Basic Concepts in Ethics

Introduction: Basic Concepts in Ethics

In his short essay entitled “The Relevance of Philosophy and Critical Thinking in Contemporary Philippine
Society,” Romualdo Abulad (2017), one of the renowned philosophers in the country, asserts that critical
thinking is inherent in philosophy itself. His assertion does not pose any difficulty at all as those who are
trained and familiar with the discipline knew that philosophical concepts, such as those in metaphysics,
epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy, develop and continue to develop by building from the
theoretical limitations, deficiencies, and pitfalls of previous philosophers. Thus, notions like “overcoming,”
“destruction,” “deconstruction,” and “reconstruction” are staples in philosophy, which indicate that philosophy
thrives and flourishes, as some would pessimistically say, by “undoing one another”. But more than that, I
think, those concepts are gentle reminders that, in philosophy, no single concept or theory reigns supreme, and
that everything is subject to the critical gaze of reason. Indeed, untouchability is foreign to philosophy and, to
borrow Habermas’s words, in philosophy “the only force present is the force of the better argument.” It is by
virtue of this which makes critical thinking inherent in philosophy.

But more than this, Abulad underscores that Philippine education, more than critical thinking, is in dire need of
ethical thinking. He surmises that the Philippines does not lack intelligent people. In fact, the country has lots
of them – brilliant lawyers, doctors, and engineers – and yet the country still suffers from a lot of social
malaises; one of those is “radical inequality” resulting from unequal distribution of wealth leading to chronic
poverty of the majority of the population and extreme affluence to some. No country in the right mind can ever
swallow that the wealth it produces are only enjoyed by some of its citizens. Critical thinking, therefore,
implies that radical inequality is thoroughly analyzed and evaluated to the details. If critical thinking suggests
that concepts have to be thoroughly analyzed and evaluated to the details, ethical thinking, on the other hand,
prods that something is ought to be done. Hence, ethical thinking prompts us to have moral courage. But
ethical thinking, particularly in our country, means more than a quest for personal perfection. Indeed, it is a
battle for a socially just and humane society. For this reason, any discussions on ethics and morality that are
oblivious of the country’s situation do not amount to ethical and moral education. Those discussions cannot
and will not, in any way, pass the famous Kantian dictum: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions
without concepts are blind” (Kant, 1998).   Indeed, ethical and moral education is empty and will remain to be
so if it is not linked to concrete social, economic, and political problems. But if discussions about those
problems are bereft of ethical and moral theories, then they are blind. Any proposed solutions without due
consideration of the moral principles, we can say, are only issued from social, economic, and political
expediency.

More than ever, today is an opportune time to develop what Abulad calls ethical thinking not only because, as I
have mentioned above, there is so much which ought to be done in our nation’s life but also because the
country is embarking on a massive educational reform, which entails thorough changes  from the basic to
college and university education. One of these changes is the inclusion of Ethics as one of the core subjects in
general education curriculum. Perhaps, like Abulad, the government and those who are tasked to undertake
reform in our education curriculum see the need to develop ethical thinking.

But what is ethical thinking? How does it differ from theoretical knowledge? How does a person develop it?
These questions are important inasmuch as they remind us of the direction and overall purpose of ethics.

As Aristotle pointed out more than two thousand years ago, ethics differs from theoretical knowledge because
it is more than acquiring knowledge of what is right and good. Ethics entails that the person lives and
actualizes moral principles in her everyday concerns. That is why Aristotle considers it as practical knowledge.
For what purpose does the acquisition of the meaning of virtue have if one is unable to live by it? Thus, ethics
is about cultivating and building one’s character – a character of virtue – and it does not happen overnight. Its
possibility is gradually realized by painstakingly choosing the moral path – by choosing what is right and good
in everything we do from the smallest to the grandest. Hence, it is only in doing and acting morally that ethical
thinking is possible. Indeed, ethical thinking is more than just knowing the right and good. It is about doing
and acting on them.

In other words, ethics is about living the good life. In order to live it, as Ryan Maboloc (2018) said, one has to
be mindful of the fact that “there are only two paths to choose in life” – a life of principle and a life of doubt.
The former “empowers [the person] to act and become a person of virtue” as she courageously follows the
moral path, while the latter makes the person “choose temporal things” since she is “guided by whims, fancies,
and impulses” (Ibid).  In the former, the person “realize[s] the good life”, while in the latter, the person
“succumb[s] to…a life of vice” (Ibid). As we can see, the person of principle complies with moral rules while
the person of doubt only pleases herself.

Now, if ethics is more than the acquisition of theoretical knowledge, then teaching it poses not only a
theoretical but a pedagogical challenge, which is sensitive to and mindful of the herculean task at hand, that is,
to develop ethical thinking among our students. This book is our humble contribution to this cause.

In what follows, the students are introduced to the nature of moral and non-moral standards; the character of a
moral dilemma and its theoretical controversies; and the foundation and minimum requirement for morality.
These concepts are important to prepare students to understand and grasp the discussions of the succeeding
chapters.

Moral versus Non-moral Standards

Ethics and morality are often used interchangeably, yet there is a subtle difference between the two concepts.
As already mentioned, ethics is about the quest to live a good life. This is done through cultivating a virtuous
character by doing and acting what is right and what is good. But as soon as we state this, the next question
begs: how does one live a good life? Or particularly, are there standards to follow to live a virtuous life? Here,
morality comes in. Morality is about rules of conduct with which individuals seek counsel to live a life of
virtue. Ethics, on the other hand, is about how a person tunes in with morality. In other words, morality is
concerned with standards of right and wrong, while ethics is concerned with how the person fair with those
standards.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that morality is understood in two senses – the descriptive and
normative sense. In the first, morality refers to “code[s] of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as
religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior”(Gert, 2016). In the second, morality refers to “a
code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons”(Gert, 2016).
Clarity on this matter is substantially important for several reasons. First, if morality is understood in the
descriptive sense, then it follows that there can be no universal morality as there are various societies,
religions, and groups of people which, in one way or another, adhere to specific rules of conduct that govern
them. Second, morality in the descriptive sense implies that the relevant rules of conduct only apply to
individuals within the group and excludes others who do not belong to them (oftentimes, however, people tend
to judge other people’s behavior with the kind of morality she holds). Third, if morality is understood in the
normative sense, then it presupposes that there is or there can be a universal moral principle. Fourth, morality
in the normative sense presupposes a moral agent, one who possesses certain conditions, such as freedom and
rationality, which makes her choice truly hers.

Ethics, as a branch of philosophy which studies morality, understands morality in the normative sense, that is,
it tries to establish universal moral principle and that it posits that the person is a moral agent. Be this as it
may, however, if one surveys the various moral principles there are in the history of philosophy, one realizes
that there is no single moral principle that overshadows the rest. For sure, one encounters several moral
principles peddled in the market of morality. From teleological, to deontological and consequentialist ethics,
and to their recent variations, one is offered different moral principles which overlap, conflict, and diverge in
many ways. Each of these theories seeks our allegiance, hoping that if we zealously follow their counsel we
will attain a life of virtue and the kind of society we dream of.
In retrospect, however, we realize that each theory seeks to realize that which is good and right for oneself and
for others. Hence, a moral standard, whether espoused by virtue ethics, or deontology, or utilitarianism, aims to
provide individuals with proper guidance as to why some actions are morally desirable or prejudicial. But,
each theory boils down to one thing: a moral standard is one that not only tells that some actions are desirable
because they are good not only for oneself but also for others, but that it is acceptable by rational actors as
well. In other words,a moral standard seeks to codify rules of conduct (of right and wrong) which can be
rationally accepted by relevant individuals. It does not simply tell us the rightness or wrongness of the action
but it justifies why certain actions are right and why other actions are wrong. In short, in philosophy, a moral
standard is one that is justified by reason, and not by custom, religion, or by certain convictions of a group of
people. A non-moral standard, on the other hand, refers to rules which do not concern moral actions or
judgments. For instance, standards on what count as beautiful belong to this one. In other words, a non-moral
standard tells us what is preferable or not but it does not tell us that valuing some goods are necessarily right or
wrong. Thus, people value money and reputation while others prefer to live a life of poverty and do not care
how other people perceives them. These are preferences which are not necessarily right or wrong. Examples of
moral standards are: do not kill; do not steal; do not tell a lie; and etc. Instances of non-moral standards are:
Black is beautiful; health is wealth; and etc.

What are moral dilemmas?

First of all, a dilemma is a situation where the individual is torn between two or more conflicting
options. Applied to ethics, a moral dilemma places the moral agent in a situation that requires her to choose
between two or more conflicting moral requirements. A moral requirement means that the person is obliged to
do certain acts. With this, we can say that a moral dilemma consists of:; (2) an obligation to act on each of the
two or more options; yet (3) the agent cannot do both or all possible options. It is important to note that in such
a situation, the person seems fated to commit something wrong, which implies that she is bound to morally fail
because, in one way or another, she will fail to do something which (1) an agent she ought to do. In other
words, by choosing one of the possible moral requirements, the person also fails on others.

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

Level 1 - Pre-conventional morality

At the pre-conventional level (most nine-year-olds and younger, some over nine), we don’t have
a personal code of morality. Instead, our moral code is shaped by the standards of adults and the
consequences of following or breaking their rules.
Authority is outside the individual and reasoning is based on the physical consequences of
actions.
• Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment Orientation. The child/individual is good in order to
avoid being punished. If a person is punished, they must have done wrong.
• Stage 2. Individualism and Exchange. At this stage, children recognize that there is not just
one right view that is handed down by the authorities. Different individuals have different
viewpoints.

Level 2 - Conventional morality

At the conventional level (most adolescents and adults), we begin to internalize the moral
standards of valued adult role models.
Authority is internalized but not questioned, and reasoning is based on the norms of the group to
which the person belongs.
• Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationships. The child/individual is good in order to be seen
as being a good person by others. Therefore, answers relate to the approval of others.
• Stage 4. Maintaining the Social Order. The child/individual becomes aware of the wider
rules of society, so judgments concern obeying the rules in order to uphold the law and to avoid
guilt.

Level 3 - Post-conventional morality

Individual judgment is based on self-chosen principles, and moral reasoning is based on
individual rights and justice. According to Kohlberg this level of moral reasoning is as far as
most people get.
Only 10-15% are capable of the kind of abstract thinking necessary for stage 5 or 6 (post-
conventional morality). That is to say, most people take their moral views from those around
them and only a minority think through ethical principles for themselves.
• Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights. The child/individual becomes aware that
while rules/laws might exist for the good of the greatest number, there are times when they will
work against the interest of particular individuals. 
The issues are not always clear-cut. For example, in Heinz’s dilemma, the protection of life is
more important than breaking the law against stealing.
• Stage 6. Universal Principles. People at this stage have developed their own set of moral
guidelines which may or may not fit the law. The principles apply to everyone.
E.g., human rights, justice, and equality. The person will be prepared to act to defend these
principles even if it means going against the rest of society in the process and having to pay the
consequences of disapproval and or imprisonment. Kohlberg doubted few people reached this
stage.

Like other valued concepts in philosophy, the concept of moral dilemma is not without theoretical controversy.
While philosophers agree about the possibility of a moral dilemma, they argue whether there is a genuine
moral dilemma. This means that there are several types of moral dilemmas, foremost of which are genuine and
false moral dilemmas. On the one hand, a genuine moral dilemma is one in which neither of the possible
course of actions overrides the other. On the other hand, a false dilemma, as the term suggests, is not a
dilemma at all since one of the agent’s seemingly conflicting moral obligations overrides the other.   For
instance, Cephalus’s and Socrates’s dialogue about justice gives us one of the examples of a seemingly moral
dilemma. In that dialogue, Socrates refutes Cephalus’s definition of justice as: “speaking the truth and repaying
one’s debt” (Plato, Book 1, The Republic). Socrates pointed out that repaying one’s debt is not always right.
According to him, one should not return a borrowed weapon to a friend who is not in the right mind. Socrates’s
reply seemingly presents two conflicting moral obligations: to repay one’s debt and to protect others from
harm. At closer look, however, those two moral obligations do not conflict with each other because the moral
obligation to protect others from harm takes precedence over repaying one’s debt. In other words, opponents of
moral dilemma contend that moral obligations can be hierarchically arranged to resolve seemingly conflicting
moral dilemmas. In this view, the moral agent needs only to cognize and to choose that moral obligation which
overrides the other. Likewise, this view posits that several moral rules apply to various situations of moral
conflicts.

Others, however, do not reject altogether the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma. William Styron’s
(1979) Sophie’s Choice is a point in case. As the story tells, Sophie was a mother of two children. They were
in a concentration camp during the Nazi regime. The guards informed Sophie that one of her children is to live
while the other is to die. Here, Sophie needs to choose who is to die and who is to live. The point is that she
needs to choose one. If she chooses neither, both of her children die, making Sophie morally compelled to
decide (Styron, 1979). This situation tells that Sophie cannot hierarchically arrange her moral obligations
because she has only one of it: to save her children from imminent death. Those who hold the first view,
however, can still argue that Sophie’s choice to choose one of her children is morally desirable rather than not
to make the choice at all. For the former view, to choose one of Sophie’s children overrides her option not to
choose at all.

The theoretical controversy concerning the possibility of genuine moral dilemma is not easily resolved as some
think that the concept itself is muddled with logical inconsistency. This is because “[a genuine dilemma
requires a person] to do each of two acts but cannot do both. And since she cannot do both, not doing one is a
condition of doing the other. Thus, it seems that the same act is both required and forbidden”(McConnell,
2014). But I think, beyond its theoretical complexity and conceptual clarity, the notion of a moral dilemma
refers to practical situations where the person is compelled to make the moral act. And in such situations, the
person seeks guidance from moral rules.

Discussions on moral dilemmas are inseparably linked to moral rules. This is not to say that the quest for
logical consistency is unimportant. At all cost it must proceed and continue. But it should not lead us astray.
Whether there is a genuine moral dilemma is not the concern of a person who is compelled to act on two moral
obligations and yet she cannot do both. The most important thing, for her, is to resolve the situation in the most
moral manner and not to tell her whether her situation is a genuine moral dilemma or not. While this view may
be reductive, as it rests on a presupposition that moral dilemma does exist notwithstanding its theoretical
problems, it recognizes, however even in the face of reductionistic or simplistic charge, that situations do arise
where an individual is caught in a set of two or more moral options where she is compelled to make the right
one. In this situation the necessity of a moral rule becomes undeniable. For now, it is enough to presuppose
that a moral dilemma, whether it is genuine or not, is a possibility.

Just as philosophers do not agree whether there is genuine moral dilemma, they do not agree also on the
various ways in which it arises. Let this be as it is. But the development of its debate shows that moral
dilemmas could and may arise through these ways: (1) epistemic and ontological conflict; (2) self and world-
imposed dilemmas; (3) single agent and multi-person dilemmas; and (4) a dilemma caused by a conflict on
general and role-related obligations (McConnell, 2014).

A moral dilemma could be caused by epistemic or ontological conflicts. The former refers to a situation where
the agent does not know what option is morally right. In other words, the agent does know which moral option
takes precedence in a given situation. An example of this moral dilemma is: telling the person’s whereabouts
and knowing, in the first place, that doing so would jeopardize the person’s safety. Here the dilemma is about
between telling the truth and the person’s well-being.    This type of dilemma is clearly resolvable if the agent
is given further information.  In ontological conflict, the agent faces a situation in which she is to choose
between two or more equally the same moral requirements and neither of which overrides the
other. Sophie’s  situation is the case in point. Sophie cannot possibly choose who between her two children she
is to save – to choose between her two children puts Sophie in a real dilemma.   A self-imposed dilemma is
caused by the agent’s wrongdoings, while the world-imposed dilemma means that certain events in the world
place the agent in a situation of moral conflict. A self-imposed dilemma arises when an agent, for example,
makes two or more conflicting promises and neither of which she can disposed without conflicting with the
other. This type of dilemma is of the agents own making. Sophie’s case is also a case of a world imposed
dilemma.   A single agent dilemma, as the term suggest, only involves a single person, while the multi-person
dilemma involves two or more persons. What is distinctive in this situation is that, while the single-person
dilemma compels the person to act on two or more equally the same moral options but she cannot choose both,
a multi-person dilemma involves several agents with the same set of moral requirements. But in this case, the
persons involved may choose moral options which conflict with each other – a situation that leads to
interpersonal conflict among the persons involved. In other words, the single person dilemma concerns an
agent who is thrown to choose between two or more moral obligations, for instance choices A, B and C. The
multi-person dilemma concerns the same set of options – that is between A, B and C. However, while the
single person dilemma necessitates that the agent chooses among the available moral obligations, the multi-
person does not inasmuch as agents X, Y and Z may possibly have chosen conflicting moral choices – that is,
person X chooses A instead of B and C, and person Y chooses B instead of A and C, so on and so forth.

It is important to note that the multi-person dilemma occurs in situations that involve several persons, like a
family, an organization, or a community who is expected to come up with consensual decision on a moral issue
at hand. A family may be torn between choosing to terminate or prolong the life of a family member, and an
organization may have to choose between complying with the wage law by cutting its workforce or by
retaining its current workforce by paying them below the required minimum wage. For sure, the multi-person
dilemma requires more than choosing what is right; it also entails that the persons involved reach a general
consensus. In such a manner, the moral obligation to do what is right becomes more complicated. On the one
hand, the integrity of the decision is ought to be defended on moral grounds. On the other hand, the decision
must also prevent the organization from breaking apart.

Most moral dilemmas are conflicts between general and role obligations. For instance, while there is a general
moral obligation to respect and preserve life, some government agents resort to torture suspected terrorists to
get the necessary information to secure the general public. Cases like these are excellently portrayed by the
movie The Unthinkable.  In this movie, three nuclear bombs are set to explode at the heart of three cities, which
would kill millions of people. The person responsible has just been apprehended but would not reveal the
bombs’ whereabouts. The only recourse left to authorities is to torture him, an act which violates Democratic
Constitution and International Law. But even then, no amount of physical and psychological coercion
compelled him to give in. The last resort: to inflict pain on his wife and his children, which the authorities
eventually did. Finally, Yusuf, the terrorist, yields and reveals where the bombs are.

