Analogy (from Greek analogia, "proportion", from ana- "upon, according to" [also

"against", "anew"] + logos "ratio" [also "word, speech, reckoning"][1][2]) is a

cognitive process of transferring information or meaning from a particular subject
(the analog, or source) to another (the target), or a linguistic expression
corresponding to such a process. In a narrower sense, analogy is an inference or an
argument from one particular to another particular, as opposed to deduction,
induction, and abduction, in which at least one of the premises, or the conclusion,
is general rather than particular in nature. The term analogy can also refer to the
relation between the source and the target themselves, which is often (though not
always) a similarity, as in the biological notion of analogy.

Rutherford's model of the atom (modified by Niels Bohr) made an analogy between the
atom and the solar system.
Analogy plays a significant role in problem solving, as well as decision making,
argumentation, perception, generalization, memory, creativity, invention,
prediction, emotion, explanation, conceptualization and communication. It lies
behind basic tasks such as the identification of places, objects and people, for
example, in face perception and facial recognition systems. It has been argued that
analogy is "the core of cognition".[3] Specific analogical language comprises
exemplification, comparisons, metaphors, similes, allegories, and parables, but not
metonymy. Phrases like and so on, and the like, as if, and the very word like also
rely on an analogical understanding by the receiver of a message including them.
Analogy is important not only in ordinary language and common sense (where proverbs
and idioms give many examples of its application) but also in science, philosophy,
law and the humanities. The concepts of association, comparison, correspondence,
mathematical and morphological homology, homomorphism, iconicity, isomorphism,
metaphor, resemblance, and similarity are closely related to analogy. In cognitive
linguistics, the notion of conceptual metaphor may be equivalent to that of
analogy. Analogy is also a basis for any comparative arguments as well as
experiments whose results are transmitted to objects that have been not under
examination (e.g., experiments on rats when results are applied to humans).

Analogy has been studied and discussed since classical antiquity by philosophers,
scientists, theologists and lawyers. The last few decades have shown a renewed
interest in analogy, most notably in cognitive science.

Contents
1 Usage of the terms "source" and "target"
2 Models and theories
2.1 Identity of relation
2.2 Shared abstraction
2.3 Special case of induction
2.4 Shared structure
2.5 Analogy and complexity
3 Psychology of analogy
3.1 Structure mapping theory
3.1.1 Structural alignment
3.1.2 Analogical inference
3.1.3 Evaluation
3.2 Factors related to analogical reasoning
3.2.1 Language
3.2.2 Transparency
3.2.3 Processing capacities
3.3 The development of analogical ability
4 Applications and types
4.1 Logic
4.2 Linguistics
4.3 In science
4.3.1 Mathematics
4.3.2 Artificial intelligence
4.3.3 Anatomy
4.3.4 Engineering
4.3.5 Cybernetics
4.3.6 History
4.4 In normative matters
4.4.1 Morality
4.4.2 Law
4.4.2.1 Analogies in statutory law
4.4.2.2 Analogies in precedential law (case law)
4.4.2.3 Restrictions on the use of analogy in law
4.5 In teaching strategies
4.6 Religion
4.6.1 Catholic
4.7 Everyday life
4.8 Hybrid analogies operating between disciplines
5 See also
6 Notes
7 References
8 External links
Usage of the terms "source" and "target"
With respect to the terms source and target there are two distinct traditions of
usage:

The logical and cultures and economics tradition speaks of an arrow, homomorphism,
mapping, or morphism from what is typically the more complex domain or source to
what is typically the less complex codomain or target, using all of these words in
the sense of mathematical category theory.
The tradition in cognitive psychology, in literary theory, and in specializations
within philosophy outside of logic, speaks of a mapping from what is typically the
more familiar area of experience, the source, to what is typically the more
problematic area of experience, the target.
Models and theories
Identity of relation
In ancient Greek the word αναλογια (analogia) originally meant proportionality, in
the mathematical sense, and it was indeed sometimes translated to Latin as
proportio.[citation needed] From there analogy was understood as identity of
relation between any two ordered pairs, whether of mathematical nature or not.
Kant's Critique of Judgment held to this notion. Kant argued that there can be
exactly the same relation between two completely different objects. The same notion
of analogy was used in the US-based SAT tests, that included "analogy questions" in
the form "A is to B as C is to what?" For example, "Hand is to palm as foot is to
____?" These questions were usually given in the Aristotelian format: HAND : PALM :
: FOOT : ____ While most competent English speakers will immediately give the right
answer to the analogy question (sole), it is more difficult to identify and
describe the exact relation that holds both between pairs such as hand and palm,
and between foot and sole. This relation is not apparent in some lexical
definitions of palm and sole, where the former is defined as the inner surface of
the hand, and the latter as the underside of the foot. Analogy and abstraction are
different cognitive processes, and analogy is often an easier one. This analogy is
not comparing all the properties between a hand and a foot, but rather comparing
the relationship between a hand and its palm to a foot and its sole.[4] While a
hand and a foot have many dissimilarities, the analogy focuses on their similarity
in having an inner surface. A computer algorithm has achieved human-level
performance on multiple-choice analogy questions from the SAT test. The algorithm
measures the similarity of relations between pairs of words (e.g., the similarity
between the pairs HAND:PALM and FOOT:SOLE) by statistical analysis of a large
collection of text. It answers SAT questions by selecting the choice with the
highest relational similarity.[5]

