In 

Buddhism, the term anattā (Pali: अनत्ता) or anātman (Sanskrit: अनात्मन्) refers to the

doctrine of "non-self" – that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in
any phenomenon.[note 1] While often interpreted as a doctrine denying the existence of a
self, anatman is more accurately described as a strategy to attain non-attachment by
recognizing everything as impermanent, while staying silent on the ultimate existence of
an unchanging essence.[1][2][3] In contrast, Hinduism asserts the existence
of Atman as pure awareness or witness-consciousness,[4][5][6][note 2] "reify[ing] consciousness
as an eternal self."[7]

Etymology and nomenclature[edit]

Anattā is a composite Pali word consisting of an (not, without) and attā (self-existent
essence).[8] The term refers to the central Buddhist concept that there is no phenomenon
that has "self" or essence.[1] It is one of the three characteristics of all existence, together
with dukkha (suffering, dissatisfaction) and anicca (impermanence).[8]
Anattā is synonymous with Anātman (an + ātman) in Sanskrit Buddhist texts.[9] In some
Pali texts, ātman of Vedic texts is also referred to with the term Attan, with the sense of
"soul".[8] An alternate use of Attan or Atta is "self, oneself, essence of a person", driven
by the Vedic-era Brahmanical belief that atman is the permanent, unchangeable
essence of a living being, or the true self.[8][9]
In Buddhism-related English literature, Anattā is rendered as "not-Self", but this
translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete
rendering is "non-Self" because from its earliest days, Anattā doctrine denied that there
is anything called a "Self" in any person or anything else, and that a belief in "Self" is a
source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness).[10][11][note 3] Buddhist scholar Richard
Gombrich, however, argues that anattā is often mistranslated as meaning "not having a
self or essence", but actually means "is not ātman" instead of "does not have ātman."[1] It
is also incorrect to translate Anattā simply as "ego-less", according to Peter Harvey,
because the Indian concept of ātman and attā is different from the Freudian concept of
ego.[15][note 4]