There were two moral positions in that movie, namely: (1) to treat persons as ends and never as means; (2) the
right of the person is not absolute; it can be infringed in lieu of a higher interest – in this case, in matters of
national security. The first is personified by agent Brody while the second by Henry Humpries, a former agent
contracted by the US government to torture Yusuf. Clearly, in the movie, agent Brody was caught in a moral
dilemma. Brody holds that it is unlawful to torture Yusuf as it is against the US Constitution and international
law – a position based on the general obligation to protect and preserve the integrity of life. But Humpries
showed and told her (Brody) that to torture Yusuf and even to inflict pain on her wife and children is necessary
since it is their role to locate the bombs and secure the general population. In other words, Brody was torn
between a general obligation and role obligation.

The point is that a moral dilemma is a possibility whose causes could be either one or two or more of the
possible situations mentioned above.

Foundation of Morality: Freedom-Responsibility for One’s Act and to Others

Morality presupposes that the person is capable of choosing right from wrong. The person’s ability to choose is
grounded on the idea that the person is free. Freedom, along with reason, is of central importance to the person
as it makes her distinct from other creatures, especially to her nearest kin – the brutes. Freedom sets the person
apart from nature because through it she transcends nature’s deterministic world.Like the person, the brutes are
capable of mobility. They feel pain. They sacavenge for food when hungry and search for water to quench
their thirst. But unlike the person, their actions are confined to their biological rhythms and instincts. But the
person goes beyond that. She can suspend her biological needs in lieu of higher and noble goals.

It cannot be denied, however, that the person, by virtue of her physical and material existence, is subject to the
natural rhythm of the world. Also, the moment the person is born, she is old enough to die. And death in this
manner is considered as one of those instances that escape human freedom. Whether the person likes it or not,
she will face the certainty of death. In other words, as physical and material being, the person cannot escape
some forms of natural necessity. But to reduce her actions as mere compulsions or responses to the stimuli
around her is not only to wallow into pessimism but to surrender one’s hope and life’s project. If one’s life is
completely determined by unconscious compulsions then there is no reason for one’s dreaming and hoping. To
dream and hope is to recognize that in one way or another we can direct our lives the way we want it to be. We
have the power to plan and manage our life. Hence, despite our physical and material existence, we are in a
sense free. By freedom we mean: we make our way within the limits of physical and material entanglements. It
is in the space within these limits that we exercise our choices. In these limits, to borrow Maboloc’s words, we
either live a life of virtue or vice. And to live in either way depends on our choices.

To presuppose that the person acts in certain manners within the nexus of her power logically implies that she
is the owner of those actions. Ownership of those actions means that she is responsible for her actions.
Consequently, it also means that she is responsible to whatever consequences of her actions to others.
Responsibility to one’s actions also entails that the person is liable morally and legally.

Contrary to humans, animals do not have moral or legal liabilities. This is so because they are said to be unfree
– insofar as they are absolutely determined by their physical inclinations. Such condition freed them from
moral or legal liabilities. For example, a lion preying on other animals cannot be charged with murder or
homicide as it is the nature of the lion to prey.

In sum, morality hinges on the idea that the person is free – that she is capable of doing or suspending some
actions deemed advantageous or inimical to her in the light of reason.

Minimum Requirement for Morality: Reason and Impartiality

  The fundamental belief in the person as a rational being is one of the underlying threads that weaves Western
Philosophy’s quest for universal moral principle. Most thinkers in Western Philosophy are convinced that each
person will come to a universal agreement on the ultimate principle which governs moral actions. If this belief
is not explicitly said, it is presupposed as an unquestioned assumption of most moral theories insofar as most
moral theorists spend much effort to provide a rational justification to their theories.

For most philosophers, reason serves as the grounding principle of moral actions. Plato’s classic Allegory of
the Cave exemplifies the person’s liberation from the World of the senses to the World of Reason. From this
liberation, the person does not only encounter the True and the Beautiful but also the Good. In this encounter,
Plato believes that the person will do what is good and what is right, insofar as the liberation from the cave
means that apart from the release from the bondage of ignorance, the person encounters eternity. In this
encounter, the person takes a wider, if not an impartial, point of view.

Of course, most moral theories no longer subscribe to the Platonic view. A lot has changed then. But it cannot
also be denied that, whether these theories accept it or not, they are in some sense still captured by the Platonic
spell. Let me elaborate.
The Kantian injunction to subject one’s action to the Categorical Imperative is one such case. For Kant, the
Categorical Imperative is a corrective measure which weighs and judges one’s actions as morally desirable or
deplorable. The Categorical Imperative is comparable to Plato’s World of Ideas as a necessary remedy to the
ills caused by the afflictions of the cave. Indeed, the Categorical Imperative stands as the impartial judge which
ensures that one’s actions are unfettered by one’s interests. And most modern moral and legal theories follow
this view. They recognize that the plausibility of one’s theory rests on a mechanism by which we subject one’s
view or actions impartially. This notion has taken many guises and faces today. In Jürgen Habermas, for
instance, this has come to mean the “discursive procedure”; in John Rawls, the “original position”; and in
Amartya Sen, “impartial spectator”. What these mechanisms mean is that the rational justifiability of moral
and legal principles lies on its unparochial or impartial character and allegiance to one’s interests. In short,
these mechanisms ensure that moral and legal principles, which will be applied to all, are free from the biases
and prejudices, as well as the whims and caprices of those who are tasked to construct them. Any moral and
legal principle which privileges one interest over another is not only viewed with suspect but will ultimately
lose in the moral test. Impartiality, then, is a fundamental requirement for morality.

Conclusion: Basic Concepts in Ethics

The objective of this chapter is very modest. Firstly, it introduces the idea that ethical thinking is imperative,
not only for one’s quest for personal perfection, but more so in lieu of the nation’s dismal social, political, and
economic condition.  Secondly, it points out that ethical thinking is different from theoretical knowledge and,
hence, it means that ethics necessitates a pedagogy that not only instructs but inclines the students to live the
ethical and moral life. Thirdly, it clarifies the difference between moral and non-moral standards. Fourthly, it
recognizes the possibility of [practical] moral dilemma amidst the background on the complexity and
theoretical controversy of the concept. Fifthly, it introduces the idea that freedom and the concomitant
responsibility to one’s actions and reason and impartiality are fundamental presuppositions of morality. In their
absence, the whole of morality collapses. The succeeding chapters will develop these basic ideas and we hope
that beyond theoretical knowledge, the students heed Aristotle’s counsel: ethics is ultimately aimed at living
the good life and [we add] the moral life for what is intelligence if one behaves irrationally.

Exercises in General Ethics

1. What is ethical thinking? How does it differ from theoretical thinking?

2. Recall three events which you were, in a sense, required to make a moral decision. Have
you, in those situations, lived a life of principle or a life of doubt? Discuss your answer.
3. List 10 standards in the society you were in. Which of these standards are moral and non-
moral standards?
4. Is normative morality possible? Are we not entangled by the social-world we’re in?
5. What is the main difference between ethics and morality? How does one relate with the
other?
6. Have you been in a moral dilemma? What did you do to resolve the situation?
7. Why should we be responsible for our actions? Why shouldn’t we allow people to just do
what they would like to do like other lower animals?
8. Does morality entail impartiality? Discuss your answer.
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content/uploads/2017/06/2-R-E-Abulad.pdf Basic Concepts in Ethics

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Gert, B. a. (2016, February 8). The Definition of Morality. Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy .https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/ Basic Concepts in Ethics

Basic Concepts in Ethics

Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Basic Concepts in Ethics

Basic Concepts in Ethics

Maboloc, C. R. (2018, April 5). The Meaning of the Good Life. Retrieved April 9, 2018, from Philippine Daily
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Basic Concepts in Ethics

McConnell, T. (2014). Moral Dilemmas. The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy .https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/ Basic Concepts in Ethics

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Plato. The Republic.http://www.idph.net/conteudos/ebooks/republic.pdf Basic Concepts in Ethics

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Styron, W. (1979). Sophie’s Choice . New York: Random House. Basic Concepts in Ethics

Culture and Moral Behavior

The overarching aim of this paper is “to explain the influence of Filipino culture on the way students look at
moral experiences and solve moral dilemmas” (Commission on Higher Education). In particular, at the end of
this paper, students should be able to articulate the importance of culture in moral behavior, making decisions,
judgments, and understanding social norms. This paper will also help them understand how Filipino culture
influences the way they think about themselves and the actions they take as moral agents. Moreover, through
discussions on the different aspects and features of a culture, students should also be able to recognize and
appreciate the differences in moral behavior among different cultures. In so doing, they will be able to
evaluate, at the same time, the issue of cultural relativism.

Introduction: The Question of Culture                  

Moral values, judgment, behavior as well as moral dilemmas and how we perceive them are largely shaped and
influenced by history (i.e., historical contingencies), power dynamics (i.e., competing ideas and interests),
and the religion of a society. The way we appreciate and assess things are not created out of nothing (ex nihilo)
or simply out of our imagination. They are conditioned by external and material elements around us that, in
turn, provide the basis for principles that orient our judgment and valuation of things. Combined as one
structure or phenomena, these external and material elements make up culture. In other words,  culture is what
shapes and influences social and personal values, decisions, behavior, and practice. Thus, to understand how
culture works and its features is to also grasp the reason why things are done in a particular way and why we
do these things the way we do them.

In the field of anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies, scholars have demonstrated why culture is the best
site for consideration as the material condition that shapes the way we judge and value things, and how through
culture these things come into concrete expression. That is to say, culture can tell us a great deal about one
particular society. Let us think about this idea concretely in and through our very own context, the Philippines.

To understand Filipino values is to understand Filipino culture.[1] However, in order to understand Filipino
culture one must recognize that it has been profoundly Christianized.[2] After hundreds of years of
colonization by Western Christian empires, the Filipinos’ moral and ethical imagination cannot be understood
outside Christian values and morality. Christianity is pervasive in our culture so that the way we judge and
value things and how things ought to be follows the doctrinal grid of Christian theology. An example of this
pervasiveness and influence of Christianity to Filipino culture is how Filipinos value more neighborliness (i.e.,
“bayanihan” or “pakikipagkapwa tao” or “pakikisama”) more than, say, the filial piety (of Confucianism).
Filipino moral universe is framed through the ethos of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this particular case, the
way we relate to others is greatly affirmed and influenced by what the Hebrew-Christian scripture teaches us to
do, that is, to love our neighbors as much as we love ourselves. Christianity reinforces the neighborliness of the
Filipino bayanihan system. In other words, within Filipino culture, biblical teachings found their way as
foundational principles for a social norm. Put differently, the intertwining of Christianity and culture in the
Filipino context is the base upon which we can understand why Filipinos do the things the way they do or why
Filipino believe things as they are.

Being aware of these “external and material elements around us” which we interact (implicitly and explicitly)
with and incorporate (consciously and unconsciously) into how we do things with and for ourselves and in
relation to and with others is, therefore, necessary in understanding why we respond to issues and to situations
of our lives in a certain way. In this chapter, these external and material elements around us will be described,
as indicated above, as culture. However, to limit our discussion, these external and material elements here refer
to people and their practices. And in relation to this, culture is normally understood as what people
do and how they do things—people and do/action.

Outline of Discussion: A Study on Culture and Moral Behavior

To further our reflection on Filipino culture and in order to place ourselves in a better vantage point, it is
important for us to first lay the historical foundation of our modern-day culture as it is currently (re)configured
today. It is necessary to thus start our reflection on the history of colonialism. The immediate antecedent of our
(Filipino) history that shaped our collective memory and experience is Western colonization. The discussion
that follows below suggests this idea: we cannot understand contemporary Filipino culture without our
collective memory and experience of Western colonial enterprise. Insights from postcolonial studies (Edward
Said) will be utilized in order to clarify and advance this reflection.

Today, to study about a culture, one must, at least, engage the insights of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.
They are the two of the more important thinkers in this area of study as they did not only transform the terrain
of this field, but also demonstrated why power and social structures are critical in understanding how culture
works. They can, therefore, help us understand the elements and nuances of a culture. In this second section,
the aim is to deepen our reflection on culture, particularly on the way in which culture becomes a conflicted
and contested site of various interests and power dynamics.

To conclude this discussion on culture, let us consider a work in contemporary cultural studies particularly as it
relates to the question of religion and culture. The aim of this concluding section is to emphasize the fact that
culture is not a homogenous space nor has a singular operative logic. It is infused with “other” elements that
may have shaped its logic. This discussion highlights as well the point that a Filipino culture today is, by and
large, shaped by a religious ethos of the Christian faith. Thus, to talk about Filipino culture is to talk about
Filipino religiosity/spirituality. In this sense, Filipino culture is an expression and way of being of the Filipino
people that manifests their “ultimate concern” (Paul Tillich, 1959).

In the Analysis Section, I will further elaborate more on the stake of the question of culture by way of looking
at it through the concept of apparatus of Giorgio Agamben. It is here as well that I suggest some theoretical
points about culture that have bearings on the question of moral behavior. The Conclusion Section outlines the
important insights from the discussion.

In the Learning Exercises section are activities that could enhance reflection on the issue of culture in general
and Filipino culture in particular. The exercises are for group and individual activity. This section may be used
to aid discussion or to deepen further reflections about culture and the way in which it influences moral
behavior.

In the end, this chapter hopes to provide an introductory discussion on and about culture, and to offer a cursory
outline of a framework through which one may think and reflect about culture’s role and place in moral
behavior.

On Culture: History of Colonialism, Power, Domination, and Religion

In its broadest description, culture is a structure of collective experience and shared practices which are
commonly expressed in, but not limited to, arts, music, dance, literature, behavior and social norms. Or, as
defined above, culture is made up of the external and material elements around us. In its simplest form,
anthropologists describe culture as a way of life. In any of this description, we see culture as life or an attribute
ascribed to a particular form of life, be it a society or a group of people that manifest their collective and
particular way of doing, thinking, and valuing things that are identifiably and distinctively theirs. For example,
this is evident when we compare Western culture as opposed to African culture. Western culture is often
described as individualistic (independence and autonomy as more important than anything else) as opposed to
African culture which is considered more as collectivistic (e.g., the Ubuntu: “I am because we are”) wherein
the “I” is only secondary to corporate entity or communal interest.

In the discussion above, the highlight is on the significant core of what culture is: that culture is a particular
feature of a particular form of human life. As will be shown at the end of this section, it is precisely because of
this link between culture and life that the question of ethics and morality is necessarily interwoven with
culture. Culture also has to do with what makes life flourish, what makes life continue from one generation to
another, and what counts for life’s possibilities. A Ghanaian scholar, W. Emmanuel Abraham (1992) suggests
this core fact about culture: that culture contains and encompasses not only the material but also the emotional,
intellectual, and ethical aspects of a society or a social group. In short, culture is undeniably related to and is
about life and everything related to it.

In the Philippine context, as the core of culture is shaped by the history of colonialism and Christianity,
Filipino life is infused with Western values and ethos of the Christian faith. Filipino culture is postcolonial as
well as Christianized. It is precisely for this reason that culture becomes a form and bearer of a form of life. To
further elaborate on the stake of this thesis, let us first reflect on the question of history, particularly the history
of colonialism, as a way to situate the formation and current form of Filipino culture.

What is Culture?: Reflecting on the Question through the Prism of the History of Colonialism

Let us first describe this history and experience of colonialism as “thick history”; thick because

this history not only shapes the current configuration (politics, governance, religion) but also because this
history continues to influence the psycho-social consciousness, define self-identity of the Filipino people, and
determine their interest and place in the geopolitical and global monetary order. The thickness of this history,
therefore, defines a great deal of contemporary culture of the Filipino people. Evidence of this thickness can be
easily seen in how our taste for fashion and music are Westernized, our love for Hollywood movies, our desire
for Western and American literatures, and our reliance on sovereign debt and Official Development Assistance
(ODA) from other countries. In short, colonial history is thick because it penetrates the social and the psychic
reality of the Filipino people not to mention how it continues to interrupt and intervene in its political,
economic, and cultural affairs.

In recent memory, postcolonial studies became an area of academic inquiry that investigates the issue of
colonialism and the colonial residues that remain operative in the cultural life, and as it pertains to our
discussion, to the Filipino people. Edward Said, a famous postcolonial literary critic and professor at Columbia
University, is one of the pioneering and towering scholars in this area. He provides us with an elucidating
account as to why the history of colonialism defines an important contour for cultural studies, criticism, and
analysis.

In Orientalism (1979), a groundbreaking book in this area of study, Said addresses how non-Western cultures
are (re)produced through representation in Western imaginaries and in Western academia. In this particular
work, he focuses on the way in which Western literatures have represented non-Western cultures in
unflattering terms—snake charmers, belly dancers, the exotic, thieves, the sensual, the depraved, the ignorant,
and the uncivilized. While he focuses on 19th century literatures, we still see this representation to be evident in
contemporary popular culture—in movies, for example, the Arabs are portrayed as religious fanatics and
terrorists and Black Americans as thugs. This is what makes the insight of Said on representation of non-
Western cultures, which remains relevant and significant, then and now, profound.

But more importantly, for Said, representation is a matter of operation of power; in a Foucauldian sense
(discussed below), representation is a mechanism that shapes “knowledge” about other people. Such
knowledge is not neutral. Because in this representation of other people, such knowledge creates
differentiation of people and culture—particularly, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes against other people.

Moreover, this is highly problematic because the way other people and cultures are represented have been
determined and shaped by their subject position in the colonizer/colonized power relations. In the history of
colonialism, this kind of representation is utilized and employed to shore up the superiority of the colonizers
and the inferiority of the colonized—i.e., they are barbaric (non-Western culture), we are civilized (Western
culture); they are irrational, we are rational. In this othering of non-Western culture, representation is not only
misleading but also inaccurate misrepresentation of others. It is also, unfortunately, an operation for
justification to the violent subjugation and inferiorization of others.