Shared abstraction

In several cultures,[which?] the Sun is the source of an analogy to God.

Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle used a wider notion of analogy. They
saw analogy as a shared abstraction.[6] Analogous objects did not share necessarily
a relation, but also an idea, a pattern, a regularity, an attribute, an effect or a
philosophy. These authors also accepted that comparisons, metaphors and "images"
(allegories) could be used as arguments, and sometimes they called them analogies.
Analogies should also make those abstractions easier to understand and give
confidence to the ones using them.

The Middle Ages saw an increased use and theorization of analogy. Roman lawyers had
already used analogical reasoning and the Greek word analogia. Medieval lawyers
distinguished analogia legis and analogia iuris (see below). In Islamic logic,
analogical reasoning was used for the process of qiyas in Islamic sharia law and
fiqh jurisprudence. In Christian theology, analogical arguments were accepted in
order to explain the attributes of God. Aquinas made a distinction between
equivocal, univocal and analogical terms, the last being those like healthy that
have different but related meanings. Not only a person can be "healthy", but also
the food that is good for health (see the contemporary distinction between polysemy
and homonymy). Thomas Cajetan wrote an influential treatise on analogy. In all of
these cases, the wide Platonic and Aristotelian notion of analogy was preserved.
James Francis Ross in Portraying Analogy (1982), the first substantive examination
of the topic since Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia, demonstrated that analogy is a
systematic and universal feature of natural languages, with identifiable and law-
like characteristics which explain how the meanings of words in a sentence are
interdependent.

Special case of induction

On the contrary, Ibn Taymiyya,[7][8][9] Francis Bacon and later John Stuart Mill
argued that analogy is simply a special case of induction.[6] In their view analogy
is an inductive inference from common known attributes to another probable common
attribute, which is known only about the source of the analogy, in the following
form:

Premises
a is C, D, E, F, G
b is C, D, E, F
Conclusion
b is probably G.
This view does not accept analogy as an autonomous mode of thought or inference,
reducing it to induction. However, autonomous analogical arguments are still useful
in science, philosophy and the humanities (see below), which makes this reduction
philosophically uninteresting. Moreover, induction tries to achieve general
conclusions, while analogy looks for particular ones.

Shared structure

According to Shelley (2003), the study of the coelacanth drew heavily on analogies
from other fish.
Contemporary cognitive scientists use a wide notion of analogy, extensionally close
to that of Plato and Aristotle, but framed by Gentner's (1983) structure mapping
theory.[10] The same idea of mapping between source and target is used by
conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending theorists. Structure mapping theory
concerns both psychology and computer science. According to this view, analogy
depends on the mapping or alignment of the elements of source and target. The
mapping takes place not only between objects, but also between relations of objects
and between relations of relations. The whole mapping yields the assignment of a
predicate or a relation to the target. Structure mapping theory has been applied
and has found considerable confirmation in psychology. It has had reasonable
success in computer science and artificial intelligence (see below). Some studies
extended the approach to specific subjects, such as metaphor and similarity.[11]

Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1997) developed their multiconstraint theory within
structure mapping theory. They defend that the "coherence" of an analogy depends on
structural consistency, semantic similarity and purpose. Structural consistency is
maximal when the analogy is an isomorphism, although lower levels are admitted.
Similarity demands that the mapping connects similar elements and relations of
source and target, at any level of abstraction. It is maximal when there are
identical relations and when connected elements have many identical attributes. An
analogy achieves its purpose insofar as it helps solve the problem at hand. The
multiconstraint theory faces some difficulties when there are multiple sources, but
these can be overcome.[6] Hummel and Holyoak (2005) recast the multiconstraint
theory within a neural network architecture. A problem for the multiconstraint
theory arises from its concept of similarity, which, in this respect, is not
obviously different from analogy itself. Computer applications demand that there
are some identical attributes or relations at some level of abstraction. The model
was extended (Doumas, Hummel, and Sandhofer, 2008) to learn relations from
unstructured examples (providing the only current account of how symbolic
representations can be learned from examples).[12]

