Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23035             October 13, 1925

In re will of Ignacio Abuton y Poncol, deceased.

TEODORA GUINGUING, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AGAPITO ABUTON and CALIXTO ABUTON, opponents-appellants.

M. Abejuela for appellants.

No appearance for appellee.

STREET, J.:

In the course of the administration of the estate of Ignacio Abuton, deceased, resident of Oroquieta,
Province of Misamis, it appeared that the deceased died testate on March 8, 1916, leaving two sets
of children by two different wives, the first of whom was Dionisia Olarte, who died about twenty years
ago, and by whom the deceased had twelve, children, three of whom died without issue. The second
wife was Teodora Guinguing, to whom the testator was married on July 14, 1906, and by whom he
had four children, all still living. A will of the testator, executed on November 25, 1914, was probated
in court and allowed on October 9, 1917 (Exhibit A); and one Gabriel Binaoro was appointed
administrator. In due course of proceeding Binaoro submitted to the court an inventory of the
properties belonging to the deceased at the time of his death. In this inventory he included only the
lands which the testator had devised to the children of the second marriage, omitting other lands
possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children of the first
marriage as having been derived from their mother. Accordingly, on March 14, 1922, Teodoro
Guinguing, in representation of herself and her four minor children, presented a motion in court,
asking that the administrator be required to amend his inventory and to include therein all property
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including property
actually in the hands of his children by her which (the motion alleged) had been delivered to said
children as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the first set of children to bring
into collation the properties that had been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the
Civil Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition that Ignacio Abuton had never in fact
effected a liquidation of the conjugal property pertaining to himself and Dionisia Olarte. This motion
was formally opposed by two of the children of the first marriage, namely, Agapito and Calixto
Abuton y Olarte.

Upon hearing the proof the trial judge found that no property had been acquired by the testator
during his second marriage and that the administration was concerned only with property that had
been acquired before the death of the first wife. The trial judge further found that after the death of
the first wife the testator had liquidated the ganacial estate pertaining to them and had divided
among the first set of children all of the property that pertained to the first wife in the division, with
the exception of the home-place in the poblacion, in which the testator had continued to reside till
death. The share pertaining to the testator in said division was, so the court found, retained in his
own hands; and this property constituted the proper subject matter of the present administration
proceedings. Accordingly an order was entered to the effect that the administrator should include in
the inventory of the estate of Agapito Abuton all of the property of which the testator was possessed
at the time of his death. From this order the two opponents of the motion appealed.

We entertain serious doubts as to whether the order in question here was really such a final order as
to be appealable under section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the making of the inventory
is necessarily of a preliminary and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion of property therein
or the improper omission of property therefrom is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons in
interest. But, passing this point without decision, we proceed to consider whether there is any merit
in the errors assigned to the order which is the subject of the appeal.  1awph!l.net

The contention made in the first assignment of error, to the effect that an order of the character of
that appealed from cannot be made by a court without formal notice being given to all persons in
interest, in the same manner as if a new action had been begun, is clearly untenable, since all the
heirs are already virtually represented in the administration and are bound by all proper orders made
therein, so far and so far only as such orders have legal effect. This is not inconsistent with the
proposition that contested claims of ownership between the administrator and third persons should
be tried in separate proceedings, which is entirely true. The question here is merely between some
of the heirs and the administrator, as representative of all persons in interest. Besides, it should be
pointed out, the inclusion of a property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of possession;
and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly included in the estate, the occupant
heir is liable for the fruits and interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art.
1049, Civ. Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to collation clearly contemplate
that disputes between heirs with respect to the obligation to collate may be determined in the course
of the administration proceedings.

The second and third assignments are directed to the supposed errors of the court in having based
its findings as to the property belonging to the estate of Agapito Abuton in part upon the recitals of
his legalized will (Exhibit A) and in part upon the recitals of a previous will (Exhibit 1), which had
been superseded by the last. This older will appears to have been produced by the representatives
of the first set of children in the proceedings for the probate of the will which was admitted, and was
attached to that expediente. It is said in appellants' brief that this document was not introduced in
evidence at the hearing of the present controversy.

It was not error, in our opinion, for the trial court to look to the recitals of the legalized will for the
purpose of determining prima facie whether a certain piece of property should or should not be
included in the inventory, without prejudice of course to any person who may have an adverse title to
dispute the point of ownership. The use made of the superseded will (Exhibit 1) in the appealed
order is of more questionable propriety, but we are of the opinion that the facts stated by the court
can be sufficiently made out from the other evidence submitted at the hearing.

As we gather from the record, the crux of the controversy consists in the fact that among the
properties remaining in possession of Ignacio Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land
covered by a composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of Dionisia Olarte. At the same
time that this title was issued, Agapito Abuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and 11654,
covering adjacent properties to be issued in his own name. From the circumstance that title No.
11658 was issued in the name of Dionisia Olarte the opponents appear to believe that this land was
her particular property and should now vest exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous.
There is nothing to show that the land covered by title No. 11658 was not acquired by the spouses
during their marriage, and the circumstance that the title was taken in the name of the wife does not
defeat its presumed character as ganacial property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of
the first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband to assign other property to the first
set of children as their participation in the estate of their mother and to retain in his own hands the
property for which a composition title had been issued in the name of the wife.

Upon the whole we are unable to discover any reversible error in the appealed order, and the same
is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:

I concur, without prejudice to the right of the appellants over the properties in question.

G.R. No. L-23273             October 9, 1925

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
C. S. SALMON, defendant-appellant.

J. W. Ferrier for appellant.

Jose C. Abreu for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted on February 5, 1924, in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila by the Manila Railroad Company for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, C.
S. Salmon, the unpaid balance due to the railroad company as freight charges on various
quantities of coconut shells shipped over the railroad by the Philippine By-Products Co.,
which charges had been guaranteed by Salmon. Upon the petition of Salmon, his
codefendant W. G. Frisbie was impleaded, and the cause proceeded thenceforth against the
two. Upon hearing the cause judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff to recover of
Salmon the sum of P1,647.22, with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, but
Frisbie was absolved with all costs of the cause against Salmon. From this judgment Salmon
appealed.

