G.R. No.

120784-85, January 24, 2001

SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA-VIRAY

Facts:

Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela,
Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.

The heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date,
Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. At
the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey. Later, the cadastre was conducted and the
property involved in the partition case were specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-
B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre
and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her
brother-in-law, despite several demands. Moses filed a complaint for partition claiming the one
fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him.During the pendency of the case, Trinidad
Fajardo died. The heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.
Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia
Nunga-Viray.

On February 8, 1989, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza. Moses sold
the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia Reyes-Bustos. The spouses Venancio
Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed an action
for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos, who were in actual possession as lessees of the
husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land.

The MCTC decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial court issued writs
of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the RTC a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. RTC dismissed the case. Both spouses Bustos and
Lucio Fajardo Ignacio appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. CA declared Moses
Mendoza as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.

In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful
detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on
the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners
may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of
petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of
the land.
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. In Lipana vs. Development
Bank of Rizal,the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and
executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain
exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G.
579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil. 164);
or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could
render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal
owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting
petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the
issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses
Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It follows that
as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An owner
who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to use
and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate
and to the fruits is a crippled owner."
G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005
FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN

Facts:
Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of
land covsituated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The respondent, by means of
force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion
thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a
portion of her property along the boundary line.

The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff. She further prayed for other reliefs and remedies just and
equitable in the premises. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent
because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the
respondent’s) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent’s house at No. 572
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with
Oscar Layno, who received the same. The respondent failed to appeal the decision.
Respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Dagupan for the annulment of the decision. RTC
ruled in favor of Jensen. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA ruled that the complaint was
one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the
defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should
have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no
prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was
followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons
and complaint upon the respondent, the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not the action is quasi in rem or in personam

Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the respondent

Held:

The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the
respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry
is a real action and one in personam.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.18 Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is
brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled
that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam.
Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject
the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem,
an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with
the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain
or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action.
G. R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION

ADMINISTRATION (NIA) vs. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A.
AGDEPPA, LEOSA NANETTE AGDEPPA and MARCELINO VIERNES, MARGARITA
TABOADA, PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ, represented by LINA ERLINDA A. ORTIZ
and MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN MAMAC and GLORIA MATAS,

Facts:

The National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is the government owned and controlled
corporation primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the
country. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized by law to exercise
the power of eminent domain.

N I A n e e d e d s o m e p a r c e l s of l a n d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f constructing the Malitubog-

Marigadao Irrigation Project. Consequently, it filed with a Regional Trial Court a Complaint
for the expropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of land. Among the affected parcels of land
was Lot No. 3080 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-61963 and registered
under the Rural Bank of Kabacan (RBK). In its answer, RBK alleged, inter alia, that it no
longer owned Lot No. 3080. Subsequently thereafter, in response to the expropriation
complaint, Margarita Tabaoda, Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Ortiz,
Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas (Intervenors) filed their Answer-in- Intervention. They
essentially pointed out that Tabaoda and Portia were the new owners of Lot No.
3080, which the two acquired from RBK.

After due process, the RTC granted the complaint and ordered NIA, among others, to
forward the payments intended for RBK to Tabaoda and Portia who have already
acquired ownership over Lot No. 3080. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed
the RTC’s decision that the payments intended for RBK should be given to Tabaoda and
Portia. The CA based its conclusion on the non- participation of RBK in the expropriation
proceedings and the latter’s manifestation that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080.

Issue:

Whether or not the payment of just compensation for Lot No. 3080 should be made to
Taboada and Portia?

Held:

No. It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.
In this kind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their
evaluation of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated
property. Thus, it was imprudent for the CA to rely on RBK’s mere declaration of non-
ownership and non-participation in the expropriation proceeding to validate intervenors’
claim of entitlement to that payment.

The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to
be valid. It should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T- 61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the
conveyance must be embodied in a public document and
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property is situated.
We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of
conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership o f L o t N o . 3 0 8 0 f r o m i t s r e g i s t e r e d
o w n e r , R B K t o t h e intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the
RBK. It is not disputed that RBK did not participate in the expropriation proceedings, and
that it manifested that it no l o n g e r o w n e d L o t N o . 3 0 8 0 . T h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d
h a v e nevertheless required it and the intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining
to the conveyance of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mere inference, considering
that the payment of just compensation is intended to be awarded solely owner based on the
latter’s proof of ownership. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the
fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name,
the RBK manifested that it no longer owned the lot, but the intervenors; however, it
presented no proof as to the conveyance thereof.