TRANSPORTATION LAW

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Preliminary concepts

Hierarchy of Transportation Laws in the Philippines

1. Primary Law - Civil Code
2. The following are suppletory in character:
a. Code of Commerce
b. Special Laws
1) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)
2) Salvage Law
3) Warsaw Convention
4) Tariff and Customs Code

Transportation- A movement of things or persons from one place to another;

What is included in the word transportation?

 It includes:
1. Waiting time,
2. Loading and unloading,
3. Stopping in transit, and
4. All other accessorial services in connection with the loaded
movement.

Nature of Transportation Activity

Contract of Transportation
 There is a contract of transportation when a person obligates himself to transport
persons or property from one place to another for a consideration.
 The contract may involve carriage of passengers or carriage of goods.
 The persons involved may be common carrier or private carrier.
 A contract of carriage is defined as one whereby a certain person or association
of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one
place to another for a fixed price.
Parties involved and the differing juridical relationships between and among
them
A. Carriage of Passengers
 Common Carrier
 Passenger – one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of contract,
express or implied, with the carrier subject to payment of fare or an
equivalent thereof.

Notes:
 Gratuitous or Reduced Fare- a passenger who has been given or is carried
gratuitously or under reduced fare is still considered as a passenger. hence, there
must still be diligence accorded to him. This is in consonance also with Article
1758 of the Civil Code which provides that if a passenger who is carried
 gratuitously or under a reduced fare, stipulations limiting the common carrier’s
liability in case of negligence is VALID.

 Baliwag Transit Corp vs CA- it should be the person whose contractual rights
have been invaded must bring the action based on the contract.

 Sanico vs Collipano - only the operator/bus owner may breach the contract of
carriage. Hence, it is only the operator who must be sued. The obligation to carry
the passenger to his/her destination is with the operator.

 Soberano vs Manila RailRoad Co. - A complaint for breach of contract of

carriage fole against the bus driver must be dismissed because the parties to the
contract are the operator and the passenger.

 Sps Fabre vs CA- there are instances where the passenger was not the one who
contracted the carrier. Example is when the school hires a school bus to transport
its teachers and students. Usually this is covered by a written agreement which
entitles one party to file a case against the other. However, even without such
agreement, the carrier owes a duty extraordinary diligence directly to the
passenger.

B. Carriage of Goods
 Carrier
 Shipper – one who delivers the goods to the carrier for transportation;
person who pays the consideration or on whose behalf payment is made.
Notes:
 Consignee- the party to whom the goods are to be delivered; not actually a party
to the contract.
When is the Consignee bound by the contract? He is bound by the contract
when or by reason of: (MOF Company vs ShinYang Brokerage Corp) R-U-
A
1. Relationship of agency between the consignee and the shipper;
2. Unequivocal acceptance of Bill of Lading by the consignee with full
knowledge of its content;
3. The Availment of stipulation pour autrui (or when the consignee demands
the carrier the fulfillment of the stipulation.

 Sub-Contractor - the carrier of the carrier.

 he is NOT directly liable to the consignee for the loss of the cargo, if the
cause of the action is break of contract. WHY? because a sub-contractor
is not a party to the contract. But the carrier may, of course, reimburse
 from the sub-c. Take note also that the consignee may file a complaint
against the SB arising from quasi-delict. (Don’t forget the elements of
quasi-delict: There is an act/omission; such causes damage to another;
such is caused by fault or negligence)

Elements of Contract of Carriage

1. Consent - it is given by the passenger and the carrier (COP); shipper and carrier
(COG)
2. Consideration -
 on the part of the carrier: Fare (COP); Freight (COG)
 on the part of the shipper/passenger, the transportation of person/goods.
3. Object - the prestation which is the transportation of goods or passenger from
one place to another.

Perfection of Contract of Contract of Goods (COG)- it may be:

1. Consensual Contract- when the carrier agrees to accept and transport the goods
at a future date.
2. Real Contract- when the goods are unconditionally placed in the control and
supervision of the carrier and upon the receipt of the carrier, the contract is
perfect.
Note: Liability commences when the Bill of Lading is issued. However, such is not
indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. The actual delivery and
the acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier.
Notes:
 Compania Maritama vs Insurance Company- the contract was already perfected
even though the cargoes were not yet loaded.