It appears in evidence that in the year 1918 W. G. Frisbie and W. J. Allen, under the name of
the Philippine By- Products Co., undertook to buy coconut shells in the provinces for use by
the Government of the United State in the prosecution of war. Much of the material collected
by them had to be brought to Manila by rail; and Salmon, being the agent of the American
buyer with whom Frisbie and Allen had contracted, guaranteed to the Manila Railroad
Company the payment of any freight for coconut shells shipped over the railroad by the
Philippine By-Products Co. The note by which this obligation was created is as follows:

May 6, 1918          

The MANILA RAILROAD CO.,

Manila

GENTLEMEN: Relative freight charges on coconut shell shipped over your railroad by the
Philippine By-Products Co. I hereby personally guarantee payment of same. Bills may be
rendered daily or monthly at my office, 314 Kneedler Building, at your convenience.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) C. S. SALMON          

While engaged upon the contract above-mentioned, Frisbie and Allen, under the name of the
Philippine By-Products Co., caused 846,000 kilos of coconut shells to be transported over the
plaintiff railroad to Manila from various municipalities in the provinces of Laguna and
Tayabas. The freight charges on these shipments amounted to P3,294.44. To recover this
debt the plaintiff instituted a prior civil action (No. 20206) in the court of the City of Manila, in
the course of which both Frisbie and Allen were brought in as codefendants with Salmon.
Before that case reached its conclusion Allen died; and upon motion of the plaintiff showing
this fact, the action was dismissed as against Allen, in order that the claim against him might
be presented through proper channels in the proceedings for the administration of his estate.
As a consequence the case proceeded to judgment against Frisbie and Salmon only.

Upon hearing the cause the trial judge found and declared that the Philippine By-Products
Co. was not a legal entity, inasmuch as no articles of partnership or incorporation had been
entered into by Frisbie and Allen; and the court further found that the two principals, Frisbie
and Allen, should be held liable as partners in a civil partnership, each being responsible for
one-half of the debt. It was further declared that Salmon, as guarantor, was liable in a
subsidiary capacity only. Judgment in favor of the plaintiff was therefore given against
Frisbie for half of the amount due and against Salmon for the same amount in the event that
it should not be made out of Frisbie. As the action had been dismissed as against Allen
nothing was adjudicated with respect to Salmon's subsidiary liability for the half which
pertained to Allen. Neither the plaintiff nor defendants against whom judgment had been
rendered appealed from this decision, and Frisbie afterwards satisfied the judgment as
against himself, leaving Salmon free from any liability under the judgment.

It further appears that the plaintiff's claim against Allen was in due time submitted to the
committee on claims in the proceedings on Allen's estate, by which committee it was
approved. Later, the court ordered the claim to be paid, but Allen's estate proved insolvent
and nothing was ever realized upon the claim. The present action was then begun by the
plaintiff to recover of Salmon the amount which the plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to
get out of Allen's estate.

The case for Salmon as presented in his brief on appeal in this court is planted on the
following line of reasoning, namely, first, that the judgment in the first case was erroneous in
that Frisbie was there held liable only to the extent of one-half of the plaintiff's claim, when
judgment should have been given against him for the whole; and, secondly, that Salmon, as
guarantor, has been released by the failure of the plaintiff to obtain judgment against Frisbie
for the entire indebtedness in that action. We are of the opinion that this contention is
unsound and that the defendant Salmon is liable for the amount awarded against him in this
action whether the first action was correctly decided or not. To make this intelligible it is
necessary first to explain why, in the former action, the Court of First Instance declared
Frisbie liable for one-half of the debt only. 1awph!l.net

In the case of Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng (6 Phil., 498), it was held that where a
partnership engages in business without the recording of articles of partnership in the
mercantile register, such partnership cannot be recognized as having legal existence, and
under article 120 of the Code of Commerce only those members of the partnership who
engage in the management of its affairs are liable to its creditors. This decision, though
perhaps necessary under the provision cited, has not infrequently been invoked to the
prejudice of creditors; and the courts, in order to give creditors all possible protection, have
been inclined to hold the individual members of such a partnership liable as members of a
civil partnership, for it will be remembered that in civil partnership all who participate in the
enterprise are liable for the acts of the management though only to the extent of the
proportionate share of each. Thus, in Co-Pitco vs. Yulo (8 Phil., 544), it was held that certain
individuals who had engaged in the operation of a sugar estate constituted a civil
partnership, as distinguished from a mercantile partnership and each member of the society
was bound to pay his pro rata share. In Dietrich vs. Freeman (18 Phil., 341), three individuals
operated the Manila Steam Laundry; and in an action to recover damages caused by the
enterprise, it was held that the three associated were liable as members of a civil partnership
and that each must pay his part of the claim. Again, in Bachrach vs. "La Protectora" (37 Phil.,
441), the same doctrine was applied to the case of various individuals who had engaged in
the business of transporting passengers and freight at Laoag, Ilocos Norte. In the light of
these decisions the action of the Court of First Instance in declaring the Philippine By-
Products Co., to be a civil partnership and the two partners to be each liable for one-half the
plaintiff's claim is comprehensible enough. It follows furthermore, in the view of the case,
that the present action is properly maintainable against Salmon to recover the share for
which Allen was liable but which, because of the insolvency of Allen's estate, could not be
recovered from him. In this connection it is to be borne in mind that Salmon, as guarantor,
has claimed the benefit of the exhaustion of the liability of his principals; and for this reason
no judgment could be entered against Salmon in the former case for Allen's part of the debt
after the cause was dismissed as against Allen. Indeed, no question is made in the
appellant's brief upon the point that judgment was rightly entered against Salmon in this
case, supposing that Frisbie and Allen were each liable only to the extent of one-half of the
plaintiff's claim.

But it is contended for the appellant that both Frisbie and Allen were jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount, in accordance with the rule of liability in commercial
partnerships (article 127, Code of Commerce); and in this connection emphasis is placed
upon the undeniable fact that the purchase and sale of coconut shells is commercial
business. It must be remembered, however, that the Philippine By-Products Co. had never
been registered in the commercial register; and in such case, as we have already pointed out,
only the manager, or managers, of the enterprise are solidarily liable, the other partners not
being liable at all. In the absence therefore of a finding that both Allen and Frisbie were
managers of the Philippine By- Products Co., it could no even be said that they were both
solidarily liable even though it be admitted that the enterprise was a commercial rather than
civil partnership.

