Dugin, Alexander - Martin Heidegger. The Philosophy of Another Beginning

RADIX 2014
Martin
Heidegger
The Philosophy
of Another
Beginning
ALEXANDER DUGIN
Edited and Translated by

Nina Kouprianova
P reface by P au l E . G o ttfrie d
English Translation © 2014
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F irst Edition
CONTENTS
P R E FA C E T O T H E E N G L IS H E D IT IO N | 3
PART 1 — SEYN UND SEIN | 13
I. M E E T I N G H E I D E G G E R : A N I N V I T A T I O N
T O A JO U R N E Y | 15
II. B E I N G A N D B E I N G S | 41
III. F U N D A M E N T A L - O N T O L O G Y | 53
IV. D A S S E Y N S G E S C H I C H T L I C H E | 67
V. T H E B E G I N N I N G A N D E N D O F W E S T E R N
E U R O P E A N P H IL O S O P H Y | 91
V I. H E I D E G G E R ’S A N T H R O P O L O G Y O F
S E Y N S G E S C H IC H T E | 127
V II. A N O T H E R B E G I N N I N G (D E R A N D E R E
AN FA N G) | 141
V III. S E Y N S G E S C H I C H T E A N D P O L I T I C A L
ID E O L O G IE S O F T H E 2 0 T H C E N T U R Y I 159
IX . " N O T Y E T ” I 177
X . H E ID E G G E R A S A G R E A T M IL E S T O N E | 185
PART 2 — DAS GEVIERT | 189
I. A N I N T R O D U C T I O N T O G E V IE R T | 19 1
II. G E V IE R T A S T H E M A P O F T H E B E G I N N I N G A N D
T H E R E T R E A T F R O M IT | 233
III. G E V IE R T I N A N O T H E R B E G I N N I N G | 273
PART 3 — DASEIN | 281
I. T H R E E S T A G E S O F D E V E L O P M E N T I N M A R T IN
H E I D E G G E R ’S P H I L O S O P H Y | 283
II. D A S E I N A N D T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y
(F R O M T H E F I R S T B E G I N N I N G T O T H E E N D O F
P H IL O S O P H Y ) | 291
III. D A S E I N A N D I T S E X I S T E N T I A L S | 313
IV. I N A U T H E N T I C R E G IM E O F D A S E I N 'S
E X IS T E N C E I 345
V. A U T H E N T I C D A S E I N | 363
V I. Z E I T - T I M E A N D I T S H O R I Z O N S | 379
C O N C L U S IO N : H E ID E G G E R A N D T H E ST A T E OF
P H IL O S O P H Y | 387
P O ST SC R IP T | 393
G LO SSA R Y | 395
B I B L IO G R A P H Y | 425
IN D E X | 447
ABOUT TH E AUTHOR | 465
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PREFACE
TO TH E ENGLISH EDITION
By Paul E . Gottfried
This m ajor study o f the G erm an philosopher M artin H eidegger

by R ussian thinker Alexander D ugin (b. 1962) has been made
available to English readers thanks to the painstaking efforts o f
an able translator, N in a Kouprianova. O ne cannot understate the
difficulty o f this dem anding translation or the value o f what the
translator has given us.
D ugin is one o f the w orld’s m ost renowned critics o f the Am erican

cult o f Liberal democracy, and his work published in English in
2012, The Fourth Philosophical Theory1, sets out to examine the
problem o f the failed (or at least vulnerable) ideologies o f the
20th century, extending from C om m unism and Fascism to what
has become the preferred Am erican political doctrine o f Liberal
m aterialism based on universal equality. D ugin views Liberal
dem ocracy as the ideological idol o f the last century that is still
standing and, given the extent o f American power and influence,
still flourishing on this continent and am ong American vassal
states in W estern Europe. D ugin famously, or notoriously, calls
for a "fourth way,’’ju st as H eidegger in the m idst o f the C old War
proposed a "third way” and, from the 1930s on, spoke o f “another
beginning” that w ould lead toward a new "openness to Being.” In
these cases, these men sought alternatives to the m aterialist and
consum erist ethos o f late m odernity— and to the ideology o f
universal political sam eness that has accom panied it.
1 A lexander D ugin, The Fourth Political Theory (B udapest: A rktos M edia,

2012 ).
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M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R : The Philosophy of Another Beginning
It w ould be an oversim plification,’ to reduce this am bitiou s and

exhaustive exam ination o f to the critique o f "teckne” which is
characteristic o f H eidegger's later work, D u gin pays scru pu lou s
attention to all the ph ases in the philosopher's evolution,
startin g with H e id eg ge rs attem pted separation o f a proper
analysis o f Being from received m etaphysical tradition s. T h is
study engages H eidegger's definitions o f ontic and ontological
and such concepts as Sein, D asein , Sein-zum-Tode, and
Zeitlicbkeit, which pun ctuate H e id eg g e rs early m asterpiece
Sein und Z eit (1 9 2 7 ). H eidegger's magnum opus treats our
grow ing aw areness o f Being as som ethin g that presents itse lf
to us, to whatever extent we grasp that existence is to be
u n derstood beyond the obvious or w hat H eidegger calls “ready
to hand.'' H eidegger is dealing with the self-revelation o f Being,
and not sim ply with the aw areness o f a m ultiplicity o f beings,
and this process unfolds in experienced time. T h e progressive
revelation o f Being carries us tow ard a future that stan d s before
us as an un finished project. T h a t project (A uftrag) becom es
apparent to us only as we exist in tim e, and H eidegger stresses
that our particular Being (D asein ) is shaped by future-oriented
labors, up until the poin t when our future is overshadow ed
by the expectation o f death. T h is is the Being-toward-death,
which, for H eidegger, brings the p o ssib ility o f entering an
undiscovered realm o f existence.
D u gin is ju stifie d in linking his study to the overarching

concept o f "Seynsgeschichte" the history o f the con sciousn ess
o f Being as it presents itse lf to us in hum an life. Like his
predecessor H egel, H eidegger stresses the h istorical context
in which Being is present for us, although, unlike H egel, he
does not essay to chart the course o f P rogress taken by S p irit
in political and cultural affairs. T h is w ould not be possible,
given H eid egger’s fram e o f reference. Like D ugin , H eid egger
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A L E X A N D E R D U G IN
is starkly p essim istic about the direction in which m odernity

h as m oved. T h is is particularly true o f H eidegger's later work,
begin n in g in the 1 9 30s, after his "turn" (Kehre) into what
could be described as a m ystical direction. T henceforw ard,
H eid egger becam e preoccupied with certain them es that
D u gin exam ines at length. T h e se include the im portance o f
pre-So cratic G reek p h ilosoph ers, like H eraclitus, in keeping
open the question o f the nature o f Being, before Plato changed
or lim ited that focus by draggin g in theological answ ers; the
enclosed rectangular space (D a s Geviert), consisting o f the
divine and the m ortal, and the sky and the earth, in which the
qu est for u n derstan din g our specific being and Being in general
m u st take place; and the in trusion o f techne as a cultural and
h istorical diversion from serious philosophical thought. D ugin
show s in detail how all these them es becom e interrelated in
H eidegger's w orks, especially after 1945, and how the trium ph
o f a purely technical culture destroyed the search for truth
m arked by a sense o f the divine (though not necessarily by
m on oth eistic b elief) and a sense o f hum an lim its in relation
to the universe.
D ugin notes that the trium ph o f certain m odernist characteristics

spelled "the E n d” o f an age that has become increasingly closed
to Being, It was therefore not surprising that, for Heidegger,
this developm ent gave rise to nihilism, that is, the devaluing
o f everything that had once been deem ed holy In a technical
age, in which thinking stresses material relations that can be
scientifically controlled, nothing has intrinsic value except for
what can be m ade materially usable or m anipulated according
to learnable instructions. This, too, argued Heidegger, had a
certain connection to traditional metaphysics, to the extent that
technicians and their adepts claim ed to be revealing what had
been hidden as undisclosed in Being. Techne was a "manner o f
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demystifying” (" Weise des Entbergens”) the nature o f existence, by

avoiding a continuing search for Being and by positing superficial
answers. Indeed, techne may be described as a simulacrum o f the
philosophical quest.
Techne im itates philosophy “by bringing forth that which was

absent as som ething present.”2 It is, therefore, in this sense
similar to the activity o f pre-Socratic thinkers, says Heidegger,
who saw philosophical knowledge as what had been removed
from oblivion (whence the G reek word for truth, "aletheia”).
But unlike true philosophers, technicians don't raise ontological
questions. They simply fill space with a multiplicity o f objects,
whence Heidegger's designation o f“the essence o f m odern techne”
as Gestell, as a soulless structure that is placed in space. W h at
the technician places before us (stellt), and which represents a
travesty on philosophy, is sum m ed up by H eidegger as "Gestange,
Geschiebe, und Geruste”— struts, detritus, and scaffolds.”3
Like D ugin , H eidegger regarded all m odern ideologies as

variations on the ascent o f techne. C om m u n ism , N atio n al
S ocialism , and, finally, W estern L iberal dem ocracy all becam e
associated, for H eidegger, with m an ip u latio n ,Seinsvergessenheit,
and the m astery o f m aterial objects. A ll these tendencies o f
the m odern age poin ted tow ard the end o f an epoch and the
beginning o f a possible return to w hat H eidegger viewed as a
m ore authentic existence. Such an existence, particularly after
the Kehre, w as to be p u rsu ed in austerity, with a sense o f duty
tow ard others and, on the p h ilosoph ical level, with openness
tow ard the m ysteries o f Being. T h o u g h one could describe the
author o f Sein und Z eit as an individualist, with a m inim al
sense o f com m unal attachm ent, the later H eidegger is clearly a
2 M artin H eidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays

(N ew York: H arper & Row, 1977).
^ Ibid.
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social tradition alist, w hose em ph asis on rootedness and w hose

love for his ancestral land o f Sw abia com es through in his
tracts. D u gin does not shy away from explaining H eidegger's
strayin g into the N a z i m ovem ent in 1933, when he b ecame
the enthusiastically p ro -N a z i R ector at the U niversity o f
Freiburg. D ugin treats this m isadventure, which was follow ed
by H eidegger's cooling tow ard the N azis, as at least partly
occasion ed by a hope for a new, higher-m inded era than the one
he had lived through. H eidegger's association with a m ovem ent
he later criticized as sym ptom atic o f techne indicated his
tu rn in g tow ard w hat he h oped w ould be “another beginning.''
H e w ould continue to be draw n tow ard this ideal after W orld
W ar II, albeit in a less unsavory form than had been the case
follow ing H itler's accession to power. T h is envisaged epoch, to
ju d g e from H eidegger's statem ents, may be seen as a return as
m uch as a poin t o f departure (Aufhruch),
D u gin has been sufficiently inspired by H eidegger's work to

devote this dense volum e to expounding its fruits. Presum ably,
the R u ssian has been influenced by H eidegger's ontology,
which is explored here with rem arkable thoroughness. From
th is book, we discover that H eidegger is returning to a
branch o f p h ilosoph y that reveals a tradition alist character,
in o p p o sitio n to such trendy p u rsu its as utilitarian ethics or
defenses o f “social justice.'' B u t H eidegger approaches w hat
h ad been a M edieval and ancient field o f study w ithout the
theological em ph asis o f earlier generations. O f course, this
m u st be qualified. T h e late M edieval philosopher D u n s S co tu s
w as the subject o f H e id eg g e rs H abilitation in 19 1 5 4, and he
ow ed a great deal to the "subtle doctor's'' concept o f truth
an d his com m entaries on A ristotle. Indeed, it is im possible
to read Sein und Z eit w ithout noticing how deeply im m ersed
4 M artin Heidegger, Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus
(T ubingen: J. C . B. Mohr, 1916).
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H eidegger was in the entire history o f W estern philosophy.

For all his com plaints about the false path taken by Socrates
and P la to — a notion that is recognizably N ietzsch ean in
origin— H eidegger overwhelm s his reader w ith qu otation s
from Plato, A ristotle, and the M edieval schoolm en, and with
his long glosses on others who cam e before him.
Like D ugin, one discovers in H eidegger, w hom D u gin routinely

calls “the greatest thinker,” a com bination o f traditional
philosoph ical interests with self-consciously m odern concerns.
B ut again, like D ugin, H eidegger w as a reactionary m odernist,
som eone who com batted m odernity by underlining its defects
and shallow ness and by trying to prove that the m odern
enterprise w as headed in a very bad direction. H eidegger tried
to do this w ithout returning to m etaphysical assu m p tio n s
that he believed belonged to a vanished past. T h is, too, as in
the case o f D ugin, is not as sim ple as it w ould first appear.
T h ere is som ethin g backw ard-looking in both thinkers,
as the p a st is for them a source o f creativity. T h is is totally
different from the kind o f “cultural conservative” this w riter
has often encountered: a tediou s eccentric who m anifests his
“conservatism ” by m aking h im self the bu tt o f gentle jo k e s. Such
a person m ay frequent clubs where tea and crum pets are served
or may introduce h im se lf as a liturgical trad itio n alist w ith an
o sten tatiou s interest in G o th ic architecture, but he is, above
all, an expert at staying out o f controversy that could threaten
his career or social calendar.
This is not the kind o f person we have in m ind when we look at

such widely hated, contentious figures as H eidegger and D ugin.
These are adversaries o f a deeper mettle. They approach their
opposition frontally w ithout trying to be “nice.” A n d they are
resourceful and deeply knowledgeable o f the fields they set out
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to transform . Such thoughtful reactionaries frame a critique o f

late m odernity with the tools o f the past, while understanding
that one can t go back in time. A nd there can be no doubt that
H eidegger is operating with the tools o f the past, and even
d istan t past, as the m ultilingual glossary to this work amply
dem onstrates. H e is a reactionary m odernist who goes back to
pre-Socratic G reek epigram s and then recapitulates the history
o f philosophy in order to find a way out o f the im plications o f
a w rong turn,
H eid eg ger is lookin g for the begin n in gs o f a d isaster (sph alm a);
an d although his subject, as D u gin properly indicates, traces
th is m isstep back to Plato, it is in the sam e ph ilo so ph er that
we learn the valuable lesson th at there is a connection betw een
"learn in g thoroughly" (katam anthan ein) and "u n dertakin g a
correction" (poiein to epanorthom a)." S tu d y in g H eid egger and
then readin g D ugin's dem anding, com prehensive explication,
one com es to u n d erstan d this necessary connection. For both
the "greatest thinker" and his faith ful R u ssian disciple, the
im provem ent o f our culture an d spiritu al life requires nothing
less than a detailed exam ination o f our trad itio n s extending
b ack to antiquity. T h ere are no short cuts on the road to
correctin g the faults o f our late m odernity.
P A U L E, G O T T F R I E D is Professor Emeritus of Humanities at

Elizabethtown College. H is books include Conservatism in America
(2 0 0 7 ), The Strange D eath o f M arxism (2005), After Liberalism
(19 9 9 ), M ulticulturalism and the Politics o f G uilt (2002), and
Leo Strauss and the Conservative Movement in America (2012).
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MARTIN H EIDEGGER
The Philosophy o f Another Beginning
PARTI
Seyn und Sein
I. M EETING HEIDEGGER; AN
INVITATION TO A JOURNEY
Thought and its Authorities
M artin H eidegger is, to the greatest extent, a foundational author.

H e belongs am ong those figures in the history o f thought that
are unavoidable. M uch can be om itted, considered optional, and
perused at leisure. But there also are other things that dem and
careful and thorough study. W ithout them, our notions and
ideas about thought, philosophy, and the history o f culture will
be defective, incomplete, fragmentary, and, therefore, unreliable.
H eidegger is indispensable for anyone who lives in today’s

w orld and tries to at least som ehow ground the fact o f one’s
actuality— one’s presence. O f course, more often than not, we
do not have to speak o f presence: after all, in R ussian, the w ord
"presence" etym ologically m eans “to be close to the essence,” but
who is “close to the essence” now ? Perhaps, we can at least ponder
over actuality. Even he who raises a question about his actuality
cannot p ass by H eidegger.
It is im possible to think, and, in particular, to think about one's

actuality, about oneself, about the world, about life and death,
w ithout relying on one or another school o f thought. I f we
ourselves do not know which philosophical system is at the base
o f our thinking, that does not m ean that there is no such system .
T h ere certainly is one: after all, our thoughts and notions are
draw n from som ewhere. I f we carefully treat the content o f our
own consciousness, take an approxim ate inventory o f it, we may
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then realize that one thing in it is from Plato, another— from

A ristotle, the third is accordant to Rene D escartes's teaching,
the fourth is from G.W.F. H egel’s dialectic; som e thoughts are
taken from the arsenal o f theology, others— from M arxism ; in
certain things the influence o f Im m anuel K an t is apparent, and
som ewhere else a fragm ent o f N ietzsch eism glitters. T h e fact
that philosophy does not reach us directly, not immediately, but
through hundreds o f half-anonymous echoes— in school, family,
society, media, education, everyday conversations, and disjointed
consumer culture— changes nothing.
*
It seem s to us that we think independently, but such an illusion
arises only from ignorance or a po o r education. It suffices to
start working on ourselves, and it becom es obvious that we
constantly quote, and, m ore often than not, we quote those
sources the existence o f which we do not even suspect. For
precisely this reason, any person who w ishes to think honestly
will begin to locate the authorities and reference system s o f
thought in philosophy, science, and art.
A thinking person is always som ew hat o f a philosopher. A

philosopher always belongs to som e school o f thought: either he
follows religious philosophy, or he is a K antian, or a H egelian,
or a liberal, or a M arxist, or a Freudian, or a positivist, or a
Nietzschean, or a structuralist, or an advocate o f the'ph ilosophy
o f life,” or a solipsist, or an existentialist, or a m aterialist, or a
D arw inist, etc. In very rare instances, a philosopher is capable
o f carrying out an interesting and original synthesis o f different
schools; and even more rarely, with intervals m easuring in
centuries, those thinkers appear that blaze new trails and truly
open new horizons for the rest o f m ankind. These are great
people, who m ark the m ilestones o f thought for all hum anity;
and they will be remem bered for centuries.
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T h e one who u n derstan ds the great thinkers and acquires one

o f the p ossible philosophical p osition s secures for h im self the
statu s o f a philosopher, a full-fledged thinking being. A nd
here is the m ost crucial truth: one m ust first bow before an
authority (even if also with a “secret wish” o f later overthrow ing
this authority) and think about on eself and the world in the
inner hall o f great ideas and theories. Yet those who strive for
originality— im m ediately and at any cost— do not stay long in
the field o f philosophy; their place is the m arket.
H eidegger: the G reat or the G reatest?
A m o n g great thinkers, two places can be set aside for Heidegger,

depending on how we look at him, to what degree we study
him , and how m uch we believe him.
A t the very least, H eidegger is the greatest contem porary

thinker, jo in in g the constellation o f Europe's best thinkers
from the pre-So cratics to our time. In this sense, som e refer to
him as the “philosopher king.” Even those whom his philosophy
leaves indifferent or those who disagree with it recognize his
indisputable greatness.
H eid egger is universally recognized as a great philosopher

o f world history. N o one seriously contests this kind o f
recognition, but som e easily p ass him by, relying on other trends
in philosophy, while others keenly respond to his m essage,
using his term s ("D a se in ’, ’ “existential," “A n gst’, ’ etc.), allowing
them selves to treat his thoughts with enthusiasm .
A different, special, exclusive place in the history o f philosophy

that can be set aside for H eidegger should be recognized in the
case when we fully trust H eidegger, im m erse ourselves in his
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thinking, and m ake him our highest authority. In other w ords,

H eidegger exam ined within the space o f H eideggerian ism
will significantly differ from H eidegger in the average and
conventional history o f philosophy. In the form er case, we will
realize that H eidegger is not only a great philosopher, on par with
other greats, but, in fact, the greatest o f them all. H e occupies
the place o f the last prophet, concludes the developm ent o f the
first stage in philosophy (from A naxim ander to N ietzsch e),
and serves as the transition, the bridge to a new philosophy,
which he only anticipates in his works. In that case, H eidegger
is an eschat'ological figure, the final interpreter and clarifier o f
the m ost profound and enigm atic subjects in w orld philosophy,
and the creator o f a radically new way of thinking. A s a result,
we can view him as a figure in a religious pantheon, as an “envoy
o f Being itself,” a herald and organizer o f the greatest event. In
it, the old history o f the European w orld will end and a new
one, which has yet to exist, will begin.
It seems to me that the second approach is more productive for

a true understanding o f Heidegger (even if, at some time in the
distant future, it may be revised). It allows for full and complete
immersion into Heidegger's thinking, without hasty attempts
at interpreting him through appeals to other authorities (and
to disparate traces they left in our consciousness) and allows
Heidegger to communicate to us what he intended to communicate
without hindrance. A nd only after accepting this m essage on
general term s and believing in its importance and inevitability, can
we, if need be, take a certain position in regard to Heidegger.
It is hardly necessary for everyone to becom e a H eideggerean

forever, but this thinker is absolutely deserving o f a certain
am ount o f intellectual time, enough to be able to say, with slight
apprehension in one's voice, “It seem s that I u n derstan d a bit o f
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his work. For som e, this will take years; for others— decades.
O th ers yet will slip when taking their very first steps. Yet the
experience is worthwhile. By studying Heidegger, we study
p h ilosoph y in its contem porary state. It is precisely what it is,
and there is nothing to contradict to it.
H eid egger is im portant not only for professional philosophers—

for them , he is sim ply indispensable. A contem porary
ph ilosoph er who does not know H eidegger looks ridiculous.
B u t he is also m eaningful for those who aspire to have m inim al
com petence in question s o f culture: for scholars in hum anities,
politicians, artists, psychologists, and sociologists; all those who
by the call o f their hearts or due to professional obligations are
involved in the fate o f m an and m ankind, society and history.
M a rtin H eidegger in the U S S R : A D istan t Shelf in a

L ib ra ry ’s Special Collections and the Futile Diligence
o f V ladim ir Bibikhin1
Heidegger's legacy in the Russian-speaking context is a profoundly

peculiar phenomenon. First, in the Soviet period, his works, his
ideas, his philosophy, as well as his intellectual standpoint and his
worldview were attributed to the m ost dangerous and unacceptable
ideological compartments, placed in the m ost distant and closed-
o ff sections o f libraries’ Special Collections, and were essentially
considered “non-existent.” Any and all interest in Heidegger was
looked at as a gnoseological crime or an absolutely futile pursuit.
Even the criticism o f H eidegger’s ideas received little attention.
"Thus, Heidegger, like many other non-M arxist philosophers, was
closed to late-Soviet (not to mention, early-Soviet) philosophy. H e
was read, translated, and discussed “underground,” which affected
the quality o f these readings, translations, and discussions.
1 T h is publication uses the Library o f C ongress transliteration for the R ussian

language, unless a different spelling had been previously accepted.
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N evertheless, a group o f Sov iet'p h ilo so ph ers, led by the late

V ladim ir Bibikhin, the founder o f the late-Soviet H eideggerean
School, reclaim ed the right to engage in critical readings o f
H eidegger. T h is rather sm all group o f scholars was responsible
for the m ajority o f extant translations, many o f which were
m ade in the Soviet era and circulated in Sam izd at.
W ithout doubtin g the sincerity on the part o f these enthusiasts,

we m ust note that their translations and the depth o f grasping
H eid egger proved entirely un satisfactory. T h e com plexity o f
the ideological conditions, lim ited access to sources, specificity
o f their ph ilosoph ical education, lim itatio n s o f ph iloso ph ical
know ledge, and, in general, the in adequacy o f the late-So v iet
social space for the scope o f H eidegger's thinkin g were
respon sible for the fact that we can — w ith out any regrets—
p art ways with the intellectual b ody o f w ork pro d u ced by
this group, so as to avoid stru gglin g w ith the chim eras o f a
h istorical p erio d so w orthless, that in som e ways it cannot
com e to an end even today.
It appears that Bibikhin and his circle o f like-m inded thinkers were,
in fact, passionately captivated by Heidegger. But there is nothing
more to the translations or explanations o f H eidegger apart from
this passion. It is completely im possible to read them, since these
texts are very expressive in terms o f the conditions, effort, and
suffering on the part o f Bibikhin himself, as well as his translator-
colleagues. However, apart from certain accidental coincidences,
these works say practically nothing about H eidegger or, worse yet,
present such an image that makes one's hair stand on end. I f we
accept these texts as an accurate translation o f Heidegger, then we
would have to adm it rather quickly that, regrettably, H eidegger
him self did not understand what he was saying and writing. In
short, we are dealing with complete nonsense.
20
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Heidegger as the M ost Western of all Western Philosophers
T h e second issue with H eid eg gers peculiar legacy in the

R u ssian -sp eak in g setting is that H eidegger is a.fundam ental link
in the chain o f Western European philosophy and corresponds to
the internal logic o f its developm ent. Therefore, generally he
is intelligible to the W estern European philosopher, who can
m ove freely in the taxonom y o f ideas and theories o f W estern
E uropean culture. T o un derstan d Heidegger, one m ust be, in the
very least, a European. A fter all, H eidegger h im self constantly
em ph asizes that he thinks in Europe, o f Europe, and for
Europe, conceiving o f it as a particular historical-philosophical
and civilizational whole.
D ogm atic M arxism and the R u ssian intellectual milieu, rather

com plicated both in the last decade o f the U S S R and today,
intersect with the m ain trajectory o f W estern European man
largely in a fragmentary, episodic, and tangential way. We,
R u ssian s, conceive o f ourselves as Europeans, and we resem ble
them in som e ways (external appearance, phenotype, language,
religion, socio -p o litical system , etc.). However, ph ilosoph y
high ligh ts th ose nuances, in which it is m ost difficult to deceive
or m an ip u late the state o f affairs, and it is in this sphere that
there is very little W estern E u ro p ean in us all. I f it exists at
all, then it resem bles a caricature. M ore likely, however, is that
we are dealin g w ith a p articu lar kind o f R u ssian thinking, o f
w hich we are barely cogn izan t ourselves, let alone o f other
cu ltu res’ p articu larities.
In a way, H eidegger represents quintessential W estern thought:

it is m ore profound, central, and, at the sam e time, m ore
W estern than in the case o f other European thinkers, who are
m ore accessible (although not by m uch).
21
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A relaxed, even-paced, and careful reading o f H eidegger, along

with m aintaining one’s own dignity— this, perhaps, is the m ost
serious test o f a R u ssian -E uropean dialogue.
H eidegger and the M etalanguage o f a N ew Philosophy
A nd finally, the third point: H eidegger consciously aim s

to establish a new language o f philosophy— a kind of
m etalanguage. T h is is based on his specific philosophy of
language (Sprachphilosophie), which he form ulated along with
the gen eral‘developm ent o f his thought. T h e essence o f this
approach consists o f the following:
1. rem oving the influence of W estern E uropean

philosophy and m etaphysics (w ith their logic,
gram m ar, im plicit ontology, etc.) on language and
its structures; that is, rejecting the presentation
o f philosophical term s in the context o f that
m etalanguage that W estern E uropean philosophy
developed and sanctioned over the period o f its two
and a h alf thousand-year history;
2. returning to w ords (instead o f term s, categories,

and concepts) and their original m eaning outside
philosophy, their etymology, as well as their own pre-
logical and pre-m etaphysical content;
3. developing a new metalanguage for a new philosophy,

which will be built upon the basis o f words,
disseminating information about Being and having
a radically differen t trajecto ry from the k in d
o f com m unication that was used in previous
philosophical discourse.
22
T h e level o f H eid egger’s texts dem ands great effort even from a
full-fledged European philosopher (in general, from a thinking
Eu ropean ), which is quite difficult for G erm an-speaking
readers and even m ore difficult for native speakers o f other
E u ropean languages. T h e question o f correctly interpreting and
adequately translating H eidegger was being settled in European
philosophy throughout the entire 20th century. T h e latter led
to the creation o f a kin d o f “ H eideggerean dictionary,” which
philosophers use in addition to a range o f translations, each
nuance o f which presents a subject for specialized discussions. In
add ition to philosophers, other academ ics, such as philologists,
historians, scholars o f antiquity, and psychologists, are also
involved in com prehending and translating H eidegger. A fter
all, the difficulty o f un derstanding H eidegger is not a technical
problem , but rather a question o f choosing a radical turn on the
path o f W estern philosophy urged by H eidegger. Europeans
participate in m aking this turn by translating, interpreting, and
com m enting on H eidegger. T h ere are no fewer com plexities in
the translation o f his texts into French or English than into
R u ssian . Yet the best m inds o f Europe have struggled with this
problem for alm ost a century, starting with those who read and
attem pted to un derstand him in the original from the outset
(Jean -P au l Sartre, for instance, owes much to early Heidegger,
even including the nam e o f his philosophy, “existentialism ”).
H eidegger’s Silence
G ettin g acquainted with H eidegger, we cannot om it the

historical fact that during the 1 920-1940s, he belonged to
the philosophical-ideological school o f the “Conservative
R evolution” (along with such em inent thinkers as E rn st Jiinger,
Friedrich G eo rg Jiinger, O sw ald Spengler, O th m ar Spann, Carl
S ch m itt, A rth ur M oeller van den Bruck, W erner Som bart,
23
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M A R T I N H E I D E G G E R : The Philosophy o f Another Beginning
Friedrich H ielscher, and others). Finding them selves in

opposition to H itle rs N atio n al So cialism and repudiating the
racism, prim itivism , and brutality o f his p o p u list propaganda,
these thinkers were forced to cooperate with this ideology in
one way or another, not only as an attem pt to survive under a
totalitarian regime, b u t also because they shared (independently
and m uch earlier than the N a z is) a num ber o f ideas, including:
• the p o litic a l ro m an tic ism an d id e alism o f the new

G erm an y ;
• the notion that it is necessary for Europe to return to

its roots, T radition , and myth;
• the imperative o f a sim ultaneous war with Liberalism

(Britain and the U .S.) and M arxism (the U S S R ) as the
two expressions o f the same kind o f nihilism (pragmatic,
in one case, and proletarian, in the other);
• a N ietzsch ean diagn osis o f E urope’s hum anitarian

disease and the need to establish a “new heroism ,” etc.
W ith that in m ind, in the 1930s and 1940s, H eidegger

openly criticized those aspects o f N atio n al S o cialism th at he
considered erroneous from the stan d p oin t o f his philosophy.
In his book Introduction to Metaphysics in particular, H eidegger
wrote, “ T h e works that are being peddled ab ou t now adays as
the philosophy o f N atio n al Socialism , which have nothing to
do with the inner truth and greatness o f this m ovem ent (nam ely
the encounter between global techne and m odern m an )— have
all been written by m en fishing in the troubled w aters of'values’
and totalities’.”2 It is im portan t to note that the term “N atio n al
2 M artin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tubingen: Niemeyer,
1935; 1953), 20 2; M artin H eidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.
R alph M anheim (N ew H aven, C onn.: Yale University Press, 1959), 199.
24
S o cialism em erged in G erm any to designate one o f the schools

o f "C onservative R evolutionary" thought long before H itler
cam e to pow er and, m ore im portant, prior to the form ulation
o f N a z ism as an ideology. O nly subsequently was it usurped by
the racist theoreticians in H itler's circle.
Evidently, H eidegger conceived o f N atio n al Socialism through

the filter o f E rn st Jiinger's m anifesto, The Worker.3 In it,
N atio n al So cialism was presented as the answer to the challenge
o f M od ern ity4 for contem porary European m an. T h e answer
paradoxically consisted o f liberating the deeply rooted, basic,
and titanic foun dations o f m ankind through the dom ination
o f techne. A ccording to Jiinger, a 20th-century European was
losin g his rapidly evaporating cultural heritage in the m echanical
grinder o f m odern w arfare— its gas attacks and the rattle o f
tank treads. Yet, at the sam e time, and despite everything, he
w as heroically returning to basic hum an im pulses, including
the vivid experience o f cam araderie (“frontline socialism ”) and
an acute sense o f the nation as a project directed tow ard the
future (“nationalism ”). Jiinger's “national socialism ” and “total
m obilization” appealed to the existential roots o f the European
on the other side o f petty xenophobia, chauvinism , and,
especially, any kind o f racism . T h is type o f “national socialism ”
w as E uropean rather than G erm an, hum anist rather than
statist, and existential rather than totalitarian and ideological.
H eid egger considered Jiinger's ideas to be perfectly acceptable
and believed, at first, that N atio n al Socialism was capable o f
evolving in the direction o f the “C onservative Revolution.”
Initially, Jiinger's national socialism left a tremendous impact

on the entire “Third Way” movement in Germany in the 1920s.
3 E rn st Jiinger, D er Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt (Stuttgart: Klett-

C o tta, 1982).
4 T h e author uses the term "N ew T im e” in reference to M odernity (Ed.).
25
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M A R T IN H E I D E G G E R : The Philosophy of Another Beginning
However, it came gradually in to'h arsh conflict with N azism ’s

official dogm a and was eclipsed by the much less intellectual, but
incomparably more wide-spread H itlerism (including its criminal
consequences), which trium phed in G erm any in the 1930s and
which appropriated the name o f this school o f thought, distorted
it, and tainted it for a long time to come, if not forever.
The sam e fate befell the ideological legacy of other

representatives o f the E u ropean C onservative R evolutionary
m ovem ent. S tartin g in the 1 9 20s, G erm any's "right-w ing”
and "left-w ing” in tellectuals— from T h o m a s M an n to O sw ald
Spengler, from H ein rich von G leich en to the com m u n ists Fritz
W olffheim and H ein rich L aufen berg, from A rth u r M oeller
van den B ruck to C arl Sch m itt, an d from E rn st N iek isch
to H a rro S ch u lze-B o y sen — searched for a new worldview,
ph ilosoph ical and political h o rizo n s beyond the lim its o f
Lib eralism , dogm atic C o m m u n ism , and the old, narrow
conservative tradition. T h ey actively experim ented with the
risk iest com bin ations o f tradition and revolution, historical
con stan ts and innovative technologies, religious values and
progressive social theories. Far from any kind o f do gm atism ,
they developed m any original doctrin es, theories, and
ph ilosoph ical conception s. Yet the tragedy o f their situation
w as the fact that when it com es to m ainstream politics, this
entire broad spectrum o f pursu its, revelations, and intuitions
has been directly linked to H itler's to talitarian regim e since the
victory o f N S D A P in 1933. A n d although all these thinkers
gradually ended up in op p osition to H itler's regim e— from
"inner em igration” (the Jiin ger brothers, H eidegger, and C arl
Sch m itt) to direct participation in an ti-fascist activities and
the R esistance m ovem ent (N iek isch , Sch u lze-B oysen , and
o th e rs)— the totality o f their views w as excised from political
thought in the W est for quite som e because o f its superficial
26
and deceptive resem blance to the political declarations o f the

T h ird Reich era.
H eid eg ger's form al collab oration w ith the N a z is did not last
lo n g — as he fu lfilled his du ties as the rector o f the U niversity
o f F reib u rg and w as forced to follow certain orders on
the p art o f the official lead ersh ip .5 It is quite notew orthy
th at H e id eg ge r w as likely the only cu ltural figure o f such
calibre ( i f his calibre is at all com parable to th at o f anyone
else) th at never ap o lo g ized for his p a st after 1945. H e was
sim ply silent. In his philosophy, silence h as the fu n dam en tal
sign ifican ce as one o f the d ialectics in which Being speaks
o f itself, therefore we can in terpret "H e id e g g e r’s silence” in
vario u s ways (like all other a sp e c ts o f his w ork), but certainly
we can do so philosophically.
D u rin g the 1 9 2 0 -1940s period, H eidegger exerted decisive

influence on m any o utstan din g intellectuals who found
them selves in 1945 in the cam p o f the victors (from the Freudo-
M arx ist H erb ert M arcu se and Jean -P au l Sartre, a C om m unist,
to H eidegger's form er student and lover, H annah A rendt, who
strongly criticized all form s o f totalitarianism and em igrated
to the U .S ., where she had a brilliant academ ic career). A s a
result, in the general philosophical context, the collaboration
with H itler's regim e and even H eidegger's later "silence" were
politely forgotten (despite the fact that the 1933-1945 period
w as one o f the m ost fruitful for H eidegger's philosophy). N o
one, except for certain superficial troublem akers (like C hilean
C o m m u n ist V ictor Farias), dealt with this subject.6 H eidegger
m eans too m uch to the W est to be treated this way, even i f his
5 H e became a member o f the N S D A P on M ay 1,1933 and remained one until
1945, despite serious complaints about him from the official Party organs and
his gradual m arginalization within the regime.
6 V ictor Farias, Heidegger and N azism (Philadelphia: Tem ple University
Press, 1989).
27
/
actions went beyond the accepted social m ores. G en iu ses can

be forgiven for anything.
O bviou sly both in the case o f the U S S R and contem porary

liberahdem ocratic R ussia, these political details o f M artin
H eidegger’s personal life did not help in developing an adequate
understanding o f his work, encouraging a deliberate bias and
selective treatm ent o f his ideas and texts (those o f the 1930s
and 1940s, first and forem ost).
• Accidental Successes
In view o f these circum stances, H eidegger represents an alm ost

unknow n quantity for us. I f there were som ething coherent in
w hat was w ritten about him in R u ssian or in the way he was
translated, then this is, m ost likely, a coincidence or a successful
im itation. R u ssian s are, in fact, very successful im itators: often,
we can easily reproduce that which we do not at all u n derstan d
and that which rem ains profoundly alien to us. H erein lies the
flexibility o f our culture.
But even the automatic, mechanical translation o f Heidegger's texts

into Russian can, in rare cases, produce a curious result. This type
o f success does exist among Russian body o f work on Heidegger.
However, without a preliminary comprehension o f Heidegger
either in the original or through an accurate translation into other
European languages, it is impossible to distinguish successes from
failures. Thus, it would be more useful to face the task o f building
everything up from square one. C onstruction engineers know that
rebuilding a dam aged building is considerably more expensive,
time-consuming, and prone to additional problems than the
complete demolition o f the old and the construction o f a new
building from the ground up.
28
\
T h a t is an offer for those who have taken an interest, accidentally

or deliberately, in studying the person and philosophy o f the
greatest thinker— M artin H eidegger,
A nd so, inasmuch as we do not know Heidegger, I propose to carry

out a journey in his direction in order to get closer to him, similar to
the way in which Evgenii Golovin (incidentally, one o f the first and
m ost profound experts on M artin Heidegger in Russia) proposed to
“move closer to the Snow Queen.” 7
Philosopher as Identity
H eidegger, as we already m entioned, thinks and presents

h im se lf exclusively w ithin the fram ew ork o f W estern European
philosophy. T h is observation is exceedingly im portant in order
to precisely determ ine the location o f H eidegger's thought. It
m ight be quite tem pting to consider H eidegger as the religious
type (as m any o f his researchers do) and to draw a parallel
betw een H eidegger and the traditionalists with their criticism
o f contem porary W estern civilization .8 Yet we should postpone
7 Evgenii Golovin, Priblizhenie k Snezhnoi Koroleve (M oscow : Arktogea,
2 0 0 3 ).
D ealing with the philosophy o f traditionalism for quite som e time
(see, in particular, Absoliutnaia rodina [Absolute Motherland], Filosofiia
traditsionalizma [The Philosophy o f Traditionalism], and Radikal’nyi sub’ekt
i ego dubl’ [The Radical Subject and its Double]), I have not em phasized
H eidegger’s teaching, despite the fact that it influenced my intellectual
developm ent in the m ost direct and im m ediate manner. M y views are
indebted to H eideggers philosophy only slightly less so than to the ideas
o f Rene G uenon. H eidegger is a part o f our worldview, our political theory,
an d our philosophy; he is a sine qua non. H eidegger is no less fundam ental
than G uenon. B ut he is different. A com parison o f H eidegger and G uenon
m ust not be carried out too hastily. We m ust thoroughly m aster G uenon
an d H eidegger separately. A nd then— only thenl— should we determ ine
where they overlap (an d where they differ). Interpreting one by using the
other is erroneous. In his Ride the Tiger, Ju liu s Evola m ade the m istake
o f interpreting H eidegger hastily and superficially from the traditionalist
perspective (G uen on s generalized standpoint), in which he presents
29
/
sim ilar com parisons for as long aS possible and first fam iliarize
ourselves with H eidegger in that context to which he belonged
and w anted to belong, and in which he h im self com prehended
his place and significance.
H eidegger is a philosopher; m ore specifically, a W estern

E uropean philosopher, who addressed the entire legacy o f
W estern European ontology— and m etaphysics form ed by it—
and was fam iliar with its m ost m inute nuances. T h ro u gh o u t
his entire life, H eidegger attem pted to operate within the
fram ew ork ‘o f W estern European philosophical axiom s, even
when his goal was to blow them apart, transform , or overthrow
them. W ith G erm an precision, he proceeds from the m om ent
that is conventionally described as the Beginning o f W estern
E uropean philosophy, i.e., the pre-Socratic philosophers, to
that which is conventionally (or a little less strictly so) believed
to be its End; i.e., Friedrich N ietzsch e.
H eidegger sees his place in this sequence as the sum m ation o f

the entire W estern philosophy. Thus, he recognizes all its stages:
he separates each o f them into an entire spectrum o f meaningful,
telling detail. Anaximander, H eraclitus, and Parm enides are
a brilliant trio in pre-Socratic philosophy; Plato and Aristotle
represent the highest achievement in G reek thought, and are
the creators o f all subsequent European philosophy and culture.
H eidegger considers the M iddle Ages and Catholic Scholasticism
only an episode, and the m etaphysics o f M odernity (from Rene
D escartes through to Im m anuel K ant, G ottfried Leibniz,
Friedrich Schelling, Johann Fichte, Johann Goethe, and G.W.F.
H egel and up to Friedrich N ietzsch e and H enry Bergson) is the
logical conclusion o f that which the G reeks initiated.
H eidegger’s ideas and term inology in a highly inaccurate and distorted

m anner and criticizes them in an even less ju stified, naive way.
30
\ _
K eeping a certain approxim ation in mind, Heidegger's philosophy

is like a p asto rs funeral speech, ‘The deceased was a very good
m an, helped the poor, did not m istreat younger kids during his
ch ildh ood, lived a worthy life, worked a lot, and then passed
away; m ay his m em ory be eternal,” A fterw ard, the pastor begins
to go over all the episodes in the life o f the deceased in detail
("studied, m arried, divorced, fell ill, changed careers, retired, fell
ill again. . ."). H eidegger's philosophy is a detailed requiem for
W estern E uropean philosophy, based on the assum ption that
"som ething was,” "som ething began," then "som ething ended,
finished, and died.” Later, we will discuss what the "beginning'
m eans to Heidegger, along with the meaning o f "something
was”— "to be” is the m ost im portant concept for him — and what it
m eans to say "that which was, is no more.”
H eid egger p ro p o ses to address W estern European philosophy,

first, as that which once was, and second, as that which is no
more. A fter all, that which exists now is not W estern European
philosophy. A ccording to H eidegger, the latter ended with
N ietzsch e. H eidegger h im se lf is on the borderline. It is from
th is sepulchral abyss (A bgrund) that H eidegger narrates on the
subject o f that which has died.9
A ddin g religion, traditionalism , or m ysticism to this narrative

w ould be incorrect. For Heidegger, only philosophy is o f decisive
im portance, only its processes and twists and turns, its stations
and postulates, its highs and lows are o f interest. H erein lies
his peculiar asceticism : in coping with the rather profound crisis
o f contem porary nihilism, H eidegger does not look for support
in exotic cults, initiations, or secret doctrines. H e courageously
chooses to be accountable for the fate o f all W estern European
9 The G erm an word "Abgrund” i.e., "abyss,” a very im portant term in

H eidegger's philosophy. It originally m eant "precipice,” "steep vertical slope,"
and "chasm,” specifically.
31
_ y
thinking in its m ost W estern, logos-based aspects, for which no

analogies exist in other cultures, and which com prises the essence
and the fate o f Western civilization, specifically.
To T hink with W ords: Indo-European
A reas o f Thought
In order to un derstand Heidegger, we m ust learn to perform

two operations based upon the aforem entioned peculiarities
o f his thought process. First and forem ost, we m ust carefully
listen to his language— not the concepts or categories b u t the
words; not the ideas, principles, and fundam entals b u t the
stems of words. H is thinking is verbal and stem -based. T h is
is w hat we m ust consider when dealing with his texts. T h eir
reading and com prehension dem and a certain, even basic, level
o f linguistic and philological training.10 In addition, we, like
H eidegger h im self in his relation to G erm an, m ust learn to
think with w ords and stem s in our native language. Therefore,
when reading Heidegger, we m ust sim ultaneously:
• listen carefully (to the G erm an w ords);
• com prehend (the m eaning, concept, and intention

o f th ough t);
• translate (looking for verbal counterparts capable o f

transm itting their m eaning).
T h e reading o f H eid egger m u st becom e our chosen path to

our language, in my case, Russian, as a language o f thought and
a language o f philosophy, T h is creates a serious problem . I f
10 N ietzsch e called one o f his works We Philologists (Friedrich N ietzsche, We
Philologists, tr. J. M . Kennedy [Teddington: The Echo Library, 2 0 0 7 ]). The
reading o f H eidegger’s philosophy is specifically for "philologists” in the
N ietzschean sense.
32
\
we take a go o d look at In d o -E u rop ean languages in term s o f

th eir d istrib u tio n area, we shall see that each m ajor lin guistic
gro u p h as its own p h ilo so p h ical system with a m ore or less
developed ap p aratu s. T h e latter is b ased on determ ining
the p h iloso p h ical significance o f certain basic w ords in each
language, either fully or in terspersed, in part, with concepts
borrow ed from related lan guages.
T h is is also the case with European culture, which possesses

three basic language grou ps: G reek (including the language o f
philosophy's origins), R om ance languages (which, in addition to
Latin , includes French, Span ish , Italian, Rom anian, and others),
and the G erm anic group. A ll three groups have an established
philosophical language with a long-standing tradition o f
translating certain basic m eanings. H eidegger breaks this rule
and p ro p o ses to introduce new m eanings by paying attention to
the w ord stem s. A t the sam e time, the work o f “breaking” the
philosophical m etalanguage com prises the lion’s share o f his
texts dedicated to the European philosophical tradition, which
is native and intelligible for H eidegger.
T h is continent o f European m eanings— with three linguistic

b a se s— is not self-evident to us. Learning Latin and G reek,
even in an adequate manner, is becom ing exceedingly rare.
O u r m astery o f contem porary European languages (at least,
G erm an and French) is not necessarily up to par. T h is w ould
not be fatal i f we at least p o ssessed the basic knowledge o f the
R ussian philosophical language. By m aking a com parison with
E u ropean m eanings, we could destroy old m eanings together
with H eidegger, know ing what we are engaged in, and what we
are destroying. W e could then build som ething new together
with Heidegger, following the wreckage trajectory and adding the
treasury o f R ussian word stem s to this new undertaking. Thus,
33
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in principle, this is how we should act. However, we have nothing

to destroy, since our culture has not established a m etalanguage
o f R ussian philosophy along with conventional translations o f
European meanings. This leads to certain problem s.
In order to reject European m etaphysics together with

H eidegger, we m ust understand it accurately and unequivocally.
O therw ise, we w ould not be able to grasp either the m eaning
or the range o f his philosophizing. T h is is a serious obstacle.
Prior to outlining the way out, let us consider this issue in
term s o f other Indo-E uropean cultures. D o they have their
own philosophical m etalanguage?
In the case o f In d o -E u ro p ean Iran, there is an extensive

tradition o f a p articular p h ilo so p h ical language, in which true
Persian w ord stem s are com bined with the vast reservoir o f
A rabic term inology, which were in trodu ced du rin g the course
o f Islam izatio n . H en ry C orbin , French ph iloso p h er and
h istorian o f religion (w hose w ork includes the first fragm entary
tran slation s o f H eidegger's m ain b ook , Sein und Zeit, into
French), in his num erous and w ell-su p p orted scholarly w orks,
dem o n strated the breadth and specific character o f Iranian
thinking, including its own m etalanguage, m eanings, as well
as p articu lar lin guistic and herm eneutic rules and p ractic es.11
C o rbin offers us an in sigh tfu l and detailed p resen tatio n o f
"res iranica”— the “Iranian thing.” H eid egger's treatm en t o f
“res europae” is alm ost id e n tic a l.12
11 H enry Corbin, "A Shi'ite Liturgy o f the Grail,” “Su fism and Sophia,” and
"The M usical Sense o f Persian M ysticism ” in The Voyage and the Messenger:
Iran and Philosophy (Berkeley: N orth A tlantic B ooks, 1998). A lso by
Corbin: The M an of Light in Iranian Sufism (N ew Lebanon: O m ega
Publications, 1994).
Take into account that H enry C orbin inform ed Europeans about Iranian
thought, while H eidegger did so with their own tradition.
34
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A nother In d o-E urop ean culture, namely that o f the H in d u s, also

p o ssesses an extremely developed and perfected philosophical
app aratus based on the S an sk rit language. H ere, San sk rit can be
considered a kin d o f a m etalanguage o f the Vedanta and Vedic
cycle. A t the sam e time, the H in d u M im am sa school represents
a separate dom ain w ithin the fram ew ork o f the H in d u religion,
set aside for the system atization o f San sk rit sounds, letters and
w ord stem s, their com binations, etc.13
A m on g In d o-E uropean cultures, only the Slavic world does

not have its own established, stable, straightforw ard, and
un derstandable philosophical m etalanguage, which is available
to those who think in R u ssian , despite having sim ilar socio
political, dem ographic, territorial, and historic param eters to
other great p eop les.14 T h is forces us to contem plate the m eaning
o f this anom aly: why does the unquestionably existent Russian
thing (res russica) lack its own logos?
In the 19th century, the Slavophiles sought to bridge the gap in

search o f the Russian logos, while the W esternizers attem pted to
artificially transfer the European logos onto the Russian cultural
soil. W e should appreciate their efforts, even though they were
nullified in the wake o f the Bolshevik Revolution. “Philosophical
R ussia" once again entered the area o f twilight consciousness, like
in many previous historic instances, when it had every possible
thing, except for a full-fledged and suitable philosophical thought.
O utside the Indo-European context, equally well developed is the
philosophical term inology o f the Jew ish K abbalah (in which sounds, letter
form s, and basic stem s have m eanings) or Islamic esotericism, based on the
A rabic language and the sacred b ook o f the M uslim s, the Koran,
14 In term s o f the fundam ental and philosophical power in the general fabric
o f Indo-E uropean culture, “abortive civilizations” (using A rnold Toynbee’s
term inology) remain in the shadow s. These include the Celts, Letto-
Lithuanians (including P russian s), Phrygians (including their descendants,
th e R o m a n s), as w ell as the ex tin c t c iv iliz a tio n s o f the M in o a n s,
Pelasgians, H ittites, Tocharians, Scythians, and Sarm atians. Perhaps, the
reconstruction o f their philosophical m essage waits for its time to emerge.
35
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I will m ake a risky suggestion,' that, out o f all the Indo-

European cultural areas, it is the R u ssian one that "lies fallo w ”
T h e latter is not an accident or the result o f our deficiency and
backw ardness. We are quite advanced in term s o f other m atters
(statehood, economy, technology, science, and m ilitary pow er).
It seem s that R u ssian s sim ply w aited for the right m om ent to
produce a new philosophy. A t the sam e time, we rejected the
old European m etaphysics, which the W est has persistently
im posed on us, not out o f foolishness, but deliberately, not
w ishing to participate in it, guarding and saving ourselves
for som ething more interesting and im p o rtan t— som ething
more fundam ental. I f this susp icion is accurate, then we
have aw aited our h ou r: the old E u ro p ean m etaphysics has
collapsed, and the m ost profoun d, serious, and respon sib le o f
the E u ropean thinkers confirm ed th is fact and urged us to
think in a radically different way. P erhaps, now is the right
tim e to p articip ate in the p rocess o f true p h ilo so p h izin g and to
unseal the virgin treasure o f the Slavo-Russian language in order
to create new meanings and to reach new intellectual horizons,
based upon the newly grasped Russian antiquity.15 Perhaps, we
"lay fallow” in anticipation, waiting specifically for the proper kind
o f turn in the world history o f thought.16
Evenings T hinking
A t the sam e time, we should not let the profoundly European

essence o f H eidegger's thinking out o f sight even for a m om ent.
For H eidegger, Europe and the W est are synonym ous, denoting
V ladim ir Kolesov published a brilliant work on the roots and m eaning o f

ancient R ussian words and their evolution. S e e V ladim ir Kolesov, Drevniaia
^ Rus’: Nasledie v slove (Sankt-Peterburg: M ir Cheloveka, 2000.)
The works o f Rene G uenon and H en ry C orbin possess fundam ental
significance. They will help us m ethodologically understand w hat exactly
we strive to discover in the general legacy o f the Slavic, and now — the
R ussian-Slavic cosm os.
36
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a specific form o f philosophizing, historical being, and cultural

path, which express the idea o f an evening,” H eidegger
em ph asizes that “E urope is an evening land” (“Abendland” in
G erm an ), T h e kind o f philosophy that suits it is an “evening
p h ilosoph y”— an "evening m etaphysics,” T h e task o f W estern
E u ropean philosophy is "to put Being to sleep"
In H e id eg ge rs book D ie Geschichte des Seyns, in the third

sectio n s ( European P hilosophy”) footnote, we read:
D er seynsgeschichtliche Begriff des Abendlandes. D as L an d

des Abends. Abend Vollendung eines Tages der Geschichte
und Ubergang zur Nacht, Z eit des Ubergang und Bereitung
des M orgens. N acht und Tag.17
T h e Seynsgeschichtliche un derstan din g o f the W est (the

land o f the evening). Evening land. Evening (W est) —
the com pletion o f H istory's day and the transition to
night, the tim e o f tran sition and preparation for the
m ornin g (to m o rro w s day). N igh t and day.
Clearly recognizing his identity as a European and a European

thinker, Heidegger, like all other Europeans, has no doubts that
the path o f the W est— its “evening path”— denotes the universal
trajectory o f Being, followed by all peoples and cultures, but
where the Europeans were first to go. This means that they would
be the first not only to descend into the night, but also to see the
daw n. H eidegger writes, “ Today, the entire planet had becom e
European (W e ste rn ).. .W hen we say “European” (W estern), we
do not m ean geography or the expansion o f influence, but rather,
history and the origins o f the H istorical in it.”18
17 M artin Heidegger, Geschichte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:

V ittorio K losterm ann, 1998), 6.
18 M artin H eidegger, Uher den Anfang (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio
K losterm ann, 2005), 107.
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By “history” H eidegger m eans W estern history, i.e., the history

o f W estern philosophy as the quintessence o f history, and he
believes that its m ost im portant m om ent, the “beginning” is the
emergence o f philosophical thought in Greece.
Conceiving o f W estern European culture as a universal culture

reflects “cultural racism,” com m on for people o f the W est, which
was completely typical for H eidegger, to o .19 However, to his
credit, we m ust note that he h im self was never m istaken. H e
believed that the W est does not bring others “progress" and
“developm ent,” but rather nihilism , “desert," “oblivion o f the
question about Being” decom position, and dow nfall (i.e., all the
jo y s o f the night). T h e contem porary W est is universal in as far
as decom position and dow nfall are universal. H eidegger saw
the m ost profound form o f this degeneration in "Am ericanism ,"
which he viewed as “planetarism ” (today we w ould say
“globalism ” and “globalization”). “ P lanetarism is the inversion o f
the beginning (o f W estern philosophy) within the beinglessness
o f its developm ent.” 20 A t the onset o f its evening path, the W est
still illum inated the world with rays o f the setting sun for other
cultures. In the latest period, “A m ericanism ,” “pragm atism ,”
“techne” and “calculation” only bring decay to m ankind. Yet
H eidegger found m eaning and universal significance even in the
decay, perversion, and insignificance o f the m odern-day W est.
Ju s t like his teacher E dm u n d H u sserl. For H u sserl, the question was

w hether “the E uropean m an po ssesses the absolute idea, whether he is an
em pirically m easurable anthropological type, like the inhabitants o f C h in a
or In dia are; in this case, whether the E u ropean ization o f other peoples
is evidence o f the absolute m eaning entering the w orld’s m eaning and is
far rem oved from historical m eaninglessness?”. T h is question w as purely
rhetorical; o f course, “the E uropean m an p o ssesses the absolute idea.”
(E d m u n d H u sserl, The Crisis o f European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology [Evanston: N orth w estern University Press, 1 970].)
H eidegger thought likewise. Im plicitly or explicitly, practically all the
people o f the W est are certain o f this.
M artin H eidegger, Uber den Anfang, op. cit., 107.
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A s a thinker o f the W est, H eidegger thinks in term s o f the

evening; even more than that, he thinks nocturnally, H e sees
his m ission in sum m arizing the entire W estern philosophical
tradition. In a way, his books are the last thing that could be
said using the evening language." H eidegger’s language is not
the language o f H eidegger as a person; it is the final chord o f the
W estern European language. H e is the last point o f W estern
E u ropean thinking. H e and his philosophy are not a specific
case; they are destiny, fate (in the sense o f fulfilling that, which
h ad been foretold). “A t the beginning o f language is a poem,"
says H eidegger. A t the end o f language is the philosophy o f
M artin H eidegger. A n d it seeks to becom e the beginning o f a
new language, foreshadow ing the m orning’s language.
H eid eg ger believed that in the m ost recent centuries, G erm an s,

ou t o f all E u ro pean s, startin g w ith G oethe, Leibniz, K an t, the
R o m an tics, Schelling, Fichte, H egel and up to N ietzsch e, had
been accountable for the fate o f the w orld (H eid egg er’s*V o rid,”
die Welt, is the to tality o f beings-as-a-whole— das Seiende-im-
G anzen). H e draw s a straigh t line from the ancient G reek s to
classic G erm an ph ilosop h y and finally— to him self.
39
II. BEING AND BEINGS
D ifferentiation ( “Ontologische D ifferenz”)
A t the root o f H eidegger's p h ilo so p h y — at the root o f all

his th o u g h t— is the n otion o f ontological differentiation
( ontologische D ifferen z’). T h is concept (“la difference"1 in
French an d"U nterschied” in G erm an ) becom es a fundam ental
p h ilo so p h ical act for H eidegger. W e are not talking ab ou t
ju s t any differen tiation, but the differentiation of all
differen tiatio n s, th at is to say, the differentiation betw een
beings (Seiende) and Being (Sein).
Beings and Being are not one and the same. T h is gap encom passes
the astuten ess o f H eidegger's philosophy, in term s o f the
existence o f sam eness and non-sam eness (sim ultaneously)
— the pair (and the non-pair) o f these two concepts. H aving
been “anointed" by H eidegger, com prehending the very nature
o f thought and m etaphysics as well as the depths o f hum an
existence, affected by the essential dyad o f "Being and beings"
as H eidegger u n derstood it, from now on, we will think like
H eidegger in any situation, when solving any problem , and
reading any philosophical work.
It is im portan t to determ ine which G erm an w ords correspond

to these fundam ental w ords in R ussian. In G erm an, H eidegger
calls "Being" "das Sein " based on the infinitive form o f the verb
"sein" (th at is, the Slavic "6um ue ” [bytie], the English “being,”
and the G reek "e iv a i” [einai] are som ewhere between a verbal
noun and a gerund). T h e G erm an language has a particular
form for con structin g a verbal noun, which requires using the
1 O r "d ijfe ra n c eas per Jacqu es D errida.
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neuter article with a verb. I f we were to translat t 'S e in literally,

we w ould have to use the O ld C hurch Slavonic verb “to be"
(6bimb [byt’]) in the infinitive, that is “6bimu” ( byti), instead o f
the extravagant, som ew hat recent, and artificial R u ssian verbal
noun “Being” (dum ue), which is quite useful in the translation
o f theological texts and W estern philosophy. W e do not have
the direct opportunity to use the infinitive form o f this verb in
R ussian, therefore we use the noun "Being” (6bimue), However,
we m ust always keep this consideration in m ind, otherw ise
we will fall into error, the significance o f which will eventually
become clear. W e will not be able to un derstand H eidegger
unless we clarify for ourselves w hat is at stake.
D a s Sein and das Seiende
T h us, we translate "Sein” as "B eing” keeping the O ld C hurch

Slavonic w ord "6bimu” (byti) in m ind. In G erm an, Seiende—
"beings” (or "cyufee” [sushchee] in R u ssia n )— is form ed by using
an active participle from the sam e verb " s e in — "Seiende”
W h at are "beings” ? O ld C hurch Slavonic had one particular

form, "cbiu (syi), m eaning the "one, who i s ” T h e difference
between beings, on the one hand, and Being, on the other,
the difference between Seiende and Sein, is the p u rpose and
foundation o f H eidegger's entire philosophy. A nd, therefore, we
m ust return to gram m ar once again. H eidegger em phasizes the
fact that the conjugation o f a verb or the form ation o f different
gram m atical form s is always the result o f its inflection2, its
linkage to som ething, its elastic bending. In its pure form, the
infinitive, the verb "sein” (or the v erb “6bim u” in R u ssian ) exists
by itse lf and does not relate to anyone or anything, does not
signify anything, and does not "bow " or "b en d ” before anyone.
2 From the Latin"inflexions, bending, or the R u ssian “naKjiOHeHue” (naklonenie)

with the sam e literal meaning.
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L e t us consider a sim pler verb: w hat does "to do" m ean? W e

u n d e rstan d w hat he does sign ifies: we are able to recognize
th e one who does’, ’ and we see the resu lts o f "what had been
done. B u t are we capable o f conceiving or im agining w hat "to
do” m eans in its p u rest form ? Its infinitive does not have a clear
im age, and n oth in g p ertain in g to beings directly correspon ds
to it. "To d o " ("dexm u" [deiati] in O ld C hurch Slavonic)
is som eth in g th at is realized by an unknow n som eone in
relation to an unknow n som ethin g. T h is level o f abstraction
is un im aginable. N o n eth eless, if we attem pt to deal with the
infin itive o f the verb "to do” in search o f correspon din g im ages,
then we will im m ediately end up in a peculiar situation. O n
the one h and, this will tell us som ething, but on the other, we
w ill not be able to grasp w hat we are dealing with no m atter
how h ard we try. T h is "deed" (dennue [deianie]) only acquires
m ean in g when it un dergoes conjugation, i.e., when it w orks
to geth er with a pro n o u n or a noun, th at is, with a subject
or an object. W e grasp the m eaning o f the verb when it is
clarified by a p erso n or num ber, when it is already inflected
("b e n t”). In its pure form , when the verb exists by itse lf as
a prjfia (rim a ), as an infinitive, we do not com prehend it; it
elu des u s — even as concrete a verb as "to do"
In that case, w hat can we say about the verb "to be" which is
m uch m ore com plex and elusive in its deceptive clarity?
I f we attem pt to grasp this verb’s m eaning (in an analogous

way to the verb "to do") in the infinitive, it will elude us even
m ore decisively. T h e infinitive is the fundam ental operation on
the p art o f our consciousn ess concerning the disincarnation o f
dem onstrable beings in action. T h is operation is linked to the
very roots o f thought, and the entire thought structure greatly
depen ds on the way it is carried out. T h is structure is built
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upon its own basic foun dations,4n which thought is obtained

in close contact with beings.
H erein lie the principal difficulties and problem s o f M artin

H eidegger's philosophy.
It is Easy to Understand Beings: The
Foundation of Thought
W h at are beings, Seiende? T h is we u n derstan d perfectly well.

We are talking about that which is actual, that which is present,
and that which is in front of us. Beings are, and the fact that they
exist as beings, in actuality, m akes them clear and obvious. Beings
are intelligible. T h e direct nature o f such clarity is located at the
basis o f thought as such, in the sense that the confirm ation
o f their actuality strictly correspon ds to the first operation in
thought. T h o u gh t may have different form s, even the m ost
fantastic; but in all its tw ists and paradoxes, it always refers us
to beings as its principal assertion. T h o u g h t asserts that beings
are. T h ey begin here. I f there is any dou bt as to whether beings
are, and that they are beings, then thought strays, m eaning gets
lost, and m adness ensues.
The experience o f beings is the primary and initial experience o f

thought. The verb is in the third person is quite specific. The whole
aggregate o f things and each o f the things, including ourselves,
can grant itself the status o f beings, o f that which is, without any
issues. This is not complicated: we can easily run into beings. All
that we see, all that has been, all that we think about or remember
are beings. Beings are, perhaps, the m ost intelligible and basic idea
about the relationship between man and the world as well as
himself. It is quite simple to understand beings: they represent that
which gives itself to us, that which is actual, that which is present?
3 A lexander D ugin uses the R ussian verb"npucymcmeoeamb” (prisutstvovat’)
44
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O f course, the field o f philosophy could pose a question, which,

at one point, concerned the S o p h ists in antiquity, Im m anuel
K an t, and the phenom enologists: does the knowledge that
beings are relate to beings them selves or to knowledge? Is
existence intrinsic to beings, or is it a predicate o f reason, which
we can grasp through basic thought process?
K a n t clearly form ulated this problem , having raised the

qu estion o f th e" thing-in-itself and th e" thing-for-us"; that is, the
question o f noumena and phenom ena. E d m un d H u sserl, the
founder o f phenom enology and H eidegger’s teacher, proposed
to introduce the concept o f "noem a" in order to avoid this
q u estion — that is, beings which are beings in the area o f thought,
and are intellectual objects, the phenom ena o f thought. Noem a
does not correspond to beings themselves, but to thoughts
ab ou t beings, including the attribution o f beings’ traits."
Despite this apparent complication, everything remains fairly simple.

It is not all that important whether beings are beings by themselves,
and whether it is at all legitimate to raise the question o f anything
"by itself” when we are dealing with philosophy. In other words,
in the area o f thought, there are only the laws o f thought that are
unconditional and fundamental, determining how thought deals
with everything else. W hether beings exist by themselves as noemata,
or whether their existence is the predicate o f reason, that is, "that
which was declared earlier” (“praedicare,” "to proclaim” or "to say
beforehand” in Latin or the Germ an "Zuspruch”), has no decisive
significance for reason. In both cases, we are dealing with “noema" In
in order to em phasize its link to the Russian translation o f “Seiende”
“cyufee” (susbcbee). T his verb shares the stem “c y u f (sushcb), also found in
such w ords as'ex isten ce,” “cyiqecmeoeaHue” (sushchestvovanie), and uses the
prefix “npu” (p ri), which m eans "near.” The English word "(to be) present”
h as links to the Latin "prceesse" which refers to being in front o f som eone
or som ething or to being at hand. (Present, Dictionary.com, O nline
Etym ology Dictionary, D ouglas H arper, http://dictionary.reference.com /
b row se/presen t [accessed: O ctober 09, 2012].) (Ed.)
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one case, it has an object that strictly correspon ds to it, and is

independent o f it; and in the other, it has an object th at does
not strictly correspond to it, and is not independen t o f it, or
has no such object at all.
A s objects, or as phenom enological"noem ata" beings are, and this

is obvious for thought. Thought deals with this as with som ething
that is obvious from the outset. Accepting the opposite— that
beings are not— we dem olish the m echanism o f consciousness,
disable it, and thereby cease to be thinking entities. After
hypothetically ceasing to be thinking entities, we can no longer
be certain as to whether we exist, i.e., whether we are entities,
inasm uch as we no longer possess the m ethods to determ ine the
existence or non-existence either o f ourselves or o f that which is
around us. In this case, someone else— one who retains reason—
will decide for us whether we are or not.
“M an” was defined by the ancient Greeks, starting with A ristotle,

as C&ov Xoyov sxov (zoon logon echon), that is, as an "anim al,
endowed with wordAanguage-thought” L o sin g our logos, we not
only lose our humanity, but also our animality, leaving the
concern with our species classification to others.
Being is a Problem : The Key Q uestion in Philosophy
Beings are intelligible and transparent, and their intelligibility

and transparency com prise the foundation o f thought. W hen it
com es to Being, however, everything is m uch more com plicated.
W hen thought takes its first step, often unnoticed by the

thinker him self, it asserts (im plicitly), that beings are. T h is is
not a problem or a question, but the b asis o f thought. O ne who
sim ply thinks always m akes this initial move.
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Yet if the thinker begins to think about how he thinks, i.e.,

thinking about thought, then the reflection about beings acquires
a completely different character and occurs on a different, higher
level o f consciousness. Reflecting upon our own thinking, we apply
the features o f beings to it, too, in one way or another. Perhaps, this
does not occur as clearly as with D escartes, with his “cogito ergo
sum ” ("I think, therefore I am”; I exist), but the ancient G reeks
were already aware o f som ething along these lines. T h is time
around, this issue dem ands questioning beings in order, in the
very least, to separate their properties im agined by the thinker,
from those properties o f beings that the thinker is.
T h is, according to H eidegger, is th e“key question in philosophy”

(Leitfrage), which is form u lated as follow s: “W h at is the Being
o f beings as su ch ?” In other w ords, “W h at is com m on to all
beings th at m akes them beings?” or “W h at is generally intrinsic
to beings?"
W h at this “key question in philosophy” addresses is Being. It

is conceived o f through beings, but as som ething different from
beings, although intrinsic to them. W e can describe the genesis
o f this question in two ways: empirically or rationalistically.
Empirically, this will look like two consecutive stages o f'n atu ral”
speculation about the fact that beings are a given. The first
stage is a sim ple affirmation that beings are. The second stage
strives tow ard generalized observations about beings, toward
the system atization and hierarchization o f the features o f
beings. O bservin g beings, consciousness begins to notice certain
regularities and, at a poin t in tim e (the appearance o f philosophy
in the ancient world), reaches the realization that beings as a
whole have a com m on property. T hus emerges the notion o f
Being and the corresponding question, “W h at is this Being?"
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The second way to address the sam e question could focus on

thought regarding thought, with an underlying and growing
conviction that beings capable o f thinking about other beings
are beings of a higher order. Their existence dem ands a different
higher form; i.e., thinking beings are principally different from
non-thinking beings. This highest form o f beings is also associated
with beings as a whole, with what beings have in common, and
leads to the following question, "W h at is the Being o f beings?”
T h u s, Being as Sein, as the G reek siv ai ( einai), as the infinitive

appears in ‘the area o f thought at that very m om ent when
thought begins to examine som ething that goes beyond
the consideration o f beings as such. T h is is the beginning o f
philosophy: leaving the fram ew ork o f initial assertions in the
vein o f "beings are"
A nd herein lies a fundam ental issue. T h o u g h t focused solely on

beings as they are in direct experience is potentially boundless.
T h o u gh t can sort beings, rearrange, com pare, differentiate, and
com bine them, w ithout m oving up to the next level— that
o f speculation about Being. For this reason, ancient G reeks
considered thought about the essence o f beings as an invasion
o f som ething divine. T h e first fragm ent about the unity o f
beings and logos, w ritten by H eraclitus o f Ephesus, refers to this
point, specifically:
ovk sjuov aXXa rov Xoyov aKoboavxaq dfioXoyeiv ocxpdv

s o u v ev TzavTa siv a i ( I f you do not listen to me, b u t
to the logos, it w ould be w ise, ab id in g by it, to say:
everything is one4).
4 Herm ann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch
(Berlin: W eidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1903), fragment 50; here, translated
from the Russian.
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In lectures ab o u t H eraclitu s’s logos, H eidegger emphasized the

fact that Heraclitus associated logos with divine lightning.5 Only
the lightning o f divine logos, surpassing the intellectual capabilities
on the part o f the philosopher him self ("do not listen to me”), can
push one to conceive o f beings as a whole: in this excerpt described
as "the unity o f all.”
H e id e g g e r also u n d e rsco red the fact th at in A risto tle ’s

p h ilosop h y, un ity is alm o st a synonym o f Being— sv (hen)
is a synonym o f ov (on). T h erefo re, we can in terpret this
frag m en t sp ecifically as one th at links logos w ith Being,
th ereby elevatin g the entire pro b lem o f th o u gh t to the
se c o n d — h ig h e st— level. T h e "key q u estio n in p h ilo so p h y ” is
fo rm u la ted at th is level.
T h e place where the question o f Being is raised is where

philosophy begins. T h is boundary separates a mere thought
from philosophical thought.
“The Key Question in Philosophy” was
Formulated Incorrectly
A ll that has been said above about beings and Being is yet to
contain anything new and unusual, perhaps, apart from the
stu bborn fixation on the relationship between Being and beings.
T h is relationship (Bezug) is the single m ost im portant problem
for H eid egger’s entire philosophy. T h e classical history o f
ph ilosoph y describes the set o f ontological problem s som ew hat
like this, assu m in g this to be a com m on issue.
5 M artin H eidegger, Heraklit 1. D er A njang des abendlandischen Denkens

(Heraklit) (1 9 4 3 ); 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos (1 9 4 4 ) (Frankfurt
am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1987).
49
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H eidegger's radical novelty is>* expressed in his obvious

dissatisfaction with the very form ulation o f the “key question in
philosophy,” starting from his initial texts on phenom enology.
H e is wary o f the original philosophical fundam entals, which
substantiate the idea that Being is the com m on property o f
beings. H e views this idea as som ething profound, foundational,
and decisive for the entire process o f W estern European
philosophy and interprets it as a fatal error, a m istake, and an
om ission o f som ething that is vitally im portant. It is not that
easy to express or describe the latter, but he grasps it intuitively
as the turning poin t o f world history.
A ccording to Heidegger, the relationship betw een beings

and Being was already interpreted incorrectly in antiquity.
A lthough this m istake was infinitely sm all during the initial
stages, it grew alongside all the consequences o f philosophy's
establishing foundations until ultim ately transform ing into the
total ontological nihilism o f M odernity, especially during the
20th century. A ccording to H eidegger, we m ust seek the key to
understanding the present state o f affairs in philosophy, culture,
and even politics at the dawn o f W estern European civilization,
in the way in which the very first philosophers resolved the
question o f correlating Being (Sein) and beings (Seiende).
Even at that point, something went wrong in term s o f clarifying

the relationship betw een Being and beings in the way the
“key question in p h ilosoph y” w as raised. "W hat w ent ‘wrong?
Why did it go wrong' exactly, an d what should happen to
m ake it right?” T h e se qu estion s com prise the core o f M artin
H eid egger’s philosophy.
50
V_
III. FUNDAMENTAL
ONTOLOGY1
The Com plexity o f Bezug
W orking out the nature o f ontological problem s, H eidegger

advances the follow ing thesis, “Sein ist das Seiende nicht”—
"Being is not beings ” O n the one hand, this m eans nothing but
the fact that thoughts about the Being o f beings as beings m ust
take us away from beings, which is alm ost obvious. T hey do take
us away, but not in the fashion that this should be done. Here,
the structure o f Bezug (relationship) moves to the forefront.
Bezug, relationship, clarifies the correlation between beings and

Being, and is structured in a very specific way in the field o f ancient
philosophy. Reflection on the Being o f beings leads ancient Greek
philosophers to the concept o f essence, as the common attribute
1 In order to em phasize the specific way in which H eidegger understands

the question o f Being, I propose to utilize the G erm an form ula
“Fundamentalontologie” “jundamental-ontologische” which H eidegger uses
him self. T his strategy is not unlike using other Heideggerean terms,
such as "D asein " “Geviert” “Ge-Stell,” and "D as M a n ” leaving them un
translated in order to em phasize the unique meaning that this philosopher
p u t into carefully selected w ords, taking them back to the source o f
their philosophical-poetic and etym ological significance. “Fundam ental-
ontology" is not “fundam ental ontology," but rather the way in which
H eidegger understands the m ost profound level o f ontological analysis.
However, the latter is only applicable within the fram ew ork o f his unique
teaching concerning nature and the structure o f Dasein (Part 3, “D asein ”
and the second part o f the book are dedicated to this subject) as well as in the
context o f the new Beginning. In som e cases, he uses the expression “onto-
ontology,” in order to underscore that “fundamental-ontology” is not ju st
another level logically constructed over the ontic, but, on the contrary, the
kind o f thought about Being that preserves the continual freshness o f direct
contact with the ontic as a form o f D asein’s existence.
53
that unites all beings in their greatest shared quality. “Essence”

[ ]
(iovoia ousia in G reek, cyiynocmb [sushchnost’] in R u ssian ) is
a feminine noun, form ed from the present participle o f the verb
“to b e" “siv ai” (einai),"6bim b” ( byt’), “sein ” T h is term was later
translated into Latin as "essentia" o r" substantia" which obscured
its m eaning. In R ussian, the word "cyufHOcmb" (sushchnost’) is
the m ost precise translation o f this term.
Here, we m ust once again address H eidegger's m etalanguage.

H e insists that ovoia is Seiendheit, i.e., a particular way to
conceive o ('Being, in which it is equated with the exact shared
quality o f all beings as beings. It is this kind o f un derstanding
that determ ines the particular path o f developm ent in W estern
philosophy, where Being as siv ai is persistently and invariably
thought o f specifically as ovaia, expressed in the form ula Sein
= Seiendheit, "Being is the essence o f beings"
This is the Bezug o f W estern European philosophy, which is

structured upon this particular ontological picture, and is based
specifically on this way o f thinking. "Being is the essence of beings’;
and, consequently, this leads to the establishm ent o f two parallel
levels: the level of beings and the level o f essence (ovoia [substance,
ousia], Seiendheit). A nd here, H eidegger makes a highly critical
assertion: ancient philosophy, and all contem porary W estern
European philosophy following it, which differentiate Being
and beings through essence, effectively overlooked the difference
between Being and beings. Thus, they created an abstraction from
beings based upon the direct analogy with beings themselves.
A s a result, W estern European philosophy conceived o f Being
(as the essence o f beings) as distinct from unique and concrete
beings, but coinciding with beings in their universality. In other
words, it ultimately viewed Being as beings. T his was, o f course,
a different kind o f beings, one from the highest, suprem e rank,
54
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but an example o f beings nonetheless. Ultimately, Being acquired

the attributes o f beings, i.e., it then became possible to make
statem ents, such as Being is, as Parmenides had done. This kind
o f an assertion is possible only in relation to beings, even the m ost
sublime, prim ordial, simple, and unified kind. I f “Being is’, ’ then
it belongs to the category o f beings, even if not simply as one o f
beings, but rather as the essence o f beings.
T h e G reeks, like other people o f the W est, loved beings too much
and becam e victim s o f this fatal love, which predeterm ined the
entire system o f W estern European philosophy. H eidegger
m entions the latter not with irritation and arrogance, but
rather with p rofoun d un derstanding and empathy. Being— as
that which m akes beings w hat they are— m ust som ehow be
com bined with beings and connected to them. A nd if we follow
this idea through, at som e point, we would, indeed, become
convinced that Being is, that it is beings, and that it is the m ost
im p o rtan t and purest o f beings. T h e opposite assertion — that
Being is not beings— can only be accepted up to a certain extent.
A t that point, we w ould have to em phasize that Being as the
shared feature is not the sam e as beings as particulars. However,
both the particular and the shared have one attribute that
unites them : they both are.
Yet, un derstan din g the depth o f ontological differentiation and

Bezug in traditional philosophy, H eidegger tells us: this is the
whole point, and the principal error is rooted here; if Being
is not beings, then it is the latter that m ust be the object o f
ontological study. However, in this case, it cannot be identical
to the essence o f beings, and, consequently, it is not a shared
attribute for beings. H ere, Being is not, it is not beings, it is none
o f beings (this also includes the non-essence o f beings and the
non-shared attrib u tes— not o v aia or koivov [koinon]).
55
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In other words, H eidegger asserts t h a t "Being is Nothingness”

(das Sein ist das N ichts), m aking W estern European philosophy
a great delusion, lasting two and a h a lf th ousan d years, as it
failed to recognize this issue.
Ontics
A nalyzing the relationship (Bezug) between beings (Seiende, ov

[on]) and Being (Sein, sivai), H eidegger introduces three levels
o f ontology, which w ould allow us to consider this problem
from another perspective. H eidegger gives their definitions in
his m ost im portant work, Sein und Z eit.2
First comes the “ontic” level, from the Greek ov— beings: ovzog
(ontos) is the genitive case, which usually helps form com pound
words in Greek. W hen we attempted to answer the question
about what beings are in the m ost direct and accessible manner, we
were in the domain o f the ontic. The ontic dimension assum es the
mind's direct grasp o f the outside world with all its distinctions
and variety. A t this point, the mind is yet to question what the
Being of beings or the essence of beings are, and restricts itself to basic
affirmations that beings are beings. Thought as such in its m ost
natural and basic form operates specifically in this dimension. To
think about beings as beings means to compare one to the other, to
line beings up, and to juxtapose them am ongst themselves, always
remaining at the same level in terms o f thought topography (i.e.,
the space o f thought), without going beyond its limits; i.e., not
raising the questions as to where beings originated, what the Being
of beings is, where the end of beings is, and o f what this end is.
T h e ontic sphere is typical for both hard sciences and everyday

thought; it ranges from the highly developed calculation
2 M artin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1 9 2 7 ) (T u b in gen : M ax N iem eyer

Verlag, 2 0 0 6 ).
56
V
A LEX A N D ER D U G IN
system s and classification to the m ost banal m ental reactions

on the part o f an average person in the m ost diverse cultures,
from the m ost prim itive to the m ost sophisticated.
T h e ancient G reeks defined the sphere o f beings by using the

collective concept “<pvaig” (physis), and, according to A ristotle,
the area o f ontic thought can be called “physics.” A little later, we
shall see ju st how m uch is invested in this concept.
In regard to ph ilosoph y, ontic th ou gh t e stab lish es its

grou n dw ork. T h is is already considered thought, but is not
yet p h ilo so p h ical (in the fu llest sense o f the w ord). T h is is
th ou gh t b ased on w ords, b u t not concepts; thoughts ab ou t
the obvious, but w ith out ab stractio n . T h e se thoughts operate
w ith things, but not essences, even i f these things have a
m en tal nature; i.e., are “noem ata” in E d m u n d H u sse rl’s sense.
For H eidegger, this th ough t level is extrem ely im portan t,
since this is where p h ilo so p h y originates. A n d how it begins,
how it deals w ith the stratru m o f the ontic w orldview and
reflection ab ou t the w orld, in which direction it sets off, and
w here it m oves o n — all have the principal significance for the
entire trajectory o f p h ilo so p h y ’s developm ent, and, in fact,
predeterm in es its fate and its end.
Ontology
H eid egger calls the second level ontological. O ntology begins

by asking “the key question in philosophy,” “W h at is the Being
o f beings?” “ W h at are beings as a whole?” and “W h at is the
essence o f beings?” T h e problem o f qualitative differentiation
betw een beings and Being appears at this point. And,
consequently, ontology is based on clarifying the structure and
quality o f the relationship betw een one and the other. H ere, the
57
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question o f Being is placed at the very core o f thought. T h ese

are philosophy's origins, which, in contrast to thought as such,
move to a principally new level. A t this level, the question about
the Being o f beings and the fact that Being and beings are not
identical, is the focal point.
A ccording to H eidegger, p re-Socratic ph ilosophers founded

ontology, like philosophy (“philosophy" and “ontology" are
identical concepts from the stan d poin t o f Being). Plato and
A ristotle definitively established these two subjects, which
entered C h ristian theology and m odern philosophy in their
com pleted form . T h e way in which the first philosophers
com prehended the question about the Being o f beings turned
out to be both destiny and fate for all W estern European
philosophy. T h eir choice and their solution to this set o f
problem s laid dow n the fundam ental groundw ork for the
entire subsequent philosophical process. T h ey are the founders
o f G reeks' ontology, which becam e the ontology for the entire
field o f European philosophy.
Solving the question o f Being, ontology identifies the Being

o f beings with the essence o f beings (ovaia) and, asserting the
difference between beings and Being (as an attribute com m on to
all beings), at the same time relates to Being as a kind o f beings,
only one o f a higher rank. A ccording to Heidegger, the m ost
im portant point is that ontology strays from its predestined
path during the very first stages. The birth o f philosophy and
the breakthrough to logos at lightning speed separated thought
from ontics and pushed it to leap beyond the horizons o f beings
and to the discovery and revelation o f Being. This would have
been genuine transcendence; i.e., a true surpassing o f lim its. It and
only it would have secured an irreversible and incontrovertible
significance for philosophy. G rasp in g beings ontically from the
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outset, the G reeks fierce thought, which had developed a taste

for freedom , should have leapt into Nothingness, into non-
beings, where it should have searched for Being as the authentic
b asis o f beings. B ut the G reeks did otherw ise and created an
ontology that was not based on Nothingness but on the essence
o f beings, i.e., on Being as the general attribute o f beings. T h ey
had thus given birth to “fictitious transcendence,” which did
not break through to the true source o f beings— their hidden
fo u n d atio n — but doubled the topography o f beings with an
add ition al level. T h e latter rem ained part o f beings (however
they m ight have called it), but, at the sam e time, served as the
suprem e source for beings in the ontic arena; i.e., as Being.
In later works (especially o f the 1936-1946 period), H eidegger

introduced a very im portant element o f his m etalanguage—
spelling the word "Sein," “Being’, ’ in two variants: the regular "Sein”
and the archaic “Seyn’. ’ This spelling variation possesses radical
significance. (In Russian, there is no possible way to convey the
two spellings; in English, we occasionally see"Beyng” [Seyn].)
O n to logy operates with Being as Sein, m eaning Seiendheit,

essence. Seyn is the kind o f Being that, on the contrary, entirely
eludes ontology and is not grasped through beings, but otherw ise
(m o st likely, in term s o f non-beings; i.e., N oth in gn ess). Seyn
represents genuine transcendence and authentic philosophy,
which H eidegger prop oses to create. T h us, ontology, in its
extant form , devises the artificial construct o f “essentialism "
over beings. T h is construct becom es the dom ain o f philosophy,
while philosophy itse lf is considered the Q ueen o f the Sciences.
In turn, ph ilosoph y determ ines the principles, foundations, and
m eth odologies o f physical sciences, as well as those o f ethics,
gram m ar, m athem atics, geometry, philology, aesthetics, etc. All
this is the result o f one original and infinitely sm all error.
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Instead o f becoming a truly more profound, essentialist, and

original form o f thought, ontology, as it developed, only continued
to distort the norm al functioning on the part o f ontic thinking,
created obstructions and dead ends, distorted and w arped beings
and the understanding o f beings. Instead o f explaining <pvaiq,
ontology violated it, im posing abstract constructions onto beings,
rooted in the incorrectly oriented basic movement o f the logos.
G reek philosophy configured the logos in ontology,

differentiating it from ontics, in such a way that it operated
with essence as though with Being, equating Being to beings
(i.e., the source o f Parm enidean “Being is, Nothingness is not").
T h is excess o f false positivity brought the negative, destruction,
and death into the ensem ble o f beings. In stead o f the salvation
o f beings through Being, logos destroyed beings through the
conjuring up o f a generalized essence.
W ith A ristotle, the philosophical intuition o f the first G reek

philosophers acquired a com pleted and system atized form . A nd
it is significant that one o f his works bears the title M etaphysics:
“that which follows p h y sics” (“physics”— as a phenom enon
and as one o f A ristotle’s other treatises). M etaphysics proves
to be practically identical to ontology (and W estern European
philosophy in general), because its task is to substantiate the
dom ain o f origins beyond physics (i.e., ontics).
H eidegger insists that all W estern European philosophy

is actually m etaphysics (i.e., ontology), even the kind that
explicitly rejects any appeals to m etaphysics, for instance, the
philosophy o f Friedrich N ietzsch e, the “philosophy o f life,"
positivism , or pragm atism . M etaphysics as ontology becam e the
sole and com pulsory style o f W estern E uropean thought long
ago, which is essentialist in each and every case. It is irrelevant
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A LE X A N D E R D U G IN
w hether we are dealing with a system o f ideas (idealism ),

things (realism , m aterialism ), concepts (conceptualism ), or
values (axiology), a system o f' the practical (pragm atism ),
vulgar political worldviews, or even nihilism . A ll these are an
expression o f m etaphysics, because the thought m atrix is one
and the sam e in all cases, and is based upon the false ascription
o f transcendence to ones preferred position.
Toward Fundam entaU O ntology
L et us move on to the m ost im portant poin t— the core

of H eideggerean philosophy. C riticizing ontology (and
m etaphysics) as false and identifying the sources o f the key
error in term s o f the first steps taken by G reek philosophers
(w hich predeterm ined the subsequent course o f W estern
philosophy) already p resu pposes the existence o f alternatives.
I f we recognize what was “wrong," then by using reverse analogy,
we can attem pt to determ ine how things should he or should
have been in order for everything to be “as it should"
H eid egger takes us up close to the following train o f thought.

