllom of the Mantiiieians was a
hare upland plain (629m) enclosed by an i1mphitheatre
of barren mountains. This alpine plain, whoS(' terrain
and location made it a convenient meeting place for
armies, often became the cockpit in which pro- and
anti-Spartan alliances settled their 、ェヲ ャNGヲH^ョ」・Nセ (418 1lC,
370/369 Be, 362 tIC).
31
Circuit m。ョエゥ ・ 。Gセ
sode. of regular-
The circuit of the re-founded city is elliptical in form, with a perimeter of nearly 、・セイオッ」 polygonal Lケイョッセ。ュ was
4km enclosing an area of some l.24km 2, and generally follows the 5<lme lines exceptionally high owing to the
as its Sth-century predecessor (Scranton 1941: 57-59). The walls, encircled by wet nature of the ternin.The river
the dh'ertcd Ophis except for a short distance on the south-east, were buill out Ophis (SlQke') was re-routed so
:.u to form a セエ moat uound the
of mud-brick. The brid.;work. some 4.05 to Sm in \o\idth, rested upon a high re--founded city. (Author's
stone soc!e of large rectangular or polygonal blocks holding a fill of fieldstoncs collection)
and earth. O\'er 120 square lowers reinforced the circuit, of which 118 have
been traced, placed about 26m apart, and 10 gateways, mostly of the 'overlap'
type, pierced its line. Gateways of this type did not have direct access, but were
designed so that the entry ran more or less parallel to tile circuit for several
metres.
As Mantineia stood entirely on a level plain, it might be reasonable to expect
the gateways to have been planned with flanking towers on the attacker's right
(unshielded) side. Actually, the reverse is Ihe case. It is true that at least some
of the gateways had a second tower on lhe inner wall, just outside the entrance
to the corridor. The placing of the primary tower on the attacker's left side,
however, does suggest thai even on level ground the' major virtue of such
gateways lay in compelling the enemy to advance for some diStance below the
line of the main wall.
An unusual feature for the 4th century DC - it would become fairly common
in Hellenistlc times - was the positioning of posterns in lhe tlanks of towers.
Promoted by Epameinondas. the Thcban srmtcgos and leading soldier of エィセG
day, new Mantineia probably incorporated in its defensive system all the most
up-to-date ideas. The use of the Ophis as a wet moat encircling the city was a
stroke of genius. Likewise, instead of plaCing posterns in the curtains under the
32 shelter of a neighbouring tower, the designers c1e\'Crly incorporated them in
the ground-floor chambers of the towers them5Clves.
Defending troops issuing from these openings would
have been in greatest danger at the moment they
emerged, while they were still in single file. To offset this
as far as POSSible, the posterns were set in the right flank
of the tower (fil<:ing the field). Thus the defenders, as they
emerged, presented their shil'lded Nセゥ、・ウ to the enemy.
Messene (Messenia)
After three centuries of ernlavement by the Spartans, the
:\iessenians were liberated by Epameinondas and
reacquired their own polis; the foundation of Messene
would be an outward and very visible sign of Sparta's
humiliation. This was not the only post-Leuktra blow
that Eparneinondas was abll' to inflict on Sparta. He also
supervised the t'Onstruction of Megalopolis in southern
Arcadia and initiated the re-founding of Mantineia.
Messene, with t.,·legalopolis and Mantincia, completed
the strategic barrier to contain the Spartans.
Topography
Situated in the famously fertile Stenyklaros plain of
Messenia (Tyrtaios [West fro 5], Strabo 8.5.6), Messenl' sits
in a hollow bl'twecn tint''' hills, Eva to the south-east,
Psoriari to the west and !thorne to the north. The site h
dominated by the summit of !thorne (802m), a natural
stronghold and thus an obvious choice for an acropolis.
Ithome ('step') had figured as a refuge in the nrst
(c.736-71611C) and Third ((.464-460 1lC) Messenian wars.
Chronology
The literary l'vidence (Diodoros 15.66.1, 6, 67.1,
PJusanias 4.27.5-7) imparts thal the city was founded,
ami the bUilding of the fortificaUons begun, in 369 Be
under the auspices of Epameinondas. Having restored the
Messenians to their territory, he actively encouraged
3J
Messene
The circuit of Messene went up in the winter of 369 Be armies. as well as the exiled Messenians who had beEn
after Epameinoodas invaded Sparu and then proceeded invited to return and establish an Independent state,
over Mount Taygeros to liberate Messenia. Built with m・ウ セ・ was the southernmost link in a defensive ch<lin
incredible rapidity by the combined Theban and Argive 'of セi・、 cities intended [0 keep the Spartans at bay.The
0.
TheOl.tre
-:
..
-.""::e
$
Nセ
.......
セ⦅BN[G III セGD
..fl'"" ...
Temple '"
":I':!
Temp:le "" セ
of As'dlilPius _..... • _.. "'-
セ cear... . .....
..:f• • セ -'I;o;l .. セ
1Uo....
....
"Ij.
セN
_...
<C'>Q _
.. セO
セ
....
34
fortifICationS. me epitome of Greek milieu-y architecwre, built to a keight of same 7 to 9m. were reinforced by
made me of me slopes of Mount Ithorne and were projecting rowers set at irTegUlar interVals; resting an solid
designed to encompass enough open land far me citizens bases these were either- one srorey with windows or two
to rear livesooc.k and cultivate crops. The waIls. all stone storeyS with loops in me Iawe.- and windows in me upper.
fセ Altar of Zeus
"
., , <
[セT
- Z N[ セ
セGMN
< ,. Nセ
.':.,
I: < ••
•
..,
=1•
".)'.
,.
. .... ....
•
セN
. ,. • •
. •
".I
35
The west wall of Messene.1ooItin& them 10 build dty walls, a project apparently completed in a mere 85 days.
wuth tow.irds Tower N. This Lawrence (1979: 382-85) argues coherently for a single main period of
structure is al1 excellent exa.mple building, and his stand for an Epameinondean date for the circuit is supported
of a fir>t·gel1entiol1 artillery tower.
by Ober (1987: 572). There are those, however, who advocate a considerably
B.uilt with a solid base. me tOWl!r
consisted of a single chamber, later date for the walls now visible. Marsden (1969: 127-38) has suggested, on
housing nOn-tOrsion catapults. stylistiC grounds, that the north wall was a Hellenistic rebuilding.
surmounted by a fighting-platform
roof. (Authors collection) Circuit
The rambling circuit, some 9.Skm long, follows the line of the ridge descending
from Ithome and was continuous except at various inacces,o;ible points. Planned
to enclose arable land, it doubtless served also as a refuge for the surrounding
population in times of danger. Its stone walls consist of an outer and inner
facing of un-mortared squared blocks, set some 2.5m apart and packed with a
rubble core. The circuit is reinforced at irregular intervals (30-90m) by
projecting towers. These are rectangular or, at salient angles, semicircular and
arc excellent examples of first-generation artillery towers.
Tower N, a well-preserved tower on the west wall, originally stood 901 high
and consisted of a single chamber surmounted by a fighting platform, on a
solid base, The masonry of the tower and associated curtain-wall is isodomic
trapezoidal. Entry to the chamber was through two side doors from the parodoi,
which ran behind crenellated parapets. The chamber has four small pentagonal
....indows that allowed for the provision of non-torsion catapults inside the
tower. The windows, two in front and one in each sidewall, splay on the inside
and thus resemble overlarge arrow slits.
TO\...er L, the best-preserved tower on the north wall, originally stood 12.5m
high and consisted of two chambers above a solid basc. The masonry of the tower
and associated curtain-wall is isodomic ashlar. Entry into the tower was by a door
in either sidewall of the lower chamber. The doors led to parodoi protlXted by
crenellated parapets. Access to the upper chamber was probably via a ladder and
trapdoor from the lower chamber. The lower chamber has four arrow slits, two in
front and one in each sidewall, which splay internaily. The upper chamber is
l6 eqUipped ....i th four small rectangular window'S, two in front and two in each
The 'CastJe', weSt wall of m・ウセョ⦅
Towers of セ・ュゥ、ヲGHZオャ。イ plan were
stronger. but more difficult to
construct. They also had the
advantage of providing defenden
with better fields of vision and fire.
(AuthOf"s collection)
'iidewall, which allowcd for the provision of non-torsion catapults inside the tower.
As open windows, unlikc loops, had the disadvantage of exposing defenders to
enemy missiles these wcrc pwtet"ted by double-leafed, outward-opening,
side-swinging shutters attached to the outside of the tower wall.