In early Buddhism[edit]
In early Buddhist texts[edit]
The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutras of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts
(Pali canon). It appears, for example, as a noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49,
V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya, II.37–45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga,
III.406 of Dhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta
Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya.[8][17] It is
also found in the Dhammapada.[18]
The ancient Buddhist texts discuss Attā or Attan (self), sometimes with alternate terms
such as Atuman, Tuma, Puggala, Jiva, Satta, Pana and Nama-rupa, thereby providing
the context for the Buddhist Anattā doctrine. Examples of such Attā contextual
discussions are found in Digha Nikaya I.186–187, Samyutta Nikaya III.179 and
IV.54, Vinaya I.14, Majjhima Nikaya I.138, III.19, and III.265–271 and Anguttara
Nikaya I.284.[8][17][19] According to Steven Collins, the inquiry of anattā and "denial of self"
in the canonical Buddhist texts is "insisted on only in certain theoretical contexts", while
they use the terms atta, purisa, puggala quite naturally and freely in various contexts.
[19]
 The elaboration of the anattā doctrine, along with identification of the words such as
"puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature.[19]
According to Collins, the Suttas present the doctrine in three forms. First, they apply the
"no-self, no-identity" investigation to all phenomena as well as any and all objects,
yielding the idea that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anattā).[20] Second, states
Collins, the Suttas apply the doctrine to deny self of any person, treating conceit to be
evident in any assertion of "this is mine, this I am, this is myself" (etam mamam eso
'ham asmi, eso me atta ti).[21] Third, the Theravada texts apply the doctrine as a nominal
reference, to identify examples of "self" and "not-self", respectively the Wrong view and
the Right view; this third case of nominative usage is properly translated as "self" (as an
identity) and is unrelated to "soul", states Collins.[21] The first two usages incorporate the
idea of soul.[22]
No denial of self[edit]
Buddhist scholars Richard Gombrich and Alexander Wynne argue that the Buddha's
descriptions of non-self in early Buddhist texts do not deny that there is a self.[1][2] Wynne
and Gombrich both argue that the Buddha's statements on anattā were originally a "not-
self" teaching that developed into a "no-self" teaching in later Buddhist thought.[2]
[1]
 According to Wynne, early Buddhist texts such as the Anattālakkhana Sutta do not
deny that there is a self, stating that the five aggregates that are described as not self
are not descriptions of a human being but descriptions of the human experience.
[2]
 According to Johannes Bronkhorst, it is possible that "original Buddhism did not deny
the existence of the soul", even though a firm Buddhist tradition has maintained that the
Buddha avoided talking about the soul or even denied its existence.[23]
Tibetologist André Migot states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete
absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholars Jean
Przyluski and Caroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in a self,
making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but
conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs.[24] While there may be ambivalence on the
existence or non-existence of self in early Buddhist literature, Bronkhorst suggests that
these texts clearly indicate that the Buddhist path of liberation consists not in seeking
Atman-like self-knowledge, but in turning away from what might erroneously be
regarded as the self.[25] This is a reverse position to the Vedic traditions which
recognized the knowledge of the self as "the principal means to achieving liberation."[25]
According to Harvey, the contextual use of Attā in Nikāyas is two sided. In one, it
directly denies that anything can be found called a self or soul in a human being that is
a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical (Ancient Hindu)
traditions.[26] In another, states Peter Harvey, such as at Samyutta Nikaya IV.286, the
Sutta considers the materialistic concept in pre-Buddhist Vedic times of "no afterlife,
complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a
Self".[27] "Self exists" is a false premise, assert the early Buddhist texts.[27] However, adds
Peter Harvey, these texts do not admit the premise "Self does not exist" either because
the wording presumes the concept of "Self" prior to denying it; instead, the early
Buddhist texts use the concept of Anattā as the implicit premise.[27][28]
Developing the self[edit]
Main articles: Buddhist Paths to liberation and Personal identity §  Theories
According to Peter Harvey, while the Suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging
Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly
developed.[29] This is paradoxical, states Harvey, in that "the Self-like nibbana state" is a
mature self that knows "everything as Selfless".[29] The "empirical self" is
the citta (mind/heart, mindset, emotional nature), and the development of self in the
Suttas is the development of this citta.[30]
One with "great self", state the early Buddhist Suttas, has a mind which is neither at the
mercy of outside stimuli nor its own moods, neither scattered nor diffused, but imbued
with self-control, and self-contained towards the single goal of nibbana and a 'Self-like'
state.[29] This "great self" is not yet an Arahat, because he still does small evil action
which leads to karmic fruition, but he has enough virtue that he does not experience this
fruition in hell.[29]
An Arahat, states Harvey, has a fully enlightened state of empirical self, one that lacks
the "sense of both 'I am' and 'this I am'", which are illusions that the Arahat has
transcended.[31] The Buddhist thought and salvation theory emphasizes a development
of self towards a Selfless state not only with respect to oneself, but recognizing the lack
of relational essence and Self in others, wherein states Martijn van Zomeren, "self is an
illusion".[32]
Karma, rebirth and anattā[edit]
The Four planes of liberation
(according to the Sutta Piṭaka[note 5])

s ta ge ' s aba ndone d re bi rth(s )

"frui t" [note 6] fe tte rs until suffering's end

up to seven rebirths in
stream-enterer human or heavenly
1. identity view (Anatman)
realms
2. doubt in Buddha
3. ascetic or ritual rules
lower
fetters once more as
once-returner [note 7]
a human

once more in
4. sensual desire
non-returner a heavenly realm
5. ill will
(Pure Abodes)

arahant 6. material-rebirth desire higher no rebirth

 7. immaterial-rebirth desire
8. conceit
fetters
9. restlessness
10. ignorance

Source: Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (2001), Middle-Length Discourses, pp. 41-43.

The Buddha emphasized both karma and anattā doctrines.[3] The Buddha criticized the

doctrine that posited an unchanging essence as a subject as the basis of rebirth and
karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikavāda". He also criticized the
materialistic doctrine that denied the existence of both soul and rebirth, and thereby
denied karmic moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".[33] Instead, the Buddha
asserted that there is no essence, but there is rebirth for which karmic moral
responsibility is a must. In the Buddha's framework of karma, right view and right
actions are necessary for liberation.[34][35]
Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism all assert a belief in rebirth, and emphasize moral
responsibility in a way different from pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian
philosophies.[36][37][38] The materialistic schools of Indian philosophies, such as Charvaka,
are called annihilationist schools because they posited that death is the end, there is no
afterlife, no soul, no rebirth, no karma, and death is that state where a living being is
completely annihilated, dissolved.[39]
Buddha criticized the materialistic annihilationism view that denied rebirth and karma,
states Damien Keown.[36] Such beliefs are inappropriate and dangerous, stated Buddha,
because they encourage moral irresponsibility and material hedonism.[36] Anattā does not
mean there is no afterlife, no rebirth or no fruition of karma, and Buddhism contrasts
itself to annihilationist schools.[36] Buddhism also contrasts itself to other Indian religions
that champion moral responsibility but posit eternalism with their premise that within
each human being there is an essence or eternal soul, and this soul is part of the nature
of a living being, existence and metaphysical reality.[40][41][42]

