Virtue Ethics

For most of modern philosophical history, the two most dominant schools of thought in normative ethics are
utilitarianism and deontology, which we have already discussed. One of the unifying elements between
these two ethical theories is their emphasis on moral principles. In the case of utilitarianism, there is the
Greatest Happiness Principle, first laid out by John Stuart Mill while in the case of deontology there is
Kant’s famous Categorical Imperative expressed in three formulas. The point of these principles is to serve
as a clear guideline in assessing the moral status of an action, that is, whether an act is morally right or
wrong, morally permissible or morally prohibited.

It has already been noted above that a unifying element with both utilitarianism and deontology is their
emphasis on assessing action through the use of moral principles. By adopting such principles, one can
judge whether an action is right or wrong, permissible or prohibited. The qualification ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
when applied to actions is evaluative. Virtue ethics puts emphasis on virtues, such as generosity and
courage. And when actions are described as generous or courageous, it is only not evaluative but also
descriptive. Thus, virtue ethics is meant to be evaluative of actions but also descriptive of what actions are
worth emulating or not. We usually know what is meant for an act to be generous but we can hardly think of
a clear description when an action is merely described as morally right (or wrong).

Secondly, virtue ethics does not rely on metaphysical entities, such as God or a set of moral duties to which
human beings are bound. Both utilitarianism and deontology can be described as an ethics of duty, the
duty being subservient to their corresponding moral principles. But the nature and existence of such moral
principles is contested, as our discussion on moral objectivism has shown. Is the nature of such moral
principles objective or relative? And if they are objective and totally separate from the desires and goals of
human beings, what makes them authoritative and worthy of being followed? Virtue ethics meanwhile is
simply dependent on actual character traits, the expressions of which are commonly observable in the real
world.

Thirdly, when something counts as a duty it is often experienced as an external command often arising
from the recognition of certain moral principles or of an authoritative moral agent, like God. But in virtue
ethics, the experience of a moral ought is internal, as something connected to the character of the moral
agent. As Stan van Hooft says, “whereas duty ethics conceives of moral motivation or practical necessity
as obedience to rules, virtue ethics conceives of moral motivation or practical necessity as responsiveness
to values.”1 So a virtuous person will do something not because the action will produce the greatest
happiness for the greatest number of people (although that may be a side effect), or do it for duty’s sake
but because the action is a natural expression of the virtuous person’s character.

Lastly, both utilitarianism and deontology are focused on actions that have a moral dimension while
indifferent to almost everything else. As long as moral agents aim towards producing the greatest
1 Stan van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics (Chesham: Acumen Press, 2006), p. 17.
happiness (as utilitarianism commands) or following the Categorical Imperative in line with what deontology
dictates, then these two schools of thought do not have much to say or judge about whatever nonmoral
actions that moral agents may take. Virtue ethics is different since it is not only concerned with actions that
have a morally distinct quality but with the totality of one’s whole life. As Daniel C. Russell states, “What
sets virtue ethics apart is that it treats ethics as concerned with one’s whole life – and not just those
occasions when something with a distinctly ‘moral’ quality is at stake.”2 Thus, virtue ethics does not start by
asking “What’s the right thing to do?” but “What’s the best way to live a human life?”

Introducing Eudaimonia

The first philosopher to introduce virtue ethics is Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, he starts his
discussion with the idea that every action aims towards some good. Good here is used as a noun to mean
anything perceived to be of positive value. Now, there are goods that are pursued for the sake of something
else, and these are called instrumental goods while there are others that are pursued for their own sake,
and these are intrinsic goods. Take for instance the act of eating vegetables for the sake of being healthy.
While someone may not like the taste of vegetables, it is done because it is instrumentally valuable for
achieving good health, which means it is an instrumental good. On the other hand, good health here is
pursued because it is intrinsically valuable, which means that it is an intrinsic good.