The attorney for the appellant relies upon the case of the Manila Engineering Co. vs.
Cranston and Heacock (45 Phil., 128), as having established that the liability of persons
operating as partners in an unregistered partnership is solidarity and not pro rata. It is true
that in the case mentioned both Cranston and Heacock were held jointly and severally liable,
but the facts of that case, if examined, will show, we think, that both Cranston and Heacock
were managers of the partnership and were hence solidarily liable by the express terms of
article 120 of the Code of Commerce.

But admitting that the appellant's view as to the joint and several liability of Frisbie and Allen
is correct and that judgment might properly have been entered in the former case against
Frisbie (who is solvent) for the whole, it by no means follows that Salmon was discharged by
the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute that cause with full effect against Frisbie. The fact that
the lower court in that action failed, even though erroneously, to give judgment against
Frisbie for the whole debt cannot be imputed to the plaintiff as an act of bad faith towards
Salmon. Neither can it be said that the plaintiff owed Salmon the positive duty of bringing that
case by appeal to this court, even supposing that success might have crowned the effort,
which is doubtful. Rather it might be said to have been the duty of Salmon to prosecute an
appeal for his own protection, if he deemed it of importance in that action, to fix primary
liability for the whole debt upon Frisbie.

One apparent anomaly in this case there undoubtedly is, which consists in the fact that two
actions have been successfully maintained against Salmon upon a single obligation; but this
is due to the circumstance that Salmon guaranteed a liability which has turned out to consist
of the separable obligations of two persons and Salmon, relving upon the subsidiary
character of his own undertaking, had insisted upon the exhaustion of legal remedies against
each of his principals. But his own election he has, therefore, made it impossible for his own
liability to be settled in a single lawsuit.

Our conclusion, upon a careful examination of all aspects of the case, is that no error was
committed in the judgment which is the subject of appeal, and the same will be affirmed. So
ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24843             October 30, 1925

CECILIO AYO, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable TOMAS FLORDELIZA, Judge of First Instance of Sorsogon, JUSTO DELLOSA,
JULIAN LACRE and VICENTE DICHOSO, respondents.
Pacifico F. Lim and Agustin Frivaldo for petitioner.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
Francisco Arellano for the respondent Dellosa.
No appearance for the other respondents.

STREET, J.:

This is an application for the writ of mandamus by which the petitioner, Cecilio Ayo, seeks to
compel the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon to reinstate an
election protest which said respondent had dismissed and to compel the same judge to issue
a subpoena duces tecum to the municipal secretary of Bacon, Sorsogon, to produce in court
the return of the municipal council as a board of canvassers showing the number of votes
received by the several candidates for the office of president of the municipality of Bacon at
the last general election. The cause is now before us upon the demurrers of the respondents.

It appears that the petitioner was a defeated candidate for the office of the municipal
president of Bacon, Sorsogon, at the last election, the successful candidate being one Justo
Dellosa. In due time thereafter the present petitioner instituted a contest over the office and
made the said Dellosa, with two other defeated candidates, parties to the proceeding. In his
motion of protest the petitioner asked for a recount of the votes in the fifth precinct. The
successful candidate, Justo Dellosa, met the protest with the counter-protest, in which he
asked for the recount of the votes in precincts Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6. One of the unsuccessful
candidates, Vicente Dichoso, also came back with a counter-protest, in which he asked for a
recount of the votes cast in all six of the election precincts of the municipality. In due course
the recount was begun, but after the votes cast in the first precinct had been recounted by
the commissioners, Dichoso, apparently finding no encouragement in the results, made a
motion to withdraw effect of placing the votes of the third precinct out of the litigation; and in
order to bring the votes to this precinct. back into the controversy the petitioner asked for
leave to amend and to make the proper changes that would justify a recount of the votes of
this precinct. This motion of the petitioner was denied by the court as having been presented
out of time. The recount of the votes of the five precincts was continued, however, and
concluded. The matter of the contest then came before the respondent judge for decision,
but as the returns from only five of the precincts were before the court, and no evidence
whatever to show the returns from the third precinct, his Honor, on August 1, 1925,
dismissed the protest, with costs against the petitioner.

It is insisted for the petitioner that this action on the part of the respondent judge was
unlawful, inasmuch as the law requires the judge in charge of a protest proceeding to make a
finding as to who was elected, or whether no person was elected. It is true that the law so
provides but the law contemplates that the proof upon which a lawful decision can be made
shall be placed by the contending parties before the court; and in a case where a cause is
submitted without sufficient proof to enable the court to determine the protest, it is not
improper, indeed it is necessary, merely to dismiss the contest. 1awph!l.net

The principal contention presented in this petition arises over the responsibility for the
situation which arose in the manner above stated; and the petitioner seeks to put the blame
on the court for not having before it the return of the board of canvassers, which would have
shown the result of the election in the uncontested precinct. In this connection it appears
that in his original motion the petitioner asked the court to issue a subpoena duces
tecum against the municipal secretary of Bacon, who is supposed to be the proper custodian
of the report of the canvassing board. In acting upon the petition his Honor made a proper
order upon the municipal treasurer to produce the boxes, lists of registered voters, and other
papers and documents used in the general election, to the end that the contest could be
proceeded with. His honor, however, either by oversight of believing that all of the necessary
documents and papers would be produced by the treasurer, failed to make an order upon the
municipal secretary to produce the return of the board of canvassers. It does not appear that
the attention of his Honor was especially called to the request for a subpoena duces tecum to
the municipal secretary, and the non-production of the evidence concerning the returns as to
the third precinct was not noted until the cause was submitted.

In behalf of the respondents it is pointed out that it was the duty of the petitioner to produce
the necessary evidence upon which a proper judgment could be made, and in particular it is
insisted that the duty of issuing the subpoena duces tecum is a ministerial duty of the clerk
of court, not requiring a special order of the court. This suggestion given is, we think,
satisfactory; and in our opinion no one is chargeable with the oversight except the petitioner
himself.