In Theravada Buddhism[edit]
Traditional views[edit]
Theravada Buddhism scholars, states Oliver Leaman, consider the Anattā doctrine as
one of the main theses of Buddhism.[43] The Buddhist denial of an unchanging,
permanent self is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such
as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts the Theravada tradition.
[43]
 With the doctrine of Anattā, stands or falls the entire Buddhist structure,
asserts Nyanatiloka Mahathera.[44]
According to Collins, "insight into the teaching of anattā is held to have two major loci in
the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses along the
Path.[45] The first part of this insight is to avoid sakkayaditthi (Personality Belief), that is
converting the "sense of I which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical
individuality" into a theoretical belief in a self.[45] "A belief in a (really) existing body" is
considered a false belief and a part of the Ten Fetters that must be gradually lost. The
second loci is the psychological realization of anattā, or loss of "pride or conceit". This,
states Collins, is explained as the conceit of asmimana or "I am"; (...) what this "conceit"
refers to is the fact that for the unenlightened man, all experience and action must
necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an "I".
[45]
 When a Buddhist gets more enlightened, this happening to or originating in an "I" or
sakkdyaditthi is less. The final attainment of enlightenment is the disappearance of this
automatic but illusory "I".[45]
The Theravada tradition has long considered the understanding and application of
the Anattā doctrine to be a complex teaching, whose "personal, introjected application
has always been thought to be possible only for the specialist, the practising monk". The
tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely on anattā as a doctrinal position", while in
practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists.[20] The
Theravada doctrine of Anattā, or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for
monks, states Donald Swearer, but for the lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia,
the doctrines of kamma, rebirth and punna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual
practices and ethical behavior.[46]
The Anattā doctrine is key to the concept of Nibbana in the Theravada tradition. The
liberated nirvana state, states Collins, is the state of Anattā, a state that is neither
universally applicable nor can be explained, but can be realized.[47][note 8]
Current disputes[edit]
See also: Buddhism in Thailand
The dispute about "self" and "not-self" doctrines has continued throughout the history of
Buddhism.[50] In Thai Buddhism, for example, states Paul Williams, some modern era
Buddhist scholars have claimed that "Nirvana is indeed the true self", while other Thai
Buddhists disagree.[51] For instance, the Dhammakaya tradition in Thailand teaches that
it is erroneous to subsume nirvana under the rubric of anattā (non-self); instead, nirvana
is taught to be the "true self" or dhammakaya.[52] The Dhammakaya tradition teaching
that nirvana is atta, or true self, was criticized as heretical in Buddhism in 1994 by Ven.
Payutto, a well-known scholar monk, who stated that 'Buddha taught Nibbana as being
non-self".[53][54] The abbot of one major temple in the Dhammakaya tradition, Luang Por
Sermchai of Wat Luang Por Sodh Dhammakayaram, argues that it tends to be scholars
who hold the view of absolute non-self, rather than Buddhist meditation practitioners. He
points to the experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such as Luang Pu
Sodh and Ajahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self".[54][55] Similar interpretations on
the "true self" were put forth earlier by the 12th Supreme Patriarch of Thailand in 1939.
According to Williams, the Supreme Patriarch's interpretation echoes
the tathāgatagarbha sutras.[56]
Several notable teachers of the Thai Forest Tradition have also described ideas in
contrast to absolute non-self. Ajahn Maha Bua, a well known meditation master,
described the citta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall
under anattā.[57] He has stated that not-self is merely a perception that is used to pry one
away from infatuation with the concept of a self, and that once this infatuation is gone
the idea of not-self must be dropped as well.[58] American monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu of
the Thai Forest Tradition describes the Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to
awakening rather than a universal truth.[3] Bhikkhu Bodhi authored a rejoinder to
Thanissaro, agreeing that anattā is a strategy for awakening but stating that "The
reason the teaching of anattā can serve as a strategy of liberation is precisely because
it serves to rectify a misconception about the nature of being, hence an ontological
error."[59] Thanissaro Bhikkhu states that the Buddha intentionally set aside the question
of whether or not there is a self as a useless question, and goes on to call the phrase
"there is no self" the "granddaddy of fake Buddhist quotes". He adds that clinging to the
idea that there is no self at all would actually prevent enlightenment.[60] Thanissaro
Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10), where the Buddha stays silent when
asked whether there is a 'self' or not,[61] as a major cause of the dispute.[62]