Now there is something which Aristotle calls the chief good in which “everything else we want is for the
sake of this end” (1094b), and this chief good is what has been known as eudaimonia. Many interpreters
of Aristotle translate it as happiness but many others see the translation as failing to capture the meaning of
eudaimonia. In modern parlance, happiness is usually associated with strong positive emotions, usually a
fleeting feeling that may not be there over a long period of time. But eudaimonia is more than just strong
emotions but is a way of living. For Aristotle, “eudaimonia is something stable. It is not therefore a
fluctuating feeling, but some kind of lasting condition.”3 Also, eudaimonia is objective, which means that
one can be wrong about their conception of it. This qualification addresses Kant’s concern with happiness
being an indeterminate end. As we have already discussed, happiness as a standard for morality is
problematic for Kant since happiness has different meanings to different people. What may be a source of
happiness for one may be a source of misery for others. But this would make morality’s authority to be
relative and not categorically binding, which is contrary to the supposed universal authority of morality. But
unlike happiness for Kant, eudaimonia is objective and thus avoids Kant’s concern. Finally, eudaimonia is
universal, something that applies to each and every human being by virtue of their nature. This does not
mean that there are no significant overlaps between the modern understanding of happiness and
eudaimonia, since there are, such as when we are wishing a birthday celebrant of happiness. In this
scenario, what we are wishing is not that this person experiences strong positive emotions in her life but
that she may find long lasting fulfillment with how her life will unfold. Thus, we may still use happiness to

2 Daniel C. Russell, ‘Introduction: Virtue Ethics in Modern Moral Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013), p. 2.
3 Michael Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 48.
mean eudaimonia so long as we bear the differences between the shallow understanding of happiness with
happiness in the Aristotelian sense (which is what eudaimonia is).

So what is eudaimonia? In order to fully explicate this notion, we need to look at Aristotle’s well-known
function argument. According to Aristotle, every thing has a function or a purpose. The function of a tree
is to grow its roots and branches and propagate itself. The purpose of a knife is to cut things. So we say
that something is a good knife if it is fulfilling its function of cutting and doing it well. So what is the purpose
of a human being? For Aristotle, what makes something a good human life is to do those things that are
distinctly human and do them well. And since what separates us from other animals is our rationality, it is
the exercise of our rationality that is the goal of human existence.

To see how the exercise of rationality relates to a good human existence, consider the notion of fulfillment.4
There is something known as individual fulfillment which is determined by one’s personal interests, goals
and desires, and vary from person to person. Some people get their individual fulfillment from playing
chess, perhaps joining in tournaments, and knowing like-minded people while some others do not find
anything fulfilling in these activities. This difference is not a problem and even testifies to the reality that
what makes one individually fulfilled may not necessarily be the case for others. Also, what would count as
individually fulfilling may be determined by arbitrary factors, such as genetics, family upbringing, education,
and social ties. Some goods that bring individual fulfillment are friends, wealth, and power but it varies
among individuals as to whose individuals are chosen as friends, how much wealth is enough, and what
kind of power is worth seeking. Lastly, individual fulfillment is a component of human fulfillment that
manifests “individuality and self-expression of a sort that dogs, say, simply do not require.”5

Now, human fulfillment has wider scope compared to individual fulfillment and this is because human
fulfillment applies to human beings qua their distinct human nature, and so must be universal. In line with
that, eudaimonia is “a good life that involves both human fulfillment and individual fulfillment.”6 But what
does human fulfillment consist of? This is where virtue comes in. As a definition, virtues are character traits
exercised through reason that help human beings to live their lives well while vices are character traits that
prevent human beings from living their lives well. Remember in our discussion above that it is the practice
of rationality that is the key to eudaimonia. Rationality here refers to “our capacity for practical reasoning,
both in thinking intelligently about what to do and in acting with emotions that can be intelligently trained.” 7
Thus, virtuous activity is just rational activity geared towards living well as a human being. In fact for
Aristotle, virtues are the most important components in achieving eudaimonia.