The architects also dispensed with the fighting-platform roof and instead
employed a gabled roof. which was easier to make watertight and thus keep
machines dry. The fighting platforms at towers along the west wall allowed the
defenders to fire upon enemy troops who approached close enough to the
circuit to be outside the beaten zone of catapults, which could not be depressed
much helow the horizontal. Presumably in the case of the gable-roofed towers
of the north wall, the designers felt that bolts fired laterally from neighbouring
towers, in conjunction with hand-fired missiles shot by defenders on the
parodoi, would provide adequate security against this particular threat.
Arcadian Gate
Of the four gateways Ihat have been distinguished, the Arcadian Gate is the
most impresSive. Gateways in gem'ral proVided both problems (since they 37
ABOVl: LEfT One of the twO side constitute an obvious weakness In any fortification system) and opportunities
doors of the 'Castle', Menene.The for monumental embellishml'nt as here with the Arcadian Gale.
enormous circuit made use of the The gateway consists of an outer anJ inner entrance, separated by it circular
slopes of three hills - Ilere it (limbs
forecourt. Square towers, 10m apart, llanked the outer entrance, which is
Psoriari - and was designed to
envelop enoogh open land to enable almost 5m wide. The forccourt, 19m in diameter, is still remarkable for the
the inhabitants to raise crops and perfection of its masonry, laid dry on a baSe of two massive courses. On either
livenock. (Author's collection) side, near the outer entrance, is a niche for the protecting deities, one doubtless
tile Hermes noted by Pausanias (4.:-13.3). The inner entrance was in the form of
ABOVE thgiセ Tower L. north wall a pair of two-leaved gates separated by a central post, an enormous monolith
of Melsene. When chambers for
now partly fallen. All the evidence sllggests that till' gateway was totally
artillery surmounted towers,
roofs were necessary to keep
demolished and rebuilt on a hlrger and more complex senle sometime around
the machines within clry.A gabled 300 llC (Scranton 1941: 128-29).
roof. as here. was easier to make
watertight than a fighting-platform Other fortifications
roof. (Author's collection) Aigosthena (Mega rid)
Aigosthena is at the eastern end of the Corinthian Gulf on the slopes of Mount
Kithairon. The settlement, which certainly existed by the 8th century Be, was
in the territory of Megara and, although rather remote, controlled the direct
but dimcult route between Boiotia and the PeJoponnese. Xenophon (Hl'Ileuikl/
5.4.18,6.4.26) records that the Spartans P.1SSed through Aigosthena in 378 IlC
and after their defeat at I.euktra in 371 Be. Aigosthena is seldom mentioned
otherwise and consequently it is not clear when and why the fortifications
were built. Dates in the mid-4th century Be (Megarian with Athenian aid), the
late 4th century Be (Demetrios Poliorketes), and the mid-]rd century Be
38 (Achaian League) have been proposed on the basis of their architectural style.
Tower L, Messene
The walls of Messene are considered the finest ensured that they could often target larger besieging
example of 'lth-<entury military architecture, and by engines before their own walls were in range.The
the second.(juarter of the century Greek engineers upper windows were larger to allow small
had designed towers to accommodate artillery that IlOn-torsion catapulu to fire from them, but the
shot from shuttered windows. The confines of the lower ones were just loops for archers.The roof was
towers and small apertures of the windows limited gabled to keep the machines dry, while the base was
the size of the catapults, but the great attitude of solid so is to support their weight. The misonry of
their placement more than made up for this and the tower was isodomic ashlar in hard grey limestone.
39
MCIYl: un The Arudian Gate, The best-preserved section of the fortifications, which enclosed a rectangle
not"th iセ of Me,$l'J'Ie.Iooki"l some 550 by 180m, is on the east side of the acropolis. Tower A, 3t the south-
USt cowards Tower L This had eastern angle of the drcuit and built of limestone and reddish conglomerate,
double entranceways separated
was 9m z and 18m high. Just beneath the gabled roof were six shuttered
by VI enclosed drcular forecourt
in which an enemy who h.ad windows, dearly discernible until the earthquake of 1981, evidently for
penetrated would be crapped. catapults. Archers were stationed on the two storeys below and the tower had
Flanking towers strengthened the a solid base. Ashlar isodomic masonry was used for the towers (eight in total),
system further. (Author's collection) mostly trapewi,1al with occasional polygonal blocks for tile curtains. The main
gateway was by Tower F, between the acropolis and fortified lower city, while a
ABOVE RJGHT Tower A,Algosthena. postern stood between towers Band C on the outer east wall. Few traces of the
Once three high. the top
Storeys
(hamber hou,ed torsion catapults.
wall on the south side of the lower city are evidtmt, but the north wall is still
behind six <huuereG w1ndOW$. ill situ and runs down to the sea, a distance of somt' 450m, and is studded with
Archers we.... SGuoned on the eiglll rectangular towers and pierced by two gateways.
twO storey'S betow. The UlWef"
had a gabled roof and a solid Eleusis (Attica)
base. (Author-'s wllectiofl) Ancient F.Jeusis lies on the shore of a large bay 21 km west of Athens, It was an
important tleme site at the edge of the Thriasian plain as well as the location of
a sanctuary dedicated to Demeter, the ァッ、 セウ of corn. Her cult, the Eleusinian
Mysteries, was one of the most successful in the Greek world and for a time
rivalled Christianity in popularity.
Eleusis was the westernmost Attic tlcllle and thus something of an outpost
facing the p」ャッー ョ ・Nセ」L home of such long-standing enemies as the Megarians,
40 Corinthians and Spartans. Th(' sanctuary itself was protected by substantial
At EletJsis the tyrant Peisistratos
(d. 527 &e) enclosed the ... ョセエu[ャイケ
01 Demeter with a substantial
circuit. This was built with a low
socle of limestone blocks エ・セ in
polygonal style. whi<h earTied
seYeral metres of sun-dried
mud-brick. (Authors collection)
.. --
-.,,_ ..---
__1:...--
,
-- \
1
-
42
UFT A common, cheap ;and effective
building material, anc;ent mud-brick
rarely survives today. He.... we see
'melted' brickwori< resting on a
sode of'lesbian masonry', the
North Tower of the West Gate,
Eretria. (Author's collection)
Eretria (Euboia)
[retria, next to Chalkis, was the prindpal polis of Euboia_
The second ャ。イァセエ island in the Aegean, F.uboia extends
ョッイエィセキ エ to south-cast for over ISOkm almost parallel
(and dose) to the mainland of central Greece and was,
from the late 5th century Il(;onwards, jOined to Boiotia by
a succession of bridges across the narrow Euripos channel.
Eretria was founded (c.82S 1lC) on a strategic site with
acropolis, natural harbour, access to fertile land, and
control of the island's main east-west land route. Close
political ties with Athens began in the 6th century Be. [n
retribution for aiding the revolt of Persia's Greek subjects
(498 1lC), a Persian expedition captured and sacked the
city (490 I\C). Fretria now entered the Athens-dominated
ambit of the Delian League, later revolting (447/446 l\c),
whereupon the Athenians occupied it until it revolted
again (41 I Ilc),
The \Vest Gale was stratt'gically sited at the point
where the artery from Chalkis crossed a winter torrent,
originally by llleans of a ford. A gateway already existed
in late archaic times, along with the first (wooden) hridge.
The extant remains, however, arc tho!>C of a rehuild after
the Persian sack to a new design, renovated at the end of
Athenian occupation (411 llC), in which the torrent bed
now acted in effect as a moat. A stone bridge led the road
through a bottleneck forccourt, flanked by a pair of
bastion-like towers with mud-brick cores, to a two-leaved
wooden gate. A well-preserved stretch of the circuit,
punctuated by three rectangular towers, runs southward
from the \-\-'est Gale. The 1>oIygOrlai socle, dated to c400
1lC, once supported a mud-brick superstructure. The
circuit as a whole enclosed an area from the shore to the
summit of the acropolis to the north.
The =<t W1I1 01 Sounion, looking
north tow.mls the bay of Sounion
from Tower 4.The high headland.
dedicated to Poseidon. wa, fortified
in 4J3/412 Be. and thereafter
became an important g;llTison for
the Athenians. (Authors collection)
Phyle (Attica)
We first heat of Phyle in the winter of 404/403 Be when Athens was under the
heel of the Thirty Tyrants. One of their opponents, Thrasyboulos, ocCUpied
Phyle, a naturally defensible site according to Xenophon (chorion, Helleni"a
2.4.2), with his band of 70 democrats. As Phyle lVas a strategic site on Mount
Parnes, a border fort was planted there sometime in the early -Ith century Be.
This was garrisoned by ephebes during their second yt'ar of paramilitary service.
Tht' fort was constructed on a triangular rocky crag (649rn) that falls sheer
on all sides, especially precipitous on the wcst and north. The site overlooks the
most direct north-south route from Athens, SOffie 20km to the south, to
Boiotia. From it the view commands nearly the whole of the Attic plain.
