George Kateb's Ahistorical Emersonianism

Author(s): Leo Marx

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Nov., 1990), pp. 595-600
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191545
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 Kateb/ WALTWHITMANAND CULTUREOF DEMOCRACY 595

potentiality,await a new summer of reform, which, however, the solitary

survivorsof yesterday'sengagementsmay be too chastenedto welcome.

-Michael Mosher
Universityof Tulsa

NOTE

1. From "Collect-Origins of AttemptedSecession," in Walt Whitman,CompletePoetry

and Prose (New York:Viking Libraryof America, 1982), 995. All other referencesare to this
edition.

Michael Mosher teaches political theory at the University of Tulsa and is author of
several articles on political theory.

George Kateb's Ahistorical Emersonianism

I REGARD George Kateb's long overdue appearance at the American

Studies Association (ASA) as a significant culturalevent. His recentwork
has earnedhim a reputationas a leading studentof democratictheoryand as
the American political philosopherwhose interestsprobablylie closest to
those of the ASA membership.But before praising him further,I should
explain that I have had the privilege of knowing him and his work, and of
calling him my friend, for more than thirtyyears. We were membersof the
same faculty for eighteen years, and thoughwe continueto disagreeon some
Importantissues, I have learnedso much from him that I must confess to a
conflict of interest.Although I am a "designatedcritic," as it were, of his
essay, and I meanto fulfill thatobligation, I also wantvery muchto persuade
those of you who areunfamiliarwith his otheressays thatcomprisethe larger
projectto which the presentessay belongs to seek them out, in the hope that
you will share my sense of theirfreshness, cogency and provocativepower.
596 POLITICALTHEORY/ NOVEMBER1990

Kateb believes that, taken together,the writings of the Emersonians-

Emerson,Thoreau,andWhitman-embody the richest,most profoundcon-
ception of democraticindividualityever formulated.'His premise is that
representative,rights-baseddemocracy,at least in the formdeveloped in the
United States, accords primacy to the individual. Or, put differently, he
claims that to speak of individualityis to speak of the centralpolitical and
moralcommitmententailed by the Americanversion of democracy.Of all
those who have writtenaboutthe individualin a democracy,Katebargues,
it was the Emersonianswho carriedthe individualistdoctrineto its "idealist
perfection."Whatthey broughtto democratictheory,above all, was the idea
of a distinctive kind of person, with a distinctive moralviewpoint, whose
emergencehas been encouragedandrewardedby the politicalinstitutionsof
democracy.2As we just heard,the hero of "Song of Myself" is an exemplar
of thatradicallyegalitarianself.
Now, admittedly,thereareseveralthings aboutKateb'sargumentthatare
boundto strikescholarsworkingin Americanstudiesin 1989 as "strange"-
to use a word he himself often uses to characterizeWhitman'sviewpoint.To
beginwith, thevery notionof a professionalpoliticalphilosopher,a professor
affiliated with the academic discipline known these days as "political sci-
ence"- the very notionof such a scholartakingseriouslythe politicsinherent
in the writings of the Emersoniansis strange. Most scholars in American
studies,I would guess, thinkof the workof these writersas too unsystematic,
too inexact,too "subjective,"or, Ina word, too literaryfor thatpurpose.How
can a poem that shouts its barbaricyawp over the rooftopsyield a rational
argumentabout democracy9To treat this elusive, impassioned,resolutely
indirect,often surrealpoem of Whitman'sas the embodimentof a coherent
political theory is especially strange.In his contemptfor establishedbound-
aries between academicdomains,it shouldbe said, Kateb'sprojectparallels
the effortof dissidentphilosopherslike Stanley Cavell andRichardRortyto
liberatecontemporaryAmericanphilosophy from what they regardas the
sterile, often merely technical preoccupationsof academic philosophers
nowadays. (In Cavell's case, moreover, that effort also has entailed the
rehabilitationof Emerson'sandThoreau'sreputationsas originalthinkers-
as true philosophers.)This disrespectfor restrictivedisciplinarydefinitions
of kinds of thinkingis one aspect of Kateb's projectthat should not seem
strangebut, in fact, wholly congenial to this audience.
But the strangestaspectof Kateb'sargumentis thatit flies directlyin the
face of so many currentlyreceived ideas. At a time when the concept of
individualismis widely regardedas an ideological constructiondesigned to
justify the power and the privileges of white males affiliated with the
 Kateb/ WALTWHITMANAND CULTUREOF DEMOCRACY 597