So how do we identify the virtues? Aristotle provided us with a rule of thumb, and it is by his doctrine of
the mean. The idea is simple: virtue lies between two extremes. These extremes make up for either the
vice of excess or the vice of deficiency. Courage for instance is widely considered to be a virtue in
response to one’s experience of fear and confidence. In one extreme is cowardice, which is a vice of

4 Daniel C. Russell, ‘Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good Life’, in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), p. 12.
5 Russell, ‘Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good Life’, p. 12.
6 Russell, ‘Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good Life’, p. 11.
7 Russell, ‘Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good Life’, p. 13.
deficiency because a coward lacks the confidence to face his fears. In another extreme is rashness, which
is a vice of excess since the rash person has an excess of confidence with regards his capacity to deal with
danger. Now one may ask how courage is supposed to be a virtue and to answer that we need to ask how
does the virtue of courage help human beings to live their lives well. It is fairly clear to every adult human
being that human life is filled with unfortunate events, danger, and every kind of existential and
psychological threat. A courageous disposition clearly helps human beings to face such threats and with
courage, one is likely to achieve success. Without courage however, it is hard for any human being to
realize their full potential and adjust to an ever changing society.

Going back to the doctrine of the mean, Aristotle however is clear that there is no one universal way to
assess what counts as excessive, deficient or the right one since it has to be judged according to the
particular individual involved. What may appear as gluttonous (which is a vice of excess) for a young boy
may be just the right action for a weightlifter. What may appear as courageous for an adult man may
appear as rashness for a young woman. For our purposes, we need not enumerate a list of virtues since
we already have some ideas of what are generally considered virtues, such as justice, temperance,
kindness, and generosity. Also, there is no mean when it comes to morally wrong actions: stealing is not
right just because it is done in moderation.

Just as in the case of courage, one may wonder what makes such things as kindness, generosity and
justice to be virtues, and to answer that we need to reflect again on the nature of human beings and one of
the features is that a good human life is social. Human beings are necessarily social animals. We
develop from infancy with the help of our parents and relatives, we thrive in communities, and we are able
to survive as a species only because our ancestors know the strength in numbers, where each human
individual has a necessary role to play in the survival of one’s community. While some of the description
mentioned is outdated, the necessity of socialization remains in place. And virtues such as kindness,
generosity and justice are exactly what they are as virtues because they help human beings relate with one
another, strengthen communal and personal ties, and create solidarity with the human community. If a
human being does not know how to live well with others, then we can safely say that he is not living a good
human life fit for a human being.

And since the doctrine of the mean is just a rule of thumb, what exactly will guide human beings towards a
life of virtue? What for instance will help a certain individual to decide whether acting in such way in a
certain situation is courageous and not excessively rash? How will one decide whether not expressing
one’s anger is an act of temperance and not cowardice? For all these, one needs what Aristotle calls
phronesis or practical wisdom. By appealing to this notion of phronesis, Aristotle clearly separates
himself from the traditions of utilitarianism and deontology, both of which rely on moral principles as their
guide. The phronimos or the virtuous person does not rely on such principles to make a moral judgment
but rather exercises judgment, learned through experience, in discerning the morally relevant features of
certain situations. Practical wisdom is “a kind of perceptual capacity or situation-specific know-how that
involves making good judgments about how to act and feel in any particular situation.”8

One of the advantages of appealing to the notion of practical wisdom is how it fits with the natural moral
ambiguity of moral life. While ethical theory may make it appear that morality as it interconnects in the
human world is neat and clearly outlined, the truth is that this is not often the case. This is very apparent
when I discuss the trolley problem in utilitarianism to my classes. Students would immediately ask, “Do I
know any of the persons involved? Is one of them my relative or enemy? How many people depend on
each of these individual? Who owns the trolley anyway? Why are there people tied on the track?” Of course
in discussing utilitarianism, all these factors are set aside to narrow down on the dilemma between saving
five people over letting one person die. But in real life, this is not usually how morality pervades our lives.
As van Hooft states,

