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Final Essay
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Danny Cooper
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INTRODUCTION:
The Second Iraq War was an independent military intervention undertaken by the United States
amidst significant controversies surrounding its underlying principles. The repercussions of this
conflict, characterized by exorbitant human and financial costs (Schmidt & Williams, 2008,
p.191), continue to reverberate in the Middle East. It is worth noting that the Bush Doctrine, a
compilation of foreign policy principles articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS,
2002), served as the ideological framework for this aggressive stance. This essay explores
principal ideology behind the second Iraq war. This essay discusses how the Bush Doctrine was
fundamentally shaped by neoconservative ideology, thereby rendering it a manifestation of
neoconservative warfare. Krauthammer states that the Bush Doctrine can be viewed as "a
synonym for neoconservative foreign policy" (Krauthammer, 2005, p.22).
The primary focus of this essay is to examine the principle ideas behind the second Iraq war and
the influence exerted by the third generation of neoconservatives, as well as their associated
think tanks and intellectual circles, on the Bush Jr. administration. Through a comprehensive
analysis, this essay will deconstruct the components of the Bush Doctrine and critically evaluate
the extent of neoconservative ideological sway over each element. Furthermore, it will explore
how neoconservative ideology impeded the Bush Doctrine, fostering a disposition towards
aggressive policies. Scholars like Cooper (2010) highlight that neoconservative’s perpetually
associate ideology with ideological conflicts and confrontations (p.72).
Consequently, this essay will explore how the foreign and national security policies implemented
by the United States during the Second Iraq War propagated a "neo-conic" worldview, thereby
establishing the ideological foundation of the Bush Doctrine (Cooper, 2010, p.72).
According to Danny Cooper, the ideology has changed, initially shifting its focus from
interventions in domestic politics to a more aggressive stance in foreign policy (Cooper, 2010,
pp. 3-4). Likewise, Justin Vaïsse (2010) has identified distinct stages or "ages" of neo-
conservatism.
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Vaïsse argues that the early phase of neo-conservatism was primarily preoccupied with domestic
politics. Figures such as Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
and Norman Podhoretz and publications like Public Interest and Commentary played significant
roles during this period. Neoconservatives criticized state intervention and social engineering,
emphasizing the importance of morality and civic virtue for preserving liberal democracy
(Vaïsse, 2010, pp. 50-81).
The third generation of neoconservatives called for promoting democracy on a global scale,
expanding their goals beyond mere defense. This idea was central to the Bush Doctrine and the
Iraq War (Vaïsse, 2010, pp. 220-271). Intellectual figures such as William Kristol, Kagan, and
John Podhoretz played influential roles during this phase. They increasingly aligned themselves
with the Republican Party, advocated for pro-Israel policies, supported military intervention,
advocated for spreading democracy through force, and expressed reservations about the Trump
administration.
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President Bush delivered a speech at the "American Enterprise Institute," a neoconservative think
tank based in Washington DC, on February 26, 2003, approximately one month prior to the Iraq
invasion, thus indicating the influence of neoconservatives on his foreign policy decisions
(Vaïsse, 2010, p. 1). The Bush family has had longstanding connections with neoconservative
circles, as illustrated by the intergenerational relationships between the two fathers and sons:
Bush Sr. with Irving Kristol and Bush Jr. with Bill Kristol. These relationships have played a
significant role in the resurgence of neo-conservatism (Dorrien, 2007, pp. 426-427). Patrick
Lang, as cited by Hinnebusch (2007), characterizes this phenomenon as a neoconservative "silent
coup" (p. 210). Khurram Husain (2003) provides an account of the generational ties between the
neocons and the Bush family, starting with Albert Wohlstetter, a military strategist at the Rand
Corporation who espoused the notion of a US-enforced global order and American
exceptionalism based on secular and humanistic principles (Husain, 2003, p. 65). In 1964,
Wohlstetter supervised Paul Wolfowitz at the University of Chicago (Husain, 2003, p. 65).
During the Bush Sr. administration, Dick Cheney selected Paul Wolfowitz as his secretary
(Husain, 2003, p. 67). Cheney, who later served as Vice President to Bush Jr., played an
influential role in shaping the Bush Doctrine. Paul Wolfowitz, a prominent proponent of a "neo-
conic" worldview, also authored the 1990 defense strategy guide that outlined US aspirations for
global dominance (Husain, 2003, p. 67). Wolfowitz further advised Dick Cheney in his capacity
as Vice President.
