Journal of Applied Philosophy

Journal Article

Against Moral Nihilism

Xim Martínez Barceló

ID: 17032958
Against Moral Nihilism

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to establish the use of the Conventionalist thesis by the Moral Relativists to
justify social moral theories is a Pyrrhic Victory against the nihilist critic that undermines the importance
of moral practice due to the relative nature of its judgements. After providing an overview of the
Conventionalist solution of Moral Relativism, presented by Gilbert Herman in Moral Relativism and
Moral Objectivity. I will consider in depth how from the point of view of a Moral Nihilist the futility of
moral speech can steel being solidly sustained. Having revealed the weakness of the Conventionalist
solution to overcome the main debility of Moral Relativism (how can I decide or support a moral point of
view over another), I will sketch a possible solution to the nihilist critic and defend the utility and
necessity of the moral discourse even if we cannot find any objective foundation to moral judgements.

Introduction – Against Moral Absolutism

It is easy to imagine a world without humans. In this imaginary world the action would not exist and
therefore morality would not exist either. Moral meaning would not exist as any meaning of any kind.
There would be mountains but not the concept of ‘mountains’. Good, bad, right, wrong, beautiful, ugly,
useful or useless is only for human kind and made by humankind. Morality is understood as a way for
humans to give meaning to the actions and facts that occur by the simple incident of living human lives.
Morality becomes a new aspect of reality, which is the result of being sociable creatures that live in
interdependence with others and have biological needs. It is an outcome of our human and animal
condition.

Living in interdependence with other human beings creates a set of facts and actions that cannot appear
in any other way. Consequently, these acts and actions only have meaning in the environment where
they happen: the human reality. Humankind use their actions to create a world that did not exist before.
This new reality has the need for meaning. They need to be embodied with sense; they need to be
justified when they emerge in the world. Hence, humanity through morality gives a new realm of reality
that emerges within it a particular and unique meaning. Thus, from now on facts are not purely facts.
They can become moral facts and therefore can be categorized only by moral categories. If we look the
action of stabbing someone as a mere factual circumstance, it is what it is: someone is introducing a
sharp and pointed artefact into someone else’s body, causing to them harm. Nevertheless, the action of
stabbing someone, in this new human reality, acquires a completely renewed meaning: it can be good,
bad, fair or unfair.

Ethics is the subject that studies a new corpus of judgments and meanings that appear in the world
alongside human beings. Where does morality appear? Through humans expressing themselves. People
express themselves in three ways: (a) interior, (b) exterior as an individual and (c) exterior as belonging
to a community. When Ethics studies the morality as an interior expression, it looks at topics like virtue,
happiness, duties or rights of the being within itself, etc. When Ethics studies morality as an exterior
expression of the individual, it touches on issues like: how should I behave in front of others? or moral
judgments, for example. Finally, when Ethics studies the morality as an exterior expression of the being
as a part of a community, it deals with the problems that appear between the being and the community
or between different communities. Using Hannah Arendt words, the place where this last kind of
expression (external, as being part of a community) happens is the Public Sphere1: The common world, a
shared and public world of human institutions and settings which separates humanity from nature and
provides a durable context for human activities. This is essential to create a stable background from
which public spaces of action and deliberation can flourish. Some issues that would fall in this realm
would be abortion, drugs, prostitution or problems between different communities that share the same
space. Thus, the root of these problems is moral but the approach to it is political, since these problems
affect all the individuals that are part of that community and therefore, share something that is common
to all.

Moral relativism is the theory that embodies the notion of morality that has been explained above
because of the moral theory that gives a better account of the real facts of moral diversity. This is
because moral relativism is matter of fact which, does not only happen between societies (where the
right or wrong depends on a concrete social, cultural or moral framework)2 but also inside societies;
between beings and groups of beings.