A decision to act, especially in morally difficult situations, is always a creative leap in the
dark. There are always features in the situation that are unique to that situation. Each
individual who can be affected by your decision is a unique person enmeshed in a unique
set of relationships with one another and with you. Accordingly, your decision to act goes
beyond what could be given in general principles or norms.9

Aristotle recognizes this, and this is why his appeal to phronesis hits the mark. A virtuous man exercises
judgment in moral matters, not by appealing to moral principles, but by being aware of the morally salient
features of the situation through reason, honed through years of training and practice and guided by the
actions and character of one’s moral exemplars. Now let us analyze this statement in detail.

How does one become virtuous? Recall that an act of generosity does not necessarily mean that the one
doing it is a generous person. Virtue ethics does not just propose doing certain good actions but developing
certain good character traits that will eventually become part of our identity. For Aristotle, no one is born
virtuous and so everyone of us can only acquire virtues through practice. Also, we need a society that
rewards us for performing a virtuous action while punishing us for engaging in vices. In that way, we start to
be socially conditioned to make virtue a habit while avoiding vice as much as possible. Also, the presence
of moral exemplars is also crucial. These are individuals who exhibit a virtuous disposition and are well-
known in the community for their virtues. When a young person is just beginning to mature in moral
development, looking up to moral exemplars and following their examples will greatly assist in the formation
of one’s virtuous character. At this point we can see the importance, even the necessity, of one’s
community in the formation (or lack thereof) of virtue in an individual. If a certain society rewards vices
while punishes virtue, then this makes virtue acquisition problematic. Also, the absence of moral exemplars
creates a severe hole in one’s virtue development. This makes virtue acquisition subject to moral luck, that
is, much of what makes one a virtuous or vicious person is due to a lucky factor: one’s societal upbringing.
However, eventually human beings in pursuit of virtue will develop their own capacity to make moral
judgments without guidance from others, and this will be possible only through practical wisdom.

8 Liezl van Zyl, Virtue Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 145.
9 van Hooft, p. 21.
As has been emphasized, performing an act of virtue does not automatically entail that one is a virtuous
person. In order to capture what it means to be a fully virtuous person, we need to discuss the three
components of virtue.

The first component is the intellectual component. This means that you need to know what you are doing,
and that you know that your action is an act of virtue. For instance, Juan borrowed money from Pedro and
promised to pay him back after a month. Suppose that Juan forgets about his debt and gave Pedro money
as a gift. In this case, Juan is not acting out of the virtue of justice since he is not aware that his action is
one of fulfilling his promise. Another feature of the intellectual component is that the virtuous person
performs an act of virtue for the right reason, that is, a virtuous person knows that his action contributes in
living a good human life.

The second component of virtue is the emotional component. This means that a virtuous person likes
what he is doing. A certain man may have acted generously but may have disliked the fact that some of his
wealth is being spent on his charitable acts. While we may still admire this man for his action, he is only a
continent person and not fully virtuous since a virtuous man finds performing the virtues to be desirable for
their own sake. A virtuous person has his emotions aligned with his actions.

Finally, the last component of virtue is the motivational component. This means that a virtuous person is
acting out of a stable character trait and so, he is predisposed to act virtuously when the situation calls for
it. When the situation requires facing a certain danger in order to achieve a certain good, a virtuous man
would act courageously without second thought. When the situation requires immediate help to a person, a
virtuous man would act with kindness without hesitation. Barring certain factors in the performance of virtue
(such as sickness or death), we can readily expect a virtuous person to act virtuously when the situation
calls for it.

One important thing to note is what Aristotle calls akrasia or weakness of will. It is easy to think of certain
examples, but one will suffice. Think of the virtue of diligence. A certain architect knows the ins and outs of
his architectural job and knows that his work contributes to living a good human life fit for him, and so the
intellectual component is present. He also enjoys the demands of his work, such as designing beautiful
buildings and houses that his clients will hopefully love. However, there comes a time when he fails to show
up at work because he is overcome by his desire to spend time on social media than actually working,
which means that in this situation the emotional component becomes absent as well as the motivational
one, thus ending up with the nonperformance of the action. In these times, the architect is suffering from
akrasia and is not being fully virtuous.