T h e question o f ontic thinkin g— natural thought prior to the
question o f beings’ Being— rem ains the basis o f subsequent
ph ilosoph ical developm ent. However, as philosophy develops,
and as ontology (m etaphysics) becom es m ore structured and
extensive, we move further and further away from the ontic,
replacing it with the ontological A t the sam e time, there is
an increase in technological displacem ent o f nature and in
the artificial p rodu cts o f hum an society. O ntology crushes
everything, including its ontic foundations.
Since we are about to reconsider ontology at its source, it is

necessary to revisit the ontic— in the exact form that it had
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at the beginning o f philosophy’s history, when it w as new

and fresh. (H eidegger solves this problem in the b o ok Sein
und Z eit3 by focusing on D asein 4), In order to m ake this
happen, H eidegger has to sort through the m assive deposits
that com prise the edifice o f E uropean philosophy from the
pre-So cratics up to the 20th century. However, this crucial
operation cannot yield any results and will only take us to the
base level— tow ard clarifying ontic thought and its structure.
T o som e degree, phenom enology, including the “Lebenswelt"
(lifew orld) concept and its basic m ethodologies, p ro p o ses to
tackle the sam e task.
Reaching the ontic and clearing away the ontological, we end

up in the sam e position as the creators o f W estern philosophy,
responsible for establishing the basic trajectory o f its future
developm ent. T h is m eans that the sam e problem s and the
sam e questions now face us. It is at this poin t that things m ust
happen differently. We m ust address the basic questions in terms
developing the logos in a different way, but at the sam e time,
we m ust ask all the basic questions all over again. H eidegger
m entions that i f the "key question in philosophy” (Leitfrage)
targeted the essence (as a com m on attribute) o f beings, then
the "b asic question in philosophy— one found at the base”
( Grundfrage) m ust be the question about the truth o f Being
( iiber Wahrheit des Seyns: that is, "Seyn” with th e"y”).
Philosophy originates at a poin t when we ask the question

about the Being o f beings. T h is is a flash o f the divine logos,
illum inating a new dim ension o f thought and leading to new
horizons. But we know that in the case o f ontology, this question
was form ulated in an exceedingly p o o r manner, whereas its
answer was truly catastrophic. O ntology, in an attem pt to rise
3 Ibid. ■
The third part o f this book is focused on this subject.
62
V_
above the ontic, created false tran scen den ce— m etaphysics
do u b led the to p o grap h y o f beings. In it, the blueprint for the
sam e k in d o f beings w as ad d ed to beings, b u t this tim e— in its
essen tial section, that o f its essence. In ontology, the G reek
logos severed its ties to beings and their ontic perception,
thereby deform in g them , b u t it could not break through to
Being as such. T h is tragedy is respon sible for the h istory o f
W estern E u ro p e and its philosophy.
H e id eg ge r p ro p o ses to focu s our attention on this poin t.

R etu rn in g to ontics, that is, to w hat is readily accessible
to perception, in its u n corru p ted state is insufficient; we
m u st un dergo the explosion o f the logos the second tim e
an d live through the new experience o f the lightning. T h is
tim e around, learning from the bitter experience o f m aking
a critical m istake, we m ust form ulate the question o f Being
directly— not through beings (Seiende) and the dead-end
ro ad o f essen tialism (Seiendheit— Sein with a n "i”), T h is tim e
aroun d, ontological differentiation m ust be carried out radically,
fo cu sin g p h ilo so p h ical attention on Being itse lf— Seyn (w hich
is n o t p art o f beings and can n ot be determ ined by assign in g the
"is” attrib ute to it); i.e., on Being that is not and, consequently,
is N o th in g n e ss. S tartin g ou t from the ontic (from beings in
their m o st obvious, accessible characteristics), this tim e we
m u st pro gress in another direction : we m ust not rise above
beings, rem aining b o u n d to them and destroying them with
this am b igu o u s relationsh ip, as in the case o f E u ropean
m etaph ysics. In stead , we m u st glance below, delve into beings’
prim ordial source— a place where nothing exists and where
N othingness is. B u t this Nothingness is not sim ply non-beings
(gen erated from beings). T h is is N o th in gn ess, which m akes
beings w hat they are, but which does not turn into beings. T h is
Nothingness is life-giving, co n stitu tin g all with its quiet power.
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T h is is w hat “fundam ental-ontology” is: the kin d o f on tology

built along principally new pattern s as com pared to the entire
preceding philosophy. “Fundam ental-ontology” will let the new
kind o f logos shine. T h is time, however, it will not focus on
beings, b u t on N othingness.
T h e logos o f classical m etaphysics conceived o f N oth in gn ess

as the antithesis o f beings— or generally, as the antithesis o f
essence and ultim ately as the antithesis o f itself, which led to
total nihilism . A fter all, operating in this manner, it destroyed
— by ignoring— that very Nothingness (Seyn = N ichts) that
gave life to beings. In turn, the logos o f “fundam ental-ontology”
will conceive o f Nothingness not as the antithesis o f beings, but
as their life-giving and eternally present source, which, rem oving
beings as beings, confirm s that they are part o f Being.
H ow is fundamental-ontology possible? It is possible inasm uch

as philosophy is an arena o f absolute freedom , one in which
thought can com plete the m ost daring and m ost unim agined
turns. B ut this is possible only if the th in k ers freedom is
com bined— risking everything— with the truth o f Being, and
will allow this truth to come to fruition.
M artin H eid egger’s ph ilosoph y is the tran sition al p h ilo so p h y

on the way to creating'''fundam ental-ontology”
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IV. DAS
SEYN SG ESCH ICH TLICH E
D ie Geschichte and Seyn
T h e noun "Seynsgeschichte" and the adjective "seynsgeschichtliche”

that it form s play an enorm ous role in H eidegger's philosophy.
T h ey are directly connected to the project focused on developing
"fundamental-ontology” W e saw the depth and com plexity o f
this project, which requires the construction o f an ontology
that serves as an alternative to the entire body o f W estern
E u ropean thought. Therefore, the range o f expressions and
w ords em ployed in the realm o f "fundam ental-ontology" require
greater attention on our part.
Before we begin to clarify the significance o f the com pound

w ord "Seynsgeschichte,” let us consider its two word stem s. We
already encountered "Seyn." In H eidegger’s work, this word
spelled with a "y” signifies "Being in the fundamental-ontological
sense.” T h is is not Being as the shared attribute of beings, an
essence, or an affirm ation o f the logos built on the basis o f
exam ining beings through beings them selves, but rather—
a breakthrough into the pure element, free from tight links to
beings, i.e., Nothingness (N ichts).
N ow let us turn to the word "Geschichte,” which unequivocally

translates as "history” But Heidegger him self— we must be used
to this by now— not only refuses to identify "die Geschichte" with
"history" (die H istorie in G erm an ), but contrasts them. Therefore,
if we translate "Seynsgeschichte" as th t'h istory o f B eing” we w ould
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m isun derstand H eidegger’s intention. T h in gs are even w orse

with the adjective "seynsgeschichtliche?’ which is nearly impossible
to translate: "Being-historical” not only sounds absurd, but also
distantly recalls an entirely different range o f convergences and
meanings contrary to those which Heidegger has in mind.
The M essage and the L eap
L et us address the etym ology o f the G erm an w ord "Geschichte.”

It com es from the verb geschehen, which m eans "to occur”
and "to happen.” Its initial m eaning is close to the G erm an
"Ereignis"1 (literally, the "event” or the "incident"). By using
this word, H eidegger nears the m eaning and form o f another
G erm an word, "Geschick" (m ost com m only used today in its
"Schicksal" form )— "fate,” which, in its turn, is form ed from the
verb "schicken’, ’ "to send,” "to dispatch,” etc.T herefore, H eidegger
sees “fatefulness,” "non-random ness,” and, m ore profoundly,
"message” in the w ord "Geschichte,” as a m essage about events
deserving attention. That which occurs in history in its m ost
essential dim ension is a kind o f a message, which acts as that
which happens and occurs, im parting meaning to everything. If
"history" is a narration about incidents, phenom ena, deeds, and
events, then Geschichte is the path o f m eanings, which travels
through history as though it w as sent. "H istory" is the envelope,
"Geschichte"— its contents. Fate consists o f all things that
happen, representing an overall connected and deliberate action,
in which som ething is p assed from som eone onto som eone else
through som ething and for the p u rp o se o f som ething.
If we delve even further into etymology, we can see that the w ords
"geschehen" and "schicken" can actually be traced to a com m on
In do-European stem "skek” which signified "sudden m ovement,”
1 W e will consider the subject o f Ereignis a little later in this section.
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a "jump," "b u rst” "im p u lse” "im pulsive g estu re” as well as "run.”
In R ussian, the verb "cKaKamb ("skakat')" m eaning "to jum p,"
com es from the sam e stem . T h is is quite noteworthy, since in
H eidegger's work, we encounter the interpretation o f the word
ju m p ’ or "leap' (Sprung) as the basic philosophical undertaking,
leading us into the domain o f "fundamental-ontology.” In order
to proceed from ontology to "fundam ental-ontology” we m ust
m ake a leap. T h is will not be a sm ooth transition, evolution,
or an overflow, but a sudden, traum atic, and risky leap over an
abyss (Abgrund). A t the sam e time, H eidegger em phasizes the
fact that this leap could be fatal, since we stand on the edge o f
a cliff and have no room for a running start.
T h u s, Geschichte, according to H eidegger, is not the gradually

unfolding canvas o f history and the historical process, but rather
the totality o f individual abrupt leaps over the abyss, preparing
the way for the last and m ost crucial (the m ost difficult and
dan gerou s)/m a/ leap. The use o f the word "Seyn" informs us about
the m essage content o f these leaps in preparation for the last leap.
T hus, we learn that the sender, much like the addressee o f this
message, was Being (Seyn) itself, notifying itself about itself by the
means o f these leaps (each leap represents a stage o f philosophical
thought, associated with a particular great philosopher and his
discoveries). This communication occurs in order to culminate
in a transition from ontology (which had revealed itself as
contemporary European nihilism) to "fundamental-ontology” (the
eschatology o f Being). T h is is Seynsgeschichte.
Seynsgeschichte as Participation in Being (Seyn)
Seynsgeschichte is not ju s t an area o f thought or a branch o f

science. It is an intense effort to recognize the message o f Being
(Seyn) em bedded in the historical process by deciphering
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the profound philosophical intention o f those thinkers who

have raised ontological questions, spoken about it indirectly,
or have been silent about it (which is no less im portan t). In
Seynsgeschichte, culture and all social and historical events and
transform ations can serve only as secondary decorations and
distant consequences o f questions th at philosophy resolves.
Seynsgeschichte is possible as the com prehended and the

affirm ed, based on the fram ew ork o f "fundam ental'ontology.”
W ith out the latter, this w ould sim ply be Geschichte: in it, we
w ould be a*ble to see both the message and the leaps, but we
w ould not be certain that authentic Being (Seyn) is part o f this
m essage, rather than the false transcendence o f the old ontology.
For instance, G.W .F. H egel's philosophy o f history is Geschichte,
i.e., it is no longer sim ply history, but not Seynsgeschichte either.
Therefore, Seynsgeschichte and its very existence directly depend
on whether a decision (Entscheidung) w ould be m ade concerning
the transition to "fundam ental'ontology," and whether this
transition (leap, ju m p ) w ould be carried out successfully.
For this reason, Seynsgeschichte is a project rather than

som ething actual— not a given, but a task. I f we could learn
the truth o f Being (Seyn) through itself, rather than through
beings or the their shared attribute, then we w ould discover
what the historical process really was, and, ultimately, what the
great thinkers com m unicated to us about the furthest reaches
o f their thought. A t that point, we will enter the dom ain o f
Seynsgeschichte, not only having becom e aware o f what had
been, but also having won the right to be present there. W e will
then have the opportunity to be w ithin the Being o f the future
(the Being that will be). However, if this does not happen, and
we decide to rem ain under the "yoke" o f the old m etaphysics,
then we will not even have Geschichte. O nly dead history will
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rem ain, with its m eaningless and endless list o f details about
the p ast, saying nothing to the spirit o f the L ast M en and
em bodying nothing but a cultural convention.
It is only possible to u n derstan d the message of Being (Seyn) in

the state o f ju m pin g (leaping) over the abyss, and this awareness
w ould be a statem ent on the part o f Being (Seyn) itself. In
turn, this is why Seynsgeschichte can serve as a starting point
for all ph ilosoph izin g within the fram ew ork o f fundam ental-
on tology: after breaking through to Seynsgeschichte and
com prehending the m eaning o f this word, by the very virtue
o f this act, we already constitute the process o f developing
fundam ental-ontology and express the message of Being (Seyn)
through our own selves.
Yet once we take p art in the leap, we w ould not only radically
alter the trajectory and order o f our actual existence, m oving
tow ard new horizons along an entirely new path, but we
w ould also and for the first tim e discover that which once
w as. T h a t which once was— was a message from Being, which
always rem ains invariably fresh and acute, new and alive. For
this reason, the adjective "seynsgeschichtliche' signifies grasping
that which once was as if it were the present. It m eans to
becom e a contem porary o f that which not only occurred and
w as com pleted in the p a st (b u t proved unim portant, becam e
outdated, and passed), but also that which truly was. By using
the adjective "seynsgeschichtliche',' we becom e contem poraries o f
great ideas and people, since we ourselves reach the ultim ate
heights. There, other m ountain peaks are clearly visible, whereas
the insignificant sw arm s in dark valleys below are indiscernible
in the present m uch like long ago. A true thinker knows as little
ab ou t the details o f society in which he lives as he does about
those o f the tim es long gone. Yet the voice o f Being is audible
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ro him, as it em anates from the lips o f the ancients clearer and

louder than the itching on the p art o f the senseless m asses,
both ancient and m odern.
Seyn ist Z eit
View ing history as Geschichte, and especially as Seynsgeschichte,

may confuse those who uncritically absorbed the normative
Western European ontology and metaphysics as undeniable
axioms and who are accustomed to conceiving o f time as something
objective or, in the very least, independent and autonom ous.
M odern philosophy and science— and the man in the street—
think o f time as that in which Being develops.2
But for H eidegger, Zeit (tim e3) is not som ething separate or
additional to Being. It is not an area where and in which Being
is realized, or not som e a priori condition (even if subjective or
transcendental, as in Im m anuel K an t). For H eidegger, Being is
time, and, consequently, time is Being (Seyn ist "Z e it"4).
H eidegger sees Z eit as Seynsgeschichte, i.e., the developm ent o f

Being in tim e (although, he does not consider Being as som ething
separate, developing in time, but as tim e itse lf). However, this
is not tim e in the natural or scientific sense (an a priori m ode
o f object's existence) or history as the field o f hum anities
un derstan ds it (as an aggregate o f hum an actions, responses to
challenges, and so on, the subject o f which is m an and all things
hum an). T h e Seynsgeschichte version o f tim e (Z eit) has no
independent object (nature) or subject (m an). Being— tim e—
itse lf is the pro tagon ist o f Seynsgeschichte. T h is kind o f Being
2 The latter do not even realize that they think in this exact manner, or that
they think at all.
The difficulties o f translating the word “Zeit" by the R ussian analogue "time”
are considered in detail in Part 3 ,“D asein "
M artin Heidegger, Geschichte des Seyns, op. cit., 142.
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(Seyn) relates to itse lf and to beings (Seiende), developing as

tim e. Yet we m ust also note that we are talking about Being as
Seyn, not as Seinl T h a t is, H eidegger un derstands time (Z eit)
in the fundam ental-ontological sense, rather than ontologically.
In a tim e like Seynsgeschichte, the past, in the sense that it was,

still is. A n d that which is not, never was. A nd the future (das
Kiinftige), m eaning that which will be, already is, and certainly
was earlier. T h e present time is the presence (parousia) o f Being
(Seyn); any other present with the exception o f the presence o f
Being (Seyn) is unreal.
Since Being (Seyn) is time (Z eit), then, consequently, not

everything in history out o f all that seem s to have been, really
was, while m uch o f what truly had been is not known to us,
to the sam e extent as we ourselves are not. H ere, we could
recall the form ula coined by the poet and philosopher Evgenii
G olovin,"H e, who had died, has never lived"5 T h a t which passed
and becam e the past, that which had passed (Vergangene), never
w as. Yet that which had actually been, the truly having-been, is
never Vergangene (that which had passed): it is im m ortal.
Three L ayers o f H istory
T h e introduction o f the Seynsgeschichte dim ension, and the

analysis o f tim e with its events and patterns from the standpoint
o f "fundamental-ontology,” differentiate three levels in the area
that is usually referred to as "history.”
It is notew orthy that this w ord m igrated into R u ssian from the
G erm an language in the 17th century, during the reign o f Peter
the G reat, and it entered G erm an from the G reek language
5 A lexander D ugin, “Sm ert' i ee aspekty,” in Radikal’nyi Sub’ekt i Ego D ubl’

(M oscow : Evraziiskoe dvizhenie, 2009).
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( ioTopia [istoria]) by the way o f'L a tin (historic*). Prior to this

point, no concept o f "history" existed in the R u ssian language:
it was the chronicles (for instance, the Prim ary Chronicle) and
ecclesiastic literature (the O ld and N ew T estam ent, patristic
literature, serm ons, lives o f the saints, the explanatory palaia,
etc.) that com m unicated historical inform ation. R u ssian
( (
"byliny" 6binunu, p i.) ”byli" 6binu ), and (
"bylichki" 6ujiuhku ),
corresponding to H eidegger’s Seynsgeschichte in term s o f
meaning, were either part o f the heroic epic tales or the part-
m ythological-part'historical stories about daily life. T h is m akes
these w ords unsuitable in the given context. In the O rth odox
tradition, Seynsgeschichte com es closest to the concepts o f
"fate’ and "providence.” "Fate” (sud’ba [cydbda]) is the "original
justice" (from the R ussian word “su d ” ju stice”). "Reasoning,"
rassuzhdenie (paccyo/cdeuue), shares the stem “su d /su zh " with
"sud’ba” which predeterm ined the developm ent o f w orld
events, assign ing the place, order, and m eaning to each o f them .
Providence (promysel [npoMbicen]) is a direct reference to divine
thought, the W isd om o f G o d (S o p h ia), which intentionally (in
eternity) organized beings, as well as the order and character o f
their emergence (yeveaig [genesis]) and disappearance ((f)Qopa
[fthora]). T h ese parallels are im portan t to us because H eidegger
perform s two operations with the concept o f "history": on the
one hand, he em ploys fam iliar ("academ ic") W estern European
concepts as they are typically and generally interpreted; on
the other, he etym ologically brings these concepts back to
the original m eaning o f ancient w ords and, at the sam e time,
overthrows the established constructions, encouraging the
creation o f radically new "fundamentaUontological" ones.
In order for the R u ssian con sciousness to strictly follow what

H eidegger is doing and what he encourages, it is always necessary
to take into account the distance between R u ssian culture
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an d its tradition o f thought (for now, I refrain from speaking

about R ussian philosophy and, especially, Russian ontology), on
the one hand, and the structure 'o f the Western mentality and
intellect, on the other. Battling the axioms o f Western European
historicism, Heidegger fights against what is far from evident to us
and what we were late in taking from the West, fragmentarily and
superficially— what had ample time to pollute our consciousness,
but did not become a full-fledged system o f a priori concepts,
giving way under the necessity o f clear reflection.
H ere, we should once again recall what H eidegger says about

W estern European history, which he (by default, like all
W estern people) considers to be universal and the only one.
We, R u ssian s, are not at all obligated to recognize the latter
as such, but we should take this into consideration in order to
better u n derstan d the context o f H eidegger’s thought.
T h u s, from the stan dpoin t o f Seysngeschichte, we can highlight

the first layer o f history, corresponding to the ontic dimension
and narrating about beings as such. T h is kind o f ontic history
could represent an account that one o f the beings collided with,
diverged from, conflicted with, or reconciled with another,
that beings were born and disappeared, then appeared anew,
transform ed, and grew dim once again. O n a purely theoretic level,
ontic history could represent a documentary account o f beings as
such. M odern historians (especially, the "Annales School") tried
to reconstruct a m odel o f history based on the pain stakin g study
o f everyday notes, household docum ents, and other practical
texts, which recorded an average person's life routine in the
previous centuries. It quickly becam e clear, however, that it is,
im possible to obtain an accurate picture o f beings in the past.
A fter all, the selection o f exam ined docum ents, and, even more
so, its m ultilevel interpretation (from the original author to the
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copyist and the historians them selves), reflects every possible

thing, but not beings as they are by them selves.
In other words, when dealing with history, we always encounter

interpretation, which is not a neutral description o f beings.
Rather, this description reflects the ontology and metaphysics
o f those who write, their audience, and those who will study
this writing after a certain am ount o f time. O ntic history as an
aggregate o f atomic historical facts is a purely theoretical hypothesis
unconfirmed by the empirical experience o f researching historical
docum ents,“which directly or indirectly bear traces o f metaphysics.
This is the second level— the ontological or metaphysical

interpretation o f beings— which are developing in time, from the
standpoint ofim agining Being as the essence o f beings. T h is type o f
history is history as Geschichte, since it develops within a two-level
topography: the topography o f the event and its meaning, where
the event's m eaning not only refers us to the level o a f beings, but
also that o f the essence o f beings. H isto ry as Geschichte narrates
about beings in their connection with essence. Therefore, the
content o f this type o f history would depend on the configuration
that metaphysics acquires, determining the philosophical axiomatics
o f this or that era. Each serious change o f axiomatics signifies a
change o f the historical paradigm and, practically, the emergence
o f a new version o f history. This kind o f history is ontological,
which ultimately does not focus its attention on beings, but on the
metaphysical message that is encoded in the dynamic development
o f beings and in the dialectic o f multiple beings.
A n im age o f ontological history was m ost fully presented in

Hegel's philosophy o f history.6 H e created the gran d panoram a
focused not on the history o f people, things, and events, but on
6 G . W. F. H egel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History, tr. H .B . N isb et

(N ew York: C am bridge University Press, 1975).
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concepts and ideas, and, m ore specifically, o f the A bsolute Idea,

which develops its “message” through m ultifaceted dialectical
stages o f m an kin d’s path throughout time.
H eidegger em phasizes the fact that after Hegel, this question

w as com pletely resolved: any history is not an account o f beings,
but, rather, the essence o f beings, i.e., m etaphysics’ account about
itself. In this way, W estern European history is an account o f
W estern E uropean m etaphysics, i.e., history is nothing other
than the history o f philosophy.
However, according to Heidegger, ontological history is the history o f

Sein, not Seyn. It is founded upon an incorrect understanding o f the
relationship (Bezug) between beings and Being. Consequently, this
history is subject to reconsideration. This kind o f reconsideration
is the discovery o f the "fundamental'OntologicaT dimension, which
proposes not only to raise beings to Being-Sein (as is the case in
ontological history), but also to meticulously investigate how the
concept o f Sein altered throughout the course (this time around)
o f the ontological-historical process. In other words, Heidegger
is not concerned with the simple construction o f history as the
history o f an Idea (Sein), but with examining the history o f an Idea
(Sein) as it correlates with Being as Seyn.
A t this point, we reach the very core o f Seynsgeschichte.

Seynsgeschichte com prehends the variations o f Being as Sein
seen through the eyes o f Being as Seyn.
Sein in the Ontological Section o f H istory
At one p o in t, H e id eg g e r pro v id es an extrem ely b rie f

b u t expressive sketch featu rin g the basic stages o f Sein's
tran sform ation in W estern E uropean m etaphysics.7 Essentially,
7 M artin H eidegger, Geschichte des Seyns, op. cit., 26.
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it represents the creation o f a "fundamental-ontological scale, the

framework o f which should be used to construct Seynsgeschichte.
Seyn
(pvoiq (fysis)
id e a (idea)
o v a i a (ousia)
s v s p y s i a (energeia)
actus (actuality)
perceptum (re-presen tation ) 1
Su b jectivity a
objectum (fobjectness) }
A ctu ality ( W irklichkeit)
(energia— vis prim itiva activa, L eib n iz) Su b jectivity b
W ill an d reason (G erm an Idealism )
}
Power (M acht, the W ill to Power, N ietzsch e)
M achenschaft
Seinsvergessenheit (th e ab an d on m en t o f
Being a s Sein, i.e., the rejection o f on tology:
prag m atism , u tilitarian ism , L ib eralism ,
M arx ism , techn ocracy— A . D .)
T h e delay in the arrival ( Verweigerung)
decision
E x p ro p riatio n (Ent-eignung)
(Ent-scheidung),
"tran sition ” ?
C o m in g to fruition , en ow nm en t (Er-eignung)
(U bergang)
T h e event (Ereignis)
O u tcom e-co n clu sio n -carryin g o u t an d

settlin g (A ustrag)
Geschichte (either as Geschichte p ro p er—

on tological h istory — or as Seyngeschichte—
th is d ep en d s on the d ecision — A .D .).
An explanation o f this dry schem a could occupy an entire

volume. L ater on, we can have a look at selected fragm ents that
clarify its m eaning. H eidegger's philosophy developed certain
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asp ects o f this schem a; others rem ained undeveloped intuitions

or sketches. T h e basic trajectory o f H eidegger's intuition may
be reduced to the following. '
Seynsgeschichte views history not as the history o f ideas or a

single idea, but as the history that tracks the transform ation
o f the relationship between thought and Being: both when this
relationship (Bezug) is described explicitly and when it ends up
concealed or im plicit. Furtherm ore, this exam ination does not
begin with Sein (i.e., the source o f ontology) but with Seyn,
which is po stu lated by “fundam ental'ontology” and, as a result,
changes the entire philosophical topography.
Seynsgeschichte outlines the stages in term s o f establish in g

oth er auth orities in the place o f Seyn (at the very p e ak —
at the sou rce): nature-ideas-essence-energy-actuality-will
and reason-the will to power-M achenschaft, and others.
A t this p oin t, we could sto p readin g the item s o ff the list
and assert that W estern E u ro pean h istory represents the
d egrad atio n o f th ough t ab ou t Being from the stan d p o in t o f
Seynsgeschichte: from nature to the will to power to mechanicity
(M achenschaft). F u n d am en tal changes occurred w ithin
th is tw o-tiered on tological topograph y itself, serving as the
fram ew ork o f historic developm ent. T h eir m ain trajectory
w as the grad u al oblivion o f Being (Sein). In other w ords, that
w hich created this to p o grap h y (th ou gh t ab ou t Being) in the
first place was gradually lo st sight of, while being replaced by
su rro gates, increasingly m ore rough and rem oved from Being.
O ccasionally, H eid egger includes “categories,” “concepts,”
"values,” "w orld-view s,” etc. in th is progression . B u t everything
rests on th e " oblivion o f Being,” on nihilism a n d " desertification.”
A t every stage o f descent, the secon d — m etaphysical level o f
th is to p o grap h y is gradually d isto rte d , perverted, and appears
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m ore and m ore nihilistic and m issh apen (from the p o in t o f

view o f Seyn-Being). W e m ay encounter som eth in g sim ilar in
the ordinary un derstan din g o f history. H ow ever, in stead o f
H eideggerean pessim ism , there is every chance to find either
a neutral announcem ent o f these changes, or an o p tim istic
assertio n that m an thus frees h im se lf from the external
restraints o f m etaphysics. H eid egger asserts th at all o f this is
pure m etaphysics, which created a false topo graph y and now
su p p o rts it, independen t o f the perp etu al change in the nature
o f the ontological argu m ent foun d at its base.
“The oblivion o f Being is the final poin t in Seynsgeschichte.

From this m om ent on, the turn tow ard fundamental-ontology
begins. Seynsgeschichte prepares itse lf for radically sw itching
its m o de— from Geschichte's inauthentic developm ent to the
authentic onset o f Seynsgeschichte.
The encounter with "delay” ( Verweigerung) is the first

phenom enon o f Seynsgeschichte in the new standby m ode
waiting for the register's shift to fundamental-ontology. It
w ould seem that the "m idnight m om ent” has been reached,
but, apparently, this is "not yet” the case. “Always this ‘not yet,’”
H eidegger m arvels. “Fundamental-ontology” is hesitant.
N evertheless, the delay com es after the"decision" (Ent-scheidung).

T h i s is the m ost im portan t category o f Seynsgeschichte. T h is
“decision" is a decision concerning the transition (or lack th ereof)
to fundamental-ontology (therefore, in the schem a, the w ord
"transition” is written in qu otation s and ends with a question
m ark). T h e choice is between the refusal (o f Seyn-Being) and its
coming to fruition. The event (Ereignis) takes place i f the latter
is chosen: Seyn reveals its truth. N e x t com es the developm ent
o f beings along the trajectory o f Seyn rather than Sein. T h a t
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is, fundam ental-ontology” is realized, asserting the prim acy o f

Seyn in relation to Seiende and the m anifestation o f the kind
o f beings that will be con ceiv ed 'o f not from their own selves
or their shared attribute (essence), but from the stan d poin t o f
Being (Seyn) as Nothingness. H eidegger calls this “carrying out
an d settling" (A ustrag) or th e "Fourfold” (G eviert).8
All together this results in history (Geschichte) taken as Seynsgeschichte.
L an gu age and the Verb "to B e” in Seynsgeschichte
H av in g added the dim ension o f Seynsgeschichte to the analysis

o f H eidegger's topography, we can better un derstand the
em ergence o f sym m etry betw een the m ost vital w ords and
their m eaning pertaining to Being. Separatin g Sein and Seyn,
H eidegger is forced to construct a double sem antic structure
asso ciated with the form ation o f secondary w ords.
In term s o f the ontic, we are dealing with beings (Seiende). “Beings

are (das Seiende ist)"— this is an accurate ontic assertion. It is
located at the basis o f language and thought. L anguage allows
beings to state the m ost im portant thing, which they cannot
do in any other way: it provides the opportunity to express
that beings are. T h e predicate “beings” em ployed or im plied
in speech, m akes this speech (whatever it might be expressing)
a unique and exceptional phenomenon. M en are speaking beings,
thinking beings; and the uniqueness o f this lies in the fact that we
assign the status o f beings to the subject o f our speech. This ontic
language predates metaphysics and relates to prehistory, to the era
when philosophy had not yet begun, had not yet come into its own.
The presence o f Seyn is apparent in this kind o f language, but
Seyn is not com prehended; it surrounds beings spontaneously
and naturally, regardless o f hum an freedom or choice. T h is Seyn
8 T he next part o f this book deals with Geviert in detail.
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does not yet jo in the message, f3.te^Seynsgeschichte, or Geschichte

(history as an ontological phenom enon).
T h e ontic language is prehistory and pre-philosophy. In this

kind o f language, beings are, but the nature o f what "are" m eans
is not conceptualized. H ere, all beings live alongside other beings
and have not been separated from them yet.
Take, for instance, a path and its undergrow th. In the ontic
prehistoric Being, they can freely spill over into one another.
T h e path gets lost in the w oods and disappears gradually and
imperceptibly. C ulture gets lost in nature. A n d in exactly the
sam e way, thick undergrow th gradually thins out and opens up
a free pathway. Furtherm ore, this does not happen when the
hiker wishes it do be so, but independently, form ing a pathw ay
in a place and at a tim e when no one asked for it or aw aited it.
T h u s, beings freely play in them selves; and the fact that they
are, and that there is som ebody speaking about them and about
the fact that they are, in no way harm s this ontic game.
Everything changes with the origins o f metaphysics. Pondering

about the Being of beings and arriving at the conclusion that Being
is the shared attribute o f beings, i.e., their essence (Seiendheit,
essentia), man begins to create history as Geschichte. This leads to
the emergence o f a new language— one o f concepts and categories.
It introduces additional beings to beings— the essence o f beings.
In term s o f language, from this poin t forw ard beings are not
conceived o f and nam ed per se but through their correspondence
to som ething else, like the essence o f beings or to beings as a
whole. Beings as a whole becom e an interm ediate authority;
the essence o f concrete beings em erges as the prim ary attribute
linked to Being between concrete beings and beings as a whole
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(Being as Sein). T h u s, the path becom es a concrete expression o f

"pathness," while the un dergrow th— that o f ’ undergrow thness.”
A t the sam e time, the path no longer has the right to be lost
(w hat kind o f a path is this, i f it leads nowhere?), and the
undergrow th m ust be thick (otherwise, it transform s into an
open w oodland, forest m arge, or m eadow ). A n abyss emerges
betw een beings, which is covered over only through an appeal
to their essence.
T h u s, a distinctive language em erges com prisin g logical

rules and rigid structures. M o st im portant, it is built on
reference— the correlation o f beings and essence, appearing as
an idea, concept, universality, and so on. Beings are bifurcated.
L an gu age transform s from functioning as an expression o f
beings to im posin g particular representations onto them.
T racing the establishment o f metaphysics, Heidegger shows that

on the way to clarifying the Being o f beings, thought seizes Being
as a whole and h ypostasizes it as the essence o f beings identical
to the sought-after Being. B ut this essence is thought o f as new
beings, gradually becom ing independent in relation to the initial
m om ent, when it was confirm ed to be beings as a whole.
A ccording to H eidegger, this sequence contains subtle

deception: Seyn-Being is “beings as a whole,” and, consequently,
the given developm ent in thought is accurate. However, Seyn-
Being is not solely and exclusively “beings as a whole,” inasm uch
as it is “the nihilation o f beings” i.e., "N othingness,” “non
beings’, ’ m ore precisely, it is that which m akes "beings” greater
than “non-beings” It is the disregard for this nuance that guided
the trajectory o f the entire subsequent development o f Western
European metaphysics. Asserting Being as essence and operating
with this essence as a result, W estern European m etaphysics
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doubles "beings” and thereby loses sight o f Seyn-Being in its

fundam ental-ontological essence ( Wesen). Constructed by this
metaphysics, this essence gets transform ed during the various
stages o f its development along the following transformation
trajectory: "Being as Sein, rather than Seyn" "nature” "the id ea”
"ovoia” (ousia, substance) "energy” “reality” etc., right up to "the
will to power” and "global machinery”
In this p ro cess, the sign ifican ce o f the verb "to be” u n d ergo es
fu n d am en tal change. In m etap h y sics, w hich deeply affected
the lan gu age and th ough t o f W estern E u ro p ean m an k in d ,
beings cease to be by them selves: by themselves they no longer
are— they draw their Being from essence. T h e y no longer
are directly, b u t indirectly, by b elo n gin g to essence. Thus
em erges the concept o f Being (Sein ) as essence (Seiendheit),
which len ds their p rin cip al m arker to beings— the fact th at
they are. F rom now on, the verb “are” m u st be u n d e rsto o d
differen tly than before. In stead o f th o u gh t, it is p h ilo so p h y
as well as th eo logy and sciences b a se d upon it th at now
d eterm in e w hether beings are or are not. It is as i f beings “so rt
o f ” are from this p o in t forw ard . M ay b e they are, b u t m aybe
they are not: it all dep en ds on so m eth in g radically differen t
than beings them selves.
Western European philosophy does not immediately reach this

radical conclusion. This becomes obvious after K an t and Hegel,
in Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, as well as the
philosophy o f the phenomenologists. Initially, beings were to the
degree that they corresponded to an idea (Plato). A t the end o f
Modernity, beings becam e beings because the “will to power,"
“reason,” and “representation” required this (by using other
term s, this was “useful " “valuable,"“com fortable," etc.). W hatever
the authority m ight have been assertin g that beings are or are
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not, this was no longer direct thought, nor beings themselves

expressin g their ontically un derstood presence in Being.
H ere H eid egger reconsiders anew the treatm ent o f the word
"to b e” p ro p o sin g to deal with it differently— according to
the structure o f Seynsgeschichte. Beings in the ontic (pre-
h isto rical and p re-ph ilosoph ical) sense are only in the case
when we ignore m etaphysics and history. I f the ontic and
the on tological are su p erim po sed, their m eaning gets m ixed
up. W e cannot view beings w ithout accounting for W estern
E u ropean m etaphysics and, consequently, getting distracted
from Geschichte. For this reason, when we say that beings are,
we m o st often m ean the ontological sense, specifically— i.e.,
that they are by p ertain in g to Being as beings as a whole (Sein).
B u t this “are” is no longer an ontic “are” in its unconditional
pre-on tological, non-referential expression. T h is is the “are”
in philosophy, rather than thought in its ontic sim plicity and
naivete; this is no longer the “are” o f language. For the p u rpose
o f differentiation, H eidegger recalls the existence o f archaic
(H o m eric) form s o f the G reek participle ov (on, beings), where
the first sou n d s was preserved: it sou n ded not like ov, ovxa
(onta), b u t like eov (eon), eovxa (eonta).9 sov is beings ontically;
they are in a way th at does not require p ro o f through any
references; ov is beings in the philosophical sense— ontological
and draw ing their Being from som ething else.
In order to sim plify the nuances containing the core o f his

ph ilosoph y in term s o f the nam ing convention, when it com es
to the ontic level, for certain contexts H eidegger proposes to
apply the L atin verb “existere,’’ “to exist" (which he tries not to
translate into G e rm a n )— instead o f Being. Beings exist. T h is
is un doubtedly so either from an ontic or from an ontological
9 M artin H eidegger, “D er Spruch des Anaxim ander,” Holzwege (Frankfurt

am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 2 0 0 3 ).
85
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poin t o f view. Yet whether they are— that is the question.

A nd although in ontics beings are, and this is obvious (so say
language and direct pre-philosophical thought), this "are” may
be incorrectly un derstood in the space o f m etaphysics. Yet the
existence o f beings is beyond d o u b t.10
But at the sam e time, fearing the distortion o f his thought due
to an incorrect interpretation o f “are" H eidegger is forced to
take radical language-form ing steps and to advance a new verb
“wesen” T h e latter is form ed from the p ast passive participle o f
the verb“sem ” (to be), i.e., (ro m “gewesen” T h e G erm an language
also contains the noun “W esen” form ed from this sam e form
and signifying the “character of something” (su t’ [cymb]) or
an “essence” (cyufHOcmb [sushchnost’]). Heidegger, however,
strictly separates essence as Seiendheit, i.e., Being, grasped as the
shared attribute o f beings and constructed b ased on beings, from
Wesen. T h e latter expresses the relationship to Seyn and Being
in its fundamentaUontological sense. Wesen is an artificial verb11,
which H eidegger conjugates as ich wese, du wesest, er / sit /
es west, wir wesen, ihr weset, sie wesen. It applies to w hat is an
expression o f Seyn, and truly is Seyn-Being.
It is here that the R u ssian verb“cyiqecmeoeamb” (sushchestvovat’)

can come in handy. Fortunately, it is com pletely unendow ed
with any philosophical m eaning and signifies the bare fact o f
beings’ Being— w ithout clear references to ontics, ontology, or
fundam ental-ontology. It seem s to me that it w ould be entirely
10 The verb “to exist” is formally translated into R ussian as “cyiyecmeoeamb"

But this is entirely unacceptable for the transm ission o f H eidegger's
thought. “Cyufecmeoeamb ” either m eans to “be a being (ontic), or “to
be through essence” (ontological). A n d in no way can we use this verb in
places where H eidegger speaks o f existence specifically in order to avoid all
kinds o f m isunderstandings and am biguities pertaining to the correlation
between the ontic and the ontological, and, consequently, to the particular
m om ent o f Seynsgeschichte that we are considering.
Wesen also m eans “to inhere in.”
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correct to reserve for it the fundam ental-ontological significance,

specifically in order to tran sm it the m eaning o f H eidegger’s
philosophy. "Cymecmeoeamb” can becom e the leitm otiv o f a
new fundam ental-ontological language in R ussian, T h ere is
a no-less interesting and sim ple opportunity in the R ussian
language to separate "Seiendheit” and "W esen” which in G erm an
signifies essence” W e could translate Seiendheit as "cyufnocmb”
(w ith an additional ontological and m etaphysical significance),
w hereas Wesen— as "cymb (su t’, nature, character, m eaning)
w ith particular em phasis on fundam ental-ontology.
T h u s, in H eidegger we encounter beings in three different

po sition s relative to Seynsgeschichte:
• ontically (pre-philosophically and prehistorically),

beings exist (D as Seiende existiert);
• ontologically (philosophically, metaphysically, as well

as both ontically and fundam ental-ontologically),
beings are (D a s Seiende ist);
• fundam ental-ontologically, beings come into their

essence (D as Seiende west).
exist
s t
beings are
come into
essence
"Is/a re ” can always be u n d ersto ck in three ways: as “comes into

its essence',’ as “exists” and strictly speaking as "is/are (i.e., by
belonging to Being as the shared attribute o f all b ein gs)}2
T h e use o f the verb wesen in H eidegger is the startin g poin t

o f a new language— the kind o f language that "fundam ental-
ontology" m ust speak. T h is language m ust express the decision
to make the leap tow ard the final and principal chord in
Seynsgeschichte. T h e very phenom enon o f this fundam ental-
ontological language m ust be not only' an instrum ent o f
Seynsgeschichte but its fundam ental-ontological essence (W esen).
12 But in any case, we rid ourselves o f the insufficiently thought-out and

hasty R ussian n eo lo g ism "6bimuucmeoeamb” (bytiistvovat’) in which many
translations o f H eidegger abound.
88
V. TH E BEGINNING AND END
OF W ESTERN EUROPEAN
PHILOSOPHY
Why Evening?
H av in g determ ined the general trajectory o f fundam ental-

ontology and clearing up what Seynsgeschichte is, let us trace the
basic stages o f the history o f W estern European philosophy, as
H eidegger saw it. H ere, we once again turn to the subject o f the
“declining W est,” a civilization in which the sun is setting, and
to Abendlandische Geschichte, the history o f the “evening,” and
the history o f the “evening” countries.
In terms o f this kind o f history, Heidegger advances a fundamental

thesis: from the poin t o f view o f Seynsgeschichte, the history
o f W estern European philosophy is a process o f progressive
oblivion o f ontological inquiry right up to pure nihilism . It is
the process o f gradually losing Being, the abandonm ent o f
Being and by Being (Seinsverlassenheit). In other w ords, the
history o f W estern European philosophy, with all its brilliance,
splendid breakthroughs, revelations, and deviations, is nothing
m ore than the process o f partin g from Being. Consequently, this
is the history o f sunset, an extended catastrophe, wanderings,
and errors. It is not by accident that H eidegger calls one o f his
book s Holzwege.1 In French, this title translates as Les chemins
qui ne menent nulle p a rt— literally, “ R oads that lead nowhere”;
in G erm an, the expression “H olzw ege’’ literally, “arboreal paths,”
can also be u n derstood as “w ooded paths,” and as “untrodden
1 M artin H eidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann,

2003).
paths, overgrown with trees” T h is kind o f w andering leads

from clarity to darkness, which is why we are dealing with
the evening. T h is is the process o f p artin g with Being, its loss,
and gradual im poverishm ent. C easin g to think about Being,
philosophy gradually ceases to be.
A s early as the dawn o f philosophy, Being as Seyn (fundam ental-

ontology) hides behind beings-as-a-whole (the ontological Seiende-
im -Ganzen). M erging with it, it becom es Being as Sein and,
ultimately, yet another variety o f beings. '
T hen, Being (Sein), as beings-as-a-whole, is replaced by the

notion (Vorstellung) o f it. N ext, this notion acquires a m ore
and m ore disconnected, abstract, m echanical, and conditional
character, in which all connections w ith beings collapse until, at
last, the era o f nihilism arrives. Friedrich N ietzsch e recognized
and described the latter— that very m om ent, when Being
finally disappears beyond the horizon, revealing the ever
present Nothingness.
W e can designate (fundam ental-historically) the entire segm ent

o f W estern European philosophy as m an k in d’s final six
h o u rs— the tim e before m idnight. A n d it is not surprisin g that
in this sector o f a cosm ic day, it is the Western civilization that
moves to the forefront, establishes laws and norm s, conquers
all others and forces them to unequivocally accept its form s,
thoughts, and values as som ething universal. T h e W est com es
into its own because the night's fate is entrusted to it, because
it acts in the nam e o f the night and uses its power. Being s
sun is setting. A n d so, civilization finally goes to sleep, and
the last candles go out, still illum inating people's hom es w ith a
farewell, artificial, and nostalgic light.
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In this case, asking "W hy Europe? W hy the West? W hy does

Western European civilization present itself as something inevitable
and universal? would be equivalent to asking" W hy evening?”
The G reat Beginning and the Philosopher’s “D aim o n ”
H eidegger considers p re-So cratic thought to be the start o f

W estern European philosophy and calls it the great Beginning,
or som etim es, the first Beginning.
A t this stage, philosophers appear as an independent type o f

person occupied only and exclusively with thought. M ost often,
these are thoughts about the beginning, Being, and thought itself.
T h o u g h t is an attribute o f m an. It is, o f course, inaccurate to

assum e that people did not think before the onset o f philosophy
and outside the area o f its dissem ination. T h ey certainly thought,
but did not philosophize. W h at is the difference?
T h is difference is between the ontic and the ontological. Ontics

sim ply correspon ds to thought, i.e., the attribute that defines
m an per se. M an speaks and thinks, and thereby he stands
at a distance in relation to his surroundings. T h is distance
em erges with m an sim ultaneously and is expressed in the
ability for thought. In turn, thought is b ased on differentiation
o f things in the world. D ifferentiation is the m ain attribute o f
thought, because a m an is such only to the extent that he is
able to differentiate h im self from the rest o f the world. T h is is
the principal distinction that becom es the key feature o f man.
D istin gu ish in g h im self from the rest o f the world, m an begins
to differentiate things in the world. A nd the more acutely he
becom es aware o f his distance from his surroundings, the more
precise are the boundaries he establishes. T h o u g h t can occur
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in the sphere o f myth, archaic cults, rites, and legends. It can

be rudim entary or well advanced. However, regardless o f how
great the distance between m an and the world is and regardless
o f his acute capacity to differentiate things in the world and
their attributes, this is not yet philosophy. T h is kind o f ontic
thought is indicative o f the pre-beginning. P hilosophy begins at
a different point.
M an takes a fundam ental leap into a certain dom ain , which

differs radically from the sphere th at h o u ses the one who
sim ply thiriks and the w orld ab ou t which he th inks. T h is is
the m om ent when ph ilosoph y begin s. A philosopher, by the
virtue o f a certain m iraculous and unique ability, suddenly
finds h im se lf in the p o sitio n o f the one who does not simply
differentiate him self and the world, but who recognizes within
him self the one who is capable o f such differentiation and the
one who recognizes the one who recognizes, A ph ilo so p h er is a
thinkin g m an, who is capable o f th in kin g how, of what, and
why he thinks.
A ccording to Heidegger, this leap takes place through an

attem pt to understand beings and the emergence o f inquiry
about the Being of beings. A t a certain point, m an is no longer
satisfied with differentiation within the fram ew ork o f the ontic
system o f coordinates, and he discovers a new dim ension as a
result o f a unique feat. T h is is the dim ension o f Being. A skin g
him self, “W h at com es prior to beings, w hat is the Being o f
beings, why and whither beings?” m an realizes the greatest form
o f his freedom , which reveals itse lf as his nature at that very
m om ent. T h e freedom o f distance w ithin beings turns out to be
a half-freedom , and m an lunges. It is at this specific poin t that
philosophy begins.
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Philosophy, as Plato defined it2 (and Aristotle later reaffirmed it3),

is a sense o f wonder and amazement“ (Oavfia^siv [thaumazein]
in G reek).4 Both R ussian words used to translate the Greek
Oavjua&iv or the G erm an "Erstaunen" are highly expressive:
yduennmbCR (udivliatsia) is form ed from “dueo” (divo) — marvel,
i.e., uydo” ( chudo) — miracle, som ething “sacred,” going beyond
ordinary perception; “m-yM-jiemte” (iz-umAenie) is formed
through an analogy with the G reek word moxamC, (ecstas),
literally, “going out o f on eself”; “going out o f the mind". W onder—
the basis o f philosophy— is the realization o f gestures, acts, and
movements, which are in no way contemplated in ordinary hum an
thought. The capacity to be am azed (to go beyond the bounds o f
the m ind), to wonder, to discover a “marvel" or a “miracle" in the
world stands very close to the leap that thought perform s when
it begins to think about the Being o f beings. This very leap along
with posing the question, which lies at the basis o f philosophy,
sends us toward the presence o f som ething that surpasses the
lim its o f the hum an. A m azem ent, in the original sense o f the
w ord “OavpiaCsiv” triggers som ething divine and superhuman,
which does not fit into the space o f ordinary hum an thought,
and which surpasses the lim its o f the ontic.
T herefore, the first pre-Socratic philosophers— Anaxim ander,

H eraclitus, and P arm enides— perceived their own leap from
ontics to ontology as an encounter with the divine and as the
discovery o f the divine dimension.
2 “ Truly, a philosopher is he whose pathos (whose passion) is wonder

(am azem ent— davfxa&iv); a philosopher has no other source.” (See also
Plato, Theaetetus [London: Penguin, 1987], fragment 155 d.)
3 “ It w as th rou gh the feeling o f w onder that m en now an d at first began
to p h ilo so p h ize.” (S e e also A risto tle, M etaphysics [N ew York: C o sim o ,
2 0 0 8 ], fragm en t 9 8 2 b l2 .)
4 M artin H eidegger, Was ist das— die Philosophies (Pfullingen: G unther
N esk e Verlag, 1956).
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/
H eraclitus’s statem ent about the-logos— " I f you do not listen

to me, but to the logos, it w ould be wise, abiding by it, to say:
everything is one”5— contrasts H eraclitus h im self as a man with
the logos as the source o f the divine. It is at the very m om ent
o f the leap tow ard the divine logos that, for the first time, man
can think about the way in which he thinks and, consequently,
philosophize. Philosophy is possible as a result o f discovering
the divine dim ension and establishing this dim ension as a new
plane o f consciousness. It is on the basis o f the latter that m an
and the w orld reveal them selves from now bn. H eidegger shows
that the logos o f H eraclitus has all the qualities o f a divine
source, ju st like the M oira o f Parm enides (which holds the
sphere o f Being in shackles) and the “chreon” o f A n ax im an d er.6
T h is leap, which opens up the divine, or, from a different

perspective, constitutes it, is that very great Beginning, T h e
philosopher, having torn h im self away from sim ple thought
(the ontic) and going beyond the lim its o f the m ind in ecstasy,
actualizes the fullness o f hum an freedom and establishes divine
horizons for the first tim e ever. T h e distinction between this
philosophical act and a religious experience lies in the fact that
it is in philosophy, specifically, that consciousness turns out to
be at a distance in relation to itself.
T h e sacred in myth and religion originate in beings, which

strikes the im agination and forces m an to trem ble before its
im placable power. It com es from the outside. T h e sacred in
philosophy reveals itse lf from within, not as the great power
o f beings, but as a fallout th ereof— a sudden acquisition o f a
unique inner space, which not only illum inates, with lightning
speed, beings-as-a-whole predating man, but also man h im self
5 H erm ann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch
(Berlin: W eidm annsche Buchhandlung, 1903).
M artin H eidegger,"D er Spruch des Anaxim ander," in H eidegger, Holzwege,
op. cit.
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as a p a rt o f beings and as the differentiating p art of beings. T h e

inner sacred on the part o f the philosopher lies on the opposite
p art o f m an, ju s t as he h im se lf is on the opposite side o f beings,
thereby creating a truly new dim ension in the topography o f
consciousn ess. From this m om ent on, a point appears in this
topography, located on another plane as com pared to the entire
plane o f the ontic, including the thought center and the thought
periphery o f the ontic.
A t the tim e o f the great Beginning o f W estern European

philosophy, m an encounters the sphere o f divine thought. B ased
on the latter, he can think about the way in which he h im self
thinks from this m om ent on. In the G reek world during the
era o f the great Beginning, the belief in “daim ons” "lesser gods”
(the “numen” o f the L atin s), was quite com m on. Yet only with
the rise o f philosophy does daimon becom e not an object o f
w o rsh ip — a pow erful and invisible kind o f beings, endowed
w ith special energy— but as a poin t radiating thoughts about
the thinker. Such is the m eaning o f Heraclitus's statem ent,
"rjOoq av6pco7tcp daifjcov” ( ethos anthropo daim on), w hich can
be translated as "a dem on (a go d o f a lightning-fast m om ent)
is order for man.” B ased on other fragm ents o f H eraclitus’s
w riting, we can infer that this daificov is identical to his logos,
"T h e self-m ultiplying logos is inherent to the soul.” 7
S o cratic daificov belongs to the sam e category: in his stories it

acts as a special authority, at tim es illum inating the actions and
thoughts o f Socrates-as-a-m an with a special light.
P h ilosophers' daimon is not sim ply a subdued god o f beings

placed on the inside. It is an elem ent o f a radically new m odel o f
con sciousness, which, from now on, has a p o in t— a fulcrum —
7 H erm ann D iels, D ie Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch

(Berlin: W eidm annsche Buchhandlung, 1903).
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from which man can look at beings surrounding him and at

h im self with an equal degree o f abstraction.
The Beginning comprises the establishment o f this point—

the arrival o f this key figure at center stage. In the Beginning,
the question concerning the Being o f beings crystallizes; i.e.,
ontology arises. This is possible only because an authority appears
(philosophers' “daimon"), glancing from which, it is possible to
embrace beings-as-a-whole as som ething com plete and unified.
“Everything is one,” asserts the “daimon-logos” o f H eraclitus.
0Y Z IZ H Aoroz
H eid egger provides a detailed description o f the establishm ent
o f the first Beginning through p re-Socratic introduction o f two
fundam ental term s: (pvaiq (“pkysis,” “nature”) and Xoyoq (“logos"
“thought,” “the w ord”). T h e w o rd “<pvaig" becam e a philosophical
concept long ago, applicable to nature as som ething strictly
distin ct from m an (the subject, culture, society, con sciou sn ess,
etc.). In the m odern period, it lo st its original m eaning
completely, having tran sform ed into a ready-m ade concept,
the sem antics o f which nobody considers. Etymologically, this
w ord traces back to a pre-Indo-E uropean stem : “bhu” “Being"
B ased on its m eaning, “(pvaiq signifies “sprouts.”
H eidegger som etim es replaces the G reek w ovd“(pvaiq" w ith the

G e rm a n “A u fgehen"in order to em ph asize its pre-ph ilosoph ical
sem antics. T h e G reek “cpvasiv" (physein) signified “to rise up,”
“to vegetate,” the way that sp rou ts com e up, bearing fruit,
but a lso — “to beget,” not in the sense o f “separatin g from
oneself,” but rather “to knock out from underneath,” “to lead
to presence.” T h is is how the earth a c ts— a prim ary elem ent,
produ cin g sprou ts, pu sh in g different entities out from w ithin
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itself. Earth, water, air, and fire are the prim ary elem ents in the
teachings o f various p re-So cratics, which realize the action o f
(pvosTv, throw ing out, pu sh in g out, and em ptying beings from
w ithin them selves.
T h e very thought concerning tpvaig as som ething complete, as

beings in their generality, is, according to Heidegger, a trace o f the
ontological leap: “tpvaig” is the nam e given “by the philosophical
daim on” (not by m an!) to beings-as-a-whole. H e thinks that
beings ascend like grains from the soil. A nd the essence of beings
com prises the very act o f ascension— this form ation.
A ccordin g to H eidegger, the entire subsequent developm ent o f

ph ilosoph y arises from the fact that it is (pvaig that becam e the
principal w ord o f the first Beginning. It is here that its fate lies—
its Geschichte. By leaping beyond its lim its, hum an freedom was
able to ju stify a poin t from which all beings were em braced by
a general image. B ut it was also this point that dictated the
kin d o f nam e for the Being o f beings that was fatal. A t this
decisive m om ent, European history m ade the choice in favor
o f interpretin g Being as tpvaig. A nd this was irreversible. T h e
fact that beings are is obvious. B ut the search for the Being o f
beings— the “are” o f this very “are”— was the volitional decision
on the p art o f a thinking m an who leapt higher than him self.
Beings are, but by defining beings as tpvaig, we unnoticeably
com e to the conclusion that Being also is. T h u s, Being itself
becom es an exam ple o f beings, even if it is the very first one, the
universal, and the highest o f beings; nevertheless, it still belongs
specifically to the sphere o f beings.
For the first time, tpvaig does not becom e a w ord but a concept,
a unique phenom enon which already belongs to the sphere o f
ontology; i.e., to the sphere o f logos and not the sphere o f sim ple
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ontic existence or pre-Socratic 'differentiating thought. It is

around this concept that ontology begins to form as Physics. 8
T h e verb “(pvoeiv” ("to sprou t” "to give shoots,” "to foster”), which
generated the first philosophical concept "(pvaig” corresponds to
another verb, no less important for the history o f thefirst Beginning,
"Xsysiv” ( legein) — the source o f "Xoyog” — "word,” "thought,”
and "reading” Originally, "Xoyog” signified nothing m ore than
"harvest” and "the gathering o f fruit.” Asysiv and (pvasiv were
closely interrelated. Being (Sein) as the essence o f beings produces
“shoots” ((pvaig) and reaps (Xsysiv) them, laying them out before
the gaze o f the philosophical daimon, which passes judgem ent on
the quality and quantity o f harvest. Xoyog and (pvaig are two sides
o f the new philosophical ontological topography, in which safe
distance in regards to beings had been conquered.
W ithin that topography, Being (Sein, Seiende-im -Ganzen as

beings-as-a-whole, Seiendheit as the essence o f beings, as the
pair Xoyog / (pvaig) is conceived as som ething that precedes
beings and is different from them . Thus, it manifests both as the
dynamics o f ascension and as the regularizing static o f the harvest
(Being'Sein vivifies and kills with the same gesture). T h rou gh
the (pvasiv / Xsysiv pair (two form s o f essenting beings), a new
kind o f beings advances, Being'Sein as beings, free from beings
in term s o f the specifics o f their dynam ic circular rotation.
Parm enides’s philosophy already clearly describes Being'Sein,
in which the question o f sivai arises, i.e., that o f Being in its
disembodied form , torn from concrete beings. But this Being'Sein
is conceived precisely as an exemplar o f beings o f the highest order.
H erein lies the problem in a nutshell, according to H eidegger.
A fter m aking the leap toward the divine logos-daimon and tow ard
the clarification o f the Being o f beings in am azem ent and wonder,
8 Aristotle, Physics (C am bridge: H arvard University Press, 1970).
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i.e., leaving the sphere o f the ordinary and the boundaries o f (pre-
philosophical) thought, the creators o f the first Beginning slightly
under-jumped (or over-jum ped). W ith safe distance separating
them from the the soil o f beings, they were not able to give
into flight and built a new level, i.e., that same soil, only artificial,
cultural-social, in no way resembling nature, but repeating its
structure unbeknownst to them. A walk along an elevated platform
replaced the flight in heavenly abyss. A nd after some time, at the
next stage o f the first Beginning— with Plato and A ristotle— the
in stan tan eous divine “daimonic” logos transform ed into “Logic,”
and the infinitely pow erful, all-generating elem ent physis
tu rn ed into a carefully w orked-out Physics.
Pre-Socratic gnoseology, established by the new authority o f

the daimon, still hesitates to finally recognize Being'Sein as the
highest instance o f beings. A s one o f the founders o f philosophical
topography, Heraclitus's entire order o f thought resists betraying
flight and replacing it with a platform. By introducing Xoyog
and (pvaig, Heraclitus clearly avoids describing Being'Sein as a
hierarchical, structured gnoseological system. This is the source
o f his paradoxes and his serious attacks against Pythagoras.
Heraclitus, more than any other philosopher o f the first Beginning,
bears the possibility that this Beginning, having begun, will become
different. H e does not move too far ahead or lose it from sight
and, more important, resists having it replaced with another kind
o f beings. Establishing his view on beings from somewhere else
(Being'Sein), he treats this “somewhere else" exceedingly cautiously
and gently. H e reveres the logos and allows the gods to fly.
AAH0E1A in the First Beginning
A m o n g p re-So cratics, truth is conceptualized as aXtjQsia

(aleth eia), literally, "the unconcealed." In order to em phasize
the significance o f p re-Socratic G reek understanding o f truth,
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H eidegger som etim es uses the Ge'rman w o rd "Unverborgenheit’

— "unconcealment.”9 D uring the first Beginning, there are
two m eanings in aXrfdsia: in the first case, we are speaking
about the unconcealment o f Being (Sein), show ing through
"shoots” and “harvest” A nd had this only rem ained so, then
the self-organizing ontology w ould have already been able to
becom e fundamental'ontology in the first Beginning. Furthermore,
Xoyog and (pvaig w ould not have overshadow ed Being (gently
replacing it with themselves), but would have been revealing its
truth; whereas Sein itse lf w ould have gravitated tow ard Seyn.
True, w onder (am azem ent) itself, too, as the principal m ood
in philosophy, should have gently transition ed into a more
abrupt and traum atic, but also com pletely sacred and ecstatic,
quality — the sacred terror (Ensetzen) . 10
B ut the fate o f W estern European philosophy as the philosophy

o f the evening w as different: gently and unnoticeably,
"unconcealment” (aXr\Qeia) slid down to the unconcealm ent o f
"shoots” ((pvaig) and "harvest” (Xoyog) as a new kind o f beings—
although at this m oment, this is still beings-as-a-whole (das
Seiende-im -Ganzen)— or even beings in their dynam ic vivifying
origins (das Sein im Seiende).
It is in sh iftin g the notion o f "truth" as "unconcealm ent” that

H eid egger recognizes basic G reek p h ilo so p h ical th ough t:
9 O ld Slavonic and Church Slavonic contained the word "pmcHoma” which
m eant "verity,” "clarity,” and which was closest in m eaning to the G reek
aXÔ sia, oArjOtjg.
10 “Im erstenAnfang, da die (pvaig in die blr\9eia und als diese aufleuchtete, war das
Er-staunendie Grundstimmung. DerandereAnfang, der des seynsgeschichtlichen
Denkens, wird angestimmt und vor-bestimmt durch das Entzetzen.” (M artin
Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) [Frankfurt am M ain: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1989], 4 8 3 —484.) The literal translation is as follows, "In the
first Beginning, when nature shone in truth and as the truth, wonder was the
principal stimulus. Another Beginning, the Beginning o f seynsgeschichtliche
thought, will be designed and prepared by terror.”
102
B ein g'Sein is given as the unconcealed. H e views thoughts

ab o u t the truth o f Being as the unconcealment o f Being— given
in the act o f sprouting ( (pvaig”) — as the gn oseological code o f
the first Beginning.
Even P arm en ides— who equates thought and Being (voeTv and
siv a i), the unity o f Being, and the sphere o f Being— believes
truth to be unconcealm ent, although here, in term s o f Being'
Sein. Heidegger actively objects to contrasting Heraclitus’s
dialectic with the static ontology o f Parmenides.11 W e view
P arm enides through the eyes o f P latonism and the m etaphysics
o f M odernity. In reality, we m ust read him in the spirit o f the
p h ilosoph ical context to which he belonged.
Parm enides's thesis, "Being is, non'Being is not”— despite its

ontological nature and the im pression o f trying to absolutize
Being as th e'seco n d kind o f beings"— is not devoid o f gravitating
tow ard the vision o f Sein'Being through beings and only through
beings that was com m on for the pre-Socratics. However,
P arm enides stipulates two paths o f learning: the true and the
false. T h e first path recognizes the unified Sein'Being more
deeply than all natural form s, things, and phenom ena— this is
ontology. T h e second is the path o f opinion, "im pression,” dd£a
(d oxa), which only perceives beings in term s o f their appearance,
tru stin g phenom ena's superficial side and failing to see their
com plexity— this is ontics.
P re-S o cratic first Beginning considers Being through the act o f

selfexposure, placement, establishment, superform ation, m oving
tow ard visibility and certainty o f beings. Here, everything
still breaths Sein'Being, i.e., that which is disclosed in beings:
11 M artin H eidegger, Parmenides (F ran k fu rt am M ain : V ittorio

K lo ste rm an n , 1 9 8 2 ).
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its freshness, depth, and elusive gran diose m ajesty perm eate
everything. B ut this loving and p assion ate treatm ent o f beings
and their truth (aXrfdsia) already contains the source o f the
subsequent catastrophe.
Yet at the sam e time, the aAtjOsia o f this cycle can still be
interpreted as a prelude to fundam ental-ontology. H a d it not
been for the entire subsequent history o f Western European
philosophy, Thales, Heraclitus, Anaxim ander, and even
Parm enides could have been viewed, in their "dash toward,” as
those who initiated the kind o f ontology that was capable o f being
revealed as fundamental-ontology at a certain point. Herein lies the
colossal significance o f the first-Beginning thinkers for H eidegger
h im self and for his fundamental-ontological project. In preparing
the space for the discovery (truth, aXrfOeia) o f Sein-Being, we
can guess the m ost subtle m ovem ent o f thought, which could
have led to being illum inated with the truth o f Seyn-Being.
The C atastrophe o f Platonism
(Idea and Representation)
H eidegger treats those that com e after the pre-Socratics, i.e.,

Socrates, Plato, and A ristotle, with even greater caution. H e
calls this second period o f G reek p h ilo so p h y “tfoe beginning o f the
end within the fram ew ork o f the first Beginning"12 The Beginning
persists, the evening glow continues to redden, traditional Greece
lives on, but the end is in the air. The end is near.
T h is is a good time to bring up the analogy o f the Biblical story

about the serpent's appearance in the G arden o f E den. It w ould
seem that A dam , Eve, and the earthly paradise itse lf exist in bliss
and abundance. Yet even in this new beautiful world, the forces
12 Heidegger, Geschichte des Seyns and Beitmge zur Philosophie, op. cit.
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o f im pending doom already m ake them selves known. A n d even

before that point, at the dawn o f C reation itself, when universal
order is only being established and all creatures are close to
G o d , the first o f A n gels— entities o f light and servant sp irits—
rebels and is cast into the abyss with his supporters. It is from
this abyss that he later trespasses into the earthly paradise. A nd
in the E n d T im es, his pow er will extend over the w orld and
the cosm os. B ut the devil, evil, and the harbinger o f the end
already m ake an appearance on the first pages o f the W orld's
sacred history. In the sunlight, jo y fu l paradise, his flexible body
tw ists around the forbidden T ree o f Know ledge o f go o d and
evil and tem pts Eve to taste its fruit.
Likew ise, the end is draw ing near within the first Beginning—
at a tim e o f the greatest tension o f spiritual forces, original
p h ilosop h izin g as if in "paradise" and the great pre-Socratic
leap— when philosophy, becom ing ontology, still hesitates in
indecision over the way in which it should interpret the Being
o f beings. T h is "first end" is an end within the first Beginning.
H eid eg ger never regarded this end disdainfully, lightly,

arrogantly, or contem ptuously. H e valued and adm ired it,
because it was, indeed, som ething great. Even error and delusion
som etim es occur on the grand scale worthy o f veneration. A nd
for H eidegger, true Being (Seyn) speaks through the catastrophe
o f S o cratic and Platonic thought. However, this takes place in
an extrem ely indirect way, through the abandonm ent o f itself
(.Seinsverlassheit) and through its concealm ent.
O ne principal nam e determ ines the end within the first

B egin n in g: P lato . A cco rd in g to H eid egger, P lato , as w ell as
S o c ra te s before him , and A ristotle after him, is the actual nam e
and historical legalization o f the greatest catastrophe.
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Here, the theory about ideas plays''a fundam ental role. H eidegger
takes apart the main etymological-philosophical aspects o f Plato s
thought trajectory, which led him to the doctrine o f ideas. Plato's
illumination by ideas and the introduction o f ideas within the
framework o f his philosophy sim ultaneously represent both
greatness and a.fundam ental substitution for Heidegger.
G reatn ess lies in the fact that Plato's thought, like th at o f all
G reek ph ilosoph y in the era o f the B eginning, is m otivated
by the qu estion o f the Being o f beings. In other w ords, we are
dealing w ith that unique and un expected leap that G reek
thought carries out from the truth o f beings tow ard the truth
of Being. A n d it is im p o ssib le n ot to see th is trajecto ry o f
th ough t in P la to — in all its triu m p h , risk, and ten sio n , in all
its fatality and d e stin y — in the very m o o d o f his ph ilosoph y.
T h e substitution comprises the following. Before Plato, the

philosophical thought o f the Greeks still wavered between
considering (pvaig / Xoyog (“physis / logos”) the true nam e o f
Being, thereby treating Being as a kin d o f beings, and m oving
further, higher, and deeper in order to “seize'' Being as a unique
event (Ereignis), which does not contain anything in itself that
belongs to beings; i.e., as Seyn (fundamental-ontology). W e can
still interpret pre-Socratic philosophy in two ways. In this
question, Plato dots all the "i"s, interpreting the preceding
philosophical tradition as ontological and taking one m ore very
im portant step in the ontological direction (at this point, this is
unequivocally the non-fundam ental-ontological).
Plato s doctrine replaces the wavering o f pre-So cratic ontology

(the m anifestation o f Being— Sein? Seyn?— through beings) by
conceiving Being as an idea. W ith Plato, Being becom es that
which is placed before man, initiating such phenom ena a s "p re-
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sentation, Vor-stellung. M an stands before ideas, while ideas

stan d before things o f the world.
T h e etym ology o f the w ord idea (idea) is connected to

visualization and originates in the pow er o f vision (based on the
verb opfjv [horen]),n Plato’s dialogue The Republic, in which he
offers an expanded theory about ideas for the first tim e— at
all levels o f the “cave” account— discusses “vision” specifically, at
first, that o f shadow s, then o f objects themselves, and finally,
o f id eas.14 W hile introducin g the concept o f ideas into the
very core o f philosophical thought, Plato reduces the basic
operations o f cognition to clear vision and recognition o f ideas,
which are the heavenly m odels o f things and phenom ena. But
any contact with ideas presu pp oses being across from them —
they can only be “seen” in this manner.
T h e latter initiates an era o f a very specific direction in the

development o f reason— an era o f a very specific rationality, which
becomes the fate o f Western European philosophy with Plato
and Aristotle. The latter completely predetermines all its stages,
including Modernity, the M iddle Ages, and even Late Antiquity.
For H eidegger, the pre-So cratics were located in the world,

inside o f it. T h ey were beings am ong beings, thinking beings and
thinking o f beings am ong beings. Such were the ancient G reeks
as a whole. In addition, philosophers, rem aining in beings and
thinking about beings, took the chance o f the divine dash (the
13 T h e sam e Indo-European stem w as preserved in the R ussian verb “to see”
(eudemb), as in the Greek. T hat is, "ideas” (udeu) can be thought o f as
“appearances” (eudbi) or "visions” (eudenrn), in references to the appearance
o f original blueprints or images. It is rather significant that the word “to
know ” (eedamb) is form ed from the sam e Indo-European stem, which was
the source o f other words, such as "knowledge” (eedenue), "inform ation”
(ceedeHue),"news” (eecmb), "renown” (useecmHocmb), “m essage” (u3eecmue),
etc. In G erm an, the w o rd “W issen” "knowledge,” goes back to the sam e root.
14 Plato, The Republic, tr. D esm on d Lee (N ew York: Penguin, 2007).
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daifiov o f philosophers) tow ard S e in g (Sein? Seyn?), w ithout

destroying the connection with m ankind or “naturality”
completely. A n d philosophizing in w onder and am azem ent, in
a state o f w onderful ecstasy at the m om ent o f th e" daim on" they
allowed logos to think through them, giving Being (Sein? Seyn?)
the opportunity to occur and show itself by coming to fruition
through them.
A nd so, with the arrival o f Plato and his theory o f ideas, man
stands before beings: he is no longer in the world, he is before
the w orld—-vor-gestellt and p resen ted to the w orld— he stands
before it. H e is no longer capable o f com m unicating with beings
and things o f the w orld directly. H e cannot participate in
the world's "unconcealm ent” (i.e., in its p re-Socratic “verity”).
From now on, he is doom ed to constantly postu late the idea—
an addition al authority o f a visualized m odel— between
everything, before everything, and over everything.
We transition to Sein als Idea (Being as idea) from the dynam ics
o f concealment and the continuous b urst o f Being in beings)
and, consequently, to an additional authority: the idea, which
replaces Being with itself. Plato’s m ost terrible accom plishm ent
com prised the fact that he equated the idea with Sein . T h e idea
was put in the place o f Sein.
W ith his “decision,” Plato m ade two ontological gestures o f

critical im portance for W estern E u ropean p h ilo so p h y : he
settled (im plicitly) the uncertainty in the question on the status
o f tpvaig in favour o f beings; i.e., he unequivocally concluded that
tpvaig as the Being o f beings is essence (Seiendheit, o v aia [ou sia]),
and then he equated essence with the idea (P lato unequivocally
speaks o f the idea as essence, o v aia). A s a result o f this tw o-fold
move, the passagew ay to Seyn-Being was irreversibly closed.
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A n d although Plato him self and the philosophers who joined him
(Aristotle, in particular) constantly raise the question about the
essence o f beings, i.e., they do not lose sight o f Being— from now
on, the discu ssio n is only about Sein'Being as a"species,’’"image,"
representation o f Seyn-Being. H e passes the ontological visual
copy o ff as the fundam ental-ontological original.
From this poin t forw ard, everything changes in com parison to

p re-So cratic philosophy. From now on, truth appears not as the
unconcealment o f (pvaig (and, perhaps, as the unconcealem ent
o f the hidden Seyn'Being— through (pvaig and through Xoyog),
b u t rather as a correspondence (reference). Moreover, from
this poin t on, that to which beings correspond is the idea, i.e.,
another kin d o f beings, which is as Sein and which the m ind
contem plates. A t this m om ent, the discovered ontological
topograph y (w ith the possibility to be fundam ental-ontological)
o f philosophy's first leap finally closes up in the upper lim its,
where the idea is located, including the first idea, that o f the
good ( t o ayaOov [to agath on ]).
A t this very m om ent, in which thoughts about the Being of

beings still shine, the process o f Beings gradually increasing
aban donm en t (Seinsverlassenheit) com m ences along with the
arrival o f European nihilism . T h e passagew ay to Seyn'Being has
collapsed irreversibly. In its place stands Sein'Being as essence,
Idea, and, consequently, as beings them selves. From this point
forw ard and until philosophy’s ultim ate ending in the 20th
century, the truth is exclusively considered through reference,
i.e., as the correspondence o f one type o f beings to another (at
first, philosophy suggests that it corresponds to the highest of
beings, and then merely to another kind o f beings).
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Subsequ en t po st-So cratic ph ilosophers p u t various ontological

constructs in place o f the idea as Sein. T h u s, Plato s stu den t
A ristotle selects svspysia (energy [energeia]). Later, other
ph ilosophers will prefer different contenders for the
replacem ent in the "office" o f the high est k in d o f beings. B ut
there will be no principal change overall. A fter Plato, the
ontological topography is establish ed once and for all and
rem ains in effect from the end within the fram ew ork o f the first
Beginning to the very last and final End.
H eidegger and Christianity (Platonism fo r the M asses)
H ere it is w orthw hile to recall H eidegger's view o f C h ristianity.

He often repeated N ietzsch e's w ords that “C h ristian ity
is P lato n ism for the m asses.” W h at did he m ean? W hy
does H eidegger have such a condescending attitude tow ard
C h ristian culture, with its intellectual elem ents an d its
com plex con stru ctio n s o f thought?
It is rooted in H eidegger's linguistic-philosophical un derstanding

o f theology.15 T h e Sem itic origin o f the Bible puts it outside
the lim its o f the strictly defined In d o-E uropean context. For
Heidegger, this is an alien kind o f thinking, which does not
interest or im press him at all. In order to think Biblically, one
m ust be a Sem ite. O f course, C h ristian philosophy was, startin g
as early as the A postolic age, a fundam ental revision o f Sem itic,
Jew ish religiosity and theology, adapted for the G reek, Indo-
European way o f thinking. However, H eidegger prefers not
to proceed along the path o f recognizing all the non-Sem itic
influences on Christianity, but, on the contrary, he removes the
problem as such by attributing it to pure Sem itic influence.
T h is m ight seem like a trivialization. However, our task is not
15 We m ust also take into account that when H eidegger used the term'theology,”
he referred to W estern-Christian (Catholic-Protestant) branch o f theology
exclusively; his love o f Greece did not encom pass O rthodox Christianity.
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to criticize H eidegger, but to un derstan d him . In the structure

o f his philosophy, Sem itic thought is sim ply left out.
Illustrating the gnoseological "naivete” o f Biblical philosophy,

H eidegger literally reproduces the phrase spoken by G o d to
M oses on M ou n t Sinai: "I am that I am,” "I am beings.” Let us say
that this statem ent refers to the highest kind o f beings, but beings
nonetheless, H eidegger argues. By doing so, H eidegger wants
to prove that C hristian theology remains within the fram ework
o f beings, i.e., in the space o f ontology, and dogm atically closes
o ff the possibility o f a breakthrough to fu n dam en tal'on tology.16
H eid egger views the case o f theology approxim ately as follow s.