Anātman in Mahayana Buddhism[edit]

Main article: Madhyamaka
See also: śūnyatā
Anātman is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found
in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions.[43]
There are many different views of anātman (Chinese: 無我; pinyin: wúwǒ; Japanese: 無
我 muga; Korean: 무아 mu-a) within various Mahayana schools.[63]
The early Mahayana Buddhism texts link their discussion of "emptiness" (śūnyatā)
to anātman and nirvana. They do so, states Mun-Keat Choong, in three ways: first, in
the common sense of a monk's meditative state of emptiness; second, with the main
sense of anātman or 'everything in the world is empty of self'; third, with the ultimate
sense of Nirvana or realization of emptiness and thus an end to rebirth cycles of
suffering.[64] The anātman doctrine is another aspect of śūnyatā, its realization is the
nature of the nirvana state and to an end to rebirths.[65][66][67]
Nāgārjuna[edit]
The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (~200 CE), the founder of Madhyamaka (middle
way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzed dharma first as factors of experience.
[13]
 David Kalupahana states that Nāgārjuna analyzed how these experiences relate to
"bondage and freedom, action and consequence", and thereafter analyzed the notion of
personal self (ātman).[13]
Nāgārjuna extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity called ātman (self,
soul), asserting in chapter 18 of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that there is no such
substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self".[68][69][70]
Nāgārjuna asserted that the notion of a self is associated with the notion of one's own
identity and corollary ideas of pride, selfishness and a sense of psychophysical
personality.[71] This is all false, and leads to bondage in his Madhyamaka thought. There
can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who accepts anātman and denies
"self" which is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states
Nāgārjuna.[13][14] Further, all obsessions are avoided when a person accepts emptiness
(śūnyatā).[13][72] Nāgārjuna denied there is anything called a self-nature as well as other-
nature, emphasizing true knowledge to be comprehending emptiness.[71][73][74] Anyone who
has not dissociated from their belief in personality in themselves or others, through the
concept of self, is in a state of avidya (ignorance) and caught in the cycle of rebirths and
redeaths.[71][75]
Yogācāra[edit]
The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of
the Yogācāra school similarly discuss anātman as a fundamental premise of the
Buddha.[76] The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-
century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti, who then offered his own theories on its
importance.[77][78]
Tathāgatagarbha Sutras: Buddha is True Self[edit]
Some 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts suggest concepts that have been controversial
because they imply a "self-like" concept.[79][80] In particular are the tathāgatagarbha sūtras,
where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed)
containing Tathāgata (Buddha). These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that "all
sentient beings contain a Tathagata" as their "essence, core or essential inner nature".
[81]
 The tathāgatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of
the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.
[81]
 Most scholars consider the tathāgatagarbha doctrine of an "essential nature" in every
living being is equivalent to "self",[citation needed][note 9] and it contradicts the anātman doctrines in
a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that
the tathāgatagarbha sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.[83][84]
The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra explicitly asserts that the Buddha used the term
"self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics.[85][86] The Ratnagotravibhāga (also
known as Uttaratantra), another text composed in the first half of 1st millennium CE and
translated into Chinese in 511 CE, points out that the teaching of
the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning
"self-love" (atma-sneha) – considered to be one of the defects by Buddhism.[87][88] The
6th-century Chinese tathāgatagarbha translation states that "Buddha has shiwo (true
self) which is beyond being and nonbeing".[89] However, the Ratnagotravibhāga asserts
that the "self" implied in tathāgatagarbha doctrine is actually "not-self".[89][90]
According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not
represent a substantial self; rather, it is a positive language and expression
of śūnyatā "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through
Buddhist practices.[87] Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in
these tathagatagarbha references.[91] Michael Zimmermann sees the notion of an
unperishing and eternal self in the Tathagatagarbha Sutra.[92] Zimmermann also avers
that "the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the
basic point of the Tathāgatagarbha Sutra".[93] He further indicates that there is no evident
interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata).[94] Williams states that the
"self" in tathāgatagarbha sutras is actually "non-self", and neither identical nor
comparable to the Hindu concepts of brahman and self.[87]
Vajrayāna[edit]