In order to assist us in thinking about these three components of virtue and how they intersect in an
individual, a table is provided below:

Status with Regard to Right reason Right emotion Right action

Virtue
 Virtuous ✓ ✓ ✓

Continent ✓ X ✓

Incontinent/Akratic ✓ X X

Evil/vicious X X X

Interestingly, some may translate virtue as magandang pag-uugali in Filipino. For example, some may say,
“Ilan sa mga magagandang pag-uugali ng Pinoy ay pagiging maintindihin (understanding) at maaruga
(caring).” However, we see that this translation fails to capture the totality of virtue as we have so far
discussed. For one, the Filipino translation seems to emphasize only the outward or behavioral aspect of
virtue but not so much the inner aspect, i.e., the character part. Remember that a virtuous person does not
only perform virtuous action but does it from a virtuous character, which means that his emotions are
aligned with his action and he does it because he is already predisposed to doing it without hesitation. The
translation mabuting tao for ‘virtuous person’ captures more what is meant by virtue since the term
mabuting tao implies that the person possesses mabuting kalooban, which may be translated as good or
virtuous character.

Now, how does virtue manifest in the stages of one’s life? Since Aristotle puts emphasis on the exercise of
rationality in the pursuit of virtue, and the key to eudaimonia is a virtuous life, then Aristotle’s view of human
fulfillment or eudaimonia may be criticized for being elitist or intellectualist. There are some passages to
suggest that Aristotle’s view is indeed elitist since he claims that contemplation of the deepest truths of
reality, being the greatest exercise of rationality, is the goal of human existence. However we need not read
Aristotle this way. A better way to read him suggested by Stan van Hooft is to see that eudaimonia cuts
across the lifespan. This is how van Hooft suggests the process:

For a young person eudaimoniā consists in the control of the passions and desires that
good training gives him. For a mature adult building on the virtues of youth, eudaimoniā
consists in practical wisdom and the social respect, responsibilities and admiration which
that form of virtue brings with it. For the retired elderly eudaimoniā consists in studying
eternal things and discoursing about them with others.10

For the youth, eudaimonia is achieved through the practice of self-control, especially with regards one’s
passions and desires. Self-control is especially relevant because we know that the stage of youthfulness is
filled with raging hormones and passionate explorations. For the adult, eudaimonia is achieved through the
exercise of practical wisdom and by guiding the young in their road to a virtuous life. Also included in this
stage of eudaimonia is the adult’s participation in civic life, which is still guided by phronesis. Lastly for the

10 van Hooft, p. 77.

elderly, since they are no longer expected to be active in civic life, eudaimonia is achieved through the
exercise of contemplation.

Objections to Virtue Ethics

The Problem of the Happy Immoralist

We have constantly emphasized that in virtue ethics, virtue is necessary for happiness (in the Aristotelian
sense). But this invites a problem: what about the immoralists: are they necessarily unhappy? This is the
problem of the happy immoralist. It at least seems to be the case that there are immoral, corrupt and
vicious people who are enjoying their lives. Or at least, there may be a lot of people who may appear good
and virtuous in public but are actually living corrupt and abusive lifestyle unbeknownst to many. But for
Aristotle they cannot really be happy or humanly fulfilled because they fail to develop a virtuous character.
How is this conflict to be resolved?