G o d as a kind o f beings is not o f interest for a true philosopher,
ad d s nothing, but rather takes away from the ontological set
o f prob lem s. T h e latter is true because the notion o f G o d
only "m ystifies” the sam e P latonic topography and referential
theory o f truth under the gu ise o f resolving it by referring to
the high est and original entity. Sch o lasticism and theology as
a w hole only confuse the problem o f the relationship between
Being and beings. In place o f this relationship, C h ristian ity
p ro p o se s to sim ply arrange beings along the hierarchy o f
their m erit in term s o f C reation ; i.e., to build a ladder o f ens
creatum, deliberately respon d in g to the question not yet raised
ab ou t the Being o f beings w ith an appeal to creationism (divine
creation o f entities).
H e id eg ge r is convinced th at C h ristian ph ilosoph y is com pletely

enslaved by the P laton ic d octrin e o f ideas and A ristotelian
*6 I realize that this m ight soun d som ew hat facile for those who understand
the entire significance o f T radition (for instance, according to Rene
G u en o n s interpretation). A t this point, every traditionalist (including
beginners) is capable o f an objection. However, let us deliberately om it such
disputes. Prior to com paring great intellectual constructions, we m ust first
u nderstand each one exactly as it is. Let us not rush in exclaiming, "Stop, I
disagree with this point!”
M A R T I N H E ID E G G E R : The Philosophy of Another Beginning
logic, which only serve the need to ju stify a S em itic religion —

w ithout ad d ressin g their G reek ro o ts— and which p articip ate
in the ph ilosoph ical process indirectly and indistinctly.
W hence the N ietzsch ean p h rase: "C h ristian ity is P lato n ism
for the m asses.” For H eidegger, this is a reason to circum vent
this sphere o f ph ilosoph y and to treat it with con d escen sion .
T h e reason is tw o-fold: because o f the aforem entioned "for
the m asses” and the P latonic character.
Let us recall what is said about the "philosophical daim on.” In

com parison with pre-p h ilosoph ical (H o m e ric -H e sio d ic)
G reeks, who lived and thought in term s o f beings and myth,
philosophers discovered the dom ain o f a different kind o f
miracle. W e called this dom ain the philosophical daimon; i.e.,
the space where the Being o f beings is questioned or the poin t
o f observing m an (as the thinkable is observed by the thinker)
from within. T h is is the sphere o f logos, where it illum ines
all beings as one (sv ), as (pvaig. V v (beings) and sv (the one)
converge on one another and alm ost becom e identical to one
another, according to Parm enides and A ristotle.
In the pre-Socratic period, wavering between Sein and Seyn, Being

occupies this dim en sion— the place o f the philosophical daimon
( god,” numen). A fter Plato, ph ilosophers m ake the unequivocal
choice in favor o f Sein. In fact, Sein is alm ost openly identified as
essence (o v aia), the idea, and, consequently, beings. T hus ontology
ends up in the risky place o f a leap into the abyss o f questioning,
established by the daimon o f wonder, a special type o f inner,
philosophical sacredness (different from the pre-philosophical
sacrality o f sacred beings). T h is topography, in which the way out
to Seyn flickered, which was blocked after Socrates and Plato by
the theory o f ideas and universal "representation” (Vorstellung), is
preserved right up to the End o f philosophy.
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A ccording to H eidegger, C h ristian theology is nothing other

than an episode in the consolidation o f this post-P latonic
topography, where the figure o f the Sem itic G o d -C reator
replaces the philosophical daimon and later the Platonic idea.
T h u s, the cycle o f C h ristian philosophy fits between two
ph ilosoph ical periods: L ate A ntiquity and M odernity. T h e
place constituted by the philosophical daimon for the leap into
Seyn-Being rem ains in approxim ately the sam e state (although
the passagew ay rem ains substantially collapsed and continues
to collapse further and further). A nd when the influence o f
C h ristian ity disappears ("G o d is dead,” according to N ietzsch e),
the lack o f change in the ontological topography becom es clear
at once: it turns out that in the philosophical sense, C hristianity
provided absolutely nothing new and only delayed the process
o f truth ful and consistent thought for 1,500 years.
T h e Sch o lastic G o d -C reato r tem porarily rem ained in the place

o f the philosophical daimon, later abandoning this philosophical
topos once again, giving room to the “idols” o f M odernity:
subject, object, the soul, matter, techne, values, worldviews, etc.
T h a t is w hat the expression “P latonism for the m asses” m eans.
D escartes: The Science and M etaphysics o f M odernity
H eid egger conceives o f M odern ity in two ways. O n the one

h and, this is a very significant turn ( Wendung), which, in his eyes,
represents renewed contact with pre-C h ristian philosophizing.
A t this time, the ontological set o f problem s begins to be
com prehended m ore clearly, rigorously, and consistently,
w ith o u t the apparen t tran qu illity o f the S ch o lastic"P lato n ism
for the m asses.” A s th ough t thaw s, it finds itse lf w ithin the
sch em atic to p o grap h y o f P lato n ic-A risto telian m etaphysics
once again, w ithout reference to C reation and its degrees.
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On the other hand, the M odern ity o f Rene D escartes,

G o ttfried Leibniz, Im m anuel K an t, and others inherits the
Platonic intellectual field in its entirety. Thus, their philosophies
contain nothing that is drastically “new" Furthermore, the
Scholastic pause that lasted for fifteen hundred years only
aggravated the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit). N ew
versions o f ontology in terms o f M odernist thinking replicate
Platonic schem ata. Although instead o f the idea, they rely
on new “representations”: the subject, apperception, energy,
reality, the monad, etc. Each new essence^ category or concept
only aggravates the abandonm ent o f Being, responding to the
question o f Being all the more formally and indifferently, sinking
deeper into the sphere o f (re)pre-sentations and solidifying an
exclusively referential theory o f truth.
D escartes bases the m etaphysics o f M odernity on the

subject, which he also introduces into the m ain trajectory o f
W estern European philosophizing. In a w ay he deals with
the “philosopher’s daim on’ once again. But D escartes no longer
operates in the open optics o f the first Beginning (m aintaining
the possibility o f a leap into fundam ental-ontology) or even
in P laton ist topography, barricaded from Seyn-Being, though
tw o-dim ensional nonetheless, where ideas still bear a trace o f
the initial flight ("Id e a s" said Plato, "either soar or perish”17).
Instead, he operates in the space o f strictly hum an thought
(o f the “rational m in d”), where a place called the “subject" is
p u t on the sam e tier under the topos o f ph ilosoph izin g and,
consequently, as the poin t for observing m an’s thought. T h u s,
the philosophers daimon ends up locked up inside m an, in his
“inner” dim ension, which only takes on this particular form
with D escartes. T h is is the subject, “res cogens',' which passes
ju dgem en t on what is, and what is not. Ultim ately, m etaphysics
17 C ited in G illes Deleuze, Logika smysla (M oscow : Rariet, 1998), 251.
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becom es the m etaphysics o f the"e£o cogens’ (the thinking "I"),

which m akes assertion s about what beings, the truth, etc., are.
In the C artesian system o f coordinates, P latonism decays to

its sm allest com ponents, where Sein-Being is lowered from
the P lato n ist idea tow ard D escartes’s subject ("cogito ergo sum”
signifies that Being becom es a function [“ergo"] o f the subject’s
act o f thinking, o f his gn oseology). T h a t which set o ff pre-
S o cratic philosophical thought, rising up into the daimonic
world o f the logos, i.e., hum an thought, becom es the place to
which the initial breakthrough returns in the final stages o f
W estern European philosophy and its Geschichte.
D escartes, according to H eidegger, is good in term s o f his

sincerity, the candid insignificance o f his prim itive ontology,
and his shrivelling lack o f intellect. Here, H eidegger finds the
very fa te o f Being, which, not having m anaged to concentrate
on Seyn-Being in the first Beginning, at a certain point could
not help but descend to the topography o f the subject. T h e
C artesian turn and the m etaphysics o f M odernity, however, is
the sam e m etaphysics as in Plato's era and during the trium ph
o f Sch olasticism . B ut this tim e it enters into a phase o f active
decay, in which its inner skeleton is exposed.
For Heidegger, it is very im portant to cleanse this skeleton from

pseudo-ontological super-im positions and empty not-quite-
philosophical and pseudo-philosophical quirks. W ith Descartes,
W estern European philosophy takes a decisive step toward its End.
S o lid ify in g the subject at the core o f his ontology, D escartes

places everything else before it in the sphere o f the (re)pre-
sented. O nly now he conceives these beings (earlier (pvaig, later
ens creatum) as objects.
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A n introduction o f the subject inevitably entails the object, as

that which stands before it. W ith Plato, ideas and things are
position ed vertically; with the Sch olastics, G o d w as above
the world; with D escartes, the subject and the object end up
being on the very sam e plane. A lthough it is the subject that
is the source o f ontological assessm ent, whichever m em ber o f
the subject-object pair we take, we autom atically get the second
one immediately. By establishing the subject, we also establish
the sphere o f the objective, where everything else falls. I f we
begin to think from the object's perspective (as M edieval
nom inalists suggested, as did the em piricists, like N ew ton
followed by philosophers such as Locke, H um e, etc., up until
the m aterialists), then we shall also inevitability arrive at the
subject as a m irror placed before the object.
In R ussian, the object is “nped-Mem” (p red-m et ). Slavs (initially,

the Poles with th eir “przedmiot”) copied this w ord for them selves
from Latin, in order to convey “ob” (“before,” “nped” [pred]) and
“jectu m ” ("that which was c a st"; "that which was thrown,” from
“jacere”— "to cast,” "to throw ”). An object is that which is before
us. T h e one before whom som ething w as cast is the subject. But
this subject has an im portant distinction from merely a m an
or hum an thought: this subject is constituted scientifically;
i.e., during the course o f a philosophical observation about
the way in which thought develops. T h is is reflective thought,
which lies at the basis o f the m odern un derstanding o f science.
T h e subject is the centre o f science and sim ultaneously that
which creates science. T h a t is why in M odernity, it is science
that occupies the place o f religion. From this poin t forw ard, it
is science that becom es the depository o f assessm en ts that are
recognized as true. Furtherm ore, it is science that takes it upon
itse lf the function o f issuin g directives concerning what beings
are and what they are not .
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In the sam e way and by using the sam e gesture, science

con structs the object as well. T h a t which the subject exam ines
an d recognizes as existent becom es the object. To be a part o f
beings and to be an object fuse into one another. T h is is the
origin o f the synonym ous use o f concepts “to exist” and “to
be objective” in colloquial language. Everything that exists is
objective, and everything that is objective exists. T h e non
objective does not exist, or exists as a blunder, an error, or
a delusion. T h e referential theory o f truth is elevated to the
level o f gnoseological absolute, but, within the boundaries o f
M od ern ity’s science, it is the subject and object that becom e the
poles o f reference.
H eidegger sees a clear sign o f nihilism in this line o f reasoning.

Scientific thinking is one o f the m ost extreme form s o f nihilist
thought; i.e., the kind o f thought in which the question about
the Being o f beings not only fails to be raised but cannot be raised.
A t this point, we m ust note the following. In the science

o f M odernity, despite the apparent detachm ent from the
transcendent dim ension (w hether P latonism or Scholasticism )
an d the low ering o f attention to concrete beings, the basic laws o f
m etaphysics continue to be fully operative. L et us recall that this
m etaphysics erected an additional superstructure over beings as
early as ancient G reece. Science represents thought w ithin the
fram ew ork o f two kinds o f beings— exactly the sam e kin ds as
in previous form s o f idealistic or religious transcendentalism .
T h e se two kinds of beings are the sphere o f the ontic and the
sphere o f the ontological, in which the place o f the ontological
is occupied by the science o f M odern ity itself. T h e topography
o f scientific thinking is the topography o f classical m etaphysics,
although it is form ulated in a radically new manner.
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Vorsetzende D urchsetzung
H eid egger m eticulously traces the artificial form ation

o f scientific and philosophical ontology in the period o f
M odern ity— from D escartes to K an t, classic G erm an
philosophy, and, finally, to A rth ur Schopenhauer, Soren
K ierkegaard, and N ietzsche. Each step brings us closer to the
End of philosophy.
T h e subjective character o f the ontological argum ent leads to

the conscious prim acy o f the will as the principal m echanism for
the construction o f beings. T h is occurred especially after K a n t’s
fundam ental studies focused on the structure o f pure reason
and the discovery that reason is unable to m ake an accurate
decision concerning the Being o f the “thing-in-itself.” T h is is
explicitly present in Schopen hauer; and, finally, N ietzsch e
elevates the will— as “the will to pow er”— as the highest form
o f identity.
A s early as Kant's practical reason, the w ill— now in the form

o f the categorical im perative— acts as the principal m oral
foundation, responsible for affirm ing the Being o f an object,
subject, and “G od." Further on, classical G erm an ph ilosoph y—
from Joh an n Fichte and Friedrich Schelling to N ietzsch e —
develops this K antian thought.
In o rd e r to d e scrib e the la st seg m e n t o f W estern E u ro p e a n

p h ilo so p h y , un derstood within the optics o f Seynsgeschichte,
Heidegger uses a specific expression— "vorsetzende Durchsetzung,”
which can be translated rather approxim ately as “p re
m editated enforcement.” W h at this m eans is that the one who
followed the path o f (re p re se n ta tio n ( V orstellung or Vor-
setzung, which literally signifies “placem en t before oneself,”
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deliberate f i x a t i o n a n d “that which was added in advance”),

m oving further and further away from Being (Sein) and
having gradually— then com pletely— lost vital contact with
beings (Seiende), ultim ately finds oneself in ontic em ptiness.
In a neurotic dialogue with this em ptiness, he started to fill it
u p — litter it with certain representations, established within
the space o f ontological topography. H e turned tow ard the
dom ain o f the idea" (which becam e the concept, the subject,
the object, the category, the value, etc.) and further im posed
these ontologically, metaphysically, and later scientifically
con structed beings directly onto the surrounding beings, not
particularly concerned with them and their existence. In order
to deal with beings that had become objects, man, at some point, was
forced to “deliberately impose” something constructed onto beings,
to pave the emptiness with the content o f his own (re)pre-senting
m ind, and to forcefully im pose these (rep resen tation s with the
help o f the will, in order to later examine them, repeating a
sim ilar operation ad infinitum.
For H eidegger, the essence o f the fundam ental advancement

on the part o f philosophical thought during the course o f
its developm ent lies in understanding the m achinery o f
“prem editated self-im position." W estern European philosophy
is a progressive vorsetzende Durchsetzung, moving from the pre-
S o cratic pole tow ard the nihilism o f the N ietzsch ean "will to
pow er" through alienating ph ases o f Platonism , Scholasticism ,
and C artesian ism .
The Objectification o f Things
T h e objectification o f things (Vergegenstandlichung der Dinge)

occurs during the proccss o f "prem editated self-im position”
(vorsetzende Durchsetzung).
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Here, it is very im portant that we un derstan d what a "thing” is.

T h e G erm an w ord “thing” (“D i n g 18) bears a sacred m eaning
sim ilar to the R u ssian counterpart. In R ussian, a thing (eeufb,
[veshch’]) is news (eecm t [vest’]), som ething prophetic (eeufee,
[veshchee]), that which prophesizes ("b roadcasts,” eeiqaem
[veshchaet]) in the world, where beings are revered as sacred.
Prophetic things prophesize or m ake them selves known in beings.
But it is through representation that they becom e objectified—
these prophetic things cease prophesizing, lose their sacred
content, deform , slip away, or, in the very least, violently
thrust into* the hum an (m ore specifically, the ontological,
philosophical) conception thereof. B ut people are not satisfied
sim ply with the objectification o f already existent things; they
are more and more p o ssessed by representation (anticipation),
Vorstellung, and the will. S o they begin to duplicate natural
things through artificial ones, "things-D oppelgangers,” "things-
shadows,” creating such man-made beings that are closer and
closer to representation thereof. T h u s they begin to replace
Aufstellung, i.e., that natural and innate something that is being
born, with Herstellung— an artificial product.
M an plunges into techne as if this were predeterm ined and

continues to move in the opposite direction o f Being (in the
direction o f Sein as Seiendheit). Beings lose their delicate
connection with Being (as Sein, or perhaps spilling over
into Seyn) as early as Plato, and then being tran sform s into
som ething m anufactured. Ultim ately, inasm uch as Being is
forgotten (Seinsverlassenheit), beings becom e enslaved, and
are replaced by that which is produ ced artificially. T h ere are
more and more objects, fewer and fewer things. T h is is the
dictatorship o f production (H erstellung).19
18 W e will review the significance o f the G erm an w ord"D ing” in m ore detail in
Part 2 ,“D as Geviert”
19 The R ussian language is an ontic language to a significant extent. Saying
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Hegel: A n O utburst o f the “G reater Logic”
H eid egger pays considerable attention to Hegel's philosophy.

From his poin t o f view, H egel tries to escape from the clutches
o f a doom ed set o f problem s in the realm o f disontologizing. For
the first tim e during the entire W estern European philosophical
tradition, he tries to resist A ristotelian logic. K an t described
the latter by saying that over the course o f two thousand years
no one had introduced anything new into it and failed to alter,
improve, or suggest anything new for it. In a burst o f genius,
H egel tries to create his own alternative logic, in which the
third law o f form al logic, the law o f excluded middle (tertium
non datur), w ould be negated.
For H eidegger, this is a brilliant experim ent, representing

the peak o f W estern European philosophy. However, H egel
rem ains w ithin the categories o f the concept, where beings are
“we produce” (npomeoduM [proizvodim]) means that “we help nature,” “we
take things out o f it.” (eueodim U3 nee [vyvodim iz nee], useoduM [izvodim]).
“T o produce som ething” signifies “to push som ething out o f somewhere”
(for instance, from Being-Sein). There is only a single word in the Russian
language for the concepts o f “Aufstellung" and “Herstellung"proizvedenie"
(“production,” “creation”). The G erm an word “H erstellung” signifies “to
set outside” or “to place in front of,” specifically, in an artificial, forceful
manner. We, R ussians, even think o f industrial production as an alm ost
m agical, m ystical feat. For instance, Russian author A ndrei Platonov
describes proletarians digging a trench, thereby collectively accom plishing
a great national archetypal gesture. It is unclear what the trench is for: a
building will not be built anyway, and no one is planning on doing so; but
everyone continues digging, convinced that this process is necessary on a
fundam ental level. P latonovs other protagonists have deep conversations
with steam locomotives, engines, and machines tools, perceiving industrial
m anufacturing as one gigantic living organism (to be fair, it also exhibits
certain infernal attributes). A m on g R ussians, even technical production is
understood (m ore specifically, was understood until recently) with a certain
level o f sacredness. T h at is why it is difficult for us to imagine an objectified
thing or an object in pure form: for us things stillprophesize (although more
and m ore quietly). (See “M agicheskii Bolshevizm A ndreiia Platonova”
chapter in A lexander D ugin, Russkaia veshcti [Moscow, 2000].)
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enslaved by reason and are not,<able to free them selves from

“prem editated self-im position” (vorsetzende Durchsetzung).
H egel accom plishes as m uch as can possibly be accom plished
within the fram ew ork o f Vorstellung. Nothing else can be done.
It is not until night reaches the point o f midnight that morning
could arrive. Therefore, poor Hegel appears to be a certain kind o f
a morning thinker, who wakes up in the middle o f the night and
begins to act as though he were ju st in time for breakfast.
H eidegger is am azed by Hegel, but at the sam e time, he thinks

that this is not a breakthrough toward fundam ental-ontology but
rather a dash toward it, since conceptual thought envelops the
movement o f H egel’s spirit like a fishing net, taking it away from
the m ost acute and potentially explosive m om ents every time.
To H egel’s enorm ous credit, he transitions from history to

the history o f philosophy, convincingly dem onstrating that
the historical process is nothing other than the deploym ent o f
concepts, the work o f the “global mind.” The latter— either openly
or covertly— predeterm ines the logic o f events, remaining the sole
content o f mankind's world history, which m ust be considered
the subject only at the eschatological m om ent when “history
comes to an end.” H egel essentially reestablishes Platonism in
its own right, which was subjected to num erous distortions
over the course o f more than two thousand years. H e speaks
o f history not only as the history o f philosophical ideas but as
the history o f an Idea, the A bsolute Idea, the transform ations
o f which com prise the fabric o f W estern European historical
Being (referring to his own philosophical period, from the pre-
Socratics until M odernity). H egel raises the question o f Being,
Nothingness, negation, and dialectics, substantially reestablishing
the ontological set o f problem s o f the G reeks, but only in the
ultimate, post-Platonic, strictly m etaphysical context.
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H egel sum m arizes W estern m etaphysics in its m ost com plete

form . B u t this entire process o f restating the question o f Being
(Sein) anew not only fails to lead'us to reconsider ontology, but
also negates the po ssibility o f thinking about beings and Being
(Sein) outside the intellectual context o f W estern European
m etaphysics once and for all.
S trivin g to respond to the difficult qu estions o f K ant's critique

o f pure reason, H egel merely exhausts the standard spectrum
o f answ ers to the ontological challenges o f nihilism through
form al repetition o f p re-Socratic theses (Parm enides and
H eraclitus) within the topography o f post-P laton ic philosophy.
H e exam ines the first Beginning, but repeats its set o f problem s
w ithin the fram ew ork o f the End.
O n ly a step separates H egel from N ietzsche.
N ietzsche an d the E n d o f Philosophy
W estern European philosophy ends with Friedrich N ietzsche,

who calls things what they are. H eidegger devoted a num ber o f
scholarly volum es to N ietzsche's philosophy.20 For Heidegger,
the latter is the m ost significant and principal thinker o f
20 M artin Heidegger, Nietzsche I (1 9 3 6 -3 9 ), Nietzsche I I (1 9 3 9 -4 6 )
(Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1996); M artin Heidegger,
Nietzsche: D er Wille zur M acht als Kunst (1936) (Frankfurt am M ain:
V ittorio K losterm ann, 1985); M artin Heidegger, Nietzsches Metaphysische
Grundstellung im abendlandischen Denken: D ie ewige Wiederkehr des
Gleichen (1 9 3 7 ) (F ran k fu rt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1 9 8 6 );
M artin H eidegger, Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemasse Betrachtung (1 9 3 8 )
(F ran k fu rt am M ain : V ittorio K losterm ann , 1989); M artin H eidegger,
Nietzsches Lehre vom Witten zur M acht als Erkenntnis (1 9 3 9 ) (Frankfurt
am M ain : V ittorio K losterm ann , 1 9 8 9 ); M artin H eidegger, Nietzsche: D er
europaische Nihilismus (1 9 4 0 ) (F ran k fu rt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann,
1 9 8 6 ); M artin H eidegger, Nietzsches M etaphysik (1 9 4 1 - 4 2 ), Einleitung
in die Philosopie— Denken und Dichten (1 9 4 4 - 4 5 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:
V ittorio K losterm ann , 1990).
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M odernity and even o f W estern,,European philosophy. This is

completely understandable: according to Heidegger, N ietzsche
is the final philosopher, and so it is difficult to overestimate his
significance in this capacity. That which began at the time o f the
pre-Socratics ends with Nietzsche. In terms o f his authority and
significance, he is a key figure, since the End o f philosophy explains
or substantially clarifies its Beginning. This helps us understand
what exactly began at the time o f this Beginning; how it came to
be that; now having commenced, this certain something came to
an E nd— and to what kind o f an End?
t
N ietzsch e asserts that nothing apart from subjectivity rem ains,

and that the m eaning o f subjectivity is in the will and self
im position. Being is no longer an id ea— it is sim ply a value,
developm ent, life, and the will to power. In other w ords, it is
an arbitrary decision on the part o f the subject. Because Being
became the function o f values, we find ourselves in the space
o f total nihilism , having lost absolutely everything that at one
point connected us to beings and ourselves.
A ccording to H eidegger, N ietzsch e does not overcom e

W estern European m etaphysics in his p h iloso p h y — he extends
it in an attem pt to save it. T h e N ietzsch ean critique o f Plato,
his appeal to the p re-So cratics, his battle with static ontology,
which h as been blocking access to the flow from the vivifying
sou rce— none o f this takes him tow ard a new turn. It does
not bring him closer to truly overcom ing W estern E u ropean
philosophy, but both sum s it up and brings it to the burial
ground. Strivin g to overcome W estern E u ropean m etaphysics,
in reality, N ietzsch e tried to save it. "T h e transvaluation o f all
values," "the will to power," "life," "the Superm an," "the eternal
recurrence — all these N ietzsch ean pro p o sitio n s, according
to H eidegger, represent the agony o f ph ilosoph ical thought,
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th rash in g ab ou t in snares o f a once falsely established

topography, where the breakthrough to Being was irreversibly
closed o ff by its entire structure. B ut in contrast to his direct
p re d e ce sso rs— K an t, H egel, and Sch open h au er— N ietzsch e
truly yearns to overcom e all o f this; he thirsts to break through
to new horizons, b u t fatally rem ains within the lim its o f the
old. T h is is the E n d com parable to the Beginning in term s o f its
scope, tragedy, and relevance. In term s o f risk, it is com parable
to the entire process o f W estern European sunset, evening
tim e ph ilosoph izin g. N ietzsch e is a worthy End.
N ietzsch e is the guard heralding the com ing o f m idnight.

“W atchm an? W h at is left o f the night? “M orning is coming,
b u t also the night.”21
T h e "destitute time” has come, according to N ietzsche, “G o d is

dead," and the m idnight o f the world arrives. Speaking o f the
fact that “m idnight has arrived,” H eidegger added, “W h at are
p oets for?” to the text, “It is already m idnight, but maybe ‘not
quite y e t’, always this ‘not quite yet’”
W e can return to this “not quite yet” a little later. In the meantime,
let us consider why the oblivion o f Being occurs.
21 “Som eone calls to me from Seir, "W atchm an, what is left o f the night?
W atchm an, what is left o f the night?” The watchman replies, "M orning is
com ing, but also the night. I f you w ould ask, then ask; and come back yet
again.” (Isaiah 21:11-12.)
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VI. HEIDEGGER’S
ANTHROPOLOGY OF
SEYNSGESCH ICH TE
M a n s G uilt
The question as to why the oblivion of Being occurs, i.e., the

question about the source o f Seinsvergessenheit as the principal
content o f the historical-philosophical process, leads us to a quite
profound level o f analysis, and we confront the problem o f man
and anthropology in the same vein as that o f Heidegger.
In one o f his works o f 1935, Introduction to M etaphysics1,

H eid egger poses the follow ing questions directly: W hy does
the fate o f Being turn away from Being? W hy does the oblivion
o f Being take place? W hy did Platonic ideas emerge, and what
pu sh es philosophy in the direction o f its End? W h at lies at the
b asis o f the End:? A n d consequently, why midnight?
W h en m eaning is obscure, philosophers turn to poets. Poets

are not lim ited by anything providing philosophers with what
they essentially lack. A n d in this case, H eidegger turns to
S o p h o c le s— in particular, an excerpt from his tragedy Antigone2
where the choruses, sym bolizing beings (Seiende), sing the
follow ing (in H eid egger’s literal translation):
1 M artin H eidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tubingen: M ax

Niem eyer, 1953); M artin H eidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, tr.
R alph M anheim (N ew H aven: Yale University Press, 1959).
2 "The O d e on M an in Sophocles' Antigone,” M artin Heidegger, in An
Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. R alph M anheim (N ew H aven: Yale
University Press, 1959), 86-87.
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♦
Chorus ,•
Strophe I
There is much that is strange ( 7xoXXa ra Seiva), but nothing
that su rp asses m an in stran geness (dsivorarov).
H e sets sail on the froth in g w aters

am id the south w inds o f w inter ‘
tackling through the m oun tain s .
and fu rious chasm s o f the waves.
H e w earies even the noblest

o f the god s, the Earth,
indestructible and untiring,
overturning her from year to year,
driving the plow s this way and that

with h orses.
Antistrophe I
A n d m an, pondering and plotting,
snares the light-gliding birds
and hunts the beasts o f the w ilderness
and the native creatures o f the sea.
W ith guile he overpow ers the b east
th at roam s the m oun tain s by night as by day,
he yokes the hirsute neck o f the stallion
and the un daun ted bull.
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Strophe I I
A n d he h as foun d his way
to the resonance o f the word,
and to w ind-sw ift all-understanding,
and to the courage o f rule over cities.
H e h as considered also how to flee

from exposure to the arrow s
o f u propitio u s w eather and frost.
Everywhere journeying, inexperienced and w ithout issue,

he com es to nothingn ess.
T h ro u g h no flight can he resist
the one assau lt o f death,
even if he has succeeded in cleverly evading
p ainful sickness.
Antistrophe I I
Clever indeed, m asterin g
the ways o f skill ( r b e y o n d all hope,

he som etim es accom plishes evil,
som etim es achieves brave deeds.
H e w ends his way betw een the laws o f the earth
an d the adjured ju stic e o f the go d s.
R isin g high above his place,
he who for the sake o f adventure takes
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the nonessent for essent loses
his place in the end.
M ay such a m an never frequent my hearth;
M ay my m ind never share the p resu m ption
o f him who does this.
H eidegger finds a concise description o f the entire historical-

philosophical process (i.e., the form ula o f W estern m etaphysics)
in these choruses about beings. It is because m an, at least G reek
m an, Western European m an is the kind o f m an that Soph ocles
dep icts— this leads to everything else.
M an, as one o f beings, gets removed from the general system

o f beings, is accentuated, falls away, and em bodies som ething
unique and special, housing catastrophe within. O n the one
hand, he is as'terrible” (strange) as all beings. H i s “terrible” nature
m ust be un derstood in its original G reek sense, H eidegger
insists. T h is is the way in which the G reek term “Seivov”
(.deinon, suffering) translates. H eidegger interprets this term as
“coercive,” “aggressive,” “subordinating,” and im posing.” C ertain
aspects o f beings are also terrible: am ong them are storm s,
hail, deadly diseases, savagery, unruliness, aggression, risk,
and threat. B ut man, partaking o f "terribleness” with all beings,
su rp asses everything else with it. M any things are terrible, but
m an is the m ost terrible o f all. H erein lies his un iqueness: he is
the m ost terrible o f all that is terrible; he is the m ost aggressive
o f all that is aggressive; and he is the m ost subjugating am ong
all that subjugates.
M oreover, he turns aggressiveness into his fate. A ccording to

H eidegger, man's specific Seivov is fully captured in "texvrj”
“techne," the ability to create special beings, which can serve
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him m ore com pletely than those beings that he conquered,

subjugated, and placed under his control.
T h e ability to create p er se is neutral with respect to good

an d evil, b u t in every case this ability is b ased on aggression,
im p o sitio n , and terror. A fter all, it is the qualitative
concentration thereof.
A t the sam e time, “Ssivov” is, in a certain sense, "SiKfj” (dike,

ju stice ), i.e., the "higher law” or the "higher order” which
subjugates all beings. H eidegger interprets "SiKrf as “(frvoiq”
(physis) and “Xoyoq” (logos), i.e., as Being o f beings. Amrj im poses
itse lf onto everything on the scale o f beings, whereas man
im poses h im self onto beings through Tsxvrj. T h is leads to the
fun dam ental confrontation between m an and Being. M an
places h im se lf in opposition to Ssivov as the expression o f
ts.iKfj through rsxvrj as the expression o f Ssivov. It is for this
reason that m an becom es "m ore terrible” than all beings. There
no longer is a poin t within beings where the two terrors could
collide: the terror o f beings’ Being and the terror o f m an, who
copies them . T h is is the poin t o f a schism in beings. M an as the
kin d o f beings that are being split represents the point where an
incursion o f the terrifying pow er o f Being (Sein or Seyn— this
is yet to be clarified) occurs. Yet m anifesting itse lf in this way, it
pushes m an away from the rest o f beings.
A s the greatest and m ost im portan t o f beings, while towering

over beings at the sam e time, he is excluded from beings and
is banished from them . H e is not welcome at the source o f
beings. In fact, he is cast out from that which com prises beings’
know ledge about him self.
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Techne as W estern European Fate
Therefore, we should search for the source o f W estern

European philosophy’s fate in the roots o f E u rop ean —
G reek— anthropology. A t his core, m an is doom ed to conflict
with beings and, indirectly, Being, which is the order o f beings
as well as their logos. Yet m an is also doom ed to conflict with
him self, since he, too, is p art o f beings and an expression o f this
order. However, this order o f beings (its Being) is exhibited in
man in an essentially different way than in the rest o f beings.
H eidegger reaches the assertion that there is “excessive Being”
in man, and it is this factor that is m anifested in his having
too much power and terror directed tow ard the overcom ing o f
beings and tow ard exiting their boundaries. T h is departure is an
attem pt to break through to the Being o f beings that com prises
the essence o f m an’s Being.
T h o u gh t is a characteristic o f m an. It is the latter that

distinguishes him from other beings. M an is capable o f acutely
differentiating one thing from another when it com es to beings,
i.e., thinking ontically. A fter all, he h im self is distin ct from
beings, because he occupies a special place in relation to them.
“M an, ruling over places (beings), placed outside o f places" (as
H eidegger translates Sop h o cles). T h u s, the very act o f thinking
already contains the possibility o f turning into a breach in beings.
How ever, m an does not attem pt to draw the necessary

conclusions from this. H e is satisfied with differen tiatin g
that which is aroun d him and w ith con so lid atin g his p o sitio n ,
although he is periodically throw n from side to side in his
attem pts to reach the edge o f beings and to battle with them
as beings-as-a-whole.
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V _
D u rin g the course o f m astering the lim its o f his own freedom
and distancin g h im self from beings, at a certain point man
discovers rsxvrj, the ability to create beings for him self. T h is
allow s him to acquire an even greater pow er over them and to
m easure distinctions betw een beings even more precisely and
accurately. T h ro u gh rsxvrj m an approaches the final barrier, the
other side o f which reveals the horizon o f the leap; beyond the
lim its o f all that is hum an, the place which we described as
daimonic topos” earlier. W ith this leap, m an considers h im self
to be am on g beings, i.e., distances h im self from him self. He,
thereby, realizes the greatest possible violence and underm ines
the last foundation for rem aining in beings. W hen he thinks o f
h im se lf as a kind o f beings in the sam e way as he considered
other beings (in opposition to h im self) earlier, he constitutes
a new place, which in a certain sense is no longer located in
beings. T h is place can only be Being. Furtherm ore, this is Being
as non-beings (Seyn als Nichts).
This gesture initiates philosophy. Yet at the same time, TS'/vi'j does
not become one o f the manifestations o f human distance, but is
instead comprehended as man's fate, as the principal thing in him,
as Seynsgeschichte. By undertaking the leap into non-Being, man
him self becomes a "product," a “means," and something technical.
A nd the potential o f an-nihil4ation (Seyn = Nichts) contained in
Being begins its lengthy work against beings and, for that matter,
against man as one o f beings. It is for this reason that Heidegger
identifies rsxvrj with fate and sees in this the manifestation o f man's
ontological depth as a phenomenon o f Seynsgeschichte.
But not every man moves in the direction o f complete and final
acceptance o f responsibility for double distancing; both from
beings and from man as part o f beings. Only the Greek man in
the earliest days o f philosophy makes this choice. And from this
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initial point onward, the leap, double topography, daimonic place,

and rexvr/ become his evening fate. Ultimately, the first gesture o f
self-awareness as a breach within beings already opens up a path
toward the gradual formation o f Western European nihilism and
the “desert’s ” advance.
Freedom and W ill
A t the heart o f the catastrophe o f W estern European fate lies

the m ost profound truth o f hum an freedom . Being reveals itse lf
in m an in a'completely different way from its revelation in other
beings. M an lives in Being, and his hom e is Being, not beings. A s
one o f beings, he, however, is not at hom e am ong beings; this is
not his home. H is authentic hom e is Being; that is why he acts
so repugnantly when he is only im m ered in beings.
Being, having brought man into presence and supportin g him in

presence until the m om ent o f death and sim ultaneously leaving
him to his own devices, rem ains in him in a special way. It
expresses itse lf through his special p o sitio n — the will. M an
places h im self before beings and im poses h im se lf onto beings
through his will. In this way, he moves tow ard the replacem ent
o f beings by the created and the technical. H erein lies his will.
M an is a wilful entity. T h is relationship between man and
Being as well as that o f Being and m an com prises the source o f
vorsetzende Durchsetzung (“premeditated enforcement”).
The impulse to move away from beings and toward Being as the
source o f philosophizing is an echo o f Beings boundless freedom
in the depths o f man. Sensing the very possibility o f this impulse,
man enters the riskiest zone o f his essence: he throws him self into
Being. In the first Beginning, the boundless nature o f freedom
signals the greatest risk in terms o f the possibility o f flying over
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the abyss. Becom ing alien to beings and interpreting this as his fate
contrary to the fate o f beings, man begins to philosophize.
A t the sam e time, this im pulse is the realization o f the greatest

violence over beings and over oneself: from now on, m an is
irreversibly alien within beings. B ut whether he w ould find his
hom e in Being— this is the big question. A t this m om ent, he
becom es m an for the first tim e because there now is a place,
from which one could say, “Ecce homol”— “Behold the m an !”—
poin tin g at h im self from som ew here w ithin (the daimonic
topos). B ut at the sam e tim e— exactly at that sam e m om ent—
m an ceases to sim ply be m an and begins to be the one who
philosophizes, a m an with a fate correlated with Seynsgeschichte.
From now on, he is no longer free o f his freedom , and is
condem ned to philosophical thinking, despite all attem pts or
desires to slip back into “sim ple thinking,” i.e„ the ontic. H aving
identified h im self as m an, as beings in what is hum an, man
m akes the lightning-bolt o f the logos a reality. In a certain sense,
the Su p erm an appears for the first time at this very m om ent
as logos is discovered. It is not a coincidence that H eraclitus
tells us about this as already m entioned, “ I f you do not listen
to me, but to the logos, it w ould be wise, abiding by it, to say:
everything is one”. “Not to me but to the logos” Philosophy is not
ab ou t H eraclitus as a man, but about the logos, and we m ust
only listen to it; it philosophizes, and it truly risks.
A n d here the exact m om ent o f m aking the greatest decision reveals

itself: to what lim it will man follow the path o f the logos? H ow
will he deal with his boundless freedom? A fter all, he reclaimed
it by taking the terror o f Being in its ultim ate concentration upon
h im self as its first-priority recipient (through death), bearer, and
inspiration for all others (through will and power).
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T oday we know the answer. E stablish in g philosophy, the ancient

G reeks did not know it. Terrified and am azed, advancing tow ard
that which they them selves did not know, they created a work
o f art unique in its tragedy: W estern European h istory— the
history o f the world’s evening.
A s we have already noted on a number o f occasions, the

fluctuation between Sein and Seyn in the works o f Aristotle and
Plato unequivocally resolves itself in favor o f Sein as Seiende-im-
Ganzen and Seiendheit. This means that the process o f soaring in
a leap was interrupted, and the very element o f the leap into the
abyss was replaced by an artificially created campsite, a temporary
stop, established somewhere halfway between the abandoned
home o f beings (ontic thought) and the true home o f yet-to-be-
acquired Being (Seyn, fundamental-ontology). But will as the
tragic banishment from beings and as violence and destruction
nevertheless became m ans fate to drift along every possible road
in a deliberately wrong direction. Always prone to turbulent
destructiveness, man created a planned schedule for it. Stopping
in his tracks at an intermediate station, he intensified the technical
destruction o f beings along with their artificial counterfeiting and,
at the same time, extended his war with dmrj as the Being o f beings,
with the dash toward Being (Seyn) no longer on the agenda.
Texvrj becam e the tw o-fold fate o f m an: he began to transform

beings into produ cts through his will, and, consequently, he
h im self (like beings) becam e m ore and more rem iniscent o f
a m achine (this is the source o f Julien O ffray de L a M ettrie’s
“m achine m an"). A t the sam e time, Being becam e the question
about the “techne” o f thought for him , which he used to
consolidate the barricades in the face o f dangerous questions
about death, Nothingness, the abyss, and Seyn.
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T h is process reaches its peak in the m etaphysics o f M odernity

and with Rene D escartes’s introduction o f the subject and
object. From this point forw ard, there is only the reasoning,
representing, and willing subject and before him — the object,
res extensa, the ob-ject, Gegenstand. It is at this point that the
fin a l ob Rectification o f things occurs.
H eid egger designates this process by using a special term,

‘ M achenschaft.” It is form ed from the G erm an stem “M achen”
“to m ake” or “to do,” which is also the source for the concept
“M acht,” “power," “might," and “dom inion.” T h e R u ssian
language conceives o f “pow er" and “dom inion” as som ething
from the dom ain o f the “po-ssible", the potential (not unlike
the L atin "potentia”), that which m ight be, but m ight not be.
T h e G erm an w ords “machen,’ “M acht" and "Machenschaft” are
linked, on the contrary, with actuality, action, act, and with that
which not only m ight show or im pose itself, but which already
show s and im poses itse lf at the given time. T h is is an active
and operating volition, operation, deed, action, and activity. It
is possible that the assonance o f the G erm an stem with the
G reek stem s fi&xojuai (m achom ai) and fj.rjxa.viKq (mechanike)
influenced H eidegger in his selection o f this group o f words;
the first signifies “fight,"“ battle,"“aggression," and “attack," and in
the figurative sense, “m achination"; and the secon d ,“m echanical
invention” and the “machine." M achenschaft is absolutized rexyrj.
It is taken as a positive program for man and m ankind no longer
implicitly, but rather explicitly.
In this inferior, pragm atic, and objectified m adness of

p ro d u ctio n , which sw ept over the W est in the era o f M odernity,
H e id eg ge r sees the sam e origin al anthropological gesture
on the p art o f the ancient G reek s realizating the greatest,
u n lim ited freedom . M an low ered h im se lf to a pro du ction
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frenzy u tilitarian ism , pragm atism , and m aterialism , precisely

because at one p o in t he faced the sources o f his hum anity
(superh u m an ity) as som ethin g distinct from beings. H e
discovered his fate in logos and will, co n stru cted a m etaphysical
topograph y o f the relation sh ip to the w orld and a referential
theory o f truth. T h a t is why the ultim ate nihilism o f
d isastro u s presen t-day circum stan ces and m an s com plete and
hopeless aban don m en t o f Being (Seinsverlassenheit) contains
the p ro fo u n d m ystery o f the relationsh ip betw een m an and
Being, the fateful h istory o f his rebellion again st the lim its
o f beings, and his descent into nihilism . Yet all o f this is not
sim ply an accident on the p art o f som eon e who p articip ates
in the independen t course o f som eth in g that is d istin ct from
him . It is m an that creates h im se lf and determ ines h im se lf
before the face o f Being (Seyn), which never lets itse lf be
know n directly through beings or through death, b u t which
can h appen to m an or not happen at all.
H erein lies the fundam ental character o f the relationship

between Being and man: for man, Being is som ething accidental
— specifically, that which may or m ay not collide with him .
A nd at the sam e time, Being needs m an in order to immediately,
accidentally, and whim sically reveal itse lf in his brokenness,
separation, and tragic mortality.
T h u s, m an’s will is his fate and Being itself. T h is is expressed

at all stages o f W estern E uropean ph ilosoph y through cpvoiq
(physis), idea (idea), y/vxn (psyche), subject, object, concept,
value, and, finally, M achenschaft.
W hy is this the case? Because Being is not a kin d o f beings;

consequently, it is N o th in gn ess. A n d since it revealed itse lf in
the great Beginning as the Being o f beings, then in the E n d it
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reveals itse lf as Nothingness out o f beings. T h u s, m an at the

foun dation o f his will actually wills Nothingness.
T h e sun moves tow ards night not because it or som eone else
m ade a m istake. T h e light sim ply expresses itse lf through light
an d shadow, and day transition s into night, in order to m eet the
new day. A s early as the first Beginning o f W estern European
philosophy, Being m anifests itse lf as will, m oving Seynsgeschichte
tow ard the poin t o f m indnight.
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/
VII. ANOTH ER BEGINNING
(DER ANDERE ANFANG)
Background fo r A nother Beginning
Gradually, we arrived at the main subject o f Heidegger’s philosophy,

which he called “another Beginning” (or the."second Beginning”).
T h e re are three w orks th at w ere not pub lish ed in H eid eg ger’s

lifetim e, con sistin g o f the outline for courses, lectures, and
oth er w orks. T h ey are dedicated specifically to the subject o f
another Beginning: Contributions to Philosophy (o f the Event)1,
Geschichte des Seyns2, and On the Beginning3, T h ey were all
w ritten betw een 1 9 3 6 and 1956, i.e., at the tim e H eidegger
th eo rized ab ou t the su b ject o f Ereignis, which had direct
correlation to the su b ject o f the second Beginning. H eid eg ger’s
th ough t ap pears m uch m ore clearly and precisely in these
loosely design ed fragm en ts than in stylistically perfected
texts. T h ey also dem o n strate the qu estion in g and fluctuation s
on the p art o f H eid egger him self, revealing his process o f
searchin g for ap p ro p riate w ords and expressions.
In all three books, the idea o f the second Beginning serves as the
author's focal point. It is this question that makes other subjects
that Heidegger considered earlier (until the m id-1930s) truly
piercing. These include Sein und Z eit as well as ideas primarily
1 M artin H eidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am

M ain : V ittorio K losterm ann, 1989).
V ittorio K losterm ann, 1998).
3 M artin H eidegger, Uber den Anfang. Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am M ain:
141 ♦
/
concerned with language and ancient Greek thought (which he

made a priority after the end o f W orld W ar II and the collapse o f
the Third Reich).
W ith the second Beginning, H eidegger equated his own

philosophy, thought, and ultimately him self. It is that with which
he completely identified his own philosophical and personal fate.
According to Heidegger, the first Beginning comprises pre-

Socratic philosophy (especially Anaxim ander, H eraclitus, and
Parm enides); it lays the foundation for philosophy as such
and determ ines the fate o f two-thousand-year-long W estern
European history. This Beginning is a unique transition from the
ontic to the ontological; from simply hum an thought to the type
o f thought that considers m an a special kind o f beings. It involves
fully accepting the responsibility for the fate o f this transition,
man, beings, and Being, conceived in a completely different way
from this point forward.
W ithin the framework o f the first Beginning, thinkers prior to

Anaximander, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle determined whether
Western European Seynsgeschichte would be ontological or
fundamental'ontological, whether the daring leap o f ontological
thought would result in a flight toward boundless Seyn-Being, or
whether it would stop halfway, replacing Seyn with the greatest
manifestation o f beings (ovrcog ov [ontos on}).
W e know what decision was made and whence it led. The

fundamental-ontological prospect was not realized. A nd the kind
o f ontology that prevailed is the one which W estern European
philosophy has been dem onstrating to us until its latest nihilistic
manifestations. Recording theoretical moves by the process o f
Seynsgeschichte, we can ask ourselves the following question about
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a certain daring endeavor together with Heidegger. Should we

discard two and a h alf thousand years o f Western m ans fate and
thought thereby transitioning to a new Beginning? Should we raise
the question about the Being o f beings anew and in a completely
different way than was done in the first Beginning— taking into
account the entire available W estern European philosophical
experience? W h at does this “different way” mean? It means posing
this question not by using beings as the starting point or equating
Being with beings, but surging directly into the pure element o f
Being through terror and abyss.
W e saw th at the first B eginning opened up the po ssibility o f a

leap and flight tow ard Seyn. W e also saw that it was not realized
an d w as com pletely taken o ff the agenda by P latonism . But
we also saw how this w as done, how the logos— the place o f
the p h ilosoph ical daim on— revealed itse lf in the highest dash
on the p art o f m an s thought, which established philosophy
in place o f sim ple thought, and ontology instead o f the ontic.
Indeed, thinkers tran sition ed from the ontic to the ontological
in the first Beginning. B u t in the second Beginning, we m ust
tran sition into fundam ental-ontology, realizing that very
p o ssib ility which was lost, discarded, and failed.
T h is com rpises the new B egin n in g— a different Beginning. We

are not sim ply raising the qu estion about Seyn-Being with all
o f its rigid and radical qualities, by asking ourselves, "W h y are
there beings rather than N o th in g n e ss?”4 T h is is a transitional
qu estion according to H eidegger. L et us recall that the "key
qu estion o f ph ilosoph y” (Leitfrage) since the introduction
o f the G reek concept o f (pvaig w as about determ ining the
essence o f beings, i.e., w hat is Being as beings-as-a-whole? T h is
is the qu estion asked at the end o f the first Beginning. "W h y
4 M artin Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metapbysik (Tubingen: M ax Niemeyer,
1953).
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are there beings rather than N o th in g n e ss?” is a tran sition al

question (Ubergangsfrage). “ W h at is the truth o f Seyn-Being?”
is a fun dam ental question (G rundfrage).
We know that the “key question” was formulated incorrectly,

whereas its responses led to a catastrophe. We also know that
“N othingness” o f the transitional question is not an empty
concept, but rather a sophisticated expression o f the incongruence
between Being and beings. In addition, the latter emphasizes the
profound significance o f Seyn-Being, which is Nichts, but also
Seyn o f beihgs (Seiende), i.e., Sein. And, finally, we know that not
only the referential theory o f truth, but also the understanding o f
truth— dXrfOsia— as the unconcealment o f beings inherent to the
pre-Socratics, is a fundamentally wrong way to raise the question.
Unconcealment m ust refer to Seyn-Being and be drawn directly
out o f it, bypassing beings, including man as a kind o f beings.
The new Beginning is also possible based on the following criteria:
1. T h e historic-ph ilosoph ical process o f the European

man has exhausted itself, and the era o f total nihilism
has arrived.
2. R eco g n izin g the w ill to pow er, M achenschaft,

values, worldviews, techne, and all other versions o f
Plato's idea as the expression o f Seyn-Being itself,
indirectly proving the latter's non-equivalence with
beings through a schism in beings em bodied in the
philosopher-m an.
3. T enacious will tow ard thinking philosophically and

the greatest risk in any situation that pertains to
man's seynsgeschichtliche dignity and his dignity as a
species— as the bearer o f greatest freedom .
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4. M artin H eid eg gers philosophy focused on the

fundamental-ontological trajectory in the history o f
philosophy. It spurred the reading o f Western European
history in terms o f its m ost significant aspects.
The new Beginning will open up if we are to believe Heidegger

and follow him, thereby taking on the new version o f thinking
and philosophizing. But if we are to consider carefully the scale o f
this philosophical act that we are to undertake, then we will feel
uncomfortable because o f the fundamental nature o f the task that we
are supposed to solve. The transition to the new Beginning translates
into ceasing to live by the rules o f Western history and the history
o f the evening. It means to not only topple metaphysics but also
the original source— the first nerve o f Greek thought about beings,
aXrfOsia— truth and (pvoiQ at the deepest level under the strata o f
Latin, Scholastic, and contemporary philosophical concepts, which
continue to predetermine the fundamentals o f Western thought,
Western logic, and Western consciousness, not to mention culture,
science, education, social relations, politics, and economics.
H eidegger offers the total overcom ing o f the W est and the
beginning o f a new history, new Being, and new hum anism . At
the sam e time, he does not poin t the way back or look for the
alternatives in other cultures and other eras. H is invitation is
as follow s: it is necessary to accept W estern Seynsgeschichte as
one’s fate, recognize the inevitability and justification o f each o f
its phases, decipher them grasping the m essage sent by Seyn-
Being, which is im plicitly contained in the approaching com ing
o f the night and the kingdom o f total nihilism . It is especially
im portan t to focus on the initial roots o f W estern philosophy
du rin g the era o f the first Beginning and take one more step—
tow ard the ab yss— in order to im m ediately and radically pass on
the truth's initiative onto Seyn-Being itself in its pure form.
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Transition (U bergang)
H ere is w hat H eidegger writes about the transition into a

different Beginning,
In preparation for the tran sition from the E n d o f the

first Beginning into another Beginning, m an not only
enters a never-before-experienced “p e rio d ” but into
a com pletely new area o f h istory ( Geschichte ). T h is
tran sition and even the different B eginning itself, will
b oth include a long phase o f overcom ing the E n d o f the
first Beginning.5
Further:
T h is tran sitio n is the ru n n in g sta rt for the leap, w ith

the help o f which the B egin n in g can com m en ce— and
an oth er B egin n in g to an even greater extent. H ere,
in th is tran sition , the m o st in itial an d, therefore, the
“m o st h isto ric” (geschichtlichste ) decision is bein g
p rep ared . T h is is an eith er-or d ecisio n from w hich one
can n ot take refuge in a b urrow or a secret h idin g place:
one will either rem ain im p riso n ed by the E n d an d its
final con sequ en ces, i.e., the renew ed m o d ificatio n s o f
“m etaph y sics,” which becom e m ore an d m ore crude,
m ore and m ore m ean in gless (th e n ew “ B io logism ,” etc.),
or one will initiate the new B egin n in g, i.e., u n dertake
its len gthy p rep aratio n .
A n d since the B egin n in g only o ccurs in a leap, then this

p rep aratio n , too, h as to be a leap an d sh o u ld o rigin ate
fro m the con fron tatio n w ith the first B eg in n in g an d its
h isto ry ( Geschichte ). ( . . .)
5 M artin H eidegger, Beitrdge zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis), op. cit., 2 27;
here, translated from the R ussian (Ed.).
146
In another Beginning, all beings will be sacrificed to

Seyn-Being, and only because o f this will beings, as such,
acquire their own truth fo r the first tim e.6
Ereignis
H eidegger poin ts directly to the m ain barrier to this tran sition —

human reason (ratio). R eason in its re-presenting role is the
obstacle for fundam ental-ontological thought.
Seyn-Being in another Beginning is not physics (and is not

perceived as a m eta-physics). It is thought o f in a radically
different way: through sim ultaneously grasping and holding on
to it as the Being o f beings and Nothingness simultaneously. A t
the sam e time, it is incorrect to consider it as som ething that
sh ould always be (it is incorrect to think o f Seyn-Being through
the prism o f perm anence). A ccording to Heidegger, Seyn-Being
is not— it exists (Seyn west), i.e., remains in essence. T h is m eans
that it is not perm anent and unchangeable, but rather extremely
rare. It occurs, com es true, and is unique.
H erein lies the fundamental-ontological core o f another Beginning:

it grasps Seyn-Being as Ereignis (literally, the “event” ).7
In order to clarify the term “Ereignis’, ’8 Heidegger uses artificial

syncretism. Etymologically, "Er-eignis” comes from “Er-augen,” in
which the meaning o f its stem is “Auge”— the “eye’, ’ more broadly,
“vision” and “observation” in the old German. Yet Heidegger
interprets the term as the similarly sounding"eigene,” i.e.,“ones own,”
6 Ibid., 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 ; here, translated from the R ussian (Ed.).

7 U nlike a sim ple “event,” Ereignis "befalls,” “attacks,” and “falls with lightning
speed.” It is the m idnight storm in which the lightning illum inates the black
landscape with a sudden, piercing, and unnaturally bright light.
8 W e will d iscu ss th is su b ject in m ore detail in the u pcom in g sectio n s o f
the b oo k.
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"genuine," and "authentic”— “Er-eigtne.”9 Heidegger conceptualizes

Er-eignis in two ways: as a unique one-off (seynsgeschichtliche) event
in which Seyn-Being instantly manifests itself in its truth, and as
the immediate transition from the inauthentic mode o f existence
to the authentic kind and, accordingly, to Being (Sein) and existence
according to the fundamental-ontological essence (Wesen).
T h e Seynsgeschichtliche horizon o f H e id eg ge r’s ph ilo soph y

is oriented tow ard Ereignis. Ereignis is the culm in ation o f
Beings history, because at this p o in t the whole p rocess o f
Seynsgeschichte m anifests itse lf in its true dim en sion : as
Being’s narration ab ou t itse lf in a reversed (inverted) fo rm —
in the form o f Beings oblivion (Seinsvergessenheit) and the
trium ph o f nihilism . Ereignis is directly linked to the fact
that at a certain p o in t the entire cycle o f W estern E u ropean
ph ilosoph y is being grasp ed in its true p ro p o rtio n s and in
term s o f fu n dam en tal-on tological significance. A n d this
p rocess o f grasp in g and com prehension form s the prem ise for
Seyn-Beings advancem ent as it truly is — this tim e not through
continuance in which it conceals itself, but rather through the
single m om ent in which it reveals itself.
H eid egger uses the m etaphor o f m aturity and ripen ess to

describe Ereignis. In the context o f Ereignis, Seyn-Being
becom es a fruit and a gift. A t the sam e tim e, Ereignis, look in g
ahead and having an in stan t place in the future, is also presen t
in the p a st— in so far as the p a st was, i.e., correlated with
Being (Seyn). T h u s, Ereignis becom es a m om ent orien tin g
the developm en t o f the h istorical (geschichtliche) process that
generates the eschatology o f Being. H eid egger w rote ab ou t
this su b ject in a text dedicated to A n ax im an d er:
9 The term s “eigene” and “uneigene” ("authentic” and “inauthentic”) are

applicable to the fundam ental concept o f "Dasein ," which we will d iscu ss in
the third section.
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Beings’ Being gath ers (XeysaOai, Xdyog) in the final

m o m en ts o f its fate ( Geschick). Being’s previous
existence collapses in its still-concealed truth. Being’s
h istory gath ers in th is partin g. T h e gathering in
th is farewell com prises the eschatology o f Being and
is akin to h arvesting (Xdyog) the ultim ate (eaxaxov
[eschaton]) expression o f its form er existence.
Being as seynsgeschichtliche (th at which w as sent) is
esch ato lo gical.10
E r-eign is is, therefore, an esch ato lo g ical event. In it, the

evening fru it o f fatally a rticu late d q u estio n s in the first
B eg in n in g falls into the h an d s o f the one who is ready to
u n d e rtak e the tra n sitio n over the p o in t o f great m id n igh t and
com e o u t on the oth er sid e — the m orn in g side. A t the sam e
tim e, H e id e g g e r believes th at the salvation o f the W e st—
w hich w as the first to follow the trajectory o f on tological
p h ilo so p h y and m etap h y sics an d w as also the first am on g
all o th ers to have reached the critical end p o in t o f cultures
(th e E n d o f p h ilo so p h y )— m u st occur in the W est itse lf—
re alize d by the latter itself. T ak in g on the fatality o f m akin g
the in itial choice, a new p h ilo so p h y o f the secon d B egin n in g
m u st m ake the new choice an d, p u sh in g o ff from its tragic
h istory, fo cu s on the p ro b lem o f Seyn 'B ein g an ticip atin g or
p re p a rin g for E r-eignis as B e in g s u ltim ate com ing to fru ition .
E r-eignis is the keyw ord o f the N e w B egin n in g. T h is is

an o th er B eg in n in g in its fu n d am en tal-o n to lo g ical essence.
“Sey n 'B ein g exists as an event” ("D a s Seyn west als das
E reign is”) , w rites H e id e g g e r.11
10 M artin H eidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann,

2 0 0 3 ), 3 27; here, translated from the Russian (Ed.).
11 M artin H eidegger, Beitrdge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), op. cit., 256.
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/
The L a s t G od
T h e eschatology o f Being takes H eidegger to the introduction

o f a certain figure, to which, as far as I know, very few people
have paid serious attention. H e outlines his assum ption s about
the L a st God (der letzte Gott).
H eidegger speaks o f him as follows:
T h e L a st G o d
T h e m ost com ing in com ing and which, constitu tin g

itself, occurs as an event.
T h e arrival as the essence o f Being.
A sk Seyn-Being itself! A n d in its silence, G o d will answ er

as the Beginning o f the w ord.
You will be able to encounter all beings, b u t you will

never find the trace o f G o d .
In G erm an it soun ds like this:
D er letzte Gott
D a s Kommendste in Kommen, das austragend sich als

Er-eignis ereignet.
D a s Kommen als Wesen des Seyns.
Frage das Seyn! Und in dessen Stille als der A nfang des
Wortes antwortet Gott.
ISO
v_
Alles Seiende mogt ihr durchstreifen, nirgends zeigt sich die

Spur des G o tte s}2
Frage das Seyn!”— "Address Being, ask Being (Seyn)!”
T h e very stru ctu re o f this text m akes it clear that this is a kin d
o f proph ecy ab o u t the fu n dam en tal-on tological vision, which
is conceived, estab lish ed , and p o stu late d as part o f an entirely
new cycle in the h istory o f philosophy. T h is is a prophecy
ab o u t a un ique event th at m u st occur strictly at the po in t o f
the G reat M id n igh t.
T h e L a st G o d is a unique figure in H eidegger's philosophy. H e

appears through Ereignis, p asses people by, leaving them only
with a nod and a hint (W ink), H e is neither part o f beings, nor
the C reator o f beings, but he m anifests h im self at the m om ent
when Being as Seyn com es to fruition during the one-tim e event.
H eid egger writes,
In the hint's (W ink) Being, Seyn-Being itse lf reaches

m aturity. M atu rity is the w illingness to becom e fruit
and to be given as a gift. T h ere is the last End, which
in its essence (wesentliche) is anticipated from the
B egin n in g and does n ot happen by chance. T h e latter
reveals the p ro fo u n d finality o f Seyn-Being: in the L a st
G o d 's nod.”13 A n d further, "T h e L a st G o d is not the end
b u t another B egin n in g o f im m easurable p ossib ilities for
our fate ( Geschichte).14
T h e L a st G o d is a m ysterious figure. H eidegger carefully

differentiates betw een him and the protagon ists o f all known
12 M artin H eidegger, Geschichte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ), op. cit., 105.

13 M artin H eidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), op. cit., 410.
14 Ibid., 4 1 1 ; here, translated from the R ussian (Ed.)
151
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religions. However, this is noic an em pty individual im age

or a m etaphor. In H eidegger— who rejected both religion
and atheism on the basis o f their total dependence on the
philosophical topography o f the first Beginning, i.e., ontology
and m etaphysics— one can find hints at a very peculiar theory
o f the divine. H e does not discuss this subject directly, but we
can attem pt to reconstruct the course o f his thought leading to
the introduction o f the L a st G o d into his eschatology o f Being.
H eidegger thinks prim arily about the other Beginning, which

m ust proceed according to a different scenario (as com pared to
the first Beginning) and lead to Ereignis. T h e first Beginning,
on the other hand, com prised the transition from the ontic
to philosophical and ontological thought. B ut the ancient
G reeks, who established the first Beginning, believed in gods.
H eidegger is not interested in the structure o f the ancient G reek
religion. H e is interested in the way in which the philosophical
consciousness o f the G reeks, m aking a leap into the abyss,
conceived o f gods and divinity. T h e m ost im portan t aspect
th ereof is that the gods are not Being, but they are not beings
either. In addition, gods are not people; they are com pletely
not hum an. A ccording to H eidegger, these gods, however, need
Seyn-Being to record their divinity. T h ey are not essence or non
essence. T h eir m ain feature is lightness. Furtherm ore, god s are
indifferent to people: they neither save nor punish them . G o d s
walk p a st people, but this happens only when people turn to
their hum anity's Being and sufficiently honor Being as Seyn by
doing so. In that case, people orient them selves tow ard the sacred.
A nd the sacred offers space to the divine, while the divine allows
gods to gather around the hearth o f Seyn-Being. T h e people
responsible for Being m ust, in contrast to other beings, correctly
structure this responsibility and serve Being as a result. T h is
will enable god s to appear. If, however, man substitutes Seyn-
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Being with Sein-Being, m etaphysics, ontology, the will to pow er

an d, ultim ately, M achenschaft, these lightw eight go d s will
easily fly off, leaving no trace behind, d istan cin g them selves.
A fter all, n othing connects them to that which is hum an.
G o d s get away from P lato n ism , theism , deism , atheism , i.e.,
from all that "intentionally im p o ses” preconceived re-pre
sentation onto beings and does not allow Seyn'Being to shine
th rough and illum inate beings so th at the go d s w ould gather
arou n d this glow.
In the first Beginning, the G reeks conceived o f gods through

Being. H eraclitus wrote th a t“efkos is the god o f man,” explaining
to the curious newcom ers that he is getting warm by the fire
because “the god s live there, too.” In struggle, he saw the source
that m akes go d s godly, and h u m an s— hum an. Parm enides was
dedicated to the go d d ess o f justice, D ike. G o d s and god desses
settled, hid, and m anifested them selves around Being, revered
by the first philosophers. T h ey were incredibly im portant for
thought and for m an, com prising a soph isticated and paradoxical
pair at the opposite ends o f beings. G o d s and men were the two
poles o f the m ost com plex, silent, poetic, and thinking dialogue
ab ou t Seyn'Being.
T h o u g h t about B eing as beingS'aS'U'whole, about essence, and

ab ou t the idea scared the go d s away. T h ey had nothing left
there anym ore, because everything was already clear to the
people. T h e god s are obtained only as part o f prayer questions
or cerem onial singing.
H eidegger's L a st G o d is the kind o f G o d that returns as part

o f the developm ent o f another Beginning. H e does not arrive as
a savior. H e p asses by. B ut he leaves a sign, slightly nodding,
which is alm ost an invisible gesture that was also m ade by
153 ♦
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ju d g es in A ntiquity or the Basilei-s, w orking on som e im portant

matter. T h e m ore serious the d ecisio n — the shorter, less
noticeable, and m ore significan t the gesture. For this reason,
the L a st G o d does not arrive, he w alks by. H e gives n oth in g
to the people and changes nothing. H e sim ply ensures the fact
that this tim e the B egin n in g is truly the B eginning, or, m ore
specifically, possibly, the B eginning. T h u s, the ripening Ereignis
receives a sm all, hardly noticeable, and not even a necessary
“certification." T h e event had com e to p a ss. A place for the
L a st G o d to w alk by is being conquered through silence, a
new sacredness, and m en s reverence.
W hen it com es to the L a st G o d , H eidegger uses poetic

language. H e deliberately relies on vague and paradoxical
expressions, expecting that in the realm o f ultim ate penetration
into the possibility o f another Beginning, consciousness is
geared tow ard graspin g the subtlest hints.
T h e L a st G o d is the Beginning o f the longest fate ( Geschichte)

along the shortest path. Lengthy training is essential for the
great m om ent o f his p assin g by. For the p u rp ose o f this training,
peoples and countries are too insignificant; they are inaccessible
for authentic grow th, and are dedicated to M achenschaft.
O nly the great and concealed individuals will prepare silence

for this G o d to w alk by, and create the silent atm osph ere
am on g them selves.”15
The Role o f M a n in A nother Beginning
(N ew H u m an ism )
H eidegger refers to these “great concealed individuals” as “the

future ones” (Kunftige), after Friedrich N ietzsche. In his fam ous
15 Ibid., 414.
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letter to philosopher Jean Beaufret on the subject o f humanism,

H eidegger describes in detail the fundamental-ontological
understanding o f m an.16
T h e content o f this oft-cited text will becom e clearer to us

i f we localize m an s place w ithin the structure o f H eid eg gers
philosophy. H eid egger rejects hum anism , m uch like other
versions o f W estern E uropean philosophy, due to its direct
dependence on m etaphysical topography. H e has zero interest
in this kin d o f hum an ism . In contrast, he is concerned with
m an and the hum an within the structure o f the Beginning
(b o th the first and the other).
M an is the breach in beings through which Being bursts in,

blow ing up beings and man him self. H e is what he is in term s
o f his relationship with Being. O nly this relationship between
m an and Being is his essence. A ll the rest— animality, reason,
spirituality, soulfulness, psychological qualities, sociality, and
ethnicity— is secondary. M an is man only in his essence, in
the fact that he is, which m eans that he is man through the
relationship (Bezug) to Being.
The one who does not think about Being or does not think about it in
the right way, who clogs questions about Being with self-explanatory
babble, who is unable to feel wonder and terror, who does not
experience problems having been “cast” into Being, who does not
create the greatest freedom in noble thinking or quiet sacred labor,
he renounces his humanity and loses it. For this reason, Heidegger's
new humanism is exceptional, in which human dignity is measured
by the level o f participation in the fundamental-ontological act, in
questioning Seyn-Being, in the preparation o f Ereignis, and in an
anticipation o f the L ast G o d to pass by.
16 M artin Heidegger, B rief uber den Humanismus (19 4 6 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:

155
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Heidegger refers to this kind o f m in — the man o f the future— as

the “watchman o f Being” ( Wachter des Seins) or the “shepherd o f
Being (H irt des Seins). M an is intimately connected to Being, but
at the same time, he is independent from it. Being needs man not
in order to be (beings can be non-human, and through them Being
is), but in order to prepare a place for it to glow am idst beings— for
the light o f its truth. M an is that very place. I f the place is proper
and sacred, then it is suitable for sacred acts, blessings, and for the
unconcealment (truth) o f Being. I f it is not, then man and mankind
turn into the garbage dump o f the world (as is the case at the end
o f Modernity, that is, today).
M an worthy o f being one is the kind o f man that is the alternative

to what we understand by using this term today— the one who
remains under the yoke o f ontology and its nihilistic deritivates.
Nietzsches “L ast M an” (comprising the majority) and his
Superm an (expressing the greatest will to power and domination)
remain within the framework o f the old humanism. Heidegger
crosses them out with fatigue and sadness. These have no entry
into the“future.” M an is only the bearer o f questioning about Being,
its truth, its remoteness, and the possibility o f its return through
the event and the L ast G od. The one who does not bear all this is
not man. In the very least, he crosses the boundaries o f Heidegger's
hum anism — the humanism of another Beginning.
M an is defined by his relationship with Being. The notion that

man possesses Being as something permanent and guaranteed, and
correlates to Being in general through his Being as that o f a man, is
a delusion on the part o f metaphysics, which should be completely
rejected in the other Beginning. Heidegger writes, “Seyn'Being for
man is based on chance (Zu-Fall); the fact that man comes to fruition
in Seyn-Being does not depend on him, nor does it mean that Seyn-
Being has any responsibilities with respect to man, as if it needed
156
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h im .17 A nd a bit earlier on, Seyn'Being does not exist for man, but
man exists for Seyn'Being, at best; for Seyn-Being in the sense that
man would have earned for him self his own essence in this way."18
T h e fact that m an is not merely a kind o f beings, but the place

where Beings encroachment occurs, is incorporated in his capacity
for speech. Speech is not merely one o f man's attributes. It is not
by accident that the latter is called "Ccpov Xdyov sxov" (zoon logon
echon), i.e., an “anim al endow ed with speech.” Speech per se is
not man's attribute, but rather an attribute o f Being. Being exists
through speech. Speech is that through which Being is in the
capacity o f Being. Therefore, in the context o f new hum anism
m an m ust speak differently. H e m ust address w ords and realize
w hat they tell him . A n d then, he m ust begin to think and talk
w ith the help o f that which he realized. W e m ust preemptively
un dertake the “destruction" o f the old language based on the
rules o f gram m ar and logic, i.e., the rules o f m etaphysical
thought o f the first Beginning, so that this new kind o f speech
could be born. T h e latter is the speech o f another Beginning,
the speech o f the future (Kunftige).
T h e new hum anism p resu p p o ses new speech, because the fate
o f Being and the greatest m om ent o f Seynsgeschichte lie in
speech and language.
The new man o f another Beginning will speak in new ways, in a

new language, stating new thoughts and things. Everything he says
will be be linked directly with the nature o f Being, i.e., with the way
in which Being exists in its spotlight. This will be fundam ental'
ontological speech about the anthropology o f Ereignis. Only this
kind o f speech could express the sacred silence, in which it becomes
possible for the L ast G o d to walk by.
17 M artin H eidegger, Uber den Anfang, op. cit., 127.

18 Ibid., 127.
157
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VIII. SEYN SG ESCH ICH TE AND
PO LITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF
TH E 20TH CENTURY
The Fundam ental'O ntological M ethod

and Its A pplication A rea
Follow ing our general excursion into the structure of

H e id e g g e rs thought, it is not difficult to grasp that in term s
o f W estern m etaphysics, he is interested only in its m ost
prin cipal asp ects. T h e se aspects focused on the relationship
o f th is m etaphysics to Being (Sein) as heings-as-a-whole or
heings o f the second order, and, consequently, the progressive
distan cin g from Seyn-Being, which p resu p p o sed — at a certain
stag e — the oblivion o f the ontological set o f problem s as such
(Seinsvergessenheit) . For this reason, the technical questions o f
this m etaph y sics— theology, gnoseology, hum anism , axiology,
epistem ology, ph ilosoph y o f science, philology, ethics, and
especially political p h ilo so p h y— did not have any independent
significance for H eidegger, being individual cases o f using the
basic principles o f this m etaphysics.
H owever, at all those tim es when H eidegger had to make

a ju d g m e n t on these particular issues, he was forced to take
them back to their m etaphysical roots. In som e cases, he had to
sketch out the poten tial direction in which respective schools o f
thought and culture should be interpreted in the fundam ental-
ontological way. T h is m eans that Heidegger, together with
criticism o f specific aspects o f W estern European m etaphysics,
159
7
also sketched out ways o f a radically new interpretation o f these

subjects in another Beginning.
T h is dual operation— tracing a particular subject under

consideration to the general context o f W estern European
ontology and the attem pt at its alternative interpretation from
the perspective of fu n dam en tal'o n to lo gy— com prises the
m ain course o f action in the transition to another Beginning;
consequently, it is the principal m ethodological tool in
H eidegger's philosophy. In its initial gesture, this m ethodology
is a “phen’om enological destruction,”1 which H eidegger did
not conceive in the negative sense o f the term "destruction.”
Instead, he un derstood the term as “de-structuring” and
“d e'co n 'stru ctio n ” in the opposite direction o f that which was
“con'Structed" artificially, as a way o f returning the term to its
original context within the structure o f m etaphysics. Later, in
French structuralism , H eidegger’s operation o f “destruction”
was renam ed “deconstruction” by Jacq u es D errida.
The second gesture of H eidegger's “phenom enological

destruction” is m ore com plex, since it is focu sed on correlating
the question o f Seyn-Being traced back to its m etaphysical
context, i.e., placing it back into the Beginning (either the first
Beginning or the new one). T h is m eans rem oving the given
question from the context o f W estern European philosophy and
including it in a radically new fun dam ental-ontological context.
It does not appear as som ething readily available, but as that
which is being created, com posed in the process o f correlating
the given thing, question, object, or phenom enon directly with
Seyn-Being. I f the new fun dam ental-ontological context were
already known and given, then this operation w ould only
constitute a technical problem . B ut it is not given. It is only
1 M artin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1 9 2 7 ) (Tubingen: M ax N iem eyer Verlag,

2006), 1 9 - 2 7 .
160
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asked as the horizon o f the possible, but not an assured new

Beginning. T h is Beginning m ay com m ence and, having begun,
it will im plem ent a total revision o f concepts, words, topics,
areas o f science, disciplines, things, and thoughts. However,
i f we capture the essence o f H eidegger's m ethod2, we will be
able to carry out this operation on our own and, in particular,
correctly decipher and even extend H eidegger's own indirect
hints regarding certain issues that he touched upon only briefly.
T h u s, we can sketch an im age o f H eidegger's relationship

to contem porary political ideologies, in which he was never
in terested per se. H ow ever, the seynsgeschichtliche approach to
this subject area will clarify m any things in the history o f the
M o d ern w orld and will provide us with the m ost im portan t
clues to deciphering the real h istory o f the 20th century.
A m erican ism and the Planetary Idiocy o f Liberals
T h e 20th century experienced three m ajor political ideologies:

Liberalism , C om m u n ism , and Fascism . In one way or another,
H eidegger spoke about each one o f them. These assessm ents were
segm ented and unsystem atic (H eidegger was never interested in
the sphere o f ideology as a subject m atter o f any significance),
but are still worthwhile on their own.
A ccording to H eidegger, all ideologies (and it follows

naturally from the preceding discussion), contain the essence
o f contem porary nihilism . T h ey express one thing only: the
trium ph o f rsxvrf ("techne”), the "oblivion o f Being,""prem editated
self-im position," the "will to power," and M achenschaft A ll three
2 T he w ord "m ethod" com es from the G reek "ftedoSog’ (methodos), where
“fiExd’ m eans “through," "on," and “after," whereas "oSog" translates as a “path"
an d “road", and originally m eant the “placement o f road signs" "Wegmarken”
in G erm an.
161 ♦
/
political ideologies are the greatest expression o f total nihilism ;

these are the ideologies o f the night, in which W estern thought
has reached its low est point. T h ey are not sim ply the essence o f
“false consciousness" according to M arx's definition o f ideology.
T h ey express the falsity o f consciousness as an ontological
and m etaphysical kind o f consciousness. M oreover, these
ideologies operate with m etaphysics in its M odern edition, and,
consequently, they place the m ost prim itive and poor idols o f
the “subject-object" pairs in the place o f the essence o f beings,
Being as a whole, the ideas, or G o d .
L ib e ra lism eq u ates the C a rte sia n su b je c t w ith the in d iv id u al

and p ra g m a tic c alc u la tio n s in the area o f c o u n tab le tan g ib le
and in ta n g ib le o b je c ts (m ain ly p r o d u c ts) ge n e rated by its
ratio. H e id e g g e r calls th is “A m e rican ism ," w hich re p re se n ts
the u ltim ate e x p ressio n o f c a p ita lism . T h e re e x ists n o th in g
m ore vile an d tre ach e ro u s th an th is d e g e n e ratio n of
p h ilo so p h y , b ecau se here n ih ilism reach es such a level o f
in te n sity th at it no lon ger re co g n iz e s it s e lf as n ih ilism . A t
som e p o in t, the n igh t b eco m es so fa m ilia r th a t it no longer
id e n tifie s it s e lf as n igh t.
C alculating reason at the basis o f Liberalism and its values are

the last stage o f degeneration o f W estern E uropean ontology.
It is im possible to go any lower. W e m ust look for the roots
o f Liberalism as a fatal and deadly pandem ic in Europe, but
it is in the U .S. that this political phenom enon has acquired
its ultim ate form . Being com pletely insignificant from a
philosophical standpoint, it continues to expand on a global
scale, creating the phenom enon o f the “giant," becom ing more
and m ore “vast,” while its m eaning and significance shrink to a
m icroscopic size. T h e global rise o f Liberalism is equivalent to
the spread o f total imbecility.
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H e id eg ge r refers to this phenom enon as “plan etarism ” (today

we talk ab ou t glo b alism ” and “m on dialism ”); he equates
it w ith global idiocy. In essence, this is none other than
desertificatio n , which Friedrich N ietzsch e described: “ T h e
d e sert grow s, and woe to him who conceals the desert within,”3
H e id e g g e r w rites, T h e g r e a te st d ev elo p m en t in the essen ce

o f p o w e r (p o w e r in the N ie tz sc h e a n sense, M ach t) d oes not
a p p e a r via the p re v io u sly kn ow n form o f d e se rtific a tio n
an d the lo ss o f ro o ts b u t in the n orm o f d ire ct o p p o sitio n
to th is k in d o f d e se rtific a tio n an d u p ro o tin g . H isto ric a lly
re co rd e d sig n s o f fu lly re a liz in g the very essen ce o f pow er
are e m b o d ie d in tw o sp ec ific p h e n o m e n a — "p la n e ta rism ”
(“globalism ”) and “idiocy,” “P lanetarism ” (“globalism ”) m arks the
sp re a d o f the e ssen ce o f p o w er ( M achtw esen) th ro u g h o u t
the en tire w o rld , th o u g h n o t as a re su lt o f a co n q u est,
b u t rath e r as the b e g in n in g o f a sp ecial k in d o f p lan etary
d o m in a tio n . “ Id io c y ” ( iS io g ) 4 tra n sla te s in to the triu m p h
o f e g o tism over everyth in g, thereby e x p ressin g the m o st
e x trem e fo rm o f su b jectivity ,"5
R ead in g these lines, one m ight think that they were written
today, not in 1938,
M an o f the global world, a Liberal, accepting and recognizing

the norm ativity o f the “A m erican way o f life,” is the kind o f
person who is a patented idiot from the philosophical and
3 See Friedrich N ietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, tr. Alexander T ille (N ew

York: M acm illan, 1896), 447.
4 “ rIdioq” (idios) in G reek m eans "private (individual)," "applies only to this
individual and no one else.” In ancient Greece, “idiots" were the kind o f
people who did not represent anyone but themselves, neither the polls, nor
the procession, neither class, nor clan.
^ M artin H eidegger, Geschichte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ), op. cit., 74.
163
etym ological poin t o f view, a ..-documented idiot, an idiot

parading his foolishness above his head like a banner.
L iberalism em bodies the m etaphysics o f M odern ity in its driest

and m ost prim itive but, at the sam e time, purest form . O ne could
treat M odern ity and its philosophy in various ways even being
closely and consciously tied to it. O ne could try to construct
a critical theory in an attem pt to overcome this inherent
alienation (as per M arxism ). O ne could endeavor to go deep
into the roots o f the problem , courageously accepting the real
status quo in the face o f nihilism (i.e., G erm an philosophy at its
peak — from G . W. F. H egel and his "negativity” to N ietzsch e).
O r it is possible to express the core o f this m etaphysics with
the least am ount o f m ental strain, surrendering to the elem ent
o f alienation, expressing naive solidarity with it, telling it a
deliberate and subm issive "yes,” and not even caring m uch as to
what this “yes” represents. It is the latter option that is Anglo-
Saxon Liberalism and A m ericanism . It is this factor that is
the m ost terrible and fatal. It represents the utlim ate choice in
favor o f abandoning the other Beginning— and such a degree o f
Beings oblivion— that the very fact o f oblivion is forgotten. T h is
is nihilism in its greatest expression, when the very awareness
o f nihilism as such becom es im possible.
T h e global pow er o f idiots does not sim ply em body the

abuse and exploitation o f one people by another. T h is is pure
nihilistic violence, the victim s o f which are everyone: both
those who carry it out, and those who subm it to it. N arcissistic
planetary idiots stan d closer to Nothingness not when they lose
som ething or are subjected to violence but rather when they
exist in com fort, security, and under the illusion o f com plete
subjective freedom . In this case, the pow er o f M achenschaft over
them is absolute, and their dehum anization reaches its lim its.
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A n idiot o f the global m arket society is no longer man, having

fallen into a Nothingness that he does not even notice.
T he M etaphysics o f Com m unism : M achenschaft
A ccording to H eidegger, things are more com plex with

M arxism . U nlike Liberalism , M arxism p o ssesses serious
philosoph ical energy draw n from classical G erm an philosophy
(H egelian ism ) and focused on the problem o f alienation. It was
this particular aspect o f M arxism , according to Heidegger, that
m ade it so attractive and successful.
U ncovering the problem o f alienation contains the core o f the

entire process o f W estern European history ( Geschichte). It is
this history that is the history o f alienation. A cknow ledging and
focu sin g on this is the appeal to the truth of Seynsgeschichte. In
this respect, M arxism is the philosophical challenge that m ust
be taken seriously. Interpreting history as the accum ulation
o f alienation's qualitative properties, M arx hits the target and
touches upon the essence o f truth. I f we are to think from
this poin t onward, then any consideration on the part o f the
thinker gains significance. Seynsgeschichte o f the first Beginning
until the End is the process o f alienating thought from Seyn-
Being and the oblivion o f Being (Seinsvergessenheit). T h is is
w hat determ ines the logic and structure o f all cultural, social,
political, ideological, and econom ic processes. M arxism puts
this at the center o f its attention and, consequently, conquers
its rightful place in the history o f thought.
B u t here lim itations from H egel’s own philosophy becom e

relevant. H egel rightly views history as the history of
ph ilosoph y and, m ore im portant, as the history o f ideas. B u t he
rem ains com pletely w ithin the fram ew ork o f the first Beginning
165
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and classical ontology and cannot arrive at the the correct

form ulation o f the question about Seyn'Being ( G rundfrage)
precisely because o f these reasons. H egel thinks w ithin the
element o f tsxvtj via philosophical concepts relying on Plato's
understanding o f ideas as the essence of beings. H e rem ains
within the fram ew ork o f W estern E uropean m etaph ysics—
although nearing its end— in scope, penetration, and totality o f
his thought, sum m ing up its m ain points in his teaching.
M arx in h erits this feature from H egel and stays loyal to the
m etaph ysical to p o grap h y o f M o d e rn ity : he th in ks in term s o f
the su b ject (society, class) and o b ject (m atter, p ro d u ct, th in g),
tim e (as an objective p h en o m en o n ), etc. M a rx ism su gg ests
to overcom e the prob lem o f alie n a tio n — M ach ensch aft— by
the m eans o f M achenschaft itself. H e c o n trasts b o u rg eo is
ideology (th e false c o n scio u sn e ss of one class) w ith
p ro letarian ideology (th e false co n sc io u sn e ss o f an o th er
class). T h e stru ggle is taken into the realm o f m an u factu rin g
and p ro d u ctio n . T h o u g h t in term s o f the su b ject (th is tim e,
the su b ject is collective, rep resen ted by society) is fully
p reserved . T h is p ath starts w ith ackn ow ledgin g alien ation ,
but can only lead to fu rth er alien atio n .
H eidegger fully records this in the case o f Soviet R u ssia, in

which the structure o f M arx ist philosophy is im plem ented
in socio-econom ic and political practice. In d u strialization ,
technological developm ent, to talitarian m obilization o f the
Soviet com m un ist society, the struggle for political pow er
and geopolitical do m in atio n — all these are clear signs
that C o m m u n ism does not overcom e W estern E u ropean
m etaphysics but is the final (an d brightest) expression o f
its fate ( Geschichte). A t the sam e tim e, C om m u n ism is m ore
loyal to the essence o f M achenschaft as com pared to all other
166
\
political ideologies. C o m m u n ism is M achenschaft in its pure

form and is thus the fate o f W estern E uropean philosophy
and a highly eschatological phenom enon. C om m u n ism is the
u ltim ate expression o f m etaphysics which establishes total
d om in ion o f the essence o f beings over beings. A nd if it is the
idea that expresses this in the Beginning, then in the E n d it
is power, m ight, and M achenschaft in its greatest and m ost
obvious form . M achenschaft is the total dom inion over beings
by th at which is conceived as their essence, which in term s o f
M od ern m etaphysics can be described as th e “objectness o f the
objective” or the “m ateriality o f the material." C om m u n ism is
not the pow er o f som e over others regardless o f which class they
b elong to. R ather, it is the pow er o f pow er over everything. T h is
is the high est form o f d isem b od ied pow er on the part o f pure
objectn ess. T h is is why H eidegger writes that “nothing hum an
rem ains in C om m u n ism .”6 “ T h e essence o f C o m m u n ism is
pure legitim ation (Erm achtigung) o f pow er (M acht) within
ab solu te M achenchaft and through this absoluteness.”7
C o m m u n ism is pure m etaphysics o f M odern ity in the

form o f its E n d . B u t it can only be recognized in the form
o f m etap h y sics w ithin the optics o f fundam entaLontology,
which captures the seynsgeschichtliche significance of
th is phenom enon, correctly decodes it, com prehends its
n on ran d om n ess, p redeterm in ation , fatefulness, and fatality.
A n d , only having recogn ized Being s own voice under this
u tter oblivion o f Being, it announces its true attitu de tow ard
the in com pleten ess o f th ough t ab ou t Being, pu sh in g o ff beings,
th rou gh ruth less and to tal d om in ion o f M achenschaft over
beings. A cco rd in g to H eidegger, it is only p o ssib le to overcome
and defeat C o m m u n ism upon u n derstan din g it.
6 Ibid. ,195.
7 Ibid., 191.
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M A R T IN H E ID E G G E R : The Philosophy o f Another Beginning
"Americanism" (Liberalism , “planetary idiocy") and C om m unism