Tibetan and Nepalese Buddhist deities Nairatmya and Hevajra in an embrace. Nairatmya is the goddess of
emptiness, and of anātman realization[95][96]

The anātman doctrine is extensively discussed in and partly inspires the ritual practices

of the Vajrayāna tradition. The Tibetan terms such as bdag med refer to "without a self,
insubstantial, anātman".[97] These discussions, states Jeffrey Hopkins, assert the "non-
existence of a permanent, unitary and independent self", and attribute these ideas to the
Buddha.[98]
The ritual practices in Vajrayāna Buddhism employs the concept of deities, to end self-
grasping, and to manifest as a purified, enlightened deity as part of the Vajrayāna path
to liberation from rebirths.[99][100][101] One such deity is goddess Nairatmya (literally, non-
soul, non-self).[102][103][104] She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and
"all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayāna
Buddhism.[95]

Difference between Buddhism and Hinduism[edit]

Atman in Hinduism[edit]
The Buddhist concept of anattā or anātman is one of the fundamental differences
between mainstream Buddhism and mainstream Hinduism, with the latter asserting
that ātman ("self") exists.[note 2]
In Hinduism, Atman refers to the essence of human beings, the observing pure
awareness or witness-consciousness.[4][5][105][106] It is unaffected by ego,[107][108] distinct from
the individual being (jivanatman) embedded in material reality, and characterized
by Ahamkara ('I-making'), mind (citta, manas), and all the defiling kleshas (impurities).
Embodied personality changes over time, while Atman doesn't.[109]
According to Jayatilleke, the Upanishadic inquiry fails to find an empirical correlate of
the assumed Atman, but nevertheless assumes its existence,[110] and Advaitins "reify
consciousness as an eternal self."[7] In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with
the empirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no
evidence" states Jayatilleke.[110] According to Harvey, in Buddhism the negation of
temporal existents is applied even more rigorous than in the Upanishads:
While the Upanishads recognized many things as being not-Self, they felt that a real,
true Self could be found. They held that when it was found, and known to be identical to
Brahman, the basis of everything, this would bring liberation. In the Buddhist Suttas,
though, literally everything is seen is non-Self, even Nirvana. When this is known, then
liberation – Nirvana – is attained by total non-attachment. Thus both
the Upanishads and the Buddhist Suttas see many things as not-Self, but the Suttas
apply it, indeed non-Self, to everything.[111]
Both Buddhism and Hinduism distinguish ego-related "I am, this is mine", from their
respective abstract doctrines of "Anattā" and "Atman".[112] This, states Peter Harvey, may
have been an influence of Buddhism on Hinduism.[113]
Anatman and Niratman[edit]
The term niratman appears in the Maitrayaniya Upanishad of Hinduism, such as in
verses 6.20, 6.21 and 7.4. Niratman literally means "selfless".[114][115] The niratman concept
has been interpreted to be analogous to anatman of Buddhism.[116] The ontological
teachings, however, are different. In the Upanishad, states Thomas Wood, numerous
positive and negative descriptions of various states – such
as niratman and sarvasyatman (the self of all) – are used in Maitrayaniya Upanishad to
explain the nondual concept of the "highest Self".[115] According to Ramatirtha, states
Paul Deussen, the niratman state discussion is referring to stopping the recognition of
oneself as an individual soul, and reaching the awareness of universal soul or the
metaphysical Brahman.[117]

Correspondence in Pyrrhonism[edit]
Main article: Similarities between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism
The Greek philosopher Pyrrho traveled to India as part of Alexander the Great's
entourage where he was influenced by the Indian gymnosophists,[118] which inspired him
to create the philosophy of Pyrrhonism. Philologist Christopher Beckwith has
demonstrated that Pyrrho based his philosophy on his translation of the three marks of
existence into Greek, and that adiaphora (not logically differentiable, not clearly
definable, negating Aristotle's use of "diaphora") reflects Pyrrho's understanding of the
Buddhist concept of anattā.[119]

See also[edit]
 Ahamkara
 Anicca
 Asceticism
 Atman (Buddhism)
 Atman (Hinduism)
 Buddhist logico-epistemology
  Catuṣkoṭi
 Dukkha
 Enlightenment (religious)
 Jiva
 Nirvana
 Non-essentialism
 Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta
 Mahaparinirvana Sutra
 Open individualism
 Ship of Theseus – a related view in ancient Greek philosophy
 Skandhas
 Tathagatagarbha
 Teletransportation paradox
 Vertiginous question