One of the ways by which this problem is addressed is by analyzing the nature of eudaimonia. While many
may think of happiness generally as contentment with one’s life or fulfillment in one’s life goals, for Aristotle
happiness has a social and holistic aspect. What this means is that other people’s judgments have an
indubitable influence on how happy a person becomes. As van Hooft says, “To be deemed a happy man
was a public judgement that others made about you just as much as it is a private judgement that you might
make about yourself.”11 And so a criminal who may appear happy in the outside is not really happy
according to this criterion since happiness is a result of honor and good reputation that one enjoys for living
a life of virtue. We need to emphasize again Aristotle’s insight that a good human life is necessarily social,
that is, it involves having good relationships with others, socializing with people, and building a good
reputation in the public eye. Ultimately, morality is not only about our standing with certain moral norms but
with how well or bad we regard one another. And taking this insight into account, we come to see that a
criminal or a vicious individual who appears happy is not really so since such an individual fails to possess
a virtuous reputation, which is necessary for happiness.

The Egoism Objection

Another objection commonly lodged against virtue ethics is that it is an egoistic moral theory. Egoism is the
view that the right thing to do is one that benefits the self, even at the expense of others. Egoism is thus a
selfish view, and since selfishness is generally looked down upon, then virtue ethics cannot be right
because it advances egoism. But how exactly is virtue ethics egoistic? According to the proponents of this
objection, virtue ethics rather than letting us focus on the moral status of our action puts the focus on
ourselves by forcing us to ask, “Am I doing this for the right reason?” (intellectual component), “Am I
enjoying this?” (emotional component), “Have I already developed a predisposition towards this action?”
(motivational component). Notice that these questions focus on how the said act will benefit the virtuous
disposition of the agent in question while there seem to be a lack of focus on others. But this form of

11 van Hooft, p. 80.

thinking which is solely focused on our “own moral status as the only matter directly at stake [in a given
situation] is moral narcissism”, as Damien Cox stated.12 More so, the ultimate aim of the virtues is to
achieve eudaimonia but it is my eudaimonia that is the aim of my pursuit of virtues, not yours, nor anybody
else’s. But this seems to be egoistic, indeed. So how can a virtue ethicist respond to this?

This objection is a misunderstanding. What makes egoism such an unfavorable view is not so much that it
focuses on the self as much as the egoist is someone who does self-interested things at the expense of
others. We should recognize that there is a natural need to consider one’s self-interest in the living of a life,
and there is nothing wrong with that. What is problematic is when the consideration of one’s self-interest
unjustly trumps the interest of others. (Note that justice—understood to mean giving others their fair share
or due—is a virtue, and so an act of injustice is a vice, and will prevent one from achieving eudaimonia.)

Also, as Liezl van Zyl noted, “one’s own happiness or eudaimonia is not the kind of good that one can
achieve at the expense of others.”13 In fact, most of the virtues are by their nature beneficial to other
people. A generous person is bound to benefit others with her generosity. A kind person is likely to help
someone in need and is bound to inspire others by her kindness. An honest person is bound to benefit
others by telling them the truth rather than lies. The primary benefit that the virtuous person gets is her
enjoyment in the performance of the virtues (emotional component). Also, there is fulfillment in realizing the
honor one gains in the eyes of others for knowing that one has lived to be a virtuous person to many. But
recognizing these benefits to oneself in living a life of virtue is not to say that virtue ethics is egoistic.

Consider this thought-experiment: the first world is the world of continents where people know the virtues
and perform them but they do not enjoy doing them. They find no pleasure in being virtuous but they do it
anyway. The second world is the world of virtue where people know the virtues, act them out and enjoy
living a virtuous life. So we can see that in both these worlds, virtuous acts are exemplified. From an
outsider’s perspective, there seems to be no actual difference from the actions of people. But the first world
is where people don’t enjoy doing the virtues while on the other, people enjoy performing them. The
question now is: what is the better world? The immediate answer would be the world of virtue since a world
where people enjoy themselves is better than ones where they do not, all else being equal. In fact, even the
proponents of the egoism objection will likely agree that the world of virtue is better. A world of happy
philanthropists is always better than ones populated by miserable ones. Thus, the thought experiment
serves to illustrate that there is nothing wrong or egoistic with people getting pleasure and self-fulfillment in
doing the virtues.