(Soviet Bolshevism ) are the opponen ts o f fu n dam en tal-
ontological transition into another Beginning, both being the
two extreme expressions o f W estern European m etaphysics
and two versions o f Machenschaft, em bodying the final stages
o f nihilism and the spirit o f the End itself, i.e., being expected,
ju stified, and fateful form s. T h ey em body a different decision—
the decision to remain loyal to W estern European m etaphysics
not only until the End, but also afterw ard, when the E n d as such
had been fixed, recognized, and correctly interpreted by the
G erm an (O ld European, not A m erican or Soviet) philosophy
o f M odernity in its last version. Therefore, only the return o f
the End's phenom ena to their end, i.e., the final destruction
o f L iberalism and C om m unism , will be the m anifestation o f
m ankind authentically taking the leap into another Beginning
and the dawn o f Beings return.
A t the sam e time, H eidegger is convinced that the victory over

Liberalism and Bolshevism by using purely technical means
is im possible, since we are dealing with m etaphysical and
ontological phenom ena that have to be conquered in the space
o f m etaphysics and ontology. Therefore, when it comes to their
destruction, the main objective is to bring them back to their
hidden nature, to their ontological roots, thereby releasing their
true nihilistic meaning. In this respect, H eidegger utters a phrase
about the political fate o f the 20th century that has become truly
prophetic, "The danger is not in'Bolshevism ,' but in ourselves’’8
The Political Ideology o f the T h ird Way
N ow we arrive at H e id eg ge r’s p olitical p o sitio n . He

con ceptualized his place in the h isto ry o f thought, as well
® Ibid., 120.
168
\
as in Seynsgeschichte, as som eth in g directly asso ciated with

G erm any, H e conceived o f his ethnic and cultural roots
m etaphysically in the context o f belonging to the G erm an
p h ilo so p h ical and poetic tradition . T h e very fa c t o f thinking
in G erm an w as highly sign ifican t to him . A fter all, in his
opin ion , language is the house o f Being. T h u s, the nature o f
th is h o u se — G erm an , G reek, L atin , English, French, R ussian,
S em itic, and so o n — largely depen ds on the nature o f m an s
relatio n sh ip to Being. G erm an ph ilosoph y is the G erm an path
to Seyn'Being, which H eid egger often em ph asized in respect
to b o th G erm an ph ilosop h y (repeatin g H e g e ls w ords that
“a great people sh ould have a great ph ilosoph y”), G erm an
culture, and p o etry (he con sidered H olderlin ’s poetry its
greatest exp ressio n ),
G erm an philosophy is linked to the fate of Seyn-Being no less

than was that o f the G reeks. It all began with the Greeks and
ends with the G erm ans. Therefore, according to Heidegger,
H egel and N ietzsche are the last philosophers, who recognized
the End o f philosophy earlier, better, and clearer than others.
T hose who have recognized the End have also opened the path
to another Beginning. This is the reason why the last ones— the
G erm an s— are so in tune with the first ones (the ancient Greeks
and especially the pre-Socratics). The m ission to start philosophy
anew belongs to the G erm an s— H eidegger and other "future
ones,” For this reason, H eidegger reduces the fate o f the W est
and Europe as a whole to the fate o f Germany, This is the source
o f H eidegger's fundam ental'ontological patriotism ; the kind o f
patriotism that rejects nationalism , collective egotism, and other
form s o f superiority based on the metaphysical understanding
o f subjectness. In G erm any and G erm ans, H eidegger sees Seyn-
Being, the language o f thought and poetry, a people com prised o f
those “singular” and rare ones who are capable o f inquiring about
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the truth o f Seyn-Being, Heidegger-s patriotism is the patriotism o f

the “basic question o f philosophy” the patriotism o f Grundfrage.
Being Germ an, it is equally European, W estern. This is also the
patriotism o f all m ankind having set upon the evening path and
reached the point o f midnight.
In term s o f specific political geograph y du rin g H e id e g g e rs

lifetim e, G erm any (E u ro p e) w as the center o f ph ilosoph ical
thought, clinched by proverbial pincers on two sides by the
derivative form s o f W estern E u rop ean m etaph ysics: from
the W est dame “A m ericanism ” and, broadly speaking, A nglo-
Saxon L ib eralism (“plan etary idiocy ”), w hereas Sov iet
Bolshevism , M arxism , M achenschaft in the m o st blunt and
to talitarian form cam e from the E a st. M etaphysically, they
both correspon ded to the kind o f th ough t that ignored
(L ib eralism ) or m isin terpreted (C o m m u n ism ) the E n d , which
G erm an ph ilosop h y had discovered and had chosen to extend
that which had already concluded after this E n d . E u ro pe
ended up under the double blow o f the final incarn ation o f
the first B eginn ing in its ultim ate fo rm — that o f totalitarian
and planetary dom in ation o f rsxvrj.
For H eidegger, Europe (and G erm any as its philosophical

eschatological equivalent) em bodied the possibility o f transition
to another Beginning. Europe w as the place o f writing, publishing,
and reading Sein und Zeit. T h u s, H eidegger consciously ended
up in the cam p o f those forces in Europe that considered its
identity at a profound level in an attem pt to penetrate its
Seynsgeschichte, desired follow its philosophical fate until the
End, and at the E n d and on the other side o f the E n d — into
another Beginning. Furtherm ore, these forces, by definition, had
to be im m ersed in the spirit o f G erm an culture and philosophy,
or, in the very least, had to recognize the significance and
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content o f this spirit. A n d finally, these forces ended up in the

p o sitio n o f a radical confrontation with Am erican (A nglo-
S ax o n ) Liberalism and Soviet Bolshevism , not for political
b u t for m etaphysical reasons. Prior to transitioning to the
po ssibility o f preparing another Beginning, it was necessary
to do away with that which persisted in ignoring the fact that
the E n d has come to fruition even after this has come to be.
H eid egger not only logically ended up am ong these forces,
b u t in a certain sense, w as their philosophical pole, center, and
core in the fundam ental-ontological and philosophical sense.
H eidegger's thought is w hat constituted them.
Ju d g in g by its form al qualities, the political ideology o f the

T h ird W ay was consistent with this m etaphysical position to a
certain extent. T h ey were oriented tow ard patriotism , were pro-
E uropean, anti-liberal, and anti-com m unist. T h ey addressed
the roots and sources that went deeper than M odernity and
laid claim s to the revival o f E uropean heritage. T hey raised the
philosophy o f H egel and N ietzsch e into the category o f the
greatest achievem ents in thought. T h e lack o f strict dogm atism
or a system allow ed them to offer a variety o f epistem ological and
p h ilosoph ical m odels and hypotheses within the fram ew ork o f
these m ovem ents. T h e eschatological sense o f a critical turning
p o in t in w orld h istory— from the lived experience o f the First
W orld War, brutal realization o f an offensive by techne on a
global scale, acutely suspecting the proxim ity o f the Decline of
the West (O sw ald S p en g ler)— com pleted the picture.
M o st fully, these trends have been presented in the ideological

m ovem ent o f the "C onservative Revolution,"9 which included
such thinkers as O sw ald Spengler, C arl Schm itt, O th m ar Spann,
T h o m as M ann, Friedrich and E rn st Jiinger, A rthur M oeller van
9 A rm in M oh ler, D ie konservative Revolution in D eutschland, 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 2

(S tu ttg a r t: F ried rich V orw erk V erlag, 1 9 5 0 ).
171
/
den Bruck, H einrich von Gleichen, E rn st Salom on, Friedrich

H ielscher, E rn st N iekisch, Ludw ig K lages, and hundreds o f
other prom inent G erm an intellectuals, thinkers, poets, and
artists. H eidegger was, by all accounts, system ic connections
and contacts, thought pow er lines and political sym pathies,
an integral part o f this m ovem ent. H e was a “conservative
revolutionary” in the sense that, as he u n derstood it, m an was
called upon to be the “guardian o f Being” (in this sense, the “one
who conserves” Seyn'Being), and at the sam e tim e— to take a
risky leap into another Beginning (the “Revolutionary” m om ent,
the orientation tow ard the future).
In a certain sense, the Conservative Revolution in G erm any and

its counterparts in other European countries, notably in Italy,
Spain, etc., were that very ideological environment in which
Fascism and N ational Socialism — Third-W ay ideologies—
sprung up. A t the same time, we can argue that the main object
o f criticism from the leaders o f the Conservative Revolution was
the spirit o f M odernity and its m ost striking m anifestations:
individualism and rationalism , utilitarianism , dogm atism ,
materialism, subjectivism — in other words, nihilism and
Machenschaft. The political ideology o f N ation al Socialism and
Fascism, partly based on the ideas o f the Conservative Revolution
(anti-Liberalism , anti-Com m unism , anti-utilitarianism , etc.) to a
great extent also contained the features o f that sam e M odernity
that the Conservative Revolution criticized. W hence came its
political pragm atism (all the way through to opportunism ),
absorption by practice and techne, the industrialization and
m ilitarization o f econom ics, subjectivism (o f nation and race),
intellectual stagnation, prim itive racial dogm atics, and m any
other traits that are typical o f the m etaphysics o f M odernity.
T h e bearers o f the spirit o f the C onservative Revolution saw
their greatest enem ies in Liberalism and C om m u n ism (the U .S .
172
V _
an d U S S R ) . T h u s, no form o f any, even relative, solidarity with

them w as possible. Yet the ideologies o f the T h ird W ay— in
the form that they em bodied in G erm an and Italian political
regim es in 1 9 3 0 -1 9 4 0 s— were not acceptable to them either.
A fter all, they p o ssessed the principles and theses with which
the essence o f the C onservative Revolution was at war.
T h e m ost astute representatives o f the Conservative Revolution,

such as E rn st N iekisch , as early as the early 1930s, saw that the
rise to pow er o f A d o lf H itler's Party w ould result in a fatal
d isaster for G erm an y— not from the standpoint o f Liberals
and C o m m u n ists (this w as o f secondary im portance) but from
the perspective o f those ideas and principles that N ation al
S o cialism allegedly sought to defend. T h a t is exactly why
N iekisch's book w as called H itler-G erm an y’s Doom (H itler Ein
deutsches Verhangnis).10 Follow ing N iekisch, and sharing his
fears, m any went into the an ti-H itler underground. T h e rest
ended up in "internal em igration”. Ern st Jiinger found h im self
in a sim ilar situ atio n — as one o f those thinkers who form ulated
the m ain ideas o f the "Conservative Revolution” more fully and
vividly, while rem aining overboard from the N azi Party, refusing
to com prom ise with vulgarity, populism , and unprincipled
p ragm atism o f H itler's Party,
W e can fully consider H eidegger one o f the Conservative

R evolutionaries who rem ained in "internal emigration,” in
which he ended up soon after agreeing to becom e the rector
o f the Freiburg U niversity and jo in in g the N atio n al S ocialist
W orkers Party for pragm atic reasons. H is rectorship lasted
only nine m onths, and soon his ideas were being aggressively
attacked by the officials o f H itler's regime. B ut despite public
10 E rn st N ie k isc h , H itler— Ein deutsches Verhangnis (B erlin :

W id e rstan d sv erlag , 1 9 3 2 ).
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criticism o f many fundam ental' poin ts in N azi ideology in

his speeches from the 1930s up to 1945, H eidegger did not
absolve h im self o f the responsibility for the decision he made,
continued to wear the Party badge, and shared the fate o f his
people and the political regime that this people had chosen.
A ll the dram a and the depth o f the p a ra d o x in the relatio n sh ip

o f the C o n serv ativ e R evolu tion w ith N a tio n a l S o c ia lism is
exp ressed in H e id eg g e r’s w ords u ttered at the b egin n in g o f
the S eco n d W orld War, w hen the co llision w ith B o lsh ev ism
becam e inevitable: “ T h e dan ger is not in “ B o lsh evism ,” b u t
in ourselves.” 11 T h is m ean t that, in the eyes o f H eid egger,
the im p en d in g war w ith the S o v ie t U n ion w as n ot m erely a
m ilitary con flict betw een tw o p ow ers over vital in tere sts or
access to n atural resources, not m erely a g ran d io se turn in the
battle for global power, b u t a clash betw een tw o b egin n in gs,
in which the “silent force o f p o ssib ility ”— the p o ssib ility o f
another B e g in n in g— had to cou n ter M a rx ist m etaph y sics
(M achenschaft). B u t w hile G erm an y and N a tio n a l S o c ia lism
had not recogn ized the fu n d am en tal-o n to lo g ical sign ifican ce
o f their own h isto ric (seynsgeschichtliche) m ission , w hile
they them selves were not free fro m the m ass character,
ratio n alism , rsxvrj, old E u ro p ean m etap h y sics, from the sam e
M achenschaft as the C o m m u n ists, th is b attle cou ld n ot be
won, as it w as n ot the kin d o f b attle th at it sh o u ld have been.
T h e discrepancy between the C onservative Revolution and

the political m ovem ents o f the T h ird W ay em bodied the
core in the political history o f the 20th century if we were to
view it from the H eideggerian perspective. O ffering hope to
raise the kin ds o f questions considered by the thinkers o f the
C onservative Revolution (o f Being, the m eaning o f authentic
11 M artin Heidegger, Gescbicbte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ), op. cit„ 120.
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history, the spiritual place o f E urope and the W est in the global
cycle o f m etaphysics, etc.), N atio n al Socialism was profoundly
and fundam entally inadequate. In it, it seem ed to Heidegger,
em erged the possibility o f transform ation, the ability to raise
the question about Seyn-Being, the possibility o f another
Beginning, but this possibility not only rem ained unrealized, but
w as not even established as a possibility, proving to be illusory
and deceptive.
Follow ing the war, philosophers and intellectuals wondered

how H eidegger could have been so w rong in term s o f his
political choices. They, however, did not account for the fact that
the political ideologies that trium phed in the war (Liberalism
and C om m u n ism ) had always been repulsive and alien to
him , because they em bodied w hat H eidegger wanted to bury,
overcome, and close as the final stage o f history ( Geschichte).
In turn, the history and the unsurprising end o f N ation al
S o cialism only confirm ed that this political regime was about
su b stitu tion and parody (about prem ature and distorted
sim ulation o f another Beginning, the im itation o f Ereignis,
etc.). P rofou n d questions about Being had been replaced with
technical questions o f power, control, dom ination, subjugation,
enslavem ent, and conquest, i.e., things and values that directly
em b odied W estern nihilism . H eidegger always considered it
his task to oppose the latter.
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IX. “NO T YET"
The M etaphysics o f D elay
C larify in g the relation sh ip betw een H eid eg ger’s ph ilosoph y

an d the p o litical ideologies o f the T h ird W ay brings us to a
very delicate issue, which cou ld be called th ^'problem o f d elay "
G erm an philosophy recognized the E n d o f W estern European

m etaphysics. Friedrich N ietzsch e form ally established it, and
H eid egger interpreted it. T h e seynsgeschichtliche localization
o f the “G reat M idnight" was theoretically carried out. B ut does
this really m ean that it had been reached? T h is question, which
already contains uncertainty and fluctuation, largely explains
the paradoxes o f the links betw een the C onservative Revolution
and the history o f the T h ird Reich. I f the E n d had com e and was
in terpreted as such, then the transition to another Beginning and,
in fact, Ereignis could and sh ould have com e to fruition within
the fram ew ork o f the seynsgeschichtliche history o f G erm any
as the center o f European thought. Friedrich H olderlin’s
prophetic visions and H egel's philosophical predictions about
a “philosopher-people” should have reached their culm ination
resulting in som ethin g great and unprecedented.
A t one poin t it seem ed that it w as “about to happen," and w hat

w as happening was, indeed, th at very other Beginning. However,
in reality, it turn ed out that the possibility was ephemeral,
which m eans that the poin t o f M id n igh t had not been reached
yet again. “Alw ays th is'n o t yet," as H eidegger states in the m ost
crucial text, “W h at A re Poets For?”1
1 M artin H eidegger, “W h at A re Poets For?” in Poetry, Language, Thought
(N ew York, H arp er Perennial, 2 0 0 3 ), 87-140.
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T h e fate o f N a zi G erm any and H eidegger's w itness to it, as well

as his personal fate and the fate o f his philosophy unequivocally
dem onstrate that this tim e around it w as still the “not yet,''
and that the occasional flashes o f light were m istaken for the
first distant rays o f dawn. A nd because o f them, darkness
got all the more dark. For this reason, H eidegger's postw ar
texts are full o f courageous despair. T h at which should have
happened in the only place where it could have h appen ed—
did not happen. O nce again, "h as not happened yet.” T h e two
ideologies with blunt ontological nihilism at their core—
Liberalism ' and C o m m u n ism — trium phed not only m ilitarily
but also philosophically. T h e latter's significance is all the more
pow erful since it was achieved not only from w ithout but also
from within, because the political ideologies o f the T h ird W ay
failed to follow the path o f another Beginning. Consequently,
they lost even prior to the decisive m ilitary battle. A nd so did
G erm any— split into two parts. S o had Europe, being half-
U S S R and half-U .S., as the two form s o f a single evil, infinite
in its w orthlessness.
At som e point, one could detect the sound o f despair in

H eidegger's voice: techne as the fate o f the W est has entered
into the totality o f its rights; nuclear w eapons are ready to
destroy the entire earth— already steeped in n ih ilism — and
turn it into Nothingness. N o one rem em bers that the N igh t
approaches because the m em ory o f the light (even that o f the
twilight and the evening) has been com pletely erased. M an, in
his "inauthenticity,” has forgotten ab ou t Being to such an extent
that he no longer understands what that m eans.
In an interview with D er Spiegel, p u b lish ed after his death,

H eidegger states, "O nly a G o d can save us.”2 T h is phrase is quite
2 “Spiegel-G esprach mit M artin H eidegger am 23. Septem ber 1966,” D er
Spiegel, 3 0 . Jg . N 23. 31 (M ai 1976).
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telling for a thinker who has always insisted that the purpose
o f the L a st G o d is not to save anyone: the latter simply arrives
and p asses by, noddin g to those whose vocation it is to “guard
Being. Now, the arrival o f the L a st G o d is no longer an option.
T h e very possibility o f “the future ones” (Kunftige) to become
such has been shut down by the totalitarian planetary pow er
o f the p a st— not the one that was, but the one that passed, is
passing, and will p ass at the very m om ent when it com es. T h is
m eans that there is no one to sing paeans to the arriving G o d .
Ultim ately, there is no one left to save.
S o where does this “not yet” come from? The answer to this
question is tantam ount to unravelling the secret seynsgeschichtliche
rationale for the external and internal defeat o f the Third Way as
well as the logic o f M artin H eidegger’s fate.
T h is “not yet" coupled with expecting Ereignis to arrive soon,

sen sin g the breath o f another Beginning nearby, announcing
one’s course tow ard fu n d am en tal-on to logy— w hat are these?
A n im precisely determ ined m om ent in tim e and place? A
m istak e in calculations, anticipation, localization, or is it
som eth in g else altogether?
M a n o f the Beginning
T h e way H eidegger poses the question about this “not yet”

leaves the im pression that something else is at play. But what?
W e can only guess. It may be that man in his classic status,

that is, as a Westerner, constructed along the lines o f W estern
E uropean m etaphysics, because o f his identity, will never be able
to approach the point o f the G reat M idnight face to face. Perhaps,
in the sense that m an is man (in term s o f this m etaphysics), he
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will endlessly circle the labyrinth-of this “not yet.” M aybe this “not
yet” is one o f the constituent parts o f a hum an being. In that case,
the G reat M idnight will never arrive. It will never arrive for man,
that is. Therefore, it is man that is the reason for this “not yet.”
A nd it is not ju st a matter o f his not being ready. Perhaps, his
essence is to delay another Beginning whenever he feels its breath,
closeness, and com ing to fruition. But in this case, the problem o f
this “not yet” is resolved through the final decisive battle between
the man of the End (which includes subhum ans, the L a st M en,
and even the Superm an himself, in the H eideggerian sense, as
the greatest em bodim ent o f rexvrj [techne] and the will to power),
and an alternate man, a man of the Beginning.
M an of the End seeks to be endless. A n d when, it seem s, all that

remains for him is to go out as the lights o f all beings are turned
off, in his electronic Nothingness o f a “provoked life” (as per
G ottfried Benn), he m anages to m ultiply the m eaningless turns
o f his absurd return— again and again— with an increasing
degree o f “planetary idiocy" (L iberalism ), which (as we know
after the experience o f the 1990s in R u ssia) turned out to be
a more advanced stage o f nihilism even as com pared to the
totalitarian m ass-m etaphysics o f Bolshevism .
M an of the End is going to "not be" for eternity, thereby

exacerbating his non-Being” W e cannot exclude the fact that this
"not yet" com prises the final identity o f man h im self as the one
postponing, pausing "'delaying" In that case, who is the man of
the Beginning? W ho is he who can turn this alm ost-m idnight into
a full-fledged M idnight, pushing the last m om ent that is frozen,
shot up, woven deeply into time, and unwilling to be cut off?
It w ould be tem pting to identify him w ith N ietzsch e’s Superm an ,

if it were not for H eidegger’s interpretation o f this figure.
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A ccord in g to H eidegger, N ietzsch e is the fundam ental thinker

o f the E n d . H e even sees the"future ones” as the m axim ization o f
the will to pow er which drives the world. T h u s, the Superm an,
despite all his m etaphysical charm , is not suitable for the role
o f the m an o f the Beginning. T h e new m an m ust relate to the
old one like a vertical line perpendicular to the horizontal
one: for him , all that is hum an in its trajectory is always that
'n o t y et...”— both in the heroic splendor o f this “delay” and in
the chafed banality o f shallow subhum an cowardice. But this
perpendicularity contrasts with the definition o f man. I f m an
is th a t*n o t yet,” then no m atter how much he transform s inside
his identity, he w ould continue thrashing about only within the
fram ew ork o f this “still not y e t . ..” A n d if we were to recall the
F irst B eginn ing and the acuteness o f H eraclitean thought, then
we will see in it a clearly delineated horizon o f that which lies
beyond m an. T h is is the logos (w hose voice is radically different
from the voice o f the thinker); this is the daemon, which is
the rjOoq (ethos) o f m an. H eidegger interprets H eraclitus’s
statem ent “rjQoq avOpcbizco Saijuojv" (ethos anthropo daimon,
“ethos is a dem on for man") as one referring to the “place" (rjOoq)
inhabited by a deity (Sai/uov) as man’s true center. If anthropos
is th at "still not yet," then the Saijucov is the "already yes"! W e
can not exclude the possibility that the final desperate hope
for salvation in H eidegger's later works referred to salvation
from "man" as such — tow ard salvation by "G o d " (Saijucov) and
his "place" (rjOoc) o f beings in the rays o f Seyn-Being from the
m etaphysical infection o f the hum an. For this reason, it is the
man o f the Beginning who is capable o f abolishing the lingering
man o f the End, the m eaning and essence o f which com prise
this delay, that will be the "L a st G od." A n d in this case, the L a st
G o d 's p assin g by will be endow ed with dram atic significance:
saving beings and illum inating the truth o f Seyn-Being, the “L a st
G o d ”— in his "m ost-arrived arrival"— will bypass the raging
181 ♦
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people o f the End, which will indefinitely continue thrashing

about in the suffocating nets o f this endlessness. T h u s, the man
o f the new Beginning could already be here, be already arrived,
already passing by, even if the man o f the End is ignorant o f his
existence. T h e m ost terrifying end for the man o f the End w ould
be to m ake this end infinite.
But in that case, fundam ental-ontology m ust be constituted

in a certain special, unique direction, w ithout any correlation
with anthropology in general, since .any kind o f anthropology
im m ediately im m erses us in the “not yet ”
But som ebody has already overcome the “still not yet!’ A nd
M idnight took place in him.
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X. HEIDEGGER AS A GREAT
M ILESTONE
R eturn in g to the beginning o f this section, we can now

u n derstan d this thin kers trajectory in a new way, in light o f
discussin g his philosophy, its structure, and eschatological
orientation. H eidegger considered h im self to be som ewhat
analogous to a prophet or seer, who, at the m ost dram atic mom ent
in the history o f the W est, not only discovers the upcom ing
resolution, but also foresees the m eaning and cause o f its source
and the significance o f the present m om ent in time. By accepting
or not accepting his "prophecy," interpreting it in one way or
another, we m ust always rem em ber that this is a "prophecy"
w ithin the fram ew ork o f W estern European philosophy, and
only there does it have content, value, and meaning. I f we look
at it from the outside rather than the standpoint o f W estern
European philosophy, religion, or som e other particular school
o f this philosophy, we w ould not only m iss the acuteness o f
his m essage but also its direct and clear meaning. Therefore,
understanding H eidegger requires a cardinal and fundam ental
rethinking o f W estern European philosophy. I f the former
un derstanding thereof was quite approxim ate (which occurs in
R u ssian philosophy), then we m ust speak not o f rethinking but
rather about the responsible and correct understanding for the
first time. Morever, this kind o f rethinking m ust not occur prior
to getting acquainted with Heidegger, but rather simultaneously,
and even through this acquaintance.
T od ay we cannot say w hat the R u ssian religious philosophy o f

the 19th and 20th centuries really was since the seynsgeschichtliche
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succession has been lost. Even less clear to us is the Soviet

M arxist philosophy, which for such a long tim e was everything
only to suddenly becom e nothing (having experienced— in
the reverse direction— the fate o f a m essianic phenom enon on
the historical stage o f the proletariat). It seem s that we could
acquire foothold in religion, but a substantial part o f religion
com prises the kind o f thought that is associated with the logos,
that is, theology. W hether our theology survives in its current
com plicated and discordant state in the face o f philosophical
generalizatios and'phenom enological destruction” o f H eidegger's
thought w e'can only state after getting acquainted with the
latter. N o t any time earlier.
For this reason, Heidegger, with his am azing radicalism and

dizzying acuteness o f his statem ents and assessm ents, may
becom e the greatest stim ulus for our rethinking the W est and
ourselves faced vis-a-vis the W est.
But at the sam e time, we m ust avoid the danger o f absolutizing

H eidegger and accepting each o f his statem ents as the ultim ate
axiom . S a d is the fate o f a seer i f he turns into an idol or a
graven image, A clairvoyant tells the story o f Being, life, gods,
and the fate o f the world, about the present m om ent and that
which was and will be. H is w ords live on and are anim ated by
the life o f those who understand them and who ponder through
them. A n d thus through this living understanding, these words
and he who expressed them continue to live and, in som e cases,
only begin truly living. I f we m anage to un derstan d H eidegger,
then we will be able to move in any direction push ing o ff from
this realization. Furtherm ore, it is absolutely irrelevant which
direction this will b e — whether we confirm certain key points
o f his philosophy or discover som ething else, for instance,
som ething that his philosophy does not contain or even
186
som eth in g that contradicts it. H e who lives in thought anim ates
those who once thought. W e m ust interpret H eidegger as a
Wegmarke, a road sign, which in G reek sounds like “/usOoSog,"
a “m ethod.” W e have the pathw ay and a sign. W h at rem ains is
to read it correctly. A n d then we will be free to do as we please.
187 %
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PART 2
Das Geviert
I. AN IN TRO D UCTIO N
TO GEVIERT
The M ean in g o f the Term “G eviert”
In G erm an, Geviert m eans “quaternion,” “four,” “quaternity.”

The im age and structure o f Geviert represent a fundam ental
m om ent for Heidegger's thought. By introducing Geviert, we
will be better equipped to understand the primary structural
lines o f his philosophy: the distinction between Seyn and Sein,
the second Beginning, Ereignis, the chasm between ontology and
fundam ental-ontology, and so on.
Geviert can be represented symbolically as two intersecting lines

resem bling St. Andrew ’s cross.
In som e cases, H eidegger h im self uses two vertical lines crossed

at a 90-degree angle.
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Let us record both possibilities. In the first case, the em phasis

is on the relative opposition o f the top ends o f the cross to the
bottom ones; in the second— the placem ent o f vertical opposition
onto a horiziontal one.
We must keep in mind that this schematic diagram does not

represent a spatial image, but rather the structure o f a philosophical
and fu n dam en tal-on tological topography. T h is is an im age
pertaining to Seyn-Being and thoughts about its truth. This is not
beings or a depiction thereof; but, at the same time, this is not a symbol
pointing toward something other than itself. Heidegger conceives o f
Geviert, both as a word and a sign, as an expression o f a method (in
Greek, this literally means "pointing the way") o f the fundamental-
ontological look at Seyn-Being itself through the light o f its presence.
Therefore, it makes sense to refrain from any hasty comparisons o f
Geviert to everything that is known about the meaning o f the cross,
the number four, and so on. Any and all analogies will turn out to
be misleading and inapplicable, especially at the first stage, when the
intensity o f Heidegger's thought is not yet clear to us. Any attempt to
compare Geviert with something already known to us or with what
we ourselves think will be fatal. Geviert is most likely something that
we do not know, have not heard, and have never encountered. Only
in this case, the freshness o f this phenomenon— o f something that
never appeared previously— will truly open up to us.
The word Geviert and its schem atic depiction appear in

Heidegger's work in the late 1930s in lecture and book notes for
a cycle related to the subjects o f Seynsgeschichte and Ereignis.1
Later, in the 1950s, he develops them further in the context o f
interpreting Holderlin's poetry2 and studies on the subject o f
1 M artin Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt

am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1989); Idem., Geschichte des Seyns
(1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1998).
M artin Heidegger, Erlauterung zur Holderlin Dichtung. Holderlin und das
Wesen der Dichtung (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1981).
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language problem s3. Heidegger investigates this subject m ost fully

in his highly poetic texts, such as the The Thing, Building Dwelling
Thinking, and so on, which were included in an anthology called
Lectures and Essays (1936-1953).4 It has become customary to
consider the problem o f Geviert as part o f Heidegger's late period,
being a leitmotif o f the final part o f his later works.
From the point o f view o f subject periodization in H eideggers

philosophy, one could say that the issue o f Geviert com prises the
culm in ation o f his thoughts o f the m iddle period (1 9 3 0 -1 9 4 0 s)
ab ou t Ereignis and another Beginning. A t its core, Geviert is a
flash illum inatin g the entire structure ( Gefiige) o f H eidegger's
ph ilosop h y with its final light. T h is is Lichtung (lighting,
floodin g with light, highlighting) o f Seyn-Being, which opened
up at the p eak o f thought, fo cu sed on another Beginning. T h e
in tro d u ctio n o f Geviert in itse lf is Ereignis.
The Fourfold ( Geviert) and Seyn-Being
H eidegger approaches the subject o f Geviert through deciphering

his favorite poet, H olderlin. The philosophical interpretation
o f the latter's hym ns brings H eidegger to the construction o f a
special kind o f envisioning beings through Seyn-Being.
Geviert opens opens up for H eidegger as a structure (Gefiige)

o f Seyn-Being in its pure form. Being is fourfold. This Fourfold
always exists as such and only as such. In other words, nothing
can be removed from it or added to it.
H eidegger introduces Geviert in order to replace Hegel's

trinitarian dialectic. I f H egel spoke o f thesis-antithesis-synthesis,
3 M artin H eidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (1 9 5 0 - 5 9 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:

4 M artin H eidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze (1 9 3 6 - 5 3 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:
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then H eidegger stated/ ‘not three,'but fo u r!’5 Morever, he speaks

o f all fo u r simultaneously. In a certain sense, addressing the four
was a critical step in terms o f the C hristian triplicity. But let us
note immediately that H eidegger viewed C hristianity as a m odel
o f W estern C hristian theology and was exclusively interested in
the philosophical significance o f triplicity: the way in which this
principle was included in the explanation o f beings structure and
the organization o f ontology. For this reason, Hegel's triad was
more im portant to him than the C hristian dogm a.
Triplicity expresses the topography o f the old m etaphysics

and Platonic ontology where Sein-Being takes the place o f
^ H ere we can use the example from a completely different field. However,
we m ust also keep in mind that there are no direct parallels between
H eideggers philosophy and the subject that we are about to address. The
following example skips over the m ost complex work that w as not really
carried ou t— o f com paring the philosophies o f two m ajor 20th-century
figures— H eidegger and Jung. C arl G ustav Ju n g paid great attention to the
sym bolic meaning o f the num bers 3 and 4. H e relied on the herm etic text
o f M aria Prophetissa who alchemically interpreted the structure o f the
Pythagorean tetractys 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 (i.e., 1 again since the Pythagorean
10 = 1). In this formula, Ju n g singled out the first three num bers, which, in
his interpretation, are linked with rationality, the "ego,” and transcendence,
and which constitute the triad; he correlated the fourth num ber— 4 — with
nature and the collective unconscious. Ju n g believed that 3 (the triad and the
trinitarian principle) refers to C hristianity (as a rational transcendentalist
kind o f theology), and 4 — to paganism . T he greatest distinction, according
to Jung, was the fact that the pagan quaternity included the principle o f evil
(the devil, shadow s), which is completely excluded from the light o f triplicity.
T his is how Ju n g interpreted the disputes am ong the students o f Paracelsus
(in particular, A dam von Bodenstein and G erhard D orn) with respect to
certain aspects o f his teachings, especially in the debate with critics from
the Church. D espite the fact that Ju n g’s psychoanalytic reconstructions and
herm etic reasoning belong to a completely different level o f philosophizing
than that o f Heidegger, there are certain sim ilarities since, evidently,
H eidegger implicitly contrasted the quaternity with triplicity in the spirit
o f his "G re ek ” “Hellenic,” and, in a certain way, “pagan” approach. See:
C arl Jung, “Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenom enon” in Memories, Dreams,
Reflections (N ew York: Vintage, 1989); C arl Jung, T he Spirit Mercury (N ew
York: A nalytical Psychology C lub o f N ew York, 1942); C arl Jung, Arkhetip
i simvol (M oscow : Renessans, 1991).
194
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Seyn 'B eing as the essence o f beings, as beingS'US'a-wbole.

T h is trin itary to p o grap h y con tain s the referential theory o f
tru th always seeking to trace the relation sh ip o f the know er
to a th ird p a rty which com prises the b asis o f m etaphysics.
Fundam entaUontology m ust treat the ontic field o f beings
an d the thinkin g m an stan d in g am id st it (the first level o f
distan cin g) in another way, avoiding the trap o f the trinitary
principle, the m eaning o f which is the d om in ation o f rexvr]
(techne). T h e latter is ultim ately expressed in contem porary
W estern E u ro p ean n ih ilism — the final em bodim en t of
triplicity. Geviert is both the in stru m en t o f “phenom enological
d estru ctio n ” (d eco n stru ctio n ) o f the old m etaphysics and the
triu m p h an t result o f its realization .
Seyn'Being, having foun d itself, illum inating itse lf (Lichtung),

letting itse lf be know n, opens itself up through Geviert, through
the Fourfold. Being is never alone; it is not m onistic (but neither
is it threefold or tw ofold). It expresses itse lf as the totality o f
fo u r, but at the sam e tim e no one element o f this Fourfold ever
acts alone. Seyn-Being and Geviert are alm ost the sam e thing,
because where Being does not generate (pro-duce [duco, Latin,
"to lead”] — (pvsiv [phyein], E d .) beings— we cannot speak o f
Being; where it produces beings, it is necessarily p re se n t, but
never fully and is always sim ultaneously absent in its presence.
A t the sam e time, always an d under any circum stances, Seyn'
Being lets itse lf be know n (w ith ou t letting itse lf be known,
h idin g itse lf) in the Fourfold.
W e cannot conceive o f Seyn-Being in som e other way, com ing

at it "from the other end.” O ne o f the m ost erroneous positions
in regard to Being was thinking about it from the standpoint o f
beings. W hen it comes to this approach, no matter how far we
move away from beings, sooner or later, we are bound to project
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them toward the abyss, the terror '"of which will only increase as
the distance from beings grows. Instead o f flying, we will create
a shore, a stop, solid ground, hardness. W e will not acquire the
experience o f the sky and will certainly start thinking o f an*'earth
o f the sky” or a "sky o f the earth.” Therefore, it is not a gaze at
Being from the standpoint o f beings, but rather— at beings from
the standpoint o f Being that will be a fundamental-ontological
act. This gaze in its concreteness and radical overturning o f all
proportions is G eviert.
In the mom ent when we envision Seyn-Being correctly— through

the light o f its own truth, through its existence in the terror o f
absolute loneliness, at the outm ost distance from all beings, in the
experience o f the abyss— it is then that we will encounter the
entire Fourfold simultaneously, it is then that it reveals itself to us.
It is extremely im portant to un derstand in advance that Geviert

does not am ount to an ontic perception o f the world, and that
it would be erroneous to conclude the latter by contrasting the
Fourfold with the trinitarian ontological topography, although
there is som e truth to this observation. But ontic thought, direct
analogies o f which we can actually see in the Fourfold, does not
know anything about Being, nor does it entertain this question
in the first place. It is dissolved in the Fourfold, but does not
know about it. It flows out from the Fourfold, but fails to grasp
it in the living m om ent o f this fundam ental event. It does not
suspect that Geviert is Geviert; it does not call it by nam e or
express its Being. Therefore, it, being located in Geviert, is lost
in it, dissolved in it, is not in it, does not exist (in essence—
west da nicht). Therefore, the discussion o f Geviert pertains
to fundamental-ontology, not ontics or the old ontology. This
discussion occurs in the register o f another Beginning, and it can
only be carried out in the case if we, in one way or another, follow
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H eidegger and the m ain stages o f his review o f Seynsgeschichte,

another Beginning, and focus on Ereignis.
Geviert is given to us like an open window to the abyss, i.e., as the

greatest gift, and it is assum ed that we will value it accordingly.
T he Contents o f the Fourfold ( Geviert)
T h e Fourfold is the Sky (H im m el), gods or God (the divine in

general), (m ortal) man, and the Earth. T h e s efou r figures, four
realm s o f the W orld, com prising Geviert, rem ained unchanged
for H eidegger. However, until the 1950s, instead o f talking
ab ou t the Sky (H im m el), H eid egger d iscu ssed the World
(W elt), equating the “w orld” with the “sky.” Later, he began to
speak ab ou t the sky, specifically. N on eth eless, let us keep in
m in d the interchangeability o f the Sky and the World in the
Fourfold. T h e Sk y an d the W orld express an open order.
sky (world) gods
P re-S o cratics u sed the w ord “cosm os” to define the world,
which did not m ean the "w orld" in our current usage but
rather "o rd e r"“harmony,” "organization.” C o sm o s is an order or
a beau tifu l order, that is, som eth in g organizated into a perfect
form ation . T h e ancients also u sed a synonym ous concept
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M A R T IN H E ID E G G E R : The Philosophy of Another Beginning
ovpaviog ( ouranious, celestial), ovpavdg (ouranos, sky), because

they considered the sky to be the source o f order, the essence o f
order, and the w orld as such. T h ey equated the w orld and the
sky. It is for this reason that P lato placed his ideas into the sky.
T h is inner identification o f the sky with the w orld is crucial
for un derstanding Geviert. L ater on, H eid egger states that die
Welt (w orld) is Geviert, but at the sam e time, he represents the
sky on its own as an independent elem ent o f Geviert.
W ar in the Fourfold ( Geviert)
H eidegger sees the source o f Geviert in H eraclitus’s form ula

about war as the fath er o f all things. H eraclitus stated, “W ar is
both father and king o f all, som e he has shown forth as gods and
others as men, som e he has m ade slaves and others free,”6 H e also
w rote,“We m ust know that war {jiolepog [polemos]) is com m on
to all, and strife is justice, and that all things come into Being
through strife necessarily,”7
For H eidegger, Being as war, H eraclitean TcoXs/uog (polem os) as

the “father o f things," is the form o f Being in the genetic sense
(Being from the stan d poin t o f origin). T h u s, the fundam entally
fourfold beings outstretched in front o f us, above us, and around
us are created through the pressure o f war, present in every
point, in every segm ent o f Geviert. W e are none other than a
product o f war, because war separated us from go d s and m ade
us into m en; on the other hand, it is war that connected us to
gods, pu t us on earth, and covered us with the sky.
6 Fragmenty rannikh grecheskikh filosofov (M oscow : N au k a, 1989), 2 02; see

also Daniel W. G rah am (ed., tr.), The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy:
The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the M ajor Presocratics
(C am bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 2010).
7 Ibid., 201.
198
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W ar— TtoXsfiog— is the name o f Being as Seyn. According to

Heidegger, herein lies the actual depth o f fundamental-ontology
as such. The roots o f understanding Being as war trace back to
the problem o f Nothingness. Heidegger defines Nothingness in the
structure o f fundam ental-ontology as the“nihilation in Seyn-Being
(das Nichten im Seyn). It is deeply erroneous to assum e that Seyn-
Being is, and always is something immutable and eternal. Seyn-
Being comes to fruition (sich er-eignet), it is always fresh, always at
risk, and never a given. Furthermore, in order to break the illusion
o f guaranteeing its unchanging existence, it turns to beings and man
with its “nihilating side. Thus, it proves the mortality o f the mortal,
the finitude o f the finite, and the uniqueness o f itself as an event
(Ereignis). Being makes itself felt not in peace but in war, precisely
because it simultaneously introduces a "yes” and a "no.” Here, we
can recall Heraclitus once again, who claimed, "Hom er, praying
th at'D iscord be dam ned from gods and men,' forgot that he called
down curses on the origin o f all things.”8 Separating ‘‘Nothingness" as
"nihilation” from Seyn-Being, we lose it in itself, because we deprive
it o f the opportunity to occur and, therefore, beings to be born in
battle and for battle. H aving turned Being into beings-as-a-whole,
we lose its creative power to transform beings into non-beings in
order to bring non-beings to beings and, consequently, we substitute
it with som ething else. Geviert is specifically Seyn-Being, which,
occurring in Ereignis, brings war into everything, establishing
tension o f the great axes o f the world. The world is war.9
8 Ibid., 202.
9 The R ussian word "mup (mir) as a'universe” can be traced back to the ancient
Slavic conception about three phenom ena, which developed from the same
roots but later received distinct interpretations. "M ir" as a community, “mir"
as non-war and peaceful existence, and “m ir” as a universe. Prior to the
20th-century reform s o f the R ussian language, the word "M upb" (mir, non
war) and "M ipb' (mir, the universe) were distinct, but in the old Slavonic
language, they were written in the sam e way as in the contem porary Russian
language (even though in contem porary Russian, these are interpreted as
hom onym s, i.e., w ords that sound, and are written in the sam e way, but that
designate different things). The G erm an word Welt m ost likely com prises
two stem s, "wer” and “alt,” which, according to one o f the etymologies,
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The Sky
T h e Sky is that which establishes order, that which m akes any

and every thing w hat it is. It highlights, determ ines, organizes,
supplies the world and parts o f the world, as well as beings with
that which H eidegger calls “dignity” ( Wiirde), aîoq (axios). It
m akes a thing valuable precisely because it is that very thing,
and it determ ines its inner worth secretely and mysteriously.
T h ese are ordered beings, beings-as-a-whole.
T h e Sky opens itse lf up and unfolds, thereby opening and

unfolding things. It divides and endow s. T h e Sky is the w orld
in its openness. T h is is the face o f the w orld facing itse lf and
those who look at the world. A gaze tow ard the w orld is a gaze
tow ard the Sky and the Sky's gaze tow ard itself. T h e Sky is the
dom ain o f light that highlights, enlightens, opens up.
T h e Sky is fundam entally open. It h as no lim its or boundaries

in itself. S o the Sky is not an essence, an object, a phenom enon,
but rather the orientation, an area, the b oun d less edge o f the
sacred geography o f Being.
The Sky and the World
We stated above that, for Heidegger, the Sky serves as a

fundam ental-ontological synonym for the world (die Welt).10
pertains to the idea o f antiquity, eternity, strength, and seniority. In term s o f

m eaning, this could be close to the old Slavonic “pod" (rod) and the San sk rit
word "rita" — “eternal im m utable order.” For this reason, the R ussian word
“m up ” carries an entire chain o f m eanings different from the G erm an “Welt”
and the G re e k “kooploo” (kosmos).
T he old R ussian language contained two w ords that designated the
w orld— “ceem ” (svet, light) and “m u p " (mir, world). It is interesting to note
that the term “world" pertained to the glance from the standpoint o f the
earth, whereas “svet”— to that o f the sky, KoapLoq (kosmos), ovpavog (ouranos,
heaven). It is the old R ussian word "ceem— “6enuu ceem (belyi svet, white
world) that corresponds to the G erm an "Welt" and Latin “mundus.”
200
T he W orld and the Sky express som ething close and alm ost
identical, hence their interchangeability in Geviert.
T h e World (as the light and the Sky), according to Heidegger,

is an expression o f openness ( Offene) — herein lies its main
attribute. The World opens up and illuminates, m aking things
clear and uncovered. A t the sam e time, beings, becoming the
W orld, establish themselves in the W orld, receive the stam p o f
orderliness; each thing gains its own attributes and places.
H eidegger writes,
A t the sam e time, as the W orld opens itself up, all things
obtain their delay and acceleration, their distance and
nearness, their vastness and its narrow ness.11
T h e W orld is that which opens up the pathways. It is extremely

im portant to note that H eidegger understands the W orld (and,
consequently, the Sky) as som ething that is profoundly connected
with a people (Volk). The W orld is com prised o f peoples, and
so is the Sky. O utsid e o f a people and its language and art, the
W orld loses itself, scatters about, and ceases to be the W orld.
Conversely, the openness o f the W orld is directly conencted to
opening the pathways for the people.
" T h e w orld is an o p en in g o p en n ess o f vast pathw ays, sim ple

an d m ean in g fu l (wesentliche) d ecisio n s in destin y ( Geschick)
for a h isto ric (geschichtliche) people.” 12 T h e p eop le at their
core are the ones who m ake the decision, w here a d ecision
is m ade, and how it is m ade. T h e p eople are a place for
d e cisio n -m ak in g . T h e people's ways in h isto ry exp ress their
11 M artin H eidegger, "D er U rsprung der K unstw erkes” in Holzwege

(Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1994), 31; here, translated
from the R ussian.
12 Ibid., 35.
201
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a ttitu d e tow ard the W orld and th e S k y m an ifested th rough

fateful d e cisio n s.
It is im portant to note that we are talking about a people (Volk),

specifically, not man (on an individual basis). This is due to the
role that H eidegger assigns to speech. Speech is the existence o f
Seyn-Being m anifesting through man. B ut speech is always based
on language. A nd it is language that differentiates non-m an from
man and one people from another. The differences between
peoples and languages com prise the wealth o f Seyn-Being. For
this reason, the people, along with language receive a certain angle
o f viewing the W orld and the Sky. It is this gaze that is language.
Therefore, the W orld opens up to the people in language, and
through language the people make the decision that will be their
destiny. It is not man that m akes this decision, but the people.
A nd this decision is always connected to language. The W orld,
as openness, acts as the possibility and necessity for this decision.
The W orlds openness is reflected in the decision o f the people.
“The world is the illum ination o f roads that point to m eaning

(wesentlicbe Weisung), in which all decisions are structured.”13
The decision (through speech) welcomes a people, but the world
dictates (points to) the structure o f this decision.
The E arth
The Earth in H eidegger is that which leads everything to presence

(Anwesen). Thanks to the Earth, many things, objects, sensations
become present, actual. The Earth is that on which one stands,
and is, therefore, real. The Earth m akes beings real. T hanks to the
Sky, things are what they are, but because o f the earth, they are
real, they lie before the world, they are stretched, they are present.
13 Ibid., 42.
202
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The m ost im portant attribute o f the Earth, according to

Heidegger, is its being closed and sealed. The Sky and the W orld
open up; they exist as the open and the opening. The Earth
conceals, covers, locks, hides. But at the same time, it preserves. In
the initial fundam ental-ontological act o f Seyn'Being, openness
is adjacent and alternates with non-openness, closedness.
E arlier we stated that H eidegger correlated the W orld with

the people (Volk). L ess explicitly, he linked the people and the
E arth . T h e latter can only be derived b ased on his indirect
observation s. A t one poin t, discu ssin g the fundam ental-
on tological significance o f the war betw een the G erm an s and
R u ssia n s14, H eid egger wrote,
Every W orld opens itse lf and rem ains paired up with the
E arth . Every W orld and every E a rth — the significance,
as a whole, lies in their m utual belonging to each
o th er— this is a h istorical (geschichtlicbe) phenom enon.
(. . .) T h e E arth o f the future lies fallow in a not-yet-
freed -fo r-itself R u ssian n e ss. H isto ry ( Geschichte) o f the
W orld (Welt) has been layered upon the self-aw areness
(Besinnung) o f the G e rm a n s.15
It is im portant to note that H eidegger connects the World

(Welt) and the Earth with a people and peoples. In a way, this is
som ew hat reminiscent o f the theory by the ancient G reek pre-
Socratic philosopher X enophanes o f Colophon, who believed
that in different regions o f the universe there are distinct skies
and earths, sim ilar to each other but different nonetheless.
H eidegger explains this hypothesis through language as the core
14 T his is a reference to W orld W ar II, which H eidegger conceptualized as

the G erm an nature in op p osition n ot so much to the R u ssian counterpart,
but rather to the Bolshevik, C o m m u n ist k in d— as an extreme expression
o f W estern E u ropean m etaphysics in the form o f Machenschaft.
15 M artin H eidegger, Geschichte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:
V ittorio K losterm ann, 1998), 108; here, translated from the Russian.
203 *
/
o f what is hum an, H eidegger h im self considers the difference in

languages and dialects a consequence o f the diverse geographical
landscapes reflected in speech. But since language is a way for
Seyn-Being to exist, then the people (Volk) with their Earth and
their Sky (world) always represent a unique attitude to Seyn-
Being. It is the people, not a single individual (the subject), that
is relevant, since language is entrusted to the people as a whole.
In G erm ans, H eidegger sees the beginning o f the open pathways,

self-awareness, the W orld, the Sky. In R ussians, he foresees the
essence o f the Earth, as one o f preserving closedness, the keeper
o f the future. The battle between R ussians and G erm ans becomes
one o f cosm ogonic dim ensions, which establishes a new Sky and
a new E arth — the G erm an Sky and the R ussian Earth.
Uranogeomachy
Between the Sky and the Earth there is tension, an axis o f war.
The Universe is constructed along this axis.
The Sky and the Earth are opposite in everything. The Earth,
unlike the Sky, is always closed; it turns its back toward the
world, and its face is hidden. N o one knows what the latter looks
like, and whether it has a face at all. The Sky has no end inward
and upward, the Earth is infinite in its breadth. But at the same
time, the battle o f the Sky (W orld) and the Earth is not a clash
between two rigidly and strictly separated entities.
T h e W orld (Sky) and the Earth are essentially different from

each other, but are never separated from each other. T h e W orld
is based upon the Earth, and the E arth rises up through the
W orld. B ut the relationship between the W orld and the E arth
does not fade in the em pty unity o f contentless opposition .
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T h e world in its quietus on the Earth seeks to raise, elevate

it. T h e W orld, being self-opening, cannot handle being closed.
T h e Earth, as the keeper o f all, is inclined tow ard absorbing the
W orld and keeping it in itself.
T h e confrontation between the W orld and the E arth is a real

war, a battle.16
T h is w ar— uran ogeom ach y (or cosm ogeom ach y)— opens
its “is” for each side, its relation sh ip with Seyn-Being, which
is th e sam e for both, but treats each o f the two differently.
In the Sky (W orld ), Seyn-Being expresses itse lf as lighting,
o pen n ess, unconcealm ent. T h is is akrjOsia (aletheia), the
tru th o f Being's un concealm ent in beings and through beings,
through a design ated sp o t in the m iddle, where Being m akes
itse lf know n through openness T h e E arth opens up another
side o f Seyn-Being— the "nihilating,” concealing, but at the
sam e tim e keeping, preserving, closing, and harborin g side.
In its relation to Seyn-Being, the E arth is b o ttom less, it is
the A bgrund. X en o p h an es o f C oloph on , according to certain
ancient auth ors, tau gh t that the E arth is the principal source
o f all and th at its ro o ts go all the way to the abyss, eternally
fallin g into their b o tto m lessn ess.
U ranogeom achy is a natural and the only expression o f

S e y n -Being through beings, in beings, through beings, and
again st beings. In this war between the Sky and the Earth,
where everyone, fighting, returns to his nature and begins to
authentically be, an even m ore profound process occcurs— the
war between Seyn-Being against beings, which makes Seyn-Being
and beings them themselves.
16 M artin H eidegger, “D er Ursprung der Kunstwerkes” in Holzwege (Frankfurt

am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1994),35.
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Gods o f the Beginning
T h e D ivine (gods) and men are the poles o f the second axis.
H eidegger uses the w ords "god” “G o d ” very carefully, although
in later works he increasingly speaks o f the “divine”, “divinity”
and the “divine ones.” T h ese essences are fundam entally
necessary for Geviert, but H eidegger avoids giving them a clear
and precise definition.
If man as a thinking entity is always present in Geviert, and his

presence is unquestionable, then it is custom ary for gods to
escape.17 In fact, the divine ones hide even when they show themselves.
T h e“divine ones” are a special kind o f beings (and, at the sam e time,
Being), which is extremely light and subtle, and whose function
is exceedingly non-utilitarian. It is as if the “divine ones” “tickle”
the world, w ithout adding any heavy fundam ental elements to it,
teach people nothing (stealing fire and establishing crafts are up
to the titans and tricksters). Instead, the “divine ones” give Geviert,
the entire Fourfold, a certain kind o f transparent intoxication.18
Divine presence, even traces o f deities, introduce the Fourfold
o f unfolded things, objects, states, and thoughts, giving them a
discreet internal current.
It is the relationship to Seyn'Being that, first and foremost, separates

gods and men. Perhaps, this is one o f the m ost difficult aspects o f
H eideggers philosophy. H e asserts,“The gods need Seyn'Being”
Fleeing gods are a consistent subject in H eidegger’s metaphysics. In som e o f

his statem ents, he makes it clear that the willingness and ability to escape
from the hum an presence is a basic property o f divinity, M an with his
fam iliar m etaphysical attributes— in particular by continually em itting the
Gestell— always scares the divine away, drives it away, and does not allow the
divine light to quietly shine at the center o f the Q uaternion.
Lucida ebbrezza. T his was discussed, in particular, by Ju liu s Evola, see Ride
the Tiger (R ochester: Inner Traditions, 2003).
206
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Further, he writes,
Being does not stan d “above” the gods, but neither do they
stan d “above” Being. Yet gods use Being, and Seyn-Being is
conceptualized in this statem ent. G o d s need Seyn-Being
in order to belong to them selves through it, even though
it does not belong to them . Seyn-Being is that which the
god s require; it is their necessity their need; they lack it.19
T hen H eidegger specifies the relationship between gods and

philosophy
Sin ce Seyn-Being is g o d s’ need and, at the sam e time,

it is fo u n d only in th in kin g over one’s own truth ,
an d th is po n d erin g, in turn, is none other than
p h ilo so p h y ( o f an o th er B e gin n in g), then g o d s require
seynsgeschichtliche th ou gh t, i.e., philosophy. G o d s do
n o t need p h ilo so p h y as i f they plan n ed to p h ilo so p h ize
on the su b ject o f their deification , b u t p h ilo so ph y
m u st occur (be, becom e, sein), if ( wenn) g o d s m ust,
once again , enter the elem ent o f the decision and
o b ta in — for Geschichte (h isto ry as fa te )— the b a sis for
its m eaning. Seynsgeschichtliche th o u gh t as the th ough t
o f Seyn-Being w ill be p red eterm in ed by g o d s.20
It is im portant to note that H eidegger conceptualizes “gods”

outside o f any particular religion. A god o f religion, he argues, is
nothing but a name inside m etaphysical topography, where beings
are placed in the place o f Being as the greatest beings, highest
beings, the original beings. S o the gods o f religion are powerless
an d die when m etaphysics collapses into contem porary nihilism.
T hese are gods in the name only and in the structures o f false
thought. The only kind o f divinity that is worthy o f itself and
19 M artin Heidegger, B eitrdge zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am
M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1989), 4 3 8 ; here, translated from the Russian.
20 Ibid., 43 9 ; here, translated from the Russian.
207
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o f gods them selves— and within the lim its o f one G o d (if gods
themselves decide that am ong them there is only one that is
truly G o d )— is the the kind o f divinity that is linked to Seyn-
Being, not various versions o f "P latonism for the m asses.” I f this
kind o f divinity is possible, then only at the ecstatic horizon o f
fundamental-ontology, balancing on the verge o f the truth o f
Seyn-Being as the core o f Seyn-Being.
We can say that Heidegger's gods are the gods o f fundam ental-
ontology and are intimately connected to it, with its possibility,
with another Beginning. This is why H eidegger conceives o f the
L ast G o d as the “god o f the Beginning.”
Heidegger's gods have another im portant attribute. These are

the gods who are not (sind nicht), in the sense that they are not
beings (Seiende). They are removed from beings by the greatest
distance. These gods are not. But the fact that they are not makes
them truly alive and sacred. W ith their “not,” they constitute
the sacred (Heilige) dim ension. In contrast to the old ontology,
which conceived o f Being as the greatest kind o f beings out o f all
beings, and in contrast to apophatic philosophy, which conceived
Being as N othingness, non-beings, and even more non-beings
than gods, fundam ental-ontology places Seyn-Being and its "in
between” truth between gods and beings.21
From a certain angle, Seyn-Being itse lf can be conceived from the

standpoint o f the gods. In this case, "Seyn-Being is the trem bling
o f gods (the echo o f gods’ decision regarding their G od).”22
But at the same time, gods are neither an abstraction, nor a

metaphor, nor an artificial construct o f an atheistic consciousness.
Atheism for H eidegger is as m etaphysical as is theism or deism.
21 Ibid., 244.
22 Ibid., 239.
208
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G ods o f the Beginning are the direction o f philosophical geography

o f that world, which m anifests itself in the event (Ereignis), in an
instant flash o f light (Lichtung) o f Beings truth. G o d s and men
belong to the same axis, establishing opposite directions. G o d s are
those who need Seyn'Being, for whom it is home and hearth. M en
are those whom Seyn'Being needs, in order for them to guard the
truth. This dual need o f Seyn'Being and in Seyn'Being constitutes,
in relation to itself, the “gods-m en" pair. Indifferent gods, subtle
and light, and sorrowful, poor men, ripped out o f all beings by the
flash o f Seyn'Being and thrown into the abyss o f the Sky.
The M en o f Geviert
W e can im agine Geviert as the geography o f another Beginning,

the schem atic diagram of the fundam ental-ontological
topography. Therefore, even m en whom H eidegger prefers to
call "M ortals” in Geviert are men o f another Beginning, men
as "guardians o f Seyn-Beings truth” (Wachter der Wahrheit des
Seyns) based on their m ain attribute, "Being'tow ards'death”.
These are the men o f a new fundam ental-ontological hum anism.
It is very important to note that they do not stand at the center o f

Geviert, but at one o f its ends. M an, even one facing his truth like the
truth o f Seyn'Being, is only one o f the dimensions o f Seyn'Being s
spark along with others. Yet even man's neighbors in Geviert are
fundamental— gods, the Sky, and the Earth. Man, as the guardian o f
Seyn'Beings truth, is comparable to them, but in no way is something
unique am ong them. H e is different from them like they are
different from each other, but, at the same time, he is unthinkable
without them, unimaginable; he is not without the other three.
M an o f Geviert, explains Heidegger, is in no way a "subject” or

an "object” o f history; he is not a "rational animal." Furthermore,
209
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he is not defined through belonging to a hum an essence, since

he, out o f all beings, lacks this essence. In place o f this essence,
which would have served as the basis for anthropology, founded
on the principles o f the old metaphysics, there is a chasm, a hole,
a window into the abyss. This abyss, which distantly lets itse lf be
known through death, terror, extreme form s o f risk, the feeling
o f abandonm ent (like falling) is the form o f Seyn-Being s own
expression, which announces itself as som ething that does not
correspond to beings and even the greatest kind o f beings. “M an
is cast in a free throw into unfam iliarity and never again returns
from the abyss remaining in the unfam iliar next to Seyn-Being"23
M an does not have an essence, and his core (W esen) does

not belong to him, but to Being’s need to p o sse ss a guardian.
Seyn-Being con stitutes a fun dam ental-ontological place for
a guardian next to itself, and he who occupies that place
becom es m an. T akin g this place, m an as a gu ardian o f Seyn-
Being rem ains in the structure o f Geviert. Beings open up to
him, as som ething unfam iliar, as part o f an event-opportunity
from the stan d p o in t o f Seyn-Being’s proxim ity, even though as
one o f beings, m an was at hom e am ong them . S ettlin g next
to Being, he becom es a gu est am on g beings, in exile, he finds
h im self "thrown" into beings. O nly this kind o f m an is truly
“mortal," since his Being is “Being-toward-death.”
W ars between Gods and M en
The divine and the mortal, men and gods, reside, according to
Heidegger, within the framework o f Geviert in a continuous
encounter (Entgegnung), that is to say, in an encounter in every
sense o f the word: they collide as opponents and encounter each
other as creatures located on the sam e axis. It is possible to
23 Ibid., 492.
210
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collide as two enemies, or m eet each other as two neighbors in a

grove or near a creek. A nd in this encounter, it is gods that escape
m ore frequently, and only the m ost subtle o f all m ortals— poets
and sages— escape from them, sensing the presence o f a deity,
thereby honoring its subtle nature and allowing gods to go where
they want, so that the earth and the world could be filled with
th is subtle light o f the sacred (Heilige).
These and many other m eanings are part o f the term Entgegnung—
the collision between men and gods. War, as the father o f things,
according to H eraclitus, separates men from gods, puts them on
opposide sides and makes them non-identical. O n the opposite
sides o f what? O n the opposite sides o f Seyn-Being, which
rem ains "in between”
T his non-equivalence, this constant and principal distinction

constitutes them both. This is the m ost accurate and precise
understanding o f what divinity and hum anity are. M en become
men and g o d s— gods through the expression o f their nature in
com parison (.Bezug) to Seyn-Being. W ar (Streit, 7toXsjuo<;) is the
nam e o f Seyn-Being when it constitutes Geviert as the intersection
o f the fundam ental-ontological power lines. Through the event’s
explosion (Ereignis), Seyn-Being casts men and gods, the Sky and
the Earth, into different points o f the philosophical geography,
thereby creating four regions, each o f which contains a vibrating
im pulse which has brought them into presence and takes it to the
source (Seyn-Being as war).
A s a rule, men treat divinity in an excessively ratio n al

utilitarian, and “technical” way even in their greatest theologies
and th eosoph ies. T h e go d s o f religion turn into m echanism s o f
pu n ish m en t and forgiveness, salvation and dam nation. T hey
becom e "hum an , all too hum an,” revealing the fact that they
211
/
had been replaced. T h ese god s do not struggle again st m en —

nor men against g o d s— for one reason: they are not, they
are constructed through being torn away from Seyn-Being.
Therefore, skillfull techniques o f clever men are capable o f
forcing them to do everything that m en desire. T h e se go d s are
tam ed gods, dei ex macbina.
T rue gods stand apart from men on the other side o f Seyn-Being
and observe men through the light o f war. This does not mean
that they are aggressive. It m eans that they are gods.
%
The ancient G reeks intuitively grasped the nature o f deities

better than people in conventional organized religions: in gods,
they saw a gam e. But gam es and wars share their source: war
is a game, and a game is always a war.24 A presence was sim ilar
to a subtle dawning, intuition. The divine alm ost imperceptibly
comes over and steps on man, attacks, falls on him, softly
extracting him from the roughness o f the everyday. This divine
attack exposes the place for a daimon (H eraclitean logos) in man.
M an s counterattack may drive a god away from his chosen place
or hold him captive (the appropriation o f the divine spark as the
soul, consciousness, the hum anization o f the divine logos as one’s
own rational m ind). M an wins the war (n ote“beating" one at war,
for instance, that is, he “plays") only when gods are victorious,
conquer man, and hold him captive. Then and only then does the
following truth come into its own right, “rfOoq avQpomm Saijucov
( ethos anthropo daim on )” that is Saijucov (daim on) becom es rjOoq
avOpcb ( ethos anthropo).
T h e Bible consecutively m en tion s— in the story o f the proph et

Elijah, when the L o rd appeared to h im — that the L o rd w as not
in the fire, the w ind, the earthquake, the rocks, but very subtly,
24 Jo h an H uizin ga, Homo Ludens (L on don : Routledge & K egan Paul, 1949);
Eugen Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol (Stu ttgart: Kohlham m er, 1960).
212
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in the gentle b lo w in g” alm ost silent and im perceptible.25

T h is Biblical description o f a "gentle blow ing" contains a
very perceptive un derstan din g o f a deity. T h is is the elem ent
o f the divine. T h e essence o f divinity is that it alm ost is not,
an d that it stan d s at the o p p o site pole from beings in all its
clarity, concreteness, tangibility, and grandeur. Beings, despite
all their scale, do not contain G o d . A n d H eidegger constantly
em ph asizes, "You can go through all beings, but you won't find
a trace o f G o d ."26
“We Think o f the Other Three”
In h is fu n d am en tal, alb eit brief, 1951 article, Building

D w elling T h in k in g27, H e id eg g e r defin es G eviert28 as follow s,
" T h e E arth is the servin g bearer, b lo sso m in g and fru itin g,
sp rea d in g o u t in rock and w ater, risin g up into p lan t and
an im al. W h en we say “earth " we are already th in k in g o f
the oth er three alon g w ith it, b u t we give no th ou gh t to the
sim p le o n en ess o f the four."29
U sing the sam e poetic rhythm, H eidegger describes the Sky, "The
sky is the vaulting path o f the sun, the course o f the changing,
m oon, the wandering glitter o f the stars, the year's seasons and
their changes, the light and dusk o f day, the gloom and glow o f
night, the clemency and inclemency o f the weather, the drifting
clouds and blue depth o f the ether. W hen we say sky, we are
25 Jh e Bible, O ld Testam ent, 3 K ings 19:12.

26 M artin H eidegger, Geschichte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:
V ittorio K losterm ann, 1998), 211.
27 M artin H eidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze (Stuttgart: K lett-C otta, 2004).
28 D u gin s translation here and further on (E d .).
29 M artin H eidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze (Stuttgart: K lett-C otta, 2004),
143; also see M artin H eidegger,"B uilding D w elling Thinking," from Poetry,
Language, Thought, tr. A lb ert H o fstad ter (N ew York: H arp er C oloph on
B o ok s, 1 97 1), 141-160.
213 «
____/
already thinking o f the other three along with it, but we give no
thought to the simple oneness o f the four.”30
N ow let us have a look at the way in which H eidegger defines the

divine ones: "The divine ones are the beckoning m essengers o f
the godhead. O u t o f the holy sway o f the Deity, the G o d appears
in his presence or withdraws into his concealment. W hen we
speak o f the Divine ones, we are already thinking o f the other
three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple
oneness o f the four.”31 N ote, in particular, "O u t o f the holy
sway o f the'Deity, the G o d appears in his presence or withdraws
into his concealment,” and "out o f the holy sway withdraws
and appears.” From the standpoint o f Seynsgeschichte, this is
always the same movement, difference and unity, opening and
concealing, appearance and withdrawal, presence and absence.
In Seynsgeschichte, these things are not opposed to each other.
H erein lies the core o f Seyn-Being: opening is not an antithesis o f
concealing and vice versa— otherwise, we are trapped by the old
metaphysics, where Being is equated to beings (which are certain
and always are), whereas non-Being strictly is not. Divinity is
not exclusive: we cannot say that it is (obvious), or that it is not
(concealed); it is both simultaneously.
W hen we say "Geviert," we m ust also m ention all others,

regardless o f where we began this incancation. A nd finally we
reach ourselves, the M ortals, die Sterblichen, "The M ortals are
the hum an beings. They are called M ortals because they can die.
To die m eans to be capable o f death as death.”32 Everyone dies
(others, not men), but in dying they (others, not men) cannot die,
because they will never be able to m aster death as death. D eath
is given to men for their personal use; death is what m akes men
30 Ibid., 14 4 ; see also M artin H eidegger, “ B u ild in g D w ellin g T h in k in g ,”

in Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. A lb ert H o fstad ter (N ew York: H arp er
C oloph on B ooks, 1 9 7 1 ), 141-160.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
214
\ _
men, death is Being-in-death and Being-toward-death— the fact

o f a presence or annihilation does not add anything to death;
it has nothing to do with death. D eath, conceived ontologically,
fundam ental-ontologically, is the same thing as life. "Only man
dies, and indeed gradually, as long as he remains on Earth, under
the Sky, before the Divine ones. W hen we speak o f M ortals, we
are already thinking o f the other three along with them, but we
give no thought to the simple oneness o f the four.”33
Further,"The M ortals live saving the Earth. Leaving it for itself.”34
M o rtals live perceiving the Sky as the Sky. T hey allow the
celestial bodies to take their course; they do not try to make
bad w eather go o d and vice versa; they do not turn day into
nigh t and night into day.
M ortals live to the extent that they wait for the Divine ones as
such. H opeful, M ortals offer to them that which was unfulfilled.
They expect a hint about their imminent arrival and do not
confuse the signs o f their absence with anything. They do
not m ake gods unto themselves or replace them with idols. In
suffering and misery they foresee Salvation.”35
I f the Fourfold ( G eviert) cannot be conceived in a one-sided

way, if only one part o f the Fourfold ( Geviert) cannot be
im agin ed separately, then any m ention o f the Earth, Sky, G o d s,
an d M en autom atically calls for the presence (specifically,
“prae-esse” “tearing away from the essence,” and "subm erging
into essence”) o f all others.
H eidegger also states,
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
3^ Ibid.
215
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M o rtals dwell in th at they in itiate their own n atu re —

their being capable o f death as d eath — into the u se and
practice o f this capacity, so th at there m ay be a go o d
death. T o initiate M o rtals into the nature o f death in no
way m eans to m ake death, as em pty N o th in g, the goal.
N o r does it m ean to darken dw elling by blindly starin g
tow ard the end. In saving the E arth , in perceiving the
Sky, in aw aiting the D ivine ones, in in itiatin g M o rtals,
dw elling occurs as the fo u rfo ld preservation o f the
F o u rfo ld (G eviert).36
• Crossing out Sein
Heidegger's m anuscripts from the second h alf o f the 1930s

contain an interesting image.
This m eans that there is no Being w ithout the Fourfold (Geviert),

and the crossed-out Being is Geviert. A t the sam e time, when
Being appears, it makes Geviert appear, which means that it
cannot be written in som e other way. It is never given to us on
its own, that is, w ithout the F o u rfo ld (G eviert) or o u tsid e o f
the Fourfold (G eviert). A s soon as we focus on Seyn-Being as
such, G eviert m an ifests itself. A s soon as we com e to fruition
in the event (Er-eignis), Geviert sim u ltan eou sly splash es in
four direction s o f Geviert and covers Seyn-Being w ith itself.
A s soon as Being expresses itself, it crosses itself out. B u t as soon
36 Ibid., 145; here, translated from the Russian.
216
\
as Geviert in its pure form m oves away from Seyn-Being, when

it conceals Seyn-Being fully, it also breaks, d isappears, and
Seyn-Being once again begin s to show through it (only with
an oth er sid e — through “nihilation,” “nichten”),
Geviert and Seyn-Being are always together, always one and the
same, although their relationship is not dom inated by constant
statis, but rather a complex, unpredictable, and eventful dynamic
o f revelations and concealments.
T his fundam ental dynamics o f Seyn-Being as Ereignis animates

the relationship o f all four Geviert regions with one another.
W aves o f revelations and concealments, arrivals and departures,
ebbs and flows, advances and retreats, the tense element o f
war and gam e perm eates Geviert, separating and uniting the
orientations o f philosophical geography.
P erh aps, there is nothin g m ore fu n dam en tal than the "S t.
A ndrew 's cross" o f Seyn-Being. S om eth in g sim ilar m u st be
p rin ted on our p h ilo so p h ical gon falon s. O b servin g Geviert,
we observe the cro sse d -o u t Seyn-Being (as well as Nichts
togeth er with it: after all, Seyn is crossed out here in every
sen se!), we sim ultan eou sly observe the Sky, E arth, D ivine and
M o rta l ones.
N o te the subtlety with which H eidegger depicted the original

Geviert. W hen one has a fundam ental metaphysical prophecy in
m ind, everything matters.
T his writing, name, image, and graphic illustration represent

the synthesis o f the m ost profound fundam ental-ontological
knowledge. C orrect thinking is equal to som ething that we could
call "illumination'' (Lichtung in G erm an, eXXa/ay/u; [ellampsis] in
217
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G reek). Geviert is the fruit o f that illum ation and, at the same
time, an invitation to this illum ination directed at those who will
focus their entire life's thought-oriented attention on it.
M en and Gods as Neighbors
In certain m anuscripts, H eidegger depicts Geviert vertically as a

regular cross.37
In this case, the Sky (W orld) is located above, the E arth — below,
which is obvious even in the m etaphysical sense (order is above,
chaos is below; light is above, darkness is below; transparency is
above, opacity and concreteness are below).
But with this turn o f events, we will see a remarkable thing: men
and gods are positioned next to each other on the same line
between the Sky and Earth. A nd this is fundam ental. From the
standpoint o f the Earth and the Sky, men and gods are located on
the same plane, in the same circle, as part o f the same roundelay
and, strictly speaking, it is im possible to differentiate between
"right" and "left." G o d s and men are gathered around the light o f
Seyn-Being and are engaged in a roundelay. G o d s gathered at a
meeting, an assem bly (Scandinavian thing) around Seyn-Being,
and ended up next to men, since they are neighbors in Geviert. It
is this kind o f neighborship that m akes the gam es between gods
and men possible. Indifferent to men’s problem s, gods occasionally
37 M artin Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am

M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1989), 310.
218
V
encroach on the sphere o f m en (and this intrusion is blessed),

visit them at hom e, find them selves in the oven, in the icon
corner, at the home's hearth, in bread, wine, the wind's blow, in
the sacred tree. A ll o f this becom es possible if we organize
G eviert in this manner.
sky (world)
men, gods
mortals
earth
G o d s end up being men's neighbors; they live in the nearby

grove, in the spring, in the stream , in spring air, in the fear o f
the night, in m idday heat, in ripe wheat; they visit m en and
vice versa, com pete for ow ning the spring, young beauty, or a
skillfully executed vessel in the sam e way that men act tow ard
each other and in relation to those w hom they are not. T h e
Bible contains a troubling story about close contacts betw een
m en and "G od's sons,” which describes how "G o d ’s sons" were
once m esm erized by the beauty o f men's daughters and came
dow n to the earth. T h e ir descendents were an ancient race o f
gian ts later gone extinct from the face o f the earth.
T h is coexistence o f men and gods on the shared plane is one

aspect o f the fundam ental rethinking o f the fundamental-
ontological schem atic diagram o f Geviert.
219
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A nd, at the sam e time, the p osition o f the Sky and the E arth on
the vertical axis underscores the kind o f war that they carry out
against each other. T h e Sky attacks the Earth, the E arth hides
from these attacks, defends itself, gathers into itse lf in the face
o f a self-scattering open Sky. T h is is U ranogeom ach y— the
war betw een the E arth and the Sky (W orld ). In this war, Seyn-
Being is the constant dynam ic o f life. T h e order o f Geviert has
not been set once and for all. T h e Sky as the expression o f
the ordering region o f fundam ental-ontology cannot im pose
its order onto the E arth once and for all. T h e E arth is too large
and prim ordial for this, too vast, too heavy. It never stop s its
life's w ork for a second, which is expressed in the stirrin g o f a
great weight. N o m atter how decisively the Sky acts, the E arth
does not allow peace to occur as sim ply peace, hidin g from the
Sk y ’s rays; the E arth m akes everything earthly, envelops the
Sky's volition with a thick presence and thereby saves things
from im m obility and perfection. T h e E arth gives things that
are established by the Sky the opp ortu n ity to decay and return
to the Earth. T h is is the Earth's revenge, its counterattack. N o
m atter w hat the Sky gives birth to with its creative power, the
Earth will, sooner or later, dissolve it in its sacred prim ordiality.
T h e Sky strikes the E arth for this; the E arth suffers, suffers
through this, and, once again, contracts in pristine fresh ness
after the splittin g strikes o f the Sky's thunder.
The Sky and the Earth are not separated from one another—
they are the waves o f Seyn-Being, its m eans to existence. These
are regions and directions o f Being.
Uranogeom achy can be dram atic and turbulent. A t times,

however, the passion subsides. The battle between the Sky and
the E arth brings beings so that they become. A truce puts out
the trem bling o f beings. The Sky tends to always fight, whereas
220
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the Earth is always ready for a truce. Peace is the E arth s revenge,
since peace is a period o f dissolution. Peace does not give birth to
anything. Everything that is born is born in war.
The A xis o f Anthropotheomachy
W e could try turning the cross o f Geviert in some other way.

T hen we will end up with another vertical axis and a different
structure o f fundam ental-ontological tension. I have not located
this kind o f a schem atic diagram in Heidegger's work. It is
theoretically possible, however, if we start at the primacy o f its
position as St. Andrew's cross, in which one o f the vertical poles
can be taken as the absolute vertical line. W ith the Sky's
leadership, this kind o f a possibility is supported by Heidegger's
own m anuscripts. But we can also put the Divine at the top o f
the vertically positioned cross.
God
sky earth
man
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T h e very sym m etry o f depicting Geviert pu sh es us tow ard

placing G o d , in the singular, at the very top. P erhaps, the
absence o f this version is explained by H e id eg ge r’s stu b born
lack o f desire to som ehow add ress the qu estion ab o u t the
“m ultiplicity o f go d s or the presence o f a single G o d .” B ut
at the sam e time, he clearly h olds onto the p o ssib ility o f a
single G o d w ithin the fu n dam en tal-on tological system o f
coordin ates, as evidenced by his usage o f the term “G o d ” in
the singular and, m ore specifically, the “L a st G o d ” (“G o d ” in
particular, not “g o d s”). B u t H eid egger carefully avoids forcing
any d iscu ssio n ab ou t a G o d b ased on a ju stifie d fear o f slippin g
back into the old m etaphysics and ontological theology, which
w ould be the equivalent to refusing to p h ilo so p h ize w ithin
the space o f another Beginning. T h e qu estion o f the one G o d
should be resolved at the assem bly o f gods, in their trem bling,
in the sacred in accessibility o f their secret m eeting at the
hearth o f Seyn'Being. W e can — appro xim ately— ju d g e only
the divine horizon as one th at open s up inside the sacred,
sacral (H eilige). B ut it is the sacred that is the other (poetic)
nam e for Seyn'Being. “ T h e sacred and Seyn-Being both nam e
one and the sam e and not one and the sam e ( ...) • T h e sacred
and Seyn-Being are the nam es o f anoth er B egin n in g tested
through experience and thought through.”38 Each o f these
nam es belongs to a different sphere: one to p oetry (the sacred,
H eilige), and the other to p h ilososh y (Seyn-Being). T h e divine
in relation to the hum an is located on the other side o f Seyn-
Being, on the other side o f the sacred zone (H eilige). T h is is
why m an in his essence, as the gu ardian o f Seyn-Being, always
sees the divine only as the farth est h orizon and can not ju d g e
the num ber o f god s, their m ultiplicity, or singularity. T h is is
not m en’s b usin ess, but th at o f g o d s— to count them selves, if
n um bering for go d s has any kin d o f m eaning,
38 M artin Heidegger, Uber den Anfang (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio

K losterm ann, 2005), 157.
222
\
Therefore, it w ould be more accurate to represent this schematic

diagram as follows:
The Divine
(gods? God?)
sky earth
man
In this positioning o f Geviert, there develops the greatest kind

o f opposition between gods and men, which were more like
neighbors in the previous version. Here, their relationship
becom es more hostile. G o d s fight men, attack them, send them
sores and suffering, m ock them, despise them. G o d s can kill men,
laugh at them, turn their lives into hell. A t times, men begin to
storm the light, airy citadels o f the gods and, on occasion, they
m anage to kill them ("G o d is dead," writes N ietzsche, "And we
have killed h im ”). In com parison to men, gods are im m ortal, but
in com parison to Seyn-Being, they are mortal, since Seyn-Being
is the event that carries Nothingness in itself as the possibility
to "nihilate," "annihilate." Som etim es, gods die (as the great Pan
once died).39 Let us also recall the Biblical subject about Jacob
w restling with the angel (G o d ) until dawn.
39 The novel M alpertuis by the Belgian author Jean R ay ([Lon don : A tlas,
1 99 8]) tells a different story o f certain great G reek gods: they degenerated
and turned into a sinister family o f hum anoid dolls. Unable to die, they
dried up and transform ed into pathetic dum m ies. (See also Jean Ray,
Tochnaia form ula koshmara [M oscow : Yazyki russkoi kul’tury, 2000].)
223] .
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A s we have already mentioned, arfthropotheomachy, the struggle

between gods and men (m ens defeat), not only m eans that gods
win but that men also do. G ods, having taken men hostage,
captive, enslaved, liberate men from their dependence on beings,
m aking them truly free for the first time. This is related to the
term "rapture,” which literally means being taken into the sky, an
abduction on the part o f som ething greater.40 T h u s, S ain t Paul
the A postle was "caught up” to the third heaven. T h e poetic
epithet o f adm iration and rapture at one poin t m eant the brute
act o f m an being kidn apped by m uses or spirits and taken into
heavenly captivity.
A nd vice versa, m ens victory over gods, the storm ing o f O lym pus,
leads to men’s defeat, since by destroying and burning down the
farthest horizon o f the divine, men lose their connection to Seyn-
Being, drop it, lose the thread o f Geviert, are thrown into the
abyss o f Nothingness. T his is not the revenge o f the gods, but
rather a self-inflicted punishm ent, their conscience, their “ethos”
(as the place o f gods in men) that pushes them into the desert o f
nihilism and techne as the price for a victory they should not have
achieved under any circum stances.
T h ere is another conclusion that could be draw n from

observing Geviert in this p articular orientation: when god s
are above and p eop le— below, then the E arth and the Sky are
located in equal positions by m oving onto the sam e plane. T h is
m eans that this tim e around, they lo st their vertical o pposition ,
sto pped fighting, reached a truce; this m eans that they are now
together, which, in turn, m eans that it is their turn to engage
in the roundelay. We can call this m om ent the m arriage o f the
S k y and Earth, their engagem ent.
40 The author uses the term "voskkiskchenie” ( eocxuvnenue), which contains

the w ord "abduction" after the prefix, to em phasize the etymology. In Latin,
"raptus” is “seizure ""abduction.” (Ed.)
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W h en the m o rtal m an begin s to realize h im self on the. sam e

vertical axis as the god s, when anthropotheom achy is set
aflam e, then the Sk y and the E arth are m ade equal, interlock
w ith each other in a chaotic connection, and their sacred
m arriage takes place.
W hen man feels the weight o f a deity not next to him self (then
it’s not its weight but, rather, lightness), but above himself, against
him self, then he is located on the line of"polemos” with gods, and
the Earth and the Sky becom e equals, then the world falls into
chaos (sacred or otherwise).
Seyn-Being as the “In Between”
H ere we should ask the following question: what stands in the

m iddle o f G eviert? In different texts and m anuscripts, Heidegger
pu t different things at the intersection o f Geviert. We saw that in
H eidegger’s depiction o f a crossed-out Seyn-Being, the center
can only be taken up by Seyn.
Seyn-Being lives between gods and men, between the Earth

and Sky; between ([Zwischen), in between (Inzwischen) is where
Seyn-Being is located. If it had specific localization then we
w ould be dealing with Sein-Being o f the old m etaphysics. But
in fundam ental'ontology, Seyn-Being does not have a specific
place; its place is alwys between places. Furthermore, this
"between” is the name o f Seyn-Being, But since Seyn-Being is
w hat is m ost fundam ental, then everything that has anything to
do with it— first and forem ost, Geviert and its regions— also
225
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become that “in between,” defining their position through their

relationship with the other. The m eaning o f the abyss is that it
has no bottom . It is not that it is simply too deep: there is no
bottom at all. Similarly, the “in between” is n o t“ between one and
the other.” O n the contrary, “one” and the “other” are hypothetical
directions taken from the starting point o f this “in between,”
where the ends' own Being is taken from their relationship with
the “in between.” The intersection o f the Geviert axes is the m ost
im portant “in between,” which m eans that it is where Seyn-
Being hides and opens up through everything that radiates from
it in all directions. H eidegger warns that the poles o f Geviert
and their struggle against each other cannot be understood as
self-sufficient entities. “The Earth is not a section o f beings-as-
a-whole. The W orld is not a section o f beings-as-a-whole. Beings
are not separated into two sections. The Earth is existence
(Being as essensing, Wesung) o f beings-as-a-whole. The W orld
is the existence o f beings-as-a-whole. The Earth and the W orld
belong to Sein-Being o f beings-as-a-whole. This is why we can
never understand the war between them if we imagine it as a
com petition or battles between different things."41 The Earth
fights to become the W orld (Sky). The W orld fights in order to
instill order on the quiet and rebellious Earth. But both the Earth
and the Sky (W orld) m ust be conceived from what is between
them which is Seyn-Being.
Geviert and Ereignis
In other cases, H eidegger places Ereignis at the center o f Geviert.

