LBJ School of Public Affairs May 2022

On the spot: The Mexican vote in the 2003 US resolution to invade Iraq
Alejandro Hernandez
1. Introduction

When the United States proposed a resolution in the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) to invade Iraq in March of 2003, the world did not focus on the usual

permanent members who could veto the decision, but rather on Mexico, a non-permanent

member. Should the government of then President Vicente Fox choose to support or oppose

the resolution, it would determine whether George W. Bush would get the UNSC approval

to legitimately remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.1 On the weeks leading up to

the vote, the Mexican president faced pressure from those who supported the invasion, and

those who opposed it, both at the international and domestic levels.

The decision was not an easy one for several reasons. On one hand, Mexico was in

the process of negotiating an immigration reform with the United States, its main trading

and investment partner, which had only been possible after Fox built a close friendship with

Bush during the first three years of his presidency. 2 On the other, the majority of UNSC

members, and most of the international community did not support the invasion, mainly

because of the incipient evidence of Hussein having Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDs).3 The international community divided into two groups, which the media called

the “war party” and the “peace party.”

1
“Consejo de Seguridad de La ONU: El Voto de México Que Friccionó La Relación Con EEUU En 2003,”
Infobae, 2021, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/11/01/consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu-el-
voto-de-mexico-que-fricciono-la-relacion-con-eeuu-en-2003/.
2
“México: Las Torres Gemelas y La ‘Enchilada Completa,’” El Universal, 2021,
https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/11-s-y-el-fin-de-la-enchilada-completa.
3
Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War” 118, no. 4
(2019): 569–98.

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The former included presidents George Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair,

Koizumi Junichiro the Japanese Prime Minister, the Italian president Silvio Berlusconi, and

José María Aznar of Spain. The latter had President Jacques Chirac of France, Vladimir

Putin of Russia, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, and the undecided non-

permanent members of the UNSC.4

At home, Mexicans, both citizens and Fox’s cabinet, did not understand the need to

support the invasion of a country thousands of miles aways, and neither why the country

should change its traditional non-interventionist foreign policy.5 Fox also had the pressure

of being the first president in 70 years to not belong to the Partido Revolucionario

Institucional (PRI)—an autocratic party that governed from 1930 to 2000—which meant

that every actions was scrutinized by the public and the opposing parties. This meant that

the decision could mean winning or losing the midterm elections of July 2003, three

months after the UNSC vote.

Also on the domestic front, the traditional foreign policy of non-interventionism

was not only in the Constitution—established in the seven principles of foreign policy of

article 30—but in the position of Fox’s staff too. The Mexican Ambassador to the UN,

Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, and the Ambassador to th United States had opposing views, the

former against the Iraq invasion and the latter in favor of it. Others, like the Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, Luis Ernesto Derbez, proposed a more moderate approach.6

4
Vicente Fox and Rob Allyn, Revolution of Hope (New York: Viking, 2007).
5
Ginger Thompson and Clifford Krauss, “Threats and Responses: Security Council; Antiwar Fever Puts
Mexico In Quandry On Iraq Vote,” The New York Times, 2003,
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/world/threats-responses-security-council-antiwar-fever-puts-mexico-
quandary-iraq-vote.html.
6
Arturo Sotomayor, “México y La ONU En Tiempos de Transición: Entre Activismo Externo, Parálisis
Interna y Crisis Internacional,” in Paradigmas y Paradojas de La Políticas Exterior de México: 2000-2006,
ed. Humberto Garza, Jorge Schiavon, and Rafael Velázquez (Distrito Federal: Colmex, 2010), 225–56.

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In this particular context of international pressure, a divided cabinet, and upcoming

elections in Mexico, President Vicente Fox had to weigh the impact of either voting against

or in favor of the resolution. This case study uses the rational actor model, a bureaucratic

policy model, and a public opinion analysis to understand how Fox ultimately decided to

vote against the United States UNSC resolution.