The plan is a loose pentagon, though lhe fortifications themselves only
encircle the eastern half of the crag. Surviving to their paved parotlv;, the
ashlar-masonry walls are broken at intervals by four towers, one of tht'ffi
Circular, and two gateways_ Within the defences were the barracks in which the
ephebes ate and slepl.
Sounion (Allica) The artillery bul.ion. which w:u
The 'sacred cape of Sounion' is first mentioned in Homer (Odyssey 3.278-83) as luer inserted into me east....-all
the place where Phrontis, Menelaos' helmsman, is buried. Lying at the of Sounion. Built of IoaJ Agrilen
marble. many of the SlnJetUTe
southernmost tip of Attica, the cajX' is a precipitous rocky headland
blocks come from ーャオョ、・セ 、 gr;IVe
overlooking the SaTanic Gulf. On its highest point (60m) stands the temple of monumenu. HaオエィッセGウ collectiOfl)
Poseidon «(.440-430 1lC) - this was the last landfall before sailors faced the
Aegean - rememhered as one of the most romantic ruins in Greece, painted by
Turner and celebrated by Byron (0011 IIWII canto III stanza 116).
With the Spartans at Dekeleia, the overland route through Oropos to Euboia
was cut. Since the beginning of the Peloponnesian War most of the Athenian
livestock had been pastured on EUbaia, from which they received essential
supplies. Thus, in the winter of 413/412 Be, the Athenians fortified Sounion to
protect the sea route to E\Jboia and the Black Sea, source of so much imported
grain (Thucydides 8.4, ct. Xcnophon Hellellika 5.1.23).
Forming a semicircle from the bay of Sounion on the north-west to the cliff
edge on the south, the walls, complete with rectangular towers, enclosed the
whole acropolis. Laler, when Athens and other Greek states attempted to shake
off Macedonian domination (Chremonidean \'Var, 268{267-263{262 Be), the
Athenians expanded and strengthened the fortifications. The new sections of
the walls and a huge artillery bastion built to carry catapults show the
characteristic signs of hasty construction: many of the marble blocks came
from plundered grave monuments.
Nature of conflict
and society
Plato judges that one facet of virtue is to Ix' found in the traditional COlliest of
tloplitcs facing each other in open battle. Tile use of walls as a protection is
therefore 'unnatural' and can only lead to the deterioration of the moral
character of the citin'n of his state (Lmvs 778d4-79a7). Plalo was particularly
averse to city.based defencc. He reviles ThemlstolJes, Kimon and Periklcs (or
haVing 'g1uttt"d Athens with harbours and dockyards and walls and tribute and
rubbish of that sort' (Gorsilfs 519a). This conservative vicw that cHy walls do not
make a slate is to be found in other 4th-cen!ury writers as well, for instance
Xenophon Hoゥォ ャQ{AュゥォッLセ 5.4-5, 6.6-7, 10) andlsokrates (7. U, cf. 8.77, H4). Even
Thucydides, despite his enthusiastic support for J'erikles' city-based system of
defence (\.1-13.5, d. [Xenophonl AliI/maio" politria 2.14-16), has Nikias say,
'men make the polis and nOI walls' (7.77. cf. Alkaios (Page frs. 28, 29\).
Apart from Athens, which could field some 13,000 citizen-hoplites - besides
16,000 above and below military age who garrisoned Ihe border forts amI
manned the city walls - at the outbreak of the Peloponncsian War (Thucydides
2.13.6-7, 31.2), the greater majority of po/cis had citizen populations of less than
5,000. In a far-reaching study Rusc.hl'nbusch (1984: 55-57) !laSCQUllted some 750
poleis in Ihe core area of the Greek world alone. AdditionaUy, he (1985: 253-6J)
calculates that a 'typical polis' had a territory of only 25 to lOOkm? (Athens was
c.2,-IOOkm?) and an adult male dtizen membership of no more than I:U to 800.
Take for instance Corinth, which appears to be typical of a polis where IXllitical
power remained traditionally in the hand.'i of the elite few (uligoi, j1l'Ilce
'oligarchy') and, as such, shows a remarkably stable history. At "Iataia (479 llC),
which was considered by the tireeb an all-out effort against the invading l'crsians.
The polis. ケエャQゥョ・セオア a 'guild of the polis fielded around 5,000 hoplites (Hcrodotos 9.28.3). l:or the baltle fought in
セイ ゥッイウᄋN deployed it$ cita..... boIty the vidnity of the ti\'Cr Nemea (394 Be), a location within C.orinthian territory, the
,n i phalanx. This nun formation
pulis only mustered 3,000 hoplitcs (Xenophon J-Icllmikil4.2.17). In comparison,
was an effectIve way of e"pressing
military power.The phalanx is seen
for l'lataia Aigina had sent some 500 hoplites (Herodotos 9.28.6), while ilt the
here on the Nereid monument, an Ncmea, lighting for the Spartans against the Corinthiat15 and their 。ャ ゥセL the
early 'lI:h-<:enwry tomb from combined strength of the hoplite 」ッャ エゥョァ・ ャセ from the Argolid polei:> of Epidauros,
Xanthos. Lyoa. (Authors collecooo) Troezen, Hermione and Halicis was 3.000 (Xenophon Hellmi/w 4.2.16).
•
Like that of his former mentor, AristOtle's ideal state was still essentially
Power politics and professional
a hoplite oligarchy Hーッャゥエ 」Nセ 1279b4, 1294a-b, 1295a-297b), but he knew warriors
Plato's authoritarian dream of an un-walled city was totally obsolete
For contemporaries. till' success of
because of the recent improvements in the efficiency of artillery and siege
Philip II of Macedoo W3.$ due to me
machines (Polilics 1331a9-1O). Despite hl.'i common-sense vicw, however, personalgreuness of Philip him"",",_
he retained vestiges himself of the traditional hoplite ideology (Politics Theopompos. who said thn ·Europe
I330b9): had never produced a man like Philip
son of Amymu· (FGrHist 115 F 27),
Doubtless there is something dishonourable in seeking safety behind f,ttlngly gave the title PhiJippko to his
histDry of me period. thereby
strong walls, at any rate against an enemy equal in number or only \'cry
acknowledging me imporunce of the
slightly superior.
king·s personality.Theopompos
recognited mu Philip did what he did.
And so the defenders came oul from their City walls not because they MId what he prede<essors Iud been
had to, but because they accepted a code of military behaviour that made un:.lble to do, because Philip wu Philip.
the risk of death in a short battle in an open field seem preferable to the Militarily the ,mporance of this
protracted and indecisive struggle between inefficient attacker and Statement all tw-d1y be l!X3ggl'f:ited,
becal,lse Philip's inl"lOViltions in Stntegy
unwilling defender. Since they 'played by the rules' and seldom locked
and taCtics radically changed the forms
themselves in, Greeks had little need of the tactics or the technology of Greek warfare. Until his acce:;sion
suited to siegecraft. (3601359 lIC). powerfulrM!1ghbours and
Internal conflicts had kept M.1cedon
Agrarian city-state from achieYIng its full potential. During
The armies of Greek poIeis were based on a levy of those citizens his first me yeus Philip suppressed the
i。エ \セイ and developed the most effic;;ient
prosperous enough to eqUip themselves as hoplitt'S, heavily armoured
セゥエィァ ヲ force ,n the Greek wond to
warriors who fought shoulder 10 shoulder in a large formation known as coerc:e the fonTlel".lnl"lOViloon. training
a phalanx (pl/Qltmges, 'stacks'). Excepi for Sparta, whose warriors were and first-class leadership were the key.
acknowledged as the 'craftsmen of war' (Xenophon Lakedaimolliall politeia Philip ruled u MI 3UtOO<It and though
13.5) because they devoted their entire lives to military training.. and a Demosthenes labelled him ;as 'm
few state-sponsored units such as the Sacred Band (llier-os focllos) of unscrupulous and clever opporo.anlSC'
(H), theAtheni3n orator abo identified
Thebes, these citizen levies were untrained soldier-farmers who saw it as
the bedrock upon which the Icing built
their moral, social and political duty to fight on behalf of their polis. his powet". namely ·his comblOf!d position
1-loplitt'S were the citizens in battle; citizens were the hoplites in In command of the army. state and
assembly. They went into battle not for fear of punishment or in hope of exchequer' (4.5). Dernost.henes wu to
plunder and booty. They fought with neighbours, brothen, fathers, sons, return to th,s thl!me of absolutism after
uncles and cousins. This meant that they did their utmost to demonstrate Chaironeia (338 llC). Philip owing his
courage, side·by·side with their comrades, and that they had a vested decisive victory there to his ·absolute
power OV1!r all his following, which in
interest in the outcome. This was the unseen glue that bound the phalanx,
セャNエイ。キ is me greuest asset of all'
and the polis, together. Only those who clashed with ashen spear and (18.235). It could be said that the lOng
bronze shield, defying death and disdaining retceat, wece deemed worthy. was the SUite or. to borrow me words
attributed to Louis XIV,'L'l!tat, ,'est mot.