This is not different than the sam e picture from before, only Seyn-
Being is described in it as the event, as som ething exceptional,
unique, final. Conceiving o f Seyn-Being as Ereignis, we end up in

V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1998), 21.
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the very m om ent o f another Beginning, initiate the Beginning

w ith this thought, Geviert is not and does not becom e, it
h appen s, com es to fruition as an event in the dynam ic explosion
o f Seyn'Being. T h is explosion is som ething seynsgeschichtliche,
an d which occurs only once. Geviert is invalid until the event
com es true, and another B eginning activates, and, thus, now
we are dealing only with gu esses about it. Geviert is, and to
such an extent that Ereignis is.
For this reason, H eidegger’s work contains the following diagram.'42
world
man -4
I
Ereignis
1
earth
P lacin g Ereignis at the center of Geviert shows its

seynsgeschichtliche character. Geviert is not simply beings
(,Seiende) or beings-as-a-whole. These are beings and beings-
as-a-whole when the event (Ereignis) occurs, when Seyn-Being
explodes, and when the L ast G o d arrives. This means that it is
accurate to conceive o f Geveirt from the standpoint o f Beings
eschatology. Geviert is an attem pt, a fundam ental-ontological
im pulse, in which Seyn-Being is recognized as the “in between”
and not in any other way. W ithout this impulse, there is no
Geviert. This is incredibly im portant to rem em ber in order to
understand Heidegger's thought process correctly.
42 M artin H eidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am

M ein: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1989), 310.
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The Thing (das D in g)
The third candidate for being placed at the center o f intersecting

fundam ental-ontological orientations o f Geviert is the thing, das
D ing .43 H eidegger warns that we m ust refrain from conceiving
o f the thing at the center o f Geviert as the fifth element. The
intersection o f two axes in Geviert does not represent som ething
new. This point does not possess independence. O u tsid e o f
Geviert— as a functional, dynamic fundam ental-ontological
m odel o f relationships inside a living rhythm along both o f these
axes— there'is no thing.
Any thing— for instance, a tree which we observe— is, is present.

A nd being in presence, it, as a result o f this fact o f being present,
represents the necessary crosshairs o f Geviert. This is why any
thing should be correctly interpreted within the fram ework o f
fundam ental-ontology as the crosshairs that indicate the axes
piercing it. Only in this case, being placed into the light o f
Geviert, does the thing become the thing.
Let us recall that Geviert is the intersection o f two axes along

which anthropotheom achy and U ranogeom achy develop, the
war between men and gods, the war between the Sky and Earth.
Seyn-Being itself is Heraclitean noXepog (polemos), the “father
o f things." W e refer to the thing because this is the crosshairs
of two wars, more specifically, o f a single war, which occurs in
two perpendicular directions. H erein lies the dynamic life o f
the thing, which is never itself— it is picked up by the regions o f
Seyn-Being, m aking it overflow with life and saturating it with
the breath o f death. For this reason, the thing in its fundam ental-
ontological dim ension is not simply a kind o f beings. It com es to
fruition, occurs, expressing Seyn-Being with itself, including its
43 See, first and forem ost, M artin H eidegger, D a s D ing, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze
(1 9 3 6 - 5 3 ) (Frankfurt am M ain : V ittorio K losterm an n , 2 0 0 0 ).
228
nihilating power. The thing is therefore dangerous and risky, it

is thrown into the abyss o f the great war. There are no non-living
things in Geviert. A ll things live here, in the field o f a continuous
and unpredictable battle.
It is im portant to m ention the Indo-European etymology o f the

w ord "thing." The roots o f the Latin word "res,” G erm an "D in g”
and R ussian “eeufb” (veshcti) originally contain a reference
to political-judicial procedures. H eidegger asks the following
question: what is D in g ? A nd answers him self: D ing is som ething
that was presented for debate at a thing, a folk assembly, at
'agora” (Ayopa) for the prupose o f deciding the rightfulness or
lack thereof, usefulness or lack thereof, o f what was presented.
D ing, a thing, is that which is brought forth to be judged. But at
w hat kind o f a trial? The kind o f trial that represents the circle
o f people walking atop the Earth, under the Sky, and in the
presence o f Deities' signs, since all sacred meetings am ongst the
ancient peoples occurred precisely in this manner. M en gathered
at a thing in front o f the Divine; this meeting occurred on Earth
under an open Sky. W h at was presented and placed at the
center o f discussion was D ing. D ing is not a symbol, a sign, or
an instrum ent. D in g is the intersection o f all four dim ensions o f
Geviert at a single m oment, when these dim ensions gather for the
purpose o f carrying out a fundam ental decision. It is im portant
to address R ussian etymology. W h at is the basic meaning o f the
R u ssian word "veshcti”? "Veshcti” is what is presented at a veche,
a Slavic folk assembly, and what is decided there. Similarly, the
G erm an D in g is what was presented at the thing. It is interesting
to note that even the Latin res initially m eant "the m atter”
specifically because it was presented to the public, to a gathering.
T his is where res publica (republic) comes from. Therefore, we
find the idea o f a gathering am ong the Latins as well, the practice
o f reaching a fundam ental decision with the help o f the Earth,
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che Sky, and G o d s. A n d chis is not simply a m etaphor given to

us by Heidegger but an insight into the core o f the way things
are in thought, language, and history.
The Thing and the Gifts o f Geviert
Every direction o f Geviert brings* the thing” something o f its own.
T h e Sky brings the thing what m akes it precisely what it is.

T h e Sky illuminates it with its light, which makes it visible
as that very thing, this kind o f thing. T h e Sky shows its place
in the world, since the Sk y and the W orld are synonym ous in
H eideggerian fundamental-ontology. A pine, for instance, is a
pine because the Sky makes it so; the Sky illuminates it as a
pine and endows it with orderly worth.
T h e E arth makes the thing present, it m akes it real, while the

Sky m akes the thing “precisely this one,” a concrete thing and a
thing that is included in the general order o f all things. In the
same way, the Earth unites all things because they all consist o f
a foundation, and, at the same time, it separates them, casting
them throughout its endless vastness. T h e Earth and the Sky
unite and separate things, but do so differently.
T h e D ivine ones introduce the sacred into the thing. W h en gods

get closer to the thing, this thing becom es em bued with their
m ost subtle, invisible, and imperceptible vibrations. T h e thing
becomes sacred. A sacred thing is the thing o f the gods. G o d s
are those for whom everyone is meant. Everyone is a sacrificial
offering handed to them. By accepting things, gods make them
light for themselves and heavy for others. Sacred things are the
m ost light and heavy things simultaneously.
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M a n brings exaltation to the thing, offers it a name. But this

is not a name in the sense o f "property” since man in Geviert
does not yet p o ssess the thing. In Geviert, man poetically sings
the thing and often drinks (from the sacred sacrificial vessel)
in order to sing on this path. Herein lies the m ost im portant
aspect: man treats the thing through language. M an extols the
thing, places the thing into language, and places language into the
thing. M an pronounces the thing. M an creates the thing in a
hymn, in poetry.44 H e creates, which means he places it where
it is located, between the Sky and Earth, before G o d s praised
by them themselves. Therefore, according to Heidegger, the
essence o f the hum an in relation to things is the exaltation o f
things, it is a hymn, it is poetry.
L an gu age is not an attribute o f man, but rather man is a form

o f languages presence. Lan gu age is the core o f Seyn-Beings
truth. Therefore, speech and statem ents reach man’s greatest
horizon, as the ‘guardian o f Seyn-Being” H e introduces the
m o st im portant aspect into the thing, som ething that exceeds
himself, and that is a statement, nam ing as a call to presence.
44 %oir\aiq (G reek), “p o e try ” m ean s "creation," “work."

II. GEVIERT AS TH E MAP OF
TH E BEGINNING AND TH E
RETREAT FROM IT
The D esert Grows
Geviert is the world as it is from the standpoint o f Seyn-Being.

T h is is a world un derstood within fundamental-ontology. For
this reason, this is the world that pertains to the Beginning,
to that m om ent in the Beginning that is, in a certain sense,
shared by both the first Beginning and another Beginning.
T h e First Beginning remained quite primal until the m oment
when the philosophical revelations and insights on the part
o f Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle
m ade definitive statem ents in the spirit o f metaphysics and
ontology (in which the essence o f beings became equated with
Sein-Being). T h e deviation from fundamental-ontology could
only be docum ented a posteriori. T h is explains H eideggers
im m ense interest in the pre-Socratics— he, a thinker o f another
Beginning, peers into the first Beginning striving to see what
m akes a Beginning the Beginning, i.e., what is initial. T h is is
why his favorite poet, Holderlin, a poet o f another Beginning,
is so close to the G reeks and the G reek poets o f the first
Beginning in his worldview.
In this sense, Geviert is a fundamental-ontological perspective

o f the world's revelation in the event (Ereignis), i.e., the
ho rizo n o f Being’s eschatology and the phenom enon o f
the L a s t G o d 's walking by and, at the same time, the
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im m ediate still frame o f the kind o f cosm os that opened

up before the first G reek thinkers in the original m ovem ent
toward philosophy and poetry. But outside o f this original
moment, Geviert can also be conceptualized, but not as an
initial phenom enon and event, rather as a platform for the
fundam ental-ontological criticism o f non-initial m etaphysics
and cosm ology based on this m etaphysics. Geviert is only
from the stan d p oin t o f Seyn-Being, when Seyn'Being com es to
fruition in a unique and singular m om ent. B u t when Geviert
is not, in other periods, characterized by the “aban donm ent
o f Being” (Seinsverlassenheit), it still is in a certain sense, but
only through its turn in the o p posite direction, not unlike
H eidegger reading the m essages ( Geschichte) o f Seyn-Being
itself in "B ein gs aban donm ent” and "B ein gs oblivion,” which
led to nihilism.
W ith the help o f Geviert, we can also examine non-Gevierf.

In other words, we can examine G eviert as a fundam ental-
ontological m ap where through the application o f other—
non-initial— representations o f cosmology, astrology, physics,
and theology, we can m easure the volume and qualitative
characteristics o f what N ietzsch e called “desertification”
( Verwustung). In this case, it is the desertification o f Geviert
that is in question, the distortion o f p ro p o rtio n s between
different “regions o f the world,” the change in their statu s and
position, their separation from Seyn-Being, the violation o f
the fragile initial connection between them.
T h e entire history o f philosophy, culture, and civilization can

be described as the process o f progressive desertification o f
G eviert It is this that will be the seynsgeschichtliche procedure
o f correct historic analysis.
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The Idea Covers the Sky
In the first section o f our investigation (Seyn und Sein), we

described in general terms the way Heidegger conceptualized
Seynsgeschichte and its stages. Let us now project these stages onto
the m ap o f Geviert in order to better understand their content.
H eidegger defined the place o f Platonism as the E nd in the

first Beginning. Here, G reek thought carries out a radical
transition from the very possibility o f thinking about Being
(Sein) as som ething different from beings (Seiende) and records
the ontological set o f problem s with the essence o f beings as the
"second kind o f beings’, ’ placed above all others.
O ntology is being constructed over ontics in such a way that it

does not reveal the Being o f beings but rather ultimately makes
them inaccessible. T h e principal instrument o f this process is
the theory o f ideas. I f we were to project this set o f problems
onto Geviert, then the m ost serious transformation occurs in
the region o f the Sky (W orld).
T h e Sky as the world region o f the fundamental-ontological

m ap in the initial Geviert is conceived as being open. Seyn-Being
reveals itself in this openness o f the Sky, in its bottom lessness
and depth. Plato puts the idea in the Sky and not only that,
but in the m iddle o f the Sky, indirectly, in the place o f the
Sky. A s the greatest kind o f beings am ong all beings, the idea
overshadows the Sky, replaces it.
T h e Sky itself is at the foundations o f seeing, since the Sky is

the region o f light and lighting. But the natural and open light
o f the Sky, tracing back to Seyn-Being, turns into an artificial
and "closed” light o f the idea in Plato.
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T h e idea as the expression o f thfe greatest kind o f beings closes

up the fundamental-ontological dim ension o f the Sky and
transform s the Sky as a region o f the world into a metaphysical
sphere. From now on, this is the Sky o f metaphysics both in
the philosophical and religious senses. According to Heidegger,
P latos metaphysics enteres Hellenized Ju d a ism through Philo
o f Alexandria, and then, through the G reek translation o f the
Septuagint, it enters Christianity. T h e Sky obtains its identity as
a logical position equal only to itself and non- equal to anything
else (the Earth, first and foremost).
T h e introduction o f logic and its laws decisively enslaves the

Sky within ontological statics, and all the versions o f later
metaphysics, including M odernity and open nihilism do not
fundamentally change anything in this question.
T h e Sky is no longer the existence o f Seyn-Being which battles

the other existence o f Seyn-Being, the Earth, in a creative and
dramatic war-game o f mirrors.
T h e Sky is the substance, essence, Seiendheit, the greatest kind

o f beings (ovTcog ov [ontos on]). T h e war against the Earth
continues, but it is no longer a game. T h e goal o f this war is
radical annihilation.
Techne (rsxvrj), Machenschaft, and “deliberate self-imposition”

take root here.
The E arth Turned into M a tte r
T h e Earth's transform ation occurs symmetrically to this. T h e

Earth in the initial version o f Geviert is not simply what is
below, at the base o f the world. It is lower and broader than that.
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T h e Earth is also open in terms o f fundamental-ontology, even

though it is closed in the face o f the open Sky, T h is mysterious
o pen n ess o f the E arth is the abyss (A bgrund). T h e E arth as
G rund (foundation, ground, soil) is Abgrund, the abyss, in
its fundam ental-ontological essence ( Wesen) because it is
none other than the essensing ( W esung) o f Seyn'Being. T h e
E arth is always lower than one could imagine. H erein lies its
life-giving power and dark terror. W h en the Sky is replaced
with the "idea” (in Aristotle, this is "energy” or "eidos”), the
Earth becom es "matter,” "substance,” "vXrj ” (yli), "wood,” the
fo u n datio n for em bodying the idea in its concreteness. T h is is
still that sacred Earth, sacred element, but it is already closed
from below, it is the bottom , not the abys, the limit, not the
dark power o f birth and destruction. But in this Earth, one
cou ld already foresee the Sch o lastic conception o f "signata
q u an titate” the am ou n t o f quantitative matter and the object o f
M o d e rn m etaphysics up until the "m atter” o f the materialists.
Ultimately, the Earth's life-giving darkness transforms into

entropy, exacting revenge through the indiscriminate spread o f
decay to all that is being disseminated stubbornly and aggressively
by the technical will to power, which was once the Sky.
H u m an M a n
B u t the m ost im portant desertification, according to Heidegger,

is expressed in the kind o f man who begins to think differently,
becom es aware o f him self differently, losing his fundamental-
ontological horizon. M an becomes closed, appropriates what
was the horizon o f Seyn-Being, the dom ain o f the gods, the
speech o f the Sacred (Heilige). A s a "guardian o f Seyn-Being” the
horizons o f speech and thought were open to man, as the forms
o f existence o f fragile, far-removed, and carefree gods, as flashes
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o f Seyn-Being illuminating the M en part o f Geviert through

man. A t the end o f the first Beginning, m an began considering
this his property, what constituted him as a species, even though
man, as a species, with his closed-off and self-identical essence,
does not exist. M an is the place for language, possible zones o f
invasion for light gods, a chasm in beings through which Seyn-
Being expresses itself as a thought. A s in G eviert.
T h e man o f Platonism and all following Western European

metaphysics is a closed (off) man: groundlessly, he asserts
his foundations and self-identity, defiantly appropriates for
him self that which was handed to him for the purpose o f
praise, exaltation, and safe-keeping. Logos was a god, daim on,
the source o f ethnics and the horizon o f true thought, the
beginning o f philosophy. In Geviert, logos owns man, not vice
versa. In G reek anthropology man turns into “C<pov Xoyov sxov”
(zoon logon echon), an “animal that owns the logos" (n o te “sxov”
u \ • tt u • tt \
— having, owning )*
In p o s t - S o c r a t i c ph ilosophy, this an th ro po lo gy, initially

d isc e rn e d only by s o p h is ts (for in stan ce, P r o ta g o r a s and
h i s ' ‘m an is the m ea su re o f all th in g s” ), b ec o m e s a ccep te d
acro ss the b o ard . T r a n s la t in g into L a tin , we get “an im alis
r a t i o n a l i s which d o es not c o rre s p o n d to anything, since
ratio ” is not “logos,” b u t “m in d ,” p re se n t in o rd in a ry
m en rather than th o se who p h ilo s o p h iz e a n d who were
illu m in a te d by the logos. T h e sam e fate reaches daim on,
which w as m an s ethos” in H e r a c lit u s . M a n to o k away “ethos”
from daim on, a p p r o p r ia te d it for h i m s e l f (in h a b itin g it with
id o ls), and, ultim ately, p layed w ith it for two m illen n ia,
only to c a st ethos” a sid e as so m e th in g e m pty to g e th e r with
the N ie t z s c h e a n analysis o f the "genealogy o f m o r a ls ” an d
the p r o s p e c t o f g o in g “ b ey o n d g o o d an d evil." T h a t sam e
N i e t z s c h e reco rded the “death o f G o d .”
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The sam e thing occurred with language. Instead of

understanding its meaning and deciphering the message o f
Seyn-Being included in it, man decided that language is his
own attribute, and, through the distortion im posed by logic
and grammar, turned language into an instrument o f the "will
to pow er” instead o f one that highlights Seyn-Being. From
this point forward, he became sure that thought, language,
and the divine are objects fully found within his completence
and dependent on his self-identifying nature. T h is notion was
ultimately fixed with the C artesian concept o f the subject and
the following metaphysics o f Modernity.
M an , establishing h im se lf as a special kind o f beings, lost

access to his own essence, which is constructed around his
o pen n ess to Seyn— Being as som ething radically different and
alternative to p o sse ssin g an original essence. D esertification
com m en ced when man began to represent and create things
instead o f exalting them.
In the Beginning, man praises the thing, names it. In Greek, this
i s " %oir\aiq" (p o iesis), which m eans "creation."
W h e n we enter the p h ase o f Platonic thought, this sacralizing

creation through exaltation o f the thing turns into direct
pro d u ctio n . IJo e a ig does not becom e poetry but rather the
feverish creation o f new beings, artificial beings, which now
expresses only m a n s uncontrollable will to power.
M a n begins to do som ething that is completely uncharacteristic

for him. H e no longer safe-guards the mystery o f Seyn-Being
or m aintains the harm ony inside Geviert. Instead, he roughly
interfers in beings, mangles them, knocks out o f them what he
needs, and seeks to subjugate them. It is here, in H eidegger’s
view, that fundam ental decadence sets in.
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Here, we come to an extremely im portant boundary. According

to Heidegger, it is to man, out o f all four directions o f Geviert,
that the decision (Entscheidung) is given. M an is a deciding
creature, capable o f making a choice. Seynsgeschichte depends
on this choice. M a n s freedom, his openness, his groundlessness,
disunity, and bottomlessness, his mortality comprise the fact
that he is capable o f disposing o f his vocation to guard Seyn-
Being according to his own will. H e can guard it, or he can evade
doing so and leave his guard. T h is decision is fundam ental and
cannot be corrected by anyone or anything in the m om ent
when it is taken. Here the Sky falls silent, as do the Earth and
the G o d s. A n d even Seyn-Being itself leaves man in a free fall,
since the freedom entrusted to him is that very illumination o f
Seyn-Being in that place o f beings that is called “man." M an can
choose to be or not to be, to exist as a guardian o f Seyn-Beings
truth, or to be in some other way, accordingly, som eone else.
M an dam aged Geviert. H e paved over the Sky with ideas and
flattened the Earth down into matter. H e dispersed, enslaved,
and killed the G o d s. H e arm ed h im self against Being and chose
to forget about his own mortality. A n d he was free to do this
since it was this freedom, this decision (Entscheidung) that
com prised his region o f Geviert.
However, being fully and solely responsible for this decision,

which was formulated during the course o f the first Beginning
and soon gained clear attributes o f Platonic metaphysics,
being completely free in this decision, man was not free in
organizing its consequences. H e created ontology within the
emptiness o f his great turbulent will, but he had no power over
predetermining the E n d that resulted from the decision he had
made. It is this that is Seynsgeschichte, fate’s message as the power
o f Seyn-Being, even more powerful than the power o f the one
whom Seyn-Being vested with the power o f his freedom. This
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is the eschatology o f Being, which, having fully accepted mans

decision in the first Beginning, demonstrated the true content o f
this decision as techne and placed man in front o f the mirror o f
his nihilistic End. Deciding everything him self in the emptiness
o f the great Beginning, man could not be free o f only one thing—
the End itself, which was contained in that very Beginning, and
which became inevitable and predetermined at that precise
m om ent when the content o f the decision that was made (even
within the framework o f the Beginning) became clear.
M a n ruined Geviert himself. A n d he paid for this with himself.
D isplaced Gods
T h e fall o f the original Geviert and its damage inevitably touched

upon the fourth region o f the divine, Heidegger speaks about
this in a figurative way by describing the “flight o f gods” (Flucht
der G ottern), O ne could describe this as the definitive and
irreversible victory o f men in the course o f anthropotheomachy.
T h e subject o f deicide or the death o f gods has ancient roots.

M an y archaic cults are based on the symbolic murder o f
g o d s — such was the fate o f Dionysus, Adonis, Purusha o f the
H in d u s, and so on. T h e idea o f deicide is also at the center o f
the C hristian religion. M en can kill god. G o d can die.
B ut it would be even simpler to scare a god away rather than

kill him. O n e does not need to carry out lengthy military
operations that require great costs, employ cunning, divide
up the resources and form squads, or think through defense
and attack strategies. It is sufficient to close o ff at least one
o f Geviert's directions, to extract one fragment from the
overall fundam ental-ontological map o f the world, even if an
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insignificant one. T h is will result in the flight o f the gods.

T h ey cannot stand roughness, stupidity, bad language, lack
o f kindness, discourtesy, and, m ost important, they cannot
tolerate enclosed spaces, slam m ed doors, finalized forms, ideas,
thoughts, and things. G o d s are openness and union. Such was
the Heraclitean g o d -logos: if his whisper remains unheard, and
the unity o f beings that he opens up remains unresponded to,
then he hides immediately, because those parts that are cut
o ff from unity fall away at an infinite distance. Herein lies the
secret: m ost o f all, gods are afraid o f stupidity or "conventional
wisdom" (which is the same thing), the "rational mind,"
"practical reason," and the Aristotelian "(ppovrjoiq” (phronesis) .
C o m m o n sense, a sober and calculated attitude, experience, and
rationality are the m ost tried and tested weapons against gods.
G o d s exist where there are sages and madmen. R ational and
pratical people are worse than poison for the gods.
M en trium phed in anthropotheom achy as soon as as they

became simply men, "human, all too human." T h u s began the
w ord s disenchantment, its desacralization.
The Fate o f the Intersection
N o w let us observe what occurs with the intersection point

as Geviert moves away from its initial (anfangliche) state.
We already discussed the transform ation o f Seyn-Being in
Platonic and post-Platonic philosophy. Seyn-Being begins to be
conceptualized as Sein-Being and as "the greatest kind o f beings’
(ovtcogov). Ultimately, it is beings (Seiende), no matter how great,
that end up at the center. At the same time, the autonom ization
o f Geviert’s center occurs. It is conceived of, not as an
intersection o f two dynamic axes, but as an independent and
fixed point, independent from these axes. T h is autonom ization
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creates a new m ap o f philosophy that stops being fundamental-

ontological and becomes ontological. After recording this point
o f the greatest kind o f beings” 'essence” "substance” we can step
away from Geviert and its world regions and construct different
geometric m aps o f thought pushing off from this point.
T o an even greater extent, these transformations with Geviert

affect Ereignis, the event, which we also placed at the intersection
o f the axes. T h is point is no longer conceived as Ereignis,
the event. T h e singularity, uniqueness, rarity o f Ereignis—
as an explosion o f Seyn-Being in its m ost direct and original
expression— has been lost. Seyn-Being stops being the event
and no longer comes to fruition. It is now conceptualized as
som ething permanent, "eternal,” "always present,” "guaranteed,”
"in presence,” as a provided, universal, and empty ontological a
priori. Being outside o f the Beginning is never Ereignis. Herein
lies the m ost profound attribute o f non-initial (old) ontology. In
the place o f the event, there now stands its negation, something
op p o sed to the event— what does not come to fruition, does
not happen, but always is. Instead o f freshness, suddenness,
a lightning flash, and newness, we have the case o f a priori,
familiarity, constancy, and banality.
A lso changing is that third item, which we previously placed

inside Geviert, i.e., the thing, D in g, T h e thing ceased to be a
simple and oversaturated expression o f Seyn-Being as war
(noXsjUog) or as the question that was brought out to a veche for
discussion am ong the Sky, Earth, gods, and men, dem anding
a life decision. It became som ething artificial, a sign, symbol,
com posite beings decom posable into an idea, form, essence,
and matter, substance em bued with secondary attributes and
qualities— accidents.
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We can summarize all o f these transformations o f Geviert at the

End o f the great Beginning in the following schematic diagram.
The Sky becomes a place

where ideas flutter and Living gods withdraw
cloak Seyn-Being; and retreat
The Sky is covered
with ideas
-Essence replaces Seyn-Being

(Sein als Seiendheit)
-The thing becomes a symbol
splits into form and matter
-Ereignis does not occur
Seyn-Being does not happen
'■ The Earth is

M an imposes himself conceptualized as matter
and turns beings into and ioses ty
re-pre-sentation dimension of an abyss
Geviert and Scholasticism
D uring the era o f Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Geviert stops

being Geviert per se. Its structure falls apart, the Fourfold
stops being fourfold, and we place the m ap o f Geviert over
a new structure o f post-Platonic ontology only to follow the
correlations between fundam ental-ontological proportions and
relationships that were indicative o f the Beginning as well as
their later distortions.
Geviert deviates from its initial structure even further

when it is dom inated by C hristian theology and Scholastic
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philosophy. According to Heidegger, this period does not bring

anything principally new to Platonic ontology, where the idea
stands above everything else as the “greatest kind o f beings"
com plementing this ontology with a theological concept o f a
single G o d , as the greatest kind o f beings, the supreme kind
o f beings, sim ultaneously acting as the Creator o f every other
(lower) kind o f beings, H eidegger believes that we are dealing
with the next level o f absolutizing the principle o f techne,
when all beings begin to be thought o f as a certain analogy
to technical production, and the demiurge is considered the
supreme being— the master who creates things and objects.
Betw een the w orld and its Creator, there appears an im passable
chasm , as i f between the potter and the po t he had made.
T h o s e fundam ental-ontological approaches that anim ated
Geviert, the subtlest o f distinctions, dram atic wars and,
sim ultaneously, the unity o f worldly regions in G eviert— all
this ended up incom patible with the C reationist m etaphysics
o f theology and Sch o lastic philosophy. It is not an accident
that the C h ristian perio d o f W estern history occurs under the
sign o f Three, not Four.
T h u s, the ontological structure changes appearance even

further. T h e com parison between the new theological ontology
and cosm ology with Geviert becomes more and more difficult.
N onetheless, certain parallels remain. T h e m ost important
aspect o f theology is the qualitative change in the status o f
the divine. Instead o f gods and an open question about the
possibility o f a single G o d , strict m onotheism is postulated as
the absolute axiom. G o d is the absolute subject and absolute
object. H e is the greatest o f beings and, at the same time, the
creator o f Being (like the w orld’s Being). T h ere is a relationship
o f strict transcendence between G o d and the world. G o d
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cannot be evaluated like the wdrld, he is beyond lim its. H e

created the world out o f N othing and has no pro sp ects o f
qualitatively changing H is own “nihilating” attributes. T h e
relationship between men and G o d acquire a strictly ju d icial
and m oral character. G o d “signs” a T estam e n t with men (a
kind o f a contract) and sternly watches over the adherence
thereof, penalizing the violators and rewarding those who
strictly follow its points.
T h e m onotheistic G o d does not have anything in com m on

with the g6d s inside G eviert. T h e se god s were a part o f the
world; it was im possible to calculate their num ber; they were
mobile, volatile, and fragile; it w ould be more accurate to say
that they are not, but, at the sam e time, they are not not.The
G o d o f theology is not part o f the world, but its C reato r; H e
is strictly unique; H e is im m obile and eternal, always equal to
H im self; H e is and, furthermore, H e is the O n e who is.
From the philosophical standpoint, it is easy to recognize

Plato's highest idea here, supplied with additional features and
attributes. From the standpoint o f philosophy, religion adds to
its structure only a little— individual details. T h e entire thought
topography remains the sam e— metaphysical and ontological.
T h is conception o f G o d breaks Geviert apart, turns it into

an asymmetric schematic diagram with G o d heading it at an
absolute and immesearable distance from the rest.
O n the other side, across from the transcendent G o d, there lies

the Earth. But, o f course, this is no longer the sam e E arth
that we had seen in the Beginning or even the sam e vXrj (y li),
substance, or m atter d iscu ssed by G ree k philosophers. From
now on, the E arth is only dust, expressing N o th in g, that
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sam e N o t h in g from which the world was created— transient,

temporary, and subject to decay. In Scholasticism , m atter was
divided into two types: m ateria prim a and m ateria secunda.
T h e form er represented som eth in g analogous to that from
which the world was created, whereas the latter was a plastic
substance responsible for physical and specific perception
o f tangible and created things. Everything that was not
G o d becam e the Earth. It is quite telling that even the Sky
was know n as the "firm am ent” from this point forward, i.e.,
soil, earth, even though it was unique and heavenly. L e t us
recall that inside G eviert, the E arth acts as the beginning
o f closedness and closing but, at the same time, a place o f
safe-keeping and hiding. T h e E arth as m ateria in creationism
(p rim a and secunda) is reduced to closedness, but loses its
quality o f safe-keeping and hiding. M atter as an expression
o f N othingness neither guards, nor conceals. O n the contrary,
it brings decay and m ortality into things. A ccording to Psalm
1 0 2 :1 4 , "F o r thy servants take pleasure in her stones, A n d
have pity u p o n her dust.”
From now on, the Sky (W orld) and man are creatures, created
entities, ens creatum. In a certain sense, as a given, the Earth
itself is also ens creatum. All that is created is earthly in some
way. T h e Sky and its inhabitants (angels) have a certain kind
o f superiority within the framework o f the general hierarchy
o f creatures, although the Sk y no longer possesses ontological
uniqueness. In Heidegger, the seynsgeschichtliche function o f the
S k y (W orld) is replaced with Divine Providence, organizing
the world order in accordance with the creating, sotereological,
an d eschatological script.
N egatively equating the rights o f the three Geviert m em bers

in the face o f a transcendent G o d also has a “positive" side
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focused on soteriology— the teachings about salvation o f

the soul. M an, despite being created out o f nothing, out o f
dust, is able to address G o d directly: neither the breadth
o f the E arth nor the height o f the Skies is an obstacle. In
Christianity, there is an additional and highly im po rtan t
doctrinal position: Incarnation. G o d the Creator, in one o f
his em bodim ents, assum es a hum an nature, thereby revealing
m an s path o f deification.
T h u s , man, while rem aining a creature, earthly, m ade o f

dust, becorties higher than the other creatures and, in som e
ways, higher than the Sky. C h r is t revealed the pathw ay to
the S k y for him.
But for Heidegger, theological statem ents represent only the

m ovem ent in the space o f P latonic metaphysics, in which
the fundam ental-ontological set o f problem s is im possible.
Therefore, H eidegger does not dedicate m uch attention
to analyzing theology, considering the C h ristian era in the
history o f W estern E u ro p ean philosophy as an extended
interlude between Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and
M odernity, on the other. In term s o f the intersecting axes in
Geviert, where we placed Seyn-Being, Ereignis, and the thing,
this poin t also transform s in theology. Being is no longer Seyn
or Sein, splitting into two p a r ts — G o d 's Being (as the highest
o f beings) and the Being o f the w orld as that o f the creatures.
In this scenario, the question o f Being as such cannot be p o sed
correctly. Here, too, H eidegger sees the m ovem ent away from
Being, the aban donm ent o f Being (Seinsverlassenheit), and
the oblivion o f Being. Ereignis, having disappeared from the
horizon o f philosophy im m ediately after the B eg in n in g1, does
1 Furtherm ore, H eidegger is inclined to think that Ereignis is not an attribute
o f any Beginning, but rather, that o f another Beginning; therefore, placing it
at the center o f Geviert m ust be done in light o f this correction.
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not appear in the theological depiction o f the world, even

though in Christianity, unlike in Plato, we encounter the
event that has an absolute significance for all C hristian faith.
T h i s event is the arrival o f C h rist, the divine logos. It w ould
be completely inaccurate to examine C h ristian cosm ology
as a special version o f G eviert with the event (Ereignis) and
the com ing o f C h rist at the center. H eidegger un derstands
Ereignis in a completely different way, and does not connect
it with redem ption, but rather with fundm anental-ontology.
However, at the sam e time, we cannot avoid noting this
parallel, even though its accurate interpretation would require
an in-depth course in theology.
Finally, when it com es to the thing, here it turns into a

creature, ens creatum, and its ontological significance fully
coincides with its place in the hierarchy o f creation; herein lies
its identity. Overall, S ch o lasticism takes on the A ristotelian
theory o f the thing (form and m atter), but the general
C reatio n ist perspective unequivocally interprets the thing as
a created thing. I f in Aristotle, tex^ still is> in a certain sense,
m an ’s im itating the creative power o f tpvaig (physis), then in
S t. T h o m a s A quinas, nature (N a tu ra ) itse lf imitiates G od's
craft. T h e relationship between nature and culture changes
substantially in favor o f culture, and man's production, elevated
to the level o f Divinity, becom es the m odel and paradigm for
u n d erstan d in g the natural processes, which, in their turn, are
now conceived as an enorm ou s m echanism or apparatus m ade
by the Creator. T h u s, the overall un derstanding o f the thing
as ens creatum, res creata, brings us significantly closer to the
final trium ph o f what H eid egger calls M achenschaft. W e can
su m m arize the changes in G eviert inside Sch olastic theology
in the following diagram .
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God-Creator
transcendent
ENS CREATUM
J
ENS CREATUM
sky
covenant incarnation
man earth
In this diagram, we m ust pay attention to the fact that the

structure o f Christian theology itself opposes being depicted
inside a fourfold figure, despite the fact that the figure o f
the C ro ss is the principal symbol o f C h ristianity A n d even
though the significance and symbolism o f the C ro ss had been
described in a multitude o f excegetic and myical texts, and the
connection o f this symbol with various teachings about the
fourfold structure o f the world (four seasons, four elements,
four directions, four evangelists, etc.) is obvious, it has no
relationship with the essence o f C hristian ontology.
Geviert in the M etaphysics o f M odernity
It is c u sto m ary to p erio d ize p h ilo so p h e rs as M o d e rn startin g

from G alileo, Francis Bacon, Isaac N e w to n , B aru ch S p in o z a ,
and, especially Rene D esca rte s. F o llow ing a lengthy p e rio d
o f d o m in a tio n by theology and the S c h o la stic (selective)
A risto te lia n ism taken in the L a tin tra n sla tio n (w hich m isse d
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m any highly im p o rta n t a sp e c ts o f G ree k thought), W estern

E u ro p e turned, tow ard a new style o f ph ilosoph izin g, which
a im e d to liberate itse lf from M ed ieval d o g m a tism , S ch o la stic
A risto te lia n ism , and the p ressu re o f theological axiom s. T h e
P ro te sta n t R e fo rm a tio n offered favorable con d ition s for
reaching this goal by challenging C ath o lic d o g m a tism and
the hitherto u n q u e stio n e d authority o f the C hurch.
H eidegger, however, underscores the fact that in addition to

the truly "new" (at least in com parison to the M iddle Ages)
elem ents in this philosophy, we also see in it the continuation,
developm ent, and establishm ent o f the same Platonic-
A ristotelian metaphysics, the same kind o f thinking b ased on
categories with reference to ontology, the essence o f beings, the
idea, etc. M od ern ity did not overcome the old metaphysics,
b u t simply to o k it to its logical conclusion, extracted, and
revealed all the consequences em bedded in it. Therefore,
in the philosophy o f M odernity, we encounter the traces o f
several centuries o f the developm ent o f the Scholastic m indset
an d the emergence o f deeper, specifically W estern European
p aradigm s, which could be expressed with greater clarity,
candor, and specificity.
From its first manifestos and programs, M odernity revealed

itself to be the time o f rsxvrj. Furthemore, from now on, the
m o st im portant pole o f techne was moved from the Medieval
G o d -C re ato r to man himself, having become, since the
Renaissance, the m ost principal "creator” o f culture, society,
economic systems, politics, etc.
W e have dem onstrated that, according to Heidegger, it is

m an that was entrusted with the decision (Entscheidung),
predeterm ining the course o f establishing Modernity, the fate
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o f W estern European thought, and, consequently, the course

o f W estern European history ( Geschichte). It is man that
was responsible for “destroying” G eviert. D u rin g the M o d ern
period, this issue, veiled during the era o f S ch olasticism , is
fully revealed. It reaches culm ination in the philosophy o f
Rene D escartes. D escartes nam es the hum an ego, the thinking
ego ( res cogens), which is expressed in his form ula cogito ergo
sum, as the main authority in the ontological ju d g em e n t
o f Being. T h is is how the philosophical topography o f the
subject is established, which ontologically constitutes the
object with' his thought (and G o d in deism ). Being a radically
new thought process from the formal standpoint, this change
in direction, in reality, only revealed the main m essage o f
the early G reek philosophy. B ehind its generalizations, gods,
elements, ideas, and cosm ogonic construction, the anticipated
shadow o f the future subject already flickered, which was
called differently at that point yjvxq, vovg (psychi, nous), etc.
Therefore, the Renaissance, with newly found pathos, began
to discover G reek authors for itself, in m o st cases incorrectly
interpreting their thought and sim plifying it. R enaissance
philosophers intuitively gu essed that the new era in Europe
was profoundly linked to the perio d o f the first Beginning,
representing, in a certain sense, its m irror reflection. T h is
explains the influence o f D em o critu s on G alileo Galilei and
Pierre G assen di, Plato on N ich o las o f C u sa ; this is the source
o f the N e o p lato n ic A cadem y in Florence (G e m istu s Pletho,
M arsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della M irandola, etc.), the
surge o f interest in the M ilesian school, Parm enides, Epicurus,
Lucretius, etc. M odernity was the beginning o f the End, much
like P lato and A ristotle representented the era o f the end o f
the first Beginning. T h e B eginning was reflected in the En d .
T o an even greater extent, this is obvious in those W estern
E u ropean philosophers who su m m ed up the m etaphysics
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o f M odernity, i.e., H e ge l and N ietzsch e: both diligently and

continually add ressed the G reek s (first and foremost, the pre-
S o c ra tic s and especially H eraclitus).
W h a t do we get if we superim pose the topography o f Geviert

over the philosophical schematic diagram o f M odernity?
In place o f man, there now stands the subject. T h e subject is

the kind o f figure that is placed at the center o f an ontological
construction. The subject is the essence (essentia, ovoia [ousia]) o f
m an and equal to his ability to reason and his rational activities.
From any standpoint, the subject is a direct construction o f the
old metaphysical topography. First, we are dealing with essences,
which immediately send us back to the Platonic idea, replacing
Seyn-Being. Essentialist thought and essentialist interpretation o f
man as a. generalizing essence (species— siSog [eidos]) was further
strengthened in Christian theology. Therefore, the subject is
based on this metaphysical foundation. Second, at the basis o f
a subject there lies the definitionof man as animalis rationalis, a
"thinking animal.” W hen it comes to "anim alis” Charles Darwin
and other evolutionists will deal with this issue later all the way
through to ethology (Konrad Lorenz), whereas it is Descartes
who will already make "rationalis” into the main attribute o f a
subject, thereby equating the rational mind with man's essence.
A t the same time, the novelty o f this philosophy includes the

fact that putting the subject at the forefront liberates him (as the
final philosophical version o f man) from his dependence on any
above-standing ontological authorities, Being, first and foremost,
which from now on derives from the subject's judgement. The
subject's thought process is deemed to be the proof o f his Being,
therefore, Being is the function o f thought and subjectness. Later
on, this topic will be developed further by Kant, who will cleanse
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the philosophical topography o f M odernity even further by

formulating the construction o f“pure reason," i.e., an autonomous
structure o f that same old rationalis.
M an as a subject transform s everything else into what he is

n o t— an object. T h e concept o f a subject is inseparable from
that o f an object. An object is that which is in fro n to f the
subject, that which is pre-sented to him (hence the G erm an
Gegen-stand,"standing across” or the R u s s ia n “nped-Mem” (pred-
met) — that which has been “thrown in front o f something.”)
T herefore/in this system o f coordinates, all other m em bers o f
Geviert become objects— the Earth, Sky, G o d (note that we are
dealing with G o d that has been rethought out o f the theological
context, in the singular, even though during the Renaissance,
timid attem pts were m ade at addressing a certain version
o f polytheism, including Bernardino Telesio’s hylozoism,
G iordano Bruno's pantheism, alchemical traditions, all the
way through to Spin o za and, later, the G erm an R om antics).
T h eir objectness differs: G o d as an object o f the highest order,
as the First Principle— the existence o f which is postulated
by the rational mind thinking abou t one’s own origins; the
Earth and the Sky together com prise an object o f the lowest
order, som ething spatial (according to D escartes), res extensa,
an “extended thing." E quating the E arth and the Sky on the
basis o f substance, that is, the earthly (material, corporeal)
nature o f the Sky, is justified, as a priority, in English empirical
philosophy by Isaac N ew ton, first and foremost.
T hus, in philosophy o f the M od ern period, we encounter

further disfigurement o f G eviert.
We see that in the given case, the structure o f Geviert has

been distorted even further. T h e Sk y m erged with the Earth:
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-highest object
-God in deism
-causa sui
subject
s -logical first cause
the ontological argument

(Beingfrom reason)
\> -lowest object

-res extensa
-causa sui
-logical first cause
the nature o f the heavenly bodies was recognized as strictly

analogous to the nature o f the earthly bodies (which was
rejected by pervious philosophical interpretations o f the
world's structure). T h e assessm ent o f an object's Being (both
highest and lowest) was assigned to the subject. T h e G o d o f
deism gradually lost the attributes o f a subject and became a
m ental abstraction (it is not surprising that at the next stage o f
philosophy o f the M od ern period, it was completely discarded).
T h is philosophical topography o f the M odern era is highly

significant, because its main parameters represent the m ap o f
the End, the last stage o f Geviert, which, prior to this point,
m aintained a certain correlation to its initial appearance.
Gestell as Fate
H ere we approach a key concept in Heidegger's philosophy

from his late perio d— that o f Gestell (literally: a frame, a stand).2
2 In E nglish, Gestell is often tran slated as "Enfram ing" (Ed.)
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Gestell may be viewed as a fundam ental seynsgeschichtliche work

in destroying (distorting, decaying) Geviert. W ith o u t accounting
for the stages o f deform ing and collapsing Geviert, Gestell
cannot be understood. Gestell is Verwustung, “desertification,”
an inexorably approaching catastrophe, but, at the same time,
a process, with the help o f which the man o f the W est realizes
his history (fate, Geschichte). M an replaces the thing first with
a symbol, then with a created thing, then with an object. T h is
is how the objectification o f the world gradually occurs. An
object is no longer a thing, but rather, a far-removed derivative
thereof. W h en man is no longer capable o f constituting and
praising the thing (D ing) in its sacredness, in its presence, its
poetic qualities, he reproduces the object (Gegenstand).
T h e object is not simply another name for the thing. A n object

is the end o f the thing, when instead o f the intersection o f
two live-giving axes o f war in Geviert, we are dealing with an
artificial, death-giving constructions o f man's rational mind.
Gestell is the fundamental work o f man's essence in destroying

Geviert. From a poet, man turns into a “proletarian," “producer,”
and, at a certain stage, he wants to know nothing outside
o f economics. A n d everything started with p o etry ...M a n
tears him self away from the world and its regions, from free
and proud essensing (Wesung) o f the thing to such an extent
that he only begins dealing with artificial objects that are
fully within his will because he produces them himself. In
this kind o f production, there is no place for either the Sky,
Earth, gods, or God. Here, man reigns suprem e— only m an as
a subject (economic subject, judicial subject, political subject,
etc.). Gradually, man becomes irritated not only with natural
things (these he tries to exterminate as a class) but also various
things he created himself. T h ey end up being too “spontaneous,"
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distinct, therefore "free,” and “autonomous,” i.e., independent

o f his will. T h is is why man gradually transitions to m ass serial
production, the"eternal production o f one and the sam e ” "ewige
Herstellung der Gleichen” T h is is the industrial-economic
version o f N ietzsch e s Eternal Return, Gestell is a fundamental
phenom enon for Heidegger, Gestell is the fate o f man. Gestell is
the essence o f man on the path to the developing consequences
o f the decision he made in the first Beginning. Gestell is the
direct opposite o f Geviert, its alternative and the process o f
its deformation, destruction, and overthrow.3 But at the same
time, H eidegger hears the voice o f Seyn-Being even through
this destruction. T h is voice is silence, abandonm ent o f Being
(Seinsverlassenheit), concealment ( Verberen), but it, too, can be
heard and deciphered. Gestell is the profound essence o f techne
and M achenschaft. A n d as such, it is linked to Seyn-Being. Seyn-
Being exists (west) through this Wesen.
H eidegger talks about the "war o f Seyn-Being with beings!’4 T h is

war is based on the fact that the correlation between Seyn-Being
and beings is problematic and not obvious. It is this factor that,
more so than anything else, deserves questioning. I f questioning
is not constituted in the proper way, or if it becomes one o f
the questions alongside all others, if the answer given to it is
too hasty or incorrect (and the decision in all cases is taken
by m an — the carrier o f speech— as a form o f Seyn-Beings
existence), then Seyn-Being initiates war with beings. T h e name
o f this war is Gestell.
3 “Gestell is what destroys Geviert'.’ (M artin Heidegger, Z ur Frage nach der

Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens [St. Gallen: Erker-Verlag, 1984], 12.)
4 M artin H eidegger, Beitrdge zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis). op. cit„ 310.
In full, this statem en t reads, “D er Streit des Seyns gegen das Seiende aber
ist dies Sichverbergen der Verhaltenheit einer ursprunglichen Zugehdrigkeit’. ’
'T h e war o f Seyn-Being again st beings is the se lf concealing relationship o f
original belonging.”
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Here, we approach the m ost im portant issue: how should we.

conceptualize nihilism and the catastrophe o f philosophy’s End in
a non-dual way?
In a dual shematic diagram, Geviert is conceived as som ething

authentic, whereas Gestell— as inauthentic. Geviert opens up
the Beginning, whereas Gestell is work toward bringing the
End. However, H eidegger uses every possible way to m ake
us realize that dual thinking is fundam entally inaccurate. It
can never resolve a philosophical problem or even form ulate
it correctly! One must think non-dually and, i f one so desires,
non-logically. O pp o sites m ust not simply be overcome through
synthesis (as a third given), but also m ust be thought o f
simultaneously as opposites and non-opposites.
Geviert is a world in which Seyn-Being is revered, a world

seen in a fundam ental-ontological way as it actually exists
(west) in the fundam ental-ontological essence (W esen). Gestell
is an unyielding, centuries-long, and deliberate process o f
destruction, distortion, and annihilation o f this kind o f a
world, a presum ptious oblivion o f Seyn-Being, a series o f
foolishly form ulated questions and even m ore foolish answers.
Gestell is man's ultimate failure, his catastrophe, his misfortune,
his self-denial, his unfulfillable goal; it is his neverending end,
his unrecognized dying per se, and the m urder o f everything
around him. H o w can all this be com bined? H o w can one
see the quiet voice o f Seyn-Being in either one? H o w can one
recognize destiny (Geschick— Geschichte) in this?
Gestell is the essence o f the world's inauthentic contents. It

appears as the world's skeleton, when Seyn-Beingis incorrenctly
conceptualized as Sein-Being. Seyn-Being opens up as Ereignis
in Geviert. Sein-Being is the routine in Gestell. But even
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though there is a fundam ental (the m ost fundam ental o f all)

oppo sitio n o f Seyn and Sein, they are not different and, at the
furthest-rem oved ho rizo n — one and the same. T h is is not a
sim ple thought. Perhaps, this is the least simple o f all thoughts.
B u t in u n derstanding this thought lies the key to the entire
philosophy o f M artin Heidegger.
The In du strial T ransform ation o f the Fourfold
From the philosophical standpoint, Gestell fully reveals itself

in the metaphysical topography o f M odernity together with
D escartes. H ere one could theoretically finalize the analysis o f
G eviert’s deform ation in Western European thought. But for
the purp ose o f a graphic demonstration, we could trace more
specific transform ations found at the point when M odernity
turns from being a philosophical program into a political,
social, ideological, and economic practice. T h is analysis offers
certain case-in-point m oments that simplify our understanding
o f speculative philosophical problems.
M o d ern ity reaches its peak with industrialization, which,

in practice, em bodies the m ain tendencies present in the
can dor o f M od ern -era philosophy. In this period, the world
regions in G eviert undergo visible changes, the main content
o f which one could easily find as early as D escartes. Yet there
is a certain distance between the beginning o f the End and the
E n d itself. T h e m o st significant change concerns G o d . A t the
E n d o f philosophy, "G o d dies.” Therefore, an entire region o f
the w orld collapses, which, starting from Geviert and until
D escartes, was part o f the philosophical topography in one
way or another. N ie tz s c h e s phrase G o d is dead refers to a
radical extraction from the ontological picture, not j u s t the
specific figure o f G o d , but the entire dim ension that previously
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was necessarily present in the philosophical topography, also

having been the basis o f the entire ontological construction
in theology. “G o d is dead" does not simply mean crossing out
the greatest o f beings, the G o d Person, but also the annulm ent
o f an entire dimension, an independent world region, which
was part o f Geviert and all other ontological m aps. T h is is the
real end o f Geviert (the Fourfold), since one o f its dim ension s
disappears in the m ost radical way. T h is is called “atheism,"
the rejection o f acknowledging G o d . H eidegger dem onstrates
that atheism, radically changing the ontological topography,
still remains within the fram ew ork o f W estern E u ropean
m etaphysics. After all, another dim ension is now in the place
o f the annulled one— either m atter (for m aterialists and
M arxists), “N o th in gn e ss” (for agnostics) or utilitarianism ,
value, life (for utilitarians, Liberals, and the philosophers
o f life). A n empty space, left in the place where the Divine
used to dwell, has the sam e role in the m etaphysics o f the
industrial world as the one previously carried out by a deity.
It remains the source o f the greatest kind o f legitimation, the
highest soft nod that indicates “divine” approval, acceptance,
and agreement. O nly from now on, the insignificance o f
this legitim ation allows us to speak abou t the “legitim ation
from the side o f N oth in gn ess.” Nothingness approves or
disapproves o f man’s fate. T h o s e who can look the truth in
the eye form ulate this literally: “N o th in g n e ss approves or
disapproves.” T h o se w hom the tragedy o f the given situation
escapes, prefer to say the following, “N o th in g n e ss neither
approves, nor disapproves.” T h e form er are conscious nihilists
(C onservative Revolution, Fascism ), the latter— un conscious
nihilists (C o m m u n ism , L ib eralism ).
S t a r t in g w ith Plato, the S k y w as the receptacle o f ideas, an d

later, in C h ristian ity, the S k y b ecam e G o d ’s throne, even
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t h o u g h it w as created . N e w to n 's cosm ology, prin cipally

b a s e d on the qu ality o f the gen eral sub stan ce, co m p are s
the S k y to the E a rth in term s o f sh ared sub stan ce. But
ultim ately, the S k y d is a p p e a r s as such du rin g the era o f
in d u str ia liz a tio n , the triu m p h o f science and techne th ro ugh
flig h ts into space an d p e n e tra tio n deep into su b stan ces,
q u a n t u m m ech an ics, the th eo ry o f relativity, field theory,
etc. T h e r e is no m ore S k y as the Sky. M a n encoun ters only
earth ly su b sta n c e, m a tte r everyw here.5 S a te llite s paved the
S k y over w ith b lin k in g a p p a ra tu s e s , iron b o d ies, an d all-
p erv asiv e radio waves, fin ish in g o f f d e sac ra liz atio n , which
b eg an w ith P la to n ic id e as. S a te llite s are the ideas o f the
in d u s t r ia l era.
T h e E a rth also sto p p e d b ein g E a r th . N o w it p ro d u c e s

h a rv e sts forcefully. It is p o is o n e d w ith chem icals in order
to achieve the im p o ssib le . T h e y m ake deep holes in it to
reach its black p e tro le u m b lo o d . T h e y cut o u t its in sid es
to d eprive it o f b r e a t h — g a s. T h e E a rth is b ec o m in g a
“resource," th at w hich m u st be s c o o p e d o u t an d destro yed,
re d u c e d to n oth in g, given into entropy. I f earlier the very
p rin cip le o f the E a r th fu n c tio n e d as a gentle fem inine
s a b o t a g e o f the Sky's order, then now m a n k in d is tu rn in g
th e E a r th it s e lf into d u st; m an m ercilessly rapes, destro ys,
d e v a sta te s, p o is o n s, sp rays w ith acids and civ ilization al
w aste, sco rch es, an d to rtu r e s it.
M a n o f the industrial era is further removed from man o f

G eviert than one could imagine. H e inflated his subjectness
to such an extent that he m ade h im se lf microscopic, infinitely
small, nearly gone. N ietzsch e wrote about this speaking o f the
5 G erm an poet G ottfried Benn wrote about this in his poem “C han ts”
(“Gesange"): “Everything is the shore, forever calls the sea.” (“Alles ist Ufer,
ewig rufi das M eer.”)
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"L a s t Men." T h e L a st M en are riien o f the En d . By p ro du cin g

m ountains o f garbage, they become garbage themselves.
A t the same time, the thing turns into an industrial product,

go o d s for sale; that is, it no longer exists at a com m unal ting or
veche— a sacred gathering but is exclusively in the m arketplace.
S o m e m anufacture things, others resell them, others yet
consum e them, and all together they create a singular stream
of late-human, late-historic m ech an ism s— production,
consum ption, thirst, suffering, desires. P roletarians and the
bourgeoisie once and for all crash what was destroyed before
them by the titans o f Antiquity, M id d le Ages, Renaissance,
and the heroic beginning o f M odernity. It was the giants that
destroyed Geviert, and the “L a s t M en" simply swarm am id st
its ruins, stealing everything they can.
M a n b ec o m e s the m an o f p ro d u c tio n , m an o f trade, m an

o f c o n s u m p t io n — homo econom icus. A n d it is no longer
m an p e r se as a su b ject th at b e c o m e s the m a ste r o f the
world's gam e, b u t Gestell itself, re p lacin g B ein g w ith it s e lf
a lo n g w ith the event, thing, m an, an d everyth in g else.
In d u stria l p r o d u c tio n b eco m e s the fate o f homo economicus
and p re d e te rm in e s the m o st sig ifn ic a n t a sp e c ts o f the
in d u stria l e ra — the hysterical a c c u m u la tio n o f cap ita l
and the a tte m p ts to re d istrib u te w h at is p r o d u c e d by the
revo lu tio n ary p ro le ta ria t in its ow n favor.
Industrial topography can be illustrated according to the

following schem atic diagram .
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N o th in g n e ss, a bsent G od
values, experiences, interests
T
Gestell
homo economicus n a tu ra l resources

p ro d u c e r / co n su m er (earth, space)
From the standpoint o f a formal approach, this looks completely

“new” in com parison to Cartesian metaphysics. But from the
philosophical point o f view, the industrial era does not add
anything principal. Gernally, all o f this was already obvious in
D escartes and N ew ton, who predefined M odernity within its
qualitative framework.
Sim ulacrum
T h e n follows another phase o f Western European history,

though H eidegger did not live long enough to see it. We are
dealing with Postmodernity, in which the entire topography
undergoes substantial changes once again. In the postindustrial
landscape o f civilizations, certain thinkers (such as Francis
Fukuyam a) announced the "E n d o f H isto ry ” ( Geschichte), at the
same time acknowledging that the comprehension o f this end as
an ontological phenom enon will not occur and that is why this
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E nd will be "infinite.” H aving happened, it will never happen,

will never occur, will never come to fruition, since there are no
longer men capable o f making the decision that the end is the
E n d and taking on the responsibility for the profound limit o f
the End. N ietzsche him self spoke o f the "L a st M en”: " H is race
is as ineradicable as the flea; the L a st M an lives longest,” We
have invented happiness,’ say the L a st Men, and they blink."6 It
is indicative that Fukuyama who announced the "end o f history,”
mentioned the "L a st M an” in the title o f his book as well.7
T h e primary world regions ( Weltgegenden) o f Geviert may be

found in Postmodernity, but this is not the sight for the weak.
Instead o f the Sky, there gapes a giant advertising billboard,

a com puterized, transparent, and alluring w indow display.
T h e subject’s dark desires are projected onto it, previously
squeezed out beneath the perception threshold by the stoic
work o f our consciousness. T h is is anitnalis, liberated from
rationalis, letting itse lf be known. But does such anim alis
exist am ong beings? Are animals, "the living,” ‘X&ov" (zoon),
capable o f doing and desiring such vile things as the L a st
M en? T h is is not anim alis but a mechanically perverted
fantasy o f an eviscerated m an creating im ages on the screen.
H e overthrows the rational m in d and wants to be an animal,
but cannot be one, because he is not an animal. T h e n who is
he? A fter all, we cannot call "this” a “m an” from any one o f the
topographies know n to us. H e is not an “anim al” because he is
no one, an d his goal is not to becom e someone, but, becom ing
no one, to break through to Seyn-Being in order to give
speech to its illumination. By failing to do so, by establishing
6 Friedrich N ietzsche, “T h u s Spake Z arath ustra,” The Portrable Nietzsche, tr.

W alter K aufm ann (N ew York: V intage B ooks, 1954), 130. .
Francis Fukuyam a, The End of History and the L ast M an (N ew York: The
Free Press, 1992).
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h im se lf as man, man com m its an irreversible error. Instead

o f the question m ark o f his identity, he offers a hasty and
preem ptively incorrect answer. T h is is how humanity, which
is not, is created. Therefore, it is not surprising that this
k in d o f hum anity does not last for long and collapses into
a new chim era— a chim era o f a m an -b east— at a certain
m o m en t (the m om ent o f P ostm odernity). N o longer capable
o f being m an (this is the kind o f Being as a strict form ula is
in itse lf m isleading), the L a s t M a n rushes in despair to the
participan ts o f the C h ristian A p o caly p se — those places where
the Revelation m entions the “b ea st” and his number. Since the
L a s t M a n is incapable o f doing anything other than counting,
he attem pts to “count the num ber o f the beast,” suspecting
that he will find the beast within by doing so. Anim ality and
dem onic incarnation are the final illusions o f the L a st M an,
since he is neither beast, nor dem on. M an becomes posthum an.
O n the one hand, this is an Ubermensch'technicia.n, deftly
reasoning, dealing with the m obile Web, capable o f loading
inform ation stream s with data. O n the other hand, he is an
Untermensch which is also a version o f posthum anity. H e is
a consum er, a user, clicking and staring at the "user-friendly
interface,” going through countless links. N o longer capable o f
com prehending text, he is simply searching in the data bases
for what correspon ds to his perception o f the "here and now.”
T h i s is constant internautic wandering through simulated,
w inking objects; staring at the screen, it is im possible to
discern where online ends and the real world begins, as he
also continues to com m unicate with som eone via Skype.
B u t let us leave this terrifying issue o f precisely describing

our contemporaries. T h a n k G o d H eidegger did not live long
enough to see this.
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T h e Earth disappears with the ease o f com m unications, all

places become the same, and utopia is realized. Utopia is where
there is no place. According to Heidegger, the Earth opens
itself up through places. T h e Earth is that very place, a natural
place. A n d nowadays, there are no places, no distances, nothing
is separate; all places, cities, points, and M c D o n a ld s drive-
throughs around the globe are completely identical. T h ere are
identical people with tattoos and piercings, chatting, drinking
beer, using the Internet, and doing drugs.
T h ere is no m ore Earth either. It has turned into a virtual

space, where what is the m ost f a r removed is banal, whereas
what is the closest does not exist. A ll that the E arth had done
during its participation in Geviert as well as later on, in other
philosophical topographies, is no longer needed. T h e Earth
is no longer a resource, but rather a garbage dum p. People
fight for it as a garbage dump, including hum an garb age —
those very N ietzsch ean “people o f the E n d ” who “obtained
happiness.” From this point forward, the E arth is a place where
people bury garbage, whether radioactive, m anufacturing-
based, or bodies o f those who died or were crem ated. G o d
becomes a joke. H e returns from M odernity's N o th in gn e ss
in the form o f a silly caricature. N o one is scaring him o ff
anym ore or killing him. H is death lost all meaning, and that
is why it is now forgotten. It is not that H e was resurrected,
but that H e simply appeared again, as i f nothing happened, as
an independent corpse.
Today, one can speak about G o d, or be silent. N o one is

interested in H im , and if anyone is, then to no greater degree
than the intrigues o f a popular actor or a supermodel. N o ,
tabloid gossip is much more interesting than G o d . Yet still,
he returns, but this time around as a parody, as a mockery o f
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death, which had been forgotten, and which lost all meaning.
"W ho died exactly?”
Bin L aden appears on television, saying to the cameras,

Allah A k b arl” "Allah is G reat!” T h e y attem pt to capture him
immediately but fail to do so. H e is nowhere, untraceable, he
is outside o f places in the utopia o f the television. C hasing
him turns into a popular detective series. Bin Laden and Allah
switch places, but the public's suspense is ju s t as high. "W h en
will they capture him ?”
W h o m ? Allah? Bin Laden? S ad d a m H u ssein? M ullah O m ar?
In re sp o n se to the qu estion why he m ade the decision to

a tta c k Iraq, G e o rg e W. Bu sh , the form er U .S . President,
allegedly p ro claim ed , " G o d told me to strike at al-Q aid a,
an d I stru ck them , and then H e in stru cted me to strike
at S a d d a m , which I d id ...”8 We are neither horrified, nor
a m a z e d by this. W e accept this as a given. H e is the P resid en t
o f the U n ite d S ta te s after all, the head o f the m o st pow erful
an d su ccessfu l dem ocracy in the world. It is quite po ssible
th a t G o d h im s e lf allow ed him to do so.
I f som eon e were to say, "G o d is not dead, at the previous stage
o f desertification (M o dern ity ), then he w ould have been put
into a psychiatric ward. But now, in the era o f Postmodernity,
whatever one says about "god” or not about god — everything
goes. D u e to ultim ate indifference. T h in gs are turning into
sim ulacra (as per Jean Baudrillard). T h e y become derivative
o f fashions, which, as in its ultim ate em bodim ent, Gestell
captures and covers us fully.
8 Ja m e s G annon, M ilitary Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination

(W estport: G reenw ood Publishing, 2008), 125.
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T h e thing ends its journey. Fronrnow on, it is a simulacrum, and

no longer an idea, sign, object, and not even a product, but rather
a pure em bodied deceipt. A product, in which the thing dies,
still maintains a connection with manufacturing, usefulness,
and a certain kind o f rationality. But even this comes to an
end. Simulacrum, according to Baudrillard, is a 'copy without
an original," akin to a poor-quality photocopy in which one’s
imagination allows one to see whatever it w ants— a portrait
o f a President, a woman's body, landscapes, or fictional text.
Instead o f a thing, Postm odernity establishes the Rorschach
test, meaningless and unnecessary ink stain, useless and empty,
but as a result o f limitless will to power and the power o f
fashion, taken to be the absolute categorical imperative. T h e
laws o f fashion as the highest level o f Gestell proclaim:
• things live only for a moment;
• things m ust be meaningless, herein lies their meaning;
• things m ust be exchanged;
• after a thing comes another thing;
• identical things differ;
• the thing is everything; the rest is nothing;
• the thing does not die; it m ust be discarded;
• the thing is greater than life.
The shorter is the life o f a thing-simulacrum, the more intense

it is. The right shoes o f Postmodernity are those that only get
worn once. This is the logic o f fashion (Gestell), it becomes more
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and more rapid. In the past, some people wore things for several
years, now — for a season or h alf a season, but this is not the limit.
The change in things at breakneck speed is their death factory,
their planned and systematized genocide. Behind the entropy o f
things, behind the transition to the regime o f total simulacrum,
stands a culture’s readiness to completely annihilate Geviert.
In s te a d o f Being, we are now dealin g with “virtual reality.”

The very c o n ce p t o f “reality ” in the m eta p h y sics of
M o d e r n it y is “v irtu a l” to the g re a te st extent in the sense
th a t it is fictio n a l an d o n to lo g ic ally u n ju stifiab le. W h e n a
su b je c t p o s t u la t e s w h at he h as in front o f him as an object,
he carries o u t a rather q u e stio n a b le o p eratio n b a s e d on
ju s t i f y i n g the o n to lo g ic a l reality o f this object. T h e o b ject
is o b jective (it is “in reality” ) b ecau se it is an object, i.e.,
b e c a u se it is e ty m o lo gically “in front o f m e” (the su b ject).
In D e s c a r te s, N e w t o n , H u m e , an d K a n t, this lo ok s serio u s
a n d solem n , fe a tu rin g th a t sp ecial p o m p o u s k in d o f p a th o s
w ith which lim ite d m in d s n o rm ally p ro claim yet an o th er
m e a n in g le ss absu rdity. B u t even m ore lim ited creatures
fall, even easier, for these scien tific fairy tales a b o u t the
n a tu re o f reality a n d w an d er th ro u gh the laby rin th s o f
th ese c ate go ries for cen tu rie s. T h e tra n sitio n from reality to
v irtu al reality is the tra n sitio n from a jo k e , taken seriously,
to a jo k e th a t sh o u ld be (m ay be) a source o f laughter.
V ir t u a l reality tak es the idea o f an o b ject ad absurdum ,
th ereb y ta k in g the idea o f a su b je ct ad absurdum as well.
T h i s is g r in n in g N o t h in g n e s s .
It is difficult to depict the topography o f Postmodernity.

But, as a hypothesis, the following (debatable) version may
be p ro p o se d . T h is topography is so terrifying that it could be
called “post-eschatological.”
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virtual reality— the screen— connectedness
T
fash ion
(Gestell)
simulacrum— artificial
sun o f the night,
grinning nothingness
the last m an ( ’’the devil

wears P ra d a ”),
post-humanity
the earth as a graveyard fo r "G od " as a clown-killtr

toxic waste from M ars
the sky as the place o f wandering

metal satellites sending out
signals ( + astronauts)
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III. GEVIERT IN ANOTHER
BEGINNING
G eviert and Future Fiorizons
W e examined Geviert as a possibility in the first Beginning

an d as a fundam ental-ontological m ap allowing us to better
understand those processes pushing Western European
philosophy toward its End. But according to Heidegger's own
thought, Geviert belongs to the realm o f the “future,” which
m u st come into fruition in another Beginning— at the moment
o f Ereignis. A n d despite the fact that certain parallels exist with
the first Beginning— at least prior to its reaching the point o f
establishing Platonic topography, Geviert per se was never in
the form in which it m ust come to fruition in the future.
For Heidegger, fundam ental-ontology is a project (Entwurf)

being constructed on grasping the hidden message from Seyn-
Being throughout the entire history ( Geschichte) o f Western
thought— the kind o f m essage that comprises the worsening
concealment o f Being. Therefore, Geviert should be conceived
as a horizon and, in a certain sense, a goal.
H eidegger thought that our time is the time o f the decision

(Entscheidung). T h is is also the time o f death, the grave hour.
T h e essence o f the decision comprises the following: either
W estern m ankind recognizes that its history has been the
result o f the decision taken in the first Beginning and accepts
the consequences o f “B ein gs oblivion,” recognizes the nihilism
e m b e d d e d in re/v y ( techne) an d G estell, or m a n k in d can
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continue p reten d in g that "everything is fine," that there is no

nihilism , and that there is no c ata stro p h e h an g in g over the
world. In the first case, the very fact o f g r a sp in g M o d e rn ity
as nihilism , as the "desolate times," and the fixation o f o n e s
attention on Gestell as an already realized fate m ean the
transition to another Beginning, the transfer o f attention
exclusively tow ard Seyn-Being, an d p re p a rin g for E reignis.
T h e n G eviert becom es the direct and natural extension o f
E reignis. T h e event, having com e to fruition, will establish
m an as the gu ard ian o f Seyn-Being, will open up the order
o f the S k ^ and the world, will save the E arth , return in g to
it its dignity and allow ing g o d s (th e L a s t G o d ) to arrive.
A t the center o f the four axes o f G eviert, the sacred (eeufax
[veshchaia], know ing) thing will reign again. In the secon d
case scenario, i f the decision ab o u t m ak in g no d ecisio n s
is m ade (this will be a decision in itse lf), the pow er o f
the unperceived Gestell, the force o f the arrived, but
un acknow ledged and un id en tified (to an ad e q u ate extent)
E n d , will lead to an u ltim ate catastrop h e. A n d then G eviert
will not occur, com e to fruition, and rsxvtj will plunge
m a n k in d and the E arth tow ard im m in en t death. In his final
years, H e id eg g e r leaned tow ard the view that m a n k in d had
already m ade its d e c isio n — the secon d fatal choice, an d that
the situ atio n cannot be rectified. O n ly a G o d can save us."1
In any case, in order to accurately understand Heidegger's

philosophy, it is important to relate Geviert specifically to the
future that is open and that depends on man’s realization o f his
profound freedom.
N u r noch ein G ott kann uns retten, Spiegel-Gesprach m it M artin

Heidegger am 23. Septem ber 1966,"D er Spiegel, 30. Jg . N 2 3 .3 1 (M ai 1976).
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G eviert as a G oal (a W ill Toward

M ak in g the D ecision)
In terms o f the decision that has already been made, there

can be certain uncertainties. It is quite obvious that choosing
another Beginning in the 20th century and the incipient 21st
century was not made. N onetheless, from the philosophical
standpoint, events developed with outm ost consistency and
internal logic. A t the end o f the 19th century, Nietzsche, in
essence, form ulated the end o f Western European philosophy.
T h is is a fundam ental historic (seynsgeschichtliche) fact. In
N ietzsche, philosophy reached its “eschaton.”
In the 20th century, M artin Heidegger, more so than anyone

else, recognizes the meaning o f the entire philosophical
process from the Beginning to the End in a crystal-clear way.
H eidegger philosophizes over a grave, dots all the “is,” once
again gazes upon the entire history o f philosophy, and marks
the unquestionable periods, meanings, and transformations.
N ietzsch e theorized the 20th century, but it was Heidegger
who did so in a more profound way. Heidegger recorded the
E n d o f the West, opened up the horizon o f another Beginning,
the trajectory o f leaping into Ereignis, and outlined Geviert as an
assignm ent. Furthermore, H eidegger conjugated the history o f
W estern European philosophy and Gestell with a fundamental-
ontological outlook in a grandiose manner, which made the
catastrophic position o f contemporary man not an argument
against Geviert but rather the p ro o f o f its fateful proximity.
In the 20th century itself, Ereignis did not occur. T h e decision

abou t transitioning to another Beginning was not made. It
was im possible to make this decision within the framework
o f the ideologies that openly took an oath for M achenschaft
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(C o m m u n ism and L ib eralism }-; and in the place where it

could have been made, and where certain m om ents m ade one
hopeful that it w ould be (the ideology o f the T h ir d W ay), the
decision was p assed over (this w as expressed in the chasm
between the Conservative Revolution and historic N a tio n a l
Socialism ). H eidegger h im se lf im partially interprets the
fact that the decision was not m ade in the G erm an y o f the
1 9 3 0 s-1 9 4 0 s as p r o o f that N a tio n a l S o c ialism was, too,
infected with M achenschaft, along with its inability to leave
the fram ew ork o f Western E u ro pean m etaphysics (with
Gestell, subject, techne, will to power, etc.). H eid egger h im se lf
saw his philosophy as a transition to another B eginning and,
consequently, as the ju stificatio n o f Ereignis and as a m oving
closer toward Geviert. W estern E u ro pean history ( Geschichte)
o f the 20 th century did not follow H eidegger, did not end
up at his level, did not accept or grasp his message. Similarly,
contem poraries did not u n derstan d H olderlin, Kierkegaard,
or N ietzsch e in the 19th century.
Heidegger, who had done more in the 20th century— and,

possibly, in the entire history o f philosophy than alm ost anyone
else— had every reason for despair. T h e political, cultural,
and social history o f the 20th century fully confirm ed his
assessment. D uring a turning point, he him self ended up where
he should have been heard, in Germany. H e was a G erm an, and
it was G erm ans, it seemed then, who were ready to take upon
themselves the responsibility o f changing the course o f history
( Geschichte). All elements o f fate were gathered into a single
whole. T here was only a single m om ent left before reaching
Ereignis and the universal midnight.
W hen everything fell apart, this becam e the greatest challenge

for Heidegger. It is difficult to im agine the kin d o f traum a
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that he experienced observing the events o f 19 3 0 s-1 9 4 0 s,

trying to participate in them. H e had every reason to think,
by the end o f his life, that m ankind is dead-set on trying to
kill itself, the Earth, and the world in no less a radical manner
than it dealt with G o d ,
Ju d g e d by the logic and significance o f the events and

transform ations, which m ankind lived through after H eidegger’s
death, nothing tells us that his fateful prognosis was inaccurate.
O n the contrary, in the last few decades, degeneration has gone
so far that there are very few left o f those who are capable o f
recognizing the depth and irreversibility o f this tragedy.
But we can also look at this situation in another way T h e

20th century, having recognized Heidegger as a great thinker,
essentially failed to understand his thought, and even if it did
u n derstand them, then it did not accept them. Heidegger's
philosophy, pulled apart into fragments, inspired hundreds
o f philosophers, psychologists, artists, scientists, cultural
critics and to a great extent affected the establishment o f the
P ostm odern paradigm . But practically no one fully and wholly
grasped H ediegger’s thought or followed the path leading to
another Beginning. However, if m ankind does not want to
acknowledge the fact that the E nd has already occurred and
persists in "planetary idiocy," dying without dying, and "stretches
the rubber,” tries to leave the dead end, making it eternal, then,
contrary to its will, it leaves open the possibility to make a
different decision in its stead.
T h e 21st century, in essence, has not yet begun: that which is

around us today in terms o f meaning is still the 20th century,
which simply cannot come to an end. T h e 21st century will
start when we truly begin to grasp Heidegger's philosophy. A n d
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then we will gain the opportunity to make another decision, a

choice in favor o f transitioning to another Beginning, in favor o f
Ereignis, in favor o f Geviert.
Heidegger faced Western European philosophy focused on

classic G erm an philosophy and its N ietzschean peak. O n its
basis, pushing o ff it, Heidegger took a leap into the abyss o f
a new kind o f freedom. We are now faced with H eid eggers
philosophy. In it, there implicitly lies the entire history o f
philosophy com prehended by him, Hegel, Schopenhaur,
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. However, it contains many other
things, too, which Heidegger carried out anticipating the
future and preparing for it. Heidegger's own appearance can be
interpreted as the dawn o f Ereignis, and this interpretation can
and m ust become the imperative for the 21 st century. Ereignis
did not arrive in the 20th century. T h is is a fact. But we would
not be free, would not be men, would not be thinking beings,
would not be the carriers o f great Indo-European languages, if
we were to give up in the face o f the mad, globalist crowds and
self-entertaining, scattered m asses o f Postmodernity, the slaves
o f tolerant, alienating, nihilating, and poisonous fashions.
Therefore, the decision about G eviert’s arrival remains open.