Mark Keane and Brayshaw (1988) developed their Incremental Analogy Machine (IAM) to
include working memory constraints as well as structural, semantic and pragmatic
constraints, so that a subset of the base analog is selected and mapping from base
to target occurs in a serial manner.[13][14] Empirical evidence shows that human
analogical mapping performance is influenced by information presentation order.[15]

Eqaan Doug and his team[16] challenged the shared structure theory and mostly its
applications in computer science. They argue that there is no line between
perception, including high-level perception, and analogical thought. In fact,
analogy occurs not only after, but also before and at the same time as high-level
perception. In high-level perception, humans make representations by selecting
relevant information from low-level stimuli. Perception is necessary for analogy,
but analogy is also necessary for high-level perception. Chalmers et al. conclude
that analogy actually is high-level perception. Forbus et al. (1998) claim that
this is only a metaphor.[17] It has been argued (Morrison and Dietrich 1995) that
Hofstadter's and Gentner's groups do not defend opposite views, but are instead
dealing with different aspects of analogy.[18]

Analogy and complexity

Antoine Cornuéjols[19] has presented analogy as a principle of economy and
computational complexity.

Reasoning by analogy is a process of, from a given pair (x,f(x)), extrapolating the
function f. In the standard modeling, analogical reasoning involves two "objects":
the source and the target. The target is supposed to be incomplete and in need for
a complete description using the source. The target has an existing part St and a
missing part Rt. We assume that we can isolate a situation of the source Ss, which
corresponds to a situation of target St, and the result of the source Rs, which
correspond to the result of the target Rt. With Bs, the relation between Ss and Rs,
we want Bt, the relation between St and Rt.

If the source and target are completely known:

Using Kolmogorov complexity K(x), defined as the size of the smallest description
of x and Solomonoff's approach to induction, Rissanen (89),[20] Wallace & Boulton
(68)[21] proposed the principle of minimum description length. This principle leads
to minimize the complexity K(target | Source) of producing the target, given the
source.

This is unattractive in Artificial Intelligence, as it requires a computation over

abstract Turing machines. Suppose that Ms and Mt are local theories of the source
and the target, available to the observer. The best analogy between a source case
and a target case is the analogy that minimizes:

K(Ms) + K(Ss|Ms) + K(Bs|Ms) + K(Mt|Ms) + K(St|Mt) + K(Bt|Mt) (1).

If the target is completely unknown:

All models and descriptions Ms, Mt, Bs, Ss, and St leading to the minimization of:

K(Ms) + K(Ss|Ms) + K(Bs|Ms) + K(Mt|Ms) + K(St|Mt) (2)

are also those who allow to obtain the relationship Bt, and thus the most
satisfactory Rt for expression (1).

The analogical hypothesis, which solves an analogy between a source case and a
target case, has two parts:

Analogy, like induction, is a principle of economy. The best analogy between two
cases is the one which minimizes the amount of information necessary for the
derivation of the source from the target (1). Its most fundamental measure is the
computational complexity theory.
When solving or completing a target case with a source case, the parameters which
minimize (2) are postulated to minimize (1), and thus, produce the best response.
However, a cognitive agent may simply reduce the amount of information necessary
for the interpretation of the source and the target, without taking into account
the cost of data replication. So, it may prefer to the minimization of (2) the
minimization of the following simplified expression:

K(Ms) + K(Bs|Ms) + K(Mt|Ms)

Psychology of analogy
Structure mapping theory
Structure mapping, originally proposed by Dedre Gentner, is a theory in psychology
that describes the psychological processes involved in reasoning through and
learning from analogies.[22] More specifically, this theory aims to describe how
familiar knowledge, or knowledge about a base domain, can be used to inform an
individual's understanding of a less familiar idea, or a target domain.[23]
According to this theory, individuals view their knowledge of domains as
interconnected structures.[24] In other words, a domain is viewed as consisting of
objects, the object's properties, and the relationships that characterize how
objects and their properties interact.[25] The process of analogy then involves
recognizing similar structures between the two domains, inferring further
similarity in structure by mapping additional relationships of a base domain to the
target domain, and then checking those inferences against existing knowledge of the
target domain.[23][25] In general, it has been found that people prefer analogies
where the two systems have a deep degree of correspondence (e.g. relationships
across the domains correspond as opposed to just the objects across domains
corresponding) when attempting to draw inferences between the systems. This is also
known as the systematicity principle.[24]

An example that has been used to illustrate structure mapping theory comes from
Gentner and Gentner (1983) and uses the domains of flowing water and electricity.
[26] In a system of flowing water, the water is carried through pipes and the rate
of water flow is determined by the pressure of the system. This relationship is
analogous to that of electricity flowing through an electrical circuit. In a
circuit, the electricity is carried through wires and the current, or rate of flow
of electricity, is determined by the voltage, or electrical pressure. Given the
similarity in structure, or structural alignment, between these domains, structure
mapping theory would predict that relationships from one of these domains would be
inferred in the other via analogy.[25]

