JOURNAL for the

SCIENTIFIC STUDY of RELIGION

The Influence of Religion on Interstate Armed

Conflict: Government Religious Preference and
First Use of Force, 1946–2002

DAVIS BROWN
Nonresident Fellow, Baylor University Institute for
Studies of Religion
Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force
Academy (Visiting)

Effects of religious norms on interstate armed conflict are understudied compared to such effects on intrastate
conflict. Yet religion exerts no less influence on states’ preferences and outcome of interstate interaction than other
factors. Religion fosters emotion, in turn generating cognitive and motivational biases in states’ leaders. Religion
acts as a political ideology that inculcates worldviews and programs political agendas. Religion accomplishes
these things through scripture, clergy, and historical narrative. Through these media, religion instills standards
of behavior, including for resort to (political) violence. Thus, religions influence states’ propensities to initiate
interstate armed conflicts, even when belligerents’ goals are not necessarily sacralized. However, different norms
are ingrained in different religions, and median war ethics of different religions range from permissive to restrictive.
Therefore, over time and space, different religions are expected to have different effects on initiation of interstate
armed conflicts. Regressing that outcome against the newly introduced Government Religious Preference (GRP)
scores for Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism reveals that such is the case; different religions are differently
associated with war and peace.

Keywords: interstate armed conflict, first use of force, government religious preference, data, religion and state.

INTRODUCTION

The effect of religion on preferences of people and populations has long been the focus of
religious studies literature, but its power to affect preferences of governments and outcomes in
international relations (IR) came to light only in the 1990s (Kepel 1994). Some argued that religion
was experiencing a resurgence (Shah and Philpott 2011; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011); others
that religion had never declined (Barnett 2011; Berger 1999; Stark 1999).1 Religion’s influence
on political preferences is now well documented when goals are sacralized and/or competitors
are defined by religious identities (e.g., Hassner 2009; Juergensmeyer 2003). Its role in fostering
intrastate conflict also is well documented (e.g., Juergensmeyer 1993, 2008). However, most
interstate conflicts have no overtly religious objectives, and religion’s effects on them remains
undertheorized (see Bellin 2008; Sandal and James 2011:5).

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank the following for their contributions and thoughtful feedback at
various stages of this project: Victor Asal, Dennis Foster, Jonathan Fox, Ron Hassner, Patrick James, Charles Mathewes,
John Norton Moore, John Owen, Todd Sechser, and several anonymous reviewers, and Luther Atkinson for programming
assistance. The viewpoints herein are those of the author and are not the official positions of the U.S. Air Force or the
U.S. government.

Correspondence should be addressed to Davis Brown, Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy, 2354
Fairchild Dr., USAF Academey, CO 80840-6258, USA. E-mail: davis_brown@msn.com
1 Hurd (2008) suggests that religion influences IR inversely, through secularism.

Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (2017) 0(0):1–21


C 2017 The Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
2 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Although religion can stoke or suppress conflict (Appleby 2000),2 this article focuses on
religion’s role in stoking it through its influence on interstate armed conflict initiation. Effects
of power, regime type, wealth, trade dependence, proximity, and time all are well established
in the security studies literature; why not also religion? The paucity of security studies liter-
ature on religion3 may instantiate institutional bias (see Wald and Wilcox 2006), manifested
in (1) the IR field’s disfavor of the idea of rational people being influenced by seemingly ir-
rational supernatural forces and beliefs, or (2) politically correct sentiments that all religions
are the same and therefore wield equal influence. That paucity may also reflect that a lack of
data on religion-state relationships had made empirical tests of hypotheses impractical. This
is no longer true for the post-Cold War period (Fox 2008, 2015), but until this publication of
this article it was still true for the period before 1990. The IR field’s renewed attention to reli-
gion suggests that it is overcoming those prejudices and embracing the constructivist viewpoint
of religions as intersubjective ideas—good or bad—that influence preferences alongside other
ideas.
In IR, however, the traditional constructivist paradigm on the role of norms fits religion poorly.
Much constructivist literature theorizes universalization of selected ideas through diffusion across
the entire state system (e.g., Finnemore 1996; Sikkink 2011), but Wendt (1999:Ch. 6) shows the
existence of multiple cultures of anarchy and degrees of cultural internalization—suggesting that
some ideas diffuse only partially. Religious ideas may be among them, as suggested by the world’s
division into broad “civilizations” demarcated largely along religious lines (Huntington 1996).
Although religions have common features, for example, promulgating behavioral standards
with concern for the afterlife, they are quite diverse in their views of self and other, conceptions
of order and authority, and the nature and causes of conflict—including especially justifications
for resorting to military force. The latter is this article’s focus. The immediately following section
outlines a theory for that phenomenon. We then proceed to explaining the research design and
introducing the Government Religious Preference (GRP) dataset, which supplies the independent
variables used in this study. We then discuss results of empirical tests. In a nutshell, interstate
armed conflict initiation is found to be negatively associated with Christianity, mildly positively
associated with Islam, and not associated with Buddhism.

HOW RELIGION INFLUENCES PREFERENCES FOR WAR OR PEACE

This section explores the processes by which religion influences states’ preferences for
fighting or not, thus their decisions to use force against other states. The content of religious war
ethics is not discussed, only the process by which they influence the state.
We begin by noting that this article covers only interstate conflict, not intrastate. Domestic
conflict and civil wars comprise a major part of the security/conflict studies field and the literature,
both qualitative and empirical, is ample (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, empirical
literature on religion and domestic conflict is still relatively new (e.g., Fox 2007, 2012). This
dimension of analysis is bracketed here and the theory set forth below may not apply to conflicts
between nonstate actors (domestic or international), or even those between state and nonstate
actors.
We next note that the following theory is framed around not the conventional realist, insti-
tutionalist, or constructivist paradigmatic divisions in IR, but rather the division of actors into