dominant, propertiedclass, Kateb insists on its democratic centralityand

integrity.The Emersoniansense of self, with its principledrejectionof all
conventions,hierarchies,andfixed social roles, is quintessentiallyAmerican.
Here, too, Kateb's unabashedaffirmationof Americanexceptionalismcuts
across the grain of contemporarythinking in American studies. Indeed, to
say it again, he regardsthe Emersoniansas having posited a new sense of
self-and a new view of the self's way of being in the world- as the great
unmatchedinnovation of the culture of political democracy in the United
States.
What responses to this criticism from the left are to be found in Kateb's
work?What answerdoes he have, first,to the stock critiqueof Individualism
as an antisocial justification of selfishness-of allowed greed and social
narcissism? To this charge he would insist, I expect, on the difference
between mere individualism-which is to say, a politically or institutionally
unqualifiedindividualism- andthe doctrne of democraticindividualitythat
he is defending.The existence of democraticinstitutions,he insists, radically
transformsthe moral significance of individualism. He contends that the
Emersoniansinvariablytake for grantedthe democraticpolitical context in
which they locate Americanindividuality.He does not deny thata degreeof
alienation is a predictableconsequence of such an atomized or privatized
way of life. Unlike the received left-radical and left-liberal notion that
alienationis a malaise peculiarto bourgeoissociety -a malaise thatcalls for
some sortof communitarianalternative- Katebconsidersa moderatedegree
of alienation,andsome degreeof disorder,often seeming to verge on anarchy,
as unavoidable,perhapseven desirable,concomitantsof modernityin gen-
eral, and of a truly democratic rights-basedpolity-one that honors the
doctrineof democraticindividuality- in particular.
But what would he say to those among us who regardthe very structure
of our society as inimical to individualism?I am thinkingof all the Amer-
icanists who would answer Kateb by saying that the experence of most
Americans,its essential characterand quality,is not chiefly, or even signifi-
cantly, determined by our society's supposed commitment to democratic
individuality.Whatreallyshapesthe lives of most people in the UnitedStates
is their socioeconomic and culturalstatus:their inclusion in groups defined
by class, gender, race, or ethnicity.On this crucialpoint, I believe thatKateb
would concede thatwe are far from having actuallyrealized the Emersonlan
doctrine of democratic Individualityin the United States. But the ideal is
deeply implantedin the consciousness of Americans,and in our political-
especially juridical and electoral--institutions, and though it has been only
partially,imperfectly,intermittentlyrealized,it nonethelessremainsa signif-
598 POLITICALTHEORY/ NOVEMBER1990

Icantforce in Americanlife. It is the basis for manyof the nationaltraitsthat

foreignobserverscontinueto regardas distinctive.
Let me concludeby notingtwo aspectsof his subjectthatKatebseems to
neglect.The firsthas to do with thevital religiousdimensionof the American
doctrineof individuality.I do notbelieve thatwe can appreciatethe intensity,
the universalisticimport,or the millennial,even messianicovertonesof that
doctnne without recognizing its backgroundIn Protestanttheology, and
especially in New England Calvinism. To name only the more obvious
affinitiesbetweenthe Protestantandthepoliticalconceptsof the self, I would
call attention,first, to the secularizedvariantsof the conversion experience
describedby each of the Emersoniansas a necessarystage in the emergence
of theirnew, democraticselves3;second,the distinctionbetweentheoutward
self, or personality,and the trueinnerself, or soul; and third,the grounding
of this egalitariandoctrineInthe conceptof the soul as universal,ahistorical,
and context-free- an entity,like the potentialCalvinistreceptacleof divine
and supernaturalgrace, defined only by its nonindividuatedpotential for
self-realization.The distinctly religious aura that surroundsthe American
ideal of individualismmakesme skepticalaboutKateb'seffortto distinguish
betweenWhitman's"religious"and"secular"concepts of the soul. As far as
I know, Whitmannever explicitly made such a distinction,and it therefore
sounds like an attemptto make Whitman'svision more congenial to our
secularage. In any case, I believe it is the specifically Protestantcontentof
Emersoniandoctrine that explains the difference, say, between his and
Tocqueville'smore or less contemporaryaccountsof Americanindividual-
ism; the same religious componentmay help to account for the difference
between the U.S. Constitution,which grantsthe status of a "higher,"more
nearly absolute law to individualrights,and, say, the British parliamentary
system of democracy,which does not.
The second aspect of the subject that Kateb neglects is the relation
between the theory of Americanindividualityand capitalism.I believe he,
like Emerson,is much too sanguineabouttheir long-termcompatibility.In
the periodwhen Emersonwas naivelyidentifyingthe laws of the marketwith
the laws of nature,Americancapitalismwas still at what now seems a benign
stage of development.It thenwas chiefly a mercantilesystem of family-sized
firms, and relatively easy for a democraticpolity to dominateor control-
even if the Jacksoniansdid not think so. That form of capitalist enterprise
was a far cry from the industrial,monopolistic, financial, corporate,and
multinationalforms whose powerwe since have come to know and respect.
If the tendencyto concentratewealthandpowerin a small minoritycontinues
 Kateb/ WALTWHITMANAND CULTUREOF DEMOCRACY 599