Hoplite warfare For the lOng united in his own person a
At first sight it may seem surprising that when Greek warfare emerges into near-monopoly of executive powers and
privileges in the religious, judicial.
the light of history, it not only soon becomes dominated by dose-packed,
diplomatic. political and military spheres.
heavily armoured amateurs, but also continues to be so for some three Yel to Philip the Slue was a mere
centuries (c.675-350 IIC). It lasted so long because as time passed the ancillary to the army, and ュ ・ イ ヲ ッ セ
system was maintained for the sake of tcadition, shared values and social was organized on the sole principle of
prejudice. Since hoplites were expected to provide their own equipment, providing manpower, labour and capital
the majority of the population in any given poliS was necessarily excluded. to ensure mat the formidable
Macedonian phalanx wol,lld be fuelled
But the full rights of cltizenship were only accorded to those who could
for further aggrandisement. Indeed,
afford to take their place in the phalanx, so that the hoplites effectively
Philip·s territorial ambitions had
were the 'nation in arms', and it would have been unthinkable to arm the nothing to do wim a few acres oot5idl'
lwi pul/oi. It was only in Athens, where the navy became important, that the polis, but rather encompassed ..
the poorest citizens, the tllett's who rowed the triremes, came to have a broader vislOl'l of mines, harbours and
significant military role - hence Athenian democracy (demokmfia: 'the tribute-paying communities.. For Philip.
people' (dimos) 'rule' [kraUm, or what Aristotle aptly called 'trireme the St{Olteg)' of war was designed
predominantly u a deYice of ambitious
democracy' (Politics 1291b21, d. 1304a8, 1321a2, (Xenophon) AlIlI?rIoiol/
state policy.
poJitl'ia 1.2). Finally, as the events of the "<;0 Persian invasions of Greece
(490 Be, 480-479 1lC) were to show, hoplites were extremely formidable. 47
Panoply
The hopJite panoply (pillloplia) consisted of a round, soup bowl-shaped shield
(ospis, Thucydides 7.82.3, Xenophon Hellmik.a 2.4.12, 504.18, ct. IlOploll,
Diodoros 15.44.3), approximately 90cm in diameter, a bronze helmet, a bronze
or linen corselet and bronze greaves. The whole, when worn, weighed
anywhere from 22.7 to 31.7kg.
Built on a wooden core, the shield '",as faced with a thin layer of stressed
bronze and backed by leather. Because of its great weight, about 6.8 to 9.lkg,
the shield was carried by an arrangement of two handles, the annband (poIf/l.lX)
in the centre through which the foreann passed and the handgrip (anti/abe) at
the rim. Held across the chest, it covered the hoplite from chin to knee.
However, being clamped to the left arm it only offered protection to his
left-hand side.
Above the flat broad rim of the shield, a hoplite's head was fully proteded
by a bronze helmet, the Corinthian helmet being by far the most common
style. This was shaped from a Single sheet of bronze that covered the entire face
leaving only the eyes clear. Under the helmet many men either wore a cloth
headband or an under-cap of felt, which not only restrained the hair but also
provided some support for this heavy piece of armour. The stress on protection
seriously impaired both hearing and vision, thus Ollt of battle it (Ollld be
pushed to the back of the head, thereby leaving the face uncovered.
A corslet protected the torso. This was either of bronze or of linen
(IilJotJUjfUX). The first, reaching a thickness of about 1.27cm, was a bell-shaped
plate corslet composed of two sections fore-and-aft. The second was built up of
multiple layers of linen glued together to fonn a stiff shirt, about half a
centimetre thick. Below the waist it was cut into stripS (plfflISes, 'feathers') for
case of movement, with a second layer of pterllges being fixed behind the first,
thereby covering the gaps between them. The great advantage of the fitlotl,iifUX
was its fleXibility. Finally, a pair of bronze greaves (/memides) protmed the lower
legs. TheY' clipped neatly round the calves by their own elasticity. Thus the
hoplite remained effectively armoured from head-ta-foot.
The weapon par excellence of the hoplite was the long-thrusting spear
(dom), some 2.1 to 3m in length, made of ash and equipped with a bronze or
iron spearhead and bronze butt-spike. The butt-spike, affectionately known as
the 'lizard-sticker' (sal/roter), allowed the spear to be planted upright in the
ground when a hoplite was ordered to ground arms (being bronze it did not
rust), or to fight with if his spear snapped in the melec. The spear was usually
thrust over-arm, although il could be easily thrust under-arm if the hoplite was
charging into contad at a run. Also carried was a short iron sword (k.opis) with
a heavy, leaf-shaped blade deSigned for slashing, but this was very much a
secondary weapon.
Hattie
Forget strategy and tactics, hoplite battle was, by its very nature, ritualistic - the
idea was to defeat rather than to annihilate. The Greeks had developed what
has been called by Hanson the 'Western way of War' - a head-ta-head collision
of summertime soldier-farmers on an open plain in a brutal display of courage
and physical prowess. Their battlefields were scenes of furious fighting and
carnage that usually consumed not more than an hour or two. Every man was
pushed to the limits of his physical and psychological endurance - and then it
was over, not to be repeated for a year or more.
That hoplites fought on the flattest piece of terrain was a point made by
Mardonios in his speech to his master, Xerxes, the Great King of Persia
(Herodotos WNYセ QIZ
The Greeks are pugnacious enough, and start fightS on the spur of the
.8 moment without sense or judgement to justify them. Whcn they de<:larc
API2:TOT::::\H
war on each other, they go off together 10 the smoothest and flartest piece AIlO'o'E LIFT A Utopian philosopher.
of ground they c<m find, and have their battle on it. Plato had little sympathy with
Athenian democracy. In his eyes, it
was almost better w lose heroically
Altll0Ugh Mardonios believed that the Grt'eks pursued th!:!r unique styll' of
on the hoplite batdefield than to
warfare out of ignorance and stupidity, what he ,'><Iys is inl'Onttovcrtible. For win at sea or lrom behind dty walls
any unexpected obstacle could bring the phalanx to a compldl' hall or break with the l"Ielp of the ho; /,olloi.
ils formation, and Aristotle (Politics 1303b16) reminds us that it would break up (Author's collection)
if it were forced to cross even the smallest watercourse. As a result generals
(strategOl) selected level plains on which to fight their haul('S. AllCN'E RIGHT Ariscode believed tNt
every livWl& chill! las built セエッit at
Once a stmtlgos had deployed his hoplitcs and battle had been jOined, there
conception iu predestined final end.
was little or no room for command or manoeuvre, the individual stratrgos its perlea form.The ·end· of all
taking up his position in the front rank of the phalanx and fighting along:>ide human sotiallile and organization
his men for the duration. Consequently, many srratexoi perished in the fray. It was lor the teleological philosopher
was outward displays of grit (areri!, (/I/(Irda), not strategic or tactical skills, which the polis. (Author'$ collection)
were all-important for a strati'gus,
Phalanx
It was the hoplite shield that made the rigid phalanx formation viable. Half the
shield protruded beyond the left-hand side of the hoplite. If the man on the left
moved in close he was protected by the shield Q\'erlap. which thus guarded his
uncovered side. Hence, hopliles stood shoulder to shoulder with their shields
locked. Once this formation was broken, however, the advantage of the shield
was lost - as Plutarch says (.a.1omlio 220A2), the armour of a hoplite may be for
the individual's protection, but the hoplite's shield protected the whole
phalanx. Thus the injunction of a Spartan mother to her son 'either with tllis or
on this' (Plutarch Moralia 241F16), that is, he was to return home both alive and
victorious carrying the shield, or lying dead ul)Qn it after a fight to the finish.