2 Although Appleby (2000) contends that all religions have equal potential for tolerance and conciliation, he later argues
that that potential is undermined by exclusivity: the more a religion is portrayed as inherently superior, the greater its
potential to generate conflict (Appleby 2003:181).
3I make no such claim for the literature on religion and conflict in comparative politics.
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 3

Waltzian first, second, and third images (Waltz 1959). The reason is that notwithstanding the
incorporation of religion into the three paradigms above (Sandal and Fox 2013; Sandal and James
2011), the theory that different religions wield different influences today does not neatly fit into
any one of them. In contrast to the Middle Ages, when the institutions of the Roman Catholic
Church and the Islamic Caliphate were also powerful state actors, few if any such actors wield
such significant hard power now. The practice of the lone religious IGO in existence today, the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, is insufficient to establish a pattern of significant religious
involvement in IR overall in the institutionalist paradigm. Religion fits constructivism poorly be-
cause constructivism posits the diffusion of universal ideas, whereas religious norms and agendas
are seldom universal across multiple religions. For example, the agendas to universally propagate
Christianity and Islam are mutually exclusive.
On the other hand, the theory that different religions wield different influences does fit neatly
into the Waltzian division of actors into individual state leaders (first image) and state-level
structures and characteristics (second image). The third image, the interstate structure, is omitted
for the same reason that realism is set aside in the paragraph above.

First Image

In the first image of foreign policy making, religion shapes perceptions and inspires emotion.
Scholars have explored emotion’s effect on identity and interests and group responses (Bleiker
and Hutchison 2008; Hutchison 2010; Sasley 2011). Anger influences constructions of morality
and induces misperceptions of capability (see Mercer 2010). Religion influences individuals’
emotions, habits, and thoughts (Sandal and Fox 2013:148) and fosters anger by appealing to
standards of injustice. For example, anger over humiliation of the Islamic world contributed to
Islam’s resurgence in previously secularized areas (Fattah and Fierke 2009), and humiliation
influences foreign policy (Saurette 2006). Religion further fosters emotional investments by
rendering issues indivisible, therefore conflicts over those issues particularly intractable (Hassner
2009).
On cognitive biases: misperceptions lead to war due to states’ leaders misreading of other
leaders’ intentions (Levy 1983), setting into motion a pathological security dilemma (Jervis 1978).
Adversaries’ reciprocal beliefs in each other’s aggressive intentions raises war’s likelihood (see
Sandal and Fox 2013:149; Stoessinger 2010). Religions introduce cognitive biases by assigning
different meanings to words and actions (e.g., jihad), further contributing to misperceptions of
intentions. For example, religions may fuel perceptions that religious homogeneity fosters peace,
or that the dar al-harb is at war with the dar al-islam, or that Christians outside Christendom are
persecuted, regardless of the truth or falsehood of any of them.
As political ideologies, religions contribute to motivational biases. Political ideologies serve
four functions: (1) explain socioeconomic and political conditions by ascribing causes;4 (2) eval-
uate such conditions as desirable or undesirable; (3) orient people by furnishing their identities;
and (4) prescribe social and political action (Ball and Dagger 2011:4–6). Religions perform all
four functions as well.5 Such political action can include resort to force. Religion influences
severity of interstate conflict when religion and state enjoy close ties (Henne 2012). As men-
tioned above, most interstate conflicts are not overtly religious. Yet religion influences their
onset nevertheless by contributing to the (mis)perceptions, worldviews, emotions, and behavioral
standards that precipitate conflict. Much of this likely takes place subconsciously, obscuring

4 Religion controls violence by redirecting hostility toward a “scapegoat” or sacrificial victim (Thomas 2005:128–30).
5 Balland Dagger themselves wrongly distinguish religions from other political ideologies, due to their supernatural and
teleological dimensions. Yet the authors cover several religiously inspired political ideologies: the Christian right, radical
Islam, and the quasi-religion of Marxism, all of which perform the same functions as secular ideologies.
4 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

religion’s direct effects from easy observation (making case studies impractical). In contrast,
religion’s aggregate effects on armed conflict initiation over time and space are observable
empirically—but only because time-series and cross-national data are now available to test these
things.

Second Image

In the second image, religion influences states’ preferences by influencing public opinion.6
Understanding public opinion’s influence on foreign policy, including war, necessitates under-
standing the reciprocal relationship between elitehood opinion and public opinion (Kubiak 2014).
Religious leaders are included in the elitehood in most countries, alongside issue experts generally
(Jacobs and Page 2005). As issue experts, or “epistemic communities,” religious leaders influence
public preferences (Sandal 2011). Public opinion moderates policymakers by dissuading them
from extremes (Key 1961; Mintz 2004; Nincic 1988; Sobel 2001).
But although the public acts as a gatekeeper against elite opinion, elite opinion nevertheless
shapes public opinion—including supporting or opposing war (Berinsky 2007; see also Nincic
1992; Page and Shapiro 1992). Individuals are most influenced by elites holding values most
closely related to their own (Berinsky 2009; Zaller 1992). For example, in Northern Ireland, the
Protestant public was most influenced by Protestant leaders and the Catholic public by Catholic
leaders (Sandal 2011). This seems intuitive: a public identifying with Religion X is more likely
to respond favorably to elites whose opinions flow from worldviews, values, conventions, and
norms of Religion X. Put another way, religions legitimize some worldviews and preferences and
delegitimize others (Sandal and Fox 2013:150–54). A governing regime drawn from a Christian
public is not expected to embrace—and may well actually oppose—policy arguments based on
distinctly Islamic perspectives and vice versa.
These worldviews, values, conventions, and norms constitute what Powlick and Katz
(1998:33) label “latent opinion”; in their words, “ingrained sets of values, criteria for judg-
ment, attitudes, preferences, dislikes.” Many cultural factors contribute to the public’s latent
opinion, including religion. “Religion holds all social strata together in the name of a unified
national culture” (Hanson 2006:6). Religion has been linked directly to public foreign policy pref-
erences. Examples include empirical relationships between people’s religious affiliation and their
international policy preferences (Daniels 2005); U.S. support of Israel resulting from American
public support, itself generated by religious affinities toward Israel (Koplow 2011); and greater
likelihood of Diaspora Jews invoking Jewish values when critiquing Israeli policy (Sucharov
2011).