The petition is therefore, in our opinion, not well founded; and the demurrers to the petition
will be sustained and the petition declared insufficient. It furthermore appearing that the
petition suffers from a defect not curable by amendment, an order absolute will be entered,
dismissing the same, with costs against the petitioner.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 241353

DANILO ROMERO, VICTORIO ROMERO AND EL ROMERO, REPRESENTING THEIR

DECEASED FATHER LUTERO ROMERO, PETITIONERS, VS. CRISPINA SOMBRINO,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure and not by those who are not true and
lawful tenants but became so only through the acts of a supposed landholder who had no right to the
landholdings. Tenancy relation can only be created with the consent of the landholder who is either
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land.1

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by the heirs of Lutero Romero (Lutero), i.e., petitioners Danilo Romero, Victorio Romero, and El
Romero (petitioners Heirs of Lutero), against respondent Crispina Sombrino (respondent Sombrino),
assailing the Decision3 dated January 22, 2018 (assailed Decision) and the Resolution4 dated June
8, 2018 (assailed Resolution) rendered by the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN.

The Essential Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As culled from the records of the instant case, the essential facts and antecedent proceedings are as
follows:
The instant Petition centers on a two-hectare portion of Lot No. 23, Pls-35 located at Marauding
Annex, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte (subject property), with an aggregate area of 12.0717 hectares,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-2261, which is registered in the name of Lutero after the
latter's homestead application was approved in 1967.5

The final and executory Decision of the Court, Third Division in Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al. v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 1093076

Prior to the present controversy, the subject property was subject of a legal dispute involving Lutero
and his siblings, the heirs of the late spouses Eugenio Romero (Eugenio) and Teodora Saltiga
(Teodora) (collectively referred to as the Sps. Romero). The Sps. Romero begot nine children, i.e.,
Lutero, Eutiquio, Ricardo, Generosa, Diosdada, Mindalina, Lucita, Presentacion and Gloriosa. The
issue regarding the ownership and possession of the subject property was dealt with in two civil
cases tried jointly before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 7 (RTC):

1. Civil Case No. 591, entitled Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al. v. Lutero Romero, et al. -
for Reconveyance with Damages and Cancellation of Registration of Mortgage

2. Civil Case No. 1056, entitled Lutero Romero, et al. v. Spouses Meliton Pacas, et al. - for
Annulment of three Affidavits of Sales, Recovery of Possession with Damages

In sum, it was alleged by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 591, i.e., Teodora, Presentacion, Lucita,
Gloriosa, and Mindalina, that Lutero merely held the subject property in trust for the benefit of the
heirs of his father Eugenio since the latter was actually the one who first applied for the homestead,
but such application was denied because Eugenio was already disqualified to apply for a
homestead, having previously applied for a homestead over another parcel of land with the
maximum limit of 24 hectares. Moreover, it was alleged that Lutero employed fraud in procuring the
homestead patent covering the subject property.7

In addition, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 591 also claimed that Lutero subsequently sold the
subject property by allegedly executing three affidavits of sale in favor of the respondents in Civil
Case No. 1056, i.e., spouses Lucita and Meliton Pacas, spouses Presentacion and Sabdullah
Mama, and spouses Gloriosa and Dionisio Rasonable. Hence, it was alleged that Lutero no longer
has any claim over the subject property pursuant to these affidavits of sale.8

The RTC rendered a Decision dated March 11, 1991 in favor of Lutero, declaring the three affidavits
of sale null and void and ordering the respondents in Civil Case No. 1056 to surrender possession of
the subject property to Lutero. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.9

The consolidated cases were then resolved with finality by the Court in Teodora Saltiga de Romero,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.10 (De Romero v. CA). In the said case, the Court held that Lutero is
the true and lawful landowner of the subject property, having exclusively acquired the subject
property after successfully applying for a homestead patent over the land in 1967. Lutero's exclusive
ownership over the subject property was even recognized by some of Lutero's sisters, i.e., Gloriosa,
Presentacion, and Lucita.11

The Decision in De Romero v. CA likewise found that the family patriarch, Eugenio, never owned the
subject property. Eugenio himself tried to apply for a homestead patent over the subject property,
but this was denied "because he was disqualified by virtue of the fact that he already had applied for
the maximum limit of 24 hectares to which he was entitled [pertaining to land located on the adjacent
lot; and the] land in question could not therefore have passed on from him to his children."12
Furthermore, the said Decision held that the supposed sale of the subject property by Lutero in favor
of the respondents in Civil Case No. 1056 was null and void for being violative of Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,13 which prohibited the alienation of a homestead within five years from
the issuance of the patent.14

After the Court's Decision in De Romero v. CA became final and executory, the petitioners Heirs of
Lutero filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the RTC on March 10, 2003. On
June 16, 2003, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution.15

However, the implementation of the Writ of Execution was held in abeyance because respondent
Sombrino filed a Motion for Intervention, alleging that she was a tenant of the subject property. The
RTC allowed the intervention and granted respondent Sombrino the opportunity to present evidence
to show good cause why the Writ of Execution should not be implemented against her.16

After due hearing and deliberation, the RTC ordered the implementation of the Writ of Execution, as
shown by the Sheriffs Report. Subsequently, a Writ of Demolition was issued by the RTC on March
29, 2005. On April 5, 2005, respondent Sombrino was ousted from the subject property.17

Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession before the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

Because respondent Sombrino failed to successfully assert her right to possess the subject property
before the RTC, she sought recourse before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Iligan City by filing a Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of
Possession (PARAD Complaint) against the petitioners Heirs of Lutero. The case was docketed as
DARAB Case No. X-543-LN-2005.

In the PARAD Complaint, respondent Sombrino alleged that she was the actual tenant-cultivator of
the subject property as she and her late husband Valeriano were installed as tenants over the
subject property in 1952 by the alleged original owners of the subject property, the Sps. Romero,
until the said spouses were succeeded by Lucita and her heirs as landowners.18 Hence, respondent
Sombrino asked that her security of tenure as tenant of the subject property be upheld and that she
be allowed to peacefully possess and cultivate the subject property.

