CASE 1 3019, the crime should have prescribed in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  1986. x x x
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR., respondents.
G.R. No 101724
July 3, 1992
FACTS:
Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986
and December 9, 1986, with the Tanodbayan by
Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina
Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of
Agusan del Sur, shortly after the private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of
Agusan del Sur in March 1986. Gelacio's complaint
questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he
was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent
title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq.
m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
On August 10, 1989, an information for violation of RA
3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed
in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary
investigation.
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan
"An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall
Warrant of Arrest" alleging that he is charged for an
offense which has prescribed.  The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution on August 1, 1991 granting the
motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the
offense charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of
its resolution is quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been
committed "on or about January 21, 1976"
when the accused allegedly misrepresented
to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands
that the land subject of the herein movant's
Application for a Free Patent was disposable
land. This misrepresentation allegedly resulted
in the issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free
Patent to the herein accused-movant. This, the
Information avers, was prejudicial to the public
interest because the land in question had been
reserved for a school site and was, therefore,
not disposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a)
of R.A. No. 3019 because the accused had
allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the
Public Lands Inspector to violate existing law,
rules and regulations by recommending approval
of the free patent application.
The accused asserts that since at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime
(January 21, 1976) the period of prescription
was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash was validly
granted.
HELD:
YES.  R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the computation of
the period for the prescription of the crime of violating it
is governed by Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which
provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of
the violation of the law becomes the operative date for
the commencement of the period of prescription".
Assuming that Paredes did induce the lands inspector
(Armando Luison) to recommend approval of his
application for free patent (which both of them denied
doing), the date of the violation, for the purpose of
computing the period of prescription, would be the
date of filing his application on January 21, 1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period
should not commence upon the filing of Paredes'
application because no one could have known about it
except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not
correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it
is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the
disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass
upon the application for a free patent including the
location of the land and, therefore, the disposable
character thereof". Indeed, practically all the department
personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving
the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who
inspected the land to ascertain its location and
occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical
description: (3) the regional director who assessed the
application and determined the land classification: (4) the
Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5)
the Department Secretary who signed it, could not have
helped "discovering" that the subject of the application
was nondisposable public agricultural land.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime"
whether it was the filing of Paredes application for a free
patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced
Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10)
years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint,
dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to
run from the registration and issuance of the free patent
title by the Register of Deeds on May 28,
1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole
world, the prescriptive period would have fully run its
course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before
Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13)
years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the
Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the
information therein.
Additionally, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11
R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen
(15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive
application to the "crime" which was committed by
Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be
prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of
the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years)
prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019,
which was an essential element of the "crime" at the
time he committed it.
Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective
in their terms,  they do not apply to crimes
previously committed  However, a few days later, the same counsel filed a
To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it
an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to
his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for
a crime that had already been extinguished under
the law existing when it was committed.
Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our
Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution),
the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in
ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for
his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6)
years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March
16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law
should apply only to those offenses which were
committed after the approval of B.P. 195.
Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided. (favorable to accused)
CASE 2
ARNEL P. MISOLAS, petitioner,  unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA, as Judge of RTC
Branch 33, Cadlan Pili, Camarines Sur and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 83341
January 30, 1990
FACTS:
After receiving information from an unidentified informant
that members of the New People's Army (NPA) were
resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster
Village, Del Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided said house in
the early morning of August 8, 1987. Three persons
were inside the house, petitioner and two women known
by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the
women were able to escape in the confusion during the
raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a
red bag under a pillow allegedly used by petitioner a .20
gauge Remington shotgun and four live rounds of
ammunition. Petitioner was arrested and brought to the
PC headquarters. On September 4, 1987, an
information charging petitioner with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was filed by the
provincial fiscal. The information alleged that the firearm
and ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion
so as to qualify the offense under the third paragraph of
Sec 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which provides: 
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of,
or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty
of death shall be imposed.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, with the assistance of
counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was
basis for the filing of a motion to quash. Respondent
judge gave petitioner time to file a motion to
quash. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because the information does not charge the proper
offense since from the allegations the offense that
may be charged is either subversion or rebellion.
Respondent judge denied the motion to quash for lack of
merit in an order dated January 7, 1988. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but such was denied on
February 15, 1988.
ISSUE(s):
(1) W/N the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition committed in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, should be
stricken down as unconstitutional.
(2) W/N P.D. No. 1866 should be struck down as
HELD:
(1) NO. Republic Act No. 1700, as amended, provides in
Section 4 that "if such member [of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any
subversive association] takes up arms against the
Government, he shall be punished by prision
mayor to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code."