The first section uses the rational actor model to describe the different outcomes

from voting one way or another that Fox considered based on international pressures. It

explains why the Mexican vote was relevant in the international arena and what actors were

involved. The second section focuses on the bureaucratic politics and describes the position

of Fox’s cabinet. It also analyses the public opinion and how that influenced the president’s

decision to publicly oppose the invasion in the weeks leading up to the vote. The last

section concludes with a reflection on the relevance of the case for the current Mexican

government.

2. International pressure

Vicente Fox envisioned an active Mexico in the world scenario, one that was open

for business and participated in international organizations. Even before he took office on

December 1, 2000, Fox was already forming alliances with other democracies around the

globe and rebranding the role of Mexico from an observer to a participant.7

He managed to do so by forming close ties with different world leaders. Most

notably George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Jean Chretién (Prime Minister of Canada), Ricardo

Lagos of Chile—who had been a close friend of Fox since they met in 1997—and Jacques

7
Paulino Arellane, La Política Exterior Foxista (Puebla: Montiel & Soriano Editores, 2012).

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Chirac of France. (See Annex 1). When the time came to vote for the revolving members of

the UNSC, Mexico had a huge support from Europe and Latin America.8

Additionally, Fox promoted more foreign direct investment, further economic

integration through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)9, and more

proximity to the United States government. His relationship with Bush also allowed him to

push for a joint immigration bill in the United States. 10 Even after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,

Fox remained a close ally to the U.S. government since his government provided security

measures at the border and helped redirect flights during the days and weeks following the

attacks.11

Because of Mexico’s proximity to the United States in trade, migration, and the

close friendship between Fox and Bush, most countries expected full Mexican support for

the UNSC resolution to invade Iraq and remove Hussein from power. Not only was Mexico

expected to vote in favor, but it was also crucial in order to have a moral majority in the

council.

Mexico’s vote in either direction would have a chain reaction from other non-

permanent members. It was known that the majority of countries opposed the invasion

since they were not convinced by the WMD’s argument the U.S. had presented. Yet just

like Mexico, these countries were wary of opposing the United States, which could mean

8
Rafael Velázquez, “Balance General de La Política Exterior de México,” in Paradigmas y Paradojas de La
Políticas Exterior de México: 2000-2006, ed. Humberto Garza, Jorge Schiavon, and Rafael Velázquez
(Distrito Federal: Colmex, 2010), 93–136.
9
Renegotiated in 2018 into the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
10
Fernando Botero, “Jorge Castañeda (2004),” in Conversaciones En La Cantina: El México de Hoy Según 33
de Sus Grandes Protagonistas y Analistas, 3rd ed. (Distrito Federal: Felou, 2013), 32–38.
11
Susana Chacón, “México y El Escenario de América Del Norte,” in Paradigmas y Paradojas de La
Políticas Exterior de México: 2000-2006, ed. Humberto Garza, Jorge Schiavon, and Rafael Velázquez
(Distrito Federal: Colmex, 2010), 257–82.

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likely economic or diplomatic repercussions.12 In some cases, they feared the proximity of

U.S. security forces would create tensions within their country and with their American

allies—this was the case of Pakistan and to some extent of Syria.13

The United States needed the support of at least eight countries to have a “moral”

majority backing the UNSC resolution.14 These would include Angola, Cameroon, Chile,

Germany, Mexico, Pakistan, and Syria. Other non-permanent members, like Bulgaria and

Guinea already supported the resolution. The former given it was negotiating its

membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The latter was the only

African country supporting the resolution, although unclear why, some point to the

government securing an aid deal with the United States.15

As Mexico became more and more resistant to vote in favor of the resolution—

because of the foreign affairs principles of peaceful mediation of conflicts and non-

intervention, but also because of public opinion—these countries justified any decision

based on Fox’s position. He recalls that:

If Mexico and Chile opposed the United States, safely sconed between two oceans

within the Americas, it would be impossible for Pakistan and Angola—two other

12
Gonzalo Montanier Peralta, Están Con Nosotros o Con Los Terroristas: El Efecto Al Qaeda y La Guerra de
Iraq En América Latina (Santiago, Chile: Ariadna Ediciones, 2020),
https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/22806/Están con nosotros...978-956-8416-90-4.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
13
Erik Eckholm, “Pakistan Nervously Pacing the Sidelines on Iraq U.N. Vote,” The New York Times, 2003,
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/10/international/asia/pakistan-nervously-pacing-the-sidelines-on-iraq-un-
vote.html.
14
The 10 non-permanent members of the Council in 2003 were Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile,
Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, and Syria.
15
“Where Security Council Members Stand,” The Guardian, 2003,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/01/iraq.unitednations.

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Security Council ‘undecideds’ with much greater exposure to Mideast terrorism—to

back the U.S.-sponsored invasion plan. Suddenly, all eyes fell on Mexico.16

As former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jorge G. Castañeda describes it: “Without

Mexico, the United States would lose the support from Chile; without Mexico and Chile, it

would lose it from Pakistan, and without Mexico, Chile, and Pakistan, it would lose

Angola.”17

Vicente Fox received cables and memos from world leaders who were in search of a

clear position. The “peace” and “war” parties alike expected Mexico to have a clear

decision before the vote of the UNSC on March 14, 2003. Fox describes receiving calls

from world leaders like Aznar from Spain, Blair from Britain, and of course Bush. He was

in constant communication with Lagos, his Latin American ally, and with Chirac from

France, who assured him that the African countries that were revolving members of the

council, would support Mexico since they were close to France. Even the Russian leader

Vladimir Putin called Fox in search for a clear answer.18

But there were also concerns from the private sector. Chambers of commerce, the

CEOs of the most important Mexican companies and associations, and other industrial

leaders, were concerned that if Mexico voted against the resolution, their businesses would

suffer.19 Although Fox knew it was unlikely that Bush would push for economic obstacles

—after all both economies were extremely tied together and any actions would have an

equal reaction—the economic punishment could come from American consumers

16
Fox and Allyn, Revolution of Hope.
17
Rubén Aguilar and Jorge Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio (Distrito Federal: Grijalbo,
2007).
18
Fox and Allyn, Revolution of Hope; Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.
19
Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.

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themselves, and other U.S. politicians. For example, even though it had no clear economic

impact, businesses and even the cafeterias in the U.S. Congress renamed French fries to

“Freedom Fries.”20

Tony Garza, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, along with Colin Powell, constantly

voiced their concern of not having the Mexican support. In a press conference in February

2003, Garza declared that “difficult issues between the two nations could become

impossible to resolve.”21 He added that “If we’re [the United States] threatened you’re

threatened too, and vice versa. This decision requires political courage” and explained that

“the issues that could be in jeopardy include a long-sought immigration accord.”22

For Fox then, measuring the impact of the vote meant looking at the diplomatic and

economic consequences. Under the scope of the rational actor model, he had to consider

first what actors where involved and what role they played. The most evident are the war

and peace parties: Aznar, Bush, and Blair on the one hand, and Chirac, Lagos, and Chretién

on the other.23

This last one was of special importance because it was a NAFTA party that also had

U.S. proximity and, although not a member of the council, publicly opposed the invasion. It

was crucial for Fox to rely on Chretién as another North American country opposing the

resolution. Other actors were both the American and Mexican companies concerned about

20
Timothy Bella, “‘Freedom Never Tasted so Good’: How Walter Jones Helped Rename French Fries over
the Iraq War,” The Washington Post, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/02/11/freedom-
never-tasted-so-good-how-walter-jones-helped-rename-french-fries-over-iraq-war/.
21
Bob Edwards, “Anlysis: Mexico’s Decision To Join France And Germany In Asking For More U.N.
Inspections In Iraq,” NPR, 2003,
https://legacy.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2003/feb/030226.hadden.html.
22
Ibid.
23
Leticia Juarez, “Mexico, the United States and the War in Iraq,” International Journal of Public Opinion
Research 16, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 331–43, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh028.