Moral Relativism

Relativism has many different variations and branches. Thus, it becomes impossible to give a synthetic
and brief definition that can fit in with each and every one of the branches of this moral approach
without falling into simplification and generalization. In the explanation that follows, instead of
explaining the main relativistic arguments I will expose the conventionalist solution to moral relativism
given by Gilbert Herman; first in relation to other theories and later, as a solution to certain moral
problems. In this way, I will show, as the explanation progresses, what this thesis consists of and what
relativism means in the moral sphere, rather than making an argumentative geography of the relativistic
thesis.

1
Arendt, H. (1969). The Human Condition. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
2
Set of cultural, religious, historical… determinations that establish the beliefs of a community and therefore its moral values.

Thus, moral values are understood here as social and purely human constructions .
According to Herman we could distinguish between two forms of relativism. Global relativism, which can
be characterized with the famous phrase of Protagoras: ‘Man is the measure of all things’ and then, the
most specific relativisms: Local relativisms. Moral relativism or aesthetic relativism are good examples of
local relativisms. Even then, all relativistic currents have a common theoretical core, whereby they are
called 'relativistic'. The premises that constitute this theoretical core in the case of moral relativism, will
be highlighted through a comparison between the general thesis of moral absolutism, moral nihilism
and moral relativism.

Moral absolutism is the theory that defends the existence of a unique and objective moral truth.
Relativism, on the other hand, states that:

(1) There are no absolute moral facts capable of confirming absolute moral judgments.

As a consequence of (1), Relativism affirm:

(2) There is no moral judgment that is more valid than another.

The first consequence of (1) and (2) is that moral judgments are not likely to be objectively true or false.
Therefore, there is no criterion from where moral judgments can be evaluated or analyzed in an
objective way. If this is so, what happens with ordinary moral statements? Moral nihilism, although
accepting the fact that there is no single moral truth, would conclude that this constitutes a sufficient
amount of reason to reject moral discourse in its entirety. On the other hand, moral relativism defends
that moral discourse should be preserved while arguing that moral judgments are judgments that are
likely to be true. In order to achieve this, moral relativism reconstructs relative moral judgments in a
way that enables them to give an account of absolute facts and reflects on relational facts. This is
possible, if it is established that the truth or the falsity of a moral judgment does not dependent on
factual facts, but rather that it is determined in relation to a concrete moral framework. Thus, Moral
Relativism affirm:
 (3) According to a moral framework M, X is morally good / correct.

Relativism understands what is morally bad or good in the form of evaluative truth: "good for X" or "bad
for X". That concludes that something is good or bad in relation to something else. Saying, "this is bad,"
or "this is bad for X" is not the same. The same happens with moral values and moral norms: there are
different moral frameworks with different standards of good and bad. In front of this solution nihilists
can reformulate and sharpen their previous critique and affirm: if there are as many moral truths as
moral frameworks (3), and none of them is morally superior to the others (2), then there is still a
sufficient reason not to accept the importance of moral discourse, nor the validity of its judgments.
Nihilists do not strictly deny that moral judgments are made in relation to a moral context, but they see
a difficulty in how a judgment that is relative, can play a relevant role in any moral issue. Relativists try
to overcome this new handicap by postulating:

(4) Morality should not be abandoned. Although moral judgments are relative, they can
play an important role in moral thinking 3.

In summary, these are the four fundamental theoretical characteristics of moral relativism. The
immediate consequence of these three premises is that relativism can only account for moral
phenomena in a descriptive way. Under premise (1) relativism can explain why theoretical
judgments happen and how they occur. This gives relativism the tools to explain phenomena such
as, moral diversity or moral disagreement within and outside a community in a solid way.
According to premise (2), relativism also accepts that there is no fundamental truth criterion
about moral judgments. Any moral judgment that respects the premise (3) in a coherent and
rational way, is true, but no moral judgment is more valid than another. Thus, moral relativism
somehow needs to give basis to a relativistic moral discourse between the frames of a theory that
claims that there is no objective standard of truth, superiority or any other type that can help us
to discern in some way why we should choose to support a certain moral judgment against one

3
Harman, G. and Thomson, J. (1996). p.6.
another. Therefore, moral relativism denies itself the possibility of developing a normative thesis
and also overcomes the is-ought problem articulated by David Hume:

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find,
that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is,
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation
or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that
a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be
a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly
use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this
small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by
reason” [Hume, David (1739). p. 335.]