A n d this openness is established thanks to the very presence
o f Heidegger's philosophy. I f this philosophy finds at least one
adequate reader, then we cannot bury Ereignis preemptively. O r
conversely, the living breath o f Ereignis will cross out today's
world with a life-giving cross, giving the region o f N othingness
its hypertrophied and unthinkably bloated creation.
In this case, the image o f Geviert can become a fundam ental

philosophical program, goal, and banner that will gather those
'exceptions'' around whom, according to N ietzsche, turns the
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wheel o f the Universe— those exceptions, whom Heidegger

calls the future ones" (Kunftige) . W hether there will be a future,
whether the Beginning commences, whether the Event comes to
fruition depends on them.
In this case, the structure o f Geviert in another Beginning will

be as follows.
new sky the last god
RES NOVA
new thing
E R 'E IG N IS
man as the guardian

of Seyn-Being; new earth
new humanism
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PART 3
Dasein
I. TH REE STAGES OF
DEVELOPM ENT IN MARTIN
H EIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY
There are tree principal stages in Heidegger’s philosophical work.
The first stage: form ulating the principal set o f problem s

and introducing the concept o f D asein. T h e culmination o f
this period came with writing his main work, Sein und Z eit
( 1 9 2 7 ) .1 T h e phenom enological approach to H u sserl2 preceeds
this book, while the period o f pondering the grand prospects
m arked in it— one that is fundam ental for the entire history o f
ph ilo so p h y — follows it.
1 M artin H eidegger, Sein und Zeit (1 9 2 7 ) (T ubingen: M ax N iem eyer

Verlag, 2 0 0 6 ); M artin H eidegger, Being and Time, tr. Jo h n M acquarrie &
E dw ard R o bin so n (N ew York: H arp e r & Row, 1962); M artin H eidegger,
Etre et temps, tr. d'E m m anu el M artin eau (P aris: A uthentica, 1985).
2 Early phenom enological works appear in the following volumes: M artin
H eidegger, G esam tausgabe. Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann.
Fruhe Schriften (1 9 1 2 - 1 6 ); Z ur Bestimmung der Philosophies Grundprobleme
der Phanomenologie (1 9 1 9 ); Phanomenologie der Anschauung und des
Ausdrucks. Theorie derphilosophischenBegriffsbildung (1920); Phanomenologie
des religiosen Lebens; Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles:
Einfuhrung in die phanomenologische Forschung (1921); Phanomenologische
Interpretationen ausgewdhlter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie
und Logik (1 9 2 2 ); Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizitdt (1923); Einfuhrung
in die phanomenologische Forschung; A K A D er Beginn der neuzeitlichen
Philosophie (1923).
T h e following texts were written im m ediate prior to Sein und Zeit developing
individual topics from H eideggers m ost im portant book o f the future:
D er Begriff der Zeit (1924); Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie
(1 9 2 4 ); Platon: Sophistes (1 9 2 4 ); Prolegomena zur Geschite des Zeitbegriffs
(1 9 2 5 ); Logik: D iefrage nach der Wahrheit (1925); Grundbegriffe der antiken
Philosophie (1 9 2 6 ); Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis K ant
(1 9 2 6 ); D ie Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (1927).
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The second stage: the years 1 9 3 6 - 1 9 4 6 are the least know n

o f all. T h i s is the case for a n u m b er o f reasons, political,
first and forem ost. In this p erio d , H e id eg ge r w as involved
with N a tio n a l S o c ialism . Even his grad u al m argin alizatio n
within that regime did not affect his careful attention to
this phenom enon, c o m p re h e n d e d in a unique, p ro fo u n d
dim ension, which coincided, overall, with the general
approach by the C onservative R evolu tion. T h i s p e rio d was
the p e ak o f H eidegger's creative p h ilo so p h ica l p u rsu its,
m arked by conceptualizing Seynsgeschichte, Seyn, an d
especially E reignis. H e id eg ge r h im se lf wrote in a note to
"L e tte r on H u m a n ism ,” "S ta r tin g from 1936, the m ain
subject o f my thought was E r e ig n is”3
A t this time, Heidegger lives through the hope o f transform ing

N a tio n a l S o c ia lism into a p ro fo u n d ly p h ilo so p h ical
phenomenon, which has been called upon to undertake the
turning point in Western European civilization and world
history in favor o f another Beginning (der andere Anfang),
comparable and even superior to the first Beginning (der erste
Anfang) when G reek philosophy arose. In order for the historic
prerequisites o f Ereignis to occur, G erm any (representing
Europe) m ust overcome two forms o f ultimate nihilism
(M achenschaft) — the U .S. (“Am ericanism us” which H eidegger
despised) and the U S S R (in which H eidegger found the triumph
o f techne through its version o f M arxism ). H eidegger linked
the victory o f N azi G erm any with carrying out a philosophical
operation— comprehending the essence o f M achenschaft and its
interpretation in the context o f Western metaphysics and its
history. W ithout this, he warned, the war would be lost.4
3 M artin Heidegger, B rief uber den Humanismus (1 9 4 6 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:

V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1949); here, translated from the R ussian.
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This kind o f comprehension did not occur, and the war was,
indeed, lost.
H eidegger o f the so-called middle period was left outside the

philosophical discussion after 1945 for obvious reasons and
is, therefore, virtually unknown. A t the same time, it is in this
period that the philosopher expresses his profound ideas in
the m ost complete and candid manner.5 W h at we know from
this period is H eid eggers works on N ietzsch e6, which are
undoubtedly fundamental, but not fully covering the central set
o f problem s in those years. I f we miss out on the contents o f
this period, we will not be able to adequately understand the
ideas o f the early period formulated in Sein und Zeit, nor those
o f the later period.
The third stage comprises works from the postwar period

until the philosopher’s death. T h ey are the continuation o f
H eid egger’s main philosophizing trajectory. However, they are
5 W e relied on the following works in the first and second parts o f this book:
M artin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tubingen: M ax Niemeyer,
195 3); Idem., Geschichte des Seyns (1 9 3 8 /1 9 4 0 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:
V ittorio K losterm ann, 1998); Idem., Uber den Anfang (Frankfurt am M ain:
V ittorio K losterm ann, 2005), and, perhaps, the m ost im portant work o f
that period: M artin Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis).
(Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1989), published, however,
quite recently, after the author's death as a result o f his will.
6 M artin H eidegger,Nietzschel (1 9 3 6 -3 9 ), NietzscheII (1 9 3 9 -4 6 ) (Frankfurt
am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1996); Idem., Nietzsche: D er Wille zur
M acht als Kunst (1 9 3 6 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1985);
Idem., Nietzsches Metaphysische Grundstellung im abendlandischen Denken:
D ie ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen (19 3 7 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio
K losterm ann, 1986); Idem., Nietzsches II. UnzeitgemdsseBetrachtung(1938)
(Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1989); Idem., Nietzsches Lehre
vom Willen zur M acht als Erkenntnis (1939) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio
K losterm ann, 1989); Idem., Nietzsche: D er europaische Nihilismus (1940)
(Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1986); Idem . Nietzsches
Metaphysik (1 9 4 1 -4 2 ), Einleitung in die Philosopie— Denken und Dichten
( 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1990).
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placed into the context o f humanities, in which the subjects

o f the second period were censored or self-censored under the
influence o f external factors. T h e collapse o f N atio n al Socialism
dem anded the revision o f certain metaphysical expectations o f
this thinker, which could not be done openly and transparently
or, perhaps, could not be done at a l l . 7
A t the sam e time, these three p e rio d s com p rise a single whole
o f H eidegger's philosophy, which can not be d ism e m b e re d
w ithout cau sing dam age to each o f its elem ents. T h e m o st
accurate Approach, in our view, w ou ld be to begin the
h isto ric a l-p h ilo so p h ic a l in v estig a tio n with H e id e g g e r's
second p e rio d (the subject o f E reign is) as the m o st direct
and concise p resen tatio n o f the acme o f his philosophy.
O nly then sh o u ld we d iscu ss his third p e rio d an d only after
that return to the subjects con sid ered in Sein und Z eit and
D asein o f the first period, the latter b eing the chosen start
for m o st researchers.
It is this second period o f Heidegger's work that contains the

keys to his thought in its entirety. I f we were to artificially
ignore this period, then we would not be able to understand the
intentions o f Sein und Zeit, or the general trajectory o f the last
writing period. In this case, the first period will only appear to
be as a certain kind o f development in the phenomenological
approach (in the spirit o f uniquely interpreting Husserl), whereas
the third period will be seen as a harmless version o f European
humanism, a certain kind o f hermeneutics o f European culture
^ H eideggers main texts in the late period from his collected works: M artin
Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am M ain: Vittorio Klosterm ann)
including Was heisst Denken? (1 9 5 1 -5 2 ); D er Satz vom Grund (1 9 5 5 -5 6 );
Identitat und Differenz (1 9 5 5 -5 7 ); Unterwegs zur Sprache (1 9 5 0 -5 9 ); Z ur
Sache des Denkens (1962—64); Seminare (1 9 5 1 —73). Holzwege, in particular,
stands out (M artin Heidegger, Holzwege [Frankfurt am M ain: Vittorio
Klosterm ann, 2003]), containing key texts about philosophy and poetry.
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and pessimistic intuitions about a technological and ecological

catastrophe. But this is not Heidegger at all.
It is quite u n d e rsta n d a b le why it is this kin d o f H e id eg ge r

th at is fam iliar to everyone. P h ilo so p h ers enslaved by his
th o u g h t tried to in troduce him in the context o f world
p h ilo so p h y despite his political p o sitio n s. Perhaps, this
w as ju stifie d , b ecause preservin g the gran d ideas o f this
thinker in W estern E u ro p e a n culture was such an im p o rtan t
u n d e rta k in g that this concession was w orth it. A t the sam e
time, reduced preservation o f H e id e g g e r’s heritage led to the
fact that m o st often we are dealing with sim ulacra o f his
th o u g h t rather than his th o u g h t itself. Referring to H eid egger
w ith o u t accoun tin g for Ereignis, we end up m aking quite a
rough a p p ro xim atio n , i f not a caricature.
T h e refo re , we chose to begin our analysis with H e id e g g e r’s

m id d le p erio d , follow ed by the section on G eviert in which
we d e scrib e d the m ain trajectories o f late H eidegger. O nly
then, here and now, we have arrived at the poin t that has
b eco m e a c u sto m a ry start, the set o f problem s fo cu se d on
D ase in an d his m o st im p o rta n t work in which they are
fo rm u lated , Sein und Z e it.
T h is book m ust only be read in G erm an. A nd, in order to get

acquainted with it, it is quite possible to learn this language.8
T h e first attem pt to work with H eideger in the U S S R took

place in the 1 9 7 0 s and was a failure. We cannot blame am ateur
8 There are no R ussian translations that are up-to-par. Therefore, the first
generation o f R ussian philosophers interested in H eidegger m ust learn
the language in which his works are written. O nly in the future, after the
em ergence o f accurate translations accom panied by an edito rs commentary,
will it be possible to discuss the next steps.
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Soviet philosophers: it was im possible to un derstan d anything

in term s o f philosophy in that intellectual atm osphere, let alone
m ake sense o f Heidegger's o u tm o st difficult work. S tartin g
from the m iddle o f the 19 60 s until today, R u ssia has been
experiencing an “empty" time perio d from the philosophical
standpoint. A lot o f things occur, but nothing takes place.
Despite everything, we m ust prepare a new turn in R ussian

philosophy starting from an accurate understanding o f Western
thought. A n d Western thought in its greatest em bodim ent is
the philosophy o f M artin Heidegger.
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II. DASEIN AND TH E HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY (FROM TH E
FIRST BEGINNING TO TH E
END OF PHILOSOPHY)
D asein as an Illum ination and Conclusion to the
Historical-Philosophical Analysis
T h e existential analysis o f D asein, according to Heidegger, is

form ulated as follow s: “Wie ist D asein?”— “H ow is D asein?"
N o te that it is n o t" W hat is D asein " but rather “how”
Therefore, we m ust describe D asein rather than define it; we

m ust invite others to think about it rather than unequivocally
postulate its meaning.
T h e expression "D asein” is fundam ental for the entire history o f

philosophy. Formally, it m eans ‘ Being,' existence, and presence
in the world,” P rior to H eidegger, this expression was not
philosophical, nor was it com prehended as som ething unique
and central. O f course, speaking about the world's Being and
space, the notion o f “D asein " w as attached to an object, whereas
d iscu ssin g the presence o f th in gs— to a subject. However, this
notion w as not key or fundam ental before H eidegger.
It is unlikely that D asein could be taken out o f the philosophical

context. It seem s that H eidegger was illum inated by D asein .
D asein revealed itse lf to him as an em pirical reality o f language
and thought.
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The source o f thoughts about Dtfsein lies in a certain fundam ental

intellectual explosion, more specifically, an implosion, i.e., an
explosing facing inward. This is why we specifically m ention the
"D asein experience.”
D asein is not a category (later on, we will exam ine the difference
between a category and an existential). D asein is a certain kind
o f fundam ental start and in another sense, perhaps, it is even
the end o f all philosophy. H eidegger's magnum opus, Sein und
Zeit, addresses the question o f what D asein is.
I f we get closer to the experience o f D asein , even if remotely,

i f we succeed in m eeting D asein , and if we are destin ed to
live through D asein, then absolutely everything will change.
D asein is w hat turn s everything u p sid e dow n. D asein m akes
our Being-in-the-world prior to this experience akin to that
o f a m an with serious vision defects: he sees everything
indefinably and vaguely, u n differen tiated, and can only gu ess
w hat objects are. O nly D asein returns everything into focus,
and, for the first tim e ever, we begin to clearly differentiate
w hat is around us, w hat we are, and w hat seem ed like m ere
sp o ts to us earlier, prior to this experim ent. H ow ever, the
com parison to vision is lim ited to a single sen sory organ. In
order to im agine D asein, we m ust project this scenario onto
the other sen ses: hearing, touch, taste, etc. Furth erm ore,
an alogous changes take place in term s o f co n sciou sn ess and
the psychological state. E n cou n terin g D asein , we leave a
m ental com a and a psych ological clo u din ess. W e awaken.
H eidegger could reveal h im se lf to us only in the experience

o f our being illum inated by D asein . T h is experience, this
w ord descended upon him like grace or in spiration . D asein
appeared to H eidegger. O f course, we could say that the latter
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w as preceeded by an enorm ous am ount o f philosophical labor,

etym ological stu dies, learning ab ou t culture and history, but all
this is custom ary to other E uropean intellectuals. H eidegger
w ould not have been H eid egger had he not located the very
nerve o f D asein . T herefore, we will attem pt to un derstand and
live through (which is vastly m ore im portant) D asein. I f we
succeed, then we will m ake it inside philosophy. I f not, then we
will be doom ed to w ander around its periphery.
Conceptual Background fo r the Emergence of D asein
I f we approach D asein externally, deductively, and descriptively,

then we could say that it represents what remains unconditional
follow ing the colossal work o f W estern European philosophy
during the course o f its entire history. This is the remnant
and, at the sam e time, the resume o f what remained during the
developm ent o f W estern European philosophy, comprehended
as a system atic destruction o f ones own ontological foundations.
H eidegger h im self described this process as de-ontologification
or the oblivion o f the question about Being. All that remained
from this colossal nihilation— which N ietzsche called "European
nihilism,” from the total reduction toward Nothingness, from
dou bt and questioning, and then from clearing the remaining
ontological elem ents— is D asein.
If we approach Dasein internally, then this is illumination, shock,

direct confrontation with the presence even before it becomes obvious
what this presence is, who encounters it, and where this occurs.
B oth approaches can be used simultaneously. O n the one

hand, realizing the fundam ental process o f W estern European
p h ilo so ph y as the abso lu tizatio n o f nihilism (N ietzsch e:
“ T h e desert grow s, and woe to him who conceals the desert
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within him." ) brings us to a confron tation with Nothingness

(this is how we delineate the outer boundaries o f D asein as a
phenom enon). O n the other hand, shaking o ff banal cliches,
thoughts, and feelings, we break through to pure experience,
which preceded any kind o f in terpretation; this experience
reveals itse lf to us, for instance, as p art o f a strong feeling—
intense love, deadly ennui, dark terror, and so on; and we end
up inside D asein . P hilosophy gives us the opportu n ity to think
about D asein, the experience o f terror— to dwell inside D ase in .
H eidegger asserts that we cannot understand D asein through

som ething else. D asein m ust only be understood through D asein .
In his book Sein und Zeit, he shows how this occurs.
Historical-Philosophical Prolegomena to H eidegger’s
Philosophy . The Pre-Socratics
In order to trace the way in which the concept and phenom enology
o f D asein form, we m ust take a b rief excursion into the history
o f philosophy. A s we already noted, H eidegger sees the source
o f ontological nihilism in W estern European philosophy o f the
M odern period in the source o f that philosophy, in the "first
Beginning” (der erste A nfang): it was there that an error, infinitely
small in the beginning, later grows to gigantic proportions and
becomes the main content o f philosophy.
This error involves:
• the understanding o f the outside world as "nature”

((pvaig [physis]), i.e., etymologically, "sprouts” (das
Aufgehen);
• further conceptualizing it as "beings” (ov [on], das

Seiende);
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• form ing the notion o f Being (eivai [einai]) as a

generalizing attribute o f all beings (Seiendheit des
Seienden), i.e., the kind o f "Being" that H eidegger
writes with an"i” (Sein) in contrast to the fundamental-
ontological Being (Seyn).
Since Being is conceptualized as generalized beings, and is

explained in relation to (pvaig (physis), then we gradually end
up at the duality o f Parm enides: "Being is, non-Being is not.”
Everything about this form ula is completely accurate, but
som ething is m issing nonetheless. Fundam ental-ontological
Being is broader than the generalizing attribute o f beings (that
is, Sein als Seiendheit des Seinden) and requires the kind o f gaze
that is projected som ewhat differently than directly at (pvaig.
O f course, Being is that general attribute that is inherent to all

beings. But that is not everything. Forgetting about the latter,
first we remain within the correct philosophical process. But
with time, this oblivion will m ake itself be known. The error in
the very design o f pre-Socratic philosophy is still minimal, but
already contains som ething fatal.
Plato
T his is fully expressed in Plato.1 Here, an ontology that was

constructed earlier over (pvaig and the understanding o f Being as
som ething com m on for all beings, reaches its crystallization in the
teaching about ideas. A n idea is the kind o f beings that is thought
as a m odel for all other beings. According to Heidegger, this is
the "end o f the First Beginning.” Beings as an idea o f the greatest
kind o f beings ultimately eclipsed Being with themselves. T h at
w hich w as a sm all error early on ("not everything”) has been
1 M artin H eidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Z u Platons Hohlengleichnis

und Tbeatet (1 9 3 1 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio Klosterm ann, 1988).
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/
taken outside the fram ew ork in 'P laton ism . T h e ontological set
o f problem s is being fixed in stu dies about the hierarchy o f
beings (from the thing to the idea), and there is no m ore place
for Being in its pure state.
Beings replace Being (Seyn). A nd, that very “not everything”

(an initially tiny chasm betw een “Being” and the “common
attribute o f beings”) ends up out o f sight, since it fin ds itse lf
outsid e o f ontology's attention, begin s to m ake itse lf known,
con stitu tin g N o th in gn ess and the .m oving force beh ind the
rejection o f beings’ Being.
Scholasticism
H eidegger, follow ing N ietzsch e, thinks that C h ristian ity

is P laton ism for the m asses from the ph ilosoph ical po in t o f
view. T h is m eans that the structure o f C h ristian (C ath olic)
theology fully reproduces Plato's ontology, in which Being is
m easured through the correspon dence betw een the thing and
its archetype— an idea as the greatest k in d o f beings. A t the
sam e time, the given ontological p o sitio n is fixed even further
around the theological concept o f creation. T h e thing's statu s
as ens creatum is determ ined by its place in the hierarchy o f
creatures. H ere, G o d replaces Plato's idea as the supreme kind
o f beings.
A ccord in g to H eidegger, S ch o lasticism does not bring

anything new to philosophy, sim ply m akin g P lato n ism banal
and tran sform in g the hierarchy o f ideas into one o f created
th in gs.2 S ch o lasticism form s an o n tological triangle, which
M od ern ity then inherits.
2 M artin Heidegger, Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin his K ant
(19 26 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1993).
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Ontological Triangle
L et us imagine that there is a triangle in front o f us, the top

vertex o f which represents G o d or transcendence. According to
A ugustine and the Scholastics, G o d ’s Being is absolute. In other
w ords, the top vertex o f the triangle resolves the question about
Being as follows: G o d is absolute Being,
There are two more vertices at the base o f the triangle: one o f them
contains the subject, the other— the object. Both are ontologically
conceptualized in Christian Scholasticism as created beings, ens
creatum. Consequently, absolute Being creates non-absolute Being,
N on-absolute Being was created, made, thereby revealing its Being,

It contains the human soul which in terms o f substance belongs to
beings (this is a very im portant point), along with things from the
outside world, which are also part o f beings in terms o f substance.
The difference is only that the former is beings as a subject (our "I,”
the human soul), whereas the latter— as an object. But they all
draw their Being from the absolute Being o f G od.
G od
(absolute Being)
ontological triangle of theism
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T here is a G o d , and H e is absolute; there is a subject, and it is

non-absolute; there is an object, and it also is non-absolute. All
it takes is replacing "G o d " in this schem atic diagram with an
"idea," and we end up with P lato s philosophical m odel. It was
this that allowed Platonism to enter C h ristian theology (first
and forem ost, in the works o f the E astern C hurch fathers).
Ontological Transform ations in the Philosophy of
M odernity. R ational Ontology o f the Subject in Descartes

\
T h e new time in the philosophy o f deism (D escartes, N ew ton )
substantially reorganizes the ontological proportion s in this
triangle. For Scholasticism (theism ), G od's Being does not
require p ro o f (Tertullian's "I believe, because it is absurd"
[Credo quia absurdum ]), and is based on faith. A fter this kind
o f an ontological assertion, it is easy to transition to Being in
term s o f the two poles o f creation— subject and object. In this
case, their Being will be ju stifie d with G o d ’s Being that brings
creatures into Being.
B ut it is at faith that the rationalism o f philosophy strikes d u rin g

M odern ity, en co u ragin g everyone to "dou bt everything,"
alon g w ith D escarte s. T h e only th in g th at D e sc a rte s d o es
not d o u b t is cogito, from which he derives the su b ject. T h e
subject, in turn , b a se d on co n clu sio n s ab o u t p erce p tio n s,
records an object's Being ( res exten sa) an d arrives at the
p r o o f o f G o d 's Being on the b a sis o f co n clu sio n s ab o u t the
cau se o f one's ow n Being.
God's Being is derived from the subject's Being, which is justified

through the empirical fact o f the thought process. A s a result, the
entire image o f the ontological triangle changes. Beings dispositif is
found in the thinking human subject, which, as the two secondary
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operations, explains the Being o f the two other vertices in the

triangle, G o d and the object, on the basis o f rational operations.
G o d as a cause (causa) o f
su b je c ts Being
ontological triangle o f
rationalist deism
T his ontology o f deism, in which the Being o f the three vertices

is proven on the basis o f cogito, ends up at the foundation o f
M odernity's philosophy.
A ccordin g to H eidegger, this is one o f the m ost im portant

asp ects in the history o f philosophy. From Plato's transcendent
idea and Sch o lastic theology with G o d at the head o f the
ontological triad, we transition to the dualist “subject-object"
im age, in which Being begins to act as a result o f the subjects
rational activity. A s a result, das Seiende, beings, is reduced to
the sim plified “subject-object” pair, and ontology acquires a
strictly rational character.
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Em pirical'O ntology
In the 17th century N ew tons and Francis Bacons English school

forms a different gnoseological m odel. I f D escartes’s ontological
argum ent was the thought process, and its principal ontological
element was the subject, then in the English branch o f M odern
philosophy, this is the outside world, an object, following the
same line o f questioning o f the ontological picture o f the M iddle
Ages. This is a classical empirical school based on induction,
experiment, and experience. ■
G o d 'd o c k m a k e r ,
th e cause (causa) o f a n object
ontological triangle o f
em pirical deism
That which is recorded by the sensory organs is considered

unconditional Being. An object is, and this is the principal
empirical assertion w ithout which one cannot construct any
science or philosophy. But the object (world) m ust have a cause.
A nd this cause is, evidently G o d . In empirical versions o f deism,
G o d is also postulated as the necessary cause o f Being’s presence,
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but this time around this occurs not from the standpoint o f the
subject but that o f the object.
W hen we pronounce the words "really” "reality” we mean "thing-

nessly, thing-ness,” In Latin, “res” is a "thing.” In empirical
philosophy, the thing is an object, and the thing is as an object.
W hence objectivity” as a synonym for reality. Initially, "reality”
w as a predicate for the empirical version o f deism, and in its
context, it had the m eaning o f an ontological argument.
Leibniz's M onad
A t the dawn o f M odernity, Leibniz offers an original interpretation

o f the ontological set o f problem s. H is task is to substantiate
theodicy, to carry out the p ro o f o f G od's Being under radically
new post-M edieval conditions. H e does so on the basis o f reason
like the other philosophers o f Modernity, but his ontology is
constructed using a different schema.
Leibniz represents the world as a hierarchy o f m onads which

hieararchically distribute Being into different subordinate groups.
In a m onad, the subject corresponds to an object.
first m onad (G od)...... ...........................................
highest (rational) monad............................
middle monad (memory, sensations).....
lowest monads (vague, bare).....
m onad schematic diagram

according to L e ib n iz
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/
The phenom ena o f space and:- matter, according to Leibniz,

appear because o f optical illusions that are sym ptom atic o f the
lowest m onads. The latter, being vague and unclear, produce
the appearance o f spatial distinctions and tem poral sequences.
The division into a subject and object also occurs as a result
o f illusions. It is not the subject or object that possesses Being,
but only the monad, keeping in m ind that the quality o f Being
improves as one moves toward the highest m onads and decreases
as one moves down.
We may consider Leibniz construction a certain kind o f attem pt

to return to the Platonic and neo-Platonic pictures o f the world
after several centuries o f C reationist Scholasticism and under
the conditions o f developing a new ontological paradigm in the
philosophy o f Modernity.
C riticizing Leibn iz'w orkon m onads is one o f the m ost im portan t

aspects in H eidegger's philosophy.3 D escribing D asein,
H eidegger warns that any parallels with Leibniz's m onadology
are erroneous, since his philosophy places Being into the first
m onad, i.e., the highest beings, but beings nonetheless.
K a n t’s Ontological D oubt
Broad ontological distribution o f M odernity's philosophical

schools dem onstrates the grow ing uncertainty regarding
what should be chosen as the unconditional point o f Being.
D issatisfaction with Scholastic C reationist recipes in theism
forces philosophers to offer new versions o f ontology—
subjective (C artesian), objective (em pirical), and m onad-based.
The m ultitude o f ontological hypotheses leads to generalizing
the accum ulated difficulties in the ontological set o f problem s
3 M artin H eidegger, Metaphysiscbe Anjangsgrunde der Logik im Ausgang von

Leibniz (19 2 8 ) (Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1978).
302
\
through K a n ts philosophy.4 This is one o f the m ost significant

aspects in the development o f W estern European philosophy.
K an t was under the influence o f ideas proposed by Descartes,

Leibniz, and New ton, but focused his attention on developing
his theory o f knowledge— The Critique of Pure Reason. In this
completely revolutionary (in an ontological sense) work, K ant
definitely shows that all the proposed versions o f ontology (that o f
the subject, object, or G od, including the monad) cannot be strictly
proven based on pure reason. Thus, the idea o f a noumenon arises,
a certain authority, whose Being cannot be proven or disproven
through the rational mind. K an t does not negate the Being o f
a subject, object, or G od. H e simply demonstrates that Being
belongs to the sphere o f the noumenon, about which the rational
m ind cannot make any solid conclusions.
In K a n ts philosophy, the ontological triangle looks as follows.
G o d (a s a noum enon)
pure
reason
su b je c t (a s a noum enon) object (a s a noum enon)
ontological triangle fro m the

standpoint o f K a n t ’s pure reason
K an t has the ontology o f cogito, which, however, does not lead

to the C artesian ergo sum. O f course, we can c o n clu d e,'! think,
4 M artin H eidegger, K an t und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929)
(Frankfurt am M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1991); Idem., Phanomenologie
Interpretation von K ants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Frankfurt am M ain:
303
therefore I think.” However, "think” does not translate into "is.”

Pure reason has its own structure, organizes apperception, and
regularizes thought processes, thereby acting as if the subject
("I”), object (outside world), and G o d existed. Yet at the same
time, pure reason lacks ontological argum entation that could
remove this as if and translate it into a strict conviction.
Faced with this purely nihilistic picture, Kant is forced to take a step
back and attempt to substantiate his ontology after all. But the latter
is not focused on the fundamental conclusions regarding pure
reason, but rather— on moral wishes on the part o f practical reason,
whence comes the subject o f the categorical imperative. Pure reason
cannot prove the Being o f a subject, object, or G od. But practical
reason, in making a moral choice, states that they must exist
nonetheless, and that it would be good for them to exist. O n the one
hand, it seems that ontology makes a comeback, but on the other,
ontological nihilism increases. A t this stage, Being is proven not
through an experience or reason, not through Revelation, but
through moral considerations: "It would be good for Being to be.”
G od as a . t
' categorical im perative
T
practical
reason
/
subject as a ^
categorical im perative
Y 0bject as a
categorical imperative
ontological triangle from the

standpoint of K an t’s practical reason
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The idea o f The Critique o f Pure Reason, however, does not heal
the traum a sustained through philosophical ontology thanks
to the critique o f pure reason," but only exacerbates it. M orally
supported ontology is even less thorough than the kind o f
ontology that is justified rationally or empirically.
N oth in gn ess grows.
Fichte and Fiegeb Overcoming K an tian Pessimism
O f course, Kant's followers attem pted to deal with this challenge.

Fichte, Kant's student, in response to the fact that K ant left the
world w ithout a subject, decided that there is a subject after all
and, developing this idea, he added that the subject is the only
thing that there is.5
H egel also sensed that things are not well. H e invested a

colossal am ount o f effort in order to dem onstrate that Being
and thought correspond to each other. For this purpose, he
h ad to construct a new logical system significantly correcting
A ristotle's traditional logic, which K an t used for The Critique
o f Pure Reason, T h u s arose the Science of Logic, in which
H egel developed a philosophical dialectic, rejecting the law o f
the excluded third in logic, which got H eidegger's attention.
H eidegger considers H egel’s form ulation about the problem
o f N o th in gn ess, rejection, negation to be correct, but at
the sam e time, he dem onstrates that H egel rem ains within
classical ph ilosoph y6, continuing to operate with concepts and
acknow ledging the referential theory o f truth.
5 M artin H eidegger, D er Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und

die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (1 9 2 9 ) (Frankfurt am M ain:
6 M artin H eidegger, Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes (1930) (Frankfurt am
M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1980).
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/
H e attem pts to answer the challenge o f disontologization

revealed by K an t and moves further in this direction than any
other thinker. But the objective lim it here is the very structure
o f W estern European philosophy in which the ontological
problem is form ulated incorrectly at its very foundation, in the
first Beginning, while the m etaphysics o f M odernity, specifically,
Kant, only discovers its ultim ate consequences.
Nietzsche: the E nd o f Philosophy
For Heidegger, N ietzsche was M odernity's m ost im portant

philosopher. H e had the greatest and m ost decisive im pact on
Heidegger. The latter dedicated a m ultitude o f texts to N ietzsch e7,
a part o f which appears in the two-volume Nietzsche book.
In order to approach the subject o f D asein, N ietzsch e has the

following central philosophical points:
• asserting that W estern European philosophy during

M odernity is nihilistic;
• stating that the cultural and m etaphysical guidelines

are artificial as a produ ct o f life's alienation;
• criticizing Plato and the referential theory o f truth;
• addressing the pre-Socratics' search for the sources o f

W estern European thought process in its pure form,
yet to be "distorted” by the teaching about ideas;
• em phasizing the will to p o w er' as the principal

m otive in life;
7 See footnote 6, previous chapter.
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\
• overthrow ing the idols and values o f the W est;
• calling for radically new ways o f thinking.
For Heidegger, N ietzsch e is the kind o f figure that places the

last period in the process o f establishing W estern European
philosophy. I f Plato were the “end within the framework o f the
first Beginning,” then N ietzsch e is simply the end o f philosophy
as such. H e is the last philosopher.
N ietzsch e no longer believes either in the object or the subject.

H e proclaim s the “death o f G o d ” openly and with greatest
conviction. F in din g h im se lf at the center o f E uropean nihilism ,
N ietzsch e add resses the elem ent o f life. H eidegger interprets
the latter as Being. T h a t, which in the period o f nihilism ’s
greatest flourish in g collides with this element, is approxim ately
w hat H eid egger calls D asein.
H usserl
O n the other hand, such phenomenon as the phenomenology o f

E dm und H usserl was born, parallel to Nietzsche, out o f consistent
and fundamentally comprehended Kantianism. H usserl was a truly
consistent Kantian, drawing the kind o f conclusions that should be
drawn. Even though more than a hundred years separates H usserl
and Kant, it is he who brought the themes directly linked to The
Critique of Pure Reason to their logical conclusion.
H usserl's phenom enology is based on the following operations:
• the object's, su b ject’s, and G o d ’s existence is

taken o u tsid e o f the fram ew ork (the principle o f
ph en om en ological reduction );
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• concentrating philosophical attention on the structure

o f hum an consciousness in the form in which it
constitutes objects o f its functioning (noem ata)
through intellectual operations (noesis).
• introducing the concept o f intentionality as the basic

model o f the relationship between consciousness
and the observed object (which, in a certain sense,
constitutes this object);
• ‘researching the phenom enological stream of

consciousness, while observing man's behavior in the
realm o f the"lifew orld" (Lebenswelt).
H u sse rl’s phenom en ology has a m u ltitu de o f different

interpretations. For Heidegger, H u sserl’s former student, the
m ost im portant aspect o f this phenom enology was the pursuit
o f identifying the purest authority that remains in place o f the
thinking man after consistently carrying out the epoche operation
in relation to the basic philosophical concepts ("subject," "object,"
I, essence, time, and so on). In essence, H usserl proceeds
along the path o f nihilism described by N ietzsch e and, being
on this path, attem pts to substantiate and accurately describe
that authority that remains after all the m etaphysical layers have
been removed. These layers include positivism , m aterialism, and
empiricism, which, according to Heidegger, are nothing more
than specific cases o f the same W estern m etaphysics.
Phenomenology, from its perspective, gradually prepared

Heidegger's approach to D asein. In a certain sense, H eidegger
can be called a “phenom enologist,” whereas D asein itself— a
phenomenological phenom enon.
308
V __
A t the sam e time, the concept o f a “phenom enon” has special

significance for H eidegger, H e links it to the G reek m eaning
o f the stem in (paiveaOai (fainesthai), which m eans to “m ake
o n e se lf appear,” "m anifest o n e se lf” “reveal o n e se lf” as well as
w ith another G reek term , aXffQeia (aletheia), “truth,” which
w as highly im portan t for H eidegger, H e interprets "truth”—
"aletheia” as "unconcealm ent” and tran sm its this G reek (pre-
S o cratic) term everywhere by using the G erm an w ord “die
Unverborgenheit”— literally, "unconcealm ent.”
H eid egger con trasts the truth as “unconcleam ent” (o f Being)

w ith the truth as the correspondence between one kin d o f
beings w ith another. T herefore, H eidegger's phenom enology
is inextricably united w ith the ontological set o f problem s.
H u sserl, in contrast, seeks to isolate phenom enology from any
k in d o f link w ith ontology, attem pting to substantiate the new
ph ilo so p h ical school that he created by using an innovative
conceptual arsenal, com pletely constructed ad hoc at the
greatest proxim ity to the phenom ena them selves. By follow ing
this path, H u sserl arrives at such poin ts as "transcendence” or
“n oesis” T h is m eans that H eid egger connects the phenom enon
an d its sphere with Being, w hereas H u sse rl— with the thought
process, which predeterm ines the difference between their
respective ph ilosop h ical approaches.
Therefore, H eidegger formally repeats a series o f classic operations

in phenomenology, but, at the sam e time, carries out som ething
completely different, since his philosophy and his history o f
philosophy are firmly fixed around the axis o f the question
about Being. H eidegger differentiates between the "key question
in p h ilo so p h y ” (L eitfrage) and the "fu n dam en tal qu estion in
p h ilo so p h y ” (G ru n dfrage). T h e form er p ertain s to beings ( Sein
der Seiendheit), w hereas the latter— to Being (Seyn). From
309
7
the very beginning, H eidegger's ph en om en ology is placed

into the context o f solving the “b asic qu estion in philosophy.''
T h is is phenom enological ontology, w hereas H u sserl's general
thought rem ains w ithin the fram ew ork o f gn oseology and the
theory o f knowledge.
310
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III. DASEIN AND ITS
EX ISTEN TIA LS
Introduction to D asein
I f we approach D asein from the standpoint o f the history o f

philosophy, then we could say that this is the last point that can
be recorded in the period o f com pleting disontologization at
the m idnight o f universal nihilism . P re-Socratics equated Being
(iSeyn) with nature, beings, the universal— m issing som ething
that was initially barely noticeable but significant. Plato equated
Being with one o f beings (idea). Sch olastics moved even further
away from Being, establishing the theological hierarchy o f
created things. D eists dou bted the dogm as o f faith and began
to explain Being on the basis o f artificial concepts, whether
C artesian rationalism , Locke's and H u m e’s em piricism , or
Leibniz's m onad. K a n t honestly adm itted that the ontological
argum ent has no rational ju stification .
Fichte’s and H egel’s attem p ts to remove this problem only

send us to a p artial conceptual correction o f the situation
w ith out affecting the essence o f this nihilistic catastrophe.
N ietzsch e calls things w hat they are and dem ands that
from now we m ust think harshly and in a sober way in
term s o f the G o d fo rsak en w orld. U nder the conditions o f
collapsin g E u rop ean m etaphysics, H u sserl introduces the
phen om en ological m eth od o f thought. W h at rem ains o f Being
in th is case, gettin g futher and further rem oved from the m ain
p ro cess o f p h ilosoph izin g, is reduced to D asein .
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___ J
D asein is the ultim ate fact o f Being preceeding any kind o f

ju stification , w ithout an adequate interpretation, placed in the
desert o f nihilism .
A t the sam e time, D asein is, undoubtedly, a phenom enological

presence. T h a t is to say, it is a phenomenological point o f
Being, the com bination of the historical-philosophical
optics o f disontologization, focused on the “key question in
philosophy,” with the direct phenom enology o f presence. T h is
phenom enology o f presence has its own features. D eterm ining
these features, i.e., the analytical description o f D asein, is the
prim ary focus o f H eid eggers Sein und Z eit.
D a and Sein
Occasionally, D asein is translated as “Being-there!’ Indeed, the

G erm an word D asein com prises two parts. D a is “(t)h ere” and
Sein is “B ein g”
T h a t k in d o f Being that is m en tioned in D asein is an

unconditional presence, manifest presence, that is, a certain kin d
o f an u n con dition al phenom en ological fact. H eid egger does
not in sist upon in troducin g m etaphysical correspon den ces
betw een D asein and Sein (and, even m ore so, Seyn), T h is
correspon dence m ust conclude the entire body o f H eidegger's
p h ilosoph y; this is the end o f the road. N o n eth eless, it is
incredibly im p o rtan t to note from the on set th at in D asein we
are dealing with Being, even i f not m etaphysically su b stan tiated
quite yet. H eid egger uses the term “ontic," from the G reek "ov"
(on), “beings” D asein p ertain s to beings: it is beings, b u t at the
sam e tim e, it is not simply beings, like the rest o f beings, b u t a
certain k in d o f special beings. A t the initial stage o f H eidegger's
philosophy, the phenom enology o f D asein may be taken as
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ontic (b u t not yet ontological, since this assertion does not yet
contain the logos).
T h e second stem in the w o rd "D asein" i s “da," “(t)h ere" T h is "c/a”

show s that Being is located <(t)h ere” (as opposed to somewhere
else), that we are dealing with som ething factual and available,
presen t definitively and tangibly. Therefore, D asein may be
perceived as a specific coagulation o f Being, Being in the ontic,
alm ost em pirical sense. O ne m ay live through D asein if one gets
accustom ed to the factuality o f Being o f that which is"(t)here”—
with the greatest possible separation from what is (t)here, who is
(t)here, where is (t)here, why is (t)here, and so on. A t the sam e
time, the translation o f G erm an “da" as sim ply "here” (into the
R u ssian “3decb” “zd es”) or "there” is fairly incorrect. In Sein und
Zeit, H eidegger h im self m entions the hypothesis o f W ilhelm
von H u m b o ld t1 in regard to the origins o f personal pronouns
b ased on locative adverbs. H u m b o ld t proposed the following
. u. 1 tt / « t ” \ ♦ 1 • 1 C “ 1 • ” / “ I »\ *< » /<<\ »\ •
version: tch ( 1 ) is derived rrom hter ( here ), tr ( he ) is
derived from from "dort" ("there”), and “du" is derived from
“da" ("here,” “som ew here here,” “not too far,” between “here” and
"there”). T h e adverb system in the G erm an language has a triple,
rather than dual, structure as com pared to the m odern R ussian
language. “H ter” is specifically “here," “dort" is specifically'there,”
w hereas “da" is som ew here in between the two.
T h is'B ein g
W e could use the R u ssian dem onstrative p ro n o u n “eom ” (vot),

which roughly translates as "this” (as in “this one,” "this one
here”). “Vot" m eans neither "here” nor “there,” but som ewhere
specifically nearby where one could point. Da could be
translated as "(t)here,” but also as "this” (“vot"). In order to
1 M artin H eidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 119.
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explain the significance o f this fundam ental term, it seem s

that “ this-Being is more accurate. H u m b o ld t’s corespondence
is im portant: “B eing” which is located "som ewhere nearby,” is a
m an that is nearby (not far away, not "out there”), but at the
sam e time, this is neither " I ” nor "non-I.” In a certain sense, this
is "you,” since the experience o f D asein includes disidentification
with the "I.” In D a s e in " " I” is perceived as “you,” but this is the
kind o f "you” that has no subject but rather a sim ple presence.
"H ere” and "there” clearly dem arcate distance, whereas "this”
does not yet have a distan ce— it preceeds it."T h is ” is som ething
to which we pointed, which we noted through our attention.
"H ere” and "there” appear only after we m arked "this.”
L a Realite H um aine
H en ry C o rb in 2 tran slates D asein into French by u sin g the

expression "hum an reality,"“realite hum aine.” Strictly speaking,
neither term is useful at all. Incidentally, th ro u gh o u t the
entire book, H eid egger m entions that he is dealing neither
with the "hum an” nor the "real,” neither with the "subject” nor
the "object,” and m ost certainly n ot "G o d .” “N eith er subject,
nor object, nor the hum an, nor reality, nor the divine” w ould
be a m uch m ore accurate descrip tio n o f D asein , rather than
C orbin ’s “realite hum aine”
2 H enry Corbin is one o f the m ost im portant French philosophers, a historian

o f religion, and a specialist in Iranian and Islam ic philosophy, m ysticism,
and poetry. See H enry Corbin, Leparadoxe du monotheisme (Paris: l’H erne,
1 981); Idem., Temps cyclique etgnose ismaelienne (Paris: Berg International,
1982); Idem., Face de Dieu, face de I’homme (Paris: Flam m arion, 1983);
Idem. Philosophic iraniennc ct philosophic comparee (Paris: B u ch et/C h astel,
1979); Idem., Corps spirituel et Terre celeste: de L ’Iran mazdeen a ITran shi’ite
(Paris: B uchet/C h astel, 1979); Idem., Histoire de la philosophic islamique
(Paris; Gallim ard, 1964); Idem., L ’homme de lumiere dans le soufisme iranien
(Paris: Editions “Presence,” 1971).
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However, this translation does elucidate the m eaning o f D asein

to an extent. In a certain unique optics (H enry C orbin was
one o f the greatest specialists in the area o f esoteric Islam,
sacred anthropology, and m ystical philosophy), D asein could
be u n dersto o d as a “hum an reality" in its purest form — before
m an and before reality— as a structured qualitative authority
developing its autonom ous attributes, during the course o f
which m an (subject) and reality" (object, world) emerge.
In this sense, we should consider C orbin’s own theory about
“mundus im agin alis’, ’ the “m an o f light," and the “purple angel"
(.Suhraw ardi)3 as well as G ilb ert D urand's theory4 o f the
im aginaire and the anthropological trajectory. B ut we will leave
this as a m arginal com m et for now.
T he Experience o f D asein as the A ppearance o f

L an gu age and an Explosion
By introducing D asein, H eidegger does not so much follow the

logical philosophical discourse (where ontology requires logical
ju stificatio n s, which cannot be introduced, giving birth to a
vicious circle and endless nihilism ), but rather— language. T h e
latter, despite all the chords o f disontologization, operates with
a concept like D asein, “ThiS'Being” as if nothing happened.
“ThiS'Being." “Being— this!’ Focusing our attention on the
m eaning o f these w ords does not take us to philosophy, but
leads us to language. T h e w ords “this" and “Being" attem pt to
express som eth in g— som ething incredibly im portan t— but, at
the sam e time, som ething fleeting, vague, and uncertain. Here,
H eidegger p ro p o ses that we m ake a leap, trust w ords rather
than concepts, sou n ds and gu essed m eanings rather than the
3 H enry Corbin, L ’Imagination creatrice dans It soufisme d’lb n ’ Arabi, 2-e ed.
(P aris: Flam m arion, 1977).
4 G ilbert D uran d, Les Structures antkropologiques de I’imaginaire (Paris: PUF,
1960).
♦
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strict philosophical discourse. P hilosophical know ledge and

obsessive interest in the ontological set o f problem s, naturally,
have an effect on the choice o f the verbal object for the purpose
o f com prehension, but com prehension itse lf is m issing at
the starting point. D asein appears instantly and im m ediately
with all the contents it already com prises. D asein is an axial
phenom enon, appearing in a priority fashion; D asein is that
which m akes appear and that which appears. But, at the sam e
time, this is the call o f the language itself.
T h e experience o f D asein belongs to pre-philosophy. It is

incredibly naive and is linked w ith language both directly
and unscientifically. (P erhaps, this is the result o f N ietzsch e's
lesson s with his We Philologists5 and H u sserl's Lifew orld).
In essence, H eid egger con stru cts ph ilosoph y from scratch.
A nd the first sound, step, and statem en t in this ph ilosoph y
(later, he will conceptualize this as a “new Beginning,” der neue
A nfang") is D asein.
H eidegger is highly critical o f and attentive to term s, concepts,

and the m eaning o f w ords, constantly placing them into
the original context and trying to precisely determ ine their
correct h istorical-p h ilosop h ical m eaning (in clu din g nuanced
tran slation s and etym ology). H e p ro p o se s to m ake one single
exception and to sim ply “believe" the m eaning o f the w ord
D ase in : it is Being that it records, n ot “som ew here,” b u t “this,”
“this here.”
D asein is the first, m ost im portant, and, in essence, the only

axiom o f H eidegger’s philosophy. H av in gg rasp ed it, we will grasp
everything else. But herein lies the difficulty: un derstan din g it
correctly is im possible w ithout being com petent in fundam ental-
5 Friedrich N ietzsche, We Philologists, tr. J. M . Kennedy (T eddington: The

Echo Library, 2007).
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ontology and, at the sam e time, w ithout the direct experience

o f colliding with Being in a factually specific m anner o f "this,"
D asein is a sudd en and explosive discovery o f Being this.

T h is itse lf is con stitu ted w ith this explosion as well as that
w hich reveals itself. A t the sam e time, the purity o f this
experience is gu aran teed only by the fact that it takes places
u n der the con d ition s o f to tal nihilism as a natural and logical
con clusion o f estab lish in g the entire process o f W estern
E u ro p ean philosophy. In all other situ atio n s and contexts,
th is phenom enon w ould have been im possible and w ould have
been su b ject to a com pletely different and, m ost likely, rather
b an al in terp retatio n . In order for Being to reveal itse lf in the
explosive and direct way o f this, it m ust be preem ptively and
com pletely forgotten. O th erw ise, there will not be an explosion,
u n iq u en ess, or Beingness in this discovery. T herefore, the
em ergence o f D asein and the ph ilosoph y based on it at its
core, is p h ilo so p h y ’s tran sition from one stage to another, from
the p re -S o c ra tic s to N ietzsch e. In order for D asein to appear,
p h ilo so p h y m u st begin, b lossom , reach its pin n acle— follow ed
by decline and tragic com pletion. O nly afterw ard— and, to a
large extent, because o f it— can this-Being reveal itse lf in the
way th at it did to H eidegger.
From Essence to Existence
H eid egger h im se lf underscores the fact that the correct

approach to D asein and its discovery is possible not through
returning to the ontological triangle that we have irreparably
lost (this loss was o f fundam ental significance, according to
H eid egger), but through courageously recording the realm o f
trium phant nihilism . D asein is w hat records nihilism w ithout
correspon din g to it. Yet it does not evade its own responsibility
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for its emergence; furtherm ore, ft w ants to travel along the path
o f this responsibility all the way.
Pushing o ff Dasein, H eidegger proposes to fundam entally change

the philosophical settings.Throughout its entire history W estern
European philosophical thinking originated from defining
thought about essence, ovoia (ousia). Essence was understood
either as G o d or an idea, subject, object, m onad, etc.
H eidegger believes that the essentialist approach expresses that

very error that brought the entire philosophical process from
the “first B eginning' (p re-Socratics) to the end o f philosophy
(N ietzsch e). S tartin g from essence as the “com m on "attribute
(koivov, [koinon]) inherent to Seiende (ens) as Seiendheit
(essentia), philosophy was doom ed to endlessly repeat the sam e
m etaphysical route, sooner or later leading thought tow ard
alienation, pragm atism , positivism , and, therefore, nihilism .
T h e attem pt to construct an ontology on the basis o f essence
leads to disontologization .
Instead o f this, he suggests to begin philosophizing from

D asein perceived as existence rather than essence, as som ething
undoubtedly present, but in the ontic, not ongological sense.
“T h e essence (Wesen) o f D a se in ” repeats H eidegger in Sein

und Zeit, “is found in existence." T h is m ight cause confusion:
encouraging us to think starting from existence rather than
essence, H eidegger h im self defines D asein (existence) through
essence (W esen). But here we m ust account for the original
G erm an context. D as Wesen for H eidegger is not a translation
o f ovoia (ousia) or the L atin “existential’ M oving along the line
o f language, not philosophical terminology, H eidegger adds
a fundam ental-ontological m eaning to the w ord "Wesen” (the
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passive participle o f the verb sein). Wesen is com plicity with

Seyn as Being, which m ust only be grasped in its proper capacity,
p u sh in g o ff from grasping the entire philosophical process from
the first Beginning until the E n d as an incorrect ontological
course. W hence H eidegger's linguistic novelties such as the
u sage o f a verbal noun Wesen as a verb— ich wese, du wesest,
er (sie, es) west, wir wesen, ihr weset, sie wesen— these form s do
not exist in the G erm an language. T h is is another language—
H eidegger's m etalanguage o f fundam ental-ontology.
T herefore, the expression the "essence o f D asein is found in

existence'' m ust be translated into the correct m etalanguage:
D ase in ’s Wesen in existence.” T h is m eans D asein is not through
correspondence with essence as som ething external or different
than itself, but rather by itself. Therefore, Wesen is not an
essence (o v aia), but an expression (discovery, leading out from
unconcealm ent) o f D asein ’s self-Being. H eidegger does not
translate the w ord “existentia” and its derivatives (“existential’, ’
"existentiell") into the G erm an language (even though he
attem pts to translate everything into G erm an: he even
tran sform s the w ord "subject” into the G erm an "Geworfenheit”,
"throw nness ” which correspon ds to the Latin etym ology: “sub’’
["un der” "below ”] a n d “jacere” ["to throw ”]). Even less useful for
translating "existentia" is the R u ssian w ord “sushchestvovanie”
(cyufecm eoeanue), since it corresponds to the G erm an Wesen
m uch closer than it does to the Latin. T h e verb "sushchestvovat”’
(cyuiecm eoeamb) transm its w hat H eidegger wanted to say by
inventing the verb “wesen," which does not exist in the G erm an
language. T h a t said, there is no direct analogy to the Latin
“existentia” in the G reek language either, and, in rare cases,
H eid egger uses the w ord “om og” (“outos” “that one,'"'this one”)
in an attem pt to find an analogy to existence, likely, supported
by the etym ology o f the G erm an D asein.
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T herefore the axiom atic phrase in H eid eg gers philosophy,

“D asein ’s Wesen in existence,” is, in a certain sense, a triple
pleonasm , whereas its G erm an o -L atin etym ology is called
upon to turn the fundam ental axiom s o f all philosophy upside
down, where everything was exam ined not through itse lf but
through another ((pvaig [physis], idea [idea], o v aia [ousia], Osog
[theos], sycb [ego], koivov [koinon], essentia, objectum, subjectum,
res, realitas, etc.). W ith his pleonasm ic form ula, H eidegger lays
the foundation o f the new Beginning in. philosophy, in which,
from now( on, he proposes to exam ine everything from the
stan dpoin t o f D asein as a factual and ontic authority, which
is not preceeded by anything logically, chronologically, or
ontologically. Therefore, a significant portion o f Sein und Z eit
is dedicated to apophatic definitions o f D asein .
D asein is neither an essence nor substance: “I,” subject, object,

world, psyche, life, Being, N oth in gn ess, non-Being, the greatest
kind o f beings, idea, G o d , man, any kind o f beings along with
others, beings-as-a-whole, the universal, the unified. D asein is
linked with Wesen and with existence, but this equals the fact
that D asein is D asein, and its form o f existing is the possibility
o f Being. However, th e 'W ’ in “existentia” is already part o f “da”
in D asein, and “Wesen" is part o f “Sein” (Being) o f D asein. In
order to explain this, H eidegger repeats the follow ing refrain,
“D asein exists factually," “D asein existiert fak tisch " "Factually"
m eans ontically," in the direct, unconditional, specific, totally
perceptible presense.
Three Ontological L ayers
T h e introduction o f D asein and the beginning o f thought,

according to H eidegger, lead us to a new form ulation o f the
ontological set o f problem s. T h u s arise three ontological layers.
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T h e question about Being m ay be phrased as follows:
• ontically
• ontologically
• fundam ental-ontologically
“O ntically" m eans a direct em pirical correlation to D asein. In a

certain sense, we can equate the ontic with the phenom elogical,
if only we approach phenom enology not from H usserl's
stan d p o in t but from H eidegger's own point o f view, that is,
as cdijOsia (aletheia), unconcealm ent o f Being in the fact o f
D ase in ’s presence. In this sense, we may say that D asein is a
phenom enon, that it is a given and given unconditionally, in
advance and w ithout any ju stificatio n s as to who, whence, when,
w hat for, and what. H ere, the given excludes both the giver and
the receiver. O nly the act o f presenting a gift— giving, presence
— rem ains, hanging over the bottom less abyss o f N oth in gn ess.
T h e ontic is the un conditional presence in the unconditional

given o f D asein. T h e ontic precedes any kind o f work on the part
o f consciousness, thought process, and even perception. T h e
ontic com prises neither certainty nor truth (as a correlation),
neither subjectness nor objectness. Being in the ontic acts in
a certain alm ost “barbaric” sense, as a fact o f a resilient, non
differentiated life that includes death and movement, tranquility
and presence, disappearance and finitude.
T h e ontic is Being before it has been thought o f and focused on,

Being before nature, before (pvaig, before idea, before object, before
subject, before category, before concept, before philosophy, before
m an, before“ l ” and its predicates.
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The “ongological" m eans com prehending Being in the

p h ilosoph ical context. O n to logy includes all the shades o f
p h ilosophically com prehending Being, as (pvaig (ph ysis), and
as idea, and as reality, and as the universal, and as subject, and
as object, and as an ob ject-b ased w orld, and as m atter, and as
consciousness, and as experience, and as the rational m ind,
and as the absolute, and as finitude, and as singularity, and
as unity. B ut herein lies the m ain problem : for H eidegger, the
entire o n tology — all versions o f ph ilo so ph ical com prehension,
description, and defin ition o f Being in W estern E u ropean
ph ilosoph y from the first Beginning until the E n d — lead in
a know ingly false direction. In p re -S o cratic philosophy,
ontology is as close as possible to ontics, b u t even they let
in a nuanced error. L ater on, this error grow s until it reaches
gigantic p ro p o rtio n s in the ph ilosoph y o f pragm atism ,
positivism , u n derstan din g Being as a m oral, value, ideal,
worldview, and, finally, p ro d u ct. P lato ’s teaching ab ou t ideas,
A risto tle’s logic and m etaphysics, C reatio n ist theology,
essentialism , idealism , realism , and nom in alism in M edieval
debates, conceptual thought, m onadology, the A b solu te idea,
H egel’s Science of Logic, N ietzsch ean will to pow er— all o f
these are variations o f incorrect th ough t ab ou t the k in d o f
ph ilosop h y that was a m ajestic and gran diose m onum ent to
the sam e error. T h e latter com p rised ignoring D asein as the
basic authority in p h ilo so p h izin g. B u t at the sam e time, this
w ork o f ontology as a misconception p repared the soil ( G ru n d)
for the b o tto m less (A bgrund) gu ess ab ou t D ase in .
“Ontologically,” according to H eidegger, m eans'philosophically,”

“incorrectly,” “nihilistically,” “ Platonically,” “in an alien ated
way,” distracted from the ontic, losing the pulse o f Being that
com prises the basis o f the ontic. In the teaching about D asein,
between the ontic and the ontological, there are the follow ing
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prop o rtio n s. T h e ontic is given before the experience o f thought,

directly. W e do not know by whom and to whom it is given.
O nly one thing is clear: it is given (“it exists factually”). D asein
is ontic, it is the ontic, O ntology is constructed over D asein; it
is the ontic com prehended through philosophy. In the optics
o f D asein, this ontology is taken as som ething general, but not
as som ethin g com m on for beings (which it wants to be), but
rather as som ething com m on for the erroneous interpretation
o f beings, which it is from the stan d poin t o f transitioning to the
new B eginning o f philosophy. T h e first step in the latter process
is D ase in , O ntology is what flows out o f D asein, overcomes it,
su rp asses it in various ways, rises above it, but, at the sam e time,
forgets it, ignores it, and replaces it with an abstract schem a.
O n tology is system atized nihilism .
T h e origins o f nihilism com prise the equation o f Being with

beings and attributin g the greatest norm ative status to a certain
kin d o f beings.
N ow , w hat is fundam ental-ontology? It is the transition to the

new Beginning. It is the construction o f the kind o f ontology
that, in contrast to regular ontology, w ould be created in close
and con stant contact with D asein, w ithout being torn away
from it, verifying every follow ing step with the elem ent o f
the ontic, expressing the ontic, allow ing it to speak for itse lf
ab ou t itse lf in the way that is the m ost suitable for it itself,
w ithout im posin g any alienating fram ework, categories, or
represen tation s. In order to underscore this particular m eaning
o f the fundam ental-ontological, H eidegger, at times, uses the
expression ontic-ontological.
F u n d am en tal'o n to lgy is different from the ontic in the sense

that this is a thought process, com prehsion o f Being, that it
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traces back to the directness o f B a se in tow ard its indirectness.

But fundam ental-ontology is different from ontology in that
the ascension from D asein rem ains organically linked to D asein
itself. Fundam ental-ontology does not make m istakes o f all the
philosophical ontologies and does not propose any additional
authorities (ideas, essences, the Creator, subject, object, etc.)
outside o f D asein , above it, around it, underneath it, and even
inside it. Fundam ental-ontology is the thought process that
dwells in D asein ’s Being, in its element, w ithout giving birth to
dualities and relationships, singularities and correspon dences—
nothing o f w hat could be placed across from one another.
Fundam ental-ontology is the yet-to-be-created philosophy o f

the “future ones” (Kunjtige), which will m anifest them selves
(in the way that Being truth'"aletheia" m anifests itself, as
w aterm arks appear on a sheet o f paper).
Fundam ental-ontology always remembers the distinctions

between Being and beings and, therefore, perceives D asein as
beings, on the one hand, but, at the sam e time, as the possibility
o f Being (Seyn), which makes D asein not only beings but also
som ething else.
D asein as Being-in-Between
It is o f outm ost im portance to em phasize from the onset

that D asein is neither "external,” nor "internal,” since these
philosophical and spatial dim ensions emerge with it, in it, and
through it, not prior to it. Furthermore, their structures depend
on D asein s regime, on the way it develops its "da” and its “Sein,”
and where the accent is placed. D asein by itself is spatial, and this
spatiality com prises one o f its qualities, which does not allow it to
be placed in what it already is— into one o f its aspects.
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A t the sam e time, D asein is neither preceeding” (a beginning),

nor follow ing (a result o f som ething that was present before
it). D asein is not a function o f time, since tim e does not
have autonom ous Being, in which D asein could settle. T h e
relationship between D asein and tim e is even more com plex
as com pared to space, which is described in the second part o f
Sein und Zeit.
B u t the existential and factual character o f D asein m akes it

a rather specific presence and, consequently, it m ust po ssess
a certain kin d o f localization. For D asein , the concept o f "in
betw een (zwischen) can serve as this em pirical localization.
Earlier, we spoke about the possible sym m etry between
dem onstrative pronouns an d the personal counterpart,
un derscorin g the connection between “da” with that which
is between " I ” and "he” (in particular, "you,” "du"). I f we search
for D asein within the fram ew ork o f the regular ontological
coordinates (which w ould correspon d to the ontic, em pirical
approach this time around), then we m ust place it in between—
between the interior and exterior, between the p a st and present.
T h u s, D asein is spatially lim ited (it dwells on the boundary,
in between) and tem porarily instantaneous (it belongs to the
m om ent between the p a st an d present). D asein s "da” m anifests
in this between. Therefore, at a certain angle, we could call
D a s e in "Being-in-between” (Inzwischen-Sein).
D a se in s E xistentials
C arryin g out the transition into the new Beginning requires the
developm ent o f a new m etalanguage for fundam ental-ontology.
Interpretations, m eanings, and contexts, linked to the old
on to lo gy perm eate tradition al philosophical term s at their very
foun dation and are, therefore, unsuitable. T h is led H eidegger
327
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to the gradual replenishing o f the fundam ental-ontological

dictionary in which all lexical p osition s were either new or
old— but rethought in the fundam ental-ontological vein. T h u s,
instead o f “categories,” H eidegger p ro p o sed to describe D asein
with the help o f its predicates, dividing and specifying it.
H eidegger refers to D asein ’s predicates a s "existentials"
A t the sam e time, H eidegger introduces a strict distinction in Sein

und Z eit between the adjectives “existential” and “existentiell."
T h e form er refers to D asein s thought process while developing
fundam ental-ontology. T h e latter is a description o f D asein ’s
ontic aspects in its direct expression, w ithout the m ovem ent
o f thought tow ard the new Beginning. Therefore, D asein s
“existential” is not sim ply a description but its philosophical
fundam ental-ontological establishm ent. “Existentiell’, ’ on the
other hand, is a factual description (although H eidegger uses
this term only as an adjective).
H eidegger presents a b rief list o f D asein ’s existentials. T h e list

itse lf is the process o f creating a new philosophy.
In-Der-W elt-Sein (Being-in-the-W orld)
H eidegger refers to one o f the m ost crucial existentials for

D asein as “in-der-Welt-Sein” (“Being-in-the-world”).6 D asein
is in-der-W elt-Sein" "T h is-B ein g" is “B eing-in-the-w orld’, ’
H eidegger asserts.
Here, it is im portant to un derstan d why this is called an

existential” and what com prises the “existentiality" o f this kind
o f predicate. T h e point is that "Being-in-the-world” taken as
an existential (i.e., within the optics o f fundam ental-ontology)
does not render any kind o f ju d gem en t in regard to what is
6 M artin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 175.
328
V _
located in the world, what the world is, whether it is at all, and
w hether it has any kind o f autonom ous Being. “Being'in-the-
world” does not respond to the question "where": it precedes
the emergence o f a question like this, m aking it "possible."
“Being-in-the-world” is an existential (and not a category) as well
because the w orld" is constituted here not through distinction,
space, and place (topograph y) but through Being. “Being-in-
the-world” is, first and forem ost, Being, specifically— the kind
that carries with it "in" and "world," not "in” and "world" as two
separate figures. It is a kind o f setting in which "in" is inseparable
from the "world,” whereas the "w orld” is inseparable from "in,"
and both o f th ese— from Being. T orn away from the "world,"
"in" is inconceivable as sim ply "in." Similarly, the "w orld” is
inconceivable as som ething separate. T h e "world" from D asein ’s
existential is always “ in-what-Being" rather than an essence.
T h e im p o rtan ce o f th is existen tial w ill be clear to us i f we

c o n sid e r the fact th at H e id eg g e r talks ab o u t the role o f“(pvoiq ”
as a con cep t in the e sta b lish m en t o f p re -S o c ra tic philosophy.
Its in tro d u c tio n grad u ally led to the referential theory o f
tru th . C o n sequ en tly , the new Beginning o f p h ilo so p h y m ust
m ove in a d ifferen t d irectio n from the o n s e t ."Being-in-the-
world” as an existen tial is fu n d am en tal becau se it prevents
the in tro d u c tio n into p h ilo so p h y o f the "w orld" as nature,
o b ject, or reality, as a certain k in d o f beings strictly separate
from D ase in . “Being-in-the-w orld” is a vaccination again st
the ap p earan ce o f the w orld as an essence. T h erefore, th is is
only the p red icate (e x iste n tial) o f D asein and, consequently,
it p e rta in s to Being directly, w ith o u t the division s o f the old
p h ilo so p h y into who is in the w orld {yvxtj, su b ject) an d the
w o rld it s e lf as so m e th in g differen t. D asein is alw ays B ein g-
in-the-world. W h en there is D asein , there is Being-in-the-
world. A n d the o p p o site is tru e: B ein g-in -th e-w orld calls
329
___ J
for the presence o f D asein , since w ith o u t D ase in as such, to

which the existen tial ap plies, it is u n th in kab le (in term s o f
fu n d am en tal-o n to lo g y ).
In a certain way, this is quite rem iniscent o f the phenom enological

m eth od— with one fundam ental difference: for H eidegger,
the question o f Being bears great and param ount significance,
direct intuition o f Being and language (the Being o f language,
the language o f Being). .
In order to better understand D asein from the existential

point o f view, we m ust successively reject two axiom s absorbed
within classical ontology: being convinced o f the “I s ” existence
and that o f the “world.” A t the sam e time, in the m etaphysics o f
M odernity, these axiom s attained hysterical significance with
the threat o f extinguishing consciousness. T h is was not always
the case, but becam e the norm follow ing the recorded “death
o f G od.” For those in traditional societies, the ontological
argum ent com prised faith in G o d . “ I ” and the “w orld” were the
ontological consequences and, in som e cases, could have been
acknow ledged as illusions (M aya in H in d u ism ) when faced
with the A bsolute. Therefore, rejecting the “ I” and the “w orld”
was a rather acceptable cultural phenom enon that did not
violate anything under norm al circum stances.
But durin g M odernity, ontology rejected the “G o d hypothesis,”

asking m an to substantiate his Being either through the subject
( cogito) or the outside w orld (em piricism , m aterialism ). It is
this kind o f M odern m an that the perceptiveness o f H eidegger's
philosophy addresses. It is the m an o f M od ern ity that he
addresses. It is for him that D asein and the u n derstan din g o f
Being-in'the-world” as an existential carry the m ost piercing,
revolutionary m essage. T h e m an o f M odernity only has his “I”
and the “world.”
330
\
H eidegger begins by suggesting that we part with these

proofless illusions, but not in favor o f a certain other kind o f
transcendent reality (G o d , the A bsolute, and so on), but, rather,
favoring D asein, factually existent, present in the here and
now. H eidegger does not call us back into ongology. H e fully
acknow ledges the legitim acy and predictability o f nihilism in
W estern E uropean philosophy. H e invites us forward, further
ahead, beyond the ultim ate lim it o f the night and N othingness,
where we will discover not som ething new as that which has not
been but som ething unique, which is, was, and will be. T h is is
D asein and its existentials.
D ase in is, an d it is in the w orld, b u t the w orld is the

co n seq u en ce o f D a se in . S u c k in g in and am azin g w ith its
Being, D asein is a p resen ce th at refuses to be called the “I,”
refu ses to be called the “w orld,” and refu ses to corresp on d
to an y th in g else. A s Being-in-the-world, D asein is a sp atially
m ovin g Being, w hich o rgan izes itse lf and everything
aro u n d itse lf. F irst com es “in-der-W elt-Sein,” "D a se in / and
only th e n — the w orld, and only in the case th at it h as the
chance to ju s t ify its autonom y. T h e latter is not at all sim ple
u n d er the circu m stan ces o f H e id e g g e r’s acute vigilance in
term s o f p reven tin g rep eatin g the on to logical m istak es
o f p h ilo so p h y ’s first B egin n in g. From now on, the w orld
b ecom es an existen tial h y p o th e sis. W e know th at there is
Being-in-the-w orld, b u t we do not know (w e can only gu ess
an d sp ecu late) ab o u t the w o rld ’s Being.
Being-in and Being-with
D eveloping this crucial existential, H eidegger also form ulates it

som ew hat differently, introducin g two other parallel existentials
Insein and M itsein.7
7 Ibid., 52,130-134.
331
/
“Insein” m eans "Being-in” W e have already m entioned that

fundam ental-ontology always tries to avoid essentializing the
world. T h e ''Insein" existential, “Being-in,” underscores the role
o f D asein in developing the w orld as that in which D asein
dwells. Even prior to the world, it dwells in som ething. O nce
again, the given in— H eidegger traces the G erm an “in” to the
G o th ic "in n an ” "to live,” from which the contem porary G erm an
“wohnen” is derived— is revealed only through Being. T h is Being
lives, it resides, it inhabits, it "dwells in.” .
*
We m ust analogously interpret “M itsein,” "Being-with” T h is

existential tells us nothing as to who dwells with whom. B u t it
underscores the fact that D asein is never alone, i.e., singular, i.e.,
separate, basing its identity on self-identity. Fichte’s form ula o f
" I ” as equal to "I,” on which he based his p o st-K an tian ontology,
is com pletely inapplicable here. D asein does not yet contain
the one who could or m ust remove his solitude, there are no
singularities o f dialogue, nor is there a dialogue itself. Here,
com m onality preceeds its com ponents, com m onality— "with”
("mit”) — is, whereas those that com prise and establish it are
not. In this case, "with," "mit, “ transform s, as in the case with
"with,” into a derivative o f Being. Being tells us that it can only be
"with"— w ithout "with" there is no Being. W hen Being discovers
itself, it does so as “Being-with” establishing non-solitude as an
inalienable feature o f D asein. D asein is not alone.
Care (D ie Sorge)
H eidegger also describes other existentials o f D asein. A nother

notable example is D ie Sorge, care.8 D asein is concerned
thereby expressing Being. Being per se represents care. T h is is
an extremely im portant designation. D asein is not som ething
8 Ibid., 117.
332
\
alienated, cold, concerned only with itself, and indifferent.

D asein is concern. Theoretically, this existential is derived from
the three preceeding ones, “Being-in-the-world’, ’ “BeingAn” and
Being-witb, but it also deciphers them. D asein radiates care,
and is care itse lf— care in its purest form, w ithout the one at
w hom it is directed. Existing is partial, interested, and involved
w ith the course o f existing.
T h e w o rld s being at hand’ is form ed through care in its

direction. T h is trajectory o f “Being-in'the-world” constitutes
som ethin g “present,” "available” (das Vorhandene) as som ething
that is at hand (das Zubandene). Being-in-the-world becom es
Being-in-tbe-bome, in which presence is conceptualized as being
surroun d ed with care, con stituted by care.
There is always care, care is the quintessence o f D asein. However,

when care pushes Dasein to step over an unseen barrier (thereby
establishing it), to reconsider something, to touch, and eat,
then care as an existential can transform being "at hand" into
objectivization. Thus, this existential o f Dasein demonstrates
the way in which the oblivion o f Being commenced in Western
European philosophy. At a certain moment, concern that is
natural for Dasein transformed the world, in which Being (Being-
in-tbe-world) manifested, into something excessively“ at hand’. ’
H ere we can observe the initial movement toward the emergence
o f cpvaiq. W e begin to understand that fundamental-ontology does
not simply constitute the new Beginning in philosophy, but also
dem onstrates the trajectories along which Dasein became alienated
from itself in the first Beginning. Placing the new philosophy into
itself and explaining in detail how the old metaphysics arose, the
errors in relation to D asein’s existentials that served as its basis, and
the way in which it formed on its own foundations, Heidegger's
analysis o f Dasein asserts its identity as fundamental-ontology.
333
A little later, we will see that D asein itse lf can have two basic
m odes— authentic and inauthentic. A n d each o f the existentials
can also act as an expression o f either authentic or inauthentic
D asein. In the case o f the care existential, this is obvious, and we
can im agine how D asein ’s existentials in the inauthentic regime
constitute the historical-philosophical process from the first
Beginning to N ietzsche.
H erein lies the entire significance o f H eidegger. N o t only

does he dem onstrate that what finished has finished, but also
explains what exactly finished, when it began, and why this
occurred. In addition, H eidegger constructs a bridge tow ard
the new Beginning.
Thrownness ( Geworfenbeit)
A nother highly im portant existential o f D asein is thrownness

(Geworfenheit). D asein was thrown. H erein lies its fundam ental
basis, m ore specifically, the lack thereof.
D asein w as throw n. It w as throw n by som eone, into

som ew here, in som e direction, from som ew here, b u t there
is no som eon e or som ew here outside o f and before D asein
itself. It was throw n in every sense, including psych ological.
D asein w as throw n since there is no auth ority th at it could
have ad d ressed with a com plaint, request, beh est, or dem and.
H erein lies the significance o f tran sitio n in g from the th ough t
process that pu sh es o ff essence to the kin d o f th ough t th at
pu sh es o ff existence. D asein w as throw n because it is on its
own, in com plete absence o f any presence o u tsid e itself. W e
could say that it dw ells in a throw, it flies, since thrownness does
not find a bottom ( G ru n d), but occurs under the con d ition s o f
an abyss (A bgrund).
334
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Even though the concept of Geworfenheit has becom e

accepted by now, and is actively used in philosophy and
p sych ology it is not difficult to determ ine H eidegger’s own
etym ological intentions. M uch like “Unverborgenheit" (literally
unconcealm ent ) has the m eaning equivalent to the "truth”
for him (as a literal tran sm ission o f G reek etym ology in the
w ord aXr/Osia), the w ord Geworfenheit" is none other than the
G erm an copy o f the L atin “subjectum"— from “sub" (“un der”)
and “jacere” ("to throw ”). It is subjectum that is the throw n one.
In the R u ssian language, there is som ething sim ilar in the word
nodnejicaufee” ("podlezhashchee,” gram m atical sub ject)— a
copy o f another L atin w o rd "substantivus”, literally “lying,” more
specifically/standing under.”
T h e subject is also thrown in, b u t this is a p articular case o f

thrownness. T h ro w n n ess as Geworfenheit’s existential is an
origin al and fu n dam en tal concept. It is characteristic o f both
the old p h ilo so ph y (w here it is called y/vxrf [psyche], Sai/uov
[daim on], “subject," “I,” etc.) and the new, where it appears in
pure form .
A n o th er existen tial is connected to D ase in s throw nness:

“sketch” (E n tw urf). T h e R u ssia n language, m uch like G erm an,
con tain s the stem “throw " in the w ord “sketch" ( nadpocoK
[nabrosok]). H av in g been thrown, staying in flight, D asein
itse lf un dertak es a throw. T h is throw is a “throw -onto” as
an answ er to thrownness. H ere, too, there are parallels with
the L atin p h ilo so p h ical term “proectum ” "project," which
etym ologically m eans “throw n fo rw ard "— practically the sam e
th in g as the G erm an “E n tw u r f or the R u ssian “nabrosok” In
L a tin / ‘subjectum, quia subiectum est, se p ro icit’, ’ “being thrown,
the subject creates a project.”
*
335
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But the "subject” and "object” are not sim ply L atin w ords; they
are also philosophical notions that belong to the conceptual
topography o f the old philosophy and, consequently, relate to
the m etalanguage o f m etaphysics. H eidegger s "throw nness” (as
well as the "sketch,” Entwurf) in the place o f the subject serve the
following purpose:
• dem ontaging the m etaphysical m eanings of

philosophical term s and their return to the elem ent
o f language (from term s to Words);
• developing a m etalanguage o f the new philosophy

which is based on G erm anic roots.
Let us note that these operations m ust be conceptualized in

the context o f the R ussian language, and then H eid eg gers
philosophy will becom e clear in R ussian, too. A lso, using
Slavic etym ology will help in un derstanding the m ovem ent o f
H eidegger's own thoughts. A t the sam e time, they can serve as
the basis o f establishing a philosophical m etalanguage on the
basis o f returning to the original etym ologies, i.e., language per
se, which will open up the possibility o f constructin g R u ssian
philosophy (which never was) relying on the origical Slavic-
R ussian m eanings (with free usage o f com parative etym ologies
o f other In do-E uropean languages).
Befindlichkeit (Findability) and F ear
D asein ’s next existential is findability, Befindlichkeit.9
D asein’s specific thrownness m anifests in that it acutely perceives

it itself as Befindlichkeit, zs'findability" D asein is found.
9 Ibid., 180-200.
336
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The am biguity in terms o f the transitive and intransitive uses

o f the R ussian verb "naxodumbCH ("nakhoditsia,” literally "to be
found," m eaning "to be located"— '“befinden” and “sich befinden”
in G erm an) is quite useful here. By using the transitive verb
incorrectly, i.e., without specifying "where" one is located, we
transm it the very core o f this existential. To be found— not
somewhere, but simply to be found. The Russian gram m ar tries
to seek a way out by using the following interpretation: Dasein
is found ( nakhoditsia ) which means that it was found by
someone. A nd this second meaning, an accurate one this time,
can also be accepted from the gram matical standpoint with the
following correction: no one finds Dasein since, outside o f Dasein,
there is nothing and no one. However, at the same time, it does
not find itself (for now), since D asein’s “self" (Selbst) comprises
another topic o f its analytical description. Thus, Dasein does not
“find itself," but is rather found. 10
Anxiety in regard to D asein being found is expressed in the mode

o f th is“findability," which is fear (Furcht).n A s a result o f the latter,
it is quite accurate to say that D asein fears. It fears both thrownness
(a throw), Being-in, and orientation toward the “world” as a place
o f dwelling. Therefore, fright comprises one o f D asein’s m ost
im portant existentials, in which general “findability" expresses
itself. D asein is frightened and can express its fright in different
ways. But it is pierced by fear from the onset, in a fundamental
ontic way, even prior to these expressions.
Verstehen (U nderstanding)
H e id e g g e r th in k s th at Verstehen12 ("u n d erstan d in g,”

"com prehension") is also an existential o f D asein. "T o
10 T h is form ula can be accepted as a fundam ental statem ent from a new
philosophy in the R ussian language.
11 Ibid., 140.
12 Ibid., 134.
337
/
un derstan d” (“noHUMamb” [p o n i m a t in its R u ssian etym ology

m eans to "take som ething"; "to u n derstan d” originates in
“'Hmb,” "'Hnmb” ("-i a t “' ni at ”’) which m eans to "take," to
"lift" som ething. T h u s, the R u ssian language conceptualizes
understanding as appropriation, capture, turning into private
property (dom estication, acquisition, use, taking into care).
Even if we could use the R u ssian w ord for "understanding" in
this case, then it could only be used to describe the existential
o f the inauthentic D asein. O nly beings turned into "things-at-
hand" can be "understood" by "taking", m aking a step over the
barrier where the sacred relationship with Being ends, and
from where— with all the dom esticity— it is better not to take,
and if taking occurs, then to give back immediately. "Being-
in-the-world” constituting "things-at-hand," actually prepares
through care these "things-at-hand” for taking. B ut D asein ’s
authentic existential clearly opp oses this. T h is m eans that
Verstehen m ust be conceptualized differently from conventional
"understanding." T h e G erm an stem o f this w ord contains the
m eaning "rearrange," "relocate"; the English "to un derstand"
m eans "to place (stand) under.” T h e French “comprendre” (from
the L a tin " comprehendere”), much like the R ussian, in contrast to
the G erm anic languages, is dom inated by the stem "prendre” i.e.,
"to take,” "to appropriate.” W e encounter som ething akin to this
m eaning in the G erm an w ord “das V ern eh m u n g “vernehmen”
("perception,” “to perceive”). By using this word, H eidegger
h im self occasionally transm its such an im portant G reek term
as vovg,” vosTv” (“nous” “noein”) — "intellect,” “rational m ind,”
“thought process,” “to think.”
For D asein, it is custom ary to “rearrange,” change places. It is

possible that this expresses its care, its empathy, its com plicity
in Being'in'the-world. By “rearranging,” D asein com prehends
what it rearranges; identifies the m eaning o f w hat is being
338
\
rearranged; places what is far away closer to itse lf and what is too
close— further away thereby constructing an intellectual order.
In term s o f meaning, this is "understanding," although both the
R u ssian and French equivalents are too tied to etymology.
T h ere is a certain linguistic problem here. I f we begin exam ining

all these nuances, we will then lose the possibility o f translating
H eidegger and will be forced to discuss him in the G erm an
language only. B ut if, on the contrary, we try to sim plify the
situation by rejecting these etym ological excursions, then we
risk ending up with total nonsense instead o f a w ell-constructed
and com pletely clear G erm anic philosophy.
I envision the following solution. W hen it comes to the most

im portant, key points in Heidegger's philosophy, especially those
dealing with his creation o f a metalanguage for this philosophy i.e.,
constructing a bridge toward the new Beginning, we m ust stay as
close to the G erm an original as possible. This risks making the text
more complex and excessively bulky, but also provides intellectual
and philosophical clarity and certainty. A t the same time, when it
comes to general presentation, we can step away from this rule and
use certain words without the etymological and terminological
specifics, that is, approximately. Heidegger him self often strays
from his m etalanguage, sporadically turning from the commonly
used connotation o f the word or term to specialized meanings
unique to his philosophy, then again, without warnings or
explanations, he returns to the common usage.
H ere is another example. W hen it comes to Sein und Zeit or his

other works from the first period, H eidegger uses the word "Sein"
in all cases where he discusses Being. In the 1930s, he begins
to carefully differentiate between "Sein” (as "Being in ontology”)
an d"Sejw " (as "Being in fundam ental-ontology"). These are not
339 ♦
/
translatable into R ussian or any other language, but remain

significant and foundational for Heidegger's metalanguage.
Therefore, com ing back to Verstehen and explaining why we

cannot generally translate it as "comprehension,'' we can say,
despite stretching it, that understanding (as interpretation,
decoding, even though none o f these is an exact etym ological
equivalent o f Verstehen) is an existential o f D asein, that D asein
is "understanding B eing” or, more specifically, "understanding,”
but not "appropriating,” Being (in order to expel the m eaning o f
"taking” em bedded in "com prehension”).
Speech (Rede)
"Findability” (Befindlichkeit) and "understanding” ( Verstehen)

o f D asein express them selves in speech.13 H eidegger em phasizes
that in the very definition o f man, ancient G reeks often
em bedded the ability to speak, C&ov Xoyov fyov ( zoon logon
echon) as the m ain attribute. T h e latter, according to H eidegger,
should be translated as a "speaking animal,” rather than the L atin
form ula o f a "rational anim al" ("anim alis rationalis"), (Speaking
does not always reveal the presence o f a rational m ind, but
always the presence o f D asein .)
H eidegger writes, "M an expresses h im se lf as beings through

speech."14 It is im portant to note here that it is beings (ontically)
that m an expresses h im self as, not m an. D asein itse lf lets itse lf
be known through speech. Therefore, speech and the language
that it reveals find their source in Being. A t the sam e time, it
is im portant to note that it is language, not its gram m ar and
logic, that expresses the deep-rooted fundam ental-ontological
layer o f D asein. H erien lies the m ost significant trajectory o f
13 Ibid., 148.
14 Ibid., 165.
340
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H eidegger s entire philosophy. D asein s ontics as a language

m ust be u n dersto o d ( verstehen) differently than by using
the logical apparatus b ased on the old philosophy and,
consequently, ontology. H eid egger’s entire opus is based on this
principle: while m oving tow ard the new Beginning, he addresses
language as D ase in s existential directly. O n its basis, he creates
a m etalanguage o f fundam ental-ontology radically differing
from the language o f W estern European philosophy— from the
first Beginning (A naxim ander, Param enides, H eraclitus) until
its End (N ietzsch e).
L an gu age is D a se in ’s Sein
H eidegger em phasizes that speech as an existential organically

includes listening and silence. Silence, according to Heidegger,
is not sim ply the lack o f speech or its rejection, but a source
o f speech, speech in its pure Being. Speech as a saying conceals
silence, eclipsing its all-encom passing and all-containing, life-
giving darkness with its presence.
H eidegger pays special attention to the process o f hearing and

listening. H e brings up the im age o f a sentinel at his station at
night surroun ded by absolute darkness. T h e sentinel is tuning
into the surroundin g silence o f beings in an attem pt to catch the
tinest signs o f the sound's barely detectable emergence am idst
its absence. T h is kind o f silence and this kind o f listening take
D asein back to the very origins o f speech, to that point in the
ocean o f language where the rivers o f speech find their source.
Speech and silence can resem ble beings and Being. Being both
is and is not beings. T h e case o f silence is sim ilar: it calls both
for the presence o f speech and its removal for the sake o f an all-
encom passing, solem n truth. From the standpoint o f D asein ’s
341 ♦
/
authentic existence, hearing speech and, to an even greater

extent, tuning into life-giving silence, is even m ore significant
than speech itse lf or natural sounds articulated by man.
Stim m ung
“Stim m ung” "Stimme” is another existential o f D asein . T h is is

a very interesting word. It sim ultaneously m eans “voice" and
“melody," “setting" and “m ood." Being tuned in is also D ase in ’s
existential since it cannot be “on its own." In other w ords, it
cannot be out o f tune: it will not play by itse lf and m ake sound.
D asein is necessarily in one o f the m oods. It either laughs or
cries, feels sad, calmly observes, feels wrathful, basks. W ithout
these, it is unthinkable: we cannot im agine D asein lacking its
Stimmung existential.
In the o ld philosophy, m o o d w as co n sid ered a secon dary

qu ality un w orthy o f a p h ilo so p h er. It is im p o ssib le to
im agine th at a stoic, a follow er o f Sen eca, Z e n o o f Elea,
or M a rcu s A u re liu s— who d e sp ise d a ffe c ts— say in g all o f a
sudden , “ W e w ere sad today, but yesterday w as enjoyable."
T h in k e rs m u st be in differen t, in sen sitive, alien ated . T h e y
m u st th in k ab o u t the eternal an d u n ch an gin g prin cip les,
observe apxrf ( “arche," the o rigin al sou rce) in the sta te o f
a x a p a ^ ia ( “a ta ra x ia ,” in differen ce).
H eidegger suspects that this is a thesis o f the false ontology.