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the economic repercussions of a vote against, either on the dollar-peso parity that would be

affected by discouraged investors, or on pending trade deals.24

The options were simple: vote in favor or vote against the U.S.-backed resolution.

They were both mutually exclusive and a “yes or no” situation. 25 The outcomes, however,

were more complicated. If the Fox administration voted in favor, Mexico could still push

for the immigration bill, the Mexican companies would keep their calm, and it would

prevent a distancing from the very close relationship between the two governments—and

between Fox and Bush.26

The opposite choice, voting against, could lead to a favored public opinion at home,

keeping the foreign policy in line with its constitutional principles. But it also meant a

possible distancing from the Bush administration, as well as losing the hard-worked

immigration bill, not to mention the economic uncertainty for investors.27

It was clear that the proximity with Bush, the possibility of keeping the immigration

bill, and ensuring the private sector that things would continue as usual—additionally

Mexico would not have to pay for any war expenses—balanced more to a vote in favor.

Nevertheless, after long consideration and discussions with his staff and other experts, Fox

realized that the U.S. would also feel both an economic and political repercussion should

Mexico be sanctioned for voting against. Mainly because of the interdependent trade on one

24
Jorge Santibáñez, “Grietas En La Relación México-Estados Unidos,” Los Angeles Times, 2022,
https://www.latimes.com/espanol/eeuu/articulo/2022-01-19/opinion-grietas-en-la-relacion-mexico-estados-
unidos.
25
Montanier Peralta, Están Con Nosotros o Con Los Terroristas: El Efecto Al Qaeda y La Guerra de Iraq En
América Latina.
26
Fox and Allyn, Revolution of Hope.
27
Ibid.

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side, but also the growing Hispanic population of voters that would remember how Bush

treated Mexico in the following months.28

Yet the international pressure and the actors involved under that scope only show

one part of the story. There was also the domestic pressure, both in a direct way among the

staff of Vicente Fox, and indirectly in the form of the Mexican public opinion. The next

section analyses both domestic pressures and in which ways they influenced his decision.

3. Domestic pressures

On the weeks before the UNSC vote, Vicente Fox met with his staff and other

experts to go through the possible outcomes of voting either in favor or against. Some of

the key staff members were Santiago Creel, the Interior Minister, Ramón Muñoz who was

the Chief of Staff, Luis Ernesto Derbez—who had only been Foreign Affairs Secretary for

two months after Jorge G. Castañeda resigned—and Eduardo Sojo, the Economic advisor to

the President.29

In addition to Derbez, there were other players who had an active role in the foreign

policy either because of the position they had, or because they had particular interests in the

bilateral relationship. They were Enrique Berruga, Subsecretary for Foreign Relations for

multilateral affairs, Gerónimo Gutiérrez, Subsecretary for Foreign Relations for North

American affairs, Juan José Bremer, the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Adolfo

Aguilar Zinser, the Mexican Ambassador to the UN, and Felipe Calderón 30, who was then

director of the infrastructure bank Banobras but also the leader of the PAN party in the

Chamber of Deputies.31
28
Juarez, “Mexico, the United States and the War in Iraq.”
29
Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.
30
Felipe Calderón would later be elected president in 2006.
31
Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.

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The decision-making process of Fox, as Jorge Castañeda recalls, was to listen to all

of these involved voices within and outside his staff. Although domestic politics often

created divisions during the meetings, foreign policy was not usually a contentious topic.

