StatCon Sept.

26 2020
1. Presumptions
2. Presumption against unconstitutionality

a. Alfredo Lim vs. Pacquing and Associated Development Corporation.

FACTS:
 18 June 1949, Congress enacted the Charter of the City of Manila, which on its section 18
the municipal board are given legislative power “to tax, license, permit and regulate wagers
or betting by the public on boxine, sipa, ... jai-alai… or any sporting or athletic contest,…”.
 On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority
to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

 On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed

Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The
City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.”

 On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The
decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof,
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.

 On 16 October 1975, PD 810 promulgated to grant Philippine Jai Alai Amusement

Corporation (PJAC) franchise to operate in the greater manila area

 08 May 1987, Pres. Aquino issued E.O. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 thus revoking and
cancelling PJAC franchise.

 In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The
government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential
Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of
the Constitution.

HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest
that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential
issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by
reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision
of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of
nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under
Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC’s
possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 209 SCRA 90)

3. Presumption against Injustice

a. Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines.

FACTS
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious
illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and
a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a
civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s
fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion
therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD
NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar
as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with
the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of
Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
IF the ruling will be favourable to the Central Bank it will result injustice to the aggrieved family
and will negate the article 10 of the civil code “in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice prevail.”

4. Presumption against implied repeals

a. Almadovar Et. Al. v. Chaiperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan, COA
FACTS:

 Aleli G. Alamadovar – GM Isabela Water District

 25 January 2007, Catalino S. Genel, Audit Team Leader of ISAWAD issued notice of
disallowances regarding on the salary increase for the GM, ISAWAD without legal
basis from august to December 2005
 26 August 2007 GM filed an appeal which was indorsed to COA Regional Office,
insist that the increase was in accordance with RA 9286, which amended PWUA
 The NDs are affirmed by the COA Regional Office and COA En Banc.
 Petitioner insists that her salary increase was proper because LWDs are exempted
from the coverage of the SSL.
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s salary increase was proper.
RULING
The increase in the Salary of the petitioner was correctly disallowed because it
contravened the provisions of the SSL.
Petitioner Claims that RA 9286 (PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITY ACT) being a later law
repealed the SSL (RA 6758). The Court however, notes that RA 9286 did not expressly repeal
the SSL. Neither did RA 9286 impliedly repeal the SSL because repeal by implication is not
favored by law and is only resorted to in case of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
between the new law and the old law.
Note: Refund was not made because the act was done in good faith
5. Repeals of statue by implication not favored
a. Antonio Mecano v. COA
6. Presumption against Ineffectiveness
a. Danilo Paras v. COMELEC
FACTS

 Danilo Paras – Incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City.

 Won last regular barangay election in 1994.
 Petition for recall was filed by the registered voter of the Barangay
 29.30%, above the required 25%, of the registered voter signed the petition.
 COMELEC set the recall election on November 13 1995, however deferred the recall
election in view of the petitioner’s decision and rescheduled on 16 December.
 The petitioner filed a petition for injunction and the trial court issued TRO.
  After conducting summary hearing, the Court dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order.
 The Comelec rescheduled the recall election on the 13 January, 1996
 The Petitioner filed a certiorari on basis the scheduled recall election date is barred as
the SK election was set on first Monday of May 1996.
ISSUE
WON SK election can be considered Local election.
RULING
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[4] The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term
of office.  Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office.  Thus, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular
local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term.  And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local
election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
"SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. –
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of
office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."
7. Presumption against absurdity
a. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. ESSO Standard Easter Inc., and CTA
b. Ursua v. CA
FACTS

 Cesario Ursua, - Petitioner

- Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Kidapawan
Cotabato
- Complaint against him was filed to the ombudsman for his involvement
on alleged illegal cutting of mohagony and illegal hauling of cut trees in
his area
 In order to secure a copy of complaint, Atty Palmones instructed his client Ursua to take
his letter request to the Office of the Ombudsman
  Ursua is reluctant on the said task but he was advice by Oscar Perez (Messanger of
Palmones) that if he is required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint he would sign
his name (Oscar Perez).
 Petitioner entered the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao and registered the name
Oscar Perez on the logbook
 He also sign the acknowledge receipt with Oscar’s name.
 Loida Kahulugan who gave him the complaint learned that Ursua is using Oscar Perez
name and reported to the deputy Ombudsman
 The Petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 1 of C. A No. 142, as amended by R.A. No
6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases." And was found guilty
by the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeals
 Ursua filed the petition
ISSUE
Whether or Not the use of a different name belonging to another in isolated transaction
falls within in prohibition of CA 142.
RULING
The objective and scope of CA 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, an Act to
regulate the use in Business Transaction of Names other than true names.
The use of fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication the the user intends to be known by this name in addition
to his real name form that day forth does not fall within the prohibition of CA 142.
The judgement was reversed and set aside the petitioner is acquitted.
8. Presumption against violation of international law
9. Intrinsic Aids
a. Miriam Defensor Santiago Et. Al. v. COMELEC Et. Al.
b. Florencio Eugenio v. Executive Secretary, HLURB and Prospero Palmiano
FACTS

 Florence Eugenio developer of E & S Delta Village in Quezon City

 Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment basis from petitioner, two lots in Quezon
City.
 17 January 1979, NHA ordered petitioner to cease and desist from making further
sales of lots
 Private respondent suspends his amortizations because of the petitioner’s failure to
develop the village.
 Petitioner sold a lot titled to the respondent to spouses Relevo.
 Private respondent filed complaint with Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs against petitioner and prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo
spouses and for the reconveyance of the lot to him.
 11 October 1983 OAALA’s decision uphold the right of the petitioner to cancel contract
and dismissed private respondents complaint
  Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, reversed OAALA’s decision applying PD
957, ordered petition to complete the subdivision and reinstate private respondent’s
purchase. Executive Secretary Drillon affirmed the HSRC decision.
 Petitioner filed an Appeal to Supreme Court
ISSUE
WON the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non
payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered
into prior to the enactment of PD 957 “ the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective
Decree”
RULING
PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled from its
preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be
enforced. PD 957 as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
disadvantaged.

c. People v. Hon. Vicente Echavez et. Al.

10.