Alienation from m ood, equating Stimme with affect, indicates
the already complete divison o f Dasein into a soul (consciousness,
vovg [nous]) and nature ((pvaig [physis]), i.e., the alienation and
loss o f correlation to Being, substituting the question about Being
with the question about beings and the general.
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D asein is attuned, and D ase in ’s m ood s leave an im pact on the

m odes o f p h ilo so p h izin g in the fundam ental-ontological vein.
I f affects were, in the old philosophy, considered the low est
dom ain o f the thought process, then in the new Beginning,
m o od s are inseparably connected to the thought process.
T h is is linked to H eid eg gers own attitude tow ard art (poetry,

in particular). C aptivated by mood, Stimme, poets and artists are
capable o f reaching the furthest horizons in this direction, the
m o st unreachable heights, which, in term s o f their significance,
are com parable to the greatest philosophical insights. H eidegger
considered ph ilosophers and artists the two types o f people that
reach an equally great height, but by using different m ountain
peak s and follow ing diverging paths. T h ey originate from the
sam e D asein , but move along different trajectories. T h is is why
H eid egger addressed the poetry o f H olderlin, N ovalis, Rilke,
and G eo rg H eym , as well as the paintings o f Vincent van G ogh,
for the p u rp ose o f interpreting m any o f his philosophical ideas.
Stimme is, w ithout a doubt, a poetic existential.
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IV. IN AUTH EN TIC REGIME OF
DASEIN’S EXISTENCE
Authenticity and Inauthenticity of D asein
H av in g described D asein and its existentials, H eidegger

introduces a highly significant distinction into D asein itse lf
H e m entions the presence o f two opposite m odes o f Being for
D asein : eigene” and “uneigene.” T h ese are norm ally translated
as “authentic” a n d " inauthentic” In G erm an ,“eigene” m eans "ones
own," in other w ords, "that which belongs only to o n eself”
“Uneigene” is “not on es own,” “inauthentic,” “alienated.” T h e
G reek w ord “avOsvxiicoq” (authenticos) is based on the root
“a m o g ” i.e., “oneself,” “on es own,” which closely corresponds to
the G erm an “eigene.”
The introduction o f this fundam ental distinction leads

us to describing these two types o f D asein ’s existence and,
consequently, to dividing all existentials into two m odes:
each existential can be viewed in its authentic (eigene) and
inauthentic (uneigene) version.
H eid eg ger d em o n strates that the “n atural” (in the very least,
m o st frequently encoun tered) state o f D asein is inauthentic.
D asein exists in the inauthentic, not o n es own. It can exist
(an d m u st do so) authentically, but m o st often (alm o st always)
th is is not the case. T h e inauthenticity o f D ase in ’s existence is
one o f the fu n dam en tal attrib u tes o f D asein , specifically. T h is
is a certain ad d itio n to D asein from the side (there is no such
sid e): it is its in sep arable and fu n dam en tal attribute. D ase in ’s
in auth en ticity h as its own d eep -ro oted foun dation s.
♦
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M A R T I N H E ID E G G E R : The Philosophy of Another Beginning
In addition, all form s o f inauthentic existence are rooted

in D asein ’s authentic structure. It is im portan t to note that
D asein appears (does not conceal itse lf any longer, reveals
itself) in the authentic mode, whereas it conceals itse lf (hides,
disappears) in the inauthentic m ode. B u t both unconcealm ent
and concealm ent com prise the essence o f its existence.
The AlUPiercing Everyday
W h at com prises the core o f D ase in ’s inauthentic existence?

H eid egger calls this "durchdringlicbe Alltaglichkeit”1, which
m eans “all-piercing" or “penetrating everyday (everyd ayn ess)."
It seem s that the term “everyday” is a lightw eight. B u t the latter
does not p resu p p o se w hat occurs daily, because very different
things occur “every day" that can n ot serve as a predicate for
such a fu n dam en tal notion like D a se in . T h e inauthentic
register o f existence itse lf gives birth to the “everyday,”
establish es, and con stitu tes it, tran sform s everything into
it, which m ay not be the “everyday” by itself, and m akes
this everyday “piercingly penetrable." “ Everydayness" and
“extraordin arity” are predeterm ined by D ase in ’s setting. In the
inauthentic m ode, everything, even the m o st extraord in ary
event, turns into routine, becom es banale, is included in the
com m on. In addition, the pow er o f D asein is so great th at it
is capable o f ensnarling everything in the “everyday," keeping
actions, thoughts, events, gestures, occurrences, and feelings
in this state. N o one and nothing are capable o f slip p in g away
from this register when it is turn ed on; the piercin g rays o f
inauthenticity control everything.
1 M artin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit„ 160.
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V _
D ecay ( Verfallen)
Sin ce D asein exists, its existentials are not som ething additional
to it, but rather express certain aspects o f it itself. Consequently,
D asein s existentials in the inauthentic m ode function as
expressions o f this inauthenticity. T h ey do not fall under the
"all-piercing everyday," but rather each constitutes the latter
in its own way. O p eratin g in the inauthentic regime, D asein ’s
existentials create the everyday.
T h us,"th row n n ess" (Geworfenheit) transform s into"breakdow n,"

"decay" ( Verfallen) inside inauthentic D asein.2 T h is kind o f
existence expresses, in its own way, furnishes, m oderates, and
em its the fundam ental elem ent o f the "throw.” D asein falls,
breaks apart, collapses, thereby creating the “everyday" as
distraction, dispersion, decom position, dilapidation, confusion,
and multiplicity.
T his affects other existentials as well. For instance, “Being-in-

the-world.” in D asein ’s inauthentic existence becomes "falling-
into-the-world." The "world" itse lf emerges as a result, torn away
from "Being-in-the-world” alienated from this kind o f Being,
preemptively fallen. Every world is a fallen world, and this
fallenness, the world’s fall into sin, is a form o f D asein’s existence
as that o f fall and decay. The world falls away from Being-in-the-
world becom ing the world; by becom ing the world, it becomes the
world o f decay, falls apart into multiplicity, imm ediately begins to
turn into dust, dissipates in the entropic process. Yet this is not
an attribute o f the world, or even the attribute o f the world that
has fallen away from “Being-in-the-world’, ’ but rather the attribute
o f D asein ’s inauthentic existence. The world transform s into the
everyday world through D asein ’s inauthentic regime.
2 Ibid., 127.
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But it is not ju st the world that falls. D asein itse lf falls and falls
into the everyday. T h is fa ll into the everyday becom es D ase in ’s
fate, its history. T h e history o f D asein in its inauthentic
regime is the history o f its fa ll (as an inauthentic expression
o f thrownness). T h is is precisely why the history o f W estern
European philosophy inexorably moves in the direction o f
nihilism : it em bodies the fall o f D asein.
T h e fall is the fall into inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit).
' C hatter ( Gerede)
Inauthentic Dasein possesses other attributes such as chatter

(Gerede), curiosity (Neugierigkeit), and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit).3
Chatter is a variant o f speech (this is obvious in G erm an:

Gerede— Rede), which narrates about D asein as it appears in
its inauthentic regime. Here, chatter expresses itse lf exactly like
speech and, exactly like speech, it is one o f D asein ’s existentials.
T h e difference is that chatter is speech pierced with the everyday,
creating this everyday, subm erging the one who speaks and the
one who listens into it, as well as the one who is silent (in this
case, the one who keeps quiet). W hen it com es to chatter, it is
im possible to tell clearly who is speaking, what about, to whom,
and for what purpose. It represents background m urm ur, white
noise, abstracted from the speaker h im se lf and from the one
whom he addresses. D asein reveals itse lf in this (even i f in its
inauthentic regim e); it is the one for whom it is custom ary to
narrate, through speech, about the Being present in it, addressing
everyone and no one at the sam e time. C h atter transfers this
existential o f D asein into a m essage about "this" (da) rather
than Being (Sein). "T h is ” appears in chatter (G erede)— "this,
3 Ibid., 175,167,170.
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this, this. C h atter attracts o n es attention to factuality (which is

also one o f D asein s existentials), but detracts from Being. T h is
is why factuality becom es insignificant, negligible.
E n d less m uttering about all that is insignificant weaves the

structure o f the everyday, fills it with endless discourse as a
kin d o f totalitarian radio, which can never be turned off, since it
bro ad casts in our con sciousness. Any attem pts to focus on any
statem en's m eaning result in failure, since Gerede transitions to
the next subject o f conversation at the very m om ent when the
rational m ind tries to com prehend the previous statem ent.
Inauthentic D asein cannot handle silence as an aspect o f

authentic speech, nor can it handle full-fledged speech narrating
ab ou t Being, asking about it, encouraging to listen to its voice.
The voice o f Being is always quiet but, so that there are no
chances left to hear it, Gerede rings louder and louder. It seems
to express everything so as not to say anything— only to fill
inquisitive silence with a stream o f ordinary statem ents.
C h atter is an inalienable attribute o f many, even the m ost non-

talkative and sullen people (anti-social loners are even more
prone to chatter on the inside). People talk constantly on
the inside. Som eth in g always goes on inside their heads with
spinn ing fragm ents o f w ords, thoughts, concepts, and phrases.
It is this that is the existential chatter o f the inauthentic D asein .
It has no beginning or end. W hen m an first em erges into the
w orld, he hears squeaking, ringing, rattling m edical instrum ents,
w hispering nurses, doctors’ self-assured deep voices, scream ing
w om en giving birth, new born crying (including o n eself); later
on appear the continuously m uttering father, mother, brothers,
sisters, gran dparen ts, cats, television, later yet— television
announcers, teachers, b osses, employees, insurance agents,
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cashiers, adm inistrators, and, again, at the end— nurses and

doctors. M an passes accom panied by the sam e cantankerous
and senseless rum bling o f the daily phrases strung onto one
another and lacking the narrative about Being.
In chatter, D asein is thrown, and in chatter it is liquidated.

W hen man dies, chatter continues since it is the fundam ental
attribute o f the inauthentic D asein .
Curiosity (N eugierigkeit)
U n d erstan d in g ( Verstehen) tran sform s into curiosity and a

neurotic desire to get acquain ted w ith m ore and m ore new
types, concepts, states, things, places, and events w ith out
subm erging into their Being. It is curiosity th at is an attem pt
to appropriate, take upon oneself, privatize the w orld torn
away from its Being. A nd, b ased upon its satisfactio n level,
curiosity only grow s, since it takes the w orld w ith out its
Being. Inauthentic D asein does not obtain anything, b u t only
loses, dispersin g its m ost im p o rtan t attrib ute while falling (it
is curiosity that is the fall o f understanding— Verstehen), Being
em bedded in "th is'B ein g” (D asein ).
In the G erm an language, N eugierigkeit literally m eans “hunger

for novelty." T h e R u ssian “m o6o“ (liubo- from “jm 6oeb
[liubov’], “love") and “-nbimcmeo ("-pytstvo” from “nbimamb”
[pytat ], here, to find out," “learn," “unravel") does not contain
the sam e negative connotation. H unger fo r novelty expresses
D asein ’s inauthentic vanity m uch more acutely. It pushes
D asein tow ard constant sliding from one thing to another,
as we get used to the last thing, we move on to the next. But
getting u sed to som ething does not mean “to be un derstood"
("verstanden”). Inauthentic D asein “un derstands" in the sense
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V _
that it "lifts" a certain som ething that it could discard in the

next m om ent, since the intention o f inauthenticity is not to
explore the Being in w hat w as "lifted,” but the gesture o f "false”
appropriation itself. A t the sam e time, the aforem entioned
R u ssian w ord for curiosity etym ologically m eans neither an
attem pt to appropriate nor the transition into novelty: it can be
a quality o f asking for one and the same, it can be triggered by
the sam e thing if it is worth it for D asein to ask about its Being.
E lem ents reproduced by D asein in its inauthentic Being becom e

a constant, continuous, prodigal contemplation which gravitates
tow ard nothing. H u n ger for novelty is a form o f the greatest kind
o f ignorance: running from one thing to another and grabbing
everything in sight, only to drop it a second later, inauthentic
D asein m akes everything old, m eaningless, uninteresting, and
does not inspire any kind o f advancem ent. T h u s Neugierigkeit
becom es an escape from m eaning, thought, content — in other
w ords, Being.
H eidegger asserts that curiosity (Neugierigkeit) expresses m an’s

aspiration to see. Seein g m eans failing to understand. T h e fact
o f seeing does not com m unicate anything to D asein or m ake
it advance in term s o f graspin g Being. Seein g is the least ontic
o f all perception form s. T h e everyday replaces thoughtful
u n derstan din g ( Verstehen) with appearances (So£a [doxa],
"renown”) and subm erges inauthentic D asein into a continuous
chain o f appearances, sightseeing.
T h e thought process dem ands limits to seeing, a focused

contem plation on one and the sam e so that this contem plation
could open up Being o f the contem plated thing — ov D asein itself.
W hence com e traditional m editative practices, concentrating
one's attention on the sam e objects. T h e less man sees, the
♦
351
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m ore chances he has for recognition and com prehension. B ut

this is the case with the authentic D asein, In its inauthentic
counterpart, everything is the opposite. Its p u rpose is to collect
appearances that replace m eaning. T h e more total is its ability
to observe, the more m eaningless are the observed im ages.
W e can com pare two exem plars o f inauthentic D asein, chatter

and curiosity. W hen it com es to chatter (Gerede), the sam e thing
is repeated over and over again, as a rule. T h is intrusive nonsense
does not even stop at night when m an closes his eyes and looks
%
at nothing. Curiosity constantly pushes him tow ard novelty—

what he “had not seen” earlier. T h u s, the eternal return o f the
sam e kind o f nonsense in the form o f Gerede is com plem ented
with a “refreshing” stream o f new nonsense in the form o f
Neugierigkeit. N o t yet ready for public consum ption when Sein
und Zeit was being written, the television handles this ideally.
T h e television com bines the flow o f half-com prehended,
inconsistent inform ation with the flow o f im ages. In this way,
the television is one o f the greatest em bodim ents o f the piercing
everyday and, consequently, a privileged form o f D asein ’s
inauthentic existence.
A m biguity (Zw eideutigkeit)
The fact that D asein is always found in between (zwischen)

generates constant am biguity in the inauthentic regime along with
uncertainty, vagueness, and always confused ontic trajectories
o f D asein ’s development in the direction o f spatial or tem poral
horizons. In contrast to authentic D asein, which grasps Being in
Being-in-between, liberating it from false identities with beings-
outside-of ((pvaig, physis) and beings-inside-of (idea [idea], yvyji
[psyche]), inauthentic D asein falls into a pattern o f thrashing
between the exterior and the interior and, spinning in a cycle o f
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uncertainties grow ing like a snowball, ends up being unable to

focus and prove ontologically the basis for either one.
W e can exam ine am biguity as a layer o f chatter over the hunger

fo r novelty. M eaningless repetition o f one and the sam e in
chatter generates sim ulated consistency in inauthentic D asein .
T h e latter establishes a fictitious row o f m eanings as a certain
k in d o f m uttering consistency o f pseudo-m eanings. Curiosity,
on the other hand, introduces the pseudo-dynam ic o f flashing
im ages. Since both are the opposite o f meaning, both processes
function in a de-synchronized state, achieving am biguity
through layering two kin ds o f nonsenses over each other
(au ditory and visual).
F ear as an Escape
A s part o f inauthentic existence, fear, typical o f D asein as

such, pushes it tow ard flig h t T h is flight (or an escape) is not
characterized by whither it could run but whence and from w hat
Inauthentic D asein interprets fe a r as a fear faced with Being and
turns it into a panicked flight from Being.
A n escape from Being, that is, from what is inside D asein

correspon din g to Sein, can be carried out in two directions:
without and within. A n escape without m eans constituting
the w orld as a w orld torn away from Being-in-the-world. T h is
w orld, as som ethin g autonom ous, becom es the result o f
D ase in ’s inauthentic existence escaping from itself, whereas the
direction o f this escape without creates the world as whitherto
one flees from Being. A t the sam e time, the sam e world that has
fallen out o f Being-in-the-world can be described as a result o f
inauthentic throw nness. W hen throw nness becom es a fall and
decay, it, first and forem ost, does not constitute the one that
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falls, but where one falls, falling apart afterw ard. W here one
falls is the sam e where one escapes.
A different form o f fear can be caused by that very w orld that

is constituted by tearing away from Being, In this case, fleeing
from Being becom es fleeing from the world. Inauthentic D asein
constitutes the internal dim ension o f the subject, which becom es
autonom ous in response to the fear inspired from the outside.
In this case, this can also be presented as thrownness, only not
into the w orld but in the opposite direction, as alienation from
the world, a turn away from beings and from the Being o f beings.
In all o f these cases with D asein ’s inauthentic existence, this fear
accom panying Being, fear o f Being, and fear as Being becom e
fear faced with Being.
The Figure o f D a s M an
D escribing the existence o f inauthentic Dasein, H eidegger

introduces the figure o f das M an .4 This is a neologism for the
G erm an language. In Germ an, “man” is “der M a n n ’, ’ a m asculine
noun with “nn” at the end. A t the sam e time, G erm an contains
such form s as “man spricht,”“man sieht’, ’“man denkt’, ’ meaning “one
speaks,’"'one sees,’"'one thinks.”5 The French language contains a
direct analogy to "das M a n — "on,” “I’on” (which is form ed from the
French“homme” “I’homme” "man” in the same way as the G erm an
“M an " is from “der M a n n ” "man,” and “Mensch” in contem porary
G erm an). In English, this expression can be translated in the way
that "they say” is used w ithout specifying who “they” are.
4 Ibid., 173.
There is no direct analogy to this in the R ussian or English languages,
and the corresponding form s either use a third-person verb w ithout a
personal pronoun ("they say,” “they think”), a reflexive verb in the third-
person singular (“it is considered,"“it is sung”), or a third-person plural verb
with the pronoun "everyone” (“everyone thinks,” “everyone believes”). "D as
M a n " has often been translated as “the They,” which conveys the relation to
“conventional wisdom .”
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H eidegger introduces das M an ' as an expression o f the

inauthentic D asein that has fallen into the everyday. D as M an
is the I o f the inauthentic D asein, its personified expression.
D a s M an is the answer to the question "W h o ?” in relation to
the inauthentic D asein.
D a s M an expresses the inauthentically taken existential o f

Being'with (M itsein). Since D asein reveals both Being-with
and Being-together, in the inauthentic regime this m eans the
transfer o f subjectivity onto an uncertain, vague, and unrecorded
authority foun d in between (zwischen), like D asein itself. In this
particular case, das M an is not an " I ” o f a certain person, or a
" h e ” "you," and "everyone put together.” Rather, das M an is no
one, since he is the target o f projecting the refusal to accept any
respon sibility for statem ents, opinions, actions, conclusions,
and p ro jects— an escape from them, a flight— rather than
responsible statem ents, conclusions, actions, results, and
projects. T h e density o f m ovem ent away from responsibility
generates the existence o f das M an , which becom es the reference
po in t for everything and everyone. W h at m an does not think
through h im self or som eone else for him — som eone specific
nearby or even far away from him — ends up in the category
o f "they think,” "they think that," "it is believed." A s a rule, no
one specifically (neither individually, nor collectively) does not
think as "they think” (as das M an thinks). N onetheless, it is this
absence o f a specific p osition personified in anyone that grants
the (inarticulate) "thoughts” o f das M an " the greatest authority,
in dispu table "truth," unconditionality, and obviousness.
D a s M an is con stituted together with the everyday as its faceless

personification , as its core, which contains nothing specific,
definitive, clear, and transparent. D as M an is concentrated
am biguity ( Z w eideutigkeit). H is "declaration s" are never
355
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unequivocal and orderly but tHis m akes them all the m ore
m andatory oppressive, and self-im posing. T h e m ore das M an
establishes h im self in ju stify in g his actions and ju dgem en ts, the
more absurd and unfounded he becom es.
In das M an , w rites H eid egger, “each one is the other, and no

one is him self.” 6
D as M an is the main acteur and, at the sam e time, creator

o f the everyday. This is D asein ’s “who” during a fall, in decay
(Verfallen). D as M an falls w ithout noticing, thinking instead
that he “has a go od seat.”
D a s M a n is the one th at gen erates in au th en tic on to lo g y ;

it is he who sp eak s o f the su b je ct and ob ject. A chain o f
in au th en tic existen tials, a system o f o n to lo g ical ju d g e m e n ts,
con cepts o f a subject, object, and, it is frigh ten in g to adm it,
“G o d ” em erges, and is co n stru c te d in him . “G o d ” as an
o n tolo gical co n stru ct o f the in au th en tic D ase in is e stab lish ed
th rough his in ability to truly a d d re ss the other, m uch like
the auth en tic state o f oneself.
A ccording to Heidegger, the m an who says “I ” is a ridiculous

m adm an, since correct philosophical com prehension o f the
first-person pronoun m akes its practical usage im possible in
principle. W hen man says, “I," he is being encouraged by das
M an to do so; “I ” turns into citing an indefinite, trustw orthy
and, at the sam e time, unprovable authority. By pronouncing
"I,” man dissipates through das M an throughout the "falling
world, filled with das M a n ’s m irrors, a m ultitude o f caricatures
o f integrity, personhood, reason, and determ ination.
A n analogous situation em erges with the term s “objective,”

“real,” “reality.” A ssu m in g that the external is a given, man, once
6 Ibid., 126.
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again, operates in the dim ension o f das A lan. T h e latter, instead

o f relating to beings through questioning about his own Being,
crosses out its essence and even its existence, annihilating
them , replacing them w ith Nothingness. Reality, objectivity,
and, especially, m ateriality are deeply nihilistic concepts.
T h e very p o ssib ility o f their existence is rooted in the all
piercing everyday and in foolish w isdom o f das M a n . M o d em
A m erican E nglish has an establish ed expression /con ven tion al
w isdom ,” which m eans, literally, the "kind o f w isdom agreed
u p o n by everyone that it is, indeed, w isdom ,” representing
the public place.” T h e latter, specifically, is the form ula o f das
M a n ’s existence, a form o f his w isdom -m aking agreed upon
by everyone (even though no one specific was asked about
it), but which can neither po in t nor prove its origins and its
intellectual genesis, the roots o f which could contain errors,
m istakes, absurdity, or an obvious stretch.
D a s M a n also h as its ow n "god.” T h is "g o d ” is calm , lazy, and

d o e s n ot p a rtic ip a te in the lives o f p eop le. Lazy, lo u n g in g
g o d ( deus otiosis o f re lig io u s o rig in s) is also a creatio n o f
d as M a n .
D as M an always thinks practically and, therefore, creates a

daily ontology, in which everything profound and problematic
is subject to doubt, while he gladly and confidently accepts
the em ptiest o f chimeras as reliable evidence. Let us propose a
schem atic diagram o f das M a n ’s ontological triangle (see below).
O f course, das M an could do without a "god,” since he has a

sufficiently firm belief in the reliability o f the erroneous and
unprovable ("I” and "reality”) along with doubt in everything else
(often much m ore ju stified and self-evident) in order to exist.
357
___ y
Nonetheless, ju st in case/' he res'erves this greatest ontological

authority where he could place the following instead o f “god”: an
"idea " “values,” "ideals” "worldviews” the "state,” "society," and so on.
“g o d ”
( b a n a l e , l a z y , c a lm )
f
D as
M an
th e d a i ly “I , ” u n c o n c e r n e d reality> objectiveness; o u tsid e

i x x ' w o r l d — reliable, m a t e r i a l,
a b o u t its n a t u r e , , , .
c arnal, a n d o b v io u s
schematic diagram featuring ontological poles

of inauthentic D a se in
The image o f inauthentic Being, the image o f our ordinary

everyday woven from us ourselves, in the eyes o f H eidegger
becomes a process o f fundam ental ontological decay— turbulent,
active, frightening, constant, and continuing every second.
The world, which normally and calmly opens up in das M a n ’s
everyday (and everyone else), in reality is som ething frightening
in this optics— a catastrophe, crisis, fall, and decay. Falling for
the charms o f das M an and his "conventional w isdom ” is more
frightening than a serial killer's paws. In the latter case, one could
recall authentic Being, Evading the killer, however, one cannot
remember Being, even though the form er had already caught him
358
\
and dism em bered him, as he slept quiety while cozily snoring.

A n d if consciousness touched this m ood even briefly, man would
awaken, because there is nothing more m onstrous, violent, and
pathological than what occurs in the piercing everyday. D as M an
dism em bers Being, forces it to rot and decompose, turns the living
into the dead, and life-saving questioning into the suffocating
and preemptively wrong answer.
D a s M a n as D a se in s E xistential
In order to u n d erstan d H e id eg ge r’s thought process, we m ust

avoid any hint o f dualism . D ase in ’s inauthentic existence, the
tran sfo rm atio n o f its existen tials— "throw nness" into “fall"
an d “decay," “u n d erstan d in g” into "curiosity," "Being-in-the-
world" into the illu sion o f objectivity, “Being-in'between” into
“am biguity," etc.; the centrality o f das M an ; the all-piercing
everyday— all o f these are n ot som eth in g external, foreign, or
other than D asein itself. T h is is D asein, its own choice, decision
(.Entscheidung). T h e term s “g o o d ’7 "b a d " are inapplicable here,
alon g with "true”/ ”false,” "k in d ”/ ”evil,” and so on. In all cases
an d in both regim es— authentic and inauth en tic— we are
dealin g with the one and the sam e: D asein, which, regardless o f
the way it exists, always and only expresses D ase in ’s existence.
T h u s, in order to avoid any hint o f dualism in describing das

M an and his attributes, H eidegger em phasizes the following:
“D as M an is an existential and, as an original phenom enon,
belongs to the positive structure o f D ase in ”7 T h is is an
incredibly im portan t clarification. E xistin g inauthentically,
D asein nonetheless rem ains the m ain and only distributor o f
Being, m eaning, content, structure, and orientation o f processes,
even if this distribution is expressed in nihilism , false ontology,
7 Ibid., 128; here, translated from the Russian.
359
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alienation, nonsense, inarticulari'ty, confusion, and decay. It is

D asein exclusively that bears the responsibility for both the
inauthenticity and authenticity o f existence. It is D asein that is
at the core and is the existence o f everything, predeterm ining
what is, how it is, a n d /o r how long what is will be.
Heidegger calls upon Dasein’s own inauthenticity to think positively.
360
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V. AUTH ENTIC DASEIN
Authentic D asein and Being
W h at is authenticity?
H e id eg ge r defines it as the antithesis o f the inauthenticity

d e sc rib e d th ro u gh v ario u s form s o f existen ce th at we
d isc u sse d earlier.
T h e m ost im portan t aspect o f authentic (eigene) D asein is the

fact that it is focused on the possibility to be, on the kind o f Sein
(Being) that is (ist) this'one-here (d a). T h e presence o f Sein is
em bedded in D asein , but D asein itse lf in its existence, may
treat this Sein in two ways. It could get distracted from it, shrug
it off, turn away, focus on som ething else (for instance, the pure
" d a ” i.e., "this”). In the case o f this decision, it enters into the
inauthentic regim e and begins existing through unleashing
the "piercing everyday,” with all its characteristic existential
versions— das M a n , "curiosity,” "panicked flight,” "chatter,”
"ambiguity,” and so on.
A uthentic D asein exists in the fact that it is, that Being prevails
in it, that it exists as Being. A uthenticity is found where we
move away from inauthenticity, from the endless chatter and
novelty as well as the "conventional w isdom ” o f das M an ;
when we stop running away from Being into the w orld or
into ourselves, dw elling in the world, when we begin to focus
specifically on Being, and, through this focus, carefully and
attentively reach "where” this Being is; when we respond to the
call o f throw nness with an intense recognition o f findability,
363
but do not allow findability to calm us, cultivating thrownness

and its inquisitiveness. B ut in all o f these authentic existentials,
the m ost im portant aspect is the concentration on Being in all
its m odalities and com binations. W e m ust address it with the
question about it itself. T h en D asein will develop according to
its fundam ental-ontological regime.
Being Which Is “T h is” and Which Is
W h at can'this'here'-Be/ng” say ab ou t itse lf dw elling in its own

authentic m ode? It could say two o f the last frightening and
beautiful words, ’’this here-Being”; “this-here— B ein g’ this here,
Being is" Instead o f the “I,” instead o f the "w orld” instead o f
"god" we m ust say the original and correct word, " is ” "Is” is in
the beginning, only then com es “what,” “who,” “how,” “where,”
“when,” “why,” “for what purpose.” B u t m ore often than not, this
“is” falls out, is erased, and som etim es disappears.
A t one point, the R u ssian language contained the connecting

verb “6bimb” ( byt’, to be) which was an unconditional participan t
o f any affirm ative sentences in all o f its form s. Being was the
required elem ent o f gram m ar. In contem porary R ussian, we
say, “I — a child,” “she— a subject o f crim inal liability,” “m an—
disabled person,” “w e— excellent fellows.” T h en w hat happened
to “is”? W e speak about the “I,” about “her,” “man,” “child," “a
subject o f crim inal liability,” "a disabled person,” but nowhere do
we state that they are, that they pertain to Being, and that Being
speaks through them. O ne could end up with the im pression that
all parties in question do not exist, that they are sym bols, that
Being left them, or that they escaped from it them selves, slipped
away, backed away, and collapsed into “N o thing.” Earlier, this
was im possible in the O ld C hurch Slavonic; the verb “to be” was
conjugated and necessarily present in such fo rm s.1
1 cijb ecMb, azm esm‘, I am;
364
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T h u s, the phrase, I — a child w ould have sounded as “a 3b

nado ecMb ( az chado esm "). B ut a child's Being, his “am (is),” is
incom patable with the I": the latter is som ething that pertains
to adolescence.
I f this saying were given back to Being, the latter w ould forbid
us to pronounce it. Sh e is a subject o f crim inal liability" m eans
that she is not worth a dim e with her Being lowered to the level
o f crim inal law. T h u s, she did not simply com m it a crime, but
her Being revolves around the ontology o f crim inal law, and her
place is in p riso n .“ T h is man is a disabled person" m eans that his
disability is the equivalent o f his Being. By acknow ledging this,
we lower his m asculinity to disability, which is a contradiction.
T h u s, a m an w ithout an arm or an eye will always remain
som ethin g other than a disabled person. H e will try to remain
a m an, while repressing his disability, pushing it further away
from the pure illum ination o f Being’s light. H e m ight even be
cured. T radition al societies either ignored w arriors w ounds
or considered them an em bellishm ent. Looking the wrong
way at a veteran w ounded by an enemy’s spear w ould cost its
source dearly— both eyes or even a broken neck. In the past,
the arm less, legless, and scarred were men; their peers and they
them selves honored their Being and m asculinity. T h e case with
the excellent fellows: if we are “excellent fellows," then we bear
responsibility. I f we brag through Being, then we will answer to
Being. T h is m o tif often occurs in R u ssian epic tales, in which
braggin g leads to dark m iracles: death in the epic tale o f Fedor
mu ecu, ty esi, you are;

( oh, ona, o n /a/o , s/he, it— previously, not personal but demonstrative
oho ,
pronouns— ecm b, est’, are;

m u ecMbi, m y esmy, we are;
6bi ecm e, vy este, you are;
( ohu ) cym b ( on i ) s u t ’, they are.
365
Buslaev, resurrection o f the T atar arm y in the epic tale o f Ilia

M urom ets and Batyga, etc.
D asein ’s authenticity is its turn tow ard Sein, its desire and will
to he, and determ ination to discover on eself as Being. In this
case, D asein is etym ologically focused on itse lf as Being, which
is not som ewhere over there, inside or out, bv.t"this (h ere)” "in
between.” T hrow nness and findability apply to Being. "Being-
witti” becom es “ ”Being-with-Being” Being-in-the-world becom es
Being-in-Being. Speech narrates about Being. Fear turns into
terror (Angst), which does not dissem inate or force to flee,
but rather turns all o f its pow er tow ard Being, which contains
both threat and salvation, the terrifying and terrified, baring its
finality and accepting it.
Spaciality as an E xisten tial o f D asein
T h e space within which D asein exists authentically is sacred,

living, fundam entah ontological. T h is space is born out o f
‘ this-Being" Spaciousness (Raumlichkeit) reveals itse lf as one o f
D asein ’s existentials.2
S p ace is the developm en t o f D a se in ’s "th isn ess” (d a ). B u t

the p o in t w here it b egin s is n ot arb itrary and ab stract, but
rather th at which p o in ts to Being (Sein ) as its ow n presen ce
(D a se in ). In th is case, Being is conceived n ot as in d ep en d en t
o f "th is” (' th is here ), there,” or "som ew here over there,”
b u t specifically this here. T h e k in d o f terror th at th is
con cen tration o f B eing in D a se in ’s factu ality in sp ire s in it,
tra n sfo rm s into the affirm atio n o f D a s e in ’s selfn ess (Selhst)
in its au th en tic existence.
2 M artin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 129.
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The W ho” o f Authentic D asein
H eidegger speaks about the who that appears in authentic

D ase in . A nsw ering the question o f w ho?"3, authentic D asein
respon d s with the "self” "it itse lf" form ula (Selbst in G erm an).
T h e Selbst o f authentic D asein com prises its equivalence with
Being, Sein. D asein m ay be. It may be itself, in which case it
is, or it may be not itself, in which case das M an and other
inauthentic existentials operate in the place o f Selbst.
W e could approach the authentic selfness o f D asein through

negating das M an , through a determ ined and conscious turn
away from the piercing everyday, but this turn will be actualized
only in the case o f D asein un dertaking it by itself, through
relying on Being, which is present in it and speaks through it.
Being-tow ard-D eath (Sein-zum -Tode)
O n e o f the m ost significant aspects o f D asein in its authentic

existence is Being'tow ard-death.4 T h e everyday does not like the
subject o f death. D a s M an always lives, always tem pting and
violating us with the thought that he m ight be im m ortal, and
we, too, as a result. A s soon as D asein pays attention to death,
as soon as death reveals itse lf "here and now," as soon as death
w ithout any interm ediate realities is launched into D asein,
there em erges the greatest p o ssibility for D asein to transition
into its authentic regime. In this regime, fe a r transform s into
terror, which originates in D ase in s lighting-fast realization o f
its finality."Bein g'tow ard'death” writes H eidegger,"is existential
\cyufHOcmHbiu] terror, A ngst!’ D asein is finite, m ortal, and is
presen t facing death. W hen it turns tow ard it, focusing on it, it
reveals itse lf in intense, absolute, ultim ate terror.
3 Ibid., 110.
4 Ibid., 114.
367
T error is the op p osite o f fear. Fear provokes filling the

external w orld w ith things, and the internal w orld— w ith
em pty thoughts and concerns. P iling up a m ultitu de o f things
and ideas is an expression o f D a se in ’s fear faced w ith its own
m ortality and finality. T h is trick w orks inside inauthentic
D asein, which is barricaded by the d issip ate d m u ltitu de
from the sim plicity and severity o f the d e ath s m om ent. B ut
this safety o f the m ultitude is the flipside o f the fear coin. It
does not remove it, but exacerbates it, m aking it flat, sm all,
and pathetic. Its alternative is the peaceful trium ph o f terror
(Angst) faced w ith clearly contem plated death. C o llid in g with
death through terror is the necessary resu lt o f D ase in ’s prim acy
and its ontic statu s. H av in g n oth in g before or after itself,
m uch like inside or out, D asein can only carry out a dialogue
with Nothingness. Being em bedded in D asein is too indivisible
for the authentic state to p o stu late som eth in g ou tsid e itself;
au th en tic D asein is collected an d c o n so lid a te d — it is yet to be
d isp e rse d th ro u g h o u t the m u ltitu d e o f beings w hich em erges
sp ecifically th rough its tra n sitio n into the in au th en tic
regim e. T h u s, D asein by itself, in sid e its own Selbst, can
m aintain a d ialo gu e only w ith death and the element o f pure
N othingness. It is the direct collision w ith th is elem ent th at
is the state o f terror. T erro r is the m o st im p o rtan t form o f
D a se in ’s au th en tic existence. In terror, D asein is D asein , th at
is, D asein to the greatest extent, since it is fully con cen trated
on its own Being which, as Being in the fu lle st sen se (n o t
an in d iv id u al or a com m on case o f B eing), can only assu m e
non-Being o u tsid e itself, i.e., death.
Being always exists toward death and is faced toward death. In

the place where death's presence is at its greatest, deep-rooted
and perfect terror reigns. T h is terror is a true sign o f Being’s
presence, since death inspires terror only because it is and
368
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because it way not be, T h a t which is not does not experience

any kind o f terror; non-beings feel w onderful inside death. It
triggers terror specifically in beings which recognizes that they
are with lightning speed.
D a s M an attem pts to conceal D asein in various ways and avoid

colliding with terror and Being when faced with death. H e is
engaged in non-stop chatter; he expresses interest and curiosity,
moves around, fills the w orld with objects, and the soul— with
concerns for a single purpose only— in order to take refuge from
this terror. B ut it is only possible to hide from it by refusing to
focus on Being as a finality, i.e., through the cost o f im itating
non-Being, Inside the inauthentic regime, D asein pretends
in such a way that it w ould not be noticed either from the
stan d p o in t o f death or that o f Being, It is as if this inauthentic
D asein is and is not at the sam e time. T h u s, it attem pts to slip
away from absolute terror by im itating immortality.
Conscience ( Gewissen)
H eidegger describes the process o f calling onto D asein ’s

authentic Being by introducing conscience into the game.
"Conscience,” he w rites,“ sum m ons D asein ’s seflness (Selbst) out
o f being lost in das M a n ”5
The G erm an word "Gewissen” means both “conscience” and

“consciousness" at the same time. The Russian language contains
a similar etymology; "coeecmb” (sovest’, conscience) is formed from
n . 1 tt i n tt /a n 1 a tt a tt i tt .>tt\ i
with and news ( co- and eecmb — so- and vest ), whereas
the G erm an "Gewissen”— from the general suffix "g e ” and the stem
"wissen” (“to know"). Consciousness springs up from the depths
o f Dasein and calls onto it to focus its attention on Being,"Dasein
is the one who calls and the one who is called,” writes Heidegger.6
5 Ibid., 2 3 1 -2 6 7 .
6 Ibid., 274. ______
369 ’
/
A “clear conscience” is illusionary. N orm ally, the conscience

reveals itse lf when it reproaches us. Gewissen is the constant
feeling o f guilt, which D asein experiences. In H eid eg gers
view, D asein is fundam entally guilty in principle. B u t only in
its inauthentic state does it try to explain itse lf or som ehow
escape from condem ntation and cover up its guilt. B ut D asein,
listening to the voice o f its consciousness, reveals itse lf in guilt
since it is through guilt, as a fundam ental reproach, that its true
Being m anifests itself. Revealed in guilt, D asein returns to what
it is. R ecognizing guilt, pure guilt, guilt as such, rem inds D asein
that it is operating in an inauthentic regime.
D asein is guilty o f the piercin g everyday, guilty o f das M an ,

guilty o f curiosity and chatter, guilty o f fear, p o stu latin g
reality and the “I," decay and decom p o sition , i.e., all versions
o f inauthentic existence. D a se in ’s gu ilt is always proven
and sabsolute. In order to feel the extent o f its endless
and absolute guilt, D asein sh ou ld not com m it anything
reprehensible. In that case, D asein w ill have no o p p o rtu n ity to
evade u n derstan din g the greatest level o f its gu ilt in the face
o f Being. Every specific fault m u st be rectified. T h e only kin d
o f gu ilt th at can not be redeem ed is the delay in tran sition in g
from inauthentic existence to the authentic cou n terp art. T h is
delay, th is “noch nicht’, ’ contains the dram a o f D a se in ’s h istoric
presence as ‘‘Sein’’ placed into “d a "
D a se in ’s fa u lt is th at th is “da" is n o t the way it sh o u ld be,

an d even in th at D a se in it s e lf can n o t ch an ge an y th in g here
solely w ith its ow n w ill. D a se in is g u ilty in an a b so lu te way,
alw ays, an d preem ptively. T h e way fro m “d a ” to w ard “S ein ”
d o e s n o t lie in th is gu ilt's re d e m p tio n , b u t rath er in its
p ro fo u n d re alizatio n .
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Noch nicht is neither an accident nor an error, it is the

con stitu tin g side o f this-Being," which cannot be canceled or
overcome, but can be recognized and accepted as guilt. In this
gesture o f recognition and acceptance, guilt becom es thepassage
toward the horizon o f another authentic Beginning,
Positive A nalysis o f D asein in Both Regimes
A uthentic D asein is D asein per se, and its existentials in the

authentic regim e express their ontic essence as the attributes o f
this D asein . But it is none other than the sam e D asein and its
existentials that activate inauthentic existence. H erein lies the
principal m o tif o f Sein und Zeit, in which H eidegger attem pts
to underscore his main idea in a thousand different ways: inside
both the authentic and inauthentic D asein, we are dealing with
the sam e authority, the s a m e "this-Being.” T h e m ost im portant
poin t is not to denounce inauthenticity and break through
tow ard authenticity (although this is also im portant), but to
com prehend the way in which inauthentic D asein is responsible
for the process o f developing the entire W estern European
philosophy from its G reek pre-Socratic heights and until the
bottom less collapse into M odern ity’s nihilism . A nd under the
m ajestic and m eaningless architecture o f this philosophy and its
consequences (culture, politics, sociology, ideology, econom ics,
etc.), we m ust recognize— always and everywhere— its main
character, hidden under a giant heap o f theories, concepts,
ideas, system s, doctrines, and religious dogm as.
P ositive analysis o f D asein in relation to the inauthentic

regim e com p rises the fact that p h ilo so ph y m u st be
fu n d am en tally d em y stified and reduced to its tru e and
p rin cip al p o in t from which it draw s its origin s, and which
is the m ain character in the history o f Being, U ncovering
371
D asein in a place where it veils itse lf p articu larly well, we

conquer the o p p o rtu n ity for u n d e rstan d in g its stru ctu re.
A n d even if we are dealing w ith the in auth en tic regim e, th is
inauthenticity belon gs to D asein , specifically, w hich could
also be authentic. W ith o u t u n tan glin g the ball o f alien atin g
and concealing inauth en ticities, we w ould have rem ained
am id st our illu sio n s regardin g D asein and its central role in
con stitu tin g the w orld, th ough ts, m an, con scio u sn ess, space,
and tim e. But, u n d erstan d in g that everywhere, even when it
is not obvious, we are dealin g w ith D asein and only D asein ,
we cou ld decipher its m essage, a d d resse d to itse lf in the m o st
u n u su al w ay— th rough flipp in g its own existen tials, th rough
self-concealm ent under the gu ise o f das M an , th rough flight
from o n e se lf and renouncing one’s own Being. I f we focus
our attention on D asein, specifically, then its self-concealment
w ill be iden tified as its in direct self-unconcealment. T h e
latter will allow us to prepare the fo u n d atio n s for its direct
and com plete self-unconcealm en t in an explosion o f Being,
T h is explosion m ust occur du rin g the tran sitio n into a new
Beginning o f p h ilo so p h y and achieving Ereignis,
D asein and Seyn
In Sein und Zeit, H eidegger does not yet arrive at the distinction
between Sein with an “i” and Seyn with a “y " which he m akes
in the 1930s during the cycle o f d iscu ssin g the problem o f
Ereignis, B ut he lays the foundations for the basic fundam ental-
ontological orientation o f his philosophy specifically in this
early period. In order to briefly highlight the problem o f Being
in relation to D asein, we can project H eidegger in the m iddle
and late periods onto the set o f problem s in his early work. In
this case, we get the follow ing picture.
372
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A t the basis o f H eid egger s thought lies the distinction between

Being (Seyn) and beings (Seiende). T h is distinction is incredibly
subtle since beings ( Seiende) are. T h is m eans that they, as beings
(Seiende), express Being (Sein), which cannot be defined in any
other way than through beings (Seiende), and that they are. T h is
is how the ancient G reeks treated this subject. Follow ing this
path further, they tran sition ed from un derstanding Being as
an attribute of Beings to generalizing this ontic observation and
con stru ctin g a philosophy in which Being was conceptualized
n ot sim ply as a fact that beings (Seiende) are, b u t as a common
attribute (koivov [koinon]) that is inherent to all beings
(Seiende) as beings (als Seiende). It was this generalization
th at w as taken for Being and indistinguishably equated with
beingness ("o v aia" [ousia] in G reek, "Seiendheit” in G erm an ).
A ccord in g to H eidegger, the entire upcom ing philosophical
on tology and all W estern E uropean m etaphysics are based
on this. T h e latter, no m atter how it form ulated the question
o f Being and regardless o f the ontological argum ents that it
accepted or rejected, forever rem ained w ithin the b oun d s o f
com prehen din g Being through beings.
A t the sam e tim e, it is here th at we sh o u ld expect a certain

trick , acco rd in g to H eid eg ger, U n d ersta n d in g Being th rough
beings (Seiende) is the sou rce o f a colo ssal an d p ro g re ssin g
m isco n ce p tio n , an illn ess la stin g tw o and a h a lf th o u san d
years, the n am e o f w hich i s " W estern E u ro p ean philosophy,”
B o rn a m id st the p re -S o c ra tic s who conceived o f Being
th ro u g h beings (H e ra c litu s, A n axim an der, P arm en id es), this
o n to lo g y com es to com p letio n in N ie tz sc h e ’s philosophy.
T h e latter definitively d e m o n strate d the kin d o f n ih ilism
th at is p resen t in M o d ern ph ilosoph y. Later, H eid eg ger will
d efin e B eing as a common attribute o f beings th rough Sein,
an d it is to th is in itial o p eratio n th at he will reduce the
373
/
c atastro p h ic h isto ry o f W estern E u ro p ean p h ilo so p h y as a

progressive oblivion o f Being.
H e id eg ge r in sists th at the B eing th at is com m on for all

beings, Sein, is n ot Being p er se, b u t only one o f its asp e c ts.
T h is asp ect, taken exclusively, clo ses the p o ssib ility o f
u n d erstan d in g Being in the full sen se o f Seyn. T h e fact o f
the m atter is th at ap art from d isco v erin g o n e se lf as the B eing
o f beings ( Sein des Seiende), Being (Seyn) is also N othingness
(N ichts) and non-beings (pir) ov, mi on), b ecau se it in clu d es
everything and excludes n oth in g. It is th is th at exp lain s the
ultim ate n ih ilism o f W estern ph ilosoph y, and the fact th at
N othingness entered the stage at the end o f its history. A t the
sam e tim e, the m icro sco p ic ch asm betw een Seyn and Sein at
the b egin n in g w as un n oticeable, an d it seem ed th at it cou ld
be overlooked.
Seyn is Sein, but it also is das Nichts (Nothingness). T h e

second p art o f the previous phrase, “but it also is das Nichts
(N othingn ess)," let itse lf be known through the im plicit and
destructive work on the part o f man's logos, alienating beings
from their Being further and further and replacing it with
re-pre-sentations (ideas, concepts, hierarchies o f creation, subject
and object, a priori statem ents, etc.) m ore and more. T h u s,
inaccurately un derstood Seyn, reduced to Sein, attem pted to
rem ind m an about the real p ro p o rtio n s through the nihilism
o f the W estern European thought process, initially hidden and
only evident at the end o f M odernity.
Since this cycle has finished, H eidegger suggest a transition to

a new Beginning, which includes conceiving o f Seyn directly—
not through beings (Seiende), but differently. H ow so?
374
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D asein serves this p u rp o se as a fundam ental basis o f a

new philosophy, as a startin g po sitio n o f con structin g
fu n dam en tal-on tology.
O n the one hand, D asein is beings (Seiende). But it is not

regular beings among beings, since it is the kind of beings that
is the Being o f beings. For this reason, the word “D asein ”
contains “Sein” rather than “Seiende” D asein is not Da-Seiende.
D irectly addressin g the w ord is not a philological game, but
a breakthrough to fundam ental-ontology. A nd the first and
m o st im portan t elem ent o f this language is D asein. A s one
o f beings, D asein fundam entally differs from the other beings
since it precedes them . It is im possible to evaluate the presence
or absence o f beings outside o f Dasein, since it is D asein that
calls beings— beings, whereas beings themselves, perhaps, do not
recognize that they are beings. This is why man is an animal
with a logos, a "talking animal.” By calling beings— beings, Dasein
introduces Being (Sein) into the game.
A t one p o in t7, H eidegger writes that Being (Sein) battles with

beings (Seiende). D asein is the kind of beings that is on the side of
Being in this battle.
In relation to beings (Seiende), Being as Seyn acts as Nothingness,

since nothing correspon ds to it. T h rough its “da” ("this”)
shines the light on Being (Seyn), its com ing to fruition. T h u s,
D asein underm ines beings as that which perceives its own
Being as an expression o f Being as a com m on attribute for all
beings. In this way, D asein “nihilates” (annihilates) it. But, at
the sam e time, D asein recovers beings in Being (Seyn) through
its authentic existence, draw ing it tow ard participating in the
7 M artin H eidegger, Beitrdge zur Philosophic (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am

M ain: V ittorio K losterm ann, 1989), 249.
375
_V
event, com ing to fruition (Ereignis). T h u s, H eidegger w rites8,

“A t first, we m ust undertake differentiation (betw een Seyn and
Seinde) and determ ine it, and then we m ust overcome it.” Both
o f these operations are carried out through D asein , by D asein ,
and inside D asein; furtherm ore, it is they that are the form o f
D asein ’s authentic existence.
T h u s, the notion o f “D asein " in troduced in Sein und Z eit

becom es the key concept for H eidegger's entire philosophy,
and is located at the basis o f fu n d am en tal-on tology and its
new m etalanguage.
8 Ibid., 277.
376
\
VI. Z EIT'TIM E AND ITS
HORIZONS
Introducing the E xpression “Z eit-T im e ’
In order to approxim ately un derstand H eidegger’s philosophical

approach to the subject o f time, let us begin with the fact
that the sem antics and etym ology o f the G erm an word "Z e it"
fundam entally differs from the sem antics and etym ology o f
the R u ssian w ord for “time." In fact, it differs so fundamentally,
that we m ust p ose the question as to whether it is correct to
literally translate "Sein und Zeit" into R ussian, let alone copying
th ose form ations that are related to the r o o t“Zei'f” and sim ilar-
sou n din g w ords in H eid egger’s philosophy (for instance,
"zeitigen”). T h e question is not as problem atic with the term
Being. A fter all, both Slavic and G erm anic roots related to
Being trace back to com m on In do-E uropean origins in one way
or another, with two fo rm s— “£>/?«-”(with the initial m eaning
u tt\ i it » / • (t f tt n f • »i f »i • u\
to grow ) and es- (m eaning to be, to be in availability, be
presen t”), which fused in conjugating the sam e verb with form s
b ased on different stem s (th is is the case both in the G erm an
and R u ssian languages).
B u t the case o f the w ord "Z eit” and the Latin "tempus” (which
is the source o f the French “le tem ps” English “time,” etc.)
is m uch m ore com plex. A fter all, "Z eit” originates from the
In d o -E u rop ean stem "da (i which m eans to “chop,” “separate
from one another,” “tear apart.” T h e L atin base has the sam e
m eaning. Yet the R u ssian word "epeMn” (vrem ia) is form ed
from the stem "eepmemb” (v e r t e t to spin), and its m eaning
379
/
is linked to "continuity” “repetition/' “linking one to another''

(e.g., R u ssian “eepeeKa" verevka, rope). T h e G erm an “Zeit" and
Latin “tempus," on the contrary “separate/’ “cut into m om ents/'
whereas the R ussian “tim e” "con nects” “ties togeth er” "sp in s”
and, in a certain sense, "repeats.” T h e G erm an “zeitigen" literally
m eans to "predeterm ine a start,” "set in m otion” (evidentaly, as a
o n e-off action), "cause the appearance o f fruit,” so that it could
be collected. Derivatives from the R u ssian w ord for "time,”
by definition, cannot have sim ilar m eanings: " noepeMenumb
(p o v r e m e n it to wait a while), in contrast, m eans to save the
fruit on the tree for as long as possible and not to hurry with
the blossom ing and ripening o f the fruit, etc.
T his creates serious difficulties in terms o f understanding

H eidegger in Russian. For him, one o f the m ost im portant tasks
was to trace the concepts in the old philosophy back to their
original meaning, and, on this basis, pushing o ff them as D asein ’s
direct speech about Sein, to create a new m etalanguage. Zeit plays
a central role in this language, but using the R ussian word for "time”
instead o f the G erm an "Zeit” will always prevent understanding
Heidegger. For this reason, the correct thing to do is to maintain
the G erm an word “Zeit" in the R ussian text. Heidegger's m ost
im portant book would be called Bytie i Zeit in R ussian. The
sound o f "Zeit" itself resembles clanging a well-sharpened knife.
Russian "vremia," in contrast, is akin to the soothing sound o f
a lullaby. But, as in the case with “understanding,” we should
still follow a different path and offer the following wild-looking
expression, "Zeit-time" i.e., the kind o f time that is at the end o f
all time, the kind o f time that does not loop, but is, instead, cut:
time-m oment, time-lightning. Therefore, we translate Sein und
Zeit as Being and Zeit-time. 1
^ The editor has kept the expression Zeit-time," even though the English
word, time, is closer to the G erm an original, as per the author s discussion
o f the Latin “tempus” above. (Ed.)
380
\
Finality o f Z eit-Tim e
T h e m ost im portan t aspect in H eidegger’s understanding o f

Z eit'tim e is that it is neither an attribute o f an object (according
to em piricists and m aterialists) nor o f a subject (according to
K a n t). D asein does not exist in Zeit'tim e. Zeit'tim e is not the
su b jects m ode either. Z eit'tim e is not found outside o f D asein,
it is inside D asein. B ut D asein has no dim ensions or space,
since spatiality (Raumlichkeit) is one o f its existentials. T h us,
Z eit'tim e should be un derstood as Being. D asein, in a certain
sense, is D a-Z eit. Since D asein is finite— this is one o f its
principal attrib u tes— so is Zeit'tim e.
H e id eg ge r con tests the infin ity o f Z eit'tim e. Z eit'tim e cannot

be infinite, since, by definition, Z eit is separation, cuttin g up,
d ism em berm en t. D ism em b erm en t is a chasm , not a bond.
Being cannot be placed into Z eit'tim e, since it predates the
b reak and in stead coincides w ith it as a fundam ental finality.
T h erefo re, Z eit'tim e does not, a priori, precede D asein, but
coincides w ith D asein, i f the latter exists authentically. O nce
D asein com es to an end, there is no m ore subject, object, or
Z eit'tim e. Yet D asein ends when it becom es B eing'tow ard'
death (Sein-xum -Tode), starin g into d eath s eyes. T h is occurs
th rough Ereignis. Z eit'tim e begin s to w ork through Ereignis
an d D a se in ’s recogn ition o f its finality.
It is im portan t to note that in contrast to space, which is

D ase in ’s existential, Zeit'tim e is not an existential. In a certain
sense, it is m ore profoun d and fundam ental than an existential,
and also m ore problem atic. Being as Seyn operates w ithin Z eit'
time. T h u s, in contrast to the perm anently present existentials
in D asein, Z eit'tim e is unique and occurs only once.
381 ♦
____ /
Three Ecstasies o f Z eit-T im e
H eidegger interprets the m anifestation o f Seyn through

Zeit-time as three form s o f frenzy, eîaoiC, (ekstasiz) in G reek.
Zeit-time steps out o f itself in three ecstasies.
T h e first ecstacy o f Zeit-tim e is linked with what was, the

secon d— with the present, w hereas the th ird — w ith what will
be. T h e m ost im p o rtan t ecstacy am ong, all three is linked to
what will be.2
T h e significance o f D asein is to throw the will so as to be and so

as to be able to be (Seinkonnen). T h is is a constant concentrated
project o f D asein ’s existence in the direction o f its authenticity.
T h e ultim ate horizon o f this throw is a leap (Sprung). This is a
leap o f D asein into Sein.
Zeit-tim e u n d ersto o d in a fu n dam en tal-o n tological way is the

kin d o f Zeit-tim e the frenzy o f which is contained in what
will be. T o the extent that D asein is Being, this Being o f fren zy
in what will be reveals itself, Zeit-tim e becom es th at which
un folds from a po in t in what will be, which co n stitu tes the
other h orizon s.
Zeit-tim e corresp on ds to D a se in ’s qu estion as to how Being

(Seyn) exists. In the ecstasy o f what will be, Being (Seyn) will
be (wird wesen), that is, will be specifically as Being (Seyn),
rather than beings and ontological co n stru cts b ased on it.
T h u s, Zeit-tim e develops and carries events in it not by itself;
it is D asein that develops it in its decision in favor o f authentic
2 The author differentiates between the past, present, and future and those
tenses based on the verb to be ; the translation follows this distinction
closely. In the R ussian language, there is an overlap; e.g. / ‘budushchee" m eans
both the "future" and, literally, "that which will be." (Ed.)
382
\
existence. T h is m eans that what will be is a horizon o f the new

Beginning, the m om ent o f Ereignis, in which Being begins to
be in full.
T h is m om ent o f Ereignis cannot be in any other horizons o f

Z eit'tim e (present or what was). I f this were not the case, then
neither the present nor the p ast w ould be either. But since
they are and were, they are connected to the m om ent o f what
will be in one way or another. D asein is what connects these
three ecstasies in existence. D asein, despite not yet existing
authentically (otherw ise, the future, that which will be, w ould
have becom e the present or p ast), exists inauthentically, but
exists nonetheless. T herefore, it participates in Being, is, even
i f in a roun dabou t way through keeping quiet and inauthentic.
H eidegger separates what was from what passed, the present—

from what is now, and what will be— from the upcoming. Each
ecstatic horizon o f Zeit'tim e contains a link to D aseins Being and
the concealm ent o f this link, which is expressed in the presence
o f D asein. This connection as unconcealment, aXqOsia (aletheia),
the truth o f Being (Seyn) constitutes an ontological core o f the
horizons: it is what was, what is, and what will be. W h at truly is
and was is what will be (in the future— what will be— Sein=Seyn).
B ut that which was and is ecstatically anticipates this, and, to the
extent that this anticipation is real, it was and is.
A ll three h orizons also have an inauthentic modality. A m ong

all that which p assed, which belongs to the past, was as that
which was, there only is w hat is the m ost im portant, m ost
m ysterious, and least obvious. T h e rest was simply that which is
passed, and as such, it belongs only to what is p assed and, to a
certain extent, it was not, even though it was in the p ast after all.
383
____ /
T h e case with the presen t is sim ilar: w hat occurs in the presen t
is the continuation o f the "w alk” (“h as passed," “o c c u r r e d “is
com ing,” "will be goin g on later”). T h is “w alk” o f the h orizon s
has a difficult relationsh ip w ith the Being thereof. S o m e th in g
from the p a st was, and som eth in g else p assed , i.e., som eth in g
that once was, and som ethin g else— only what passed.
T h e sam e is the case in the present and the upcom ing that could
become what will be or sim ply the upcom ing. T h is com prises
the very core o f D asein .
»
Dasein, according to H eidegger, m ust m ake a fundam ental

choice between the upcom ing and what will be, that is, a direct
choice about authentic existence and questioning Being (Seyn).
Then, the upcoming will becom e what will be. I f it m akes the
choice in favor o f inauthentic existence, then the upcom ing will
only remain thus, which m eans that it will not be.
T h e past, that which is arriving, and the upcoming com prise

three inauthentic ecstasies o f Zeit-tim e in three h orizons. In
this chain, the p ast is com pletely incom prehensible for what
is occurring, and the latter, in tu rn — for w hat is upcom ing.
Instead o f the history o f Being (Seinsgeschichte), the aggregate
o f these three horizons o f inauthentic existence com prises a
nonsensical cast o f futility.
A nd on the contrary, a group o f three authentic ecstasies o f

Zeit-time produces that line o f Being (Seyn) which m akes all
three h o rizo n s con tem poran eous to each other. W h at w as in
that which was cannot d isap p ear anywhere, since Zeit-tim e
does not precede D asein . W hat is, having links to Being
(Seyn), can not not be, since it already was. T h u s, what was
still is now. H eid egger d escribes th is as in stan tan eity and
384
\
alm o st sim ultaneity, synch ronism o f authentic thought. Each

p h ilo so p h ical era h ad its own heights and, even though they
are sep arated by centuries, they are separated by m om ents
an d conceive o f them selves as contem poraries. A fter all,
truly serio u s th ough t (th o u gh t ab ou t Being) o f one thinker
is pick ed up by another thinker as the m ost relevant in term s
o f m easu rin g depth. For p ro fo u n d thought, only the deep is
contem porary, regardless o f to which horizon it belongs. T h e
m o st current and deep is the kin d o f fu tu re— what will be—
th at is the fulfillm ent o f Z eit-tim e’s ecstacy in the form o f the
in stan tan eo u s, unique, an d finite Ereignis.
W h at was, is. B oth are preparations for what will be. B ut what
will be, to the extent that it will be, already is, and it transform s
the p ast into w hat once was, and the transitional— into w hat is.
385
CONCLUSION; HEIDEGGER
AND TH E STATE OF
PHILOSOPHY
M artin H eidegger s philosophy is a m om ent in the thought

process we cannot avoid. M ore precisely, we could do so, but
it w ould negatively affect us. L ook in g for the approach to
com prehending beings, deciphering philosophical heritage,
grasp in g the tem poral and spatial features o f where we find
ourselves, we could say for certain: Heidegger is a reference
point from which we could measure thought trajectories in various
directions. It is possible to assum e that we w ould stum ble upon
this poin t even w ithout H eidegger, but even in that case, we
w ould discover the sam e structural lines, notice the sam e subtle
flashes o f the “desolate tim es/’ the sam e om inous shadow s o f
E uropean nihilism , the sam e indecipherable w hisper o f the
weary and w orn-out D asein. H eidegger is an eternally new idea
in us ourselves, in it itself. W ith ou t colliding with this wealth,
our thought process is invalid.
B u t H eid egger neither gives us any answ ers, nor p oin ts the way.
H is p h ilo so p h y is som eth in g o p p o site o f a system , teaching,
or theory. In stead , it is the life-giving flesh o f th ough ts that
excludes any closed and irreversible trajectories, any fixation,
or any con stru ction .
A t first glance, it may seem that H eidegger deliberately

com plicates his thought, and those who get confused at tim es
are surprised that, in certain works, he w rites in an incredibly
387
clear way. However, the opposite is the case: the m ore unclear
and vague— his words, the clearer and brighter— his thoughts.
H is w ords are a quiet and genuine flam e that rem ains elusive
for the devious strategies o f an ice-cold, rational m ind.
H eidegger h im self wrote that the G reeks called H eraclitus “the
D ark,” since their own intellectual light turned into a wretched
shadow as com pared to his genius. H e burned and sculpted.
Im m ersed into darkness. T h is is why he was "o Z koxsivoq (o “
Skoteinos), “the Dark.”
We m ust appreciate H eidegger— incomprehensible, imprecise,

avoidin g strict d efin itio n s, d o d g in g sy ste m atizatio n s,
contradictory, and unclear. H e used to say that in its squeam ish
quest to liberate itself from the irrational, W estern European
philosophical thought forgot to focus its attention on the m ost
im portant aspect— on the sacrament o f its own emergence, its own
appearance out o f the dusk o f the pre-philosophical, pre-rational
era. A nd it is there, in the twilight, where it is unclear whether
we are already dealing with thought or "not yet" "not quite" that
we pass the currents o f philosophical fate, the fate o f the W est,
and those o f men connected to it. H eidegger im m ersed into this
twilight with pleasure, awe, and terror, as if fulfilling his destiny.
Z ealou sly researching the Beginning o f thought, he discovered

for h im self and for us the ability to live and think in the elem ent
o f this Beginning. It is there that the trajectory o f m ankind s
history originated at one point. It is there that a period should
have been placed, a single period, in a terrifying steam o f
absolute freedom . I f this period placed by the first ph ilosophers
coincided with the unseen center o f em ptiness, the pole o f
N oth in gn ess, then the stream s o f Geviert, the “ Fourfold," w ould
have removed the fatality o f com plex and false paths in W estern
European m etaphysics leading to the cliff o f nihilism . B ut this
388
\
perio d was placed somewhere nearby. It was very close to the pole
o f N o th in gn ess, but a tiny bit away, by a m icron. T h is m iniscule
distance, present nonetheless, m ade the Beginning into th t first
Beginning, predeterm ining everything else— from Parm enides
through P lato and A ristotle to A ugustine, D escartes, H egel,
an d N ietzsch e.
O nly one straight line connects any two points. A n d in our case—
only in one direction. T h is is the direction away from Seyn—
Being. H avin g done so, H eidegger substantiated the case for the
abyss o f E uropean nihilism through obtaining an unshakable
foun dation in it itse lf— “fundam entum inconcossum” A n d it so
turn ed out that it w as in H eidegger him self, as in the “prince of
philosophers’’ (princeps philosophorum ), that philosophy came to
fru ition . T h e light ray reached the point from which, from now
on, it was called to reflect as i f it were sm ooth m irror-like flesh.
W h at H eidegger had done with the history o f philosophy gave

us philosophy as w hat “has h appened” and “has finished.” But, at
the sam e time, if we carefully observed the developm ent o f its
gran d creation, we obtained that which is most important. W ith
the price o f the original error in establishing the point o f the
first Beginning, tragically paid for by more than two m illennia
o f dram atic W estern history, we know reliably and fo r certain,
rather than arbitrarily guessing, where it was necessary to place
this period in order to avoid w hat had happened. H eidegger
h im se lf clearly saw : with its path into the abyss, im m ersing into
the elem ent o f pure nihilism , with its am biguous, disastrous
anthem to Gestell and technical developm ent, the W est was
th t first to reach the low est boundary o f Being’s abandonm ent.
W ith its sacrifice, it dem on strated not only where not to go,
b u t also how to commence the second Beginning, free from the
inexorable abyss.
389
/
T h rough the retreat from the' possibility o f an authentic

Geviert, from venerating Seyn-Being as a creative nihiliation and
nihilating creation, W estern m etaphysics outlined the blueprint
o f the way in which it should have been done and should be done
so as to avoid deviating from it. W hen? Always. Now. T h e
second Beginning, although dependent on D asein ’s existential
choice in favor o f authenticity, at the sam e time, depends on
nothing. It has already been roughly outlined.
A s a result o f the calm, passionately indifferent acceptance,

not yet” has lost the fatality o f its hypnosis in H eid eggers
philosophy. We are no longer fighting in its snares, feeling
nervous, but we accept it as it truly is, trying to find the sign o f
another Beginning with solem n gratitude in the last sm oldering
ruins o f W estern culture.
G rateful peoples from those cultures that are different from the
W est will be able to appreciate the greatness and significance o f
the W est’s last thinker, the last European, the one who uttered
the m ost beautiful, m ost profound, the brightest, and the m ost
poignant funeral speech about W estern m etaphysics, W estern
history, and the history o f W estern civilization.
A nother Beginning is a m atter o f the future, o f those who will

be upcom ing, as N ietzsch e dream t. B ut the Su n does not rise
in the W est. A n d from now on, we have grasped the m eaning
o f the sunset, necessary for m oving tow ard the horizon from
another direction. Heidegger’s another Beginning cannot address
the people of the West. Therefore, it addresses us.
390
\
PO STSCR IPT
I envision this book as exactly h alf o f what I w ould like to

say about M artin H eidegger and another Beginning. H aving
foun d the poin t o f this other Beginning, we will try to move
ahead in the direction o f the possibility o f Russian philosophy. It
is quite obvious that the R u ssian thought lay fallow, ripening
w ith bloody ju ices o f prem onitions, m uttering in its sleep,
attem ptin g to say a certain som ething, but fatally locating no
w ords, im ages, or signs. Perhaps, the R u ssian thought has been
w aiting. It has been w aiting for the right time, not w anting to
participate in the end o f W estern European philosophy, being
neither in solidarity, nor vitally involved in the developm ent o f
W estern European m etaphysics.
M any R u ssian s m inds have asked the follow ing question, “W hat
are we w aiting for?”
A n d we are, indeed, still w aiting for som ething all the tim e ...I
will risk suggesting that we have been waiting specifically fo r
that. W e have been w aiting for the m om ent when the W est
com es to an end in order to enter philosophy with our R ussian
pow er am assed over the centuries, but. . . only truly and into
genuine ph ilosoph y— the kin d that will be worthy o f our silent,
m ysterious R u ssian dream hidden deep inside. A nd this could
only be the philosophy of another Beginning,
T h is is the title o f this b o o k s second volume dedicated to the

greatest W estern thinker: M artin Heidegger: the Possibility of
R ussian Philosophy.
393 ♦
/
GLOSSARY
Abyss (Abgrund)— an aspect o f Seyn-Being expressed through

nihilation (Nichten); the openness o f m an and D asein; beings’
lack o f reliable foun dations (contrary to the topography o f
P latonic m etaphysics); the risk inherent in freedom ; traces o f
Seyn-Being in beings facing D asein, first and forem ost.
Ambiguity (see Zweideutigkeit)— an existential of inauthentic

D asein, the u n ce rta in ly o f everyday thought tracing back to
the extrem ely sim plified referential theory o f truth; the lim it o f
vulgarized P latonism .
Americanism — the ultim ate expression o f the m etaphysics

o f the subject in the form o f individualism , the trium ph o f
technology consum erism , calculation; the final expression o f
W estern European m etaphysics in the form o f pure Gestell and
M achenschaft o f capitalist m arkets; the final form o f m ankind's
degeneration; aggressive L iberalism ; the choice in favor o f the
infinite End instead o f another Beginning (A nfang); the same
thing as "planetary idiocy."
Authentic (eigene)— one’s own, genuine, that which

correspon ds to the fundam ental-ontological essence (Wesen) as
a direct relationship (Bezug) with Seyn-Being,
Be, to be (see Sein, sivai) — the main concept in H eidegger’s

philosophy; in the ontic sense, it m eans to be one of beings, to be
like beings; in the ontological and theological sense, it m eans to be
the essence o f beings, the greatest kind of beings; in the fundam ental-
ontological sense, it m eans to exist (wesen), to "be in accordance
with essencing," i.e., to be a participant in Seyn-Being.
395
Beginning — transitioning the thought process from sim ple

(ontic) to the philosophical, posin g the question about Being
in its purest form, up until receiving a definitive answer, that
is, through to establishing a full-fledged ontology; see the first
Beginning, another Beginning.
Beginning, another (andere Anfang)— Heidegger's philosophy,

which invites us to fundam ental-ontology, preparin g for
Ereignis, burying W estern European metaphysics, and a radical
leap into Geviert. -
%
Beginning, first (erste Anfang)— the transition from thinking

to philosophy carried out in ancient G reece by the pre-Socratics
and com pleted under Plato.
Being (Seyn, Seyn-Being, Sein, Sein-Being)— the general

name o f what m akes beings (that, which is)— beings; thought
trajectory that transform s thought into philosophy; the horizon
o f the deepest and m ost accurate understanding o f beings;
H eidegger interprets this in two ways: old (Platonic and post-
Platonic) metaphysics and fundamental-ontology. In the first case,
he conceives o f Being as the essence o f beings, the greatest kind of
beings, idea, ego, subject, object, will, power, appearance, as well
as techne, Gestell, writing it with an "i” (“Sein"); in the second case,
H eidegger interprets this as non-beings, as that which makes
beings— beings, but that does not become beings in the process,
writing it with a y ( Seyn ). N o t all o f H eidegger s texts closely
adhere to this rule. Thus, in order to understand him correctly,
we m ust always specify what he m eans when using"Sem " w ithout
any additional inform ation— Seyn or Sein.
Being-in (Insein)— a neutral existential o f D asein that can be

interpreted both as inauthentic (scattering throughout beings)
and authentic (participation in the Fourfold, Geviert) m odes.
396
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Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein)— the m ost im portant

an d fundam ental existential o f D asein that characterizes its
m ain attribute; see World.
Being, this-Being (Dasein) — the center o f the thought process

that renders ju dgem en t about beings and, in certain cases, about
the Being o f beings; has a unique relationship with Seyn'Being;
un conditional presence which m akes the ontic— the ontic,
and the world (W elt)— the world (W elt); the location o f Seyn-
B eings dw elling in beings; the abyss (Abgrund) is its foundation
(G ru n d ); the m om ent o f illumination (Lichtung) o f beings by
Seyn-Being (as if by lightning); a certain som ething that is
defined through existentials; that which is localized inside
G eviert’s "w orld region” (Weltgegend) in the direction o f man;
that which exists factually; one o f the m ost im portant w ords in
H eid egger’s philosophy.
Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode)— an existential of

authentic D asein; a fundam ental attribute o f man, the only kind
o f beings capable o f facing death; m an is a "m ortal” (Sterbliche)
by definition; only man can die, while all the other beings perish.
Being-with (M itsein) — a neutral existential o f D asein that

sign ifies that D asein neighbors beings (as a multitude, izavxa)
or Being.
Beings abandonment (Seinsverlassenheit)— Seyn-Being’s

refusal to rem ind us about itself under the circum stances o f
incorrectly posin g the question about it and receiving an even
m ore incorrect answer; ignoring W estern European philosophy
and history on the part o f Seyn-Being; thefundamental-ontological
essence (W esen) o f W estern European philosophy and history;
the m eaning and internal contents o f European nihilism.
397
/
Being's guardian — man in another Beginning, inside Geviert

unleashed by Ereignis.
Being's oblivion (Seinsvergessenheit)— refusal to place the

question about Being at the center o f the philosophical process;
gradual exacerbation o f Platonic theory o f ideas until the
emergence o f contem porary pragm atism , technocracy M arxism
(M achenschaft), and “A m ericanism ” (planetary idiocy).
Beings (Seiende)— that which is present around the thing;

that which' is perceived through the ontic throught process as
that which is,
Beings-as-a-whole (Seiende-im-Ganzen)— the answer (especially

in Plato and A ristotle) to the ontological question about what
differentiates beings from Being in the spirit o f early metaphysics;
the sam e thing as Sein-Being.
Beings, highest, supreme, “ beingful" ( ovtco<; ov) —

the b a sic elem en t in P la to n ic philosophy and su b se q u e n t
m etaphysical to p o g ra p h y o f W estern E u ro p e a n philosophy;
the sam e th in g as the idea, beings (Seien dh eit), Sein -B ein g;
G o d in W estern C h r istia n th eology.
(In) Between (see Zwischen)— Seyn-Beings location inside

Geviert (betw een men and gods, Sky and E arth ); D ase in s
location between the internal and external, between the past
and future, between the ontic and ontological.
Care (Sorge) — one o f the m ost im portan t existentials for

D asein; in its authentic regime, it signifies D asein facing Being,
whereas in its inauthentic regime, it turn s tow ard beings.
398
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Chatter, gossip (Gerede)— an existential of inauthentic D asein;

a steady stream o f consciousness o f a conventional man; reciting
(alo u d or silently) w ords and ph rases the m eaning o f which one
does not fully grasp or does not grasp at all; analogous to the
speech (Rede) existential o f authentic D asein,
Conscience (Gewissen)— D ase in ’s existential, which signifies

the correspondence between D asein in the depth o f itsfindability
(Befindlichkeit) with itself, with its own Selbst (as Seinkonnen).
Curiosity (Neugierigkeit)— an existential of inauthentic

D asein ; inability to focus one’s thought process on things in
order to grasp their m eaning, their connection to other things
and structures o f thought; the expression o f everyday idiocy;
the aspiration to obtain "new” inform ation w ithout the accurate
com prehension o f the "old.”
Decay (Verfallen)— D asein ’s inauthentic existential, D asein ’s

fall into beings, D asein ’s alienation from itse lf (Selbst).
Desert, desertification (Wiiste, Verwiistung)— widening

the area o f Nothingness (Nichts), the result o f replacing natural
beings with artificial, objectified, technical beings; exacerbation
o f the abandonment o f Being (Seinsverlassenheit); the sam e thing
as "desolate tim es” (durftige Z eit).
Decision (Entscheidung)— the ontological and philosophical

choice o f fate as an answ er to the question about beings’ Being;
in a narrow sense, a turning-point decision by contem porary
m ankind about recognizing or not recognizing European
nihilism , Gestell, and xeyyt] as the com pleted, ultim ate fate
( Geschick) o f W estern E u rope and, consequently, its transition
(or not) into another Beginning.
399
7
Destruction, phenomenological destruction (Destruktion,

phanomenologische Destruktion)— taking a statem ent back
to its context within the space o f metaphysical topography; the
sam e thing as that which was later called “deconstruction” in
structuralism (Lacan, D errida).
Difference, ontological difference (Differenz, ontologische

Differenz)— the basis o f philosophy, the ability to differentiate
between Being and beings and provide an answ er to the question,
“W h at is Being like?”
*
Earth (Erde) — world region ( Weltgegend) in Geviert; the

beginning o f concealment, objectness, giveness, presence; beings
that lean tow ard attem pting to becom e the World; cover for the
abyss; is in the state o f war with the Sky (W orld).
Ecstacy — leaving the boundaries, form s o f existence and

essenting in Zeit-time.
End — the establish m en t o f P laton ic ontology, A risto telian

logic, physics, and metaphysics w ithin the fram ew ork o f the
first Beginning; N ietzsch e's discovery o f European nihilism —
w ithin the fram ew ork o f the entire W estern E u ro pean
philosophy— as the m ain attrib ute o f M od ern ity and o f the will
to power as the m ain driving force b eh in d W estern E u ro pean
philosophy and history.
Essence, fundamental-ontological (^Vesen)— everything

that has direct relationship with Seyn-Being.
Essence (Seiendheit, o im a) — the answ er to the theological

question as to what differentiates beings from Being in the
spirit o f early metaphysics; idea in P lato; the basis o f the tw o
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dim ension al philosophical topography and the referential

theory o f truth; the sam e thing as Sein-Being.
Event (Ereignis) — Seyn-Being in another Beginning; that which

com es to fruition like Seyn-Being in fundamental-ontology; a key
w ord in H eidegger s philosophy.
Existence — affirm ation m ade as part o f a (non-philosophical)

thought process about the fa c t o f an ontic presence o f a certain
k in d o f beings.
Existence, the way in which Seyn-Being is (Wesung)—

presence in accordance with Wesen, that is, with Seyn-Being.
Existential— one o f the m eaningful aspects o f D asein ’s

phenomenological existing.
Fate, destiny (Geschick, Geschichte)— the m essage o f

Seyn-Being em bedded into the basis o f W estern European
ph ilosoph ical process.
Findability (Befindlichkeit)— neutral existential of D asein,

the fact o f D asein ’s discovery o f itself.
Fourfold (Geviert) — a figure o f a fundamental-ontological

un derstan din g of beings through Seyn-Being; com prises
two intersecting axes o f the World-Sky (Himmel, Welt) with
the E arth (Erde) and gods (divinities, Gottern) with men
(.M enschen); each of the axes (gods-men, Sky-World) represents
a line o f war (battle, Streit); Seyn-Being, Ereignis, and the thing
(D ing) are located at the intersection.
Fundamental-ontology — a philosophical thought process

fo cu sed on Seyn-Being; conceives o f Seyn-Being directly, not
401
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from the stan d p oin t o f beings but through itself; rejects the
double topography o f the old metaphysics and con structs
philosophy w ithout tearing it away from the ontic (non-
ph ilosophical) thought process and its obvious asp ects; the
sam e thing as onto-ontology.
G o d — the highest o f beings in W estern European theology and

Scholasticism , C reator o f the world, religious figure pu t in the
place o f the idea o f good (truth, good, and beauty) by Plato; the
root cause, causa sui as part o f M odern ity’s deism ,
t
G o d , g o d s, divin e (G o ttlic h k e it, G o tt, G o tte r n )— one o f the

“world regions” ( Weltgegenden); one o f the four com ponents o f
the Fourfold (G eviert); we cannot say that gods are (sind), or
that they are not (sind nicht); “god s need Seyn-Being”; go d s are
light and prone to fleeing; gods are at war with men (see also
th e "L a st God”).
G o d , la s t (le tzte G o t t ) — the figure o f the god in the Fourfold

( Geviert) developing in another Beginning at the m om ent o f
Ereignis; eschatological figure crow ning Seyn-Being with its
arrival; the last horizon in fundamental-ontology; see the Divine,
gods, God.
Id e a— visual appearance o f Plato’s philosophy, which is at the basis

o f creating metaphysical topography and classic ontology; Plato’s
teaching about ideas predetermined the fate o f Western European
philosophy and, consequently, the course o f Western European
history; the idea is beings, but the greatest kind of beings, supreme
beings (ovxcoq ov), the essence of beings (ovaia, Seiendheit), beings-
as-a-whole (Seiende-im-Ganzen); later, in this topography, without
changing its two-tier (referential) structure, the place o f Plato's
idea is taken by form, energy, G od, subject, ratio, object, will to
402
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power, values, world view, rsxvrj at various stages; the idea per se is
the pure em bodim ent o f Gestell; the teaching about ideas fixes the
principle o f Being as Sein-Being until the end o f Western European
metaphysics; P latos teaching about ideas as the correlation
between things and ideas (P lato s Republic) is at the foundation
o f W estern European theory o f knowledge (gnoseology).
Idiocy, planetary — projecting the metaphysics o f the subject

onto an individual in contem porary A n glo-Saxon (A m erican),
technical, Liberal, capitalist culture that has reached global
p ro p o rtio n s; transfer o f the entire set o f problem s into the
sphere o f satisfying the private interests o f a single individual;
the ultim ate form o f "Being’s abandonment” (Seinsverlassenheit),
nihilism, and degeneration; m axim ization o f the will to power in
the realm o f the utilitarian and non-heroic everyday approach;
the sam e thing as Am ericanism .
Inauthentic (uneigene)— not one’s own, counterfeit, turned

away from one’s essence, from on eself (Selbst), a distorted
relationship with Being or forgetting o f the latter.
Language (speech, Rede)— Seyn-Being’s statem ent about itself

through D asein ’s authentic existence; is entrusted to a people
(Volk), whence thinkers and philosophers draw it.
Leap (Sprung) — addressin g Seyn-Being through bypassing

beings; the sam e thing as the transition (Ubergang).
Lightning (KspaDVO*;)— the nam e o f Being in H eractlitus,

alongside "w ar” (n o ls ju o g )fir e ” (nvp), etc.
Man — a kind o f beings that differs from other beings with

his unique relationship with Seyn-Being; that, through which
403
_ y
Seyn-Being expresses itself; the approxim ate location o f D asein;

beings that have no essence, the Wesen o f which leads into the
abyss; in old metaphysics, man is one o f the nam es for the subject,
an “anim al in procession o f a rational m ind" (C&ov Xoyov sx°v,
animalis rationalis); the “guardian o f Being" in the philosophy o f
another Beginning.
Metaphysics— philosophical topograph y based on a system

o f doubling beings through postu latin g a “higher” plane (ideas,
thought process, G o d , values, representations, subject, object,
and so on will); the fate o f W estern European m ankind;
initially, clearly prepared in the philosophy o f Plato and
A ristotle; overcoming metaphysics is a necessary step to prepare
the transition ( Ubergang) tow ard another Beginning and
fundamental-ontology.
Metaphysics, overcoming of — a necessary act in term s o f

recognizing the fatal inadequacy o f posing the question about Being
and its answer in W estern European metaphysics (Plato, Aristotle,
Scholasticism , M odernity); discovering the "abandonment of
Being (Seinsverlassenheit) and accurately deciphering its meaning;
understanding techne (rsxvrj) and Gestell as fate ( Geschick,
Schicksal); the operation o f “phenomenological destruction"
(Destruktion), i.e., placing any philosophical statem ent into the
original metaphysical topography.
Nihilate, nihilation (nichten, Nichten)— an attribute o f

Seyn-Being in relation to beings; Seyn-Beings war against beings.
Nihilism, European — the final ph ase o f th e " oblivion of Being"

{Seinsvergessenheit), “abandonment o f Being (Seinsverlassenheit),
the End o f W estern European philosophy, the crash of
metaphysical topography, the discovery o f rs/vr/, M achenschaft,
404
V
Gestell, and the will to pow er as the m ain trajectory o f this

ph ilosoph y; N ietzsche's discovery o f the real state o f W estern
E u ropean history.
Nothingness (Nichts) — 1) in Seyn-Being, the side that does

n ot corresp on d to the pow er that generates beings, killing
source; the sam e thing as "nihilation ; 2) Seyn-Being as non
beings, as that which differs fro m beings; 3) sim ply non-beings
w ith ou t specifying w hether it belongs to Seyn-Being or not;
4) the fundam ental-ontological essence (W esen) o f W estern
E u ro p ean p h ilo so p h y and h isto ry as Gestell; 5) in certain
cases, this is the abyss.
Object (objectum)— what is in front o f the subject in the

metaphysics o f M odernity.
Object (Gegenstand)— in the culture o f M odernity this is an

object that was m anufactured or used in the process o f production.
Ontics, ontic— a form o f thought that rem ains within the lim its
o f beings and does not raise the question about beings’ Being; a
n on-ph ilosophical thought process.
Onto-ontology — the sam e thing as fundamental-ontology.