Perfection of Contract of Contract of Passengers (COP)

2 types of COP
1. Contract to Carry - agreement to carry the passenger at a future date.
 Consensual. Meeting of minds perfects the contract.
 Here, an action for damages is possible though no tickets are issued yet.
Because the agreement perfects the contract to carry.

2. Contract of Carriage or Common Carriage

 Real Contract. HEnce, the passenger shall use the facilities of the carrier
in order that the latter fulfills its obligations. (sabi sa discussion, it is
needed that the passenger had checked-in at departure counter, passed
thru customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus, and proceeded to
the ramp).
Perfection of COP in an:
AIRCRAFT.
1. Contract to Carry- there is a perfected contract to carry even if now tickets are
issued because the mere consensual agreement between the parties perfect the
contract.
2. Contract of Carriage (Real Contract)
 when the passenger had checked-in at departure counter, passed thru
customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus, and proceeded to the
ramp), the contract was perfected.

BUSES, JEEPNEYS AND STREET CARS.

 when the bus, jeeps, street cars stop, it is in effect making a CONTINUOUS
OFFER to riders.
 Continuing Offer Rule- it is the duty of the vehicle to stop to afford the passengers
the opportunity to board the conveyance. They are liable to injuries suffered by
the passenger in case of sudden start-up of the vehicle.

TRAINS. A person who wants to board a train in a railway station must purchase a
ticket and must present himself at the proper place and proper manner for
transportation.
 the passenger must have a bonafide intention to use the facilities of the carrier,
possess sufficient fare, and present himself to the carrier.
 in one case, a passenger boarded the freight wagon and not the passenger couch,
ngayon naikkat yung wagon, naihiwalay, di liable si carrier kasi di naman siya
sumakay ng tama, at sa kung saan dapat talaga sasakay na part ng train.

State regulation over transportation industry/business

Relevant Sources of Obligations (Civil Code)
1. Contract
 Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
 A contract is defined as “a meeting of the minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something to
render some service.”
- Obligatory Force of Contract – existence of a valid and enforceable
contract
2. Delict
 Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by
the penal laws.
- Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
- The rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
3. Quasi-delict
 Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by this book
and special penal laws.

 Quasi-delict is a legal institution distinct and separate from delict or crime. The
requisites must concur: damage suffered by the plaintiff; fault or negligence of
the defendant; and connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

Concept of common carrier

 Common Carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
air, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. (Art. 1732,
NCC).
Common carriage vs. private carriage
Common Carriers Private Carrier
As to Common carriers are
A private carrier is one who, without
Definition persons, corporations, making the activity a vocation, or without
firms or associations
holding himself or itself out to the public
engaged in the as
business of carrying or ready to act for all who may desire his or
transporting its
passengers or goods or services, undertakes, by special
both, by land, water, agreement
or air, for compensation,in a particular instance only, to transport
offering their goods or persons from one place to
services to the public. another
(Article 1732, Civil either gratuitously or for hire. The
Code) provisions on ordinary contracts of the
Civil
Code govern the contract of private
carriage. (Perena v. Nicolas, G.R. No.
157917, 29 August 2012)
As to Undertaking is the Undertaking is a single transaction, not a
Character of transport and conveyance part of a general business or occupation,
Business of goods or persons from although involving the carriage of the
one place to another. goods for a fee, the person or corporation
offering such service is private carrier.
CASES:
CASE 1: Pedro De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, GR L-47822, 22 December 1988
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used
bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. He utilized 2 six-wheeler trucks which he owned
to transport the materials to Manila. Upon return to Pangasinan, he would load with
cargo which various merchants wanted delivered in Pangasinan where he charged
freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates.
Petitioner Pedro De Guzman, merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk
Company, contracted with Respondent for the hauling of 750 cartos of milk from Makati
to Rizal; 150 cartos were loaded in the 1st truck driven by him, and 600 were loaded in
the other truck driven by Manuel Estrada (employee). The 2 nd truck was hijacked
somewhere in Tarlac, hence, only 150 boxes were delivered.
Petitioner filed an action demanding payment of P22,150.00 against respondent
contending that as a common carrier, he failed to exercise extraordinary diligence
required by law. Respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and the loss was
due to a force majeure.
RTC Decision: Found private respondent to be a common carrier holding him liable for
the value of the undelivered goods.
CA Decision: Reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that respondent had
been engaged in transporting return of freight “as a casual occupation” – a sideline to
his scarp iron business” and not a common carrier. CA referred to the fact that private
respondent held no certificate of public convenience, and concluded he was not a
common carrier.
ISSUE: WON respondent Ernesto Cendana is a common carrier?
WON respondent Ernesto Cendana was liable for the undelivered cargo?
RULING:
1. YES. Respondent Cendana is a common carrier.
Article 1732 defined Common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the provision, it makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Respondent Cendana is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent’s principal occupation was not the
carriage of goods for others.
 2. NO. Respondent is NOT liable with the undelivered value of the cargo.
On the issue of incurring liability by Respondent Cendana, the Court holds that the
occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the
common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall
that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and
of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen
or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence.
GR: Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or detertioration
of the goods which they carry (Art. 1734).
XPN: Art. 1735 (6) – common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves or
robbers is dispensed with or diminished – this provision is contrary to public policy.
Hence, the Court agrees with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private
respondent Cendaña is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise
which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private respondent’s control.