Thus, given the particular facts of the case, petitioner
could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A. No.
1700. But as bluntly pointed out by petitioner:  and the rebellion, insurrection, and subversion under the
. . . It is a matter of public knowledge that the
military has even admitted its policy or practice
of charging armed subversives or rebels with
"qualified" illegal possession of firearms instead
of subversion or rebellion for two reasons: (1)
the former is easier to prosecute than the latter,
and (2) the former has a higher penalty than the
latter.
Undeniably, it is easier to prove that a person has
unlawfully possessed a firearm and/or ammunition under
P.D. No. 1866 than to establish that he had knowingly,
wilfully and by overt acts affiliated himself with, became
or remained a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive
organization under R.A. No. 1700, as conviction under
the latter "requires that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives
of the Party.
However, that the same act may be penalized under two
different statutes with different penalties, even if
considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and
onerous to the accused, will not necessarily call for the
invalidation of the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 which provides for the higher penalty.
In the present case, petitioner is being charged
specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition under P.D. 1866. HE IS NOT
BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY
CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
That the facts charged comply with the elements of
the offense penalized in the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is not disputed. But
petitioner asserts that the nature of his alleged acts
requires that he be charged with subversion or with
rebellion instead of qualified illegal possesion of
firearms and ammunition, perhaps in view of the
lower penalty for subversion and rebellion. Quashal
of the information cannot be had on this ground, the
matter of what offense to charge in the information
being within the prosecutor's sound discretion.
(2) NO. In thjis separate opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento
espouses the view that P.D. No. 1866 should be struck
down as unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.
“ I find, first and foremost, the law to be a bill of attainder
the aforequoted provisions specifically, as it has been
defined, that is, "a legislative enactment which inflicts
punishment without trial. It is a bill of attainder so I
submit, because it presumes the accused, upon
conviction, to be guilty as well-of the crimes (murder and
homicide under the second paragraph of Section One,
third paragraph of Section Three) that supposedly
merely qualify the offense of "illegal possession" (or
"illegal manufacture" as the case may be) when the
accused has not been tried and found guilty of either
crimes in any judicial proceeding. In the case at bar,
the fact that the petitioner has been charged with
illegal possession of firearms "in furtherance of
subversion" means that the petitioner has
committed subversion, notwithstanding the fact that
he is not standing trial for subversion. ” (TAKEN
FROM THE DISSENTING OPINION OF SARMIENTO
J.)
Initially, it must be pointed out that the petition never
challenged P.D. No. 1866 on that ground. As discussed
earlier, petitioner objected to P.D. 1866 on the ground of
substantive due process. Established rules of
constitutional litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry
based on the theory that P.D. No. 1866 constitutes a bill
of attainder. It must also be noted that while petitioner
challenges only the third paragraph of section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, Mr. Justice Sarmiento would have the other
portions of the law invalidated. Again, this is
impermissible.
But even if a challenge on the ground that P.D. 1866 is a
bill of attainder could be appropriately considered, it will
still be met with little success. The Court, in People
v. Ferrer, supra, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative
act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members
of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a
bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals
or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,
penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last
element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding
of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be
imposed, is the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not
possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does
not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt
and an imposition of a corresponding punishment.
What the decree does is to define the offense and
provide for the penalty that may be imposed,
specifying the qualifying circumstances that would
aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on
the power of the court to determine after due hearing
whether the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal
possession of firearms has been committed and that
the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been
established also beyond reasonable doubt as the
Constitution and judicial precedents require.
CASE 3
AAA, Petitioner 
vs.
BBB, Respondent
 G.R. No. 212448
January 11, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006
in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC
was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1,
2009.
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a
chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in
September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates
his address to be in Quezon City where his parents
reside and where AAA also resided from the time they
were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their
children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that
BBB sent little to no financial support, and only
sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra
hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income
as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of
virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son
CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make
matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an
affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok
with whom he allegedly has been living in
Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011
when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a
hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their
kids. As can be gathered from the earlier cited
Information, despite the claims of varied forms of
abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient
basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital
infidelity.
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest
was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a
Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to
evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived. On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance
as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to
Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure
Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB.
The trial court granted the motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the
case. Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case,
AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant
petition on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an
offense constituting psychological violence under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the
alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside
the country?