Structural alignment
Structural alignment is one process involved in the larger structure mapping
theory.[24] When establishing structural alignment between two domains that are
being compared, an individual is attempting to identify as many commonalities
between the systems as possible while maintaining a one-to-one correspondence
between elements (i.e., objects, properties, and relationships).[24] In the flowing
water and electricity analogy, a one-to-one correspondence is illustrated by water
pipes mapping on to wires but not corresponding with any other elements in the
circuit. Furthemore, structural alignment is also characterized by parallel
connectivity, or the idea that if a one-to-one correspondence is generated between
relationships across two systems (e.g., the rate of water flow through a pipe
increases with pressure similarly to how the current in an electrical circuit
increases with voltage), then the relevant objects and properties must also
correspond (e.g. the rate of flow of water corresponds to electrical current and
water pressure corresponds to voltage).[26]

Analogical inference
Analogical inference is a second process involved in the theory of structure
mapping and happens after structural alignment has been established between two
domains being compared.[25] During this process an individual draws inferences
about the target domain by projecting information from the base domain to said
target domain.[23] The following example can be used to illustrate this process,
[26] where 1 represents information about a base domain, 2 represents
correspondences between the base and target domain, and 3 represents an inference
about the target domain:

In plumbing systems, narrow pipes lead to a decrease in rate of flow of water

Narrow pipes correspond to resistors in an electrical circuit and water corresponds
to electricity.
In an electrical circuit, resistors lead to a decrease in the rate of flow of
electricity
Evaluation
Evaluation is a third process involved in the theory of structure mapping and
happens after structures have been aligned and inferences about the target domain
have been proposed. During evaluation, an individual is judging whether the analogy
is relevant and plausible.[25] This process has been described as solving the
selection problem in analogy,[27] or explaining how individuals choose which
inferences to map from the base to target domain as analogies would be fruitless if
all possible inferences were made. When evaluating an analogy, individuals
typically judge it on several factors:

Factual Correctness. When evaluating an inference in terms of correctness, an

individual compares the inference to their existing knowledge to determine whether
the inference is true or false.[23] In the case once cannot determine the
correctness, then the one may consider the adaptability of the inference, or how
easily the knowledge is modified when translating it from the base to target
domain.[25]
Goal Relevance. When evaluating an analogy, it is important that the inferences
provide insight that is relevant to the situation at hand. For example, when
attempting to solve a problem, does the inference provide insight that moves one
towards a solution[23] or generate new, potentially helpful knowledge?[27]
Factors related to analogical reasoning
Language
Language can support analogical reasoning when relational labels are provided to
compensate for low transparency.[28] For example, children struggle when they are
asked to identify the relational structure between sets of boxes (e.g., Set 1: a
small, medium, and large box. Set 2: a medium, large, and extra large box).
Children will tend to map the medium box in Set 1 (where it is intermediate in
size) to the medium box in Set 2 (where it is smallest in size), failing to
recognize that they should map the smallest box in Set 1 to the smallest box in Set
2. Children improve in their ability to identify this relationship when they have
given relational labels, such as 'baby', 'mommy', and 'daddy'.[29]

It is also important to note that, while language may support analogical reasoning,
it may not be necessary. Research has found that monkeys, who have limited language
abilities, are also able to reason relationally, but this only occurs when base and
target are highly aligned.[30]

Transparency
Analogical reasoning is impacted by how similar the objects being mapped to each
other are. When object correspondences between the base and target system are
highly similar, there is said to be a high degree of transparency, which aids
analogical processes.[25] High transparency is helpful when using analogy to
support problem-solving.[23] For example, if a student is asked to calculate how
many golf balls each golfer will need at a tournament, they will then be able to
apply this solution to future problems when the objects are highly similar (e.g.
reasoning about how many tennis balls each player will need).[23]

Processing capacities
In order to engage in analogical processes, an individual needs time to work
through the processes of alignment, inference, and evaluation. If not given
adequate time to engage in analogical reasoning, then one is more likely to fixate
on lower level object correspondences between the two systems, as opposed
identifying potentially more informative higher-order relationships that are
analogous.[25] Similar effects also occur if one's working memory is under a high
cognitive load at the time (e.g., the person is trying to reason through an analogy
while also keeping a word in the mind).[25]