The Ruling of the PARAD

In the Decision19 dated October 28, 2005, the PARAD rule4 in favor of respondent Sombrino and
declared her to be a de jure tenant of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered as follows[:]

1. Declaring complainant Crispina Sombrino to be a de jure tenant and ordering

her reinstatement to the subject landholding[;]

2. Ordering herein respondents and/or any person in occupation/possession of the subject

landholding to vacate and turn-over its possession to the complainant;

3. Directing the MARO, DAR of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte to execute an agricultural

leasehold contract between the herein parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 5, Series of 1993[;]
 4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.20

The PARAD held that respondent Sombrino was able to establish that she was installed as tenant by
the Sps. Romero in 1952. According to the PARAD, "[w]hile indeed, there [was] no tenancy relations
that [existed] between [respondent Sombrino] and [the petitioners Heirs of Lutero] as there were no
shares received by [the latter,] x x x it is as if [Lutero] succeeded the ownership of the subject land
from Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero[; thus, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero] who inherited the
property [were] bound to [assume] and respect the tenancy rights of [respondent
Sombrino]."21 Hence, the PARAD held that "[o]nce such relationship is established, the tenant shall
be entitled to security of tenure."22

The petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the PARAD
in the Order dated January 12, 2006. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero appealed
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The appeal was docketed
as DARAB Case No. 14261.

The Ruling of the DARAB

In the Decision23 dated June 28, 2010, the DARAB denied the appeal for lack of merit. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision
dated 28 October 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

The DARAB held that through the final and executory judgment in Civil Case Nos. 591 and 1056, the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero were vested ownership over the subject property.25 However, since
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 384426 states that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not
be extinguished by mere sale, alienation, or transfer of the leaseholding and that the transferee shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor; the
agricultural leasehold relation instituted between the Sps. Romero and respondent Sombrino "is
preserved even in case of transfer of the legal possession of the subject property."27

The petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 1, 2010,28 which
was denied by the DARAB in the Resolution29 dated February 26, 2016.

Hence, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Petition for Review30 under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court before the CA. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied the appeal for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 28, 2010 and Resolution dated February 26, 2016 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.31

According to the CA, respondent Sombrino sufficiently established by substantial evidence the
essential elements of tenancy:

Indeed, respondent sufficiently established by substantial evidence the essential elements of

tenancy. The late Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero are the landowners; respondent, together
with her late husband, is their tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a
farm land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by respondent and share in the
harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the
harvest, respondent pays rental as well as the irrigation fees. Lastly, respondent's personal
cultivation of the land was conceded by Lucita Romero Pacas, [who] succeeded her parents the
Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero, thru a leasehold agreement which became the contract
between the parties.32

Thus, the CA held that the petitioners Heirs of Lutero are bound to respect the leasehold relationship
between the Sps. Romero and respondent Sombrino:

Given the foregoing, the petitioners are bound to respect the leasehold relationship between the late
Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero and respondent notwithstanding the transfer of legal
possession of the subject agricultural land. Accordingly, respondent cannot be dispossessed of her
possession and cultivation of the subject agricultural land without any valid and just cause. Security
of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of
their land holdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the
termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law x x x as
specified in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844. A perusal of these provisions will show that no
such valid cause exists in the present case warranting the termination of the leasehold relationship.
Hence, the rights of respondent as tenant should be respected.33

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 dated
February 7, 2018, which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant Petition before the Court.

On January 14, 2019, respondent Sombrino filed her Comment35 dated December 14, 2018 to the
instant Petition wherein she asserted that she was able to duly establish her tenancy with respect to
the subject property.36 Despite the Court's Resolution37 dated March 13, 2019 requiring the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero to file their Reply, the latter failed to do so.

Issue

Stripped to its core, the critical issue is whether there exists an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the petitioners Heirs of Lutero and respondent Sombrino. Otherwise stated, is
respondent Sombrino a tenant de jure that enjoys security of tenure as guaranteed by tenancy laws?

The Court's Ruling

The instant Petition is meritorious. Respondent Sombrino is not a tenant de jure and does not enjoy
the security of tenure accorded to agricultural tenants. There is no tenancy relationship between the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero and respondent Sombrino.
Propriety of a Factual Review

Preliminarily, the Court is aware that the determination of whether a person is an agricultural tenant
is basically a question of fact.38 As a general rule, questions of fact are not proper subjects of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to
questions of law.39

Nevertheless, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions such as when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken; and when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.40

The Court finds that the aforesaid exceptions to the general rule apply in the instant case. Therefore,
the Court shall proceed to rule on the main issue.

Agricultural Leasehold Tenancy

According to RA. 1199, as amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines, an agricultural leasehold tenancy exists "when a person who, either personally or with
the aid of labor available [from] members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a
piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both."41

The existence of a tenancy relation is not presumed. According to established jurisprudence, the
following indispensable elements must be proven in order for a tenancy agreement to arise:

1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

The absence of any of the requisites does not make an occupant, cultivator, or a planter a de
jure tenant which entitles him to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws.42

However, if all the aforesaid requisites are present and an agricultural leasehold relation is
established, the same shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the
landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court
for causes herein provided.43 In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the
leasehold shall bind the legal heirs.44

To recall, in the instant case, the PARAD, as concurred by the DARAB and the CA, found that an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relation exists between respondent Sombrino and the petitioners
Heirs of Lutero because the supposed original landowners of the subject property, i.e., the Sps.
Romero, allegedly entered into a tenancy agreement with respondent Sombrino in 1952. And
because the leasehold relation subsists and binds the legal heirs of the agricultural lessors even
upon the latter's death, Lutero and, subsequently, his heirs are bound by this leasehold relation.

Respondent Sombrino failed to provide substantial evidence on the existence of an agricultural

leasehold tenancy relationship between herself and the Sps. Romero

The Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to provide sufficient evidence that there was, in the
first place, an agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement entered into by herself and the alleged
landowners, the Sps. Romero.

Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. An assertion that one is a tenant does not automatically
give rise to security of tenure. Nor does the sheer fact of working on another's landholding raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. One who claims to be a tenant has the onus to
prove the affirmative allegation of tenancy.45 Hence, substantial evidence is needed to establish
that the landowner and tenant came to an agreement in entering into a tenancy relationship.

Considering the foregoing, jurisprudence has held that self-serving statements regarding supposed
tenancy relations are not enough to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement.46 Moreover,
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional, not conclusive on the courts, and have little evidentiary value without any
corroborating evidence.47 There should be independent evidence establishing the consent of the
landowner to the relationship.48

In the instant case, the pieces of documentary evidence presented by respondent Sombrino do not
provide proof that the latter and the Sps. Romero came into an agreement as to the establishment of
an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship.

As explained by the DARAB, "[t]o prove her claim, [respondent Sombrino submitted] the Joint
Affidavit of Sarillo Bacalso and Neil Ocopio, whom she allegedly hired in several occasions as
planters, mud boat operators and thresher operators[.]"49

Such evidence severely fails to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement. At most, the
aforementioned Joint Affidavit merely establishes that respondent Sombrino occupied and cultivated
the subject property at some point in time.

In Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. Development Bank of the PhilippinesDagupan Branch, et al.,50 the

Court held that an affidavit of the same nature as the said Joint Affidavit fails to prove consent of the
landowner. In the said case, the Court explained that such document in no way confirms that the
alleged tenant's presence on the land was based on a tenancy relationship that the landowners had
agreed to as "[m]ere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert
the tiller into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws."51

In believing that respondent Sombrino was able to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement
with the Sps. Romero, the DARAB also gave credence to "the Affidavit of the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman."52

In Soliman, et al. v. Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., et al.,53 the Court held that the
certifications issued by a BARC Chairman to the effect that the alleged tenants were actually
cultivating the agricultural land deserve scant consideration in determining the existence of a
tenancy relationship. Citing the findings of the court a quo, the Court held therein that "[o]bviously,
the barangay captain x x x whose attestation appears on the document-was not the proper authority
to make such determination [because even] certifications issued by administrative agencies and/or
officials concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship are merely preliminary or
provisional and are not binding on the courts."54

With respect to acknowledgment receipts presented by respondent Sombrino showing the payment
of irrigation fees and rentals to Lucita,55 such pieces of documentary evidence fail to show that the
Sps. Romero installed respondent Sombrino as a tenant of the subject property. The said receipts
merely establish that, at most, respondent Sombrino entered into an arrangement with Lucita and
not with the Sps. Romero.

More doubt is engendered in the mind of the Court as to the existence of the alleged agricultural
tenancy agreement because of the undisputed fact that "Eugenio Romero died sometime in
1948."56 To recall, at the heart of respondent Sombrino's claim of tenancy is her allegation that
Eugenio, together with Teodora, installed her as tenant in 1952. Needless to say, with the death of
Eugenio in 1948, contrary to the contention of respondent Sombrino, it was impossible for Eugenio
to have instituted respondent Sombrino as tenant of the subject property.

All in all, the Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to discharge her burden of proving that a
tenancy relationship existed between her and the Sps. Romero.

Assuming that it even existed, the supposed tenancy agreement was invalid as it was not entered
into with the true and lawful landowner of the subject property

Even assuming arguendo that the Sps. Romero indeed entered into a tenancy agreement with
respondent Sombrino in 1952, such agreement would not have created a valid tenancy relationship.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landowner who is
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land. It cannot be created by the act of a
supposed landowner, who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy, much less by one who has
been dispossessed of the same by final judgment.57

The Court's ruling in Heirs of Teodoro Cadeliña v. Cadiz, et al.58 is on all fours. In the said case, the
respondents-farmers therein claimed that the alleged landowner, Nicanor Ibuna, Sr. (Ibuna), validly
installed them as tenants. Analogous to the instant case, by virtue of a final and executory judgment
recognizing the ownership of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro Cadeliña (Teodoro),
over the subject property therein as the latter was a holder of a homestead patent, the respondents-
farmers were ousted from the land. As in the instant case, the respondents-farmers filed complaints
for reinstatement of possession of the land before the DARAB.

In dismissing the respondents-farmers' claim of tenancy relationship, the Court explained that a
tenancy relationship could only be created with the true and lawful landowner who was the owner,
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land. Since Ibuna was not the true and lawful
landowner, he could not have validly installed the respondents-farmers as tenants of the land.
Further, the Court held therein that upholding Ibuna as the legal possessor of the land was
inconsistent with Teodoro's homestead, which was already deemed valid in a final and executory
judgment, since a homestead applicant was required to occupy and cultivate the land for his own
and his family's benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else, viz.:

In this case, Ibuna's institution of respondents as tenants did not give rise to a tenure relationship
because Ibuna is not the lawful landowner, either in the concept of an owner or a legal possessor, of
the properties. It is undisputed that prior to the filing of the complaint with the DARAB, the transfers
of the properties to Ibuna and his predecessor, Andres Castillo, were declared void in separate and
previous proceedings. Since the transfers were void, it vested no rights whatsoever in favor of Ibuna,
either of ownership and possession. x x x

Notably, upholding Ibuna as the legal possessor of the properties is inconsistent with petitioners'
homestead since a homestead applicant is required to occupy and cultivate the land for his own and
his family's benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else. x x x 59

In the instant case, to reiterate, it has already been decided in the Court's final and executory
Decision in De Romero v. CA that:

x x x Eugenio Romero was never the owner of the land in question because all he bought from the
Jaug spouses were the alleged rights and interests, if there was any, to the said land which was then
part of the public domain. The Jaugs could not have sold said land to Eugenio as they did not own it.
Eugenio Romero was not granted, and could not have been granted, a patent for said land because
he was disqualified by virtue of the fact that he already had applied for the maximum limit of 24
hectares to which he was entitled. The land in question could not therefore have passed on from him
to his children.60

Moreover, De Romero v. CA definitely held that Lutero's homestead patent over the subject property
was validly acquired and he was the true and lawful landholder of the subject property, viz.:

On the other hand, Lutero Romero applied for a homestead patent over the land in question and his
application was duly approved. The appellants have not established that there was any fraud
committed in this application. In fact it appears that there was even a hearing conducted by the
Bureau of Lands on the application because a certain Potenciano Jaug had been contesting the
application. Under the presumption of law, that official duty has been regularly performed, there
appears to be no ground to question the grant of the patent to Lutero Romero in 1967.