HELD
YES. The elements of psychological violence under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and
Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor children or access to the
woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other
sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime
are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or
children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the
offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with
whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child
mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the children or similar· such acts or omissions.
What R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence
causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under
the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.
Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which psychological violence may be
committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances
of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit
relationship may or may not even be causing mental or
emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or
emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
distinct element in the commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas
v. People, the Court explained that:
The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but
is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
 should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. x x x
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly
pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA,
Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the
crime or any of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as
the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential
also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which
is personal to the complainant.
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No.
9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential
thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the
crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it
being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction
when the abusive conduct or act of violence under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a),
Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine
territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where
the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered
being a material element of the offense. In the present
scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent
husband are residents of Pasig City since March of
2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise
jurisdiction over the case.
CASE 4
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,  Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent
G.R. No. 217874
December 5, 2017
FACTS:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the
Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC),Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an
accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted
to the position of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of
which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and
collection officer. As such, petitioner received cash and
other collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special
message fees. The collections she received were
deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor
of the Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash
examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as
instructed by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result,
Lopez came across deposit slips dated September 19,
1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, respectively. Upon close
scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did not bear
a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine
validated. The auditors then found that petitioner duly
accounted for the ₱81,340.20 remittance but not for the
₱11,300.00.
Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for
malversation of public funds against petitioner with the
Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due
investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss
of ₱11,300.00. Accordingly, petitioner was charged
before the RTC of Baguio City.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her conviction but
modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however,
the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has no
appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower
than Salary Grade 27. Petitioner's new counsel, Atty.
Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen, then appealed the case to
the Sandiganbayan.
In a Decision dated November 13, 2009, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment of
conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a
Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013,
the Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became final and
executory. On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent
Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with
same and directed the execution of the judgment of
conviction. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of
Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution
of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise
denied.
ISSUE(s):
(1) Whether or not accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation of
public funds.
(2) Whether or not the case may be reopened for
further reception of evidence.
HELD:
(1) YES. The elements of malversation of public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:
(1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were
public funds or property for which he was accountable;
and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them. This article
establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails
to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he
is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds to personal uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she, together
with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and
handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller
Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her
version. For another, when questioned about the subject
deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same
readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain
its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all
that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that she
did not have them in her possession when demand
therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily
explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed
that it was somebody else who misappropriated the
said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for
malversation.
(2) NO, but the instant case was nevertheless
reopened ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in
view of the enactment of an amendatory law
favorable to the accused.
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the
absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be
before the finality of a judgment of conviction already
cripples the Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of
the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration had already become final
and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the
Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24,
Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own
initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of
justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days
from the issuance of the order
However, the Court held that it is still necessary to
reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the
Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in
order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land. When, however,
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court
may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the
penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an
example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we
have here a novel situation wherein the judgment
convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already
become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed
thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of
said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner’s
sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the
retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being
favorable to the accused, she may even apply for
probation, as long as she does not possess any ground
for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on
probation, or R.A. No. 10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that
petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of
suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to
reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment
dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6)
months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is
P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the
new penalty that should be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which
has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day, to six (6) years.
The Court also held that when exceptional
circumstances exist, such as the passage of the
instant amendatory law imposing penalties more
lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall
not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of which is to
correct not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties to be imposed.
CASE 5
INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON,
MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS,
SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL,
HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F. TEJADA,
ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. MONDEJAR,
ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO,
EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO,
JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO NERI,
JR., Petitioners  of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the
vs.
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Respondents
G.R. No. 212719
June 25, 2019
FACTS:
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S.
Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). For reference, the
modifications are underscored as follows:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment
deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of their sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time
during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily
in writing after being informed of the effects thereof
and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted
previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance
of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which
he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated,
he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on
appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of
preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate
release under this paragraph shall be the actual
period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is
absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the
trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest
of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists,
habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage
accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal
liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may
earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment
or serving his sentence.
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good
conduct of any offender qualified for credit for
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of
this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any
other local jail shall entitle him to the following
deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each
month of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of twenty-three days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year,
inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of thirty days for each month of good behavior during
detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he
shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in
addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each
month of study, teaching or mentoring service time
rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of
entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct.
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A
deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall
be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his
preventive imprisonment or the service of his
sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article
158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities
within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of
two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be
granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the
place of his confinement notwithstanding the
existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in
Article 158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving
sentence.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever
lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a
provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once
granted shall not be revoked. (Emphases ours)
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly
issued by respondents Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel
A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective on
April 18, 2014. Petitioners and intervenors assail the
validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the
prospective application of the grant of good conduct
time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study,
teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time
allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground
that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.