In his pioneering work, therefore, Said offers a new way to look at the history of colonialism as not just history
determined through arms and armies but through literatures, not only about conquest but also about
anthropology, not just about oppression but about justification of colonialism through a narrative. Although
this is more developed in his later work, particularly in Culture and Imperialism (1994), we already see
in Orientalism the way colonialism changes and influences non-Western cultures, one that is not immediately
visible to the naked eyes. These colonial codes embedded in non-Western cultures are hidden and veiled ideas
—for example, white race is superior and Western ideas are civilized and objective. Without the sharp analysis
of Said, these colonial codes will just appear as self-evident and natural, and as a result, continue to reinforce
the superior/inferior dichotomy of the colonizer/colonized relations.

This kind of trenchant analysis and critique of colonialism (through representation in literature as in the case of
Said) is described as postcolonial criticism. Such kind of criticism is critically important in our reflection
about culture because this only demonstrates the way in which culture is not only molded within itself but also,
more importantly, without itself. A culture is not isolated from history, indeed, from world history. In
modernity, it is affected and infected, for bad and for good, with Western imperial enterprise. A culture is
always intertwined with the affairs of the world. To use a postcolonial concept, culture is hybrid, like a  halo-
halo. Culture is constituted by different elements that became part of what it is―a mixture of assorted
ingredients, like chopsuey. In the schema of Said, contemporary culture is entangled in, one way or the other,
the Western/non-Western divide.

Moreover, along the insights of Said, colonialism operates insidiously; it is pervasive and it pervades even in
how we imagine what and how things are and should be (e.g., in literature or fashion). An example of this is
how we love to pattern our fashion after Western style—i.e., even in a tropical weather, we love to wear coat
and tie. This is the postcolonial Filipino culture, a mixture of style and preferences acquired through the reality
and experience of colonial relations, and an incorporation and integration of various things into a particular
way of life. In this respect, the history of colonialism made Filipino culture what it is today. How we
appropriated the experience and reality of colonialism is a testament of our creativity and ingenuity. But how
we use it to enhance our collective life as a Filipino people and our cultural identity remains an unfinished
task.

Finally, although he focuses on the problem of representation in Western discourse and literature, Said
provides us, nonetheless, with a way to understand the dynamics between Western and non-Western cultures,
between the colonizer and the colonized, whose relationship continues to shape contemporary perceptions and
practices of non-Western cultural subjects. Entanglement of Western and non-Western cultures have become
problematic because of its history and uneven power relations. Postcolonial criticism makes us aware of the
problems and issues, particularly as they relate to the question of Filipino culture. Indeed, postcolonial Filipino
culture is an amalgam of local and colonial ideas and practices, shaped by Western colonialism.

In sum, what I hope to simply illustrate here is this: it is necessary to understand culture, or as in our case,
Filipino culture (a non-Western culture but now a Western non-Western culture), in and through the history of
colonialism. In this way, we al so see how culture is (re)configured, and how subsequently, it can produce
subjects and practices in a way that it does. As I will discuss below, the Foucauldian (Michel Foucault) idea of
discourse/knowledge is central to this thesis—discourse/knowledge produce subjects and practices. Let us
proceed to this train of thought, first, by way of the theoretical work of Pierre Bourdieu on practice or habitus.

What is Culture?: Reflecting on the Question with Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is known for his works in a number of different areas of study, such as
sociology of culture, education, language, and literature to name a few. Many of his key concepts
like habitus, doxa, practical logic, and cultural capital have become integral and influential in social sciences
and humanities.

For our purposes of thinking about the processes or practices of social patterns, particularly in relation to
behavior, the concept of practice and habitus is especially relevant. By practice, Bourdieu refers to the things
that people do as opposed to what they say; and the way he theoretically develops this idea of practice is
through the notion of habitus. In his best-known text, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), he
defines habitus in this manner:

…durable, transposable, dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures,

that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively
“regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules.

Simply put, a habitus is a set of predispositions that generate and structure human actions and behaviors.
While it shapes all practices, it is not imposed on us by way of an edict or law. It is incorporated in us
unconsciously and informally. It is acquired non-forcefully. By doing the things that we see and experience in
our immediate surroundings, we acquire habitus specific to our social location. We internalize them—again,
unconsciously and informally.

Another important element of this notion of habitus that needs emphasis is this: it appears or expresses itself
into different manifestations, contingent on a particular social or cultural markers. For example, the  habitus of
a corporate executive with an advance degree (say, Masters in Business Administration or Juris Doctor) who
eats his steak with red wine, watches cultural shows and symphony concerts is different from the habitus of a
factory worker who does not have a college degree and eats “pagpag” meal (a dish made from leftovers from
food establishments) for dinner, and drinks Vino Kulafu. Put differently, a habitus is a specific set of
disposition particular to a specific social or cultural location. This is not fixed or static however. As in the case
above, the worker may overtime become a corporate executive. Or, he or she may win a lottery—which may
provide him or her with disposable income that allows her do whatever a corporate executive can do.

To study the specific trait and element of habitus may be difficult to grasp, but it certainly allows us to
understand why we do the things we do and explains them in way that allows us to see how social structures
structure social practices and behaviors. The concept of habitus then is the explanatory account of social
practices. It provides explanation to our actions.

More importantly, for Bourdieu, “the notion of habitus reveals that while a person’s behavior may be in part
determined by formal social rules and mental ideas—uncovered and described by the social scientist—a
significant determinant of behavior is hidden, implicit knowledge learned informally and embodied in specific
social practices” (Deal and Beal, 2004).

The theoretical insight of Michel Foucault, a colleague of Bourdieu at College de

France, the most prestigious academic institution of that country, provides us with a better account on how the
“hidden, implicit knowledge” significantly determines why we do the things we do through his notion of
power. For Bourdieu, power relations already exist as embodied in habitus between, as cited above, social
classes (the executive and the worker). Foucault however gives more weight on the issue of power and treated
it more systematically and directly to the issue—why we do the things we do.

While his work is expansive, ranging from such topics as madness, punishment, medicine, and sexuality,
Foucault is particularly relevant for us because of his work on (the history of) power—particularly, how power
operates to produce particular kinds of subjects and their practices.

To go about it, let us first establish cursorily how Foucault arrived at such theoretical insight. In his early
works, Foucault writes about various institutions like psychiatric clinics, prisons, and schools. He analyzes
how these institutions operate and forms “body of knowledge” that come to be seen as natural and self-evident
through assumptions and operations. In these works, for our purposes here, he particularly investigates the way
in which these institutions produce “discourses” or “knowledge” which then constitute practices relative to that
body of knowledge. This is the naturalizing operations of discourses/knowledges of the aforementioned
institutions.
For Foucault, the effect is disciplinary. People become disciplined subjects within a particular discourse.
Disciplinary power here is not coercive power. It is by and large provides the “hidden, implicit knowledge”
(Bourdieu) as to why we do the things we do. And this disciplinary process, for Foucault, demonstrates how
the “hidden, implicit knowledge” and subjects are intertwined.

Analyzing how institutions produce this discourse or knowledge and how in turn knowledge makes subjects is
what Foucault is known for. This historical analysis of such process of production of discourse/knowledge and
subjects is known as archaeological or genealogical critique.

So far we have a sketch account on discourse/knowledge and subjects. However, the question that remains for
us is this: how does power come into play in this equation? In his later investigation of social processes of
subjectivization, that is, the process by which a human subject is constituted or made “subjects”, Foucault
came to a conclusion that what made this process possible is the operation of power. For Foucault, “power is
not some monolithic force that appears in the same guises throughout all times and places. Instead, power has a
genealogical history and is understood differently depending on place, location, and theoretical perspective”
(Deal and Beal, 2004). In other words, power is an effect; and its manifestations vary depending on different
situations in a particular society. Or in its theoretically nuanced definition, Foucault defines it in his famous
text, History of Sexuality, in this manner:

…not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip
away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations….
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere…power is
not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with it; it is a name that
one attributes to a complex strategically situation in a particular society (Foucault, 1978).

Put simply, as an effect, power is a name that we attribute to social operations and mechanisms that produce
various kinds of subjects. It is also equally important to qualify—and repeat—that this power is not ahistorical.
Its “form” differs and varies across history. Corollary then, the kinds of subjects produced by such power also
differ and vary in every historical milieu. Thus, for instance, the difference between the subjects of before and
after the advent of Facebook is qualitatively different, either also here (Philippines) or elsewhere in terms of
location.

Through this Foucauldian lens that we see why we do the things we do is through power—particularly, as this
is inscribed and articulated discursively. “Power” produces “disciplined” subjects and “hidden, implicit
knowledge.” Also, here we are able to recognize the way in which social institutions, body of knowledge, and
discourses operate insidiously, behind the scene, so to speak, that make things appear as natural and self-
evident.

To summarize the theoretical insights of Bourdieu and Foucault as they pertain to the question of culture, there
are prominent features that we must consider. First, habitus as structuring structure for social behavior
manifests not only differently in terms of its social or cultural markers, but also,  second, in terms of its
historicity. Social or cultural markers are historical, thus, their manifestations and logic varies from one milieu
to another. Third, any social practice or behavior is produced by power, indeed, through power relations (as
power is always relational and social). What makes this persuasive and more relevant account is that, social
practice or behavior is produced through knowledge, or more precisely, through the ruling episteme/knowledge
of a particular time. This explains, for instance, why Filipino cultural and social norms and practices are
Christianized. With the arrival of colonizers on our shores, “Christian doctrines” have been the ruling
episteme/knowledge of our society; and this, in turn, shaped our moral consciousness and imagination. A
concrete example of this connection is how we think of marriage rights (a right of a citizen but conflated with
religious doctrines and religion of the person) or reproductive rights (a human right but always understood
through the lens of natural theology of Christian theology). In short, Christian episteme/knowledge saturates
the moral universe of the Filipino people. If Christian episteme/knowledge is a reading glass, this provides us
with the capacity to read the text before us.
In the end, the theoretical accounts of Bourdieu and Foucault provide us with explanatory insights to the way
in which our action and practice, and the way we think about them, is shaped by historical and social
conditions. Importantly, they give us a way to think about our culture that is shaped by Christianity—a theme
that I will now reflect on.

What is Culture?: Reflecting on the Question with Cultural Studies—the Filipino Culture

Finally, while we have already outlined significant theoretical considerations in order to not only define but
also to describe and understand culture, we have yet to directly reflect what it means to reflect on culture as it
relates to the question of what is right and wrong. The hope is that the foregoing discussions have sufficiently
already laid out the basic premise of this discussion: postcolonial Filipino culture is shaped by Western
civilization, and, more importantly, that the ruling regime of knowledge (Christianity and its institutions)
introduced to (enforced on) us by Western colonizers shapes our moral sensibilities and ethical orientations.
Indeed, it penetrates and sticks into the core of our being—our subjectivity and cultural identity. Who we are,
who we think we are, and what we are, are extensively determined by the Judeo-Christian ethos. In this
respect, Filipino culture is primarily a religious-culture or, specifically, a Christian culture.

In his classic and influential text the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), Max Weber suggests
how a religion/religious teaching is consequential to public life and order. Particularly, he argues that secular
and materialistic culture of modernity is indebted to the spiritual revolution of the Protestant Reformation in
the sixteenth century. But more relevantly for our reflection, he demonstrates in this work the relationship
between religion and culture. As contemporary theologians affirmed and as sociologists demonstrated how this
is still operational in contemporary society, the Weberian thesis remains a lingering and influential idea to
reckon with today.

What is worth highlighting in Weber’s thesis is that it also seems to suggest a direct correlation between
religion and culture. How they are to be understood as constitutive in contemporary Filipino culture will be
discussed below. To frame and further advance this discussion, it is instructive to adopt here the argument of
Dwight Hopkins. Hopkins (2001) writes:

Culture is always religious insofar as the way of life of all human beings entails some yearning for, belief in,
and ritualization around that which is ultimate—that which is both part of and greater than the self. Culture is
religious because the ultimate concern is both present in cultural material and transcend it.

In this argument, Hopkins particularly builds on and broadens the definition of culture of Raymond Williams
(“whole way of life”) in order to understand the way of life and everyday practices of enslaved African
Americans (during the time of slavery in the United State of America). He argues that the previous definition
of culture does not capture the essence of the culture of the slaves. In his study, religion is inseparable from
their everyday life. Slave experiences and cultural practices are interwoven in their religion as they encounter
“sacred word power” in the form of “the Bible (as written word), prayer (as words of hope), spirituals (as
singing words), and naming (as words of self-definition)” (Ibid.). Hopkins defines “sacred word power” as an
example of their everyday experience that is part and parcel of their culture—the experience of co-constituting
themselves in a harsh and cruel environment filled nonetheless with the presence of divine power. Thus,
whether they are inside the church or outside of it, enslaved African Americans embody such encounter. For
instance, Negro Spirituals (“singing words”) is not just a solo effort of a gifted enslaved. But it is a process
through which the enslaved shares his or her pain while it is also a communal participation in such pain. For
Hopkins, in this experience and articulation of such experience, therefore, religion and culture are not separate.
A cultural expression through songs, for example, is a manifestation of their religious yearning for that which
is ultimate and sacred. They are interwoven, so much that Hopkins strongly suggests that the most appropriate
way to describe this “culture” in this situation is to name it as religious culture.

Along this line, I suggest that contemporary Filipino culture is religious culture insofar as it is the product and
expression of the collective cultural memory of the colonized Filipino people. Historically, Western
colonialism is unintelligible without the support and sanction of Western Christianity and vice-versa. The
Christian Cross arrived in the Philippine islands through the Spanish armada. The Bible landed on the
Philippine shores with the American empire. Substantially considered, therefore, colonialism and Christianity
are inseparable experience of the Filipino people, and hence not a detachable reality from the collective
cultural memory of the Filipino people. Thus, the postcolonial Filipino culture is unquestionably Westernized,
and deeply infused with Christian doctrines and values. In this particularly respect, the contemporary Filipino
culture is a religious culture. But what makes this different from the account of Hopkins is that this emphasizes
the operation of colonialism in its substance and process. Put differently, the link
between culture and Western colonialism and Christianity is at the heart of the religious culture in the
Philippines.

Moreover, I highlight this dimension of contemporary postcolonial Filipino culture because this has direct
consequence to connecting the dots between “behavior, judgment, value” and “culture”. In the Philippine
context, any assessment on Filipino behavior, judgment, and value is insufficient without taking into account
its religious orientation and substance. Whether we think about issues ranging from marriage (same-sex),
sexuality (LGBTQIA), reproductive rights (condom, pills, abortion), environmental issues (use and utilization
of natural resources), and human rights (extra judicial killings), we cannot ignore Christian interest and agenda
in these issues. In Philippine context, cultural value is a religious value. Making this relation explicit is to
recognize the historical link, and at the same, the substantial (ontological) bind between religion and culture in
the lives of the Filipino people.

The tenacious tentacles of colonialism are also highlighted in this context because it seeps into the
consciousness and imagination of the Filipino people. As Filipino psychologists have pointed out, colonial
residues remain determinative in the life of the Filipino people. One example of this residue they have
identified is “colonial mentality”—we mimic and pattern our values and preference after the values and
preferences of the colonizer. Such problem is a colonial legacy that pesters Filipino life and culture. In From
Colonial to Liberation Psychology: The Philippine Experience (1992, 33), Virgilio G. Enriquez, thus, argues
the need for sikolohiyang Pilipino to work against a psychology of “colonialism and its attendant
characteristics among the Filipino people”. He highlights the fact that this is a virus that needs to be taken out
from the Filipino body. This highlights as well the historical and substantial fact that colonialism has
penetrated in the inner sanctum of the being of the Filipino people—an evidence of how invasive colonialism
is to Filipino culture.

In this brief discussion of religion, culture, and colonialism, the link between and among them is highlighted.
By following the insight of Hopkins, the necessary feature of culture is brought to the fore, and in the process,
identifying the essential categories that explain postcolonial Filipino culture as fundamentally constituted as
and by both religion and colonialism.

Summary: Culture as a Contested Site and as a Site of Contestation

As discussed above, culture is not homogenous nor a value-free site. Rather, as in the case of the Philippines, it
is coated with the “thick history” of Christianity and colonialism. Filipino culture is constituted and inflected
with Western culture and Judeo-Christian tradition. Thus, any discussion that reflects on the relation between
culture and moral behavior is inadequate without any consideration for the layers provided by Christianity and
Western colonialism. While the discussion above does not comprehensively address such relation between
culture and moral behavior, it at least indicates important themes that must be considered in to order to address
such matter.

What is not highlighted above, but one that has great consequence to further understand culture and its relation
to moral behavior is this: that culture is a contested site and a site of contestation. Let me discuss few
points here as a way to conclude this section.

First, culture is not just an expression or embodiment of what people do and how they do their things. Nor is it
simply just a representation of their ideals or aspirations. Rather, to develop further the insights from Foucault
and Bourdieu, culture is a product of power relations (M. Foucault) and hence it is also a generative field (P.
Bourdieu) that reproduces and sustains itself in such power arrangement. Thus, culture does not only reinforce
but also reproduce social values and social norms of a particular power arrangement of a society. It is in this
respect that cultural representation is necessarily contested and cultural performance is a struggle among
contending interested groups.

Second, culture is not eternal. Nor is it transcendental. As it is a product of human labor and aspiration, it
changes its forms and substance. Its particular form only lasts a particular historical, social, and political milieu
insofar as it is a product of a particular form of power relations and social arrangement. Thus, its influence on
moral behavior is contingent and transitory. The substance and form of human culture is like a chameleon;
they change according to exigency of time and place. Its influence to moral behavior is, thus, limited.
Nevertheless, and precisely because of its malleability, culture is susceptible to power configurations and
relations of a particular society.

Third, since culture is deeply interwoven in “power configurations and relations” of a society, it is thus
implicated in political dynamics of a society. It becomes and is part of a power struggle. As discussed above,
in relation to the work of Bourdieu, culture reflects and embodies class struggle in the society—thus, there is
high vs. low culture; dominant culture vs. non-dominant one; elite vs. popular. All this to say, the influence of
culture on moral behavior depends on its status in relation to the power and social configuration of a given
society.