Consequently, the neoconservative Vice President, Dick Cheney, played a significant part in
shaping the Bush Doctrine. Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz, all prominent
neoconservatives, held influential positions in the Bush Jr. administration and exerted
considerable influence over its policies. This influence was evident in their early actions, such as
rejecting participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court and their
decision to proceed with the National Missile Defense Program despite strong domestic and
international opposition (Nuruzzaman, 2006, p. 245). The events of 9/11 immediately paved the
way for an assertive neoconservative foreign policy agenda (Davidson, 2009, p. 68), with the
Second Iraq War serving as a critical ideological battleground for this worldview.
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Intellectuals first underestimated the Bush administration's Neo-conservatism (Schmidt &
Williams, 2008, p. 192). A prominent US foreign policy specialist, Danny Cooper, claims that
Neoconservative values dominated the global scene and shaped US foreign policy (Cooper,
2010, pp. 7-8). Neoconservatives disagree with liberal and realist international relations theories
(Singh, as quoted by Cooper, 2010, p. 8). Neoconservatives sell American exceptionalism.
According to Danny Cooper, humanitarian intervention and the obligation to protect are founded
in American exceptionalism (Cooper, 2010, p. 47). Neoconservatives advocate "ideological
crusades" (Cooper, 2010, p. 157).
Cheney convinced Bush to start the war in early 2002. Since the leaders agreed, war was
unavoidable (Mearsheimer & Waltz, 2003, p. 20). However, realists opposed the 2003 Iraq war.
They said the war was terrible for America (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 192). The Project for
a New American Century's influential neoconservatives suffered another defeat in 1998 when
they wrote to President Clinton urging a military regime change in Iraq (Schmidt & Williams,
2008, p. 193). 9/11 and the Iraq War allowed the neoconservatives to depose Saddam and bring
democracy to the Middle East.
President Bush's 2002 West Point Academy commencement address and the subsequent
publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy served as early indications of the foreign
policy objectives of the Bush administration preceding the 2003 Iraq War. These policy
documents revealed the establishment of the Bush Doctrine, a foreign policy ideology centered
on promoting and protecting freedom (Callaghan, O'Connor & Phythian, 2019, p. 161).
Jervis (2013) delineated four vital elements of the Bush Doctrine: democracy and liberalism, the
perception of significant threats justifying preemptive war, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a
commitment to American hegemony (p. 79). These elements were formulated and shaped within
Neo-conservatism’s framework, underscoring this ideology's influence on the development of
the Bush Doctrine.
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Neo-con’s view of American Exceptionalism ; Spreading democracy through
military means
According to Steed (2019, p. xxiii), Neo-conservatism ideology posits that Western liberal
democracy and values represent the ultimate stage of political development and should be
disseminated globally through any available means. This belief is rooted in the conviction of
neoconservatives in Kantian's 'Democratic Peace Theory', which argues that a world consisting
of democracies would be peaceful as democratic governments are highly unlikely to engage in
war with each other (Kant, 1795; Doyle, 1983, p. 504; Deudney, 2010). The Middle Eastern
terrorist threat has been attributed to dictatorial regimes in the Middle East (Mearsheimer, 2005,
p. 57). Promoting democracy has long been a prominent element of US foreign policy. During
the Cold War, it was envisioned to be realized through the desired 'Domino' effect (Steed, 2019,
p. xxiii).
According to Mead (2013, p.xiii), an aspect of the Bush doctrine is its perceived Wilsonianism,
which asserts that the United States has a moral obligation and a vital national interest in
spreading democratic and social principles worldwide to establish a peaceful international
society governed by the rule of law. As cited by Schmidt and Williams (2008, p. 199),
Mearsheimer aptly describes it as 'Wilsonianism with the teeth.' Likewise, Tony Smith
characterizes the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq as "a Wilsonian undertaking," driven by
the belief that democratic regimes would enhance American security (Ikenberry et al., 2008,
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p.53). However, it was naive of the neoconservatives to assume that the Middle East would
transform like post-World War II Europe and become a democratic peace zone.
The Bush doctrine was marked by its controversial element of preemptive action against
perceived threats before they materialized. The neoconservative 'Defense Planning Guidance
paper,' authored by Paul Wolfowitz and released in 1992, advocated for a US grand strategy of
supremacy to counter potential new rivals, calling for strategic decisions to be made prior to the
actualization of the threat (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 195). This doctrine, known as the
preemptive strike doctrine, was further reinforced in the National Security Strategy of 2002.