His sisters Gloriosa, Presentacion, and Lucita apparently recognized Lutero's ownership of the
property when in 1969 they sought the help of the mayor of Kapatagan to convince Lutero to
execute affidavits of sale in their favor.61

In sum, with the finality of De Romero v. CA, it can no longer be disputed that the Sps. Romero
never became the owners of the subject property. Neither did they become the lessee, usufructuary
or legal possessor of the subject property. Hence, the Sps. Romero had no capacity whatsoever to
install respondent Sombrino as a leasehold tenant on the subject property. Consequently, neither
could the heirs of the Sps. Romero (aside from Lutero) validly enter into any tenancy agreement
over the subject property.

Given the foregoing, with the absence of the first essential requisite of an agricultural tenancy
relationship, i.e., that the parties to the agreement are the true and lawful landholders and tenants,
respondent Sombrino cannot be considered a de jure tenant who is entitled to security of tenure
under existing tenancy laws. And corollarily, there being no agricultural tenancy relationship existing
in the instant case, the PARAD and DARAB acted beyond their jurisdiction when they ordered the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero, among other things, to restore possession of the subject property to
respondent Sombrino.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 22, 2018 and
Resolution dated June 8, 2018 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 rendered by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and the Decision dated June 28, 2010 rendered by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession in DARAB Case No. X-543-LN-2005
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Cunanan v. Judge Aguilar, 174 Phil. 299, 313 (1978); citation omitted.

2 Rollo, pp. 15-48.

3 Id. at 50-57. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, with Associate Justices
Romulo V. Borja and Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon, concurring.

4 Id. at 60-61.

5 Id. at 51.

6 377 Phil. 189 (1999).

7 Id. at 197.

8 Id. at 201-202.

9 Id. at 196-199.

10 Supra note 6.

11 Id. at 198.

12 Id.

13 THE PUBLIC LAND ACT; Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 was repealed by
Republic Act No. 11231 entitled "An Act Removing the Restrictions Imposed on the
Registration, Acquisition, Encumbrance, Alienation, Transfer and Conveyance of Land
Covered by Free Patents Under Sections 118, 119 and 121 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise Known as 'The Public Land Act,' as amended," (February 22, 2019).

14 De Romero v. CA, supra note 6 at 200-201.

15 Rollo, p. 65.

16 Id.
17 Id. at 52, 65.

18 Id. at 102.

19 Id. at 102-108. Penned by Provincial Adjudicator Noel P. Carreon.

20 Id. at 108; emphasis in the original.

21 Id. at 106-107.

22 Id. at 107.

23 Id. at 89-97. Penned by DARAB Member Arnold C. Arrieta, with DARAB Chairman
Nasser C. Pangandaman and DARAB Members Ma. Patricia Rualo-Bello, Ambrosio B. De
Luna, Gerundio C. Madueno, Jim G. Coleta, and Isabel E. Florin, concurring.

24 Id. at 96.

25 Id. at 93-94.

26 AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE.

27 Rollo, p. 94.

28 Id. at 22.

29 Id. at 99-101.

30 Id. at 62-86.

31 Id. at 57.

32 Id. at 55.

33 Id. at 56; citation omitted.

34 Id. at 109-121.

35 Id. at 141-149.

36 Id. at 146.

37 Id. at 154-155.

38 Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-Dagupan Branch, et

al., 720 Phil. 414, 422 (2013); citation omitted.

39 Goyena v. Ledesma-Gustilo, 443 Phil. 150, 158 (2003).

40 See Almelor v. The Hon. RTC of Las Piñas City, Br. 254, et al., 585 Phil. 439 (2008).

41 RA 1199, Sec. 4, as amended by RA 2263.

42 Heirs of Teodoro Cadeliña v. Cadiz, et al., 800 Phil. 668, 677 (2016); citation omitted.

43 RA 3844, Sec. 7.

44 RA 3844, Sec. 9.

45 Soliman, et al. v. Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., et al., 607 Phil. 209, 224
(2009).

46 See id. at 226.

47 Reyes v. Heirs of Pablo Floro, 723 Phil. 755, 769 (2013).

48 Caluzor v. Llanillo, et al., 762 Phil. 353, 367 (2015).

49 Rollo, p. 90; citation omitted.

50 Supra note 38.

51 Id. at 425; citation omitted.

52 Rollo, p. 90.

53 Supra note 45.

54 Id. at 226; italics in the original, citation omitted.

55 Rollo, pp. 103-104.

56 De Romero v. CA, supra note 6 at 194; underscoring supplied.

57 Cunanan v. Judge Aguilar, supra note 1 at 311; citation omitted, underscoring supplied.

58 Supra note 42.

59 Id. at 678-679; citations omitted.

60 De Romero v. CA, supra note 6 at 198.

61 Id.; underscoring supplied.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 237102, March 04, 2020 ]

CRC 1447, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ROSALINDA CALBATEA, EDUARDO CALBATEA, RICARDO
DULA, RICARDO DULA, JR., GUIDO BALUYOT, FRANCISCO LIWANAG, ARIEL CORDOVA,
JOVI MANALANSAN, ROMEO ORTEGA, REYNALDO ALFONSO, DOMINADOR CALING,
REMEGIO GODINES, EFREN LAGTU, RODELIO QUINTO, JONATHAN RAMOS, AND ANY
AND/OR ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision2 dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated January 31, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 105421, which affirmed the Order4 dated January 19,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 in Civil Case No. DH-1341-
14.

