Paula Madrigal Sanmartín

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Essay 11 & 12 Ethics and Economics

AFTER VIRTUE (ALASDAIR MACINTYRE); CHAPTER 14: THE NATURE OF VIRTUES

After Virtue is a book that deals primarily with the moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre, providing
a discouraging view of the state of modern moral discourse as non-rational. He argues, therefore, that
ancient forms of moral discourse had a better form, highlighting in particular the moral philosophy of
Aristotle. The author aims to respond to the criticism that there is no central conception of the virtues
through the accounts of authors such as Homer, Aristotle, Franklin, Austen, the New Testament...
Each of them, as Maclntyre puts it, offers not only different priorities but also different theories of
what a virtue is. For Homer, virtue can be summed up in the qualities of the person, for Aristotle and
in the New Testament, they can only be available to certain people, but they all agree that they enable
the person to play a social role, they are a means to the end of the good life. Thus, the exercise of
virtues in itself is an essential component of the good life of man.

I agree with Maclntyre's first definition of a virtue, considering it an acquired human quality whose
possession and exercise tends to allow us to attain those goods that are internal to the practices and
whose lack effectively prevents us from attaining any of those goods, always accepting the virtues of
justice, courage and honesty. It is interesting the example he gives, where a girl who plays chess with
the promise of receiving an external good, in this case a candy, in case she wins, which may motivate
her to cheat but that will deprive her of the internal goods and she will only beat herself, however, as
she learns to play, she acquires particular skills and gains reasons to excel, so that in part a practice
involves a series of standards of excellence and obedience to the rules in order to obtain those goods.
There is therefore no central conception that can claim universal allegiance and these virtues are
embodied in specific institutions as a presumption of the prior account of social and moral life. Every
practice is a social activity that has internal goods and rules made to achieve those virtues, and allows
us to expand our knowledge in the understanding of human goods and ends, as would be the case with
the girl child.

The author argues that these practices require technical skills, but that they are not all about skills, but
must also be nurtured by these ends and goods. Personally, I consider that these ends and goods have
practically the full weight in the practices, since the skills can be moulded and obtained with the habit,
and although they serve to enrich it, they cannot depend on it alone. Furthermore, he expresses his
view on the importance of institutions as the means that prevent practices from being corrupted, which
cannot always be avoided. Therefore, practices and institutions have to include virtues and vices,
since without virtues in society only external goods would be recognised. The author differs from
Aristotle's thinking in her explanation of the virtues and the conflict that can arise from competing
goods, while like the Greek philosopher she considers that in many cases it has more to do with the
defects of the individual character than with the multiplicity of goods. The author points out that there
can be evil practices and therefore virtues that support such evil, her explanation being incomplete
because firstly, a life informed only by the defined conception would be full of conflict over goods,
secondly, many virtues remain incomplete without providing rational information and finally, the
reference to constancy as a crucial virtue but one that cannot be used as a reference to a complete
human life.
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As a conclusion to saving Western humanity, Maclntyre finds an alternative in classical Aristotelian
thought with certain differences to his view, valuing Aristotle's assumption that man is as he is and is
different from what he ought to be but does not offer a metaphysical framework, his assertion that
rules are based on virtues that derive from an understanding of telos whereas in the Enlightenment
they were understood to be subjective principles and the assertion that virtue and morality are integral
parts of society, since an understanding of telos must be social and not individual, whereas in the
Enlightenment moral authority is lost and the individual becomes the interpreter of moral issues. This
leads to the question of whether it is rationally justifiable to conceive of each human life as a unit, that
is to say, that it makes sense to define it as having its own good, and therefore we can understand the
virtues as if their function were to enable the individual to realise through his life one kind of unity in
preference to another.

THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS (BERTRAND RUSSELL)

Bertrand Russell in his essay on the Elements of Ethics proposes to define human conduct by
differentiating what is conceived as virtuous or vicious, where in practice people are called upon to
choose. He therefore stresses the importance of being clear about what we mean by good and evil,
since only then can we go back to our conduct and analyse how we can improve it. Russell was a
cognitivist who believed that good is the most fundamental ethical concept and is indefinable, holding
that we know a priori certain propositions about the kinds of things that are good in themselves. Each
individual can be considered to have an indistinct view of what he or she considers to be good, as the
author argues, all definitions of good are intended to be meaningful propositions, which serve as the
basis for ethical theories, their truth or falsity independent of our opinions and emotions.

It is difficult to analyse the idea of good and evil as the author says, they are complex and possessed
by everyone. In the case of good, it is difficult because goodness cannot be perceived by the senses,
there is a common confusion with the idea that it cannot be analysed. I agree with the idea that a thing
is good when it must exist by itself and bad when it does not. However, all these characteristics
actually presuppose the notions of good and bad and are only useful as a means of calling ideas good,
not as logical definitions. We use the notion of good to explain what right conduct is, but we do not
use the notion of right conduct to explain what good is. I agree with the author's idea of the innate
goodness of the world, since it is only something that religions preach, that it has been created by a
good and omnipotent God. He uses a chemical example to try to show that by combining several
elements a new compound can be obtained, but it can never be different from what was created, the
result can never provide something other than itself. This applies to the concept of good, since it
cannot contain evil. Therefore, evil is the non-existence of something and is united to good because it
derives from it, integrates it and is part of its essence. This leads us to the previous conclusion that
both good and evil are subjective and convenient.

Contrary to the author, I believe that the good does not necessarily have to be desired; not everything
that we want to acquire or fear to lose can be considered good. The sense of good and evil that is
needed in ethics is not in this way personal; and it is very essential, in the study of ethics, to realise
that there is an impersonal sense. For him, the good is relative, from the perspective of what we want,
always covered by a duality around our decision, opting for what is believed to be good in the face of
something else that is thought to be bad or that is convenient for us in this way. According to logic
there should be a general proposition that says that everything that exists is bad. The author tries to
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base the idea that the basis of pain, cruelty, envy are not empty but not evil either, but are opposed to
the good and are part of it. I would not agree with this idea because it is based on an evolutionary
ethic where all these acts would be justified as a cult of force, even though they are unethical. To think
that the strongest survive, thanks to commendable efforts, with struggle and effort but through
unethical actions, does not seem to me to be admirable but rather condemnable, regardless of the time
or circumstances. Basing ourselves on the idea that good and evil are part of each other does not allow
us to integrate them as a justification for obtaining what we desire.

In conclusion we can summarise the whole discussion of ethics in the most fundamental notion of
good and evil. Goodness and badness cannot be deduced from any of their qualities, such as their
existence, therefore, a right act cannot have any relation to what happens but that within all possible
acts, the one we consider right is likely to produce the best results. However, there is the possibility
that when an individual is wrong about what is objectively right, he or she may act in a subjectively
right way. It is difficult to define an act as morally immoral, as good or bad; it must be decided on the
basis of whether it deserves to be praised and reproduced by others or reproached.