On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction) was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary
De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J.
Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact of convicted
prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP). They contend
that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature
and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given
retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the
RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it
implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex
for the Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) and the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to
retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records
are complete and the distinctions between the pertinent
provisions of the RPC and R.A. No. 10592 are easily
identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple standards
added by the new law, which are matters of record, and
the creation of the Management, Screening and
Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not override the
constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and due
process of law aside from the principle that penal laws
beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect.
ISSUE:
W/N R.A. No. 10592 is penal law and hence, Article
22 of the RPC, providing for the retroactive effect of
penal law, applies.
HELD:
YES. While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a
crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation
component of our correctional system, its
provisions have the purpose and effect of
diminishing the punishment attached to the crime.
The further reduction on the length of the penalty of
imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial
to the detention and convicted prisoners alike;
hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the
RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions
of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of
petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It
precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their
respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus,
making more onerous the punishment for the crimes
they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they
are justly entitled as a practical matter results in
extending their sentence and increasing their
punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear
mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
CASE 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
FACTS:
Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period from
21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against
appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA and
BBB, the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was
accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G,
6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of
raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G,
6905-G, and 6907-G. All these cases were consolidated
for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed
in several instances over a span of six (6) years.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of
rape. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to
controvert the clear, candid and straightforward
testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims
and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the
latter being the former's relative by consanguinity
within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death
sentences, the records of the case were automatically
elevated to this Court for review. However, in the
aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People
v. Mateo the present case was transferred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.  SCALE NO. 1
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8)
death sentences imposed on appellant. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached
to the two (2) counts of rape from death for
consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
attempted rape.
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and
two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of
Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both
crimes should be amended.  Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the
Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" was
enacted. Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the
Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the
accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when
appropriate.
ISSUE:
Whether Bon’s penalty for attempted qualified rape,
which under the penal law should be two degrees
lower than that of consummated qualified rape,
should be computed from death or  reclusion
perpetua.
HELD:
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the
attempted rape of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted
rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence
at the time it was meted prior to the enactment of Rep.
Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code
establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the
principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon
the principals in an attempt to commit a
felony.
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law" for attempted rape? The courts, in
applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty
two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal,
which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
However, "Death," as utilized in Article 71 of the
equation in the graduation of penalties. In the case
of appellant, the determination of his penalty for
attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two
degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term
of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision
mayor.
The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a
statute should be so construed not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system—a
uniform system of jurisprudence. "Interpreting and
harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would
provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to
secure the rights of all persons affected by different
legislative and quasi-legislative acts." There can be no
harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised
Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as
having downgraded those penalties attached to death by
reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in
that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to
the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted
felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.  G.R. No. 228373,
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics
that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed
against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused. If the language of the law were ambiguous,
the court will lean more strongly in favor of the
defendant than it would if the statute were remedial,
as a means of effecting substantial justice. The law
is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. It is
this philosophy of caution before the State may
deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one
of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of
Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory
construction would not have been necessary had Rep.
Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws
imposing the death penalty did not engender the
corresponding modification of penalties other than death,
dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress,
and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep.
Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and
inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have
remained. If that were to be the case, we would have
acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and
inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does
not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately
inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments.
Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is
susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects
with the precepts and practices that pervade our general
penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear
will of Congress.
By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the
death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding
reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the
downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts
consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted
rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade
the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346.
For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we
downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty
of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium
period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
CASE 7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
PO1 JOHNNY K. SULLANO, Respondent.
March 12, 2018
FACTS:
On October 16, 2012, Senior Superintendent Nerio T.
Bermudo (P/SSupt Bermudo), the City Director of the
Butuan City Police Office, ordered fifty (50) randomly
selected police officers under the Butuan City Police
Office to undergo drug testing pursuant to Section 36,
Article III of R.A. No. 9165. Among those who underwent
testing was respondent, a police officer at Butuan City
Police Station 5.
Respondent's urine sample was received on October 17,
2012. According to the Initial Chemistry Report of the
Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory
Office 13, the test conducted on respondent's urine
specimen gave a positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine. The confirmatory test on the same
specimen completed on November 5, 2012 yielded the
same result.