CASE 2: First Phil. Petroleum vs. Court of Appeals, GR 125948, 29 December 1998

FACTS:

- Petitioner FPIC, a grantee of pipeline concession under RA 387, applied for a mayor’s
permit to install and operate oil pipelines in Batangas City, however, City Treasurer
required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts in 1993 with a total amount
of P956 M.

- Petitioner filed a letter-protest addressed to City Treasurer contending that it is exempt

from paying tax on gross receipts under the Local Government Code and the authority
of cities to impose and collect a tax on the gross receipts of "contractors and independent
contractors" does not include the authority to collect such taxes on transportation
contractors because the term "contractors" excludes transportation contractors.

- Respondent City Treasurer denied the protest contending that petitioner cannot be
exempt from taxes LGC as said exemption applies only to "transportation contractors
and persons engaged in the transportation by hire and common carriers by air, land
and water." Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term "common
carrier" which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships and the
like. Respondents further posit that the term "common carrier" under the said code
pertains to the mode or manner by which a product is delivered to its destination.

- Trial Court dismissed the case citing that the exemption granted under LGC
encompasses only common carriers so as not to overburden the riding public or
commuters with taxes. Plaintiff is not a common carrier, but a special carrier extending
its services and facilities to a single specific or "special customer" under a "special
contract."

- CA affirmed trial court’s decision that Petitioner FPIC is not a common carrier.
Petitioner claims that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that (1) the
 petitioner is not a common carrier or a transportation contractor, and (2) the exemption
sought for by petitioner is not clear under the law.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that Petitioner FPIC is not a common carrier?

RULING:

YES. Petitioner FPCI is a common carrier.

Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person,
corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public." A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who holds
himself out to the public as engaged in the business of transporting persons or property
from place to place, for compensation, offering his services to the public generally.

TEST for Determining WON a party is a common carrier of goods:

1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public

employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and

4. The transportation must be for hire.

There is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business

of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public
employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons
who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from
the definition of a common carrier.

"Common carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means of

transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide that the
transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle.

Petition GRANTED. CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

CASE 3: Spouses Perena vs. Court of Appeals, GR 157917, 29 August 2012

DOCTRINE: The operator of a school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the
law. He is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He
is presumed to be negligent when death occurs to a passenger. His liability may include
indemnity for loss of earning capacity even if the deceased passenger may only be an
unemployed high school student at the time of the accident.
FACTS:

The Perenas were engaged in the business of transporting students from their
respective residences in Paranaque to Makati. In 1996, the Zarates contracted the
Perenas to transport Aaron (son of Zarates) to and from Don Bosco school. In an
incident, Aaron took the left side of the van near the door along with other 14 student
riders. While traversing the railroad crossing, PNR train (operated by Johny Alano) hit
the rear end of the van and the impact threw nine of the 12 students in the rear
including Aaron; he was dragged out of it which caused his death. Alano fled from the
scene. Consequently, the Zarates filed an action for damages against the driver, the
Perenas, PNR, and Alano.

The Zarates’ claim against the Pereñas was upon breach of the contract of
carriage for the safe transport of Aaron; but that against PNR was based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176, Civil Code. The Perenas adduced evidence that they had exercised
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro (the
driver). PNR defended that the van recklessly crossed the lane which caused the
collision.

RTC Ruling: Decided in favor of the Zarates and against the Perenas ordering them to
be jointly and severally liable to pay damages including a loss of earning capacity of
P2M; RTC reiterated cooperative gross negligence of the Pereñas and PNR had caused
the collision that led to the death of Aaron; and that the damages awarded to the Zarates
were not excessive. Perenas and PNR both appealed.