The National Security Strategy explicitly stated that the United States would act preemptively if
necessary (NSS, 2002, p.15). As a result, neoconservatives anticipated scenarios involving rogue
states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that posed a potential
threat to the United States. However, this preemptive approach deviated from Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, which grants the inherent right to self-defense only in the event of an
armed attack (UN, 2014). Nevertheless, the NSS provided legitimacy to preemptive action,
particularly when an imminent threat was perceived (NSS, 2002, p.15).
The definition of "imminent threat" was modified by neoconservatives, who argued that Saddam
Hussein, due to being 'undeterrable,' posed an inevitable threat to US security and justified the
use of preemptive force against Iraq (Zunes, 2022, p.28). This shift in the national security
strategy marked a significant change in foreign policy, emphasizing the preemption of perceived
threats (Zunes, 2022, p.28). Additionally, the War on Terror further supported the notion that the
US had the right to preemptively attack terrorists and "rogue states" to prevent future assaults
(Callaghan, O'Conner & Phythian, 2019, p. 161).
Critics of the preemptive strike strategy, particularly in the context of the Iraq War, have argued
against its effectiveness. Mearsheimer and Walt (2003) contended that Saddam Hussein could
have been deterred since his primary goal was to "stay alive" and "remain in power," unlike
terrorist groups who saw death as martyrdom and could evade the US, making deterrence
impossible. They challenged the neoconservative claim that preemptive force was necessary due
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to unattainable deterrence and highlighted the rejection of the realist view that stability equates to
security (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003).
The Bush Doctrine aimed to protect the national interests of the United States worldwide through
any means necessary. Neoconservatives opposed realist "balance of power" politics, believing it
hindered American national interests. Their belief in American exceptionalism and benign
hegemony led to a preference for a "preponderance of power" and acceptance of
"bandwagoning" logic. According to this theory, weaker states should align themselves with a
stronger enemy because the latter would seize what it wants by force regardless (Mearsheimer,
2005, p.163). Instead of attempting to check the power of a more vital state, weaker states should
join forces with it (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p.196). Neoconservatives viewed Iraq as crucial
to maintaining American primacy and believed that transforming Iraq would create a bandwagon
effect and present a desirable opportunity for global hegemony.
The Iraq war faced international opposition due to the United States unilateral actions, supported
by the neoconservative ideology. The US disregarded the UN Security Council and acted
unilaterally, demonstrating its willingness to override opposition from allies to achieve its goals
(Jervis, 2004, p.13). Neoconservatives were confident in their unilateralist strategy, relying on
the United States military dominance and the perceived technological superiority of the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
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Neoconservatives believed the US could swiftly eliminate a regime, withdraw, and prepare for
the next target, envisioning a cycle of military actions (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 57). In addition,
they may have viewed Iraq as an easy target to initiate a "bandwagoning" effect among
competitor states, driven by their faith in RMA.
However, realists like Posen (2002) had already foreseen the brutal insurgency and complex
urban warfare that the neoconservatives overlooked. While RMA facilitated the rapid destruction
of the Iraqi army, it failed to address the challenges of reconstruction, occupation, and the
ensuing asymmetric warfare (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 197). The realists argue that the
neoconservatives' utopian understanding of democracy led them to overlook the complexities of
the insurgency.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, this essay asserts that the Bush doctrine, which shaped US foreign and national
security policy during the Bush administration, was heavily influenced by the third generation of
neoconservative intellectuals and ideologists. The doctrine promoted the exportation of neo-
liberal democratic values, preemption of threats, unilateral action, and a commitment to US
hegemony. The core principles of neo-conservatism played a significant role in shaping the Bush
doctrine, stemming from a belief that Western liberal democracy represents the ultimate form of
political development and should be disseminated globally.
The justification for preemptive action against terrorists and "rogue states" in the War on Terror
provided the US with the rationale to preemptively attack and prevent future assaults. The 2002
national security strategy explicitly called for preempting perceived threats. In 2002, Vice
President Cheney persuaded President Bush to support the decision to go to war, while
neoconservatives advocated for the use of force to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.
Furthermore, the essay argues that American exceptionalism and nationalism are essentially
intertwined and influence US foreign policy through a combination of benevolence and power-
seeking. The neoconservatives saw the Iraq war as an opportunity to accomplish the unfinished
agenda from the first Iraq war, namely, to remove Saddam's regime and promote liberal
democracy in the Middle East to preempt any threats to US dominance in the Gulf region.
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Overall, the Bush doctrine reflected the neoconservative ideology and its vision for American
global leadership, democracy promotion, and the use of preemptive force to safeguard US
interests. It marked a significant shift in US foreign policy and had profound implications for the
Middle East and the world at large.
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