Until now.32

Similar to the situation at the international level, there were two sides. On one, those

who supported the resolution: Eduardo Sojo who was concerned about economic

consequences, the Economy Secretary, Guillermo Ortiz, Ambassador Bremer, and the

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Derbez.33 Luis Ernesto Derbez defended a more moderate

argument, that did not necessarily support the United States, but who rather cautioned not

supporting the resolution and instead reach a compromise with the Bush government on

other international organizations, and perhaps publicly denounce the Hussein regime.34

On the other side, there were those who firmly opposed any U.S. action. The most

vocal were Santiago Creel who was mainly concerned about the image of the president, and

Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, who based his position on “principles” as he put it in an interview a

couple of years later.35 Zinser often had this anti-American position, and constantly got into

arguments with the former Foreign Secretary, Castañeda, who he accused of being too

complacent of American requests, “too pro-yanqui.”36

Until 1990, Mexican diplomats often carried an agenda of proximity to Cuba and

other socialist governments, and only cooperating with the United States on practical
32
Botero, “Jorge Castañeda (2004).”
33
Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.
34
“Niega Derbez Interés Binacional En Voto de México Sobre Irak,” Proceso, March 4, 2003,
https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/estados/2003/3/4/niega-derbez-interes-binacional-en-voto-de-mexico-
sobre-irak-73813.html.
35
Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.
36
Fernando Botero, “Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (q.e.p.d.) (Julio 2004),” in Conversaciones En La Cantina: El
México de Hoy Según 33 de Sus Grandes Protagonistas y Analistas, 3rd ed. (Distrito Federal: Felou, 2013),
39–47.

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matters. It was only after the end of the Cold War and the distancing from Cuba that most

of them understood they needed to compromise if they were going to keep their careers in

the new world order.37 This was the case of Zinser, who expressed to Fox that, as

Ambassador to the UN, he “would promote Mexico but never be a servant of the United

States.”38

“I believed in autonomy, sovereignty, and international bodies,” he said when asked

why he took the job if he had different opinions than Fox, “yet I realized that Vicente had a

good idea in his mind, which was creating a Mexican project that was active, that did not

mean I would quit my ideals, and the cabinets, both the national and American, hated me

for that.”39 Zinser was so firm in his position that, according to Fox, “he threatened to resign

in every meeting at the slightest suggestion of supporting—or not opposing for that matter

—the United States.”40

Other staff members, like Santiago Creel, also opposed the resolution, but mainly

because of political reasons. Creel was concerned with the familiar anti-American feelings

Mexicans had, a nationalist, yet pacifist, population. However, Fox knew that was not true

anymore. “Today,” writes former Secretary Castañeda, “Fox believes that in the new times

of Mexico, there are closer ties between the two countries because of economic integration,

but more clearly because of immigration.”41

37
Sergio López et al., “La Diplomacia Bilingüe: Intereses y Principios de La Política Exterior Mexicana,” in
México Global (Mexico City: CIDE, UNAM, MATÍAS ROMERO, 2016).
38
Botero, “Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (q.e.p.d.) (Julio 2004).”
39
Ibid.
40
Fox and Allyn, Revolution of Hope.
41
Botero, “Jorge Castañeda (2004).”

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Fox explained to Creel and other concerned staff members that “the old PRI

strategy of, should everything fail, we blame the United States does not work anymore.” 42

Yet in spite of this conviction, Zinser remained adamant that they should vote firmly

against the United States to the point that he started publicly denouncing the pressures that

came from Washington, in particular from Colin Powell.43

His position did not change throughout the weeks leading to the vote. If anything,

he became more stubborn and more secretive of the meetings he held with other diplomats

in New York.44 (It was later discovered that the United States and the United Kingdom had

tapped the phones of UNSC delegations in the UN building, which explains why, after the

undecideds secretly agreed to finally form a block against the resolution, pressures from

Washington increased).45 Washington even asked Fox that Zinser should be left out of any

conversations leading up to the vote, since he was “too stubborn and impossible to agree

with.” Zinser was later removed from his position as ambassador in November 2003.46

Under this context of a divided cabinet, the question for many was: If Vicente Fox

had a strong friendship with George W. Bush and believed that Mexico and the United

States were closer thanks to trade and immigration, why did he side with Adolfo Aguilar

Zinser in the discussions? Why did he not silence him or ordered him to take a more

moderate approach, like Derbez?