Vehicles of Religion’s Influence

How does religious ideology affect states’ preferences for using force? Weber ([1922] 1958)
theorized that religion’s meanings, values, prescriptions, etc. (including prescriptions for taking
life) are first conveyed to the masses through a charismatic prophet and the prescribed behavior
is induced through psychological sanctions (see also Laitin 1978:565–66). Religious epistemic
communities (Sandal 2011) inculcate values and worldviews and prescribe behaviors to individu-
als, communities, and entire populations, including the governing regimes drawing their officials
from those populations.
For epistemic communities to accomplish this, they must first be informed. This is real-
ized through scripture, other written classics, and historical narrative. Religious prophets provide

6 Although the cited literature focuses on public opinion in the United States, the same processes work worldwide. Public
opinion influences policy decisions in all states, not just democracies (Weeks 2008).
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 5

ideal-types necessary for formulating scripture, which in turn memorializes the prophets’ teach-
ings and relevant historical context (Lynch 2009:391, interpreting Weber). Scripture influences
people directly but also through the priesthood (Sandal’s epistemic community). The priesthood
provides ideal-types necessary to contextualize scripture; it organizes, systematizes, and institu-
tionalizes religious precepts for application to broader phenomena (Lynch 2009:391–92). This is
done at the pulpit but also by the printing press. Once written down, the most persuasive priestly
teachings become more durable and more widely accessible. In this way, nonscriptural classics
inform later interpretations of scripture for generations.
Religion also wields influence through historical tradition, by emphasizing events and actions
and stories emerging from them. Examples include compilations of Islamic hadith (nonscriptural
compilations of words, actions, and decisions of the Prophet Muhammad), traditional biogra-
phies of the Prophet and histories of Islam’s early expansion, and classical Buddhist historical
sagas. These narratives form bases for analogizing current events to past events and prescribing
reactions—a prominent tool for states’ leaders in managing crises (Khong 1992).
Through these three media—scripture, priesthood, and historical narrative—the meanings,
values, priorities, cognitions, and prescriptions of human life are instilled into entire societies and
cultures, including states’ governing regimes. This influence is seldom overt or even conscious.
Admittedly, the religiously inspired value sets of high-level officials do not always override
material incentives, pressures, and constraints (which are very strong). However, state behavior
is not always strictly egoist, not even in security matters, and ideology affects regimes’ decisions
(see Haas 2012; Owen 2010). Such ideology includes religious principles.

Interest or Disinterest?

The theory just presented could be applied in multiple ways. One trajectory is to treat religions
alongside other ethnicities, following the logic that ethnicities tend to promote solidarity within
their respective in-groups, with conflict generated by incompatible out-group agendas. Data
sources for measuring such effects would likely be those on religious demographics, for example,
RCS (Brown and James 2015). Applied to interstate armed conflict onset, likely hypotheses
might include constraining effects of religious similarity and permissive effects of religious
difference. Another trajectory, following the religious economy school, leads to theories that
religions promulgate agendas based on their own institutional interests. Applying the logic of
neoclassical realism, religious institutions, their members, and their respective religious adherents
would engage in rent seeking like any other interest group. Potential hypotheses might include
effects of the expected economic outcome of armed conflict on a religious group on that group’s
preferences for war or peace.
These are all desirable directions of research, but in this article, I posit a different kind of
preference: norms, which flow from the religion itself, as documented in scripture, promulgated
by the priesthood, and ingrained in historical narrative. These are more disinterested preferences.
Applied to the outcome at hand, religious norms define when resort to violence is legitimate,
both interpersonal and international. In international relations, religious norms regulate legitimate
use of states’ armed forces by defining what triggers the right of self-defense and other morally
permissible purposes for offensive force.7 Lynch (2009:381) rightly advocates examining the role
of ethics in practices of religious actors; the same is true for nonreligious actors such as states’
governing regimes—which are still influenced by religious ethics alongside nonreligious ethics.
Religious ethics define the common good and provide foundations for goal valuation (Lynch
2009:397)—including goals warranting resort to violence.

7 Secularideologies, including secularization, may also set standards for legitimizing violence. However, that topic is for
another article.
6 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Figure 1
Median and modal religious war ethics

This is the domain of war ethics, an understudied phenomenon in IR because the literature
is situated mostly within religious studies and political philosophy. Studies of religious war
ethics reveal that different religions have different standards for resorting to military force, with
some war ethics overall more permissive than others. I grant that religious ethics should not
be primordialized or treated apart from modern interpretation and practice (Lynch 2009:382).
However, each religion’s diverse range of ethical prescriptions is rooted in, even unified by, a
distinct body of scripture, other written classics, and historical narratives, all of which shape
intersubjective interpretations of religious rules (Lynch 2009:399).
This being the case, each major religion must have its own distinct ad bellum ethic of war
(Brekke 2006; Hensel 2010; Nardin 1996; Popovski, Reichberg, and Turner 2009), which its
adherents tend to follow over the long term. Although the war ethics held by the totality of
adherents within a religion tend to vary (sometimes widely), diverse interpretations of a religion’s
war ethic tend to congregate around one interpretation that is more influential, therefore more
intersubjective, than any other. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in the
top two graphs, a preponderance of adherents of a religion may embrace a war ethic that is
permissive or restrictive overall, even if within that religion they embrace a range of war ethics
from highly militant to extremely pacifist. Each religion has an identifiable “median” war ethic.
The bottom-left graph depicts a hypothetical “bi-modal” religion; its adherents cluster around
opposing “modes” of war ethics. When superimposed (bottom right), these median and bi-modal
war ethics are distinguishable from each other.
It follows, then, that a religion with a permissive war ethic would be more likely to favor
armed conflict, whether to advance its own self-interest or bring about an outcome more favorable
to its worldview or standard of ethical conduct. A religion with a restrictive war ethic would be
less likely to favor armed conflict. A religion with a bi-modal war ethic seems most likely to
embrace a level of permissiveness lying in the middle of the modes; if, as shown in the bottom-
left graph, the median is neither strongly permissive nor restrictive, then that religion’s war ethic
likely wields no influence on state practice (because the opposing war ethics cancel each other
out).
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 7