As the phalanx itself was the tactic, two opposing phalanxes would head
straight for each other, break into a run for the last few metres, collide with a
crash, and then stab and shove till one side broke. Thucydides famously says 49
An un-costly affair
(5.71.1) that an advancing phalanx tl·ndt'<.l to (wb to the right. The extreme
right-hand man drifted in fear of セ ゥ ョ ァ caught on his unshielded side, and the
S,orming parties of 'barbarian' rest of the phalanx would naturally follow suit. each hoplite edging into the
men:enaries were the exception
shadow of the shield of the comrade on his right. Thus each right wing might
that proves the rule, namely
Greek StltC!s would shy awwy overlap and beat the opposing left.
from heavy losses among their A phalanx was a deep formation, normally composed of hoplitcs arrayed
citizen-hoplites in what was the eight to 12 shields deep. In thiS dense mass only the front two ranks could usc
hazardous adventure of a their spears in the mHee, those in the third rank and beyond adding weight to
head-on assault upon a fonified the attack by pushing to their front. This was probably achieved by pressing the
position.
shield squarely into the hollow of the man in front's back, seating Ihe left
In 41 3 Be 1,300 Th"'dan peJUSlS.
known fo<- their fighting skills and
shoulder beneath the upper rim, and, digging the sales and toes into the
the use of the short sword, ground for purchase, heaving. Both Thucydides (4.43.3, 96.2, ct. 6.70.2) and
al'TiYed in Athens toO late to wi Xenophon (Hellmika 4.3.19, 6.4.14, cf. .'''ewort/l,i/i" 3.1.18) commonly refer to
with the relief fo<'ce headed for the push and shove (otlli.smos) of a hoplite ュ」ィセ・N Once experienced such a
Syracuse (ThlK)'d,des 7.27.1). As thing was never easily forgotten and even Aristophanes' chorus of veteran
the Athenians had no wish [0
hoplites is made to say (Wasps 1081-85);
incur unnecessary expenditure,
they セ sent back under the
command of Diitrephes and 'as After running out with the spear and shield, we fought them ... each man
!hey were [0 sail throur the stood up against each man .. we pushed them with the gods until evening
Eupiros. he was instl'\.lCted [0 use
them in damg whatever damage The pushing with the shields explains the famous cry of Epameinondas, who
he could [0 the enemy on their had introduced a SO-decp phalanx, 'for one pace more' at I.£uktra (Polyainos
YOyag'l! along the coasd,ne'
(Thucydides 7.29.1). First raiding
2.3.2, d. 3.9.27, 4.3.8).
セt these troops were then
The melee il'ielf was a t()C.ta..toc affair, the front two ranks of opposing
unleashed :apinst MybJessos. phalanxes attempting to stab their spears illlo the exposed parts - throat, groin or
whidl was stOflTll!d one morning thighs - of the enemy. Meantime, the ranks behind would thrust their shields
at daybreak. flush against the backs of the men in file before them and shove with all their
Arguably these barbarians strength_ Once a hoplite was down, injured or not, he was unlikely ever to get up
were expendable. but this small
again. This short but vicious 'serum' was resolVl'd once one side had practically
Bolotlan toWn was clearly so far
inland that the inhabitants never collapsed. The phalanx became a mass, then a mob. There was no pursuit by the
thought they would be attacked victors, and thu<;(' of the vanqUished who were able fled the battlefield.
from the sea.. Further, 'the
fortifications were weak and Siegecraft
had fallen down in places (It had For most of the classical period fortification walls do not have a place in that
been built in a hurry) and the
central moment of Greek warfare, the dash of opposing phalanxes. The ethic of
gateS were open be<:ause of the
populace's false sense of
hoplite warfare and the pr<ll'tical Tl"Stri<.1ions im!x>scd by the heavy panoply meant
security' (Thucydides 7.29.3). the hoplite was ill equipped to deal with the difficulti<."S of cracking fortified
What followed was one of positions. The equation between hoplite status ,Illd citizenship also made the rate
the worst atrotlties of the of casualties a significant political consideration and the relatively small citizen
Peloponoesian War. The populations of many of the QIHャイゥLセ magnified tllis factor. Since the hazardous
Thracians 'butchered the adventure of a direct assaulL gl'nNally imposed t he greatest number of losses, there
inhabitants sparing neither
was il tendency to shun such operations unless unavoidable, Cities stated 10 have
the young nor the old, but
methodically killing everyone lx"Cn taken by storm (kata krdtus) were ImignJf!canl or un-walled (Thucydides
they met, women and children 2.30.1 !Astakosj, 3.97.2 [Aigitionl, 5.6.1 IGalepsosL fl.62.2ILampsakosj, lJiodoros
alike, and even livesto<k and 14.36.2-3 [Magnesia], Xenophon F-kl/mika 7,1.281K<tryail, 4.20 jKromnosl).
every living thing they saw' What the citizens of a polis !lad to f('ar most from their fellow Greeks was
(Thucydides 7.29.4). Surprise reduction by starvation or their betrayal to the enemy from within. Although
was total and the lack of
I'erikles is credited with the use of Siege devices against Samos (Diodoros
preparation by the defenders
made it an easy target, as 12.28.3), the city held out for eight months and then capitulateo (Thul"ydides
Thucydides. with conlrolled 1.117.3), which suggests that it was reduced by blockade, by starvation or the
indignation. pamfully records. fear of starvation, rather than by dJrC<'1 assault, Plataia, after ingenious attacks
which seem to have been the acme of contemporary Greek siegecraft was, in
the end, left to fall to the long-drawn pressure of starvation after two years of
close-drawn circumvallation (Thu<.)'dides 2.75-78, 3.52.1-2). Actually this
siege highlights the real weakness of Greek siegecraft, and is a clear indication
of the difficulties that still stood in the way of capturing a fortified position
50 during the Peloponnesian War even with the latest te<:hniques available.
'New Model' phalanx
M...cedon Wil-$ ... poor country On the northern rim of the 'which consined of the flower of the Macedonians" (16.4.S, d.
Aege.m. and the Macedonian phalanx wu composed of peasant Theopompos FGrHiSl liS F 318). It is assumed Diodoros is
levies - all healthy male subjeccs of the king were liable for referring here to the I'ezhetoira;. Philip havIng ·ordered his
se""';ce - wno could iY afford the panoply 01 a Grffl< hopIite. cavalry (heta;ro;) to ride past the barbarians and ...tUck them
Consequently, mey were issued. at sate expe:n$e, with me on the flank. while tle hirTl.Self falting on the enemy in a fronQl
samsa and Iigtot body armour.As the new weapon required assault (t6.'l5). So. by leading them in person. Phitip P"! the
both halKls for adequate control mel ィ。ョ、セァN a 「オッョMウセ newty established Macedonian phalanx a psychologial boost.
shield. some 60cm in diameter; wu hung from the ned< by The sorissa was lTQ(ie 01 a long shaft 01 comeI wood (Comus
means of a ned<.nnp md m;moeuvred with the ヲセ。イュ as mos. comelian cherry), the .tlafr. b8>g of F,WOof>ieCe constn,,:tion
required (Polyainos 'l.210.Asklepiodows Talet/ko S.I. Polybios fltIed together by a bronze coupling sl_. Eq... ipped with an iron
18.29.2). leaf-shaped bbde and bronze bua-spike - both about SOan in
The mobiliution of the peasantry as a political tool, as well length - mel weighing V"OUnd 6I<g. the sor;sso was held WIth a
as a military force, may predate Philip if Anaximenes is heeded. two-handed grip 1.8m from me butt. This meaJ'lt the weapon
He says it was Philip's eldest bruther,Alexander II. who created exti'Ilded some 3.6m in front of the Macedonian phalangite. thus
and organ,zed Macedon's first heavily ...rmed infantry....nd giving hIm an ...dvalll:age in reach of over 2. 4m more than the
awarded them the honorific title of Foot-Companions gセォ hopIite.ln addition. the first fIVe. not two ranks were now
(pezhetoiroi) to enhance their prestige (Anaximenes FGrHist th",sting,giving 40 per cent more セー・。イィ・。、ウ in the killing zone.
72 セB " Harding SOB, d. Demosthenes 2.17 with s,holion '" Such a hedgehog.like front provided an オョセ。ャ degree of
Harding SO...). But Alexander II only reigned for a year offensive might. as well as defensi"" protection for the lightly
(370/369-369/368 Be) - a rival assassinated him. It is highly armoured initial t4nks. Under Philip the usual depth may have
probable that the introduction of the 10 to 12-cubit (4.S-SAm) been 10 ranks, as a file W35 called a dekas. But to be tactically
forino as the principal offensive infantry weapon was Philip's successful, the Macedonian phalanx needed a rank and file that
innovation. particularly if in translation Anvdmenes' text had was tough. disciplined and well trained. These requirements
been corrupted ...nd thus should read 'Philip father of Alexander' certainly tie in with Philip's regime to toughen up his troops by
and not ·Alexander'. That is certainly implied by Diodoros when forced marches under arms and loaded down with rations and
tle says Philip was ·the first to ッイァ[ュセ・ the Macedonian phalanx' equipment (Diodoros 16.3.1, Polyainos .01.2.1. 2. 10, IS, Fronti",,-,
HQVNS RN、 m。イウセ FGrHist 135 f 17). 5tratoeems 'l.1.6).The use of tightly packed ipearmen in the
Philip's first battle was against the Illyrians near lake Lychnitis phalanx may have been a Greek development. but it reached
(3S913S8 ee). Diodoros. drawing upon me lnId-4th-century Be its peak of efficiency and prowess in the Macedonian ...rmies
...ud'lor Theopompos, sta.tes thn Philip ted the right wing, commanded by Philip and his son A1eunder.