In sum, culture is an important site through which to study human behavior, social norms, and, as such, human
life. Because it is a product of human labor, culture is also a vital site through which to investigate assumptions
about human action, human interaction, and human relationships.

Analysis on Culture as Apparatus

As discussed, culture is a human artifact that embodies and encompasses human life and all things related to it.
As such, it is an inherent part of human life. Humans cannot extricate themselves from culture. Neither can
culture be separated from human life. Culture and human life is deeply interwoven with each other.

In this section, an idea discussed above will be presented using an insight of Giorgio Agamben—particularly
on the idea that culture is an operation that manufactures a form or forms of human life. Agamben is one of the
most important thinkers today, especially in the field of human sciences. His multi-volume work on  homo
sacer outlines some of the most significant theoretical terrains mostly discussed in humanities today. Directly
relevant to our discussion here is his work that is immediately related to the work of Foucault, whom we have
already discussed above.

In his work What is Apparatus? (2009), Agamben develops the insight of Foucault on “governmentality” or

“government of men” into a full blown account of techniques of power operative in modern forms of
governance and economy. He calls these operative techniques of power as apparatus. For our purposes here,
the concept of apparatus of Agamben is useful as we think about culture as operations and practices and
insofar as it has the “capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures,
behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings” (Agamben, 14)—or more relevantly, culture as apparatus
that is capable of orienting and modeling and manufacturing behaviors and opinions.

To employ the Agambenian concept of apparatus to further our reflection on culture, let us consider culture as
a privileged site to think about human behaviors and social norms and how it manufactures them. Culture is a
(re)productive machine. Moreover, let us consider that it is in culture that a form of systems of belief and
feelings, rules, processes or institutions become concrete. Culture is the site where ideas and practices,
supported by knowledge and systems of beliefs and feelings, become visible and concrete in and through,
among other things, behavior. Now, there are two things worth highlighting from this insight: one on the
theoretical aspect and the other on the practical side.
The theoretical import of this insight is this: culture captures and manufactures subjectivities, practices, and
norms. The latter point is vital to understanding why culture does not only influence behavior but is also a
generator of human behaviors. In our reflection about culture, this is directly related to how we understand
why colonized cultures continue to exhibit and manufacture colonial residues that manifest in different ways in
the social-psyche, political economy, and religious life of the Filipino people. In other words, culture as
apparatus allows us to understand human activity as cultural production of values and behavior in its
historical and substantial specificity; that performance of culture is also a production or reproduction of social
norms and values.

The Agambenian apparatus makes it historically (and genealogically) clear the mechanism of culture and how
its formation and subsequent emergence and operation is a product of human labor. The concept of apparatus
also supplements and strengthens the postcolonial insight of Said and the theoretical suggestions of Foucault
and Bourdieu.

The practical import of this insight is this: culture as apparatus allows us to  see how cultural artifacts and
performances are not simply “products”; they are also performances that shape moral perception, sensibilities,
and worldview. For example, pop songs are not simply artistic expression nor cultural representation of a
communal aspiration about what love is; they are also “shapers” of a social and moral imaginary of what love
could be. Pop songs can transform ideas as they can posit what an idea could be. For instance, from the
biblical idea that love is about caring other people especially those who are most in need, pop songs have made
and transformed the idea of love into as a “many splendored thing.” This is what Agamben means when he
describes the operation of the apparatus as one that captures (“what love is”) and manufactures (“what love
could be”) as it applies to social practices and moral norms.

In that respect too, we see in a much better view the trace of the link between culture and life. Culture is not
just an intrinsic and inherent part of life. Culture also produces a particular form or forms life. In the above
example of love songs, cultural performance enacts and creates a “new horizon” of what “life” (love) could
mean and be.

In sum, the concept of the apparatus of Agamben adds a layer to our reflection on culture. Particularly, it
tightens the knot that binds culture and life together. And it allows us to understand theoretically and
practically the stake of this connection.

Conclusion: Culture as Not-All but Essential

While culture is important and necessary to the way in which we understand and explain moral behavior, it
must also be argued that this is not a zero sum game. Culture provides us with a powerful and persuasive
explanatory power on why we do the things we do. It is not however the only sole factor or explanation. For
instance, our fear or respect for rebellion (whatever the case maybe) against the laws of the land is a case in
point. We do the things we do in relation to the laws of the land because of our own set of perceptions about
life and what life should be. In this particular case, either we do not want to be punished under the law or we
desire order that we would rather respect the law. Or, we believe that the law is inherently oppressive that the
only thing meaningful is to rebel against it. In other words, there are other explanatory accounts that explain
behavior, norm, judgement, and practices. For example, psychoanalysis, existentialism, Marxism, or
psychology have their own way of explaining what and why things are, different from culture. In short, human
beings are complex beings that one box is not enough to place them. Thus, culture may be important and
necessary but it is insufficient to fully explain why people do the things they do.

With this theoretical caveat, the following concluding points maybe offered—repetitions but necessary for
purposes of emphasis and importance to the topic at hand.

First, culture is a human-made. To use a postmodern category, culture is a social construct. As such, it is
historical as it is social and indeed political and religious. In this sense, it embodies and expresses human
aspirations and their ultimate concern.
Second, culture is site specific. There is no “universal culture.” As discussed through the theoretical lens of
Bourdieu and Foucault, culture is particular and specific to a society or social operation. And as suggested by
Said, this particularity or specificity of culture in post-colonial era is marked by its difference and relation to a
dominant/imperial culture.

Third, culture reflects and embodies the logic and the power relations of a particular social order. Put
differently, it is a product of a particular social order. As such, it mirrors the values as well as the power
dynamics within a particular order. In this sense, there are “cultures” within a particular culture.

Finally, culture is performative. It is neither static nor fixed. Over time, it transforms itself, as well as its form
and values, orientations and qualities. This is to say that culture mutates as historical contingencies change or
social configuration modifies or political order revolutionizes itself. This is the case of Martial Law and post-
Martial culture in the Philippines, as it is in the Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution in China. Put
differently and succinctly, culture is what people do. It dies with people. It comes alive with them.

[1] Due to the inherent limitations of this chapter, we will not be able to reflect on the questions about
“Filipino culture.” For instance, is Moro culture part of the Filipino culture (since, for instance, Moro culture
does not share the lechon-loving culture of Filipino Christians)? How about the indigenous belief and practice,
are they part of what we know as Filipino culture (since they believe in diwatas)? This is to say that we must
be careful and conscious about our claim on what constitute as Filipino culture.

[2] It is equally important however to also highlight that this is not one-side affair. Pre-colonial culture had
also shaped Christianity. For instance, superstition and local belief became part of Christian faith and practice
—Simbang Gabi, nine days of mourning are examples of this incorporation of pre-colonial culture to Filipino
Catholicism.

Moral Development and the Moral Agent

Introduction

This paper is integral in the understanding of the moral agent as it focuses on the moral character and its
development, as well as the different stages/phases of moral development. The main objective of this paper,
then, is to lead the learner to a broader understanding of the moral agent. This paper also reviews factors that
influence character formation and theoretical perspectives related to stages/phases of moral development.

Specifically, this paper directs the learner to satisfy the four learning outcomes, namely, to (1) Recall defining
moments in their moral formation; (2) Recognize how character determines moral action; (3) Explain the
relationship between individual acts and character; and (4) Identify and articulate each stage/phase of moral
development.

These four learning outcomes may be fulfilled by responding to the following questions: What is moral
character and how is it developed? How does character determine moral actions? What are the stages/phases of
moral development and what is the highest level? These questions can be answered through the help of the
three moral philosophers, namely, Aristotle, Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. Aristotle’s theory on
Ethics helps in elucidating the character development and how character determines moral action. Kohlberg
acknowledged several issues underlying studies of moral development while Gilligan studied the
psychological development of women (Laura Ball, 2010). These three philosophers are equally relevant in the
understanding of the moral set up of the human person.

Moral Character and its Development

People frequently encounter situations that present ethical quandaries. In few circumstances, the “right” choice
seems quite evident, while in other circumstances a considerable lack of clarity about what is “right” may
exist. How do we come to know what is right or how do we respond in a principled way in a given situation? It
is here where the discussion on the development of moral character becomes relevant because it would serve as
a guide in moral decision making. As we may already know, moral character affects one’s moral decision. This
character is a personality trait or disposition that has become habituated in the individual moral agent. Indeed,
it is something that is developed, nurtured and cultivated. As Flanagan and Rorty (1990, 96) write:

It is one question whether a character is a good one. It is another to what extent it is  one’s own.  Of course,
there is an obvious sense in which one’s character is always just as much one’s own, regardless of its genesis.
Moreover, one’s character is not a possession like fine clothes or a house or even a Ph.D. Nonetheless, it may
still be more or less one’s own in a familiar sense, just as one’s opinions and creed may be more or less one’s
own. Indeed, the analogy is an apposite one. In part, for one’s moral character to be one’s own is for one’s
powers of discrimination to be actively engaged in shaping its content.

It is important to consider that moral character is not something that is imposed from the outside, but
something that springs from the will of the moral agent. Hence, a moral character develops as she grows into
maturity.

These traits must be praiseworthy and must have the content because of the agent’s active discrimination rather
than from the others, and it must have a reference to the value-making dimensions of the traits. In other words,
the moral agent has a responsibility for her own character (Flanagan and Rorty, 1990, 96). As Flanagan and
Rorty (1990, 97) put it, the phrase “The individual is responsible for his character” means that she is the “one
who is active in a certain way in the shaping of it”. One’s character, therefore, is shaped first and foremost by
the will power of the individual as is it habituated. One’s character is also practiced everyday as part of her
self-determination (Foot, 1997, 330). For this reason, we may view moral character as a disposition or
tendency to act or think in a specific way for which a person can be held morally responsible. And for Yarza
(1994, 174), these traits are rational, informed, and stable dispositions of the human person.

One way to explain further character development is through the virtue ethics approach. As will be discussed
later, virtue ethics represents the concept that individual’s actions are based upon inner moral virtue. As we
may already know, Aristotle was the leading figure in virtue ethics. In fact, virtue is a central concept in
his Nicomachean Ethics. Now, in virtue ethics, one does not ask the question, “what morally ought we to do?”;
rather, virtue ethics posits that the basic function of morality is the moral character of persons (Beauchamp,
2001). In relation to this, Beauchamp suggests that virtue should not be thought of as a moral requirement,
because this confuses with a principle or rule. Rather, virtue is a character trait that is socially valued.

As we can see later, Aristotle considered goodness of character as a product of the practice of virtuous
behavior. This means that for Aristotle, virtuous acts are not the end results of a good character. In fact,
according to Aristotle, virtues are tendencies to act, to feel, and judge, tendencies which are developed from
natural capacity through proper training and exercise (Yarza, 179). He believed, therefore, that practice creates
a habit of acting in a virtuous way. Again, it is for this reason that virtue is something that can be learned and
improved (Yarza, 179).

It is important to note that for Aristotle, virtue depends on “clear judgment, self-control, symmetry of desire,
and artistry of means” (Durant, 1926, 75). Hence, virtue can be viewed as a fruit of intelligent pursuit. The
virtue of excellence, for example, can be achieved by training and habituation, and that a virtuous character is
created by repeatedly acting in a virtuous manner.

Now, because for Aristotle virtue is a product of development, then we can conclude that a good behavior
comes naturally. For this reason, Aristotle believes that each individual person has a built-in desire to be
virtuous. Thus, according to Aristotle, if a person focuses on being good, the right actions follow without much
effort and she will do good things. But what does it mean to be a good person? For Aristotle, thing has an
essence. This essence is the proper functioning of a thing. And if this thing properly functioned, then it is good.
This is because, for Aristotle, anything that fulfills its intended function is good. Applied to humans, a human
person is good if she fulfills what nature expects of her.
But how can a person be virtuous? It is important to note that a virtuous behavior for Aristotle means
practicing moderation, that is, avoiding both excess and deficiency (Temporal, Notes, 2016. See also the
chapter on Aristotle’s virtue ethics). Aristotle calls this the doctrine of the mean. This “doctrine of the mean” is
a principle that suggests that a moral behavior is one that is in the middle of two extremes. For example,
between gain and disadvantage is justice, and between shameless and touchiness is modesty (Temporal).
Indeed, moral virtue can be defined simply as the just mean.

Theoretical Perspectives of Moral Development

One way of understanding the concept of moral development is through the contribution of the works of
Kohlberg and Gilligan. An overview of their frameworks will be presented in this section. However, let one
put to mind that theories such as that of Kohlberg and Gilligan are proposed elucidation for a class of
phenomena. It is not something to be taken as final and absolute. However, these theories may help one
understand how an individual develops and nurtures her moral life. Let me now develop Kohlberg and
Gilligan’s moral development frameworks.

Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development

Lawrence Kohlberg was a professor at Harvard University. He began as a developmental psychologist and
then moved to the field of education. He was influenced by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, who is famous
for his theory on moral development of children (Doorey, 2012). Kohlberg was particularly well-known for his
theory of moral development which he popularized through research studies at Harvard’s Center for Moral
Education.

Kohlberg’s theory was derived from interviews conducted on boys distributed from early childhood to late
adolescence. In these interviews, he asked participants to respond to hypothetical ethical dilemmas (Heinz
dilemma), such as a man considering stealing a drug to save his dying wife because he cannot afford the drug
and has exhausted other possibilities for paying it. The result of the interviews shows a pattern of responses
which suggested a progression in moral reasoning (Doorey, 2012). As a consequence, Kohlberg thought that
moral development involves process and time, and that people progressed in their moral reasoning through a
series of stages.

Kohlberg then came up with six stages of moral development, which, according to Doorey (2012) could be
more generally classified into three levels. The formulation of Kohlberg’s theory is shown in the table below.
As we can see, the six stages of moral development are divided into three levels and each level has two stages,
each of which has a corresponding social orientation.

LEVEL STAGE SOCIAL ORIENTATION

Pre-conventional Punishment; Authority

Stage 1 –          Obey or pay
 
(Self-focused)
–          Authority – Fear

  Pleasure Orientation
Stage 2 –          Self-satisfaction
 –          “What’s in it for me?”

Peer and Group Acceptance

Stage 3 –          Approval-Group Norms
 
–          Loyalty-Belonging
Conventional
(Group-focused)
Legalistic Orientation
Stage 4 –          Law and Order
 
–          Duty to Society

Common Good
Stage 5 –          Standards of Society
 
–          Social Contract
Post-conventional
(Universal focused)
Universal Principles
Stage 6 –          Decision of Conscience
 
–          Logical Moral Principles

Chart (2016): Adapted from the notes of Prof. Dennis Temporal during the General Education Training for
Trainees (CHED-Ateneo Ethics Course) last October 2016 in Ateneo de Manila University.

Let me explain each stage below.

Pre-conventional Level

The pre-conventional level, which is focused more on the self, is concerned with the consequences of one’s
action. According to Prof. Dennis Temporal, this level simply pursues its own interest while at the same time
avoids sanctions. Here, the child would base her judgment on the external consequences (punishment and
reward) of her action having no concept of the society’s conventions on what is right and wrong. At this level,
obedience is based on authority (“Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development,” article online). And according
to Kohlberg, there are two stages in this level.

The first stage is concerned with punishment and authority. Here, the child behaves according to socially
acceptable rules or norms because she is told to do so by some authority figure like her parents, teachers,
pastors or clergy and elders in the community. According to Kohlberg (1987, 7), the child obeys the rules in
order to avoid punishment. But Kohlberg argues that her obedience to the rules should be a result of a better
decision rather than just mere conformism.

The second stage is concerned with pleasure orientation. Kohlberg observes that people behave in the right
way because they thought that doing so means acting in one’s own interest. Hence, as Kohlberg sees it, one
obeys the norms because it is beneficial to her. Here, decisions are made based on the rewards one can receive
in doing an action by following rules (“Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development”).
Conventional Level

The conventional level, which is focused more on the group, is concerned with societal relationship, with
emphasis on social conformity (Burkhardt and Nathaniel, 2002). According to Kohlberg, people in this level
are more concerned with the opinions of others. Here, moral decisions are based on what the others may say.
According to Kohlberg, the third and fourth stages of moral development belong to this level.

The third stage is concerned with peer and group acceptance. This stage, according to Kohlberg, is
characterized by a behavior which seeks to do what will gain the approval of peers. Hence, Kohlberg says that
the reactions of others are somehow the basis for decision-making and behavior. For this reason, peer and
group acceptance become the rule of the day so that an individual retains relationships with others.

The fourth stage is concerned with the legalistic orientation. This stage, according to Kohlberg, is
characterized by obedience to the law, responding to the obligations of duty, and respect of those in authority
(Burkhardt and Nathaniel, 2002; “Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development”). Hence, this stage
emphasizes the upholding of the law, order, doing one’s duty, and obeying social norms. Kohlberg believes
that this stage is important because there is a higher value in obeying the law than by simply seeking the
approval of one’s peers.

Post-conventional Level

The post-conventional level, which is focused on the common good and universal moral principles is the most
challenging one (Zecha and Weingartner, 1987, ix). According to Kohlberg (1987), persons at this level make
judgment based on impartial universal moral principles, even when these judgments may conflict with societal
standards. At this level, a person does not consider rules and laws as absolute but a relative one. Hence, in this
level, laws and rules will only be considered as significant mechanism for maintaining harmony and order in
the society. According to Kohlberg, the fifth and sixth stages belong to this level.

The fifth stage is concerned with the common good. In fact, as Kohlberg (1987) says, this stage is anchored on
the understanding of social mutuality and genuine interest in the welfare of others. Here, laws and rules are
considered as social contracts and these are for the good of the community and for equal protections of
individual rights (Kohlberg, 1987, 9). For this reason, laws can only be accepted or approved relative to the
common good of the society.

The last stage is concerned with respect for universal principle, such as the principles of justice, dignity, and
equality. That is why, for Kohlberg, the basis of one’s action is not just the common good or a social contract,
but a deeper universal principles. Hence, according to Kohlberg, moral decision is not just based on the laws
and rules of the society, but on one’s conscience.