The Charge of Moral Relativism

It is an undeniable fact that what count as virtues (and their corresponding vices) vary across time, culture
and society. For instance, humility is seen as vice by Aristotle but it is seen as virtue by Christian medieval
thinkers like Aquinas. In many non-Western societies, modesty is still seen as a virtue but in much of the
Western world, modesty is considered a vice given their so-called culture of liberation. Physical

12 Damian Cox, ‘Agent-Based Theories of Right Action’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9:5 (2006), p. 515.
13 van Zyl, p. 55.
aggressiveness may have been seen as a virtue in ancient Sparta but it is likely to be considered a vice in
the current corporate world. There is no denying that much of what we consider virtues and vices are
dependent on arbitrary factors, like the society where we were brought up.

Of course, the main problem with virtue ethics being relativistic boils down to what makes moral relativism
(in both conventionalist and subjectivist forms) deeply problematic. As we have already discussed, there
are several scathing objections to moral relativism, some of which are pointing out its inherent
inconsistency. But an inconsistent moral theory cannot be the correct one.

Some virtue ethicists recognize that virtue ethics is heavily dependent on tradition, defined as “the
collective wisdom of a people as handed down through upbringing and education in a given community.” 14
By this definition, one can easily infer that virtue ethics presupposes moral conventionalism since what is
considered virtues or vices is totally dependent on the considered judgment of people in one’s community.
Some virtue ethicists, like Stan van Hooft, concedes this point. As he said, “The community gives me my
own ethical convictions and intuitions by giving me ethical exemplars. Just as it is unnecessary or even
impossible to break out of the circle of language in order to establish the foundations of the meanings of our
words, so it is unnecessary or even impossible to break out of the circle of a community’s ethics in order to
establish the foundations of that ethics.”15 In other words, for van Hooft we cannot but presuppose moral
conventionalism. But as we’ve seen, there are several problems with relying on one’s community to tell us
what is right and wrong (or virtuous and vicious). For example, there is the social reformer objection already
discussed in the section on moral conventionalism which is strikingly anticipated by van Hooft. As he said,
relativism “leaves would-be moral reformers with no independent basis upon which to mount their critique
of the practices that they see as immoral. If there are no universal, objective or absolute principles then we
can only accept the prevailing practices and standards of our communities.”16 Stan van Hooft sees the
objection as a failure on the ground that “character as shaped by community or tradition can motivate such
a critique because of its inherent creativity and sensitivity to value.”17

But van Hooft’s response fails to avoid the inconsistency plaguing moral conventionalism. His appeal to
creativity is moot since if it is tradition that ultimately dictates what counts as virtuous or vicious, then there
is no reason to suppose that a creative expression of character that deviates from tradition is the correct
one unless of course he is already assuming a standard that is separate from tradition. This similarly
applies to his appeal to a character’s sensitivity to value. If tradition is what determines whether a certain
value is good or bad, then it is impossible to justify how a character’s sensitivity to value that deviates from
the traditional norm is even better.

A defensive strategy available to the virtue ethicist is to admit that the relativistic implication of moral
conventionalism brought out by moral disagreement is problematic but this same problem besets other
ethical theories as well. This is the so-called tu quoque (literally means, “you too”) response. Utilitarianism
has the problem of reconciling disagreeing views about what happiness or well-being consists of.

14 van Hooft, p. 31.

15 van Hooft, p. 36.
16 van Hooft, p. 40.
17 van Hooft, p. 41.
Deontology has the problem of reconciling different interpretations and even applications of the categorical
imperative. This boils down to the problem of moral justification, which is the problem of providing an
adequate justification of one’s moral view to skeptics, nihilists and disagreeing moral agents from another
culture. Of course, this response does nothing to alleviate the problem of moral relativism as it applies to
virtue ethics and given that, this is a problem that needs to be forcefully addressed by proponents of virtue
ethics in the future.