The Athenians had some reputation for sicgccraft {Thucydides 1.l0Z.2, cf.
Herodotos 9.70.2-:i, 102.1), but Potidaia held out against them for nearly three
years and then surrendered only on terms, and that too although it was important
for Athenian prestige to bring the SiC?ge to an end as qUickly and deciSively as
pOSSible (Thucydidcs 2.70.1-3, Diodoros 12.46.4-6). When Myulene revolted
against Athens the city could not be taken until the 「」セLGゥョ ァ of starvation led
to its surrender. In fact capitulation only came about when the mass of the
cili7.cns were armed and were able to get their way against the mort' determined
aristocrats who had been responsible for hringing about the rl'bcllion in the first
place CI11Ucydides 3.27-28). Likewise, some form of ({/liP de IIwi", helped by local
treachery, captured the Long Walls at Megara (Thucydides 4.66-68).
For the Athenians the prolonged encirclement and starvalion of tIle trapped
populace lllay have been the keys to victory, but mounting a formal siege was a
ruinously expensive undertaking. The siege of Samos had cost over 1,400 talents
(1(; i3 363.19 = Fornara 113, d. Plutarch I'erik/es 28.1), while thai of l'otidaia was
an even greater financial drain, cmling no less than 2,000 talents or two-flflhs of
the reserves of Athens (Thucydides 2.70,2, d. Diodorm 12.46.4). But it was the
Siege of Mytilene that strained Athenian fiscal resources almost to breaking point.
The Athenians, needing mont')' for the siege, decided on a dcsjX'rate solution and
'raised among themselves fOT the first time a property tax of 200 talents'
(fhucydidcs 3.19.1, d. 1.141.5).
During the latter half of the 5th century Be, the Greeks certainly used
siege-mounds and deployed 'machines' (mlc1lamll). This unqualifIed term is
entirely indefinite, but almmt certainly included the scaling·ladder, battering
ram, tortoise and shed, although not the catapult. The absence of artillery from
the detailed military narrative of Thucydidcs is onc of the strongest arguments for
thinking that it had not been invented before the turn ofthe -hh century Be. 51
-
Infem;tl fire Engines of war
Thucydides (-4.100) describes Pluarch hril</e< 27
how the Bo,Qtian$ セ オ " """" «OK
--
Oiodo<"o$ 12.28.3 Battering rwns (krioUs). tortOIses (dteIOnerl;)
fWne..-throwing contraption
om.. -431 QNXilセ Lセ possibly IXlI1ering rams
.......
to incinerate the wooden !IC
The Peloponneslan
siege-mound at Plataia
(summer 429 Be) ,
For 70 days and nights
continuously the
Peloponnesians kept on
raising the siege-mound.
First, containing walls of
timber laid like latticework
were constructed to conuln
the mound. Next, the spaces
between the timber walls
were filled with earth,
rubble and wood. n。エセョ、ャ
the mound builders LャZQ・セイ
some form of HイセL|「Gエ」・ッー セ
that would permit thefn \' .iセQ Gp BLセ GQ { セN
\ ' lャエoセNZwBtェ。jpG
to work unhindered. T q-, GセNゥ L ,. ,
solution was a shed. a'!'o\Jf -,
light timber struetur{l Gエセ ,'. .Jit' セ
open-ended with A . . , I'r'f'.. '; :
wickerwork ウャ、・Lセ _,0.,',: セ セ
a boarded roof a ·
a fireproof covering 0 •セ
,"
,,.
1
,$. ,
l'i
BIイNセ
\
."
were arranged ・ョ、Mエッ N・ョセG .- ,1./
1
to form a 」ッイゥ、Ntィセ I Nセ
Plataians countered by
heightening the fortifications .'
with a wooden framework ,"
within which they erected 0'
a wall using bricks from ... ,.'i·.. r
the nearest houses. The I
structure was covered with
hides to protect the
workmen and to prevent
incendiary devices reaching "
the woodwork.
The Athenian siege of Syracuse (summer 414 Be)
The Athenians took up a position on the dominating heights, called Epipolai.
north of Syracuse. There they built twO forts, the tabdalum and 'the Circle'. From
the latter they began to construct a double line of ditches and palisades from sea ;"/
to sea in order to blockade the city. The sケイ。」オウセョ tried to prevent them with,.----
counter-walls, each a combination of ditch and palisade. at X-X,Y- Y, and fFtY
.' NセO」L
succeeded with Z-Z after capturing the fort at Labdalum.The-·latter ョ。セ
west from the city and cut across Epipolai, ケッセョ・ィ{ GBセ Z
N[Gゥ^セ ゥf ...J-
,,;Wr' ..,
f
precluding the enian ... ": セj[DOAZG ,-
attempt to reach the sea セッャゥァイtエ。 and i'solate !he city:With the 10 of BNセ
GLセB
Labdalum, the Athenians fortified ゥBセL。
mouth of the Great Harbour in..ord
:1:.,
piece Nᄋイケュ・AヲZ[ NBゥセイ・エ
of
t9 ensure a.s:c!,!ss' cont
.' [NGᆬセL " .'
or suriplies...'
Nセィエ[ jZ QゥG N
".'1:'/>.
<;'...
•
3'1;" I,",:' セAL
\セNOMGエャB
.,:. "":'
ヲセZN セ
, NOUGセZL」B
[NZLセゥ
;I
> • • •• "
. • セALN セ ',d
Bセ」N '.3 .. LセZᄋGQB[\ᄏM ,j;;
セB t!.';r':','-, GM [ \Nセ ,.t'::>,..BセL ZNL[ MLNAZセQ L セB OZ\
MBL[NZセ
.. セイ ..·
セM セGB|ャ "/§\ Y
•• : .
'..., NセAG イ jゥヲGセ N ゥ ..セゥョZ ',. *;;:
, GZセN LZセH "'"': :OJ:.',:'" GO[ZAヲ セ スz[GZM
".'
, Ortygia
Plemmyrium
セ
セ
Siege of Syracuse (415-413 Be)
In 415 Be, with the I'clopollnC'sian War in a state of uneasy truce, Athens,
ostensibly to preserve the independence of her allies Egesta and Leontini,
launched an eXJX'dition under Nikias, Lamachos and Alkibiades to capture
Syracuse. From the outset the Athenians suffered from command problems.
Alkihiadcs, summoned home to answer a charge of sacrilege, deserted to Sparta,
and the able Lamachos was killed during the early stages of the siege. This left
Nikias, whom Thucydides (7.42.3, d. 2.65.11) represents as timid, incompetent
and notoriously superstitious, in command. The armada included 134 fighting
triremes, 60 of them !\thcnian, and an unknown number of troopships
carrying 5,100 hoplites, 1,500 of them Athenian, with light-armed troops,
including archers from Crete and slingers from Rhodes, in proportion. Athens
also supplied 700 tllites, who normally Shipped as citizen-oarsmen, eqUipped as
hoplites so as to serve as marines (epibatt/l) on the triremes (Thucydides 6.43,
d. 8.2, fG i J 93_6 = Fomanl 146).
The Athenians severed sケイ。」オセGウ land communications with two forts. One
....' as planted at Sycc north-west of the city and not far from the southern edge
of the rod,,. heights, called Epipolai, overlooking the city. The other fort was
placed at Labdalum on Epipolai's northern escarpment line. Thucydides calls
the fort at Syce 'the Circle' (6.98.2) and this was to be the centre of operations
for the Athenians while they conducted the siege. At their other fort, that at
Labdalum, the Athenians stored their supplies, equipment and war-chest. They
also began to construct a double wall of circumvallation from 'the Circle',
northwards in the direction of Trogilos and southwards towards the Great
Harbour. The Athenians, however, left their northern walls, those running
across Epipolai to the sea at Trogilos, incomplete, which was to prove
disastrous. Meanwhile the fleet prepared 10 blockade Syracuse by sea. After two
aTtempts to build counter-walls (ll}'poteicllisma) from their defences were
defeated, the Syracusans wen.' then dismayed to set' the Athenian fleet sailing
into their Great Harbour.
The Syracusans had sent urgent messages to the Peloponnese asking for
assistance and Corinth, as the metropolis of Syracuse, had prt'ssed Sparta to act.