The development of analogical ability

Research has also found that children are capable of using comparisons in order to
learn abstract patterns, but this sometimes requires prompting from another.[29] To
provide support for this claim, researchers taught 3- and 4-year-olds a simple
relationship by showing them a series of pictures. Each picture had 3 of the same
animal and was labeled as a “toma” for the child. Some of these children were
prompted to compare the different ‘tomas’ while others were not. After seeing the
pictures and some having been prompted to compare, the children were tested on
whether or not they had learned the abstract pattern (i.e., a ‘toma’ is a triad of
matching animals). Children were shown two images and asked “Which is the ‘toma’?”.
The first was a relational match and displayed a triad of matching animals they had
not seen before, while the second image was an object match and displayed a triad
of non-matching animals that the child had seen while learning about the
relationship. The children who had been prompted to compare the tomas while
learning were more likely to have learned the pattern and choose the relational
match when being tested.[28]

Children do not always need prompting to make comparisons in order to learn

abstract relationships. Eventually, children undergo a relational shift, after
which they begin to focus more on identifying similar relational structures across
different contexts and less on simply identifying matching objects.[29] This shift
is critical in cognitive development as continuing to focus attention on specific
objects would hinder children's ability to learn abstract patterns and engage in
analogical reasoning.[29] Interestingly, some researchers have proposed that the
relational shift does not seem to be driven by maturation in children's underlying
cognitive abilities (i.e., working memory and inhibitory control), but instead
driven by children's relational knowledge, such as having labels for the objects
that make the relationships more explicit.[29] Although, there is not ample
evidence to determine whether the relational shift is actually driven by
maturation in cognitive abilities or increases in relational knowledge.[25]

Additionally, research has identified several factors that may increase the
likelihood that a child may spontaneously engage in comparison and learn an
abstract relationship, without the need for promoting.[28] Comparison is more
likely when the objects to be compared have spatiotemporal proximity,[28] are
highly similar (although not so similar that they are matching objects, which
interfere with identifying relationships),[25] or share common labels.[29]

Applications and types

Logic
Logicians analyze how analogical reasoning is used in arguments from analogy.

An analogy can be stated using is to and as when representing the analogous

relationship between two pairs of expressions, for example, "Smile is to mouth, as
wink is to eye." In the field of mathematics and logic, this can be formalized with
colon notation to represent the relationships, using single colon for ratio, and
double colon for equality.[31]

In the field of testing, the colon notation of ratios and equality is often
borrowed, so that the example above might be rendered, "Smile : mouth :: wink :
eye" and pronounced the same way.[31][32]

Linguistics
An analogy can be the linguistic process that reduces word forms perceived as
irregular by remaking them in the shape of more common forms that are governed by
rules. For example, the English verb help once had the preterite holp and the past
participle holpen. These obsolete forms have been discarded and replaced by helped
by the power of analogy (or by widened application of the productive Verb-ed rule.)
This is called leveling. However, irregular forms can sometimes be created by
analogy; one example is the American English past tense form of dive: dove, formed
on analogy with words such as drive: drove.
Neologisms can also be formed by analogy with existing words. A good example is
software, formed by analogy with hardware; other analogous neologisms such as
firmware and vaporware have followed. Another example is the humorous[33] term
underwhelm, formed by analogy with overwhelm.
Analogy is often presented as an alternative mechanism to generative rules for
explaining productive formation of structures such as words. Others argue that in
fact they are the same mechanism, that rules are analogies that have become
entrenched as standard parts of the linguistic system, whereas clearer cases of
analogy have simply not (yet) done so (e.g. Langacker 1987.445–447). This view has
obvious resonances with the current views of analogy in cognitive science which are
discussed above.
Analogy is also a term used in the Neogrammarian school of thought as a catch-all
to describe any morphological change in a language that cannot be explained by
sound change or borrowing.

In science
Analogies are above all used as a means of conceiving new ideas and hypotheses,
which is called a heuristic function of analogical reasoning.
Analogical arguments can play also probative function, serving then as a means of
proving the rightness of particular theses and theories. This application of
analogical reasoning in science is, however, debatable. Probative value of analogy
is of importance especially to those kinds of science in which logical or empirical
proof is not possible such as theology, philosophy or cosmology in part where it
relates to those areas of the cosmos (the universe) that are beyond any empirical
observation and knowledge about them stems from the human insight and extrasensory
cognition.
Analogy may be used in order to illustrate and teach (in order to enlighten pupils
on the relations that happens between or inside certain things or phenomena, a
teacher may refer to other things or phenomena that pupils are more familiar with).
Analogy may help in creating or elucidating one theory (theoretical model) via the
workings of another theory (theoretical model). Thus it can be used in theoretical
and applied sciences in the form of models or simulations which can be considered
as strong analogies. Other much weaker analogies assist in understanding and
describing functional behaviours of similar systems. For instance, an analogy
commonly used in electronics textbooks compares electrical circuits to hydraulics.
[34] Another example is the analog ear based on electrical, electronic or
mechanical devices.
Mathematics
Some types of analogies can have a precise mathematical formulation through the
concept of isomorphism. In detail, this means that given two mathematical
structures of the same type, an analogy between them can be thought of as a
bijection between them which preserves some or all of the relevant structure. For
example, {\displaystyle \mathbb {R} ^{2}}\mathbb {R} ^{2} and {\displaystyle \
mathbb {C} } \mathbb{C} are isomorphic as vector spaces, but the complex numbers,
{\displaystyle \mathbb {C} } \mathbb{C} , have more structure than {\displaystyle \
mathbb {R} ^{2}}\mathbb {R} ^{2} does: {\displaystyle \mathbb {C} } \mathbb{C} is
a field as well as a vector space.