CA Ruling: affirmed RTC decision but modified the damages. Perena’s morecon was
denied.

ISSUE: WON the Perenas and PNR are solidarily liable based on breach of contract of
carriage and quasi-delict?

RULING:

YES. The Pereñas and the PNR are negligent. The Perenas were liable for the
death of Aaron Zarate.

Carrier Private Carrier

A carrier is a person or corporation who A private carrier is one who, without

undertakes to transport or convey goods
or persons from one place to another,
gratuitously or for hire. The carrier is
classified either as a private/special
carrier or as a common/public carrier.
making the activity a vocation, or without
holding himself or itself out to the public as
ready to act for all who may desire his or its
services, undertakes, by special agreement
in a particular instance only, to transport
goods or persons from one place to another
either gratuitously or for hire.
 In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that Article 1732 of the Civil
Code avoided any distinction between a person or an enterprise offering transportation
on a regular or an isolated basis; and has not distinguished a carrier offering his services
to the general public, that is, the general community or population, from one offering
his services only to a narrow segment of the general population.

A common carrier is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed

to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects of passengers,
or the death or injuries to passengers. The true test for a common carrier is not the
quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and character of
the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the undertaking is a part of the
activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the general public as his
business or occupation.

In this case, the Perenas were found to be: a) engaged in transporting passengers
generally as a business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry
passengers over established roads by the method by which the business was conducted;
and (c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the Pereñas
operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or
near where they operated the service and for a fee.

The Pereñas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact that their driver
might have acted beyond the scope of his authority or even in violation of the orders of
the common carrier. Hence, the lower courts correctly held both the Pereñas and the
PNR "jointly and severally" liable for damages arising from the death of Aaron.
Case #4 -Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.

FACTS
Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(TCTSI), and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) for the transfer of semi-chemical fluting paper and kraft liner board from the port
area to the Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.

Metal Vns, arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru”. After 24 hours,
they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port
Services, Inc. Petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo from
the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. The goods were
inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that some of the semi-chemical fluting
paper were “wet/stained/torn” and some of kraft liner board were also torn.

SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract.
Respondent on the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner
in RTC, Makati City. The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage
to the shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

1. Is a customs broker or warehouseman who offers his services to select clients a

common carrier?

2. Is petitioner liable for the damage of the goods?

RULING:

1. Pursuant to Article 1732, petitioner is a common carrier as transportation of goods

is an integral part of her business. Article 1732 defines “common carriers” as persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public. This article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular
or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
2. Petitioner is liable because she failed to prove that she exercised extraordinary
diligence in the carriage of goods, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art.
1735 applies. Under Article 1735 of the Civil Code, if the goods are proved to have been
lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed the extraordinary
diligence required by law. The burden of the plaintiff is to prove merely that the goods
he transported have been lost, destroyed or deteriorated. Thereafter, the burden is
shifted to the carrier to prove that he has exercised the extraordinary diligence required
by law. Thus, it has been held that the mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to
a carrier, and of their arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes out a prima
facie case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury
occurred, the carrier must be held responsible.

CASE #5. SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. SUN
HOLIDAYS, INC., Respondent.

Spouses Dante and Leonora Cruz (petitioners) lodged a Complaint against Sun Holidays,
Inc. (respondent) with the RTC of Pasig City for damages arising from the death of their
son Ruelito C. Cruz (Ruelito) who perished with his wife on board the boat M/B Coco
Beach III that capsized en route to Batangas from Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro
where the couple had stayed at Coco Beach Island Resort (Resort) owned and operated
by respondent.

Facts:

The newly wed Ruelito and his wife stayed at the Resort from September 9 to 11,
2000 was by virtue of a tour package-contract with respondent that included
transportation to and from the resort and the point of departure in Batangas.

One of the survivors, Miguel Matute, gave his account of the incident that led to the
filing of the complaint.

He was originally scheduled to leave the Resort in the afternoon of September 10, 3000,
but was advised to stay for another night because of strong winds and heavy rains,

On September 11, 2000, as it was windy, Matute and 25 other resort guests including
the petitioner’s son and his wife boarded M/B Coco Beach III.

Shortly after the boat sailed, it started to rain. The waves got more unwieldy and
after hit by two big waves which came one after the other, M/B Coco Beach III
capsized putting all passengers underwater.