A coherent relativist can only explain moral problems and their reasons, but he cannot justify why
he take sides for one or the other argument or legitimize why X solution is more valid than
another. In other words, the possibility of making a moral theoretical reasoning becomes a
practical reasoning that has applications and repercussions in the world is denied.

One of the solutions that some relativists take, to overcome the previous objection, is the
inclusion of conventionalism within their thesis. Conventionalism is that doctrine that considers all
moral principles as the results of a convention between people or communities. Moral relativism,
when combined with the conventionalist thesis, can not only explain why some moral principles
are chosen over others within a society, but also give a solution to the is-ought problem.

Conventional relativists rely on the affirmation that not all disputes have to be rationally resolved.
Therefore, if we take the criticism set forth above seriously, we close the door to the opportunity
of resolving moral conflicts in a way that goes beyond reaching conclusions, based merely on
evidence. Conventionalists differentiate between affective attitude (being happy) and cognitive
attitude (knowing that I am happy)4. The solution to moral problems, then, is not rational in many
cases since they include emotional conflicts and not just cognitive conflicts. Thus, when the core
of the problem is identified as affective, the conventionalists propose to reach an agreement. In
this way, moral conflicts are resolved through a bargaining between two (or more) different moral
conceptions that are involved in the conflict. This solution is very similar to the discursive or
participatory ethics approach of authors such as, Habermass or Seyla Benhabib. What now
legitimizes the changes from the is to the ought, is the agreement reached between the two parts
of the bargain.

The Problem

The Conventional solution is not without problems. The relative and conventional character of this
moral conception is the source of its power and its explanatory force. But this solution does not
overcome the nihilistic critique of moral relativism. Nihilism denies the premise (4) that is
established in order to get over the debilities that the premise (3) implies. These weaknesses
derive from converting moral judgments into relational judgments, where the truth or falsity of
moral propositions is determined by their conditions of truth:

(3) According to a moral framework M, X is morally good / correct.

We can understand (3), as a material equivalent, whose antecedent and consequent are variables. This
gives relativism a lot of descriptive power, due to the easy adaptability of this formula of the events that
occur in the world. The functioning of the theoretical structure of relativism can be understood in a
analogous manner, to the functioning of mathematical functions. Mathematical functions alone do not
have any concrete solution: they determine a number, sometimes infinite, of possible possibilities. Thus,
in order for the mathematical function to be determined by one or more precise solutions, it needs to
have fixed variables. The same goes for moral relativism: premise (3) by itself has no meaning, it only

4
Harman, G. and Thomson, J. (1996). p. 21
determines a specific area of "what is good / right". For (3) to acquire full meaning, variables X and M
must be set. What follows this is that the meaning of the moral content for Relativism is momentary,
particular and purely dependent on the context. It is a descriptive theory, not a normative one. This is
the reason, why this type of relativism uses the conventionalist solution to reinforce this weakness and
to show how; in a world where morality and its judgments are relative, solutions to moral conflicts are
possible.

The conventionalist solution, in my opinion, is a Pyrrhic victory over nihilist criticism, since it implicitly
gives the nihilists new argumentative routes, through which they can re-base another critique on
relativism. Conventionalism is based on the idea of ‘agreement’ and ‘convention’ which only happens
between humans or between communities. They occur in the Public Sphere, within the realm of what is
common. Therefore, the problems treated in this way, are political. That is to say that they are problems
with a moral origin but because they emerge due to the common space created by humans living in
interaction with each other, they have a political treatment. Indeed, relativism, when it uses a
conventionalist solution, denies itself the possibility of clarifying moral issues that concern other areas
where humans also express themselves morally. For example, relativism would not deal with problems
or moral conflicts that may occur within oneself.