The Situationist Challenge to Virtue Ethics

Finally, the most well-known challenge to virtue ethics is the so-called situationist challenge.
Philosophical situationists, such as John Doris and Gilbert Harman, argue that virtue ethics is an empirically
inadequate theory for failing to recognize the results of social psychology which shows that there is no
evidence that character traits, which include the virtues, actually exist.18 Situationism in social psychology
is the view that it is the situation that primarily dictates how one will act in a given scenario. What drive
people to certain behaviors are factors that can be found within the situation, and not in the inner state of a
person. Consider the so-called bystander effect in psychology, the idea being that a person is unlikely to
help someone in need when he knows that there are people around. By implication, a person in need of
immediate help is likely to get assistance when there are fewer and not more people around.

The most famous and heartbreaking incident of the bystander effect is the case of Kitty Genovese. 19 Kitty
was a 28 years old woman living alone in an apartment house. What is saddening in her story is that
outside her apartment early in the morning, she was stabbed by a stranger for 35 minutes during three
separate attacks until she died. What is even more shocking is that the crime against Kitty was witnessed
by 38 of her neighbors and no one did anything to stop the crime. No one called the police, no one tried to
frighten the criminal or helped Kitty get away from the assailant. Social psychologists explained this
horrifying event by the phenomenon of bystander effect: since many of the neighbors can see each other
from their window or know that many of them are within the vicinity at that time, nobody felt compelled to
help.

One promising response to the situationist challenge is to concede to the results of social psychology while
noting that this does not prove that character traits like virtues are nonexistent. After all, virtues are
excellent character traits and must therefore be rare. This is the rarity response. Applying to the
Genovese case, it must have been the case that none of the 38 witnesses possess the virtue of courage. In
fact, it is difficult to find a true moral exemplar since one has to spend years of practice, accumulate
relevant experiences and look up to other moral exemplars before a person can become one. But this does
not mean that we should not try to achieve a life full of virtues.

An offshoot of the rarity response is to make use of the insights from social psychology in designing one’s
situation in such a way that one will perform a virtue rather than commit a vice. The situationist challenge

18 John Doris, Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Gilbert Harman, ‘The Nonexistence of Character Traits’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 100 (2000).
19 A. M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight Witnesses: The Kitty Genovese Case (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966).
only goes to show that situational factors have an important role to play in the development (or lack thereof)
of virtues. Christian Miller for instance suggests a precommitment strategy where “you take steps now to
make it harder for your future self to get into bad situations and easier for your future self to get into good
situations.”20 So for instance, being on Twitter makes you angry and express it by tweeting angry rants
against strangers, then if you want to develop the virtue of temperance, it might be better to get off Twitter
or to limit your time using it, or perhaps you can just follow people who are less likely to make you angry. If
being on Facebook or watching Netflix makes you lazier and procrastinate on important work, then to
develop the virtue of industriousness, you may choose to turn off the internet completely on scheduled days
so you can get important work done. This strategy is promising since it is sensitive to the results of social
psychology without compromising the core of what makes virtue ethics what it is.

Conclusion
Alongside consequentialism and deontology, virtue ethics is now currently perceived to be a major
contender for normative ethics. With a long history that can be traced back down to Aristotle, it has certain
appeals that make it an ethical framework worthy of study. What makes it intuitively appealing is its appeal
to happiness (which is understood differently from utilitarianism), making morality not merely a set of rules
but a necessary component in achieving true human fulfillment. More so, virtue ethics is holistic: it tries to
place morality according to what humans naturally value and desire. By looking at and following the steps
of moral exemplars, we have a clear way of developing virtues (and avoiding vices) that are necessary for a
life well lived. Finally, we surveyed some of the objections to virtue ethics where some are not adequately
addressed. In any case, what is important is to take into heart the insight of virtue ethics that developing our
own moral character is at the very core of why we study ethics and what will make us truly fulfilled.

20 Christian B. Miller, The Character Gap: How Good Are We? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 205.