Notes[edit]
1. ^ Definition:
 Anatta Archived 2015-12-10 at the Wayback Machine, Encyclopædia
Britannica (2013): "Anatta, (Pali: “non-self” or “substanceless”) Sanskrit
anatman, in Buddhism, the doctrine that there is in humans no permanent,
underlying substance that can be called the soul. Instead, the individual is
compounded of five factors (Pali khandha; Sanskrit skandha) that are constantly
changing. "
 Christmas Humphreys (2012). Exploring Buddhism. Routledge. pp.  42–
43.  ISBN  978-1-136-22877-3.
 Brian Morris (2006). Religion and Anthropology: A Critical Introduction.
Cambridge University Press. p. 51.  ISBN  978-0-521-85241-8.: "...anatta is the
doctrine of non-self, and is an extreme empiricist doctrine that holds that the
notion of an unchanging permanent self is a fiction and has no reality. According
to Buddhist doctrine, the individual person consists of five skandhas or heaps—
the body, feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness. The belief in a self
or soul, over these five skandhas, is illusory and the cause of suffering."
 Richard Gombrich (2006).  Theravada Buddhism. Routledge. p. 47.  ISBN  978-
1-134-90352-8.: "...Buddha's teaching that beings have no soul, no abiding
essence. This 'no-soul doctrine' (anatta-vada) he expounded in his second
sermon."
2. ^ Jump up to:a b Atman in Hinduism:
 Anatta Archived 2015-12-10 at the Wayback Machine, Encyclopædia
Britannica (2013): "The concept of anatta, or anatman, is a departure from the
Hindu belief in atman ("the self").";
 Steven Collins (1994), "Religion and Practical Reason" (Editors: Frank
Reynolds, David Tracy), State Univ of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-2217-
5, page 64; "Central to Buddhist soteriology is the doctrine of not-self (Pali:
anattā, Sanskrit: anātman, the opposed doctrine of ātman is central to
Brahmanical thought). Put very briefly, this is the [Buddhist] doctrine that human
beings have no soul, no self, no unchanging essence.";
 Edward Roer (Translator), Shankara's Introduction, p. 2, at Google
Books to Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, pages 2–4;
  Katie Javanaud (2013), Is The Buddhist 'No-Self' Doctrine Compatible With
Pursuing Nirvana? Archived 2015-02-06 at the Wayback Machine, Philosophy
Now;
 David Loy (1982), "Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta: Are
Nirvana and Moksha the Same?", International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume
23, Issue 1, pages 65–74;
 KN Jayatilleke (2010), Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, ISBN 978-
8120806191, pages 246–249, from note 385 onwards;
 Plott (2000)
3. ^ Buddha did not deny a being or a thing, referring it to be a collection of impermanent
interdependent aggregates, but denied that there is a metaphysical self, soul or identity in
anything.[12][13][14]
4. ^ The term ahamkara is 'ego' in Indian philosophies.[16]
5. ^ See, for instance, the "Snake-Simile Discourse" (MN 22), where the Buddha states:
"Monks, this Teaching so well proclaimed by me, is plain, open, explicit, free of patchwork. In
this Teaching that is so well proclaimed by me and is plain, open, explicit and free of
patchwork; for those who are arahants, free of taints, who have accomplished and completed
their task, have laid down the burden, achieved their aim, severed the fetters binding to
existence, who are liberated by full knowledge, there is no (future) round of existence that can
be ascribed to them. – Majjhima Nikaya i.130 ¶ 42, Translated by Nyanaponika
Thera (Nyanaponika, 2006)

6. ^ The "fruit" (Pali: phala) is the culmination of the "path" (magga). Thus, for example, the
"stream-enterer" is the fruit for one on the "stream-entry" path; more specifically, the stream-
enterer has abandoned the first three fetters, while one on the path of stream-entry strives to
abandon these fetters.
7. ^ Both the stream-enterer and the once-returner abandon the first three fetters. What
distinguishes these stages is that the once-returner additionally attenuates lust, hate and
delusion, and will necessarily be reborn only once more.
8. ^ This is a major difference between the Theravada Buddhists and different Hindu traditions
which assert that nirvana is realizing and being in the state of self (soul, atman) and is
universally applicable. However, both concur that this state is indescribable, cannot be
explained, but can be realized.[48][49]
9. ^ Wayman and Wayman have disagreed with this view, and they state that
the tathāgatagarbha is neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality.[82]

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External links[edit]
 Nirvana Sutra, Kosho Yamamoto's English translation of the Mahāyāna
Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra
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