Matute and others who reached the surface, asked the Captain upon seeing him what
they could do to save those who were still trapped under the boat, but the Captain
replied “iligtas niyo na lang ang sarili niyo”

Eight (8) passengers, including petitioner’s son and his wife, died during the
incident.

Petitioners demanded indemnification from respondent for the death of their son in the
amount of at least P4,000,000.00
Respondent denied any responsibility for the incident which it considered to be a
fortuitous event. It nevertheless offered, as an act of commiseration, the amount of
P10,000 to petitioners upon their signing of a waiver.

Petitioners declined respondent’s offer and filed a complaint alleging that

respondent, as a common carrier, was guilty of negligence in allowing M/B Coco
Beach III to sail notwithstanding storm warning bulletins issued by the PAGASA as early
as 5:00 am of September 11, 2000.

In its Answer, respondent denied being a common carrie, alleging that its boats are
not available to the general public as they only ferry guests and crew members.

Issue:

Whether or not Sun Holidays, Inc. is a common carrier since by its tour package, the
transporting of its guest is an integral part of its resort business.

Ruling:

Yes.

The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations

engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service
on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one
who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions.

In the case at bar, the Resort accepts clients by virtue of a tour-package contracts that
included transportation to and from the Resort and the point of departure in Batangas
is considered a common carrier.

Its ferry services are so intertwined with its main business as to be properly considered
ancillary thereto.

The constancy of respondent’s ferry services in its resort operations is underscored by

its having its own Coco Beach boats. And the tour packages it offers, which include the
ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These
services are thus available to the public.
 Case 6. Estela Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., GR 138334, 25 August 2003

Facts:

 Petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel

and Tours to arrange her tour "Jewels of Europe" at a total cost of P74,322.70. A 5%
discount was given and the booking fee was also waived.
 Menor delivered travel documents and plane tickets to the petitioner, and in return gave
Menor the full payment. Menor then told her that her flight will be on Saturday.
 Petitioner did not check her documents and went to NAIA on Saturday and discovered
that the flight she was supposed to take had departed the previous day, Friday.
 Menor asked the petitioner to take another tour – the "British Pageant", the petitioner
was asked to pay P20,881.00 and she gave respondent P7,980.00 as partial payment.
 Upon petitioner’s return from tour, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement
of P61,421.70, representing the difference between the sum she paid for "Jewels of
Europe" and the amount she owed respondent for the "British Pageant" tour. But the
respondent company refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same was
non-refundable.
 Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and
damages.
 In her complaint, petitioner alleged that her failure to join "Jewels of Europe" was due
to respondent’s fault since it did not clearly indicate the departure date on the plane
ticket. Respondent was also negligent in informing her of the wrong flight schedule
through its employee Menor. She insisted that the "British Pageant" was merely a
substitute for the "Jewels of Europe" tour, such that the cost of the former should be
properly set-off against the sum paid for the latter.
 Respondent company denied responsibility for petitioner’s failure to join the first tour
and insisted that the petitioner was informed of the correct departure date, which was
clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket as was given two days ahead of the
scheduled trip.
 Respondent explained that it can no longer reimburse the amount paid for "Jewels of
Europe", considering that the same had already been remitted to its principal in
Singapore and maintained that the "British Pageant" was not a substitute for the
package tour that petitioner missed. This tour was independently procured by
petitioner.

Issue:
I. Whether or not the parties entered into a contract of carriage the common carrier.
II. Whether or not the respondent is obliged to observe utmost care and extra-ordinary
diligence which is higher in degree than the ordinary diligence required of the
passenger.

Rulings:
I.
 No. A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or
association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from
one place to another for a fixed price. A common carrier is defined under Article 1732
of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
 It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the
business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private
nor a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one
place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as a travel agency include procuring
tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.
 The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the latter’s service of
arranging and facilitating petitioner’s booking, ticketing and accommodation in the
package tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of
passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this case
was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage. Petitioner’s submission is
premised on a wrong assumption.

II.
 The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is
determinative of the degree of care required in the performance of the latter’s obligation
under the contract. For reasons of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of
carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as far as human care and foresight can
provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due regard for all
the circumstances. As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a common carrier but
a travel agency. It is thus not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in
the performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims.
 Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of
care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the
Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily
prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test
to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
7. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING
CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES, Respondents.