at its presentpace, if the gap between rich and poor continuesto widen, it is
hardto believe thatdemocracywill survive in the long run.Of course, Kateb
can say, with some justice, thatthe theoryof democraticindividualitycannot
be expected to providebluepnntsfor coping with every economic andsocial
problem.It cannotbe expected to deal with the potentialthreatto democracy
inherentin the furtherinstitutional,strictly socioeconomic, developmentof
corporatecapitalism.I am not sure what I think about that, and I will leave
the issue open for now.
But the developing culture, the ideology or subjectivity,as it were, of
Americancapitalismis anothermatter.It is more closely bound up with the
ideal of democraticindividuality,and Kateb is obliged, I think,to take it into
account. Like the economic system, the cultureof capitalismhas undergone
a transformationin recentyears- one thatmakes it far less reconcilablewith
democratic individualitythan it was in Emerson's time. One conspicuous
innovationof the Reagan years was to equip American capitalismwith an
aggressive, updated,popularmoral code, a straightforwardethos of acquis-
itive individualismrooted in the old ideology of laissez-faire.This code is
not merely Irreconcilablewith the ideal of democraticrule but is its explicit,
active enemy. It holds thatthe best social policies arearrivedat by lettingthe
market,not the electorate,decide. This is tantamountto accordingpolitical
power to the impersonalflow of capital. There is no way to reconcile this
code with Whitman'sideal of a generous, courageousindividualitycapable
of overcoming narrowself-regard. Does the hospitality of the American
people to this ethos not point to a weakness in the Emersonianideal of
Individuality9Here, again, Katebmay reply by saying that he is describing
an ideal, not a social actuality.Yet the fact remains that the power of his
argumentdepends on the Imperfect,partial, intermittentrealizationof the
Idealby Americans.Underthe circumstances,I do not see how he can Ignore
the erosion of our democratic culture effected by the possessive form of
individualism.
But perhapsthis is unfair.To say it yet again, Kateb'smain purposeis to
reveal the subtlety and profundity of the American ideal of democratic
individuality.I firmly believe that he is accomplishingthatpurpose.And if
that ideal proves to be unrealizable, it nonetheless can serve, like other
utopias, to bolster conviction and to educate desire.

-Leo Marx
MassachusettsInstituteof
Technology
600 POLITICALTHEORY/ NOVEMBER1990

NOTES

1. HereI am drawingon his otherwork,especially"DemocraticIndividualityandthe Claims

of Politics," Political Theory2 (August 1984): 331-60, and Hannah Arendt:Politics, Con-
science, Evil (Totowa,NJ: Rowman& Allanheld, 1984), especially 178-83.
2. Chief among those institutionsare electoral politics, a state whose power is confined
within strict constitutionallimits, and the rule of law grounded in the inalienable rights of
individuals.
3. I am thinking of the famous "transparenteyeball" passage in Emerson'sNature; the
episode in the chapteron "Solitude"in which Thoreaurecoversfromhis only boutof loneliness
while at Walden;and Whitman'saccount of the emergence of his poetic powers in sec. 5 of
"Song of Myself."

Leo Marx teaches at the MassachussettsInstituteof Technology.His most recent book

Is The Pilot and the Passenger:Essays on Literature,Technologyand Culture(1988).