Beyond this top-level framework I am reluctant to make hypotheses concerning any specific
religion. Entire books are written on individual religions’ war ethics and no journal-length piece
could do justice to all three of the religions tested here, let alone any of them singly. Furthermore,
in this current environment of political correctness, the empirical results revealed here seem likely
to generate some controversy, so I prefer simply to let them speak for themselves. My purpose
in presenting this framework is only to lay the foundation for the hypothesis that over time
(decades) and space (multiple continents), different religions’ norms influence states’ behaviors
differently—notwithstanding the inevitability that states’ leaders will violate their own religions’
war ethics on occasion:

H1: States with governments influenced by different religions initiate interstate armed conflicts
at different rates.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Statistical operations were conducted on a dataset containing all 1,148,536 directed dyad-
years of the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset, updated manually to incorporate
version 4.1 (Correlates of War 2014), for the years 1946–2002 (the range of available data on all
variables).
The binary dependent variables (DVs) denote whether the observed state (State 1) “initiates
an armed conflict” against State 2 in the observed year. They are generated by applying the
following algorithm to the MID dataset: in the “A” models, this happens if either of the following
conditions is met: (1) State 1 is on Side A of a MID and it militarizes the dispute at a Highest
Activity (HiAct) value of 12 or higher (thus it “used” force); or (2) the state is not on Side A, but
Side A made only a threat or show of force (HiAct 11 or lower) and then responds by using force
(at HiAct 12 or higher). State 1 “initiates” the armed conflict in the first year that it meets either
of the conditions just stated. If it does, the DV is coded 1, otherwise 0. Initiating-side joiners of
conflicts are coded as initiators alongside the original initiators. In the “B” models, the DV is
coded 1 if the armed conflict initiated by State 1 results in any fatalities (Souva and Prins 2006).
The independent variable (IV) is an index of my design: the state’s Government Religious
Preference (GRP) scores for Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. GRP measures the state’s govern-
ing regime’s favorable disposition toward one or more religions above others. A religion toward
which a state’s government is most favorably disposed has greater influence on that government’s
preferences and decisions, including for war or peace, than any other religion. A religion that
is disfavored by the state has less influence. Inspired by Fox’s (2008, 2015) Religion and State
dataset (RAS), GRP measures government favor/disfavor toward various religious denominations
in five areas:

(1) Official status. Is X-Religion the state religion? If not, is it singled out for special
protection or recognition? Or is there explicit separation of religion and state?
(2) Religious education (in public primary and secondary schools). Is it required, optional,
or prohibited? Can students of different religions opt out? Can students of the religion
being taught opt out? Or must students opt in?
(3) Financial support. Does the state provide financial support (directly or through tax
breaks) to any religion? Does the state support all religions equally/equitably, or does it
support one or several religions but not others?
(4) Regulatory burdens. Do all religions have the same regulatory burdens, or do some have
heavier or lighter burdens than others?
(5) Intolerance of free exercise. Is the practice of X-Religion required? Or is it restricted or
even prohibited?
8 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Figure 2
Government involvement in religion versus government religious preference

Each of the five components described above receives a score from 0 (most disfavorable)
to 4 (most favorable) for each state-year, for each religious denomination covered in the dataset.
The five components then are averaged into a composite index measuring the overall GRP of the
state, for each religion.
The denominations covered in this generation of the GRP dataset are: Christian (overall,
Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox), Jewish, Muslim (overall, Sunni, and Shi’a), Hindu, Bud-
dhist (overall, Theravada, Mahayana, and Tibetan), Shinto, Confucian, Taoist, and Indigenous
(i.e., ethno-religionist, including Animist). Several composite categories of denominations are
included also. A more detailed exposition of GRP’s construction is provided in Appendix 1.
GRP is a more narrowly focused measurement than RAS or its second generation, RAS2.8
RAS measures government involvement in religion, that is, simultaneously religion’s influence on
government and government’s influence on religion. In contrast, GRP captures only the former,
as shown in Figure 2. Representing a significant step forward in development of religion data,
RAS is unparalleled in the number of variables capturing governments’ religious policies (148 in
RAS2), but its temporal coverage goes back only to 1990 (from 2002 in RAS, 2008 in RAS2). In
addition, RAS and RAS2 provide scores and composite indices only for the state’s Government
Involvement in Religion (GIR) overall, not for, in, or with any individual religions. In contrast,
GRP captures data in far fewer variables (only 5),9 but for 18 religious denominations, from 2002
back to 1946. A more macro-historical picture of religions’ effects on states’ characteristics and
outcomes of interstate interactions is thus possible.
GRP is also a more refined measurement of religion’s influence on states’ preferences
than religious demographics. Demographic variables quantify the religious identities of states’
populations, but not the relative political power of religions in those states. GRP identifies the
religion with greatest political power—which may be different from the population’s majority
religion, for example, the Idi Amin regime in Uganda. The religion with the greatest political
power is expected to wield the greatest influence on key decisionmakers; the ethical norms and
processes of the preferred religion should sway them more than those of any other. GRP also
quantifies the strength of that political power, appreciating that the same religion may strongly
influence one state but only weakly influence another.
A battery of standard control variables is also included. Absolute power of putative initiator
(State 1) and target (State 2) are controlled as the logarithms of their Composite Indices of
National Capability (CINCs), obtained from COW National Capability dataset (Singer, Bremer,