42
Fernando Botero, “Vicente Fox (Febrero 2009),” in Conversaciones En La Cantina: El México de Hoy
Según 33 de Sus Grandes Protagonistas y Analistas, 3rd ed. (Distrito Federal: Felou, 2013), 123–30.
43
Ernesto Ekaizer, “El Último Combate de Adolfo Aguilar Zínser,” El País, 2005,
https://elpais.com/diario/2005/06/08/agenda/1118181608_850215.html.
44
Ibid.
45
Martin Bright, Ed Vulliamy, and Peter Beaumont, “Revealed: US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraq War,”
The Guardian, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq; Marcia Mitchell and Thomas
Mitchell, The Spy Who Tried to Stop a War: Katherine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion
(California: Poli Point Press, 2008).
46
Kevin Sullivan, “Mexican Envoy, a Critic of U.S., Is Fired,” The Washington Post, 2003,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/11/19/mexican-envoy-a-critic-of-us-is-fired/
415e14ce-76e8-4b03-8a67-3313bf295248/.

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Zinser gave one explanation two years later: “In the end, even when there was no

distancing from Washington, Fox put the diplomatic blame on me. He used the argument of

‘it was Zinser, not me’ even though he is the president.”47

Another explanation is that, since his victory in 2000, Fox closely followed the

weekly polls on his government. Throughout the month of February 2003, he realized that

whenever he spoke against the UNSC upcoming vote and how Mexico was standing firm in

its skepticism over WMDs, the more popular he was.

“By early March” writes Castañeda, “Fox realized that the more he spoke against

the invasion, the higher the [weekly] approval rates.” This meant that “the decision to vote

against a U.S.-backed resolution the following days changed from a foreign affairs dilemma

to a political advantage.”48

At the beginning of the debates in the UN, Mexicans were unsure of what voting

against would entail. But as they became more aware of how many allies supported Mexico

(from France and Germany to Chile and Pakistan) their opinion changed radically. 49 For

example, on February 28, 2003, 56% of Mexicans were in favor of a military intervention

and 43% were against.50

By March 6, only 30% were in favor and 69% were against an invasion. The same

happened with economic repercussions: In the same February 28 poll most Mexicans (74%)

were “worried that the U.S. sanctions Mexico if we vote against their resolution.” By

47
Botero, “Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (q.e.p.d.) (Julio 2004).”
48
Aguilar and Castañeda, La Diferencia: Radiografía de Un Sexenio.
49
Reynaldo Yunuen Ortega Ortiz, “The United States-Iraq War and Mexican Public Opinion,” International
Journal 61, no. 3 (2006): 648–60, https://doi.org/10.2307/40204195.
50
“Evaluación Final de Gobierno: Vicente Fox (2006),” Mitofsky, 2006,
http://www.consulta.mx/index.php/encuestas-e-investigaciones/evaluacion-de-gobierno/item/1253-
evaluacion-final-de-gobierno-vicente-fox-2006.

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March 6, the percentage changed to 51% worried versus 49% not worried about economic

sanctions.51

Furthermore, Fox’s popularity directly correlated with this particular moment. In

February of 2003, 53.2% of Mexicans favored his presidency, but by the end of March—

after speeches and press conferences defending the peaceful position of Mexico—the

number rose ten points to 63.5 percent.52

A March 2003 radio brief on NPR summarized the opinion of Mexicans: “On the

streets of Mexico City, it’s difficult to find people who support a US-led war against

Iraq.”53 The reasoning was different among the population, some pointing to the peaceful

foreign affairs principles like one interviewee who said that “This [the war] is bad for the

world […] it is not convenient for anyone. Besides, we’re a totally peaceful nation.” 54

Others disregarded the vote as something irrelevant that did not concern Mexico at all.

Another interviewee joked about it, saying “I wish Bush and Hussein would beat up on

each other until they’re exhausted, and their anger goes away.”

