B2022 REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer vs CA Filamer vs CA
Petitioner: FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE,
Respondent: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P.
SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of Appeals, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN SR.,
Recit-ready summary
Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of petitioner Filamer Christian Institute.
One day, Funtecha, who had a student’s driver’s license requested the driver, Allan Masa,
to take over the vehicle, a Pinoy jeep, while the latter was on his way home one late
afternoon. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road,
negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.
● Note that Allan was a driver and security guard of the school He lived with his
father, who was the president of the school. Funtecha lived with them as well.
Allan’s job demands that he bring home the jeep so that he can pick the students
the next day.
Allan testified that there was a moving track that nearly hit them so they had to swerve to
the right to avoid collision. However, the jeep swerved and hit a pedestrian, Potenciano
Kapunan.
The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Funtecha for serious PI through reckless
imprudence, and he was convicted. The heirs reserved the right to file a separate civil action
and later filed an action against Filamer, Funtecha, Agustin Masa (director and president
of Filamer though sued in his personal capacity for personally allowing Funtecha to drive).
Lower court held Funtecha, Filamer, and Allan Masa liable. In its defense, petitioner
Filamer alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between Fulamer and
Fintecha, hence the former cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of the latter.
W/N Filamer Institute is liable for the acts of Funtecha.
No in the 1990 case, YES in the 1992 case.
1990 decision. NO. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render
service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha worked for petitioner for two
hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from
4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted
by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.
G.R. NO: 75112
ARTICLE; TOPIC OF CASE: Owners and Managers of Enterprises / Employers DIGEST MAKER: Eon
VOL [August 17, 1992]
● But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the
primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner
Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been
satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his
supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours
every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep
from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in
a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly
not within the ambit of his assigned tasks.
1992 MR. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his
own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and on behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner- school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties.
The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving
the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of
the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at
the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment
for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for
the benefit of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of
his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show
proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over
its employees Funtecha and Allan.
PONENTE: Gutierrez Jr.
 B2022 REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer vs CA
In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under
Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a
party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that
as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was
Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive.
For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough
that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that
Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in
furtherance of the business of his employer.
A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily
demonstrated.
FACTS:
Funtecha is a working student. He is a part-time janitor and scholar of petitioner Filamer
Christian Institute. In relation to the school, he was an employee even if he was assigned
to clean the school premises for only 2 hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, to take over
the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon.
It is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the
school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was
allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating
a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.
G.R. NO: 75112
ARTICLE; TOPIC OF CASE: Owners and Managers of Enterprises / Employers DIGEST MAKER: Eon
VOL [August 17, 1992]
Filamer vs CA
In Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they
had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check.
Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed
that Funtecha followed his advice to swerve to the right. At the time of the incident (6:30
P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-
school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after
driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and
then drive home using the same vehicle.
The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer for damages. In its defense, petitioner
Filamer alleged that Funtecha acted outside the scope of his authortity. Therefore, it was
only Funtecha who was liable and not Filamer
On the other hand, rivate respondent asserts that Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
applicable since Funtecha is an employee of the petitioner. They argue that under said
article, an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for
whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the
interest and benefit of the petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N Filamer Institute is liable for the acts of Funtecha? YES.
RULING:
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose
of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the
jeep was intended by the petitioner school.
Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-
school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties.
The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
PONENTE: Gutierrez Jr.
 B2022 REPORTS ANNOTATED
Filamer vs CA
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving
the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of
the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at
the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of
his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show
proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over
its employees Funtecha and Allan.
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for
in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and
guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles
if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president
from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner
has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use
of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil.
760, 772 [1918]) In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it
the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the
employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are
paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a
party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that
as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was
Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive.
G.R. NO: 75112
ARTICLE; TOPIC OF CASE: Owners and Managers of Enterprises / Employers DIGEST MAKER: Eon
VOL [August 17, 1992]
Filamer vs CA
The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse
against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore
for the petitioner even for a short while.
For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough
that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that
Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in
furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the
petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court
decision is REINSTATED.
Notes
Kapunan filed a case against?
Funtecha (driver), Filamer (school), and Masa, Sr. (President of Filamer).
As to Masa, Sr., who was Funtecha?
He was a janitor.
So, Kapunan sued the 4, and the issue in this case boiled down to whether
Filamer could be held vicariously liable for the acts of?
Funtecha.
Based on what theory?
Kapunan was arguing that Filamer should be held vicariously liable because
he allowed Funtecha to drive the car even if he was not employed as a
driver, but as a janitor.
In the first Filamer case, as to the decision whether Filamer could be held
vicariously liable as an employer, what did the SC say? Liable or not liable?
Not liable.
Ok, Filamer was not liable for 2 reasons. First reason was? Because first,
working students cannot be considered employees of the school.
Atty. Jess Lopez: Ok, so, you have to this Labor Code IRR provision which
says that there is no EER between a working scholar and a school, and in
PONENTE: Gutierrez Jr.
 B2022 REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL [August 17, 1992]

Filamer vs CA Filamer vs CA

the first Filamer case, the SC ruled that in light of codal provision,
necessarily, there can be no EER between Filamer and Funtencha.
As to the 2nd reason why Filamer was not held vicariously liable in the first
Filamer case, Funtecha was employed as a janitor, and was driving the jeep
within the scope of Funtecha’s acts as a janitor? No.
In fact, the act of driving the jeep was foreign to his functions as a janitor,
obviously. What are his functions as a janitor? He was to sweep the school
passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes.
Atty. Jess Lopez: So, kahit janitor pero nagdrive siya and the act of driving
was for the benefit of the employer or inured to the benefit of the employer,
then that would still be considered as acting within the scope of the assigned
tasks.
In this case, how was the act of driving in furtherance of Filamer’s interests?
Because Fontecha was driving the school bus to the house of Masa, Sr. so
that it can be parked there, and in the following morning, it can be used
again to fetch the students from their houses to the school premises.

Atty. Jess Lopez: In the first Filamer case, Filamer was not found to be
vicariously liable for 2 reasons: (1) First, no EER; and (2) Second, Funtecha
not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.

In the 2nd Filamer case, what did the SC do?

The SC reversed itself.

And the SC ruled this time, in the 2 nd case, that?

Filamer is vicariously liable.

What did the Court in the 2nd Filamer case as regards the existence of the
EER? How did the Court construe the Labor Code IRR provision on working
scholars?
The SC said that Labor Code IRR is not the decisive law in a civil suit for
damages. While that provision is valid and binding for labor cases, it is not
binding in civil cases for purposes of determining the existence of an EER.

What did the SC in the 2nd Filamer case as regards the 2nd reason of the 1st
Filamer decision, not acting within the scope of the assigned tasks? In the
1st Filamer case, SC said that Funtecha was a janitor and driving a jeep was
outside the scope of his assigned tasks. Therefore, in the 1 st Filamer case,
Filamer was not liable because Funtecha was not acting within the scope of
his assigned tasks. In the 2nd Filamer case, did the Court modify or reverse
that ruling? Yes.

How?
The SC here said that “in the performance of assigned tasks” should also
include those acts that for the benefit of or in furtherance of the interests of
the employer.

Atty. Jess Lopez: So, the 2nd Filamer case is very important to us. Why?
Because it tells us what test is to be applied for the purpose of determining
whether an employee acts within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.

And what is that test?

If the employee acts for the benefit of or in furtherance of the interests of
the employer.

G.R. NO: 75112 PONENTE: Gutierrez Jr.

ARTICLE; TOPIC OF CASE: Owners and Managers of Enterprises / Employers DIGEST MAKER: Eon