8 This article was drafted and submitted prior to the release of RAS’s third generation, RAS3.
9 The next generation of GRP, currently in progress, will feature 27 variables and 6 composite indices.
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 9

and Stuckey 1972; Correlates of War Project 2010).10 Power differential is controlled using the
logarithm of the directed ratio of the CINC of State 1 to that of State 2 (see Russett and Oneal
2001:103). As a further control for absolute power, the wealth of State 1 is controlled using the
logarithm of its Maddison GDP (obtained from the Quality of Government dataset: Teorell et al.
2013).
Regime types are controlled using the “Adjusted Polity Score” of each state (Center for
Systemic Peace 2013).11 The lowest Adjusted Polity Score of the dyad accounts for the dyadic
democratic peace. The monadic democratic peace is controlled with the Adjusted Polity Score of
State 1 specifically.
The effects of alliances are controlled using the COW Formal Alliances dataset (Correlates
of War 2013; Gibler 2009), updated manually to reflect NATO’s enlargement. The latest version
reports on the existence of agreements for collective defense, neutrality, entente, and nonaggres-
sion. Four directed binary variables are tested: (1) whether State 2 agrees to defend State 1 if
State 1 is attacked; (2) whether State 2 has an entente commitment with State 1; (3) whether State
1 has pledged neutrality toward State 2 in State 2’s conflicts; and (4) whether State 1 agrees not
to commit an act of aggression against State 2.
Geography is controlled through proximity and region. A control for contiguity is constructed
using COW’s Direct Contiguity dataset (Correlates of War Project 2006; Stinnett et al. 2002) and
Colonial/Dependency Contiguity dataset (Correlates of War Project 2002). The variable used here
denotes the closest level of contiguity between the state (direct or colonial). Regional effects are
controlled through a series of dummy variables denoting whether both states are located within
a specific region (Americas, Europe, Africa, Middle East, or Asia-Pacific).
The peace-learning process (Cederman 2001) is controlled by generating the number of years
since the dyad’s last MID and cubic splines using the btscs command (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998). The effects of trade dependence are not included in these models because doing so would
reduce the number of observation by over 70 percent due to missing data.
The correlation of the IVs to probability to initiate an interstate armed conflict is measured
using logit regressions in Stata 11, using the RElogit command to adjust for rare-event biases
(King and Zeng 2001) and clustered by directed dyad.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 shows logit coefficients for regressions of first use of force on Christian, Muslim,
and Buddhist GRPs.12 It is apparent that H1 is supported, as different religions exert different
effects on probability to initiate an interstate armed conflict. The correlation of Christianity is
negative and Islam positive, with Buddhism having no statistical significance.

10 Before the logarithm is generated, the decimal CINC is multiplied by 100 to generate a meaningful range of units,
then incremented by 1 to avoid negative logarithm values. The same procedure is also performed on the logarithm of the
directed CINC ratio and economic dependence ratio. This was not needed for the logarithm of Maddison GDP.
11 The Adjusted Polity Score, my own invention, reflects the level of democracy of the state’s central government
without regard to territorial control or transition. The examined behavior is the militarization of a dispute by a state;
in international law and diplomatic practice the behavior of the state and its government are virtually synonymous. A
state with the Polity code “interregnum” or “transition” can nevertheless have a functioning government that is able to
direct military operations. However, no Polity scores for such states are provided, resulting in considerable missing data.
I submit that during such periods, the state’s last nonmissing Polity score is the best available indicator of the democratic
or autocratic traits of its government, and thus of the effects of democracy/autocracy on the state’s decision to use force.
The Polity score of a state in “occupation” remains missing, as an occupied state is presumed to be unable to direct its
own foreign policy.
12 Going forward, for economy of words, a state with a regime preference for Christianity is called a “Christian state,” a
state with a Muslim preference a “Muslim state,” and so on.
 10
Table 1: RELogit regression of initiation of interstate armed conflict on government religious preferences, 1946–2002

Model 1A Model 1B 12+ Model 2A Model 2B 12+ Model 3A Model 3B 12+

Initiate at HiAct level: 12+ w/fatalities 12+ w/fatalities 12+ w/fatalities
Christian GRP (1–10) −.102*** −.203***
(.027) (.049)
Muslim GRP (1–10) .088*** .103**
(.019) (.032)
Buddhist GRP (1–10) −.001 −.007
(.070) (.084)
Log CINC State 1 .253* .790*** .475*** 1.066*** .362** .871***
(.126) (.028) (.126) (.188) (.124) (.202)
Log CINC State 2 .462*** .055 .478*** .117 .489*** .151
(.105) (.168) (.100) (.162) (.096) (.160)
Log directed CINC ratio −.061 0.222** −.060 −.185* −.061 −.189*
(.053) (.085) (.052) (.083) (.051) (.083)
Low polity of dyad .030* −.057* −.027* −.053* −.027* −.189*
(.012) (.023) (.012) (.020) (.012) (.021)
Polity of State 1 −.027** −.001 −.022* .004 −.032*** −.011
(.009) (.011) (.009) (.012) (.009) (.011)
State 2 def. ally of State 1? .145 .011 .165 .100 .149 .006
(.152) (.269) (.158) (.284) (.163) (.283)
State 2 entente w/State 1? .100 .129 .006 .131 .115 .273
(.310) (.552) (.312) (.577) (.311) (.553)
State 1 neutrality w/State 2? .818** .967* .818** 1.012* .705* .853
(.253) (.424) (.265) (.427) (.276) (.454)
State 1 nonaggression w/State 2? −.992** −.870 −1.01*** −1.032 −1.023*** −1.06
(.292) (.641) (.284) (.647) (.283) (.618)

(Continued)
JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
Table 1 (Continued)