Corinth and Sparta despatched only a few triremes and a handful of troops, but
the Spartans supplied a determined and resourceful stm/egos, Gylippos
(Thucydides 6.93.2). He slipped p<lst Nikias and entered the city. There he put
frt'sh heart into the beleaguered Syracusans, who captured the fort at Labdalum
and the unfinished northern fortific,1tiOns on EpipoJai and started tht'
construction of four fortified camps and a third counter-wall, which was to run
north of 'the Circle' parallel to Epipotai's northern escarpment line. The
Syracusans' confidence increased dramatically, so much so that they began to
train their naval crews with the intention of challenging the Athenian neet.
Nikias now saw the danger of the besiegers being besieged and wrote to
Athens to ask permission to retire or, failing that, for more troops to be sent
(summer 414 Be). The assembly vott'd for a second expedition. Befort' it arrived,
howcwr, the Syracusans managed to seize the three forts - the supply depot
built to replace Labdalum - at Plemmyrion, a promontory forming the
southern side of the narrow entrance to the Great Harbour. This victory
dcmonstratt'd once and for all that the Athenians could be defeated with the
right combination of land and naval forces. To overcome their vulnerability on
the sea, the Syracusans had cut down the bows of their triremes and reinforced
them with stay-beams so that they could ram head-on instead of from the flank
or stern as the skilled Athenians preferred: their sleek triremes were fast and
manoeuvrable, the epitome of effident muscle power.
This defeat forced the Athenians to crowd into an inadequate camp in
unhealthy, marshy ground on the west side of lhe Great Harbour (spring 413
oc). Rut the strategic cost of the capture of Plemmyrlon was even greater as the
56 Syracusans now held both sides of the harbour. The Athenians could no longer
bring in supplies, and 'the loss of I'Jemmyrion brought bewilderment and
discouragement to the army' rl'hucydides 7.24.3).
Just as things were looking bleak for Kikias and his men, however,
Demosthenes, the leader of the second expedition, sailed into the Great
Harbour with 73 triremes carrying almost 5,0IX) hoplites, and swarms of
ャゥァィエセ。イュ・、 troops 'both from Greece and from outside' (Thucydides 7.42.1).
\'\'ith his characteristic clarity and boldness Demosthenes recommended a
night attack to destroy the Syracusans' counter-wall and seize Epipolai, for
without the heights no assault on the City could prevail. But this ended in
confusion and failure, 'a great many of the .'\thenians and allies were killed,
although still more arms were taken than could be accounted for by the
number of the dead' (Thucydides 7.45).
Demosthenes realized evacuation was the only way to save the Athenian
force, but a lunar e<lipse caused the superstitious Kikias to delay the expedition's
departure for 'thrice nine' days. The S)'Jacusans discoveu'(J the Athenian plan to
retire and thus became more determined than ever not to relax their pressure
and to force the enemy to fight again in the confined space of the Great Harbour.
Defeated at sea, the Athenians resolved to try to break through the improVised
boom of merchantmen thrown across the harbour mouth by the Syracusans, bot
their ships were driven into the centre of the harbour and attacked. After a
daylong struggle - the Athenians had strengthened the bows of their triremes in
the Syracusan manner and boarded everyone likely to be of service as a marine
セ the Athenians fell back on their camp.
Abandoning their sick and wounded, the Athenian ann)' of 40,000 men
now attempted to Withdraw overland to reach friendly Katana. :"likias led the
van while Demosthenes commanded the rearguard, but the "va columns
became separated under the constant harrying of the Syracusan horsemen and
light-armed troops. Dcmosthencs' force was trapped, 20,000 men were killed
and some 6,000 surrendered. Meanwhile Nikias' starved and thirsty force had
made its way to the Assinaros and, while slacking their thirst, was attacked by
the Syracusans, who slaughtered them as they drank from the river, 'all muddy
as it was and stained with blood' (Thucydides 7.84.4). Nikias surrendered
himself to stop the slaughter and the few survivors were taken prisoner.
Both stmtegoi were executed without trial (fhucydides 7.86.2). The prisoners
were sent to the quarries, where all periShed of exposure, starvation or disease
after 70 days of incarceration there, save for the few who were lucky enough to
be sold into slavery or those who, according to legend, 'were able to recite verses
by Euripides from memory (Plutarch Nikias 29.2). This was Athens' greatest
reverse and a turning point in the war. Thucydides, emphasiZing the foolhardy
ambition so typical of Imperial demouacy, says, 'the Athenians were beaten at
all areas and altogether; all they suffered was great; they were annihilated, as
the saying goes, with a total annihilation, their fleet, their army セ everything
was annihilated, and few out of many returned horne' (7.87.6).
58
these de«<nding stones. The impression is on the a=cking side ABOVE UFT Four rock.hewn tunnels passing bene:l.th me walls of
of a thOf'OUgnly professiOl\aJ body with a well-established Palaip;tphos undermined the PersIan siege·mound. Tunnel I, seen
rechnique of siege<:raft. which relied not on artillery セ to be here, セ dug 2.8m below the base of the circuit and continued
invented) to take the city but on the slege-mound, built doubtless through the soft conglomerue rock until It reached the bottom
by impressed local labour and prote<:ted by Persian arcnery. of the fosse. (Author's colle<:tion)
Nevertheless, It appears the PersiallS did not gain f';p,!aipaphos
without a fierce struggle lor the siege-mound had be<.-n Through Tunnel t as much material of the Persian
AIlO\If: RIGHT
undermined by the besieged In twO dIfferent ways. First, by a ramp as possible was removed, and the cavity propped up with
passage dug through the berm and. second, by four tunnels CUt timber. By means of some flammable substance carried in a
through the bedr¢ck underneath the fortifications, the wooden large bronze cauldron - note here calcined stone - the timbers
pit props of Tunnels I and 3 having been fired on completion by were burnt. (Author's collection)
means of some flammable substance (possibly sulphur and
pitch) carried in large bronze cauldrons.
The best location 10 survey the dty walls of Athens is in the Kerameik6s
archaeological site (fencoo), juSt 1km from '\'fonastiraki (Metro, Line 1) via
Odhos Ermou. Here part of the City Wall runs for some 183m in a north-south
direction and Is interrupted by the Sacred Gate and the Dipylon Gate. The site
also has a museum (Oberl:inder Museum) that holds, amongst other artefacts,
the statues and steJai recovered from the Thcmistoklean circuit.
Much of the Long Walls have long disappeared. The northern wall follows
the line of Odh6s Pirai6s and has been buried beneath the road. The southern
wall is largely on the route of the original Athens--Peiraieus Electric Railway
(Metro, Line 1). sections of it (an be seen in Neo Fallio, and also on the St'a.....ard
side of the line between Kallithea and Moskhato stations.
Down in the Peiraieus a strctch of the Themistoklean circuit can be セ ョ
next to the Naval Museum of Greecc, which is in the bay south of lea. By
following the road (Akti Themistokloous) just beyond the museum that runs
round the Akti peninsula, well.preserved stretches of the Kononian drcuit can
be secn edging the shore.
Gyphtakastro is on the old Athens-Thebes road, and its impressive remains
still dominate the!<aza pass between Attica and Soiotia. From the restaurant in
Kaza follow the gravel track signed Andent Fortress of £leutherae (open site).
Mantineia lies 12.5km nOrth of Tripolis just off the Tripolis-l'irgos road
(follow sign for Ancient Mantincia). The site itself (fenced but open) is oppositc
a bizarre church (1972), a Minoan-classical-Byzantine folly dedicated to Ayia
I'hoteini.
Ancient Messcne Is just outside the village of Mavromati, on the slopes of
:Mount Ithome. Just Ikm to the north-west of the village are the impressive
remains of the Arcadian Gate (still in use) and part of the city walls (open site).
:\1ost of the vast circuit has been unearthed or traced, and excavations at the
archaeological site (fenced) at the southern edge of the village are ongoing.