Given the result of the random drug test and
confirmatory test, P/SSupt. Bermudo filed a
Complaint Affidavit against respondent for violation
of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In lieu of a
counter-affidavit, respondent filed a
Manifestation, wherein he claimed that he voluntarily
submitted to the random drug test ordered by P/SSupt.
Bermudo; the urine sample he submitted gave a positive
result to the presence of methamphetamine; he did not
use the dangerous drug but had no means to contest the
test's veracity; and he entered into a rehabilitation
program with Cocoon Foundation for Substance Abuse.
He concluded by pleading for the dismissal of the
complaint against him.
Assistant City Prosecutor Isabel Corazon Cabuga-Plaza
recommended the dismissal of the complaint through a
Resolution dated February 1, 2013. This was reversed
by Deputy City Prosecutor Aljay O. Go in an Order dated
April 8, 2013, finding probable cause against
respondent. Consequently, an information was filed.
Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued. After the prosecution rested its case,
respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence.
The RTC granted the demurrer to evidence through its
order dated March 7, 2014. The RTC relied upon the
wording of Sec. 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 articulating
its reasoning thus: 
It pre-supposes that accused was arrested or
apprehended committing a crime and therefore
should be subjected to a drug examination,
 considering that this could be alleged as an
aggravating circumstance in any criminal case
filed against him.
In this case, the accused was never arrested
nor apprehended committing an offense. He
was only subjected to a random drug
examination per directive of the PNP
Superior Officer.
Due to the dismissal of the case, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari  with the CA. The CA was not
convinced of petitioner's arguments and denied the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
requires the apprehension or arrest of a person for
the latter to be considered as violating the provision.
HELD:
YES. The provision, Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A
person apprehended or arrested, who is
found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of
six (6) months rehabilitation in a government
center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the
second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging
from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to
Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section
shall not be applicable where the person tested
is also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for
under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that this section should be read in
conjunction with Section 36, Article III of the same law,
which mandates the random drug testing for certain
employees, and pertinently includes police officers like
respondent.
As stated, several factors militate against petitioner's
construction of the phrase "a person apprehended or
arrested" appearing in Section 15. It is likewise
important to note that the allegations in the
information against respondent clearly state that he
is only being prosecuted for Section 15 and nowhere
in the information was it stated that it should, be
read in relation to Section 36.
The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the plain-
meaning rule. Verba legis non est recendendum - "from
the words of a statute there should be no departure."
When the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
the words should be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. Especially for penal
provisions, it is not enough to say that the legislature
intended to make a certain act an offense, the legislature
must use words which in some way express that intent.
An analysis of the construction of the sentence
yields no other conclusion. Section 15 is
unambiguous: the phrase "apprehended or arrested"
immediately follows "a person," thus qualifying the
subject person. It necessarily follows that only
apprehended or arrested persons found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug may be
prosecuted under the provision. 
Moreover, the elementary rule in statutory construction
that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others, also known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, is relevant and
applicable. This rule applies where the very terms of the
statute expressly limit it to certain matters; thus it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. In the provision in question,
Congress itself confined and restricted the liability
arising from use of dangerous drugs to those who
were apprehended or arrested if charged with a
violation of Section 15.
Petitioner also advances the argument that a narrow
interpretation of Section 15 will result in an absurd
situation where a person found to be positive for use of
dangerous drugs through Section 36 may not be
penalized for not being arrested or apprehended,
rendering Section 36 meaningless. 
The Court disagrees. 
The information, quoted above, against respondent is
straightforward: respondent "wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug
and found positive for use, after a confirmatory test." The
essential element, i.e. the accused was apprehended
or arrested, was not specifically alleged. Moreover,
nowhere in the information was Section 36
mentioned. Urging the inclusion of Section 36 in
accusing the respondent of the crime will deprive
the latter of the opportunity to prepare his defense
and violate his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
An information must be complete, fully state the
elements of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as an information is a recital of the essentials
of a crime, delineating the nature and cause of the
accusation against the accused. Convicting an accused
of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would plainly be
unfair and underhanded.25 This appears to be petitioner's
intention here and should not be condoned.
It is true that every part of a statute must be considered
together with other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole law. The statute's clauses
and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in
order to produce a harmonious whole. Parenthetically,
the Court finds no difficulty in harmonizing Section 36
with a strict interpretation of Section 15. Section 36, last
paragraph states "[I]n addition to the above stated
penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of
Section 15 of this Act." This may be construed to
mean that rehabilitation for six (6) months in a
government center, as stated in Section 15, may be
imposed on those found positive of use of
dangerous drugs through a random drug test. This
reading of the provisions would still pursue the
intent of the law to encourage not the prosecution
and incarceration of those using dangerous drugs,
but their rehabilitation. This reading especially finds
relevance in this case as respondent voluntarily
submitted himself to rehabilitation.
Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there
is no crime unless a law specifically calls for its
punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege.
Another basic criminal law precept important to
remember here is in dubiis reus est absolvendus -
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused. Any criminal law showing ambiguity will
always be construed strictly against the state and in
favor of the accused.
CASE 8
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  conformably with Section 13, Article III of the 1987
vs.
LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 216007-09
December 08, 2015
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by
Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both
State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in
Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the
disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City
Government. Among the subjects thereof were the
reimbursements of expenses of private respondent
Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of
Bacolod City.
Based on the verification conducted in the
establishments that issued the official receipts, it was
alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to
enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the
Government the total amount of P279,150.00 instead of
only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of
P274,306.75.
The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office
(PACPO), Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas received
the joint affidavit, which was thereafter resolved adverse
to Valdez.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four
of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the
remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles
217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before
public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-
CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is still at-large,
caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail. She
argued that the three cases are bailable as a matter
of right because no aggravating or modifying
circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the
medium period that ranged from 18 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the
RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the
maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition that
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable
as the attending circumstances are immaterial
because the charge constituting the complex crime
have the corresponding penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Since the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead
of a motion to fix bail, a summary hearing to determine if
the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore, necessary
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.
Public respondent granted the motions of Valdez. It
recalled the arrest order issued in Criminal Case Nos.
SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. In lieu thereof, a new
arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each offense
charged in said cases in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Without filing a motion
for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether an accused indicted for the complex crime
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
HELD:
YES. Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required. Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons
in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the
term "punishable" under the provisions above-quoted?
The term "punishable" should refer to prescribed,
not imposable, penalty. People v. Temporada, which
was even cited by petitioner, perceptibly distinguished
these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general
prescription for the felonies defined therein which
consists of a range of period of time. This is what is
referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance,
under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges from 12
years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further,
the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission of
a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be
imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is
referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of
homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC
shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period.
From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single
fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the
"penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison
term he has to serve.
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the
one provided by the RPC before conviction to determine
whether the charge is bailable or not, while the penalty
actually imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon
conviction. Hence, it is maintained that the penalty
imposable for the offense charged against private
respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal
Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-
bailable.
The argument is erroneous.
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty"
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such
crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, the "imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetua in
view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty
of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua shall be applied in its maximum. The
falsification, which is the means used to commit the
crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic
aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall
impose," found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the
RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be
imposed" found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64
refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering the
aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally, the
"penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua,
considering that the ISL finds no application as the
penalty is indivisible.
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is
spot on had it not confused imposable penalty
with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through
the text of the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-
graft court actually meant prescribed penalty whenever
it referred to imposable penalty. Therefore, in essence,
the ruling is correct. Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru
Falsification be imposed in its maximum period,
there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The
cases, however, are still at their inception.
Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is
not the proper time, therefore, to call for the
application of the penalty contemplated under
Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum
period.
For purposes of determining whether a person
can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is
the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the
crime charged which should be considered and,
not the penalty to be actually imposed.
Illustrative cases such as Catiis v. Court of
Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu Ruey
Chun evidently confirm this to be so.
 xxxx

At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be

found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved
during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it
would be premature to rule that the supposed crime
committed is a complex crime since it is only when
the trial has terminated that falsification could be
appreciated as a means of committing malversation.
Further, it is possible that only the elements of one
of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation
or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be
proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the

right to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it
turns out that there is no complex crime committed.
Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in
depriving the accused person's constitutional right to bail
for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even
considered as inherently grievous, odious and hateful.
To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does
not change the nature of the constituent offenses; it only
requires the imposition of the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law. When committed through
falsification of official/public documents, the RPC does
not intend to classify malversation as a capital offense.
Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should
have been expressly included in Republic Act No.
7659.33If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should
have already considered it as a special complex crime
like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with
homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide,
which have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to

Valdez as an accused following the rule of lenity:

Intimately related to the in dubio pro

reoprinciple is the rule of lenity. The rule
applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute,
one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him. The rule
calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.

The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are

construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. When there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved
in favor of the accused. Since penal laws should not
be applied mechanically, the Court must determine
whether their application is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law.