Model 1A Model 1B 12+ Model 2A Model 2B 12+ Model 3A Model 3B 12+

Initiate at HiAct level: 12+ w/fatalities 12+ w/fatalities 12+ w/fatalities
Log Maddison GDP State 1 .251*** .009 .186*** −.098 .220*** −.031
(.048) (.067) (.047) (.064) (.047) (.063)
Closest contig. score −.548*** −.549*** −.538*** −.524*** −.543*** −.542***
(.030) (.042) (.029) (.041) (.028) (.040)
American dyad? 1.674*** 1.371*** 1.809*** 1.310*** 1.575*** 1.040*
(.212) (.335) (.196) (.339) (.203) (.323)
European dyad? .669** 1.703*** .569** 1.400*** .458* 1.157***
(.211) (.300) (.188) (.258) (.185) (.261)
African dyad? .910*** .728** .804*** .585* .950*** .801**
(.174) (.254) (.171) (.243) (.165) (.237)
Middle East dyad? 1.439*** 1.723*** 1.380*** 1.756*** 1.693*** 2.086***
(.216) (.287) (.237) (.342) (.200) (.271)
Asia-Pacific dyad? .304 .774** .536** 1.167*** .473* 1.027**
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT

(.201) (.272) (.201) (.281) (.213) (.353)

Peace years (since last MID) −.285*** −.300*** −.290*** −.305*** −.289*** −.295***
(.021) (.035) (.021) (.034) (.021) (.033)
Cubic splines omitted
Constant −4.790*** −3.420*** −4.760*** −3.265*** −4.760*** −3.418***
(.492) (.649) (.482) (.619) (.481) (.614)
N observations 755,763 755,055 788,922 788,197 807,050 806,330
Clusters 24,045 24,045 24,231 24,231 24,247 24,247
Wald X2 (21) 3740.35 2219.25 3746.73 2176.72 3904.70 2276.05
Pseudo R2 .324 .318 .319 .303 .317 .298
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Diagnostics via logit, not relogit.
11
12 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Figure 3
Predicted probability of first use of force against Christian GRP

Figure 3 graphs the predicted probability of resorting to force against the state’s Christian
GRP. When the threshold for “using” force is lowest (HiAct = 12+), a state with the median
nonzero Christian GRP (4.38) is 37 percent less likely to initiate an interstate armed conflict than
a state with no Christian GRP. A state with the maximum Christian GRP (8.13) is 54 percent
less likely. In each model, the graph shows a steady decline in the probability to use force as the
Christian GRP score increases. Table 1 further shows that the constraining effect of Christianity
grows stronger as the threshold for “using force” is raised. In Model 1B, the negative effect of
an increase in Christian GRP is nearly twice as strong as that of the same increase in Model
1A. A state with a (nonzero) median Christian GRP is 60 percent less likely to initiate a fatal
armed conflict than a state with no Christian GRP. A state with the maximum Christian GRP is
73 percent less likely.
Whereas empirical results suggest that states with Christian GRPs are less likely to use force,
they also suggest that states with Muslim GRPs are moderately more likely. Figure 4 graphs the
predicted probability of resorting to force against the state’s Muslim GRP. At the lowest threshold
of using force, a state with the median nonzero Muslim GRP (7.50) is 84 percent more likely
to resort to force than a state with no Muslim GRP (versus an analogous Christian state being
37 percent less likely). However, this result does not necessarily indicate that Islam’s positive
correlation is stronger than Christianity’s negative correlation. The median nonzero Muslim GRP
is much higher than its Christian counterpart, which likely explains why the change in Pr(Y = 1)
is so much greater for the Muslim GRP median. The positive effect of Islam (Model 2A) is
weaker than the negative effect of Christianity in the analogous model (Model 1A). At the same
low threshold (the A models), a state with the maximum Muslim GRP (10.00) is 126 percent
more likely to initiate an interstate armed conflict than a state with no Muslim GRP. But the
higher the threshold for an armed conflict triggering the DV, the stronger the effect of Islam. In
Model 2B, a state with the median nonzero Muslim GRP is 189 percent more likely to be the first
user of force than a state with no Muslim GRP, and a state with the maximum Muslim GRP is
244 percent more likely.
Buddhism appears to have no effect on states’ propensities to initiate interstate armed con-
flicts. All coefficients are close to zero and none are statistically significant. Figure 5 graphs
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 13

Figure 4
Predicted probability of first use of force against Muslim GRP

Figure 5
Predicted probability of first use of force against Buddhist GRP

the predicted probability of resorting to force against the state’s Buddhist GRP. Even having the
maximum Buddhist GRP (8.33) clearly makes no difference in the initiation of armed conflict.
The 95 percent confidence intervals, shown in gray, are vast compared to those of in the other
graphs.
14 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Robustness Tests