Either way, they represented an opposing vote favoritism, and an important

advantage in the road towards the summer elections. Public opinion highly influenced his

position on the matter and seeing a favorable response to opposing the resolution and

upcoming midterm elections, he had both good options at home and abroad.55

4. Conclusion

51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Edwards, “Anlysis: Mexico’s Decision To Join France And Germany In Asking For More U.N. Inspections
In Iraq.”
54
Ibid.
55
Ortiz, “The United States-Iraq War and Mexican Public Opinion.”

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In the end, the dilemma of the UNSC vote dissipated into a clearer option. Although

the vote would have consequences, they had been greatly exaggerated. On the bilateral

relation, the immigration bill had been stuck in the US Congress since 2001, and it was

unlikely that the war would change that, regardless of how Mexico voted. Fox also

understood that the NAFTA interdependence, as well as the Hispanic population in the

United States would discourage any serious retaliation against his government.

On the multilateral front, a combination of a favorable diplomatic relationships gave

him room to maneuver the Mexican position. With the support of France and plenty of

other non-permanent members, he had a supporting alliance. This meant that while the vote

pressure was on Mexico, the real diplomatic pressure came for the “war party” conformed

by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain.

At home, Fox had to deal with a contentious cabinet, whose members had also

fallen into the trap of exaggerating the consequences of voting against the resolution. All

except for Agular Zinser and Santiago Creel, advised for a cautious approach. Yet in the

end it was not only the diplomatic and economic safety nets Mexico had abroad, but also

the public opinion of Mexicans.

The case study demonstrates the limitations of using only one scope to analyze a

decision-making process. The bureaucratic politics approach could not explain why Fox

supported the stubborn position of Aguilar Zinser and did not go for a more moderate

approach, unless one looked at the influence public opinion had.

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As for the relevance of the case study for today geopolitics, Mexico is once again a

non-permanent member of the UNSC.56 It is also in a complicated position, since th

Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has close ties to Russian president

Vladimir Putin, who in February 2022 launched an invasion to Ukraine. With debates

taking place in the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, the

Mexican government has to mediate close bilateral relationships—for example Russia was

the first country to export COVID-19 vaccines to Mexico, the Sputnik V—at the same time

that it mediates an international opposition. Although the situation is reversed, the situation

also poses a difficult situation.57

The problem is the current government does not have a contentious staff like

Vicente Fox did, and it is very prone to fall into groupthink. Furthermore, public opinion

will not play a role since most Mexicans condemned the invasion. It will require time to

determine if Mexico can leverage immigration, energy, and trade deals that it has on the

table, or act as a mediator with Russia in the UNSC.

56
Franc Contreras, “Mexico Becomes Leader of UN Security Council,” CGTN America, 2021,
https://america.cgtn.com/2021/11/10/mexico-becomes-leader-of-un-security-council.
57
“Rusia y Ucrania: Por Qué México Se Muestra Ambiguo Sobre La Invasión Rusa a Su País Vecino,” BBC
Mundo, March 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-60866199.

16
LBJ School of Public Affairs May 2022

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Annex 1: Pictures from Vicente Fox’s autobiography Revolution of Hope (2007)

Image 1. “Toasting Putin at the June 2005 state visit at the Kremlin. The Russians are combat drinkers. When I went to
bed that night, I had to put one foot on the floor to stop the room from spinning.”

Image 2. “At the twenty Mercosur Summit, July 2004, with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leader of
Latin America's sensible left"

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Image 3. "At Crawford in March 2004 with Condi Rice—an iron lady, attractive and charming, with a steel-trap mind"

Image 4. "In February 2002, Marta and I visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. I reached out Mexico’s hand in friendship with the
goal of increasing trade and financial ties with Havana, but voted against Castro on Human Rights at the UN"

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LBJ School of Public Affairs May 2022

Image 5. "In 2002, with "Just Call Me Tony" Blair. You may disagree with the British prime minister, as I later did on
Iraq, but it's impossible not to like him"

Image 6. "Doña Mercedes welcomed President Bush to Rancho San Cristóbal in 2001 like a classmate I might have
brought home from school: "Oh, you're Vicente's friend!"

21