As mentioned above, individuals grow and develop in progression, that is, from one stage to another. It is
important to note that for Kohlberg, an individual cannot just jump from stage one to, say, stage four without
passing through stages two and three. Thus, for Kohlberg, one’s moral development is linear and is ordered
hierarchically (Burkhardt and Nathaniel, 2002).

Indeed, Kohlberg’s theory on moral development broke new ground in morality. However, his theory also
received fierce criticism most notably from the American psychologist Carol Gilligan, who argued that
Kohlberg’s theory neglect the patterns manifested on women’s moral development. Let me now briefly
elucidate Gilligan’s theory of moral development.

Carol Gilligan
Carol Gilligan is another American psychologist who earned a Master’s degree in Clinical psychology at
Radcliffe College and earned her PhD in social psychology at Harvard (Ball, 2010). Gilligan acknowledged the
influence of Kohlberg in her thinking while she was working with him as a research assistant (Ball, 2010). But
unlike Kohlberg, Gilligan’s interest is on women’s moral development. Thus, it could be viewed that Gilligan
extended the coverage of Kohlberg’s moral development by focusing this time on women (Gilligan, 1982, 4).

As a result of her project, Gilligan was able to publish a groundbreaking book entitled  In a Different Voice,
which made her famous. Gilligan’s theory added a deeper understanding on the moral development of the
human person, especially on women. Thus, it could be surmised that Gilligan’s work challenged Kohlberg’s
theory in terms of its generalizability. It is also interesting to note that Gilligan’s work has opened another
venue for a feminist critique (Ball, 2010).

Now, while there seems to be a difference between men and women’s moral perspective, Gilligan argued that
the difference is not that significant (Gilligan, 1982, 2). In fact, the difference is simply on the distinction
between two modes of thought (of men and women) rather than a generalization about either sex (Gilligan).
However, it is important to note that Gilligan’s theory does not simply aim to show the contrast between men
and women, but how this contrast can eventually become a venue for understanding both of them.

Gilligan’s theory of moral development is composed of three phases, that is, the concern for survival,
goodness, and the imperative of care. Let me briefly develop this point below.

The concern for survival focuses on what is the best for the self. However, it is the phase of moral
development where selfishness takes center stage. Gilligan acknowledged that initially the self cares for itself
in order to survive (Gilligan, 1982, 74). Hence, anything that can benefit the self will be the basis of her moral
decision. In fact, Gilligan sees it logical that before one cares for another, one must care for herself first.
Hence, one should be responsible first for oneself before being responsible for others (Gilligan, 1982, 76).

However, according to Gilligan, as the individual matures, she realizes that she is not alone. She then starts to
acknowledge that the self is also related with other selves in the community. Indeed, she recognizes the
presence of other selves in the community. In this moment of realization, the transition happens when the self
starts to see the others as significant to her life. For Gilligan, the connection to others will slowly become the
basis of moral judgment. This serves as a transition from self-interest to being concerned with others (Gilligan,
1982, 76). This is practical for Gilligan because the moment the self begins to see the value of being dependent
on others, the self also sees the benefits that it can reap from it. But it must be remembered that the kind of
relationship that the self had with others is not genuine because it’s instrumental, that is, it is selfish as it only
considers the advantages that it can get from the relationship. Hence, there is no mutual recognition here.

Now, this recognition of the other’s presence leads one to the next phase of moral development. According to
Gilligan, this phase focuses on goodness, which includes a sense of sacrifice and responsibility. Hence, in this
phase, Gilligan (1982, 79) quips, the self prioritizes the other, that is, the self puts the needs of others ahead of
itself. Hence, for Gilligan, the individual in this phase becomes aware that there are societal norms and
expectations. And this awareness allows oneself to be part of the society by adopting these norms or values
(Gilligan, 1982, 79). Thus, as Gilligan notes, a moral person is one who is capable of helping others and being
at the service of others as one’s obligations and responsibilities to others become her primary concern. It is for
this reason that for Gilligan, doing good to others is the basis of moral decisions.

The concern for others would lead one to the third phase of moral development, which, according to Gilligan,
focuses on the imperative of care. In this phase, Gilligan notes, the individual attains a deeper appreciation of
connectedness with self and others, including responsibility to self and others as moral equals and a clear
imperative to harm no one. Hence, the basic ethical principle of “non-maleficence” is very important in this
phase. It is also important to note that the individual in this phase goes beyond societal expectations, rather
than simply satisfying social norms and values. And the individual in this phase of moral development takes
responsibility for her choices, in which projected consequences and personal intention become the motivation
for actions, rather than concern for the reactions of others. Here, moral decision is understood as the exercise
of choice and the willingness to accept responsibility for one’s actions (Gilligan, 1982, 67).

As we can see, the theory discussed above emphasizes the ethics of care. It focuses on the individual’s
responsibility and personal commitment towards oneself, others, and the common good. This ethics of care,
therefore, implies relationship, obligations, and responsibilities towards the other and the world as a whole
(Gilligan, 1982, 62). This also implies for Gilligan that an individual cannot live part from others, and that
one’s concern for others has a higher value than the concern for personal survival. Indeed, the self can only be
“itself” because of the presence of the others, they are interdependent (Gilligan, 1982, 74).

Analysis

If anything, what then are the implications of the theory of Aristotle on character development and that of
Kohlberg and Gilligan’s view on the moral development of the human person. What is the relevance of
understanding or knowing the moral character and moral development?

The theories discussed above lead one to knowledge on the dynamics of morality specifically on the moral
agent. And one way to understand the moral agent is to begin by knowing what is character and its
development and how this character affects one’s moral decision. Aristotle’s theory on character begins with
the idea that as a rational animal capable of decision making, the human person has to decide morally one way
or the other. One’s decision, according to Aristotle, is influenced by one’s character. And if one recognizes that
a moral act is something that would eventually lead to a better life in the society, then that person would be
willing to do such act. In fact, as Aristotle argues, a virtuous man wants to do good because that is what her
inclinations and desires dictate her to do. Thus, a virtuous individual is one who does the right thing based on
moderation. And she will be cautious not falling into two extremes, that is, excess and deficiency.

Moreover, another way to understand the dynamics of morality is to understand the moral development of the
human person. Kohlberg and Gilligan offer us two frameworks of moral development, each complementing
the other. As we can see, Kohlberg focuses on men while Gilligan focuses on women. In this chapter, both
frameworks are appropriated in order to understand the two modes of thinking in relation to moral decision
making process of the individual.

As we already know, Kohlberg talks about three different stages of moral development. He affirms that these
stages are hierarchical and in the process of development, one cannot just proceed to a higher stage without
passing through the lower ones. As an implication of such a theory, one realizes that as one matures in age and
wisdom, one also matures in moral decision making. However, one’s moral development takes time. It is not
something that is done in few years. Indeed, the stages in Kohlberg’s theory suggest that moral development is
not an overnight process. It is a life-long process. It is something that an individual should work on everyday
of her life. As one matures and grows in wisdom, a moral agent has to expand her moral horizon, that is, from
simple fear and avoidance of punishment  towards the highest stage which is based on universal principles. But
at the end of the day, the moral agent has to be responsible whatever stage one reached.

Gilligan’s theory of moral development, on the other hand, is composed of three phases, that is, the concern for
survival, goodness, and the imperative of care. What this implies is that for Gilligan, moral decision making
involves not only the consideration of the self, but also the good of the entire society. According to Gilligan, as
one grows in a certain family or society, one begins to realize the value of self and as well as the others.
Gilligan believes that this value of self and others determines one’s moral decision. Moreover, the three phases
in Gilligan’s theory of moral development suggest that the standard or criteria for moral decision is caring for
the others and the world at large.

In the end, however, it must be noted that Aristotle, Kohlberg and Gilligan’s theories of moral development
should be viewed simply as guideposts in moral decision making; they should not be taken as absolute. One
reason for this is that there are quite a number of famous theories of moral development out there. But I chose
Aristotle, Kohlberg and Gilligan because I believe that their theories are the most appropriate in this context.

Conclusion

This chapter explores the concept of moral character and its development. It also develops the moral
philosophy of three influential moral philosophers, namely, Aristotle, Kohlberg and Gilligan.

What we learned from the reading above is that a moral character is something that a human person develops
as he grows and matures. Hence, a moral character is habituated, nurtured and cultivated with the willingness
and cooperation of the person. In this process, however, the moral agent has to be actively engaged.

In terms of moral development, both Kohlberg and Gilligan presented different stages and/or phases in the
moral agent’s life. Kohlberg offers six stages while Gilligan three. Here, we learned that Kohlberg focuses on
men’s moral development while Gilligan focuses on women. Lastly, we also learned that both philosophers
acknowledged the importance of the moral development of men and women.

Works Cited

Ball, L. (2010). “Carol Gilligan.” Retrieved from https://www.feministvoices.com/carol-gilligan/ accessed on

04 April 2018.

Beauchamp, T. L. (2001). Philosophical Ethics (3rd ed). Boston: McGraw Hill.

Burkhardt, M. A. and Nathaniel, A. K. (2002). Ethics and issues in Contemporary Nursing. Singapore:

Thomson Learning Asia.

Doorey, M. (2012) “Lawrence Kohlberg.” Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lawrence-

Kohlberg accessed on 04 April 2018.

Durant, W. (1926). The story of philosophy. New York: Washington Square Press.

Flanagan, O. and Rorty, O. (1990). Identity, character, and morality. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. USA: Harvard
University Press.

Hall, E. T. (1973). The Silent Language. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1987). The philosophy of moral development. New York: Harper and Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1987). “Conscience as principled responsibility: On the philosophy of stage six.” in Zecha, G.
and Weingartner, P. (eds.). Conscience: an interdisciplinary view. Holland: D. Reidel Publishing.

“Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development.” Retrieved

from    http://www.waunakee.k12.wi.us/faculty/lcarothers/English10/Mockingbird/Kohlbergs%20Stages.pdf a
ccessed on 03 April 2018.

“Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development.” Retrieved

from http://www.suttonclassroom.com/uploads/9/0/6/0/9060273/lawrence_kohlberg_chart.pdf accessed on 03
April 2018.
“Moral Development.” Retrieved from http://www.healthofchildren.com/M/Moral-Development.html accessed
on 03 April 2018. See also https://philonotes.com/index.php/2017/11/27/racism-and-immigration/.

Temporal, D. (2016). Notes on Ethics Training. Ateneo De Manila University.

Yarza, Ignatius (1994). History of Ancient Philosophy. Manila: Sinag-Tala Publishers.

Zecha, G. and Weingartner, P. (eds.) (1987). Conscience: an interdisciplinary view. Holland: D. Reidel

Publishing.

What is Moral Experience? 

Introduction

In this paper, we shall tackle another element of moral experience – the act. First, we shall discuss the
hermeneutical nature of moral experience to provide a necessary backdrop for our succeeding discussions. We
will clarify what characterizes a truly human action and a good moral decision. We shall also find out how our
feelings shape our moral decisions and why feelings get in the way of reasoned and impartial decision-making.
Analysis of cases of moral dilemmas will be presented to serve as bases of the students’ own analysis later in
the exercise/assessment part. We shall adopt a seven-step model for decision making to aid us in our analysis.
The discussion will come to a close differentiating moral knowledge from moral courage and highlighting the
need to cultivate the will towards what is right and reasonable in the hope that everyone, students of Ethics in
particular, will become morally reasonable and courageous human persons.

What is a Moral Experience?

Experience in its broadest sense refers to anything we undergo, to our encounters, and to what happens to us.
In a lifetime, we will have countless experiences which will shape us and of course, since there will be more
experiences to come, there is no end to the shaping of our person.

Interestingly, Hans-Georg Gadamer, a famous German thinker, speaks of experience in two senses: in the first
sense, experiences in plural form and in the second sense, experience as singular, which is notably
characterized by its continuity as a process where particular experiences are all streamed in (1998, pp xiii-xiv).
A more experienced person in the first sense of the word “experience” is one who is knowledgeable about
particulars and has expansive knowledge about things; while an experienced person in the second sense is one
who is “taught and corrected” (van Tongeren, 1994, p. 202) and humbled by experience and being aware of
one’s own finitude and limitations in the vastness of reality. Here, a person opens his/her self to the possibility
of knowledge and of such knowledge to be interrogated by experiences. This points to the paradoxical nature
of experience such that the more one grows in experience, the more one comes face to face with his ignorance.

However, because every human experience requires understanding, interpretation, and application, every
experience can be considered hermeneutical (Gadamer, 1998, p. 308). As such, any encounter that fails to
reach our level of understanding or to call upon us to interpret or to rouse us from our complacent existence
can hardly be called an experience at all. An experience, therefore, is one that initiates us to a process of
meaning-making. For both Gadamer (1998) and van Tongeren (1994, p. 203), experience takes place when one
is “summoned” by meaning and “when something speaks to us”. This leads one to examine and put to test
one’s sense of meaning through and by his/her encounters with things.

Being summoned to meaning, one is called to conduct critical examination of one’s own conceptions, attitude,
prejudices, decisions, behaviour and even, feelings. The call, incidentally, may originate or be triggered by
extraneous factors say, an incident being witnessed or a situation to which one is subjected or a question posed
by the other person. However, without us acknowledging the legitimacy of the call, it holds no power over us.
Hence, every experience to which we are subjected, involves us actively, individually, and personally so that
every human experience in so far as it is ours, touches base on who we truly are at the core of our persons and
so, is considered to have a moral dimension.

Nonetheless, to speak of all human experiences to have a moral dimension should not be taken to mean that all
experiences are essentially moral experiences for there is something profoundly moral in the latter that is not
true to all species of experience.

And so, we ask: What sets moral experience apart from other species of experience? How do we know that the
experience we undergo at the moment is a moral one? It seems, in explaining the concept of moral experience,
we cannot avoid resorting to circular reasoning. Essentially, moral experience is an experience of moral value
such that one’s moral consciousness comes to work as one is called “to [make a] moral response” (van
Tongeren, p. 204). Let me highlight the key points presented in this definition.

First, our moral experience puts our moral consciousness to work. Whether it’s the arousal of moral
consciousness that results in the occurrence of moral experience or the reverse, is hardly the point at issue here.
In a moral experience, one’s sense of right and wrong or the so-called moral consciousness comes to play.
Whatever factors or conditioning variables may have helped develop or shape it, such moral sense frames our
ways of viewing and responding to moral situations and eventually, our moral decisions.

Second, moral experience is an experience of moral value. Moral value refers to the quality of something
being good or bad, right or wrong, and just or unjust. It differs from other types of values because it demands
for a response, it involves moral responsibility, and it defines both the action and the human agent.
Accordingly, De Finance (1991, p. 69) highlights the role of moral value in the sphere of human existence
because for him moral value is the only value which alone “‘measures’ the human action as human and
through it the person as person.” He further said that “moral value affects [one] at the center of his [or her]
being as a person” (p.85).

Third, as mentioned, moral experience which is an experience of moral value, defines us. Either we are

drawn towards an action because of the good that we sense in it or we sense the good because of our own value
or that “goodness” that is in us. Whichever is the case, in the process and as a result, our choice becomes us.
For instance, as generally experienced, we are inclined to think that possession of wealth makes a person
wealthy; of beauty makes a person beautiful; and of intelligence makes a person intelligent. But being wealthy,
beautiful and/or intelligent does not define one’s person in the way being a liar or a murderer does. We cannot
say, Ann is beautiful, intelligent and rich therefore she is a good person; but we can say, Ann is honest, truthful
and kind, hence, she is a good person.

Fourth, moral experience is not a one-time but is an ongoing, continuous process. It can be said that by
choosing the good, we become good. By choosing to tell the truth, one becomes honest in so far as that
particular instance is concerned. But honesty exhibited once does not make one honest for to be such, one has
to consistently choose to be honest. It may sound straightforward and formulaic but actual moral experience
can be far more complex than hypothetical situations we play in our heads. Hence, becoming good, as the word
“becoming” itself connotes, involves a constant struggle. Every experience demands thinking and decision-
making and there can be no universal formula to solve every moral dilemma. Hence, every moral situation
calls for our rational deliberation and affirmation of our humanity.

Fifth, moral experience touches on and brings in one’s moral ideals. Our moral ideals pertain to what are
believed to constitute a life that is worthy of humans which are products of generations of shaping via our
tradition and which come to the fore as summoned by experience. Van Tongeren (1994, p. 204) states:

Moral experience [happens when we are] being addressed by something or someone in such a way that, by
inherent authority, we are summoned or obliged to commit ourselves to, or continue in a certain way of acting
or relating, or praxis, which is at the same time understood as being part of real or good human life.
For instance, let us take a look at our moral experience of shame or regret. What makes the experience of
shame or regret truly a moral one is that it reminds us of how we actually conduct ourselves in the light of how
we should. It reminds us that there are certain ways of thinking, acting or behaving that are expected of us
because we are human beings, after all.

Finally, moral experience is action-oriented. In the face of a moral situation, we feel compelled to respond
and to respond personally and right away. In the language of De Finance (pp. 84 -85), “the demands of
morality do not allow for holidays or strategic retreat [and in it] no one can take [one’s] place in attaining the
value [that one is] called upon to achieve”. We cannot therefore delay choosing what is good neither can we
ask another to make a moral choice for us. If we realize the need to be good, the duty to be good begins right
here and right now and not tomorrow and not elsewhere. More importantly, we become good not because we
believe in being good or because our parents are but because we choose what is good and to be good in thought
and in action. In other words, as one is summoned to meaning in moral experience such sense of meaning has
to take shape more concretely in the form of human action.

What is a Human Action?

There are two general types of actions by human agents: one that is devoid of moral value, referred to simply
as “acts of man” and the other which is of moral value, referred to as “human acts.”

Act of man. I need you to ask yourself: what it is that you do at the moment? You are reading this text and as
you read, your eyes are moving back and forth from one side of the page to the other side, from one sentence
to another. You can almost feel the thoughts racing in your head. Your heart beats and you become conscious
of how it beats.  These are just some of the many things that you do at the moment. These are all considered to
be actions of a human person but most of them lack the characteristics that define a truly human act.