This first printing of such results warrants rigorous robustness testing due to their contro-
versial nature. The first test was to compare effects and explanatory power of GRP scores with
those of other, more conventionally used variables. As diagnostics are not available using the
RELogit command, they were generated using the standard logit command instead. The models
using the lowest threshold of initiation of interstate armed conflict (the A models) tend to generate
the weakest coefficients for the religious variables; therefore, this test employs the A models.
Table 2 summarizes and compares individual baseline tests of selected explanatory variables. As
shown, the coefficients and diagnostics of the religion variables are not out of place with the other
variables.
The remaining tables summarize a panoply of individual regressions with the full battery of
control variables, but controls are not reported due to space limitations. A Stata log of all tests is
included as Appendix 2.
Table 3 summarizes results of regressions on GRP scores and indices from the Religion
and State dataset (Fox 2008, 2015). For equitable comparison, all three IVs are rescaled to 0–10
and regressions are run only for the time frame common to all three datasets (1990–2002). The
top row uses the GRP score for the preferred religion of the state, whichever it may be (i.e., the
state’s non-religion-specific GRP). The middle row uses the Government Involvement in Religion
index (GIR) from the original RAS dataset (Fox 2008). The third row uses my construction of a
composite score from variables in the expanded RAS2 dataset (Fox 2015).13 All measurements
except one indicate that the greater the state’s association with religion broadly speaking, the
greater its propensity to initiate an interstate armed conflict (the GIR coefficient in the A model
barely missed significance at p < .068). But since GRP and RAS measure different phenomena,
we can infer that the effect of government preference toward (and influence by) religion (GRP)
is less pronounced than that of the broader phenomenon of government entanglement with
religion (RAS). When regressed across its full coverage (bottom row), GRP’s effect appears to be
less pronounced over time (1946–2002) than the RAS variables indicate for government-religion
entanglement in the present (from 1990). Ultimately, however, the range of permissible inferences
from this table are limited, for these variables do not differentiate between religions.
Tests were conducted on the A and B models with alternative religion-specific independent
variables. In Table 4, regressions of religion-specific GRPs are compared to those of percentage of
population. Percentages are obtained from the Religious Characteristics of States dataset (Brown
and James 2015). GRP is also interacted with the RCS percentage. All variables are rescaled to
0–10 for equitable comparison. Results suggest that overall, the effect of majority adherence to
a religion (RCS percentage) is less pronounced than the effect of government preference toward
that religion (GRP), but the effect of GRP interacted with population majority (GRP × percent)
is more pronounced than that of GRP alone. This finding applies only to religions that had any
effect in the original models (Christianity and Islam).
Additional tests substitute several control variables and add new ones, as summarized in
Table 5. Effects of nuclear capability of both State 1 and State 2 are added, as are effects of
Israel being the target (State 2). Cubic splines of peace-years are replaced with squares and cubes
of the same (Carter and Signorino 2010)—and doing so makes it possible to also substitute the
more accurate Werner peace-years (Werner 2000), generated from 1648, for the less accurate

13 The actual RAS2 dataset provides no overall composite score for the state-year, but one is easily constructed. The SAX,

SBX, and SCX variables all are rescaled 0–100 and averaged for a composite S score (Separation of Religion and State).
The original composite scores labeled MX (Minority Religion Discrimination), NX (Religious Regulation on Majority),
and LX (Religious Legislation) all are rescaled to 0–100. The four subcomposites are averaged into a single overall score,
here styled RAS2 Composite. The subcomposites are given equal weight (Fox 2011).
Table 2: Comparison of logit baseline tests of selected explanatory variables (A models)

Min Max Logit coefficient p LR Chi2 (1) Pseudo R2 Log likelihood N

Christian GRP (0–10) 0 8.125 −.223 <.001 323.76 .017 −9647 992,749
Muslim GRP (0–10) 0 10 .087 <.001 118.61 .006 −10,213 1,089,960
Buddhist GRP (0–10) 0 8.333 .081 <.001 24.73 .001 −10,727 1,111,084
Log CINC, State 1 0 3.622 .922 <.001 821.36 .036 −10,870 1,148,530
Log dir. CINC ratio 0 12.030 −.050 .001 10.67 .001 −11,274 1,147,199
Low Polity score 0 20 −.051 <.001 98.21 .005 −10,581 936,300
Polity, State 1 0 20 −.038 <.001 112.99 .005 −10,921 1,036,111
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT

Log GDP, State 1 4.84 15.920 .272 <.001 333.57 .018 −8911 931,185
Closest contiguity 1 6 −.850 <.001 4828.36 .214 −8866 1,148,530
Peace-years* 0 186 −.409 <.001 2299.45 .102 −10,131 1,148,530
*Including cubic splines.
15
16 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Table 3: Comparison of GRP composite score with GIR and RAS2

A models B models
12+ 12+ w/fatalities
Initiate at HiAct level: (RSE) (RSE) Years
*** ***
GRP, preferred (1–10) .172 .272
(.044) (.064)
N= 286,871 286,683 1990–2002
General GIR (1–10) .116 .290**
(.064) (.098)
N= 295,268 295,079 1990–2002
RAS2 composite (0–10) .252*** .566***
(.072) (.098)
N= 294,973 294,784 1990–2002
GRP, preferred (0–10) .116*** .122**
(.029) (.042)
N= 728,761 728,118 1946–2002
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Control variables omitted.

Table 4: Comparison of GRP score with RCS percentage

A models B models
12+ 12+ w/fatalities
Initiate at HiAct level: (RSE) (RSE)
Christian GRP −.102*** −.203***
(.027) (.049)
Christian % (RCS) −.050** −.060*
(.018) (.028)
Christian GRP × % −.101** −.217**
(.036) (.065)
Muslim GRP .088*** .103**
(.019) (.032)
Muslim % (RCS) .068*** .083**
(.017) (.030)
Muslim GRP × % .112*** .122**
(.021) (.037)
Buddhist GRP −.001 −.007
(.070) (.084)
Buddhist % (RCS) −.014 −.011
(.046) (.060)
Buddhist GRP × % .037 .043
(.091) (.096)
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Control variables omitted.

peace-years generated from 1816 by the Stata btscs command. As shown in Table 5, the GRP
coefficients in the alternative models do not deviate significantly from those in the original models.
In tests not reproduced here, trade dependence was added to the original models. Following
Russett and Oneal (2001:140–43), variables were constructed to measure State 1’s economic
dependence on State 2, and the logarithm of the ratio of State 1’s dependence on State 2 with the
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 17

Table 5: Comparison of GRP scores in original models with GRP scores in alternative models

A models B models
12+ 12+ w/fatalities
Initiate at HiAct level: (RSE) (RSE)
Christian GRP (original) −.102*** −.203***
(.027) (.049)
Christian GRP (alternative) −.110*** −.210***
(.028) (.050)
Muslim GRP (original) .088*** .103**
(.019) (.032)
Muslim GRP (alternative) .091*** .094**
(.020) (.035)
Buddhist GRP (original) −.001 −.007
(.070) (.084)
Buddhist GRP (alternative) .012 .006
(.071) (.085)
Note: In the alternative models, dummy variables for nuclear capabilities of States 1 and 2 and Israel being State 2 are
added, Werner peace-years are substituted for peace-years, and Carter-Signorino time controls are substituted for cubic
splines. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Control variables omitted.