Category theory takes the idea of mathematical analogy much further with the
concept of functors. Given two categories C and D, a functor f from C to D can be
thought of as an analogy between C and D, because f has to map objects of C to
objects of D and arrows of C to arrows of D in such a way that the compositional
structure of the two categories is preserved. This is similar to the structure
mapping theory of analogy of Dedre Gentner, in that it formalizes the idea of
analogy as a function which satisfies certain conditions.

Artificial intelligence
Steven Phillips and William H. Wilson[35][36] use category theory to mathematically
demonstrate how the analogical reasoning in the human mind, that is free of the
spurious inferences that plague conventional artificial intelligence models,
(called systematicity), could arise naturally from the use of relationships between
the internal arrows that keep the internal structures of the categories rather than
the mere relationships between the objects (called "representational states").
Thus, the mind may use analogies between domains whose internal structures fit
according with a natural transformation and reject those that do not.

See also case-based reasoning.

Anatomy
See also: Analogy (biology)
In anatomy, two anatomical structures are considered to be analogous when they
serve similar functions but are not evolutionarily related, such as the legs of
vertebrates and the legs of insects. Analogous structures are the result of
convergent evolution and should be contrasted with homologous structures.

Engineering
Often a physical prototype is built to model and represent some other physical
object. For example, wind tunnels are used to test scale models of wings and
aircraft, which act as an analogy to full-size wings and aircraft.

For example, the MONIAC (an analog computer) used the flow of water in its pipes as
an analog to the flow of money in an economy.

Cybernetics
Where there is dependence and hence interaction between a pair or more of
biological or physical participants communication occurs and the stresses produced
describe internal models inside the participants. Pask in his conversation theory
asserts there exists an analogy exhibiting both similarities and differences
between any pair of the participants' internal models or concepts.

History
In the history science comparative historical analysis is often using the concept
of analogy and analogical reasoning. Recent computational approaches operating on
large document archives allow for automatically finding analogical entities from
the past for arbitrary user queries (e.g., Myanmar - Burma) [37] and for their
explanation.[38]

In normative matters
Morality
Analogical reasoning plays a very important part in morality. This may be in part
because morality is supposed to be impartial and fair. If it is wrong to do
something in a situation A, and situation B is analogous to A in all relevant
features, then it is also wrong to perform that action in situation B. Moral
particularism accepts analogical moral reasoning, rejecting both deduction and
induction, since only the former can do without moral principles.

Law
In law, analogy is primarily used to resolve issues on which there is no previous
authority. A distinction can be made between analogical reasoning employed in
statutory law and analogical reasoning present in precedential law (case law).

Analogies in statutory law

In statutory law analogy is used in order to fill the so-called lacunas or gaps or
loopholes.

First, a gap arises when a specific case or legal issue is not explicitly dealt
with in written law. Then, one may try to identify a statutory provision which
covers the cases that are similar to the case at hand and apply to this case this
provision by analogy. Such a gap, in civil law countries, is referred to as a gap
extra legem (outside of the law), while analogy which liquidates it is termed
analogy extra legem (outside of the law). The very case at hand is named: an
unprovided case.

Second, a gap comes into being when there is a statutory provision which applies to
the case at hand but this provision leads in this case to an unwanted outcome.
Then, upon analogy to another statutory provision that covers cases similar to the
case at hand, this case is resolved upon this provision instead of the provision
that applies to it directly. This gap is called a gap contra legem (against the
law), while analogy which fills this gap is referred to as analogy contra legem
(against the law).

Third, a gap occurs when there is a statutory provision which regulates the case at
hand, but this provision is vague or equivocal. In such circumstances, to decide
the case at hand, one may try to ascertain the meaning of this provision by
recourse to statutory provisions which address cases that are similar to the case
at hand or other cases that are regulated by vague/equivocal provision. A gap of
this type is named gap intra legem (within the law) and analogy which deals with it
is referred to as analogy intra legem (within the law).

The similarity upon which statutory analogy depends on may stem from the
resemblance of raw facts of the cases being compared, the purpose (the so-called
ratio legis which is generally the will of the legislature) of a statutory
provision which is applied by analogy or some other sources.