Actions which proceed from the natural programming of the body such as “instinctive, thoughtless
movements, mannerisms, [and] reflex actions…” (De Finance, 1991, p. 35) are not considered to be properly
human actions as they happen outside the control of the human agent. Likewise, any action done by an
individual out of honest ignorance hardly fits in the criteria of a human action. Hence, acts of man are actions
that are based on instincts or driven by factors other than reason and free will.

Human actions, on the other hand, are actions which, as Glenn (1968, p.3) notes, “proceed from the deliberate
free will of man…and which are proper to man as man”. Hence, human actions are those actions which
properly belong to conscious, rational, and free human beings. Let us highlight the key elements of human
actions.

Primarily, human actions are those done by an agent with knowledge or consciousness as opposed to actions
which are done with or out of ignorance. Knowledge here pertains to knowledge of the facts surrounding or
characterizing the situation, the choices available and even the possible consequences of the choices. For
instance, a person unaware that her friend is allergic of peanuts, serves her a peanut butter sandwich. Had she
known about her allergy, she could have served a sandwich with a different filling.  What is lacking in the
action is knowledge. In its absence, there is ignorance. However, a condition of ignorance not automatically
cancel out moral responsibility except when such ignorance is totally beyond remedy. On the other hand, a
person who does things with knowledge, whether partial or full, is accountable over his/her action.

Secondarily, human actions are those which involve freedom and are carried out voluntarily. The exercise of
freedom is only possible in the presence of knowledge because a choice can only be made if one is aware of
the choices at hand. This freedom is enjoyed by the human agent and if I may say, the highest expression of
his/her person. At the outset, one may experience being compelled by strong forces outside and even natural
forces inside oneself but those forces depending on the strength of their pull, may strip the act of those
qualities that make a human act worthy of being considered truly human. To illustrate this, let us take the case
of a psychologically deranged person whose normal sensibility is taken over by indifference or irrational
obsession. The sense of freedom is as well handicapped by the irrationality taking over the senses. On the
contrary, a person who is well aware of the situation and his/her choices and is oriented by the reason towards
doing what is judged as morally right but who chooses otherwise becomes all the more liable or responsible
over his/her choice. There might be a refusal to take the responsibility but such refusal does not eliminate
responsibility. In the final analysis, refusal to respond or to take the consequence of one’s action is tantamount
to a denial of the self.

Because human actions emanate from our decision, they involve responsibility on our part. This means that the
moment we choose certain actions, we do not only become liable over them and their possible consequences;
for sure, we also become liable to ourselves. And because the human agent cannot be dissociated from her
action, her choice of an action, especially when done repeatedly or consistently, defines her person. Thus, an
instance of cheating stains one’s character, but a habitual act of cheating makes one a cheater.

Do Emotions or Feelings Play a Role in Moral Decision-making?

In many cases, we find ourselves spontaneously springing into action as dictated by our strong emotions
towards a moral situation. Consider this first case: You heard a news in the local radio that a newly-born baby
was found in a waste bin of a public toilet. How would you react to this? What would you most probably feel
upon hearing this news? Maybe you’d be immediately gripped by mixed emotions, such as outrage for the
mother and pity for the baby. Is it right to feel this way? What if someone instead of feeling this way, feels
joyful and jubilant? Which one of the two sets of emotions is reasonable?

Consider this second case: A quiz was administered in the class. Your teacher asked everyone to pass the
papers to the aisle and to exchange papers with those at the opposite row. After checking, the papers were
returned to the owners to verify if items were checked correctly. You saw how your seatmate hurriedly wrote
all the correct answers on another sheet of paper, checked all the items, wrote a  perfect score and instead of
submitting the original quiz paper which scored zero, the one which had a perfect score was submitted. How
would you feel towards her action? Would you approve of it? How would it make you feel knowing that a
student has consistently cheated her way up to the dean’s list of honor students?

Emotions are indeed part of our configurations as human beings. Although Western ethical theories give more
weight on the role of reason in making ethical decisions, our actual moral experiences demonstrate how
emotions play an active role in the way we deal with them. As Greenfield (2007) puts it: “emotions are part of
our basic responses to meaningful situations, and, as a result, emotional responses cannot be isolated from our
ability to recognize a moral issue or dilemma and our willingness to act” (p. 15). Before we consciously
deliberate on whether a situation involves a moral dilemma or not, our attention is moved towards it by our
initial “feeling”. Hence, our common expression, “it does not feel right”, “it does not sit well to me”.  When a
thing does not feel right, we give it a second look, harder and longer this time and, later, a careful thought. And
so, we identify the reason for such a situation to not “feel right”.

What we can infer from the above discussion is that we decide not only, and certainly not always, in favour of
what we think is reasonable but what we feel so strongly about what we “feel” is reasonable. Often, we find
ourselves saying “It feels wrong to congratulate her for a position she does not deserve”, or “It does not feel
right to tolerate cheating”, or “It feels bad to throw a helpless kitten in a waste bin and to throw an innocent
baby is even twice as bad”. This clearly shows that we oftentimes find ourselves deciding based on feelings
rather than on reason.

Interestingly, advanced neurological sciences, which explain how the brains’ neural circuitry works, give birth
to a new ethical theory referred to as Neuroethics. This “neuroscience of ethics [which] examines the
neurobiological basis of cognition and emotions in moral reasoning” (2007, p. 17), claims that emotions and
reason do not necessarily oppose each other. The former is indicative of a normally functioning brain and
serves as a trigger calling the attention of the latter towards its proper object. In the words of Callahan (1988 as
quoted in Greenfield, 2007), “emotions and thinking are…complementary, synergistic, parallel processes,
constantly blending and interacting as a person functions.” Once emotions as automatic neural responses enter
the conscious field, they find expression in the form of feelings (Greenfield, 2007).

If the neuroethics’ claims were to be taken as true, the most important insight we could gain out of it as pointed
out by Greenfield (p. 18) is that “[r]eason is not purely dispassionate but is emotionally engaged.” If this is the
case, then our moral prejudice can also be emotion-based and, partly, of emotional nature. Should it be taken to
mean that emotions provide a good compass to where we should go and what we should do given a moral
situation? I suggest, we give this question a serious thought. 

Why Can’t we Simply Rely on our Feelings in Ethical Decision-making?

Let us consult our personal experiences. In this section, I invite you to scan your memory and recall an incident
involving you in a moral dilemma or situation. Maybe it has to do with a cheating incident in the classroom or
your witnessing a best friend’s boyfriend cheating on her or maybe being tempted to make a big lie to your
parents about why you didn’t make it home last night or being tempted to betray your sibling to save yourself.
Whatever is that incident, I need you to recall how you felt. Consider these questions for reflection:

1. Do you still feel the same way now as you recall such incident?
2. Did you decide based solely on what you felt?
3. Did you give the matter a careful, thorough thought before making a decision?
4. If such incident would happen today, would you feel the same way and respond the same
way?
5. Was there any feeling of regret? If only you could, would you want to do things
differently?

As we can see, regret is a healthy emotion. One only regrets if one knows better. A regretful person is one who
looks back into his actions and re-examines it through the light of reason. It is an admission of fault which is
only possible if one is honest, humble and responsible enough to own up to his fault. It is, in other words, a
sign of maturity.

Although it is a healthy emotion, experiencing regret can be painful for it summons us, rouses us from sleep,
takes away our focus, and often times, it makes us feel bad about ourselves. But why do we experience regret
in the first place? Regret is a product of wrong or bad decisions and, normally, these kinds of decisions are
done haphazardly as dictated by upsurge of emotions. When a sudden rush of strong emotions grips us, we
jump into action. Observe yourselves when you are angry, don’t you say things which later you regret? Words
that you can’t bring yourself to utter in normal situation come out of your mouth like hard-hitting bullets and
they leave the target wounded and your relationship, dead. The hardest thing is, what is said cannot be unsaid,
and so you become regretful. Others do more than that. They harm others because of anger or jealousy.

Although it might be true that emotions inform and guide our reason towards a particular decision, emotional
upsurges can be so strong a force that it clouds our mind. In the language of St. Thomas, emotions or feelings
modify our human action, making it “more voluntary but less free” (in De Finance, 1991, pp. 49-50). In the
process, the human agent who regularly gives in to the dictates of emotions becomes less and less reasonable
as emotions are now holding the rein with the reason relegated to the back seat. For St. Thomas, “a human
being whose life is dictated by…emotions would not be guided by what is distinctive of him, namely reason”
(Aquinas, 1999, p. xiii).

To illustrate further, let us imagine a man who decides based on emotions. As emotions can be fleeting,
decisions depending on them will have to be adjusted every time. To quote Rachels and Rachels:
[Feelings] can…get in the way of discovering the truth: When we feel strongly about an issue, it is tempting to
assume that we just know what the truth must be, without even having to consider the arguments on the other
side. Unfortunately… we cannot rely on our feelings, no matter how powerful they may be. Our feelings may
be irrational; they may be nothing but the products of prejudice, selfishness, or cultural conditioning (2007, p.
11).

Imagine further a situation which demands that community members will sit down together and come up with
a common decision. Does the Habermasian model of communicative action fit in the picture if members of the
community were to decide based on how they feel? How could we possibly legitimize laws if emotions were to
be relied upon? In the first place, could laws be grounded on emotions?

Reliance on feelings in making moral decisions also does not sit well in Immanuel Kant’s duty-based ethics.
For Kant, a person acts morally only when he acts out of duty and such duty, once having passed the test of the
principle of universalizability, becomes everyone’s duty (Timbreza, 1993, pp. 36-39). In Kant’s perspective,
the ultimate arbiter of morality is the human reason acting in full autonomy. Hence, truth telling is a duty not
because of the benefits one gets out of it and more so not because of how it will make the agent feel by doing
it. To illustrate the point of Kant, let us consider the fictional case of Ann and John. They are both students.
Ann does not cheat because of fear of being caught. John does not cheat as well because he thinks it is his duty
as a student to study and be prepared for the exam, and that cheating is a dishonest way of getting what one
does not deserve. Which one acts out of duty? Which one acts out of emotion? Which one is morally
praiseworthy?

What Characterizes a Good Moral Decision?

As discussed, overreliance on emotions or feelings in making moral decisions proves to be problematic

because emotions are fleeting, particular, biased, and variable. To properly deal with a moral experience, the
human agent must first conduct a rational deliberation to inform his/her moral judgement and give equal
consideration to the interests of those who might be directly or indirectly affected by the decision without
privileging one’s self. These, for Rachels and Rachels (2007, p. 11), are referred to as, moral reasoning and
impartiality, respectively.

What does Impartiality Mean? 

To explain the meaning of impartiality, let us first discuss the relationship of the parts to the whole. A part of
the whole does not provide us a complete picture of the whole. Hence, to stay focused on parts is to lose sight
of the greater and, oftentimes, of what is essential. To be partial means to be confined to a particular part and
so such part is elevated to a position of privilege.

To be impartial, on the other hand, means to consider all parts equally and to prioritize the whole over its
constituents. In actual moral situations, catering to the whole is next to impossible; hence, we settle on striking
a balance between the interests of everyone concerned or affected by our decisions. For Rachels and Rachels
(p. 13), the moral requirement of impartiality demands that we “acknowledge that other people’s welfare is just
as important as our own [and not to] treat the members of particular groups as somehow morally inferior.”

This requirement of impartiality is intimately connected to the other requirement of a good moral decision –
reasonability.

What is Moral Reasoning? 

There is no straightforward logical structure that frames our moral reasoning for the process hardly follows a
straight path. For Nietzsche (2002), judging what is good can be a matter of interpretation for when it comes to
the question of morality, there are neither facts nor universal-objective moral truth but just moral
interpretations of facts. To this, Gadamer’s reply (as highlighted by van Tongeren 1994, p. 211) is: “to
interpret something means to understand the questions to which interpretations will be the answer.” In other
words, the point of the answer – its legitimacy – comes from the point of the question. Various interpretations
can be summoned and re-viewed in relation to that which they are given or offered as interpretations.

On the contrary, for Paul Glenn (1963, p.88), while epistemological certainty is not possible, moral certitude
is. And such condition of moral certainty can be arrived at if one painstakingly does a moral investigation and,
with sincerity, follows the dictates of a clear conscience. Rachels and Rachels (2007) further note that
“morality is first and foremost, a matter of consulting reason [and that] the morally right thing to do, in any
circumstance, is whatever there are best reasons for doing” (p.11).

How does moral reasoning proceed? This question is framed in such a way that it demands a description of the
process and not a prescription of how should the process be. To describe the process means to consult the
agents on how do they actually do the moral reasoning which is an interesting research topic for a qualitative
phenomenological researcher to embark on. But, ethics is not a sociological study which is only interested in
describing social phenomena. It deals with how should humans act and not how they actually act. Even the
process of moral reasoning is governed by norms. Ethics’ proper object is moral act, and decision-making is
certainly a moral act. Hence, the point of the question is what is the proper way of making a moral decision?

Human agents cannot simply proceed to acting without thinking. This should not be taken to mean that all
human actions proceeds from careful thinking. Actions without thinking are still culpable actions and the
human agent is held responsible to whatever it is that he/she does, whether or not it is grounded on careful
rational deliberation. Our concerns here are what makes us as human agents truly human and what makes our
action a morally good one.

Rachels and Rachels (2007, pp. 11-13) enumerate the three major steps involved in moral reasoning, namely:
(1) Identify the facts of the case. Here, we need to consider the questions of how, why, where, when, who, and
what. Some cases are far more complex that more questions will need to be asked. This step requires a
thorough investigation. (2) Consult moral principles. There are variety of moral principles but not all of them
may be applicable to the matter at issue. So, we will choose only those that are relevant to our problem. For
instance, in the example about the baby dumped in the waste bin of a public toilet, one may think of the
principle of inviolability and sacredness of human life. In the next chapter, you shall be introduced to the
different principles of morality endorsed by different theorists. Hence, we will reserve the room for a more in-
depth discussion later. Finally, (3) The application of the most appropriate moral principles. Because moral
situations are real, deliberating it inside your head does not make you a moral agent. It is not enough to simply
identify the moral principle that best applies to your case; you need to decide. Deciding means taking a stand, a
responsibility.

A more detailed and directed seven-step model of decision-making is introduced in the book of Rae Scott and
Kenman Wong (1996, pp. 637-645) and is adapted to our discussion here. This model consist of seven steps
which are hereby formulated in question form, as follows:

1. What are the facts surrounding the case? For a decision to be any good, it has to be
informed by facts. But the facts at times are not readily available, and so, we need to
conduct a careful and thorough investigation and to thresh out irrelevant facts. Hence, in
the fictional case of a cheating incident in the class, what relevant information do we
need?

1. What are the ethical issues involved? In the first place, is the incident involving an
ethical issue? This is the initial question to ask because the kind of response required of
us depends on the kind of situation there is. Ethical issues, to quote Scott and Wong (p.
 639) “are stated in terms of competing interests or good.” With no conflicting positions,
there can be no issue. Going back to the case of cheating involving a student, the one put
in a dilemma is the classmate who witnessed the incident. But what is the dilemma
about? To report the incident or not? To remind the cheating classmate or not?

1. Consider the principles that have a bearing on the case. Certainly, cheating is not
tolerable because it is a form of dishonesty. As is well known, dishonesty undermines
relationships and structures which are grounded on mutual trust. However, in this case, it
is not cheating per se that is the issue. It is whether one would report the incident or not.
What then are the possible principles which may be rendered relevant to the issue?
Principle of justice? Fairness? Utility? Respect?

1. What are the available alternatives? This part requires the moral agent to think
creatively and, maybe, outside the box. Here, one needs to explore all possible
alternatives. For instance, instead of reporting to the teacher what you witnessed, would it
be wise to talk to your cheating classmate and ask her instead to confess to the teacher?
Would you talk to the teacher about the cheating incident without naming persons?
Would you wait till she commits the same violation again?

1. How do the alternatives compare with the principles? After having considered all the
possible alternatives, it is now time for you to re-view them in relation to the identified
relevant principles. You will weed out those alternatives that are not viable until you
arrive at the best ones.

1. What might be the consequences? The consequences referred to here are those of the
identified viable alternatives. Consider as many consequences as possible both on the
negative and positive side and weigh them against each other. Ask yourselves series of
questions.

1. Make a decision. Here, you arrive at a point when you need to put a rest to the seemingly
arduous task of deliberation. Because absolute certainty is impossible to achieve, content
yourselves with the best that you have done in the previous steps. Decide and carry the
decision out. Say, you have decided to tell the teacher. Don’t just decide. Go.Tell. Don’t
waste your time deliberating and in the end, do nothing about your decision.

This leads us to the final point of this chapter.

Why is Moral Courage Necessary? 

The difference between making a decision and executing a decision is the same difference existing between a
Nelson Mandela and a complacent South African who knew and complained about apartheid but never did
anything about it. It’s the same difference existing between Jesus Christ who remained steadfast to his mission
and Peter or Judas who got swayed for self-protection; and between those who speak up against injustices and
those who suffer in silence.

In the earlier part of this chapter, we pointed out the essential elements of a human act, namely: knowledge,
freedom, and voluntariness. Our conduct of moral deliberation results in knowledge of the moral situation and
of the most morally viable response to it. But, unless man is free to carry out such response, it will remain as a
matter of conviction. Freedom does not guarantee execution of an act still. The agent needs to intend the act,
and not only to intend it because intending it does not get anything accomplished except in the mind, but to,
more importantly, intend the execution of the act. That is precisely what I mean by the line “ Don’t just decide.
Go. Tell.” In St. Thomas’s words (in De Finance, 1994, p. 49), “voluntary [action]…refers to a person’s will,
to the elan with which it is drawn towards its object.” Will acts alongside knowledge and freedom and not
apart from them. For Glenn, in itself, will is blind and has to be guided by the intellect. On the other hand,
unless the will works, nothing is done. It is like saying, you do not become honest by believing in honesty but
by doing honest things, honestly.

This resonates with what is commonly experienced to be the case of many known personalities in our society.
It is not unusual to hear people commenting that many of our national leaders are products of reputable
universities, but why did they end up rotten and corrupt? This concretely proves the point that knowledge does
not necessarily guarantee morality. It is one thing to know the right thing to do and it is another to actually
stand up and do exactly what one believes he/she should.