FACTS:
G. P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver a 30 units of Condura
S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central
Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.
While traversing the North Diversion Road, it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes (P204,450.00)
to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CII’s rights & interests, FGU, in turn,
sought reimbursement from GPS.

Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of
contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC.

In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII
since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier. GRANTED.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an
appeal to the CA. CA REJECTED.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES 1: ETO LANG YUNG ISSUE CONNECTED SA TOPIC NATING COMMON

CARRIER

WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined under the law & existing
jurisprudence.
RULING:

NO. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified.

Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the

business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air,
for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in
general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true
test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers/goods, providing space for those
who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term “common carrier.”
In this case, GPS, being an exclusive contractor & hauler of Concepcion Industries,
Inc., rendering/offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered
a common carrier.
ISSUE 2.
WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to have
been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were subsequently
damaged while in its protective custody & possession.
RULING:

Yes. GPS cannot escape from liability.

In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a
party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.
A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering
that which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of
the promisee that may include his:
1. Expectation interest – interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed; 2. Reliance
interest – interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been
made;
2. Restitution interest – interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect
of every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has
been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he
can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally
that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law
such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the
attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of
lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.

Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof
of his negligence/fault. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between
petitioner’s principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A
contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have
assumed their personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios
acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third
person. Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana,
which would require the claimant for damages to prove the defendant’s negligence/fault.
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Jesus Garcia, GR 115381, 23 December 1994

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Jesus Garcia,

GR 115381, 23 December 1994

Doctrine in re. Transportation Law:

Public Utilities; Common Carriers; Words and Phrases;

When one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to the control by
the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.—
Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose services are
essential to the general public.
They are enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce to
their comfort and convenience. As such, public utility services are impressed with
public interest and concern. The same is true with respect to the business of common
carrier which holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is
superinduced upon it the right of public regulation when private properties are
affected with public interest, hence, they cease to be juris privati only. When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to the control by
the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.
Nature of the case:

Petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order.
The Petition assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars
and/orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board LTFRB) which, among others:
(a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the LTFRB and
without hearing and approval thereof by said agency
(b) and to establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for
certificates of public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving
that there is no need for the proposed service,

Facts:
 Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395
to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below
the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
 This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009
providing, among others, that:
"The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for
provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with
the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for
the expanded fare range."

 Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PBOAP,) availing itself of the deregulation
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus
25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and
without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%)
percent of the existing fares.

 On March 16, 1994, petitioner KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU) filed a petition before
the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.
 LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit, thus the instant petition.

Issues:

(Locus Standi)
In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the
issues raised by the petitioner, questions the wisdom and the manner by which the
instant petition was filed.
PBOAP asserts that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest
in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for.

Also in their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner
does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is
within DOTC and LTFRB’s authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a
presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience.

SC:

In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers,
members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic
organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to
question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of
various government agencies or instrumentalities

In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer
grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned
memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that
was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged
memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,
trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary
increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise
the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
Personal Notes:

Private respondents and even the OSG questioned the locus standi of KMU, however
even SC pointed that the issue was imbued with public interest. KMU gained Locus
Standi by reason of the nature of those whom they represent and since the industry was
public in nature.

Main Issue:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators
to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus
twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing
authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional,
invalid and illegal.

HELD:
Yes.

Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct
Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent
LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under
Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987.

However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the
PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.

Fallo
the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order
No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24,
1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid
insofar as they affect provisions therein

(a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or
decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and
(b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a
certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need
for the proposed service to the oppositor.
TRO was also granted and made permanent insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate
increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars,
memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.
CASE 9

CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA,

NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA,
PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners, vs. VICTORIO OCHOA,
MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978]

FACTS:

 This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause.
 On September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney
driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa and
Borilla is the employer of Ochoa
 For the death of Arsenio Virata, an action for homicide through reckless
imprudence was instituted against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as Case No. 3162-P of said court
 Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate
civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability and filed a
motion in said case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action
 thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and presented
evidence on the damages;
 On June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to
institute a separate civil action and commenced Civil No. B-134 for damages
based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner
of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa
 Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another
action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same
cause
 The Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No.
3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an
injury by name accident
 Then, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil
Case No. B-134 for damages

ISSUE: Whether or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the
damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and
owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.