Illum ination (Lichtung): philosophical address to Seyn-Being and
its result for D asein and beings.
Ontology, ontological— 1) thought process that raises the

question about beings’ Being and gives a certain answer to it;
2) incorrectly form ulated question about beings’ Being in the
first Beginning and metaphysical and philosophical topography
con structed on its basis; in this sense, it is the opposite o f
fundam ental-ontology.
405
/
Openness (Offene)— unconcealm ent; see Illum ination.
(A) People (narod, Volk)— those entrusted with language as

Seyn-Being’s statem ent about itself.
Question in philosophy, basic (Grundfrage)— w hat is

the truth o f Seyn-Being? H ow does Seyn-Being exist (west)?
A d dressin g Seyn-Being not as beings and not from the stan d poin t
o f beings; a leap into the abyss.
Question in philosophy, key (leading) (Leitfrage)— what is

the essence of beings? W h at are beings-as-a-whole?
Question in philosophy, transitional (Ubergangsfrage)—

why is there som ething (beings) instead o f Nothingness
(L eib n iz)?; an interm ediate question between the "leading
question” o f the old metaphysics (“W h at is the essence of beings?
“W h at are beings-as-a-whole?”) and the basic question of
fundamental-ontology ("W hat is the truth of Seyn-Being?)
Philosophy— the kind o f thought process that poses the question

about the Being of beings and develops it inside the kind o f
topography that is explained with the answer to this question.
Sacred, holy (Heilige)— the nam e o f Seyn-Being in poetry

(H old erlin ).
Setting, voice (Stimme, Stimmung, 7ra0o<;)— D asein ’s

existential defining its positioning in relation to beings and Being.
Seynsgeschichte, seynsgeschichtliche— fate linked to Seyn-

Being, Seyns m essage through the structure and history o f
W estern European philosophy about itse lf with the help o f self
406
V
removal and self-concealm ent during the course o f developing

the first Beginning (up until the trium ph o f nihilism and
M achenschaft) and self-discovery in another Beginning (Ereignis);
one o f the m ost im portant terms in H eidegger’s philosophy.
Sky (Himmel)— a world region (Weltgegend), one o f the four

com ponents o f the Fourfold (Geviert), along with the Earth,
gods, and men; em bodies the principle o f light, celestiality,
openness, appearance, unconcealm ent; in som e cases, H eidegger
equated the Sky with the World (inside Geviert).
Spaciality (Raumlichkeit)— D asein ’s existential.
Subject — in the metaphysics o f M odernity, it is the carrier

o f the rational source and an authority that makes the m ost
im portan t ontological ju d gem en t (D escartes's cogito) about the
Being o f beings.
Surprise — the kind o f setting (Stimmen, %dOoq) that leads one

tow ard p h ilosoph izin g inside the first Beginning (according to
P lato and A ristotle).
Terror (Angst) — D ase in ’s existential generated from its

gro u n d lessn ess, thrownness, and findability at a distance
from all beings; the experience o f com ing into contact with
Seyn-Being as a "nihilating pow er; the leap into the abyss; the
em ergence o f Sein, which open s up and Is illum inated in da
(this, here); the m ain settin g (Stim m en, %aQoq) o f thought
in another Beginning in con trast with the first Beginning, in
which th at settin g w as surprise.
Theology — C h ristian religious ph ilosoph y of W estern

E u ro p e estab lish ed on the b a sis o f P latonic and A risto telian
407
_ /
metaphysics; G od-Creator person ifies the greatest, surpreme

kind o f beings.
Thing — initially, beings in their relation to Seyn-Being,

som ething sacred, holy (Heilige); is position ed at the center o f
Geviert; in W estern European metaphysics, the thing gradually
becom es an object (objectum, Gegenstand), som ething technical,
m anufactured, or used in production (a resource).
This — the side o f this-Being (D asein ) in which Being (not as

beings, but rather as Being) may reveal itse lf and appear in the
way that it exists (west), directly rather than indirectly through
beings; the m om ent o f fundamental-ontology focus.
Thought process— 1) ontic thought: evaluating beings

individually and collectively, com paring individual parts o f
beings with each other; man’s attributes; 2) philosophical
thought: posing the question about Being and its relationship
with beings; philosopher’s attribute.
Thrownness — one o f D asein ’s crucial existentials related to the

absence o f D asein ’s obvious cause inside beings; D asein ’s set o f
problem s, its foreignness in relation to beings, it s “hom elessness";
a hint ab ou t the etym ology o f the w ord "subject” (literally:
“thrown under.”)
Times, desolate— the period o f desertification (Verwiistung),

oblivion of Being (Seinsvergessenheit), triumph o f European nihilism.
Transition (Ubergang) — the tran sition from the E n d of

philosophy tow ard another Beginning; the sam e thing as the
leap (Sprung).
408
V
Truth (see Unverborgnheit, a)o]0£ia)— unconcealm ent,

which can m ean: 1) Seyn-Being’s unconcealm ent (fundamental-
ontology), 2) unconcealm ent o f beings (the philosophy o f the
first Beginning), 3) the correlation between one kind o f beings
(thing) to another (supreme b ein gs— idea, place in the hierarchy
o f creation, concept, etc.), which is the source for the referential
theory o f truth.
War, battle — the nam e o f Being in H eraclitus; the “father o f

all and king o f a ll” the relationship between the polar "world
regions” (Weltgegend) inside Geviert.
Who (Wer) — the q u estio n in regard to who is the " I ” for

D a se in ; m ay be authentic (Selbst, Seinkdnnen) an d inauthentic
(d as M a n ).
W ill to power (Wille zur M acht) — d eep -ro o ted contents

of P lato n ic ontology and the old metaphysics, finally
revealin g th em selves in today's w orld, n o ted and o u tlin ed by
F ried rich N ie tz sc h e ; d o m in atio n , "p rem ed iated im p o sitio n ”
(V orsetzende D urchsetzung), n ih ilism , the sam e th in g as
Gestell, rs/vt], M achenschaft.
World (Welt, Koofio^)— order, openness; beings perm eated

by light rays, logos, lightning, and fire in H eraclitus; beings-as-
a-whole as a "w orld region” (Weltgegend) o f Geviert; the same
thing as the Sky; that in which and how D asein is found (see
Being-in-the-world).
World region (Weltgegend)— one o f the four com ponents

in the Fourfold (G eviert): Sky (W orld), E arth, gods, and men,
unthinkable w ithout the others.
409
/
G erm an Terminology X3sed by H eidegger in a

P articular Way
Abschied — farewell.
Als — as.
Abendland — the W est; literally “evening land.”
Abgrund — abyss.
Abkehr— departure from.
Alltaglichkeit, durchdringliche Alltaglichkeit—

everyday(ness), all-piercing everyday.
Anfang, anfangliche— beginning, initial.
Angst— fear, terror.
Anwesen— presence, presencing.
Aufgehen — rise up, com e up, sp ro u t, the act o f cpvosiv,

w hence (pboiC.
Aufstellung— setting, installation.
Befinden, sich befinden— to be located, found.
Befindlichkeit— findability.
Besinnung — com prehension, contem plation.
Bezug — relation, relationship.
410
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D a — this, (t)here.
Dasein — th is-B eing; in a regular sense: existence, Being.
Destruktion (phanomenologische Destruktion)— destruction,

phenom enological destruction.
Differenz (ontologische Differenz)— difference, ontological

difference.
Ding — thing.
Durftige Zeit — desolate time.
D ort — there.
D u — you (sin gular).
Eigene — one’s own, authentic.
Entscheidung — decision.
Entwurf— draft, project, sketch.
E r — he.
Ereignis, Er-Eignis — event; H eidegger artificially brings its

m eaning closer to eigene (authentic).
Erinnerung, Er-Innerung — memory, rem inder; H eidegger

artificially brings its m eaning closer to "inner”
Ermachtigung — legitim ization, authorization.
411
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Erstaunen — wonder, amazemertt.
Entsetzen — terror.
Existential— an existential (noun), pertains to the

fundam ental'ontological analysis o f D asein,
Existentiel— existential (adj.), pertains to the ontic description

o f D asein,
Ewige— et'ernal.
Furcht— fear.
Gefiige — structure.
Gegenstand — object.
Gerede — chatter, gossip.
Geschichte— history; for H eidegger, this is the fate o f W estern

European philosophy em bedded into its ontological structure
and linked to this structure and topography.
Geschick — fate, m essage.
Gestell— that which was positioned, affixed (like a sh e lf); jo in t;

one o f the m ost im portant w ords in H eidegger's philosophy
which signifies the relationship to beings from the stan d poin t
o f metaphysically com prehended Being and, consequently, m an
operating w ithin the topography o f this ontology.
Gewicht— weight.
412
V
Gewissen — conscience, one o f D asein s existentials.
Geworfenheit— throw nness, one o f D asein ’s existentials.
Gleiche, ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichens— one and the

sam e; N ietzsch e’s Eternal R eturn.
Grund — foundation, basis.
Heilige — sacred, holy.
Herstellung — production.
H ier — here.
Holzwege — paths in the w oods, for Heidegger, som ething

betw een a path and thick brush o f the w oods.
Ich—I.
Insein — Being-in, one o f D asein ’s existentials.
Inzwischen-Sein — Being-in-betw een.
Kommen, das Kommendste — to come, arrive, that which

arrived (in regard to the L a st God).
Konnen, sein konnen— to be able to, the m ain attribute o f

authentic D asein.
Kunftige — the future ones, those who pertain to another

Beginning.
Lichtung — illum ination, clearing.
413 *
____ /
Machen— to do, make. '
Machenschaft— mechanicity, a relationship of technical

production tow ard beings and Being; the m ain attribute o f
M arxism and capitalism ; the fundam ental-ontological essence
(Wesen) o f Machenschaft is Gestell; close to re/v//.
Macht— power, from machen.
Man, das Man — the “who” o f inauthentic D asein.
Mitsein — Being-with, one o f D asein ’s existentials.
Neugierigkeit— curiosity, one o f D ase in ’s existentials.
Nichten— nihilation.
Nichts— nothing, N oth in gn ess.
Offene— open.
Raumlichkeit— spatiality, one o f D ase in ’s existentials.
Rede — speech.
Schiitzen, Schutz, Schutzlosigkeit— protect, secure.
Seiende — beings.
Seiende-im-Ganzen — beings-as-a-whole.
Seiende ist— beings are.
Seiendheit— essence.
414
\
Sein (in Sein-Being)— Being in ontology.
Seinsvergessenheit— oblivion o f Being.
Seinsverlassenheit— abandonm ent o f Being.
Selbst — oneself, the who o f authentic D asein.
Seyn (in Seyn-Being)— Being in fundamental-ontology .
Seyn west— Being exists.
Sorge — care, one o f D ase in s existentials.
Sprung — leap.
Sterbliche — m ortal.
Stimmen — voice, m ood, setting, one o f D asein s existentials.
Streit — war, battle.
Tod, Sein-zum-Tode— death, Being-toward-death, one o f

D ase in ’s authentic existentials.
Ubergang — transition, passage.
Ubergangsfrage — transition al question.
Uneigene, Uneigentlichkeit— inauthentic, inauthenticity.
Unheil— disaster, evil.
Unverborgnheit— unconcealm ent, truth (aletheia).

Verbergen— hide, conceal, cover.
Verfallen— decay, ruin, one o f D asein’s inauthentic existentials.
Vernehemen— perceive, examine.
Verstehen— understanding, one o f D ase in ’s existentials,
Verstellen— disguise, conceal, obstruct,
Verweiger'ung— refusal, denial.
Verwiistung— desertification.
Volk — a people, narod (R u s.).
Vorhandene— available, present.
Vorstellung— re-presentation; thought-process specifics

within the fam ew ork o f W estern E uropean metaphysics; traces
back to Plato’s theory o f ideas,
Vorsetzende Durchsetzung — predeterm ined im position.
Wachterschaft — guardianship.
Wage— balance.
Wagnis— venture, risk, danger.
Wahrheit — truth.
Weg— way.
416
V
Weltgegend — w orld region (inside Geviert).
Weisung— direction, instruction.
Wendung— turn.
Wesen— fundam ental-ontological essence.
Wesen als Verb (ich wese, du wesest, er, sie, es west, wir
wesen, ihr weset, sie wesen)— to exist.
Wesentliche— that which is according with existence.
Wesung— presence in accordance with W esen.
Wille zur Macht— W ill to Power.
Wink — nod, wink.
Wohnen— to live.
Zeit (Zeit-time)— time in the Germ anic understanding as that

which separates (unlike the linking idea o f time in Slavic"vremia").
Zufall — accident, literally “that which falls.”
Zuhandene — that which is at hand.
Zukunft — future, that which is coming.
Zweideutigkeit— ambiguity, D asein ’s existential.
417
Greek Terfninology
oucov n al$ £<jti 7tou^cov, 7i£pp£tjcov: 7iai56<; f| P a<;i^f|if|—

“ T im e is a child playing, throw ing dice. T h e ruling pow er is a
child’s.” (S e e H eraclitus.)
&>oj0£ia (a leth eia )— truth.
ou Oevtikoc; (au th en tik o s)— own, genuine, authentic.
y£V£<n<; (g en e sis)— origin.
Saifiov (d aim o n )— god, m inor deity.
S eivov (d ein o n )— terror, som ething inspiring fear.
5 ikt] (d ik e )—justice.
5oâ (d o x a )— visibility appearance.
eydi (e g o )— I.
£i5o<; (e id o s)— type.
£ivai (e in ai)— to be.
£V (hen) — one, unified. (S ee H eractlitus.)
£V£py£ia (e n e rg e ia )— action, energy.
£Ov, Eovra (eon, eon ta ) — beings (archaically active present

participle from sivai).
£K<tt&<ti<; (e k sta sis)— ecstasy, leaving oneself.
418
V
so x ax o v (eschaton)— end.
£t3k ,i)k X,o<5o (p a ip o <5(e u k y k lo s s p h a ir o s ) — w ell-rounded sphere.

(S e e Parm enides.)
rj0 o<; dvGptontp S a ijito v (e th o s a n th ro p o d a im o n ) — “ethos is a

daimon for man.” (S ee H eraclitus.)
ofj (z o i) — life.
^(pov X,oyov e/ov (zoon logon echon)— anim al processing the

rational principle (speech, thought).
0 at)fid^£iv (th a u m a z e in ) — to wonder.
0e6<; (th e o s) — god.
I5 s a ( id e a ) — idea.
i 5 io<; (id io s) — one’s own, individual.
K£pat)vo<; ( k e r a u n o s ) — lightning.
k o iv o v (k o in o n ) — that which is shared, com m on.
Jusysiv (le g e in ) — to speak, think; initially, to reap.
X,oyo<; (lo g o s ) — word, thought, speech; initially, harvest.
ji&Xojiai ( m a c h o m a i) — to fight, battle.
jie0o8o<; (methodos)— m ethod, direction sign.
HHXaviKrj (m e c h a n ik e ) — m echanics, machine.
4191
_y
’
voeiv (n oein )— to think, understand,
voijc; (n o u s)— thought process, m ind,
ov (on )— b eings. (S ee H eractlitus.)
ovtgx; ov (ontos o n )— the greatest (suprem e) kind o f beings.
O vk Ejioij a%Xa to v Xoyov atK ovaavraq ofioôygiv aotpov

ecttiv ev Travxa siv a i. (O u k em ou a lia tou logou a k o u sa n ta s
hom ologeih sophon estin hen p a n ta e in ai.)— " I f you do not
listen to me, but to the logos, it w ould be wise, abiding by it, to
say: everything is one." (S ee H eraclitus.)
ovpaviov (o u ran io n )— o f the sky, heavenly, celestial.
ovpavdq (o u ra n o s)— sky, heavens.
ovCTia (o u sia )— essence, substance.
ovxoc; (a u to s)— oneself.
naQoq (p a th o s)— state, im pression, pathos.
n a x r a (p a n ta )— all beings, all things.
;roi£iv (p o iein )— to create, make.
;rouiai<; (p o ie sis)— creation.
;r6>,£Ho<; (p o lem o s)— war, battle.
;ri)p (p y r )— fire.
420
V
xsfivsiv (tem n ein )— divide, cut.
texvii (tech n e)— technique, craft, skill.
(yli) — matter, substance; initially, w ood.
(p aiv so x a i (p h a in e sth a i)— to appear.
<j)0opa (p h th o ra )— decay, destruction, death.
(ptxrsiv (p h y sein )— produce, generate, sprout.
(|n)<Ti<; (p h y sis)— nature.
(p sy c h e)— soul.
L a tin Terminology
animalis rationalis — rational animal, i.e., man.
causa sui — self-caused cause, cause generated within itself,
cogito ergo sum — “ I think, therefore I am.” (S ee D escartes.)
creare — to create,
ens— beings.
ens creatum — created beings.
esse — to be.
essentia — essence.
421
____ /
existentia — existence. '
fundamentum inconcussum — unshakable foundation.
homo economicus— self-interested, econom ic man.
jacere — to throw, cast, hurl.
mundus imaginalis — im aginary world.
negatio — hegation, rejection,
objectum — object, literally “that which w as cast in front.”
ordo — order.
positium — positive, set, established,
ratio — rational m ind,
res— thing.
res cogitans— thinking thing, m ind. (S ee D escartes.)
res creata — created thing.
res extensa — corporeal substance. (S e e D escartes.)
subjectum — subject, literally "that which w as cast down.”
substantia — substance, literally "that which stan ds under."
templum — temple.
422
\
tempus time, as that which is split, closer to the G erm an

Z eit" than the R u ssian "vrem ia”
tr anscendens transcendent, on the other side o f the boundary,
vis primitive active— original active force. (S ee Leibniz.)
423
____ /
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---------------------------- * Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzuge

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___ J
H eidegger, M artin. Aristoteles' M etaphysik I X 1 - 3 . Von

Wesen und Wirklichkeit der K raft (Sommer semester 1 9 3 1 ),
Gesam tausgabe (G A ) 33, edited by H . H iin i (Fran kfu rt am
M ain: V. K losterm ann, 1981).
_________________ . Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1 9 1 0 —

1 9 7 6 ), G A 13, ed. H . H eidegger (Ibid., 1983).
_________________ . Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)

(1 9 3 6 - 1 9 3 8 ), G A 65, ed. F.-W. von H errm an n (Ibid., 1989).
_________________ . Besinnung ( 1 9 3 8 / 3 9 ) ; G A 66, ed. F.-W. von

Herrm annÎkzci., 1997).
_________________ . Bremer und Freiburger Vortrage, G A 79, ed.

P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1994).
_________________ . D er Begriff der Z eit (1 9 2 4 ), G A 64, ed.

H rsg. F.-W. von H errm ann (Ibid., 2 0 0 4 ).
_________________ . D er deutsche Idealism us (Fichte, Schelling,

Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart
(Sommersemester 1 9 2 9 ); Im Anhang: Nachschrift “Einfiihrung
in das akademische Studium ” (Sommersemester 1 9 2 9 ), G A 28,
ed. C . Strube (Ibid., 1997).
_________________ . D er Satz vom G rund ( 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 5 6 ) , G A 10,

ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1997).
_________________ . D ie Frage nach dem Ding. Z u K an ts Lehre von

den transzendentalen Grundsatzen (W intersemester 1 9 3 5 /3 6 ) ,
G A 41, ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1984).
_________________ . D ie Geschichte des Seyns, G A 69, ed. P.

Traw ny (Ibid., 1998).
-----------------------. D ie Grundbegriffe der M etaphysik. W elt-

Endlichkeit—Einsam keit (W intersemester 1 9 2 9 /3 0 ) , G A 2 9 /3 0 ,
ed. F.-W. von H errm ann (Ibid., 1 9 8 3).
---------------------- .. D ie Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie

(Sommersemester 1 9 2 7 ), G A 24, ed. F.-W. von H errm ann
(Ibid., 1975).
430
V
----------------------- . D ie M etaphysik des deutschen Idealismus.

Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling: Philosopbische
Untersuchungen iiber das Vfesen der menschlichen Freiheit und
die dam it zusammenhangenden Gegenstande (1 8 0 9 ), G A 49, ed.
G . S eu b o ld (Ibid., 1991).
_________________ . Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik (Sommersemester

1 9 3 5 ), G A 40, ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1983),
_________________ . Einfuhrung in die phanomenologische

Forschung ( W inter semester 1 9 2 3 /2 4 ), G A 17, ed. E-W . von
H errm an n (Ibid., 1 994).
_________________ . Einleitung in die Philosophie (Wintersemester

1 9 2 8 /2 9 ), G A 27, ed. O. Saam e et I. Saam e-Speidel (Ibid., 1996).
_________________ . Erlauterungen zu Hdlderlins Dichtung (1 9 3 6 —

1 9 6 8 ), G A 4, ed. EW . von H errm ann (Ibid., 1981).
_________________ . Feldweg'Gesprache (1 9 4 4 /4 5 ), G A 77, ed. I,

Ingrid Sch iissler (Ibid., 1 995),
_________________ . Fruhe Schriften (1 9 1 2 - 1 9 1 6 ), G A 1, ed.

E 'W . von H errm an n (Ibid., 1 9 78 ).
_________________ . Gedachtes, GA 81, ed. Paola-Ludovika

C o rian d o (Ibid., 2 0 0 7 ).
_________________ . Geschichte der Philosophie von Thom as von

Aquin bis K an t ( W intersemester 1 9 2 6 /2 7 ), G A 23, ed. H .
V etter (Ibid., 2 0 0 6 ).
_________________ . Grundbegriffe (Sommersemester 1 9 4 1 ), G A

5 1 , ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1981).
__________________. Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie

(Sommersemester 1926), G A 22, ed. F.-K. Blust (Ibid., 1993).
_________________ . Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie

(Sommersemester 1 9 2 4 ), G A 18, ed. M . M ichalski (Ibid., 2 002).
_________________ . Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewdhlte

“Probleme” der “Logik” (W intersemester 1 9 3 7 /3 8 ), G A 54, ed.
F.'W . von H errm an n (Ibid., 1 9 8 4 ).
431
/
M ARTIN H EIDEGGER: The Philosophy of Another Beginning
_________________ . Grundprob'leme der Phanomenologie

( Wintersemester 1 9 1 9 /2 0 ), G A 58, ed. H .-H . Gander (Ibid., 1992).
_________________ . Hegel / H rsg. I. Schiissler. F r./M ., 1993

(G A 68 ).
_________________ . Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes

( Wintersemester 1 9 3 0 /3 1 ), G A 32, ed. I. G orlan d (Ibid., 1980).
_________________ . H eraklit. 1. D er A nfan gdes abendlandischen

Denkens (Somm ersem ester 1 9 4 3 ); 2. Logik. H eraklits Lehre
vom Logos (Sommersemester 1 9 4 4 ), G A 55, ed. M .S . Frings
(Ibid., 1 9 7 9 ).
_________________ . Holzwege (1 9 3 5 - 1 9 4 6 ), G A 5, ed. F.-W.

von H errm ann (Ibid., 1977).
________________ . Holderlins Hymne “Andenken” (Wintersemester

1 9 4 1 /4 2 ), G A 52, ed. C . O chw aldt (Ibid., 1982).
_________________. HolderlinsHym ne“D erIster” (Sommersemester

1942), G A 53, ed. W. Biemel (Ibid., 1984).
_________________ . Holderlins Hym nen “G erm anien” und “D er

Rhein” ( W intersemester 1 9 3 4 /3 5 ) , G A 39, ed. S . Z iegler
(Ibid., 1 9 8 0 ).
_________________ . Identitat und D ifferenz (1 9 5 5 - 1 9 5 7 ) , G A

11, ed. F.-W. von H errm ann (Ibid., 2 0 0 6 ).
_________________ . K an t und das Problem der M etaphysik

(1 9 2 9 ), G A 3, ed. H rsg. F.-W. von H errm an n (Ibid., 1991).
________________ . Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache
(Sommersemester 1934), G A 38, ed. G . Seu bold (Ibid., 1998).
-----------------------. Logik. D ie Frage nach der Wahrheit

(W intersemester 1 9 2 5 /2 6 ), G A 21, ed. W. Biem el (Ibid., 1 976).
_________________M etaphysik und Nihilism us, G A 67, ed.

H .-J. Friedrich (Ibid., 1999).
-----------------------. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im

A usgang von Leibniz (Sommersemester 1 9 2 8 ), G A 26, ed. K .
H eld (Ibid., 1978).
432
V
_________________ . Nietzsche 1 (1 9 3 6 - 1 9 3 9 ), G A 6.1, ed. B.

Schillbach (Ibid., 1996).
_________________ . Nietzsche 2 (1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 6 ), G A 6.2, ed. B.

Schillbach (Ibid., 1 997).
------------------------♦ N ietzsche metaphysische Grundstellung im

abendlandischen D enken: D ie ewige W iederkehr des Gleichen
(Som m ersem ester 1 9 3 7 ), G A 4 4, ed. M . H ein z (Ibid., 1 9 8 6 ).
_________________ . Nietzsche: D er europaische Nihilismus,

(1 9 4 0 ), G A 4 8 , ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1986).
________________ . Nietzsche: D er Wille zur Macht als Kunst

(Wintersemester 1 9 3 6 /3 7 ), G A 43, ed. B. Heimbiichel (Ibid., 1985).
_________________ . Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur M acht

als Erkenntnis (Sommersemester 1 9 3 9 ), G A 47, ed. E. H an ser
(Ibid., 1 989),
_________________ .Nietzsches M etaphysik (fur das Wintersemester

1 9 4 1 /4 2 angekundigt, aber nicht vorgetragen) / Einleitung in die
Philosophie— Denken und Dichten (W intersemester 1 9 4 4 /4 5 ),
G A 50, ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1 990),
_________________ . Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizitat

(Sommersemester 1 9 2 3 ), G A 63, ed. K . Brocker-O ltm anns
(Ibid., 1 988).
_________________ .Parm enides (W intersemester 1 9 4 2 /4 3 ), G A

5 4 , ed. M .S . Frings (Ibid., 1 9 82).
_________________ . Phanomenologie der Anschauung und

des A usdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung
(Sommersemester 1920), G A 59, ed. C . Strube (Ibid., 1993).
_________________ . Phanomenologie des religidsen Lebens. 1.

Einleitung in die Phanomenologie der Religion ( Wintersemester
1 9 2 0 /2 1 ) ; 2. Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus
(Sommersemester 1 9 2 1 ); 3. D ie philosophischen Grundlagen
der mittelalterlichen Mystik, G A 60, ed. C . Strube, M . Jung, T.
Regehly (Ibid., 1 995).
433
/
M ARTIN H EID EGGER: The Philosophy of Another Beginning
________________ . Phanomenologische Interpretation ausgewahlter

Ahhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik
(Sommersemester 1 9 2 2 ), G A 62, ed. G . N eu m an n (Ibid., 2 0 0 5 ).
_________________ . Phanomenologische Interpretation von K an ts

K ritik der reinen Vernunft (W intersemester 1 9 2 7 /2 8 ) , G A 25,
ed. I. G orlan d (Ibid., 1977).
_________________ . Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu

Aristoteles. Einfuhrung in die phanomenologische Forschung
(W intersemester 1 9 2 1 /2 2 ), G A 61, ed. W. Brocker et K .
B rocker-O ltm anns (Ibid., 1985).
_________________ . Platon: Sophistes (W intersemester 1 9 2 4 /2 5 ),

G A 19, ed. I. Schiissler (Ibid., 1992).
_________________ . Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs

(Sommersemester 1 9 25), G A 20, ed. P. Jaeger (Ibid., 1979).
_________________ . Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges

(1 9 1 0 —1 9 7 6 ), G A 16, ed. H . H eidegger (Ibid., 2 0 0 0 ).
_________________ . Sein und Wahrheit. 1. D ie G rundfrage

der Philosophie (Somm ersem ester 1 9 3 3 ); 2. Vom Wesen der
Wahrheit (W intersem ester 1 9 3 3 /3 4 ) , G A 36, 37, ed. H .
T ietjen (Ibid., 2 0 0 1 ).
_________________ . Sein und Z eit (1 9 2 7 ), G A 2, ed. F.-W. von

H errm ann (Ibid., 1977).
_________________ . Sem inar: Vom Wesen der Sprache. D ie

Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Z u Herders
Abhandlung “Uber den Ursprung der Sprache,” G A 85, ed. I.
Schiissler (Ibid., 1999).
_________________ . Seminare (1 9 5 1 - 1 9 7 3 ) , G A 15, ed. C .

O chw adt (Ibid., 1986).
-----------------------. Sem inare: Nietzsche: Sem inare 1 9 3 7 und

1 944, G A 87, ed. P. von R uckteschell (Ibid., 2 0 0 4 ).
-----------------------. Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen

Freiheit (1 8 0 9 ) (Sommersemester 1 9 3 6 ), G A 42, ed. I. Sch iissler
(Ibid., 1 988).
434
V
----------------------- . Unterwegs zur Sprache (1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 9 ), G A

12, ed. F.-W. von H errm an n (Ibid., 1985).
----------------------- . Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.

Einleitung in die Philosophie (Sommersemester 1 9 3 0 ), G A 31,
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----------------------- • Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Z u Platons

Hohlengleichnis und Theatet (W intersemester 1 9 3 1 /3 2 ), G A
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_________________ . Vortrage und Aufsatze (1 9 3 6 - 1 9 5 3 ), G A 7,

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_________________ . Was heijlt Denken? (1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 ), G A 8,

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_________________ . Wegmarken (1 9 1 9 - 1 9 6 1 ), G A 9, ed. F.-W.

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_________________ . Z u Ernst Ju nger “D er Arbeiter,” G A 90, ed.

P. T raw ny (Ibid., 2 0 0 4 ).
_________________ . Z u Holderlin / Griechenlandreisen, G A 75,

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_________________ .Z u r Bestimmungder Philosophie. l.D ie ld e ed er

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Universitat und des akademischen Studiums (Sommersemester
1 9 1 9 ), G A 56, 57, ed. B. H eim biichel (Ibid., 1987).
_________________ . Z u r Sache des Denkens (1 9 6 2 —1 9 6 4 ), G A

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_________________ . tjber den A nfang (1 9 4 1 ), G A 70, ed. F.-W.

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INDEX
A Anfang, der erste (first Beginning)

9 3 - 9 9 , 1 0 0 -1 0 6 , 123, 125,
Abendland (evening land) 3 6 —39, 138, 233, 235, 238, 2 4 0
9 1 - 9 3 , 102, 104, 125, 134, 241, 244, 252, 257, 396
136, 145, 149, 170, 178 Anfang, der neue. See Anfang, der
Abgrund (abyss) 31, 69, 71, 83, andere
101, 105, 112, 135, 136, angels 105, 223, 247, 317
143, 145, 152, 1 9 6 -1 9 7 , Angst (terror) 17, 102, 1 3 1 -1 3 2 ,
205, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 , 224, 226, 135, 143, 155, 196, 210,
229, 237, 278, 3 2 3 -3 2 4 , 237, 294, 366, 3 6 8 -3 6 9 ,
334, 389, 395 388, 4 0 7
abyss. See Abgrund (abyss) A nnales School, the 75
actuality 15, 44, 7 8 - 7 9 , 137 A ntigone (Sophocles) 1 2 7 -1 3 1
A d am (Biblical) 104 A postles, the 110, 224
aesthetics 59 A rendt, H annah 27
alchemy 194, 254 A ristotle 7, 16, 30, 46, 49, 5 7 -5 8 ,
aletheia. See Unverborgenheit 60, 95, 1 0 0 -1 0 1 , 104,
Alltaglichkeit (the everyday) 3 4 6 1 0 5 -1 0 6 , 1 0 9 -1 1 1 , 113,
348, 3 5 1 -3 5 2 , 3 5 5 -3 5 9 , 121, 136, 142, 233, 237,
395, 4 1 0 242, 244, 2 4 8 -2 5 2 , 283,
am azem ent. See wonder (Erstaunen) 305, 324, 389
am biguity (existential). atheism 260
See Zw eideutigkeit Aufstellung (installation) 1 2 0 -1 2 1
A m ericanism 38, 1 6 1 -1 6 4 , Austrag (carrying out and settling)
1 6 8 -1 6 9 , 170, 284, 395, 78, 81, 150
398, 403 authenticity. See eigene
A naxim ander 18, 30, 85, 9 5 -9 6 , axiology 61, 159
104, 142, 148, 233, 341, 373 axiom 30, 72, 75, 186, 245, 251,
Anfang, der andere (another 318, 322, 330
Beginning) 1 4 1 -1 5 7 , 193, axiom atics 76, 322
196, 2 0 7 - 2 0 9 , 222, 227,
233, 249, 2 7 3 - 2 7 9 , 3 9 0
391, 396
447
7
B C hristianity 58, 1 1 0 -1 1 3 , 194,

236, 241, 2 4 5 -2 4 6 , 2 4 8
Beaufret, Jean 155 250, 253, 260, 265, 2 9 6
Befindlichkeit (findabiliry) 3 3 6 -3 3 7 , 298. See also philosophy
340, 401 (Scholasticism )
Beginning, another. See Anfang, der Eastern (O rth odox) 74, 110, 298
andere (another Beginning) W estern 30, 110, 251, 2 9 6 - 2 9 8
Beginning, first. See Anfang, der erste classification 46, 57
(first Beginning) cogito ergo sum 47, 115, 252, 421
Being. See Seyn-Being,' See Sein-Being C om m un ism 6, 24, 2 6 - 2 7 , 161,
Being and Time (H eidegger). See Sein 1 6 5 -1 6 8 , 172, 175, 178,
und Z tit (H eidegger) 180, 260, 276
Being-in. See Insein conceptualism 61
beings. See Seiende, das conscience (existential). See Gewissen
Being-toward-death. See Conservative Revolution, the 2 3 - 2 6 ,
Sein-zum-Tode 1 7 1 -1 7 4 , 177, 260, 276,
Being-with. See Mitsein 284
Beitrage zur Philosophie (H eidegger) Contributions to Philosophy
102, 141, 257, 285, 375 (H eidegger). See Beitrage zur
Bergson, H enri 30 Philosophie (H eidegger)
Bezug (relation) 49, 5 3 -5 6 , 77, 79, Corbin, H enry 34, 36, 3 1 6 - 3 1 7
155, 211, 395, 410 Creation (the Bible) 105, 111, 113,
Bibikhin, V ladim ir 1 9 - 2 0 245, 247, 249, 296, 298,
Bible, the 1 0 4 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 -1 1 1 , 125, 302, 324, 374
213, 219 curiosity (existential).
Britain 24 See Neugierigkeit
Bruck, Arthur Moeller van den 23, 26
bylina (epic tale) 74, 3 6 6
D
C daimon 9 3 - 9 9 , 97, 1 0 0 -1 0 1 , 108,
1 1 2 -1 1 5 , 133, 135, 143,
care (existential). See Sorge 212, 238, 335
Cartesian. See D escartes, Rene Darw in, C harles 16, 253
C elts 35 Dasein 17, 53, 62, 72, 148,
chatter (existential). See Gerede 2 8 1 -3 8 3 , 3 9 5 -3 9 8 , 401,
C hina 38 4 0 5 - 4 0 6 , 408, 4 1 1 - 4 1 7
chreon (A naxim ander) 96 decay (existential). See Verfallen
448
V
decision, the. See Entscheidung em piricism 308, 313, 330

(decision) E nd (o f philosophy) 5, 30, 9 1 -1 2 5 ,
deconstruction (D errida) 160 127, 138, 146, 149, 151,
D eleuze, G illes 114 165, 1 6 7 -1 7 0 , 177, IS O -
D em ocritus 252 182, 235, 2 4 0 -2 4 1 , 244,
D errida, Jacqu es 41, 160 2 5 2 -2 5 3 , 255, 2 5 8 -2 5 9 ,
D escartes, Rene 16, 30, 47, 2 6 2 -2 6 7 , 2 9 1 -3 1 0 , 321,
1 1 3 -1 1 8 , 137, 162, 239, 324, 341, 395, 400, 404,
251, 2 5 2 -2 5 4 , 259, 263, 408
269, 2 9 8 -2 9 9 , 3 0 2 -3 0 3 , E nd T im es (Biblical) 105
313, 389, 407, 4 2 1 - 4 2 2 energy 7 8 -7 9 , 84, 97, 110, 114,
desertification 38, 80, 134, 163, 224, 237
2 3 3 -2 3 4 , 237, 239, 256, enframing. See Gestell (enfram ing)
267, 2 9 3 -2 9 4 , 314, 399 Ensetzen (sacred terror) 102
dialectics 16, 27, 7 6 - 7 7 , 103, 122, Enteignung (expropriation) 78
193, 305 Entscheidung (decision) 70, 78,
differance, la 41 80, 88, 99, 135, 146, 168,
D ing an sich. See thing-in-itself 2 0 1 -2 0 2 , 2 0 7 -2 0 8 , 229,
D ing fu r uns. See thing-for-us 240, 252, 2 7 3 -2 7 4 , 2 7 5
D in g (thing) 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 2 2 8 -2 3 1 , 279, 359, 363, 382, 399
243, 256, 401 epistem ology 159, 440. See
disontologization 306, 3 1 3 -3 1 4 , also theory o f knowledge,' See
317, 320 also gnoseology
divinities. See gods Ereignis (event) 18, 68, 78, 80, 102,
D u n s Sco tu s 7 106, 141, 1 4 7 -1 4 9 , 154,
156, 1 9 1 -1 9 3 , 197, 199,
207, 209, 211, 2 1 7 -2 1 8 ,
E 223, 2 2 6 -2 2 7 , 2 3 3 -2 3 4 ,
243, 2 4 9 -2 5 0 , 262, 274,
ecce homo 135
279, 376, 396, 398, 4 0 1
ecclesiastic literature 74
402, 407, 411
ecstasy (existential) 96, 108, 382,
Ereignung (enownment) 64, 78,
4 00, 4 1 8
80, 108, 149, 151, 156,
eigene (authentic) 1 4 8 -1 4 9 , 3 4 5
171, 177, 180, 199, 216,
346, 349, 352, 356, 3 5 8
2 2 7 -2 2 8 , 234, 243, 264,
360, 3 6 3 -3 6 4 , 3 6 6 -3 6 8 ,
2 7 3 -2 7 4 , 279, 375, 389
3 7 0 -3 7 2 , 3 7 6 - 3 7 7 , 395
Erstaunen. See wonder
elem ents (four) 9 8 - 9 9 , 250, 252
449 ♦
/
eschatology 18, 69, 122, 1 4 8 -1 5 1 , 1 3 0 -1 3 1 , 1 3 3 -1 3 8 , 138,

167, 170, 185, 227, 233, 14 2 -1 4 3 , 145, 149, 151,
241, 247, 270, 402, 419 154, 157, 166, 1 6 8 -1 7 0 ,
essence. See Seiendheit 178, 186, 202, 207, 238,
essentialism 5 9 -6 0 , 63, 324 2 4 1 -2 4 5 , 252, 2 5 5 -2 5 8 ,
ethics 59, 159 260, 262, 2 7 4 -2 7 6 , 348, 388
ethos 97, 153, 181, 212, 224, 4 1 9 fear (existential). See Furcht
Europeanization 38 Fichte,Johann 30, 39, 118,
European (philosophy). 3 0 5 -3 0 6 , 313, 332
See philosophy (W estern Ficino, M arsilio 252
European) findability (existential).
Eve (Biblical) ‘ 104 See Befindlichkeit (findability)
evening. See Abendland (evening Fourfold. See Geviert (fourfold)
land) Freiburg University 7, 27, 173
everyday, the (existential). French (language). See language
See Alltaglichkeit Freudo-M arxism 27
Evola, Ju liu s 29, 206 Freud, Sigm und 16
existence 8 5 - 8 8 , 100, 119, 148 frontline socialism (Jiinger) 25
149, 196, 199, 202, 220, fruition, com ing to. See Ereignung
226, 2 3 6 -2 3 7 , 254, 257, (enownment)
291, 307, 3 1 9 -3 2 2 , 330, Fukuyam a, Francis 2 6 3 - 2 6 4
334, 342, 3 4 5 -3 6 0 , 363, fundam ental-history 92
3 6 7 - 3 6 8 , 370, 3 7 6 -3 7 7 , fundam ental-ontology 5 3 - 6 4 , 67,
3 8 2 -3 8 4 69 -7 1 , 7 3 -7 4 , 7 9 -8 1 ,
existentialism 17, 23 8 6 - 9 0 , 102, 1 0 4 -1 0 6 , 109,
existential (o f Dasein) 17, 2 9 1 -3 1 0 , 111, 114, 122, 136, 1 4 2
3 1 3 -3 4 3 , 345, 3 4 7 -3 4 9 , 143, 145, 1 4 7 -1 4 8 , 151,
356, 3 5 9 -3 6 0 , 3 6 3 -3 7 6 ,4 0 1 . 1 5 5 -1 5 6 , 157, 1 5 9 -1 6 1 ,
existentiell 321, 328 167, 169, 171, 174, 179,
182, 1 9 1 -1 9 2 , 1 9 5 -1 9 7 ,
1 9 9 -2 0 0 , 203, 2 0 8 -2 1 0 ,
F 211, 215, 217, 2 1 9 - 2 2 1 ,
Farias, Victor 27 225, 2 2 7 -2 2 8 , 230, 2 3 3
Fascism 3, 161, 172, 260. See 236, 242, 2 4 4 -2 4 5 , 248,
also N ation al Socialism 258, 273, 275, 295, 3 1 8
fate 19, 26, 32, 39, 68, 74, 92, 320, 323, 3 2 5 -3 2 8 , 330,
99, 102, 107, 115, 127, 3 3 2 -3 3 3 , 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 , 343,
450
V
364, 366, 372, 3 7 5 -3 7 6 , Geworfenheit (thrownness) 321,

4 0 4 - 4 0 6 , 40 8 3 3 4 -3 3 7 , 337, 3 4 7 -3 4 8 ,
Furcht (fear) 3 3 6 -3 3 7 , 3 5 3 -3 5 4 , 3 5 3 -3 5 4 , 359, 3 6 3 -3 6 4 ,
366, 4 1 2 366, 4 0 7 -4 0 8 , 413
Gleichen, H einrich von 26, 172
globalism. See idiocy, planetary
G gnoseology 101, 103, 115,
117, 159, 310, 403. See
G alilei, G alileo 250, 25 2
also epistem ology/ See
G arden o f Eden 1 0 4 - 1 0 5
also theory o f knowledge
Gegenstand (object) 137, 256, 405,
G o d 74, 105, 111, 113, 116, 118,
408, 412. See also object
125, 162, 178, 181, 197,
geom etry 59
2 0 8 -2 0 9 , 213, 214, 222,
Gerede (chatter) 3 4 8 -3 5 0 , 3 5 2
239, 2 4 5 -2 4 8 , 2 4 9 -2 5 1 ,
353, 363, 3 6 9 -3 7 0 , 399
254, 256, 2 5 9 -2 6 0 , 2 6 6
G erm an (language). See language
267, 274, 277, 2 9 6 -3 0 1 ,
G erm an (philosophy).
3 0 3 -3 0 4 , 307, 313, 316,
See philosophy (G erm an)
320, 322, 3 3 0 -3 3 1 , 356,
G erm any 2 4 - 2 8 , 1 6 9 -1 7 0 , 172
398, 402, 404, 408
174, 1 7 7 -1 7 8 , 276, 284
god, last 150 -1 5 5 , 155-1 5 7 , 179,
Geschichte des Seyns (H eidegger) 37,
208, 227, 233, 274, 402, 413
72, 78, 104, 141, 151, 163,
gods 97, 101, 112, 197, 2 0 6 -2 0 9 ,
174, 192, 203, 213, 226,
2 1 0 -2 1 2 , 215, 2 1 8 -2 2 5 ,
28 4 -285
2 3 0 -2 3 1 , 2 4 0 -2 4 2 , 256,
Geschichte (history as fate) 37,
274, 398, 4 0 1 -4 0 2 , 407, 409
6 7 - 8 8 , 91, 99, 104, 115,
G oethe 30, 39
141, 146, 151, 154, 163,
Golovin, Evgenii 29, 73
1 6 5 -1 6 6 , 1 7 4 -1 7 5 , 192,
good, the (agathon) 109
203, 207, 213, 226, 234,
gram m ar 22, 42, 59, 157, 239, 337,
252, 256, 258, 263, 273,
340, 364
276, 283, 285, 296
G reek (language). See language
Geschick (fate) 68, 149, 201, 258.
G reek (philosophy). See philosophy
See also fate
(Greek)
Gestell (enframing) 6, 53, 206, 2 5 5 Grundfrage (fundam ental question)
263, 2 6 7 -2 6 8 , 2 7 3 -2 7 5 , 389
62, 144, 166, 170, 309, 406
Geviert (fourfold) 5, 53, 81, 120, guardian o f Being 172, 2 0 9 -2 1 0 ,
1 8 9 -2 7 7 , 287, 3 8 8 -3 8 9 , 401 222, 231, 237, 240, 274,
Gewissen (conscience) 3 6 9 -3 7 1 , 398, 404, 416
399, 413 Guenon, Rene 29, 36, 111
451
/
M ARTIN H EID EGGER: The Philosophy of Another Beginning
H ' 3 8 8 -3 9 0 . See also Geschichte

(history as fate)
Hegel, G.W.F. 16, 30, 39, 70, 76, H itler, A d o lf 7, 2 4 - 2 9 , 173
84, 1 2 1 -1 2 3 , 125, 1 6 4 -1 6 6 , H ittites 35
169, 171, 1 9 3 -1 9 4 , 253, H olderlin, Friedrich 169, 177,
278, 3 0 5 -3 0 6 , 313, 324, 1 9 2 -1 9 3 , 233, 276, 343,
389 406, 431, 432, 436.
H eidegger in the U S S R 1 9 - 2 0 Holzwege (H eidegger) 85, 91, 96,
Heilige 208, 211, 222, 237, 406, 149, 201, 205, 286
408, 413. See also sacred,Hthe
om er 85, 112, 199
H eraclitus 5, 30, 4 8 - 4 9 , 9 5 -9 8 , hum anities 19, 72, 286
101, 1 0 3 -1 0 4 , 123, 135, H um e, D avid 116, 269, 313. See
142, 153, 181, 1 9 8 -1 9 9 , also empiricism
211, 233, 238, 253, 341, H u sserl, E dm u n d 38, 45, 57,
373, 388, 409, 418, 4 2 0 283, 286, 3 0 7 - 3 1 0 ,
Herstellung (production) 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 313, 318, 323. See
257. See also production also phenom enology
(technical)
H eym , G eorg 343
Hielscher, Friedrich 24, 172 I
H in duism 35, 241, 330
idealism 24, 61, 324
M aya 3 3 0
idea (Plato) 61, 7 8 - 7 9 , 8 3 - 8 4 ,
M im am sa school 35
Vedanta 35 1 0 6 -1 1 0 , 1 1 1 -1 1 5 , 119,
Vedic cycle 35 122, 124, 127, 138, 144,

153, 162, 1 6 6 -1 6 7 , 198,
historicism 75
235, 237, 240, 243, 2 4 5
Historie, die 67. See also Geschichte
history 6 7 - 6 9 , 7 0 - 8 2 , 85, 91, 99, 246, 2 5 1 -2 5 3 , 2 6 0 -2 6 1 ,
268, 2 9 5 - 2 9 9 , 313, 320,
100, 1 0 4 -1 0 5 , 122, 136,
138, 142, 1 4 5 -1 4 6 , 1 4 8 3 2 2 -3 2 4 , 326, 352, 358,
149, 151, 161, 165, 168, 374, 396, 398, 400, 4 0 2

405, 409, 416, 419
171, 1 7 4 -1 7 5 , 177, 185,
201, 203, 207, 209, 230, ideology 2 4 - 2 5 , 1 6 1 -1 6 2 , 166,
234, 245, 248, 252, 256, 1 6 8 -1 7 5 , 276, 371
263, 273, 2 7 5 -2 7 6 , 278, idiocy, planetary 3 8 - 3 9 , 1 6 1 -1 6 4 ,
2 8 3 - 2 8 4 , 2 9 1 -3 1 0 , 313, 168, 170, 1 7 9 -1 8 0 , 277, 403
320, 348, 372, 374, 384, illum ination (existential).

See Lichtung
452
inauthenticity. See uneigene

In dia 38. See also H in du ism
L
Indo-E uropean (group). L a M ettrie, Julien OfFray de 136
See language language 22, 3 2 -3 6 , 142, 157,
Insein 331, 396, 413 169, 193, 2 0 1 -2 0 4 , 213,
Introduction to Metaphysics 2 3 0 -2 3 1 , 2 3 8 -2 3 9 , 242,
(H eidegger) 24, 127 291, 3 1 7 -3 2 0 , 330, 336,
Iran 34, 316. See also Corbin, 3 4 0 -3 4 2 , 375, 403
H enry Arabic 3 4 - 3 5
Islam 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 . See English 23, 380
also Corbin, H enry French 23, 3 3 - 3 4 , 41, 91, 169,
Islam ization 34 316, 3 3 8 -3 3 9 , 354, 379
Italian (language). See language G erm an 23, 3 1 -3 3 , 41, 45, 73,
91, 95, 98, 102, 107, 12 0
121, 137, 147, 150, 161,
J 169, 191, 1 9 9 -2 0 0 , 217,
229, 254, 287, 309, 314,
Jew ish. See Sem itic
3 2 0 -3 2 2 , 332, 3 3 5 -3 3 9 ,
Jew ish m ysticism 35
345, 348, 350, 354, 367,
Ju d a ism 236
3 6 9 -3 7 0 , 373, 3 7 9 - 3 8 0
Ju n g, C arl 194
Germ anic group 33, 336, 338,
Junger, E rn st 23, 2 5 —26, 171, 173
379
Junger, Friedrich G eorg 23, 171
G reek 33, 41, 43, 46, 4 8 - 4 9 , 54,
ju stice (dike) 129, 131, 153, 198
56, 74, 85, 95, 98, 102, 107,
110, 130, 137, 161, 163,
K 169, 187, 192, 200, 218,

231, 236, 2 3 8 -2 3 9 , 309,
K an t, Im m anuel 16, 30, 39, 45, 314, 3 2 1 -3 2 2 , 335, 338,
72, 84, 114, 118, 121, 123, 340, 373, 382
125, 254, 269, 283, 296, Indo-European group 23, 28,
3 0 2 -3 0 7 , 313, 332, 381 3 2 -3 6 , 68, 98, 107, 110,
K ierkegaard, S 0ren 84, 118, 276, 229, 278, 336, 379
278 Italian 33
K lages, Ludw ig 172 Latin 33, 42, 4 5 - 4 7 , 54, 74, 85,
K oran 35. See also Islam 97, 116, 137, 169, 195, 200,
Kunjtige (future) 73, 154, 169, 179, 224, 229, 238, 251, 301,
181, 279, 326, 413 3 2 0 -3 2 2 , 335, 338, 340,
3 7 9 -3 8 0
♦
453
/
m etalanguage 2 2 -2 3 , 3 3 - 3 5 , 54, Liberalism 3, 6, 9, 24, 26, 78, 1 6 1

59, 321, 327, 336, 3 3 9 -3 4 1 , 162, 1 6 4 -1 6 5 , 1 6 8 -1 6 9 ,
376, 380 170, 172, 175, 178, 180,
O ld Church Slavonic 4 2 - 4 3 , 102, 260, 276, 395, 403
364 Lichtung (illumination, clearing)
Persian 34 397, 405, 413
Polish 116 lifeworld. See Lebenswelt
Romance group 33 Locke, Joh n 116, 313
R om anian 33 logic 22, 53, 83, 111, 1 2 0 -1 2 2 ,
Russian 32, 33, 3 6 -3 7 , 4 1 -4 3 , 236, 239, 305, 307, 317,
54, 69, 7 2 -7 5 , 8 6 -8 8 , 95, 322, 324, 3 4 0 - 3 4 1
107, 116, 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 137, laws 121
169, 1 9 9 -2 0 0 , 229, 254, Logic, Greater. See Science o f Logic
287, 315, 321, 3 3 5 -3 4 0 , (H egel)
3 5 0 -3 5 1 , 354, 364, 369, Logic of Sense (D eleuze) 114
3 7 9 -3 8 0 , 382 logos 32, 35, 46, 4 8 - 4 9 , 58, 60,
Sanskrit 35, 200 6 3 - 6 5 , 9 6 -1 0 2 , 106, 108,
Slavic group 41, 116, 336, 379 112, 115, 131, 135, 138,
Spanish 33 143, 181, 186, 212, 238,
L ast M an. See M an, L ast 242, 249, 3 7 4 - 3 7 5
(N ietzsche) Lorenz, K on rad 253
Late Antiquity 107, 113, 315
Latin (language). See language
Laufenberg, Heinrich 26 M
leap (Sprung) 5 8 -5 9 , 6 8 -6 9 ,
Machenschaft (m echanicity) 7 8 - 7 9 ,
9 4 - 9 6 , 9 9 -1 0 1 , 1 0 5 -1 0 6 ,
84, 1 3 7 -1 3 8 , 144, 1 5 3 -1 5 4 ,
109, 1 1 2 -1 1 4 , 1 3 3 -1 3 4 ,
161, 1 6 4 -1 6 8 , 170, 172,
136, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 , 146, 152,
174, 203, 236, 249, 257,
168, 172, 275, 278, 317,
2 7 5 -2 7 6 , 284, 395, 398,
382, 403, 40 8
404, 407, 409, 414. See
Lebenswelt (lifeworld) 62, 308, 318
also techne
left-wing 26
machine man (Julien O ffray de L a
Leibniz, G ottfried 30, 39, 78, 114,
M ettrie) 136
3 0 1 -3 0 3
M an, das 53, 3 5 4 -3 5 9 , 363, 367,
Leitfrage (key question) 4 6 - 5 0 , 57,
3 6 9 -3 7 0 , 372
62, 1 4 3 -1 4 4 , 309, 314, 40 6
M an, L a st (N ietzsch e) 71, 156,
Letto-Lithuanians 35
180, 262, 2 6 4 - 2 6 6
454
V
M ann, T h om as 26, 171 164, 166, 168, 1 7 1 -1 7 2 ,

m anufacturing. See production 236, 239, 248, 2 5 0 -2 5 5 ,
(technical) 267, 296, 3 0 1 -3 0 2 , 306,
M arcu s A urelius 342 330, 371, 374, 400, 402,
M arcuse, H erbert 27 4 0 4 -4 0 5 , 407
M arxism 16, 21, 24, 78, M oeller-Bruck, A rthur 172
1 6 4 -1 6 6 , 170, 284. See Mohler, Arm in 171
also C om m un ism M oira (Parm enides) 96
M arx, K arl 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 M oses (O ld Testam ent) 111
m aterialism 61, 138, 172, 308, 330 M ount Sinai (O ld Testam ent) 111
m athem atics 59 myth. See sacred, the
m etalanguage. See language
m etaphysics 22, 24, 30, 34, 3 6 -3 7 ,
41, 6 0 - 6 4 , 70, 72, 7 6 - 7 8 , N
8 0 - 8 7 , 103, 1 1 3 -1 1 9 , 1 2 3
nationalism 25, 169
125, 130, 137, 1 4 5 -1 4 7 ,
N ational Socialism 6, 2 4 -2 9 ,
149, 1 5 2 -1 5 3 , 156, 15 9
1 7 2 -1 7 6 , 276, 284, 286.
160, 162, 164, 1 6 6 -1 6 8 ,
See also Fascism,- See
170, 172, 174, 1 7 9 -1 8 0 ,
also N azism
1 9 4 -1 9 5 , 203, 2 0 6 -2 0 7 ,
nature 61, 72, 79, 82, 84, 98,
210, 214, 222, 225, 2 3 3
1 0 1 -1 0 2 , 121, 194, 249,
234, 2 3 6 -2 3 8 , 240, 245,
294, 313, 323, 329, 342,
248, 2 5 1 -2 5 2 , 260, 263,
421. See also physis
269, 276, 284, 306, 308,
N azism 7 - 8 , 2 4 -2 8 , 173, 178,
313, 324, 330, 333, 336,
284. See also N ational
373, 388, 3 9 0 -3 9 1 , 4 0 4
Socialism ; See also Fascism
o f delay 1 7 7 -1 7 9 , 1 8 0 -1 8 1 , 370
Neugierigkeit (curiosity) 348,
M etaphysics (A ristotle) 60, 95
3 5 0 -3 5 2 , 399
M iddle A ges 30, 107, 2 5 1 -2 5 2 ,
N ew Testam ent 74
262, 300, 301, 324.
N icholas o f C u sa 252
See also philosophy
Nichts (N othingness) 56, 5 9 -6 0 ,
(Scholasticism )
6 3 -6 5 , 81, 83, 92, 122, 129,
M inoans 35
133, 136, 138, 1 4 3 -1 4 4 ,
Mitsein (Being-w ith) 331, 355, 397,
147, 199, 247, 260, 266,
414
269, 278, 2 9 3 -2 9 4 , 296,
M odernity 2 4 - 2 5 , 30, 50, 58, 84,
305, 3 2 2 -3 2 3 , 331, 357,
98, 103, 107, 1 1 3 -1 1 8 ,
368, 3 7 4 -3 7 5 , 388, 405
1 2 2 -1 2 3 , 1 3 7 -1 3 8 , 156,
455
_ 7
Niekisch, E rnst 26, 1 7 2 —173 ' 113, 1 1 5 -1 2 0 , 1 3 7 -1 3 9 ,

Nietzsche (books by H eidegger) 160, 162, 1 6 6 -1 6 7 , 200,
1 2 3 -1 2 4 , 285 202, 206, 209, 237, 239,
N ietzsche, Friedrich 8, 16, 18, 24, 245, 2 5 2 -2 5 4 , 256, 2 6 8
3 0 - 3 2 , 39, 60, 78, 84, 92, 270, 2 9 1 -2 9 2 , 2 9 7 -3 0 4 ,
110, 1 1 2 -1 1 3 , 1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 3 0 7 -3 0 8 , 3 1 6 -3 1 8 , 320,
1 2 3 -1 2 5 , 154, 156, 3 2 2 -3 2 4 , 326, 329, 333,
1 6 3 -1 6 4 , 169, 171, 177, 336, 351, 3 5 6 -3 5 7 , 359,
180, 223, 234, 238, 253, 369, 374, 381, 399, 422. See
257, 259, 261, 264, 266, also Gegenstand (object)
2 7 5 -2 7 6 , 278, 285, 293, oblivion o f Being.
296, 3 0 6 -3 0 8 , 313, 318, See Seinsvergessenheit
320, 324, 334, 341, 373, O ld Church Slavonic (language).
3 8 9 -3 9 0 See language
nihilism 5, 24, 31, 38, 50, 61, 64, O ld T estam ent 74, 213
69, 79, 9 1 - 9 2 , 109, 117, ontics 53, 5 6 -6 4 , 7 5 - 7 6 , 8 1 - 8 2 ,
119, 1 2 3 -1 2 4 , 134, 138 8 5 - 8 7 , 9 3 - 9 7 , 100,
139, 1 4 4 -1 4 5 , 148, 161 103, 1 1 7 -1 1 8 , 120, 132,
162, 164, 168, 172, 175, 1 3 5 -1 3 6 , 1 4 2 -1 4 3 , 152,
178, 180, 195, 207, 224, 1 9 5 -1 9 7 , 235, 3 1 4 -3 1 5 ,
234, 236, 258, 273, 284, 320, 3 2 2 -3 2 6 , 3 2 7 -3 2 8 ,
2 9 3 -2 9 4 , 304, 3 0 7 -3 0 8 , 337, 3 4 0 -3 4 1 , 3 5 1 -3 5 2 ,
3 1 3 - 3 1 4 , 317, 3 1 9 -3 2 0 , 368, 371, 373
325, 331, 348, 360, 371, ontologische Differenz (differentiation)
374, 3 8 7 -3 8 9 , 4 0 3 - 4 0 4 41 -4 2
noch nicht 80, 1 7 7 -1 8 2 , ontology 22, 30, 41, 4 9 - 5 3 , 5 6 - 6 4 ,
3 7 0 -3 7 1 , 388, 390. See 67, 6 9 - 7 0 , 7 2 - 7 3 , 7 5 - 8 0 ,
also m etaphysics o f delay 82, 8 5 - 8 8 , 9 1 - 9 3 , 95,
noema (phenom enology) 4 5 - 4 6 , 57 9 8 -1 0 0 , 1 0 2 -1 1 6 , 1 1 8 -1 2 2 ,
N othingness. See Nichts 124, 133, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 , 149,
not yet. See noch nicht 1 5 2 -1 5 3 , 156, 1 5 9 -1 6 0 ,
noumenon (K an t) 45, 303 162, 166, 168, 191, 194,
N S D A P . See N azism ; See N ation al 1 9 6 -1 9 7 , 208, 215, 222,
Socialism 2 3 5 -2 3 6 , 240, 2 4 3 -2 4 5 ,
numen 97, 112 2 4 6 -2 4 7 , 2 4 9 -2 5 0 ,
2 5 2 - 2 5 3 , 2 5 9 -2 6 0 ,
263, 269, 283, 2 9 3 -3 0 5 ,
O 3 0 9 -3 1 0 , 320, 3 2 4 -3 2 7 ,
330, 332, 339, 3 4 1 -3 4 2 ,
object 43, 4 5 - 4 6 , 72, 78, 107,
456
X
3 5 6 -3 5 7 , 360, 365, 373. See 218, 223, 234, 236, 2 3 8

also fundam ental-ontology 239, 247, 2 5 1 -2 5 2 , 284,
onto-ontology. See fundam ental- 309, 314, 321, 335, 338,
ontology 340, 345, 371, 373, 382,
388, 4 1 8 - 4 2 3
o f language. See Sprachphilosophie
P pre-Socratic 5 -6 , 9, 17, 30, 58,
62, 9 3 -9 5 , 9 8 -1 1 2 , 115,
paradise. See G arden o f Eden
119, 1 2 2 -1 2 5 , 135, 142
Parm enides 30, 55, 60, 9 5 -9 6 ,
144, 169, 197, 203, 233,
100, 1 0 3 -1 0 4 , 112, 123,
253, 2 9 4 -2 9 5 , 306, 309,
142, 153, 233, 252, 295,
313, 3 1 9 -3 2 0 , 324, 329,
373, 389, 4 1 9
371, 373, 396
Parmenides (H eidegger) 103
Rom antics 39, 254
Pelasgians 35
Scholasticism 8, 30, 110-113,
Persian (language). See language,' See
115, 117, 119, 145, 244, 249,
also Iran
252, 296-298, 302, 402, 404
Peter the G reat 73
Soviet 19
phenom enology 45, 50, 62, 84,
N on -M arxist philosophers in the
294, 3 0 7 -3 1 0 , 314, 323
U S S R 19
phenom enon 45, 103, 107
Soviet H eidegerrean School 20
philology 59, 159
W estern European 2 1 -2 3 , 2 9 -3 1 ,
philosophy 6 - 9 , 1 5 -1 9 , 2 9 -3 1 ,
3 7 -3 8 , 42, 50, 5 4 -5 6 ,
4 5 - 5 0 , 5 7 - 5 9 , 70, 84,
58, 6 1 -6 3 , 67, 72, 74, 77,
9 4 - 9 6 , 99, 105, 109, 112,
8 4 - 8 5 , 9 1 -1 2 5 , 1 3 0 -1 3 6 ,
1 2 2 -1 2 5 , 136, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 ,
1 3 8 -1 3 9 , 1 4 2 -1 4 5 , 1 4 8
145, 151, 162, 376
149, 155, 1 5 9 -1 6 1 , 162,
G erm an 8, 24, 39, 78, 118,
1 6 4 -1 6 8 , 170, 179, 185,
1 6 4 -1 6 5 , 1 6 8 -1 7 0 , 172,
195, 203, 238, 248, 2 5 1
177, 254, 278, 339 252, 2 5 9 -2 6 0 , 263, 273,
G reek 5, 8, 30, 3 8 - 3 9 , 41, 2 7 5 -2 7 6 , 278, 284, 287,
4 6 - 4 8 , 50, 5 3 - 5 4 , 5 6 -6 1 , 2 9 3 -2 9 4 , 303, 3 0 6 -3 0 7 ,
63, 85, 95, 9 5 - 9 8 , 1 0 1 -1 0 2 , 3 1 9 -3 2 0 , 324, 331, 333,
104, 1 0 6 -1 0 7 , 110, 112, 341, 371, 3 7 3 -3 7 4 , 388,
122, 127, 130, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 , 3 9 5 -3 9 8 , 400, 4 0 2 -4 0 7 ,
1 3 6 -1 3 7 , 1 4 2 -1 4 3 , 145, 412, 416
152, 161, 163, 169, 187, Phrygians 35
192, 194, 198, 203, 212, physics 57, 60, 1 0 0 -1 0 1
457
__V
Physics (A ristotle) 1 0 0 —101 41 3 -4 1 4

physis (nature) 57, 60, 78, 9 8 -1 0 3 , Providence (o f G od) 74
106, 108, 112, 115, 131, P russians 35
138, 143, 145, 249, 2 9 4 psyche 138, 322, 335, 352
295, 3 2 2 -3 2 4 , 329, 333, Pythagoras 101
342, 421
Pico della M irandola, Giovanni 25 2
planetarism. See idiocy, planetary
Plato 5, 8, 9, 16, 30, 58, 84, 95,
Q
question, fundamental.
101, 1 0 3 -1 1 7 , 1 1 9 -1 2 4 ,
See Grundfrage (fundam ental
127, 1 4 2 -1 4 4 , 153, 166,
question)
194, 198, 208, 233, 2 3 5
question, key. See Leitfrage (key
236, 2 3 8 -2 4 0 , 242, 2 4 4
question)
246, 248, 2 5 1 -2 5 3 , 2 6 0
question, transitional.
261, 273, 283, 2 9 5 -2 9 9 ,
See Ubergangsfrage
302, 3 0 6 -3 0 7 , 313, 324
(transitional question)
Platonic Academ y (Florence) 252
Platonism 103, 1 0 4 -1 1 0 , 1 1 2 -1 1 4 ,
117, 119, 122, 143, 153,
208, 235, 238, 296, 298,
R
398. See also Plato rationalism 172, 174, 298, 313
Platonov, A ndrei 121 Rdumlichkeit (spatiality) 326,
Pletho, G em istus 252 3 6 6 -3 6 7 , 381, 407, 41 4
poetry 1 2 5 -1 3 0 , 169, 192, 222, realism 61
231, 234, 239, 256, 286, reality 84, 252, 269, 291,' 301,
316, 343 3 1 6 -3 1 7 , 324, 329, 331,
Polish (language). See language 3 5 6 -3 5 7 , 370
positivism 60, 308, 320, 324 reason 4 5 - 4 6 , 70, 74, 7 8 - 7 9 ,
Postm odernity 2 6 3 -2 6 5 , 2 6 7 -2 6 9 , 8 4 - 8 5 , 107, 1 1 7 -1 2 3 , 137,
277-2 7 8 147, 155, 162, 242, 2 5 3
pragm atism 38, 6 0 -6 1 , 78, 137, 254, 265, 301, 3 0 3 -3 0 5 ,
1 7 2 -1 7 3 , 320, 324, 398, 43 9 307, 356
Pre-Socratic (philosophy). Rede (speech) 3 4 0 -3 4 1 , 3 4 8 -3 4 9 ,
See philosophy (pre-Socratic) 403
Prim ary Chronicle, the 74 Renaissance 2 5 1 - 2 5 2 , 254, 262
production (technical) 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , representation 78, 8 3 - 8 4 , 1 0 4
137, 166, 239, 245, 249, 110, 112, 114, 1 1 9 -1 2 0 ,
2 5 6 - 2 5 7 , 262, 405, 408, 234, 325, 4 0 4
458
V
Republic, The (Plato) 107, 403 261, 300, 305, 324

R esistance (W W II) 26 Science of Logic (H egel) 1 2 1 -1 2 3 ,
res russica 35 305, 324
R eturn, Eternal (N ietzsch e) 257, Scythians 35
413 Seiende, das (beings) 5 -4 0 7 , 1 3 -4 2 1
Revolution (Bolshevik) 35, 203 Seiende-im-Ganzen (beings-as-a-
Ride the Tiger (Evola) 29 whole) 39, 92, 96, 9 9 -1 0 0 ,
right-wing 26 102, 132, 136, 143, 153,
Rilke, R ainer M aria 343 159, 195, 199, 2 2 6 -2 2 7 ,
R om ance (language group). 322, 398, 402, 41 4
See language Seiendheit (essence) 5 4 -6 0 , 6 2 - 6 4 ,
R om anian. See language 67, 7 6 - 7 7 , 79, 8 1 -8 8 ,
R om an s 35 9 9 -1 0 0 , 1 0 8 -1 0 9 , 112, 120,
R u ssia 29, 35, 180, 288 136, 143, 1 5 2 -1 5 4 , 162,
R u ssian (language). See language 1 6 6 -1 6 7 , 195, 233, 235,
236, 251, 253, 295, 308,
309, 3 2 0 -3 2 2 , 326, 329,
S 398, 400, 402, 4 1 4
Sein-Being 1 3 -4 2 1
sacred, the 24, 9 4 - 9 7 , 9 5 - 9 7 , 102, Seinsvergessenheit (oblivion o f Being)
105, 112, 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 152, 6, 38, 7 8 -8 0 , 125, 127, 148,
1 5 4 -1 5 7 , 200, 208, 211, 159, 161, 164, 165, 167,
2 1 9 - 2 2 2 , 225, 2 2 9 -2 3 0 , 234, 248, 258, 273, 293,
237, 256, 262, 274, 317, 295, 333, 374, 398, 404,
338, 406, 408, 413 408, 415
Salom on, E rnst 172 Seimverlassenheit (abandonm ent o f
Sam izdat 20 Being) 91, 114, 120, 138,
Sanskrit. See language 399, 4 0 3 -4 0 4 , 415
Sarm atian s 35 Sein und Zeit (H eidegger) 4, 7, 34,
Sartre, Jean-P aul 23, 27 56, 62, 141, 160, 170, 283,
Schelling, Friedrich 30, 39, 118 2 8 5 -2 8 7 , 292, 294, 3 1 4
Schicksal 68, 404. See also Geschick 315, 320, 322, 3 2 7 -3 2 8 ,
Sch m itt, C arl 23, 26, 171 339, 379
Scholasticism . See philosophy Sein-zum-Tode 2 0 9 -2 1 0 , 215,
(Scholasticism ) 3 6 7 -3 6 9 , 381, 397, 415
Schopenhauer, A rth ur 84, 118, 125 Sem itic 1 1 0 -1 1 1
Schulze-B oysen, H arro 26 Seneca 342
science 16, 36, 57, 69, 145, 159, Septuagint 236
459
___ J
setting (existential). See Stimmung 119, 122, 124, 1 3 7 -1 3 8 ,

Seyn-Being 5 -4 0 7 , 1 3 -4 2 1 162, 166, 169, 172, 204,
Seynsgeschichte 4, 6 7 -8 8 , 91, 209, 245, 2 5 2 -2 5 6 , 2 6 1
102, 118, 1 2 7 -1 4 2 , 145, 262, 264, 269, 276, 291,
1 4 8 -1 5 0 , 157, 1 5 9 -1 7 5 , 2 9 7 -3 0 8 , 316, 3 2 2 -3 2 4 ,
197, 214, 235, 2 4 0 -2 4 1 , 3 2 9 -3 3 0 , 3 3 5 -3 3 6 , 3 5 5
284, 406 356, 374, 381, 3 9 5 -3 9 6 ,
simulacrum 6, 2 6 3 - 2 7 0 4 0 2 -4 03 , 40 7 -4 0 8 , 422
Slavophiles 35 substance 54, 78, 84, 2 3 6 -2 3 7 ,
Socrates 8, 97, 1 0 4 -1 0 5 , 112, 244, 247, 254, 261, 297,
142, 244 322, 420. See also Seiendheit
Som bart, W erner 23 (essence)
Sophia (W isd om o f G o d ) 74 suffering (deinon) 1 3 0 - 1 3 1
Sophocles 1 2 7 - 1 3 2 Superm an (N ietzsch e) 124, 135,
Sorge (care) 3 3 2 -3 3 5 , 338 156, 1 8 0 -1 8 1
Soviet Union, the. See U S S R surprise (existential) 4 0 7 - 4 0 8
Spanish (language). See language
Spann, O th m ar 23, 171
spatiality (existential). T
See Rdumlichkeit
speech (existential). See Rede Tale o f Bygone Years. See Primary
(speech) Chronicle, The
Spengler, O sw ald 23, 26, 171 techne 4 - 5 , 6 - 7 , 2 4 -2 5 , 36,
Spinoza, Baruch 250, 254 38, 113, 120, 1 2 9 -1 3 4 ,
Sprachphilosophie 22, 33, 191, 229, 1 3 6 -1 3 7 , 161, 1 7 1 -1 7 2 ,
3 1 4 -3 1 6 , 3 2 1 -3 2 2 , 3 3 5 1 7 8 -1 7 9 , 195, 224, 236,
339, 3 4 8 -3 6 0 , 3 6 3 -3 7 6 , 241, 245, 251, 257, 261,
379 -3 8 5 273, 276, 284, 396, 399,
Sprung (leap) 6 8 -7 1 , 88, 403. 4 0 3 - 4 0 4 , 409, 414, 421

See leap technocracy 78, 398
Stim m ung (settin g, voice) 3 4 2 — terror (existential). See A ngst
343, 406 terror, sacred. See Ensetzen
Streit (war inside Geviert) 2 0 4 -2 0 5 , Thales 104
2 1 1 - 2 1 2 , 217, 2 2 0 -2 2 1 , theology 16, 58, 84, 1 1 0 -1 1 1 ,
226, 2 2 8 -2 2 9 , 257, 401, 113, 186, 194, 222, 234,
409, 415 2 4 5 -2 4 6 , 2 4 8 - 2 5 1 , 253,
structuralism 160, 400 260, 296, 2 9 8 -2 9 9 , 324,
subject 29, 43, 78, 98, 1 1 3 -1 1 6 , 398, 402, 40 7
460
V
theory o f knowledge 303, 310, 403. 1 4 4 -1 4 5 , 156, 205, 309,

See also epistemology,' See 321, 323, 326, 335, 346,
also gnoseology 372, 383
The Worker (Jiinger) 25 Uranogeom achy 2 0 4 -2 0 5 , 220, 228
thing. See D ing U nited States, the 24, 27, 162,
thing-for-us 45 172, 178, 267, 284. See
thing-in-itself 45, 118 also Am ericanism
T h ird Reich, the 2 4 - 2 8 , 1 4 1 -1 4 2 , U S S R 1 9 -2 1 , 24, 28, 173, 178,
177. See also N azism 284, 287
T h ird W ay (ideology) 2 5 -2 6 , utilitarianism 78, 137, 172, 206,
1 6 8 -1 7 5 , 1 7 7 -1 7 8 , 276. 211, 260, 403
See also F ascism ; See
also N azism
throw nness (existential). V
See Geworfenheit
Van G ogh, Vincent 343
Tocharians 35
Verfallen (decay) 38, 3 4 7 -3 4 8 , 353,
Toynbee, A rnold 35
356, 3 5 8 -3 5 9 , 360, 370,
T rad ition 24
399, 41 6
transcendence 58, 63
Verstehen (understanding) 3 3 7 -3 4 0 ,
transition. See Ubergang
3 5 0 -3 5 1 , 416
T ree o f Know ledge (Bible) 105
Verweigerung (refusal) 78, 80. See
also noch nicht
Verwiistung. See desertification
U vorsetzende Durchsetzung
Ubergangsfrage (transitional question) (prem editated enforcement)
144, 406, 415 1 1 8 -1 2 0 , 134
Ubergang (transition) 37, 78, Vorstellung (notion) 92, 120
1 4 6 -1 4 7 , 396, 4 0 3 -4 0 4 ,
408, 415
Ubermensch. See Superm an W
(N ietzsch e)
Wachter der Wahrheit des Seyns.
unconcealment. See Unverborgenheit See guardian o f Being
understanding (existential).
war (Geviert). See Streit
See Verstehen Was ist das— die Philosophie?
uneigene (inauthentic) 148, 403 (H eidegger) 95
Unterschied (difference) 41 watchman, the (N ietzsche) 125,
Unverborgenheit (unconcealm ent) 156. See also Wachter der
6, 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 108, 109,
461
Wahrheit des Seyns

Weltgegend (world region) 235, 243,
X
259, 264, 397, 400, 407, X enophanes 203, 205
409, 4 17
Wendung (turn) 113, 115, 124,
156, 171, 174, 178, 180, z
234, 251, 2 6 6 -2 6 7 , 276,
Z eit (tim e) 7 2 - 7 3 , 3 7 9 - 3 8 5 , 41 7 ,
284, 288, 367, 399, 41 7
423
We Philologists (N ietzsche) 32, 318
Z en o 342
Wesen (fundam ental-ontological
Zweideutigkeit (am biguity) 348,
essence) 84, 86, 88,
3 5 2 -3 5 3 , 355, 395
1 4 8 -1 5 0 , 192, 210, 237,
2 5 7 -2 5 8 , 295, 3 2 0 -3 2 3 ,
395, 400, 405, 41 7
W est, the. See philosophy (W estern
European)
W esternizers 35
Wille zur Macht. See will to power
will to power (N ietzsche) 7 8 -7 9 ,
8 4 - 8 6 , 1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 1 2 3 -1 2 5 ,
135, 144, 153, 156, 161,
1 8 0 -1 8 1 , 237, 239, 268,
400, 402, 405, 409, 4 1 7
W isdom o f G od. See Sophia
Wolffheim, Fritz 26
wonder (Erstaunen) 95, 100, 102,
108, 112, 155, 412, 419
world regions (Geviert).
See Weltgegend (world region)
W orld W ar I 171
W orld W ar II 7, 142, 174, 203
462
V
ABOUT TH E AUTHOR
A LE X A N D E R D U G IN (b. 1962) is one o f the best-known

writers and political com m entators in post-Soviet Russia.
Born to a well-educated fam ily— his parents held doctorates in
m edicine and law— he entered the M oscow Aviation Institute
in 1979. D uring the 1980s, he was a principal member o f the
underground traditionalist movement in the Soviet Union,
including dissident author Yuri Mamleev. H e later became a
translator and journalist, m aking his earliest foray into politics
by join in g P am iat’, the first nationalist party to emerge during
the twilight years o f the U S S R .
After the collapse o f the U S S R opened up new possibilities, Dugin

began associating with several o f the major figures o f the European
N ew Right, such as Alain de Benoist. Between 1994 and 1998,
he collaborated with Russian opposition movements, including
Eduard Lim onovs N ational Bolsheviks, which sought to synthesize
Left and Right doctrines. In 1998-2003, he served as the advisor to
Gennadiy Seleznyov, the Chairm an o f the State Dum a.
In 2002, D ugin founded the Eurasia Movement, which he

has continued to lead up to the present day. In addition to the
m any books he has authored on political, philosophical, and
spiritual topics, he currently serves on the staff o f the M oscow
State University and regularly appears on m ainstream Russian
television. H e holds doctorates in political science, sociology, and
philosophy. A s an advocate o f the return o f R ussia to the global
stage and its potential as a counterweight to American hegemony,
som e com m entators have pointed out the influence o f Dugin's
geopolitical ideas on V ladim ir Putin and the modern Krem lin.
«
465
___ J
There are few philosophers more influential, more misunderstood,
more admired, and more feared than Martin Heidegger. He is
simply unavoidable for an understanding of modern thought,
modern culture, and the modern world.
As Alexander Dugin explores in Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy

of Another Beginning, Heidegger traces a particular _conception of
Being and truth-·begun with the pre-Socratics and cemented
with Plato and Aristotle-that has, over millennia, led the
West to embrace materialism,· egalitarianism, and nihilism. It i•
Heidegger, argues Dugin, who understood this most deeply; it is
thus Heidegger who opens up space for "Another Beginning" -a
new grounding for human experience.
Drawing on the history of philosophy, political ideologies, and
Heidegger's relationship to Germany and Europe-and including
a useful bibliography and glossary of terms-Dugin's analy sis
will be of great interest to scholars as well as those encountering
Heidegger for the first time.

Dugin, Alexander - Martin Heidegger. The Philosophy of Another Beginning

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RADIX 2014

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N o part o f this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or

Radix / W ashington Sum m it Publishers

e m ail: Info@ W ashSum m it.com

C ataloging-in-Publication D ata is on file with the

Printed in the U nited States o f Am erica

PART 1 — SEYN UND SEIN | 13

PART 2 — DAS GEVIERT | 189

PART 3 — DASEIN | 281

ABOUT TH E AUTHOR | 465

This m ajor study o f the G erm an philosopher M artin H eidegger

D ugin is one o f the w orld’s m ost renowned critics o f the Am erican

1 A lexander D ugin, The Fourth Political Theory (B udapest: A rktos M edia,

It w ould be an oversim plification,’ to reduce this am bitiou s and

D u gin is ju stifie d in linking his study to the overarching

is starkly p essim istic about the direction in which m odernity

D ugin notes that the trium ph o f certain m odernist characteristics

demystifying” (" Weise des Entbergens”) the nature o f existence, by

Techne im itates philosophy “by bringing forth that which was

Like D ugin , H eidegger regarded all m odern ideologies as

2 M artin H eidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays

social tradition alist, w hose em ph asis on rootedness and w hose

D u gin has been sufficiently inspired by H eidegger's work to

H eidegger was in the entire history o f W estern philosophy.

Like D ugin, one discovers in H eidegger, w hom D u gin routinely

This is not the kind o f person we have in m ind when we look at

to transform . Such thoughtful reactionaries frame a critique o f

P A U L E, G O T T F R I E D is Professor Emeritus of Humanities at

Thought and its Authorities

M artin H eidegger is, to the greatest extent, a foundational author.

H eidegger is indispensable for anyone who lives in today’s

It is im possible to think, and, in particular, to think about one's

then realize that one thing in it is from Plato, another— from

A thinking person is always som ew hat o f a philosopher. A

T h e one who u n derstan ds the great thinkers and acquires one

H eidegger: the G reat or the G reatest?

A m o n g great thinkers, two places can be set aside for Heidegger,

A t the very least, H eidegger is the greatest contem porary

H eid egger is universally recognized as a great philosopher

A different, special, exclusive place in the history o f philosophy

thinking, and m ake him our highest authority. In other w ords,

It seems to me that the second approach is more productive for

It is hardly necessary for everyone to becom e a H eideggerean

H eid egger is im portant not only for professional philosophers—

M a rtin H eidegger in the U S S R : A D istan t Shelf in a

Heidegger's legacy in the Russian-speaking context is a profoundly

1 T h is publication uses the Library o f C ongress transliteration for the R ussian

N evertheless, a group o f Sov iet'p h ilo so ph ers, led by the late

W ithout doubtin g the sincerity on the part o f these enthusiasts,

Heidegger as the M ost Western of all Western Philosophers

T h e second issue with H eid eg gers peculiar legacy in the

D ogm atic M arxism and the R u ssian intellectual milieu, rather

In a way, H eidegger represents quintessential W estern thought:

A relaxed, even-paced, and careful reading o f H eidegger, along

H eidegger and the M etalanguage o f a N ew Philosophy

A nd finally, the third point: H eidegger consciously aim s

1. rem oving the influence of W estern E uropean

2. returning to w ords (instead o f term s, categories,

3. developing a new metalanguage for a new philosophy,

G ettin g acquainted with H eidegger, we cannot om it the

Friedrich H ielscher, and others). Finding them selves in