What is lacking here is the will, that is, the moral courage and the strength of character to stand up for what is
true and right and proper. And that, more than the technique in doing moral deliberation is what we need to
work on in us.

Nonetheless, unless we know what we lack, we will stay caught up in the realm of inaction. What we need,
truly need, is a great deal of openness to experience so that we can touch base on what makes us truly us. This
requires moral courage too.

Conclusion 

This chapter is dedicated to the second element of moral experience, which is the act. It started with a
discussion about the hermeneutic nature of moral experience. At the outset, taking off from such a topic is like
taking a detour from the main focus of the chapter. However, it was meant to remind the students and the
readers of this text that everything that we are engaged in, more importantly, our moral experiences, has an
interpretive dimension to it. Our interpretations are framed by our sense of meaning as influenced by our
traditions and are directed towards meaning-making. We then discussed the concept of human act where we
found out that not all acts of man have moral value but only those which are done out of knowledge, freedom
and voluntariness.  Although humans have the capacity to distinguish what is reasonable from what is not, at
times, we make decisions based on emotions or feelings. Feelings or emotions, according to Neuroethics, form
part of our normal brain functioning, which suggests that reason and emotions are neural partners. Hence,
emotions are not purely irrational. On the other hand, overreliance on feelings in making ethical decisions can
be disadvantageous because feelings can be fleeting and subjective. The above discussion also showed that
good moral decisions are characterized by their being reasonable and impartial. The seven-step model of moral
decision making by Scott and Wong is adapted. And the chapter culminates in a discussion on the need for
moral courage and the reiteration of moral experience being a truly human experience.

                                                           

Works Cited 

Aquinas, T. (1999). Disputed Questions on Virtue. (R. McInerny, Trans.) South Bend, Indiana, United States
of America: St. Augustine’s Press.

De Finance, J. (1991). An Ethical Inquiry. Roma: Editrice Pontifica Universita Gregoriana.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1998). Truth and Method (2nd ed.). (J. Weinsheimer, & D. Marshall, Trans.) New York:
Continuum.
Glenn, P. (1930). Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy. London: B. Herder Book Co.

Greenfield, & Bruce. (2007). The Role of Emotion in Ethical Decision Making: Implications for Physical
Therapist Education. Journal of Physical Therapy Education, 14-21.

Nietzsche, F. (2002). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. (R.-P. Hortsmann, J.
Norman, Eds., & J. Norman, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rachels, J., & Rachels, S. (2007). The Elements of Moral Philosophy (5th ed.). Boston: McGraw Hill.

Scott, R. B., & Wong, K. L. (1996). A Model for Moral Decision Making. In Beyond Integrity: A Judeo-
Christian Approach to Business Ethics (pp. 637-645).

Timbreza, F. (1993). Bioethics and Moral Decisions. Manila: De La Salle University Press.

van Tongeren, P. J. (1994). Moral Philosophy as a Hermeneutic of Moral Experience. International

Philosophical Quarterly, 199-214.

Virtue Ethics 
Introduction: Virtue Ethics

Virtue has become a compounding concept in ethics in the modern times not only due to the Greek forefathers,
namely, Socrates, Plato and, more particularly, Aristotle, but also from its roots in a more ancient Chinese
philosophy of Confucius. However, the Greeks overshadowed Confucius and dominated in the development of
Western moral philosophy until the Enlightenment era. Subsequently, the formulation of Virtue Ethics is
primarily grounded in the Greeks tradition, which demonstrates theories essential for moral development not
only to the Westerners but also to the Easterners (Orientals) and to the entire morally capacitated beings in the
world.

Meaning of Virtue Ethics

Basically, virtue ethics is defined as an approach to ethics that emphasizes the person’s character in moral
thinking. This implies that trait or character is essential to the person’s achievement of the “good”. Hence,
virtue ethics is not an action-based ethics (as in the case of deontology and consequentialism), but a person-
based one. Thus, in any moral situations, virtue ethics does not provide the moral agent specific principles to
guide her actions. What virtue ethics provides in attaining the good are simply ideal behaviors, traits, and
characters. That is why in Aristotelian ethics, with which most virtue ethics theories drew inspiration, practical
wisdom is a central category that helps individuals become virtuous.

But to understand virtue ethics in general, we must first qualify it as being composed of theories that, as
mentioned above, lay emphasis on the role that character and virtue play in moral philosophy, rather than those
which consider deliberate actions based on duty or on anticipated good consequences. In other words, in virtue
ethics, there are no universal principles that oblige the person to act because it is his duty to act or because the
situation calls him to render good consequence. Based on this contention, we can extract two distinctive
approaches in ethics, namely, deontological approach and consequentialist approach. On the one hand,
deontology or rule based ethics, was popularized by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) during the Enlightenment
era. The term deontology was derived from the two Greek words deon, which means duty, and logos, which
means study or science. Hence, deontology is etymologically defined as the study of duty. But it is usually
understood as a kind of normative theory with regard to what choices are morally required, forbidden, or
permitted (Alexander & Moore, 2012). Deontology, therefore, emphasizes man’s duty and obligation to act
morally. Consequentialism, on the other hand, holds that choices are to be morally assessed solely by the
situation or consequences they bring about (Ibid.). As the term suggests, its main focus is on the consequences
of one’s action as the definitive basis for the rightness or wrongness of her judgment. Thus, this ethical
doctrine believes that an act is moral if it will produce a good outcome or consequences.

What makes virtue ethics distinct from the two approaches of normative ethics, that is, deontology and
consequentialism, is that it does not emphasize the moral agent’s choice as to what course of action she has to
pursue. Hence, virtue ethics emphasizes the person’s practical moral development which is the key to the
attainment of authentic happiness. For this reason, virtue ethics deals with broader queries like: What kind of
life should I live? What is the good life? How can I be consistent in my moral actions? Indeed, these are some
of the ethical questions that we will be dealing in this chapter.

The Three Main Strands of Virtue Ethics

The “what” or gist of virtue ethics can be properly understood through its three main strands, namely: Ethics of
Care, Agent-Based Theories and Eudaimonism. Firstly, the Ethics of Care holds the idea that a moral action
centers on social and environmental relationships in which care or kindness is considered as the main virtue. It
suggests that “care” is a central category in determining the moral worth of human actions. Michael Slote
(1983: 36) corroborates this point by stating that “caring is the primary virtue and that a morality based on the
motive of caring can offer a general account of right and wrong action”. Hence, the motive in developing
man’s moral practices in which care is the primary virtue is clearly the main objective of the ethics of care. In
relation to this, according to Held (2006), the ethics of care examines moral practices and values. It focuses on
moral development which is more possible through the reformation of practices than the mere use of reason
from any abstract rules. Thus, this reformation of practices, which is to be nurtured and developed into virtue,
is the foremost emphasis of ethics of care. Secondly, Agent-Based Theories are unitary normative theories.
This means that the status of actions is entirely dependent upon the moral status of an agent’s motives and
character traits. As Slote (2001: 38) writes:

A warm agent-based virtue ethics puts a fundamental emphasis on a person’s motives and, more particularly,
on a person’s overall morally relevant motivation. Say for example, an act is morally acceptable if and only if
it comes from good or virtuous motivation involving benevolence or caring (about the well-being of others) or
at least doesn’t come from bad or inferior motivation involving malice or indifference to humanity.

Thus, again, in agent-based theory, an action is right if it expresses a virtuous motive or at least does not
exhibit a malicious intention from the agent.

Finally, Eudaimonism comes from the Greek word Eudaimonia, which can be translated as happiness, well-

being or the good life. For Aristotle, happiness or the good life is the highest goal of man which can be
achieved by a lifetime of actively exercising moral virtues or “arête” (a Greek word which precisely combined
with qualities, such as valor, to make up good character). And to enhance moral virtue, according to Aristotle,
we need phronesis or practical wisdom, which can resolve any concurrent ethical problem. Indeed, with moral
virtue, human life would attain Eudaimonia, the happiness which should be seen as a final end, and not as a
subjective state characterized by the seemingly well-lived life irrespective of the emotional state of the person
experiencing it. This will be further discussed in the later section.

However, to speak of dissimilarities between Eudaimonism against the first two main strands of virtue ethics is
obvious. Say for instance, the former comprises the entire development of a moral person, that is, to become
holistically good as she reaches to the point of the ultimate end, while the two latter strands emphasize morally
good action within the sphere of a certain circumstance or event. Thus, Eudaimonism aims for eternal
goodness rather than depending on the contingent recurrence of certain actions. Furthermore, to determine
their resemblance is too apparent. As mentioned above, virtue ethics in general does not particularly deal with
the rightness or wrongness of specific actions. Rather, with the aid of practical wisdom, virtue ethics guides the
moral agent in seeking the “good”. But because this chapter focuses chiefly on Aristotle’s virtue ethics, I will
only discuss the key concepts of Aristotle’s moral teaching. Let me develop them below.

Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics

Aristotle was born in Stagira, in Macedonia (now northern Greece), in 384 BCE. Since his father was a doctor,
he also has the fondness for medical analogies in the Ethics. He traveled to Athens at the age of seventeen
where he became a student of Plato (Barlett & Collins, 2011). As is well known, Athens was the center of
learning in the Greek world during this time. Aristotle remained for more or less 20 years at the Academy
established by Plato. When Plato died in 347 BCE, Aristotle left Athens for thirteen years, during some of
which he was a tutor to Alexander the Great. In 334 BCE, Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens and started
giving lectures to audience who were primarily youths.

Meanwhile, before his death in 322 BCE (Aristotle, 2004), Aristotle gives lectures on ethics that centers on the
concept of Eudaimonia or happiness. His ethics was first written in Eudemian Ethics which later developed
into Nichomachean Ethics. Accordingly, the latter work is believed to have been named in honor of Aristotle’s
son, Nicomachus. In this particular book, Aristotle offers moral principles of conduct that would guide humans
in attaining the “good life”.

To fully understand Aristotle’s ethics, we must take into consideration the notions of virtue, telos and good
habit in relation to happiness because these concepts will help render the true nature of Aristotle’s notion of
happiness or Eudaimonia. That is why, in this section, these concepts are profoundly explicated. Let me start
with the notion of happiness.

On Happiness

As is well known, Socrates understands virtue as the major source of happiness. Plato continued this tradition
and argued that moral virtue is vital to the rational soul of man. Aristotle followed Socrates and Plato’s agenda,
but according to Crisp, Aristotle’s concept of happiness differs from Socrates and Plato’s happiness for
Aristotle’s concept of happiness consists only in virtuous activity (Aristotle, 2004). Happiness, which most of
Aristotle’s interpreters call Eudaimonia, is the ultimate goal/end of human life. This happiness or the ultimate
end is genuinely desired for its own sake or without qualification. So, actions which precede this end become
the most valuable and cannot be superseded by any actions driven by ordinary kinds of ends. As Lear (2004:
20) corroborates, “to choose for actions which result in honor, wealth and power is definitely part of man’s
inclination to seek for happiness (as pleasure), but unfortunately this could not be the end which offers true
happiness.”

Like Eudaimonia, pleasure is also good. That is why Aristotle does not condemn man for desiring pleasure
because it is a significant part in human flourishing. But for Aristotle, the desire and actions that lead to
pleasure only presuppose limited value since its end is temporary. Hence, the satisfaction that one gets from
these actions cannot be truly called happiness. For Aristotle, these actions, which only lead humans into the pit
of the two opposing vices (either excess or deficiency), drive them away from the ultimate end. Hence, for
Aristotle, only virtuous acts can lead man toward living the good life or happiness.

This is indeed the central concept in Aristotle’s virtue ethics: virtue or the mean is the key to happiness. And
by the word “mean”, we mean that which settles at the middle ground. Please see below Aristotle’s Table of
Virtues and Vices. Meantime, let me briefly discuss Aristotle’s concept of virtue.

The Concept of Virtue

Virtue is defined as a behavior showing high moral standards or the general quality of goodness in a person.
An example of this is the virtue of patience or truthfulness. Following Aristotle, the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (2006: 678) categorically describes virtue as the opposite of vice. Vice in this context
should not be literally understood within the specific context of social vices, like drug addiction, excessive
cigarette smoking, and gambling. Rather, according to Aristotle, vices are the two extremes of the
spectrum―one is the excess and the other is the deficiency (Ibid: 680). It is for this reason that Aristotle claims
that virtues are the mean or the middle ground between the excess at the one side and the deficiency at
the other. For instance, if a moral agent maintains patience or good temper (mean) and rejects irascibility
(excess) or lack of spirit (deficiency), then he is said to have possessed virtue. Thus, in Aristotle’s mind,
virtues categorically serve as the essential elements of man’s proper or moral behavior. The table below helps
us understand the relation between virtue and vices in the Aristotelian sense.

TABLE OF ARISTOTLE’S VIRTUES AND VICES 

SPHERE OF
ACTION OR EXCESS (VICE) MEAN (VIRTUE) DEFICIENCY (VICE)
FEELING

Fear and Confidence Rashness Courage Cowardice

Licentiousness/Self-
Pleasure and Pain Temperance Insensibility
indulgence

Getting and Spending

Prodigality Liberality Illiberality/Meanness
(minor)

Getting and Spending Vulgarity/Tastelessnes

Magnificence Pettiness/Stinginess
(major) s

Honor and Dishonor

Vanity Magnanimity Pusillanimity
(major)

Honor and Dishonor Ambition/empty Proper Unambitiousness/undue

(minor) vanity ambition/pride humility

Patience/Good Lack of
Anger Irascibility
temper spirit/unirascibility

Understatement/mock
Self-expression Boastfulness Truthfulness
modesty

Conversation Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness

Social Conduct Obsequiousness Friendliness Cantankerousness

Shame Shyness Modesty Shamelessness

Righteous Malicious
Indignation Envy
indignation enjoyment/Spitefulness

Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics Revised Edition, trans. J. K. Thomson (New York:
Viking, 1995), 104.

For Aristotle, as we can see above, there are two kinds of virtues, namely, intellectual virtue and moral virtue.
On the one hand, intellectual virtue corresponds to the act of thinking which affirms or negates something. On
the other hand, moral virtue signifies the act of choosing which actions to pursue or avoid. For Aristotle,
intellectual virtue involves two stages, namely, the contemplative stage and practical stage. According to
Aristotle, the contemplative stage is neither practical nor productive because it is purely intellectual in nature.
Aristotle argues that it is in this stage that the categorization of the good as truth and the bad as falsity occurs.
Interestingly, Aristotle claims that the practical intellect already possessed the truth. In intellectual as practical,
according to Aristotle, the truth or the understanding of the good which is in agreement with the right desire is
already obtained (Aristotle, 2009). In this stage, intellectual virtue is accomplished because, here, the moral
agent’s determination for the virtues or the mean adheres to the desire for right and truth. Therefore, the
accomplishment of intellectual virtue can be done through the possession of “practical wisdom”.

In contrast to intellectual virtue, moral virtue emphasizes the role of the will in choosing the good and right
actions. As is well known, moral virtue is always inclined toward the correct conduct. This kind of virtue,
according to Aristotle, is the actualization of practical intellect whereby the agent has the disposition to behave
in the right manner or to act according to the mean between extremes of deficiency and excess. However, with
deliberate desire and habitual choice for the good and truth, moral virtue can be a constant practice of a
rational acting agent.

According to Aristotle, the capacity of the human person to possess intellectual and moral virtues is what
makes him distinguishable from the lower forms of animals. Though animals are capable of perception, they
do not have, according to Aristotle, the faculty of intellect and will. For this reason, animals cannot deliberately
choose the right action which is based on truth and wisdom. Now, according to Aristotle (2009), since a moral
virtue is a state of character that is concerned with choosing the good and the right, then both the act of
reasoning and deliberate desire must be true and right.

Telos or the Ultimate End

Literally, the Greek word telos is translated as “result” or “end”. Its verb form teleo means “to come to an
end,” as for the death of an individual. Based on this literal meaning of telos, Aristotle conveys two distinct
notions of end, namely: telos as ordinary ends, which is also composed of hierarchy (lower and higher ends),
and telos as the ultimate achievement of human being or the final end. On the one hand, ordinary ends signify
a goal wherein accomplishments are simply viewed as byproducts of human beings’ common desire. This goal
is the stopping point or the “last thing” (Lear, 2004: 11), but it is not really the final or the ultimate one. Since
it is ordinary, it entails only temporary fulfilment from one’s experience of an apparent good. Yet, we can
assert that, at this juncture, telos is indeed the point of completion of an activity that an individual wishes to
achieve because of the foreseen apparent good. Consider these two examples as guides. Mario decides to play
basketball. Most likely, he wants to solely experience pleasure by playing the game itself or by winning it (if
he will actually win), or to maintain a healthy body, or something else which prompts and motivates him to
play the game. However, when he is about to play basketball, he remembers that he has an appointment with
his thesis adviser on the same time. Consequently, he cancels the game and proceeds immediately to his
adviser. In relative manner, Maria studies hard all the lessons in school because she wants to earn higher
grades in all her subjects so that, later, she might become a scholar. If we examine tightly these examples, both
demonstrate ends which correspond to the desired good. So in this context, Lear (2004: 15) states that every
human person is directed toward a goal or end which is good because such good is, most of all, the desired
end. As we can see, the end (telos) of the actions in these examples is simply viewed as an ordinary end
towards an ordinary good.

Nonetheless, the first example above implies that there is actually a hierarchy of ends. As Aristotle ( Phys. II.3
195a23–25), writes: “…and then there is the end and the good of the other things; that for the sake of which
will be the best and the end of the other things”. In the first example, Mario opted to see his thesis advisor
rather than play basketball. For sure, choosing to play basketball is a lower end, while choosing to see the
advisor is a higher end, which other higher ends are possibly attached, e.g. to finish his thesis and pass the
subject. In addition to the idea of hierarchy of ends, we may also talk about a series of ends. This statement is
clearly manifested in the second example above, whereby higher end determines the extent to which lower end
is worth pursuing. Thus, Maria’s desires for higher grades in order to achieve an honorable reward during the
graduation ceremony becomes a springboard for another higher ends, such as landing on a good job in the
future. As we can see, in these series of ends, there is this pattern of relations between lower and higher ends,
which is also applicable to other modes of action which involves desirable results.