The relativists, wanting to safeguard themselves, have given argumentative and demonstrative tools to
the nihilist. The nihilist´s can argue:

(a) How the moral discourse of relativism cannot be fully developed as the moral foundation of a
practical action since it denies itself the ability to take sides, to become moral meditation into the
motive of an action with the will to change the world.

(b) Indifference towards the content of the moral of relativists shows the large number of areas of
morality, that relativism sets aside. What relativists are doing, is what the nihilists criticize. Moral
discourse is trivial because relativism can only speak clearly about what the world is like. Therefore,
moral relativism cannot develop a normative foundation that legitimizes the action.

(c) Conventionalist relativism only gives explanations to those problems that, although they have a
moral foundation, are eminently political as they belong to the Public Sphere. Consequently, they
 leave aside the spheres of human interior expression and exterior human expression as an individual.
These two areas that, due to their private nature and not belonging to the Public Sphere, have no
connection to politics and their treatment, therefore, is purely ethical. This is to say that Relativism
ignores the fields that are purely moral.

Conclusion

A possible solution, that relativism can suggest, to overcome the nihilistic critiques could be to
interpret morality as a dimension that human beings add to the world to give it a particular meaning.
This is because conceiving morality as a dimension that emanates from humankind, as a product
belonging purely to the human spirit, peoples’ creative ability (to do things that had never been done
before) takes an important role and It can be a sufficient reason to defend moral practice. Moral
values, actions or judgments can be valued by the virtue of being created, as any other human creation
can be valued, studied… etc.

When morality is understood as a dimension, it must be accepted that nothing is in it, that is not a
human product: from moral concepts to the moral interpretation of the world. This means that it is a
creation, the meaning of which is created by the human beings, both consciously and unconsciously.
Among Mans abilities, he is able to create, to do or say things that have never been said or done. Thus,
humanity has the possibility to constantly create moral content and therefore, add meaning to the
world. This should be the fundamental role of the moral philosopher, who accepts moral relativism as
a fact that occurs in the world because, although there are no moral foundations to determine an
absolute or objective truth, none of the moral spheres or moral issues should be set aside.

I think the reason why moral speech should not be stated apart is because morality is a human
creation, that is in constant transition. All different points of views need to be faced and through this
confrontation and the knowledge of experience and rhetoric, the best arguments survive.

With this creative activity, philosophers, and all those who explore the world of morality, must give
tools that add meaning to the world, must constantly create content, seek new paths and new original
interpretations. The moral thinker, like the painter, needs to add new colours to his palette, so that the
world, like a painting, can acquire more and more tones and colours for those who perceive it. It
should not be inferred that philosophy is described as a free artistic activity. Philosophy has its own
internal rules, and so it is understood here without having to dig deeper into the subject, coherence
could be one of these internal and implicit rules.

In a metaphorical way, philosophy must be the “artistic activity” of knowledge, where reason and
imagination go hand in hand. These are the reasons that substantiate the importance of ethical study
and morality as a whole, and not only in its political implications. If ethics is not used as a tool to create
discourses that can legitimize a moral action, significant moral content is not created anymore, and
moral problems would be stalled. The world would lose its nuances and superstition, and dogmatism
would rise again. The ability to move forward and generate new solutions would be lost, the possibility
of approaching a problem from different perspectives would be forgotten. The world would lose its
colours and humankind would lose its ability to give meaning and value to its reality and to its actions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Arendt, H. (1969). The Human Condition. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press

Boghossian, P. (2014). Fear of knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon.

Harman, G. and Thomson, J. (1996). Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers

Hume, David (1739).  A Treatise of Human Nature. London: John Noon.

Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien (1922) La Mentalidad Primitiva.

https://es.scribd.com/doc/153800441/Levy-bruhl-La-Mentalidad-Primitiva-pdf

Seyla Benhabib (2009) Los Derechos de los Otros. Barcelona: Gedisa.

Stanford, P.Keyler (2003) Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 100, No. 11,
pp. 553-572