HELD: YES.
  It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an
action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
 Before Criminal Case was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that
they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver
of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict.
 The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case
is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on
quasi-delict
 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134
is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law.
 Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or
omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
 The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-
134 is reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with
costs against the private respondents.

CASE 10. Tiu vs. Arriesgado, GR 138060, 1 September 2004

Tiu vs Arriesgado

Facts:

 On March 15, 1987, a Truck marked “Condor Hollow Blocks and General
Merchandise” was on its way to Cebu when it’s rear tire exploded. The driver
Sergio Pedrano then parked the truck on the side of the National Highway, left
the rear lights on, and instructed his helper, Jose Mitante, to watch over the
truck and place a spare tire on the road a few meters away from the tire to
serve as a warning device as he went and had the faulty tire vulcanized.
 After Pedrano left, D’ Rough Riders passenger bus carrying the respondent,
passed by the same route and hit the truck. The petitioner was injured in the
collision and his wife, Felissa Arriesgado eventually died after sustaining
injuries from the same. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioner for
breach of contract of carriage, damages and for attorney’s fees against the
petitioner, the owner of the bus, William Tiu and his driver, Laspinas.
 However, the petitioner filed a third-party complaint alleging that the said truck
was parked in a slanted manner and did not have any early warning devices
displayed while it was left by the driver which resulted to the collision and
would therefore make, Benjamin Condor, the owner of the truck liable as well.
 The trial court found that the contention of the petitioner was invalid because
the said truck had left its tail lights open and that the said road was well lit at
the time of the accident. Hence, it was the fault of the bus, for traveling at a fast
pace, that the collision happened. The Petitioner, Tiu, appealed to the CA but
was denied which prompted him to seek reconsideration.
Issue:

WoN Petitioner was negligent as a driver of the passenger bus.

Ruling:

 YES.
 The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their
passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755and 1756. It is
undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the
destination agreed upon.
 In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved. This
is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the
express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is
immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of
the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the
duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in
the care of his passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest
possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may be submitted to overcome
such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the
required extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight
can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event.
 As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut
such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the
passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitionerTiu, as the owner of the
passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.
 The court found that indeed, the petitioner, was liable for being negligent while
being engaged in the business of common carriage. The SC could no longer
change the facts that were sustained in the trial court and court of appeals
hence, since it was deemed that the bus was moving in a very fast speed which
was the cause of the accident, the SC will have to sustain that ruling and hold
that indeed, there was negligence on the part of the petitioner.

Del Carmen, Jr. vs. Bacoy, et al., GR 173870, 25 April 2012

CASE 11: DEL CARMEN JR. VS. BACOY, ET AL
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY
MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD,
KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B.
MONSALUD, Respondents.
(GR NO. 173870, April 25, 2012)

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the registered owner of a motor vehicle who
challenges CA’s Decision which held him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims
who were run over by the said vehicle.

Spouses Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and Emilia Bacoy Monsalud along with their daughter
Glenda Monsalud were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended when
they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep that was being driven by Allan Maglasang
(Allan). The said vehicle was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr.
(Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle.

Because of the unfortunate incident, a Criminal Case was filed against Allan before the
RTC-Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. During the pendency the criminal case, Emilia’s
father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children of the
Monsaluds, filed a Civil Case -an independent civil action for damages based on culpa
aquiliana, against Allan, along with his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar
del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the
registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr.

Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the
award of attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages resulting from the death of the
three victims, and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a
publicschool teacher at the time of her death.

Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims’ deaths. Oscar Sr. averred
that the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do
not own the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan.

Oscar Jr. alleged that Allan and his friends stole his jeep while it was parked beside his
driver’s rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified
that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key, but
would run without any headlights on.

The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared before the
investigating officer that during said time, the vehicle’s headlights were off. Because of
this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case against
Allan and his companions but was dismissed.

Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latter's brother,
Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver; He likewise testified that
it was routinary that after a day's trip, the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigo's rented
house for the next early-morning operation.

RTC’s ruling: RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency
of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity.
The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a
presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that
caused an injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course
of things, the accident would not have happened had there been an exercise of care.
Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and
controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo.

Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration contending that the provision on vicarious liability
of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code requires the existence of employer-
employee relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his
employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his
employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond
the scope of his employment when he drove the jeep.

RTC granted the Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability.

Geronimo appealed.