Now, what we can infer from the discussion on the series of ends is that the hierarchies cannot go on  ad
infinitum (toward infinity). For Aristotle, there must be an apex of the hierarchy which is also known as the
ultimate end or the highest good. This is because, for Aristotle (2004: 20), without a final resting point, “our
desire (orexis) would be empty and vain”. This is means that without the highest good as the ultimate end,
there would be no reason for a rational being to act morally. And again, for Aristotle, the highest good as the
ultimate end of moral actions is “happiness” without qualification. Allow me to develop Aristotle’s concept of
happiness below so we may be able to understand it fully. This is important because, as we already know,
happiness is the focal point of Aristotle’s virtue ethics.

Moral Virtue as Good Habit

The formation of a moral virtue or good habit is indeed essential to Aristotelian ethics. This is due to the fact
that a moral agent can only attain happiness by being consistently living a good life or acting habitually in
accordance to the good. Thus, a good habit is instrumental to the development of virtue because it is
considered to be the consistent pattern for doing virtuous actions. Aristotle (NE II:1, 1003a) writes, “we are
adapted by nature to receive these virtues and are made perfect by habit”. In this sense, though virtue is already
part of our natural inclination, human being still needs the habit of doing good for him to become virtuous.
What we must do then is to constantly practice doing virtuous acts in order to develop a habit. For instance, we
acquire the virtue of patience by repeatedly integrating it into our deliberate actions, or by being constantly
patient. In similar way, we can obtain the virtue of courage by maintaining it within the purview of the mean
while avoiding rashness and cowardice. Therefore, our actions can only be morally good and right if there is a
habitual practice of virtues. This is to say that to eventually maintain these moral actions which lead us to
attain authentic happiness, the formation of good habits is a requisite.

Moreover, the formation of virtue or good habit has two stages: first, the habit of contemplation or the
education of thought for the formation of intellectual virtue and, second, the habit of the actual practice of
moral virtue. On the one hand, the habit of contemplation is a matter of constantly acquiring knowledge and
using one’s mind in the right way that leads to the habitual exercise of virtue (Aristotle: 2004). Through the
habit of education of thought, the state of character is constituted by the stable equilibrium of the soul (NE II:1,
1003a). This is to say that the state of character which shapes moral virtue primarily requires proper mental
activity aside from the actual performance of moral action. In other words, before we can actually practice
virtue, we have to think about practicing virtue all the time; or, to put it in a Heideggerian jargon, we need to
attune ourselves (our consciousness) to virtue all the time. On the other hand, the habitual actual practice of
virtue presupposes that every human being has brought out the contemplated understanding of virtue into
actions. In other words, we put into practice what the mind thinks. In addition, the putting into practice of this
understanding should be done consistently so that it would lead to the formation of good habit. True enough,
virtue is defined as a behavior showing high moral standards, or a good moral quality, or the general quality of
goodness in a person. But for Aristotle, we should push this further by developing a habit of doing the good all
the time.

Therefore, the process by which a state of character and moral virtues are formed is just similar to the process
of habit-formation. Let’s take the case of walking. Learning to walk is an activity characterized by choice; it is
not automatically accomplished once a certain level of physical development has been attained. Children learn
to walk by actually practicing the act of walking–by standing, taking a few steps, falling down, and then
repeating the whole process over and over again until the action becomes second nature and can be done with
ease. In this analogy, a repeated performance of the action is necessary in order for the child to learn how to
walk, whether she ends up learning to walk well or badly. In like manner, the habituation of virtue necessitates
the deliberate repetition of doing virtuous action consistently to increase the degree of moral virtues until
perfection is attained.

Conclusion

As we can see, to understand Aristotle’s ethics in general, we have to begin with knowing virtue as the key
toward man’s authentic happiness. Virtue, which is a state of character that is concerned with choosing the
good and the right, is the only requirement for happiness. Happiness is the ultimate end of rational being that is
not to be confused with pleasure in the ordinary ends. As the final telos, it is the end for the sake of itself,
without any qualifications. So, man cannot just aim for pleasure alone since it only leads us toward an infinite
chain of ends. There should be a final resting point of the hierarchy of ends. For Aristotle, this is the ultimate
end or the highest good.

Virtue ethics then centers on the moral character of the person carrying out an action. In other words, virtue
ethics is person-based, in contrast to actions which are based on duties and rules of deontological ethics and the
consequences of particular actions of consequentialism. In fact, the three main strands of virtue ethics (Ethics
of Care, Agent-Based Ethics, and Eudaimonism) provide guidance for the person in the achievement of the
“good.” However, Eudaimonism differs from the Ethics of Care and Agent-based Ethics in the sense that it
comprises the aim for eternal goodness rather than depending on the contingent recurrence of certain actions.

Moreover, since virtue ethics focuses on the inherent character of a person, its concern therefore is the whole
person, rather than the particular events or actions. Its method recognizes the agent’s habits and behaviors that
will allow her to achieve “Eudaimonia,” or a good life. This is to say that good life can only be attained if the
person possesses and completely practice these virtues. As James Keenan (1995) puts it: “Being virtuous is
more than having a particular habit of acting, e.g. generosity. Rather, it means having a fundamental set of
related virtues that enable a person to live and act morally well.” Therefore, with the fundamental necessity of
practical wisdom, a lifetime practice of these virtues leads to true happiness.

Finally, virtue ethics also fundamentally includes an account of the purpose or meaning of a human life. In
Aristotelian sense, human flourishing or happiness is man’s purpose or goal. But Aristotle did not condemn
man for desiring pleasure as an ordinary end because it is a significant part in human flourishing. What he
emphasizes is that ordinary ends cannot sustain authentic happiness. Pleasure as an ordinary end is only
tantamount to an apparent good whose quality is only temporary. In contrast to pleasure, true happiness is a
state wherein man experiences the highest good. So, this noteworthy experience, for Aristotle, is supposedly
the ultimate or final end of man.
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Keenan, J. (1995). “Proposing Cardinal Virtues.” In Theological Studies, 56.

Lear, G. R. (2004). Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Slote, M. (2001). Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc.

________ (1983). Goods and Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

For a related topic in general ethics, see

What is Utilitarianism?
Utilitarianism is an ethical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham and
developed and popularized by John Stuart Mill. As the term suggests,
utilitarianism is founded on the principle of utility, which adheres to the
belief that an act is good or morally right if it promotes happiness and bad or
immoral if it tends to produce pain.
The key, therefore, in utilitarianism is the principle of happiness. Hence,
again, in utilitarianism, an act is good or morally right if it produces greatest
happiness to the greatest number of people; and bad or immoral if it produces
more harm or pain than benefits or happiness to the greatest number of
people. This explains why the utilitarian would not care whether the action is
done out of deception, lie or manipulation as long as it produces maximum
benefits to many people.
For example, the act of condemning a terrorist to death is morally right (that
is, good) for the utilitarian because this action produces equal benefits or
greatest happiness to the greatest number of people concerned.
Let us take the famous case of Robinhood as another example. As is well
known, Robinhood steals properties from wealthy people and give them to
the poor. From the vantage point of Christian ethics, Robinhood’s act is
immoral because it deprived the wealthy people of the right that is due them.
However, from the vantage point of utilitarianism, Robinhood’s act is
morally good because it produces maximum benefits, that is, greatest
happiness, to the majority of the people.
Jeremy Bentham’s Model of Utilitarianism
How does Bentham view happiness?
For Bentham, happiness is simply the absence of pain. Bentham introduced
the “felicific” calculus to measure the degree of happiness or pleasure that a
specific action may produce. The felicific calculus is also called the utility
calculus or hedonistic calculus. It includes intensity, duration, certainty,
propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.
For Bentham, the intense (intensity) the pleasure, the better; the longer
(duration) it lasts, the better; the more certain (certainty) that it will happen,
the better; the closer (propinquity) that it will occur, the better; the greater the
possibility (fecundity) that it will be followed by another pleasure, the better;
the purer (purity) the pleasure, the better; the greater the number of people
that it benefits (extent), the better.
The formula of Bentham’s felicific calculus goes like this: Happiness – Pain
= Balance. For Bentham, the Balance is the basis of the morality of an action.
In other words, for Bentham, if the balance is in favor of happiness, then the
act is morally right, and if it is in favor of pain, then it is morally wrong. How
do we do this?
Bentham said we just need to sum up all the pleasures and pains produced by
the action. If the balance is in favor of please, then the act is morally right. If
the balance is in favor of pain, then the action is morally wrong. Put in simple
mathematical calculation, if an act produces 12 pleasures and 6 pains, then
the balance is 6 which is in favor of pleasure or happiness. Hence, if this is
the case, then for Bentham the action is morally right. However, if the act
produces 20 pains and just 5 pleasures, then the balance is 15 which is in
favor of pain. If this is the case, then for Bentham the act is morally wrong.
John Stuart Mill’s Model of Utilitarianism
Mill disagrees with Bentham. Mill argues that we cannot calculate the
amount of pleasure or pain that an act produces. Thus, for Mill, the felicific
calculus cannot be the basis of morality but the majority of the people that
attains happinessꟷthus the famous utilitarian claim: an act is morally right if
it produces greatest happiness to the greatest number of people and it is
morally wrong if it produces more pain than pleasure to the greatest number
of people concerned.
As we can see, Mill’s utilitarianism is considered qualitative since the
philosopher emphasizes intellectual pleasure than sensual pleasure.  Thus, his
famous saying goes: “It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied.”
ACT and RULE Utilitarianism
Act utilitarianism holds that the utilitarian principle should be applied to a
particular act in a particular situation or circumstance. It takes into account
the possible result of each act. Hence, as the name suggests, in Act
utilitarianism, the basis of the morality of an action is the act itself. Hence, in
Act utilitarianism, we should perform those “actions” that produce greatest
happiness to the greatest number of people concerned.
Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, holds that the principle at issue should
be used to test moral rules, and then such rules can be utilized in judging
what is right and wrong under the circumstance. Here, we consider the
possible results in light of the rule(s). Thus, in Rule utilitarianism, an act is
morally right if it conforms to a justified moral rule. And of course, we know
that moral rules are justified if such rules produce greatest happiness to the
greatest number of people concerned.
Let us take the act of condemning a terrorist to death as an example.
An Act utilitarian would ask the question “What possible good or evil results
from this act?”.  If the majority of the people are benefited by the act itself,
then it is moral.
A Rule utilitarian, on the other hand, would ask whether there is a rule or law
that condemns terrorists to death and whether this rule was formulated based
on the utility principle. If this is the case, then it may be morally right to
sentence a terrorist to death.

Jeremy Bentham
What is Pragmatic Ethics?
Pragmatic ethics is the result of the application of the principles of
pragmatism to moral issues. Pragmatism was founded by the American
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and was developed by the American
philosophers William James and John Dewey.
Pragmatism is epistemological by nature but can be applied to ethics. As an
epistemological doctrine, pragmatism holds the belief that the true and
meaningful form of knowledge is one that is practical, workable, beneficial,
and useful. Thus, in pragmatism, if an idea works or brings good results, then
it is true and meaningful. If it does not, then that idea is meaningless, that is,
it has no value.
According to the pragmatists, an idea is practical if it produces good results,
workable if it can be put to work, beneficial if it benefits people, and useful if
it can be used to attain good results.
How do we know that an idea is practical, workable, beneficial, and useful?
In other words, how do we know that an idea is true and meaningful?
According to William James, ideas are proven to be true and meaningful
through the process of experimentation. Hence, for James, ideas are value-
neutral from the beginning; their truth and meaning can be proven through
testing or experimentation. For example, how do we know that Coca Cola
tastes good? Of course, according to James, by tasting it. Or if someone
claims that condoms are the most effective and reliable contraceptive, then its
truth and meaning can be proven by using and comparing them with other
contraceptives.
John Dewey, on the other hand, argues that ideas are proven to be true and
meaningful if they proved to be an effective instrument in attaining
something. Thus, Dewey’s model of pragmatism can be viewed as a form of
instrumentalism.
Applying Pragmatism to Ethics
When applied to moral issues, a pragmatist may view the morality of a
human act from the vantage point of its practicality, workability,
beneficiality, and usefulness. Hence, in pragmatic ethics, an action is
considered morally right if it is practical, workable, beneficial, and useful;
otherwise, it has no moral worth.
Let us take, for example, the moral issue of aborting a deformed fetus.
As we can see, in Christian ethics, particularly St. Thomas Aquinas’s model
of ethics, abortion in whatever form is absolutely immoral because in the first
place the act is evil because it implies killing. For the pragmatists, however, it
is better to abort a deformed fetus than let it suffer for a lifetime. The act of
aborting a deformed fetus for the pragmatists, therefore, is:
1) practical because it will produce good results, such as sparing the parents
and the child himself from physical, mental and emotional suffering that may
be brought by the deformity;
2) workable because obviously the act of aborting a deformed fetus can be
put to work;
3) beneficial to both the parents and the child, especially in terms of freedom
from physical and emotional suffering that may be brought by the deformity;
and
4) useful because it can be used to attain good results, such as, again, sparing
the parents and the child himself from physical, mental and emotional
suffering that may be brought by the deformity.
Let us take another example. A medical doctor may say to her patient: “The
injection of this chemical compound is good for one who is suffering from
diabetes.” For the pragmatists, if the patient regains his health after the
injection of the chemical compound, then the act is judged as morally right.
This is what William James meant by his famous phrase “truth happens to an
idea”. In ethics, the pragmatists claim that “goodness” or the moral worth of
action happens to the act itself.
As we can see, in pragmatic ethics, a human act is always value-neutral from
the beginning. The morality of a human act depends on the quality of the
results, that is, on its practicality, workability, beneficiality, and usefulness.
Hence, in pragmatic ethics, morality does not seek final and absolute
answers, yet it is not relativistic. Pragmatic ethics is not relativistic in the
sense that it recognizes that there are different circumstances and that in
different circumstances, different actions might be appropriate.

Charles Sanders Peirce, founder of

Pragmatism

John Rawls’ Theory of Justice

John Rawls’ theory of justice attempts to explain why clear social inequalities
are unjust and what a just society really is. As we can see, Rawls’ theory of
justice as he developed in his seminal work A Theory of Justice is both a
work of ethics and politics. Hence, we can glean from Rawls’ theory of
justice some kind of an ethical theory. For one, in his A Theory of Justice,
Rawls attempted to address the problem of distributive justice. In what
follows, these notes will briefly sketch the key concepts of Rawls’ theory of
justice.
Some Basic Principles of Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Rawls believes that a just society is one whose characteristics conform to
normative rules that everyone would agree. This explains why Rawls’ theory
of justice begins by introducing the fundamental principle that every
individual is inviolable. Rawls writes: “Each person possesses an
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of the state cannot
override. Therefore, the rights secured by justice are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interest.” From this fundamental
principle, we can draw the following implications.
First, for Rawls, life should not be sacrificed for the sake of the majority. For
example, suppressing the people’s right to speech and expression for the sake
of economic growth is morally wrong for Rawls. As we can see, Rawls’
theory of justice directly attacks consequentialist ethics, especially its most
notable representative, that is, utilitarianism.
Second, it would appear that for Rawls, an erroneous theory is tolerable in the
absence of a good one. Thus, as Rawls would have us believe, an unjust law
is better than no law at all. In other words, an act of injustice is tolerable if
and only if it is necessary to avoid greater act of injustice. For example, it
might be morally right to incapacitate, if not kill, a notorious serial killer if it
is the only way to stop him from killing more innocent people.
And third, individual liberties should be restricted in order to maintain
equality of opportunity. For Rawls, restrictions through law preserves
freedom in democracy. For example, it is probably morally right to restrict
people from owning more than 5 hectares of agricultural lot so that other
people will have the chance to own a lot.
With this, we can now come up with two basic principles of justice that
Rawls introduced in his seminal work A Theory of Justice. These two
principles of justice are expressions of what Rawls calls “justice as fairness”.
The first principle puts emphasis on equal access to the basic human needs,
rights, and liberties. Rawls calls this the equal liberty principle. This principle
guarantees the right of each person to have the extensive basic liberty
compatible with the liberty of others. Some examples of this right are the
right to life, the right to vote, the right to speech, and the right to peaceable
assembly.
The second principle emphasizes the idea of fair equality of opportunity and
the equal distribution of socio-economic inequalities. Rawls calls this the
difference principle. This principle implies that social and economic positions
are to be to a) everyone’s advantage and b) open to all.
But how can such principles be universally adopted? Or how can we
actualize Rawls’ theory of justice?
It is here where Rawls’ notions of the “Veil of Ignorance” and the “Original
Position” come in.
Rawls introduces the theoretical “veil of ignorance” in which all players in
the social game would be placed in a hypothetical situation called the
“original position”. Rawls suggests that in the original position, each
individual does not know her sex, race, natural abilities, social status,
economic conditions, and the like. In other words, in the original position,
individuals hide their identity behind the “veil of ignorance”. Just like in
Husserl’s epoche or phenomenological reduction, the individual in the
original position sets aside her biases towards and preconceptions about
anything.
According to Rawls, out of this veil of ignorance, each individual makes a
rational prudential choice concerning the kind of social institution they would
enter into contract with. As we can see, Rawls appears to be a moral
contractarian and his theory of justice is in itself a kind of social contract.
Rawls recommends that individuals in the veil of ignorance ought to adopt a
generalized point of view that bears strong resemblance to a moral point of
view. And according to Rawls, if everybody in the original position promotes
equality then “justice as fairness” is attained. If inequality is upheld, then
injustice prevails.
As we can see, justice as fairness is achieved through the notions of the
original position and the veil of ignorance. In the original position,
individuals agree on specific social rules and institutions and in the veil of
ignorance, individuals choose the basic structure of society that they thought
is just. This is possible because Rawls argues that selfish but rational people
who are detached from their concrete identity and context will freely choose
to create a society that is truly just. In fact, Rawls believes that through the
veil of ignorance, individuals can identify universal beliefs about how society
should be organized.

John Rawls