Statutory analogy may be also based upon more than one statutory provision or even
a spirit of law. In the latter case, it is called analogy iuris (from the law in
general) as opposed to analogy legis (from a specific legal provision or
provisions).

Analogies in precedential law (case law)

First, in precedential law (case law), analogies can be drawn from precedent cases
(cases decided in past). The judge who decides the case at hand may find that the
facts of this case are similar to the facts of one of precedential cases to an
extent that the outcomes of these cases are justified to be the same or similar.
Such use of analogy in precedential law pertains mainly to the so-called: cases of
first impression, i.e. the cases which as yet have not been regulated by any
binding judicial precedent (are not covered by a ratio decidendi of such a
precedent).

Second, in precedential law, reasoning from (dis)analogy is amply employed, while a

judge is distinguishing a precedent. That is, upon the discerned differences
between the case at hand and the precedential case, a judge reject to decide the
case upon the precedent whose ratio decidendi (precedential rule) embraces the case
at hand.

Third, there is also much room for some other usages of analogy in the province of
precedential law. One of them is resort to analogical reasoning, while resolving
the conflict between two or more precedents which all apply to the case at hand
despite dictating different legal outcome for that case. Analogy can also take part
in ascertaining the contents of ratio decidendi, deciding upon obsolete precedents
or quoting precedents form other jurisdictions. It is too visible in legal
Education, notably in the US (the so-called 'case method').

Restrictions on the use of analogy in law

In legal matters, sometimes the use of analogy is forbidden (by the very law or
common agreement between judges and scholars). The most common instances concern
criminal, administrative and tax law.

Analogy should not be resorted to in criminal matters whenever its outcome would be
unfavorable to the accused or suspect. Such a ban finds its footing in the very
principle: "nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege", a principle which is understood
in the way that there is no crime (punishment) unless it is expressly provided for
in a statutory provision or an already existing judicial precedent.

Analogy should be applied with caution in the domain of tax law. Here, the
principle: "nullum tributum sine lege" justifies a general ban on the employment of
analogy that would lead to an increase in taxation or whose results would – for
some other reason – be to the detriment to the interests of taxpayers.

Extending by analogy those provisions of administrative law that restrict human

rights and the rights of the citizens (particularly the category of the so-called
"individual rights" or "basic rights") is as a rule prohibited. Analogy generally
should also not be resorted to in order to make the citizen's burdens and
obligations larger or more vexatious.

The other limitations on the use of analogy in law, among many others, pertain to:

the analogical extension of statutory provisions that involve exceptions to more

general statutory regulation or provisions (this restriction flows from the well-
known, especially in civil law continental legal systems, Latin maxims:
"exceptiones non sunt excendentae", "exception est strictissimae interpretationis"
and "singularia non sunt extendenda")
the making of the use of an analogical argument with regard to those statutory
provisions which comprise enumerations (lists)
extending by analogy those statutory provisions that give impression that the
Legislator intended to regulate some issues in an exclusive (exhaustive) manner
(such a manner is especially implied when the wording of a given statutory
provision involves such pointers as: "only", "exclusively", "solely", "always",
"never") or which have a plain precise meaning.
In civil (private) law, the use of analogy is as a rule permitted or even ordered
by law. But also in this branch of law there are some restrictions confining the
possible scope of the use of an analogical argument. Such is, for instance, the
prohibition to use analogy in relation to provisions regarding time limits or a
general ban on the recourse to analogical arguments which lead to extension of
those statutory provisions which envisage some obligations or burdens or which
order (mandate) something. The other examples concern the usage of analogy in the
field of property law, especially when one is going to create some new property
rights by it or to extend these statutory provisions whose terms are unambiguous
(unequivocal) and plain (clear), e.g.: be of or under a certain age.

In teaching strategies
Analogies as defined in rhetoric are a comparison between words, but an analogy can
be used in teaching as well. An analogy as used in teaching would be comparing a
topic that students are already familiar with, with a new topic that is being
introduced so that students can get a better understanding of the topic and relate
back to previous knowledge. Shawn Glynn, a professor in the department of
educational psychology and instructional technology at the University of Georgia,
[39] developed a theory on teaching with analogies and developed steps to explain
the process of teaching with this method. The steps for teaching with analogies are
as follows: Step one is introducing the new topic that is about to be taught and
giving some general knowledge on the subject. Step two is reviewing the concept
that the students already know to ensure they have the proper knowledge to assess
the similarities between the two concepts. Step three is finding relevant features
within the analogy of the two concepts. Step four is finding similarities between
the two concepts so students are able to compare and contrast them in order to
understand. Step five is indicating where the analogy breaks down between the two
concepts. And finally, step six is drawing a conclusion about the analogy and
comparison of the new material with the already learned material. Typically this
method is used to learn topics in science.[40]