Websites
Greek National Tourist Organization (EOT)
ww\V.gnto.gr
Ministry of Culture
\Vw\v.cullure.gr
Camp, J. M., ''''otcs on till' towers and borders of classical Boiotia', Americall
faunlal of Arrhaoology95. 1991: 193-202
Camp, j. M., 1111' Ardlarology of Allums, London: Yale University jセ・ウ L 2001
Cook, J. LNセ or
'Old Smyrna, 1948-195 I', TIl(' AIIIIlIal tJlf' Britisll School at
AlIlellS 53-54, 1958-59: 1-34
Cooper, F. A., 'Epaminondas and Greek fortifications', Alllerielm/Olln/a/ of
Archaeology 90, 1986: 195
Coulton, J. L Allcietli Gr('('k. Architects at Work: Problems o(Strrlcrure (//1(/ DeS;gll,
Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1995
Harding, 1'., 'Athenian defensive strategy in the fourth century', /'lu)('lIix 42,
1988: 61-71
Kern, P. B., Ancient Siege Warfare, Bloomington: Indian3 University iGイ」⦅セウL 1999
Knigge, U., The Atllm/ill! Kemlllf'ikus: History - MOlllllllelllS - EX((IVl1tioIlS,
Athens: Deutsches Archilologisches Imtitut Athen, 1991
L<mdels, J. G., Engineering ill tl1l' Allcienl Wurld, London: Constable, 2000
Lawrence, ,\. W., Cr('ek Aims il/ Forli{iCtllion, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979
Lawrence, A. W_ (TeviS{'() by R.A. Tomlinson), Greek Arc!litI'Ctllrt', London: Yale
University Press, 1996
セᄋャ。イウ、・ョL E. IN., Greek Will Ruman Artillery: ャョ」ゥイッエセNh rkvelupme/lt, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1969, 1999
Munn, セBャNL n,l' Deff'l/5(' of AUiCCl, Berkeley: University of California I'ress, 1993
Obcr, J., Forlrf"SS Attica: lkfl'r/St' of till! AtiJellian Lund Frontier, .w+-322 BC,
l.ciden: E..j. Brill, 1985
Ober, J., 'Early artillery towers: Messcnia, Boiotia, Attica, Mcgarid'. All/men/!
jOl/mal of Arcllarofogy 91, 1987: 569-604
Ober, J., 'Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 40'1-322 IIC a reply', P/lomu
43, 1989: 294-301
O!x'r, j., 'Hoplites and obstacles', in V.D. Hanson (ed.) lIaplitl.'S: nil' Classical
Grrek Battle Experience, I.ondon: Routledge, 1991, 173-96
Il.uschenbusch, E., 'Die BevOlkerungszahl Griechenlands 1m 5. und 4. Jhs',
Zeitsc/lri(r {iir Papyrologil.' rmd cpisrapl1ik 56, 1984: 55-57
Huschenbusch, E., 'NormaJroJis', Zl'ilsrllrift {iir Pap,vrologie I/Ird Episrapllik 59,
1985:253-63
Sekunda, N. V., 'The sarin-a', Acta Ulliversitatis Lvdziemis 23, 200 I: 13-41
Scranton, R. 1.., Greek Wal/s, Cambridge, Mass.: IIarvard University Press, 1941
Vanderpool, E., 'Roads and forts in northwestern Attica', Cali(ofllia Simlies ill
C/tlssiwl Antiquity 11, 1978: 227-45
Westlake, I I. D., 'The progress of epildchimos'. Classical Qrwrterly 33, 1983: 12-24
Winter, F. E., Gn'ek Fortifktltions, London: Routledge &. Kegan I'aul, 1971
Wycherley, R. E., How セNォ・イg Huill eWes, London: Norton, 1976
62
Glossary
63
Index
Figures in bold セヲ・イ 10 illustrations ephebe' 30 Philip lI,king of Macedon 25."7,51
セーゥエ 」ZQュョキゥ 17 PhyIe 14,43.44
equipment 48 pbnning 10
acropolises. importance of 10 Ereui>. 8.43,43 Plataia. battle of (479 oc) 46
Agesipolis,ldng of Sp;lru ) I, 57-60 Euoo.. 43 Pia cola. siege of (429-0127 llC) 50,52.53.
Aigostherg 38--40. <10 54
AiJlciu Taktikos 52 financing 9 Plato 25.30.46. 49
Aisc.h,nes 30. 60 formations see phalanxes Phltatl:h 21.49.60
Alexander II. king of Macedon 51 fortiflCltions poIeis ... 10, 16. 46
A1kibiades 56 <:ontemporary attitudes to 46. 47 politial organization 4
Arw<imenes 51
an:he.., 39
Archidamo1; II. killl of セ イ オ
""'" 9
Arisooplwles 16. SO
53 . ....,. role 16
fon!c:oun: typo:' 26
Messene 37-38.40
posterns: positionin& 32-33
Pvudaia,s'egeol("301C) 51
rubble 8-9, II
Ruw.enbusdl. E. 46
Aristode 49 0¥Wbp type 32
on ephebes 30 proteCtion of 16 s。ュッウNセッャH\hPMTSYャ cI SO,51,52
on fortiliaotions 12.47
on phabnxes 49
onpole<s 4.10,16
ウャ。イセ
Lセ
Gylippos 56
...
49 sorissoe 51
shields "8,49.51,52
セヲエ SO-52. S8-59
s.lits ) I
:lf1'OW Gyphtola.W'O 13-14.25-30.27-3 I. 61 SfqC!-(T"IOOnOs 53.54.58,58
AtMnian for'tffiac.ons 16-15 K>des 8-9.11.19,32.42
4th-ancury rep;ilJrs 9,20 helmeu 48 Soloow 25
GtyWaII 17-2' Herodotos 17,27.43-'19.58 Sounion 44,45,45
o,p)'lon G.lte 17.20.22-23.22-21.26 Homer 45 sー^セ
Irontiel" defences 25-30 hop/ires 46-52 arodAthens 17,18,19--20
k・セ ゥォVウ 11.13 leuktn aftermath 39
LongVQJls 16.18.19-20 arod Manlineia 31
nQW;;Jdays 6' military prowess ..7
セ 24-25.24 I<znnb see Panakton and siete of Mantine,a (385 IIC) 57--l.O
Rin& SlTefl. 25.25 Kimon 60 and siege of P1acoi;t (429-0127 IIC) 53--5-4
Sacred Gate 17,19,21.22 Konon 20 and sle&" of 5yraC\lsc (41 H 13 DC) 56
use of brick 10.11 Spe3f"li 48
A<ho" "",,",9 stone,wori<ingwith QRセ U
conflictswithSp3l'u 17.18,19-20 umachos 56 stone.thn>w<:rs and shot 24.25
llnd En!tr;a 43 'long wall' <:on<:ept 16, 18 stRrlfp ..9
lind Macedon 45 lucian 22 swords 48
militllrysmngth 46."7 ","",,,,,, 9 5ynrosc.slegeof{"IHI3 IIC) 55,56--57
and siege of s ケ ョ 」 オ セ (415-413 1(:) 55. lyundros 18
56-57 Thebans 53
and slegecraft 5 I Macedonians 45, "7, 5 I Theminokkls 17_19
and Soonkm 45 MMltineia 11,31-33.31-32,61 Theopompos 47
and TllirtyTynonu 44 siege of (3B5 0<;) 57-60 Thraci;tns 50
Mardonios 48-49 Thucydides
bude ウエケャセ 48--49 masonry styles 12-14,13_14 on Athenian life and fortifICations 16, 17.
セ、ッゥ b and UョセゥNャッ b 27.52 Messene 33-38.33-40,61 19.46
bolt-shooters and bolts 20 Aradian Gate 37-38,40 on Attlean limiu 27
bricks 8-9.10-11 mud_bricks 8--9.10-11 on Dellon (424 oc) 52
building materials 10-12 Mykales'os, storming of (413 0<;) 50 on epj!eichismoi 17
Myoupolis ,ee Oinoe on Mykalessos (413 0<;) 50
catapult.! 25,39.51-52 Mytilene, siege of 5 I on phal;lnl(es 49-50
Corinth 11.'!6 on siege of Pla[<l.la (429--427 O<;) 53
corselets 48 Nemca River. banle of (394 0<;) 46 on siege of 5yr:tcuse (415--413 K)
Nereid monument 46,59-60 56-57
Dekelaia 7 Nikias 56-57 timber revettJng 10
Delion, battle of (424 ec) 52 lOWerS
Df!lphi 10 Oinoe (Myoupolis) 28 AI&osthena 40,40
Dem.!trios Poliorketes 20 Olynthos II ardllery 36.39.40,40
Demosthen.es (&ene",l) 57 Gyphtolcastro 28
Demosthen.es (o"'tor) 9. 10,21."7 Palaipaphos. siege of (498 llC) 58-59.58--59 introduction of 16
Diodoros 51 Paookl:on (K:>V3sala) 28 Messene 31.35.36-39
D;onys,os I. [)"'lIm of Sy",cuse 52 panoply 48
Dryoskephillai (KiD) Pm 25.27 PauSilllias 57,60 Vitruvius I I
Peiraieus 16.17.18.19--20.61
Son.Athenian arnlck on (477-476 te) 60 PeisistralOS 41 weapons
Eleusis I Lll. <fO.-.41, 41-42 Perilcles 16.17.19.50 pusonal 48. 51
Beutherai 27 Pe",ians "2, 43. 46. 58-59 siege 20.24.25.25,39,51-52
see o/so GypIltokastro phabnxes 46, "7, 49-50
64 Epame,nondas 32, 33. 33. 34, SO Mac:edonian 51