Table 6: Comparison of GRP scores between RELogit and XTLogit regressions

A models B models
Initiate at HiAct level: 12+(RSE) 12+ w/fatalities(RSE)
Christian GRP (RELogit) −.102*** −.203***
(.027) (.049)
Christian GRP (XTLogit) −.113*** −.208***
(.027) (.044)
Muslim GRP (RELogit) .088*** .103**
(.019) (.032)
Muslim GRP (XTLogit) .121*** .113**
(.016) (.025)
Buddhist GRP (RELogit) −.001 −.007
(.070) (.084)
Buddhist GRP (XTLogit) −.072 −.008
(.046) (.057)
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Control variables omitted.

inverse.14 When these variables are added, only one GRP score remains significant (Christian, in
Model 1A). However, the number of observations is reduced by nearly three-quarters, from about
750,000 to about 200,000, raising concerns about this test’s validity. These tests, like all others,
are reproduced fully in Appendix 2.
Finally, tests were performed on the original models using a more stringent operation: a
time-series logit regression. Table 6 summarizes those tests and compares them to the original

14 The economic dependence indicator of State 1 on State 2 is multiplied by 100 to generate meaningful units. The directed

economic dependence ratio is incremented by 1 before generating its logarithm, in order to avoid negative scores for that
variable.
18 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

models. The time-series operator strengthens the effects of religions that had effects in the original
models (Christianity and Islam). To present results as conservatively as possible, I reported the
weaker coefficients as the main models. Finally, to “break” the models, I added fixed effects. This
is the most stringent test possible and doing so usually destroys the significance of independent
variables. Such was the case for Islam (rendered insignificant) and Buddhism (omitted due to lack
of within-group variance). However, such was not the case for Christianity. The significance of
Christian GRP was weakened to p < .05 and p < .01, but is still within the IR field’s conventional
standard of 95 percent confidence. Christian GRP coefficients were rendered much stronger than
in the original models; –0.32 in Model A (cf. –0.10 in the original Model 1A) and –0.78 in Model
B (cf. –0.20 in the original Model 1B). These tests are reproduced in Appendix 2.

CONCLUSION

In this article’s research design as well as in most robustness tests, regime preferences for
Christianity and Islam have definite, measurable effects on propensities of states to militarize
disputes into armed conflicts. Although their effects appear weaker than effects of proximity
and time, they remain significant and not out of place with other factors. H1, which posits that
different religions influence states’ resort to force differently, is supported.
The way forward is exploring why. No explanation is offered for the different results herein
because no journal-length article could do justice to any. It might be related to religious identity
of the population (from which the governing regime draws its officials, at least most of the time).
It might be related to religion’s effects on other factors that themselves stoke or suppress conflict,
for example, regime type, alliances, possibly GDP. It might be related to the relative religiosity of
adherents of the tested religions; for example, Fish (2002) argues that Muslims overall are more
fervent religionists than Christians. But it might also be related to religious war ethics. All these
possibilities deserve ample consideration.
A few caveats are in order. First, the effect of religion is not necessarily constant over
centuries. It is certainly possible, even probable, that the effects of the religions studied here were
different 500 years ago, and different again 1,000 years ago. For example, the Christian war ethic
was markedly different during the Crusades than today—but so likely was the Islamic war ethic.
However, until sufficient data on armed conflict onset and controls are developed, including for
states and state-like entities outside the Westphalian state system, testing empirically the effects of
any state-level characteristics—including religion—is not feasible. In addition, the constraining
effect of Christianity may be weaker during less restrictive epochs of jus ad bellum. When jus ad
bellum is highly permissive (as in the 19th century), then all states, regardless of religion, should
use force more often than during the present epoch in which jus ad bellum is highly restrictive.
The second caveat is that domestic conflict has been bracketed entirely, therefore no claim is
offered regarding religions’ effects on the same. Indeed, GRP could prove useful in empirical
studies of domestic conflict, at least in quantifying states’ treatments of religious minorities.
Mindful of the visceral reaction against Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilizations, I close
by offering an anticipatory response to the objection that the narrative presented here somehow
offensively stereotypes some religions or promulgates a dangerously self-fulfilling prophecy.
Such objections are driven more by political ideology than dispassionate scientific inquiry, for
example, “the 12th-century Crusaders were militant; therefore these 20th-century results can’t
be right.” In the past I have been challenged to support these empirical results with detailed
theory on religion-specific causation. However, doing so here would be inappropriate because
the constraints of such an exposition in a journal-length piece itself is too easily dismissed as
superficial and stereotyped. There is space only to show the empirical findings, and whether they
give comfort or discomfort is in the eye of the beholder. Additionally, whether these findings
articulate a self-fulfilling prophecy is unknowable. Further study is necessary to explore whether
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON INTERSTATE ARMED CONFLICT 19

these results are illusory or real, and if real, then the root of religion’s influence on interstate
armed conflict.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the
publisher’s website:

Appendix 1 Government Religious Preference (GRP) Codebook

Appendix 2
Appendix 2 STATA Log
Figure A1.1 Preferred Religion Unordered Codes [prefrelid]
Figure A1.2 Dichotomous Religious Preference Variables
Figure A1.3 Constitutional Establishment [constest]
Figure A1.4 Religious Education [releduc]
Figure A1.5 General Privileges [genpriv]
Figure A1.6 Intolerance [intol]
Table A1.1: Pairwise Correlation of GRP Components
Table A1.2: Missing Data in GRP Composite and Component Scores