In 1989 Kerry Ruef, a teacher, began an entire program, which she titled The
Private Eye Project. It is a method of teaching that revolves around using
analogies in the classroom to better explain topics. She thought of the idea to use
analogies as a part of curriculum because she was observing objects once and she
said, "my mind was noting what else each object reminded me of..." This led her to
teach with the question, "what does [the subject or topic] remind you of?" The idea
of comparing subjects and concepts led to the development of The Private Eye
Project as a method of teaching.[41] The program is designed to build critical
thinking skills with analogies as one of the main themes revolving around it. While
Glynn focuses on using analogies to teach science, The Private Eye Project can be
used for any subject including writing, math, art, social studies, and invention.
It is now used by thousands of schools around the country.[42] There are also
various pedagogic innovations now emerging that use visual analogies for cross-
disciplinary teaching and research, for instance between science and the
humanities.[43]

Religion
Catholic
The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 taught: For between creator and creature there
can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen
between them.[44]

The theological exploration of this subject is called the analogia entis. The
consequence of this theory is that all true statements concerning God (excluding
the concrete details of Jesus' earthly life) are analogical and approximations,
without that implying any falsity. Such analogical and true statements would
include God is, God is Love, God is a consuming fire, God is near to all who call
him, or God as Trinity, where being, love, fire, distance, number must be classed
as analogies that allow human cognition of what is infinitely beyond positive or
negative language.

The use of theological statements in syllogisms must take into account their
essential analogical character, in that every analogy breaks down when stretched
beyond its intended meaning.

Everyday life
Analogy can be used in order to find solutions for the problematic situations
(problems) that occur in everyday life. If something works with one thing, it may
also work with another thing which is similar to the former.
Analogy facilitates choices and predictions as well as opinions/assessments people
are forced to do daily.
Hybrid analogies operating between disciplines
Visual analogies have been developed that enable researchers to "investigate
literary studies by means of attractive analogies taken principally from science
and mathematics. These analogies bring to literary discourse a stock of exciting
visual ideas for teaching and research..."[45]

See also
Argumentum a contrario
Argumentum a fortiori
Case-based reasoning / Casuistry
Commonsense reasoning
Conceptual blending
Duck test
False analogy
Hypocatastasis
I know it when I see it
Parable
Sensemaking
Metaphor
Intuitive statistics
Notes
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, revised and augmented
throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940) on Perseus Digital Library. "Henry George Liddell,
Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀναλογ-ία". Archived from the original on
2016-04-23. Retrieved 2018-05-21.
analogy, Online Etymology Dictionary. Archived 2010-03-24 at the Wayback Machine
Hofstadter in Gentner et al. 2001.
"Journal of Statistics Education, V11N2: Martin". Archived from the original on
2013-03-07. Retrieved 2012-12-10., Michael A. Martin, The Use of Analogies and
Heuristics in Teaching Introductory Statistical Methods
Turney 2006
Shelley 2003
Hallaq, Wael B. (1985–1986). "The Logic of Legal Reasoning in Religious and Non-
Religious Cultures: The Case of Islamic Law and the Common Law". Cleveland State
Law Review. 34: 79–96 [93–5].
 Ruth Mas (1998). "Qiyas: A Study in Islamic Logic" (PDF). Folia Orientalia. 34:
113–128. ISSN 0015-5675. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2008-07-08.
John F. Sowa; Arun K. Majumdar (2003). "Analogical reasoning". Conceptual
Structures for Knowledge Creation and Communication, Proceedings of ICCS 2003.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Archived from the original on 2010-04-05., pp. 16–36
See Dedre Gentner et al. 2001
See Gentner et al. 2001 and Gentner's publication page Archived 2010-06-14 at the
Wayback Machine.
Doumas, Hummel, and Sandhofer, 2008
Keane, M.T. and Brayshaw, M. (1988). The Incremental Analogical Machine: a
computational model of analogy. In D. Sleeman (Ed). European working session on
learning. (pp.53–62). London: Pitman.
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Keane, M.T. (1997). "What makes an analogy difficult? The effects of order and
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PMID 9231438.
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External links

Look up analogy in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Wikiquote has quotations related to Analogy.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Analogy and Analogical Reasoning", by Paul
Bartha.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Medieval Theories of Analogy", by E. Jennifer
Ashworth.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning", by
Grant Lamond.
Dictionary of the History of Ideas Analogy in Early Greek Thought.
Dictionary of the History of Ideas Analogy in Patristic and Medieval Thought.
Computational approaches to computing temporal analogy.
Categories: AnalogyConceptual modellingPhilosophical argumentsSemantics
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