CA’s Ruling: The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for
the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It
disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping
case was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to
have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers
were assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the
brothers’ house and not returned to del Carmen’s residence; the jeep could easily be
started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or
secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even
without the ignition key.

ISSUE:
WoN the registered owner of the vehicle is directly and primarily liable for the damages
caused by the same.

RULING:
Yes. Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary liable.
Petitioner’s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given the dismissal of
the carnapping case filed by petitioner against Allan, the former also admitted to such
dismissal in the SC.

Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen,
which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability
for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep's use.

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “where the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants;
and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence
of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant – that the accident arose
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. All three are present in the case at
bar.

Heirs of Redentor Completo vs. Sgt. Albayda, GR 172200, 6 July 2010

Case 12- Heirs of Redentor Completo v Amando Albayda, Jr. Ponente:

Nachura J.

Facts: Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the

Philippine Air Force. Petitioner Redentor Completo (Completo), now represented by his
heirs, was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla, owned and operated by co-petitioner
Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).
Albayda and Completo figured in an accident along the intersection of 8th and
11th Streets of Villamor Air Base. While Albayda was on his way to the office to report
for duty, riding a bicycle, the taxi driven by Completo bumped and sideswiped him,
causing serious physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the Philippine Air Force
General Hosp. However, he was transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Medical Center because there was a fracture in his left knee and there was no orthopedic
doctor available at PAFGH.
Conciliation in the barangay failed so Albayda filed a complaint for physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence at the Office of City Prosecutor of Pasay, the latter
then recommended that the information be filed in court. Completo, on the other hand,
filed a counter-charge of damage to property thru reckless imprudence against Albayda,
however it was dismissed by the City Prosecutor.
When the case reached the court Albayda manifested his reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad. He alleged that the
proximate cause of the incident which necessitated his stay in the hospital for
approximately seven months was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the
accident, was in the employ of Abiad. He also asked for moral, exemplary and attorney’s
fee.
Meanwhile, Completo posited that Albayda had no cause of action. The accident
and the physical injuries suffered by Albayda were caused by his own negligence, and
his purpose in filing the complaint was to harass petitioners and unjustly enrich himself
at their expense. During the trial, he also presented Abiad as his witness where the
latter testified that he required the former to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and
driver’s license when Completo applied for work and he was never involved in any
vehicular accident. Abiad further testified that he would wake up early and personally
check all the taxicabs and that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family.
The court ruled in favor of Albayda on the ground that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda and this gives rise to liability on the part
of Completo, as driver, and his employer Abiad.
The CA affirmed the trial court but it deleted the award of actual damages for
failing to present documentary evidence to establish with certainty the amount that he
incurred during his hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he suffered.
Hence, this petition.

Issues:
W/N CA erred in ruling that Completo was the cause of the collision? NO!
W/N Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the
family. YES

Ruling:
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury
to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the
bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the
serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down even when
he approached the intersection. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of way,
considering that he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
 As to Abiad the owner of the taxi: Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. When an injury is
caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on
the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes
the legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden
of proof is on the employer.

The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid
collision with Albayda gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as driver, and his
employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-
delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee
is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The civil liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside
the vehicle at the time of the collision.

Abiad’s evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and this is insufficient

to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and
supervision of Completo.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. Decisions of the trial court and CA are
affirmed.
LRTA vs. Marjorie Navidad, et al., GR 145804, 6 February 2003

G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT
SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the
area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate
how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along
with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for
the death of her husband.

The RTC held that Prudent and Escartin were liable and were ordered to pay jointly and
severally the damages for the death of Navidad.

On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin from any liability for the death of
Navidad and held that LRTA and Roman were jointly and severally liable. It ruled that
the contract of carriage has already existed when Navidad entered the premises of the
LRTA when he paid for the token as fee for his fare.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death;

2. Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.

HELD:

1.
A. Yes, LRTA is liable for the death of Navidad. The foundation of LRTA's liability
is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arising from
 the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of a common carrier.

A common carrier is required to use utmost diligence in carrying passengers with

due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course
of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they
ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due
to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

B. No, Roman is not liable for the death of Navidad. There is no showing that
Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission and the contractual tie
between LRTA and Navidad is not a judicial relation between the latter and
Roman. Thus, roman can be made liable only for his own negligence.

2. No, Prudent and Escartin are not liable for the death of Navidad.
There is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor Navidad, for the reason
that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. If Prudent
is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art.
2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer,
Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.