The Facts

Subject of this Petition is a portion of an estate originally owned by Liberty Hizon Vda. De Luna
(Hizon) and Eufemia Rivera (Rivera). Sometime in 1993, said estate was the subject of a Notice of
Coverage pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Hence, an application for
conversion of said property from agricultural to industrial was filed, which was granted per Decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 37386 dated February 9, 1999. Upon finality of said CA Decision, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order of conversion as directed by the CA, subject
to the condition, among others, that the development of the area shall be completed within five years
from the issuance of said order.5

In 2004, Rivera filed a petition before the DAR, which sought for an extension to comply with the
condition of developing the property.6

In the meantime, the subject property was purchased by CRC 1447, Inc. (petitioner) sometime in
2006, and thereafter registered under its name as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-260935 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan.7

On October 24, 2007, the DAR issued an Order denying Rivera's petition for extension and instead,
directing the issuance of a Notice of Coverage over the entire estate which includes the subject
property. Thus, petitioner received a Notice of Coverage8 dated December 11, 2008.

Petitioner then filed a petition to lift said Notice of Coverage before the DAR. While this was pending,
petitioner sent demand letters to respondents for them to vacate the subject property. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the petition was denied by the DAR in an Order9 dated February 8, 2013. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of said Order was likewise denied in an Order10 dated September 10,
2013.

On February 26, 2014, petitioner filed a Complaint11 for Recovery of Possession before the RTC
against herein respondents, who claimed to be actual occupants and potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries of the subject landholding.

In their Answer,12 respondents sought the dismissal of said petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, or referral of the same to the DAR for determination and certification that the issue
involves an agrarian dispute or matter pursuant to the Supreme Court Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 62-2010,13 as the subject matter of the case involves an agrarian
dispute. Respondents posited that since they are actual occupants and potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries and the subject property is an agricultural land placed under CARP coverage by virtue
of the DAR Notice of Coverage, and considering also the denial of petitioner's petition to lift said
Notice of Coverage, the issue as to who has the right to possess and/or use the subject property is
within the competence of the DARAB.

In its Reply,14 petitioner argued, among others, that the case does not involve an agrarian dispute
and that the Notice of Coverage over the subject property was patently illegal. Hence, petitioner
insisted on the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

The RTC Ruling

Considering that the subject property is the subject of a DAR Notice of Coverage, and that petitioner
alleged in its Reply the issue on the validity of the Notice of Coverage over the subject property, the
RTC held that the case involves an agrarian dispute. According to the RTC, "the determination of
whether or not the Notice of Coverage was illegally issued remains within the exclusive and primary
jurisdiction of the DAR and still falls within the definition of 'agrarian dispute'." As such, the RTC
ruled for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction.

Consequently, the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to refund the
excess deposit in the Sheriff's Trust Fund to its payor upon submission of pertinent documents.

SO ORDERED.15

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order
dated June 11, 2015:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by [petitioner] is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of this Court dated January 19, 2015 dismissing the
instant case still stands.

SO ORDERED.16

The CA Ruling

The CA sustained the RTC's conclusion that the case involves an agrarian dispute. The CA ruled
that since the case is "an offshoot of the Notice of Coverage issued by the DAR," and "considering
that the property in question became the subject of conversion and was reverted to being an
agricultural land by the DAR," the case falls squarely under the matters relating to the
implementation of the CARP. Citing OCA Circular No. 62-2010, the CA upheld the dismissal of the
case for want of jurisdiction. It disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is Denied.

The January 19, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 in Civil
Case No. DH-1341-14 is hereby AFFIRMED for the reason that it is the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) which has primary jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.

SO ORDERED.17

Undaunted, petitioner now seeks refuge before this Court, maintaining its position that the RTC, not
the DAR, has jurisdiction over the case for recovery of possession. Petitioner argues that the
issuance of the Notice of Coverage is merely a preliminary step for the State's acquisition of the land
for agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership thereof
to the government. In fine, petitioner contends that a Notice of Coverage does not ipso facto render
the land subject thereof a land reform area. Petitioner also maintains that while respondents may
have been actual occupants, which may make them potential CARP beneficiaries, this does not give
rise to tenancy relationship for the DAR, through its Adjudication Board (DARAB), to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.

The Issue

Ultimately, the only issue for our resolution is whether the courts a quo correctly dismissed the case
for recovery of possession on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Court's Ruling

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law
and determined by the allegations in the complaint.18 Further, jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the issues or
questions that is the subject of the controversy.19 Specifically in this case, if the issues between the
parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB,
such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.20

The jurisdiction of the DAR is laid down in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No.
9700,21 viz.:

SEC. 18. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the DENR."

xxxx

SEC. 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding
Section 50-A to read as follows:

"SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. - No court or prosecutor's office shall take
cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties
that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case
shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and
certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from
the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by
the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial
court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals."
(Emphases supplied)

Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A,22 the DARAB was created, which was designated to
assume the powers and functions of the DAR with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases, and matters relating to the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws.23 Corollary,
under Section 1, Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB's jurisdiction is not
limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy or leasehold agreement between the parties exists.
Specifically, Section 1(a) of said Rule provides that its primary and exclusive original and appellate
jurisdiction includes, among others, cases involving "[t]he rights and obligations of persons engaged
in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the [CARL], as amended, and other related agrarian laws."

DAR Administrative Order No. 03-1124 also finds relevance in this case, wherein it was declared
that the DAR shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all cases that are agrarian in nature pursuant to the
landmark case of Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca,25 wherein the Court ruled that "[a]ll
doubts, [with regard to jurisdiction on agrarian reform matters], should be resolved in favor of the
DAR since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian
matters." Said Administrative Order also cited the OCA Circular No. 62-2010, which directs all courts
and judges concerned to "refer all cases before it alleged to involve an agrarian dispute to the DAR."

In this case, the averments in the Complaint seemingly make out a case for recovery of property,
which is clearly within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Said Complaint, however, failed to
mention that the subject property is an agricultural land, placed under the coverage of the CARP as
stated in the Notice of Coverage. The Court has previously explained that "[a] notice of coverage is a
document that aims to inform the landowner that his land has been determined by the DAR, on the
basis of the latter's preliminary identification, to be under the coverage of the [CARP]."26 Further,
the fact that respondents are the actual occupants and potential agrarian reform beneficiaries of the
subject agricultural landholding cannot be disregarded. Moreover, the denial of petitioner's petition to
lift the Notice of Coverage before the DAR is likewise revealing. Notably, the Order27 of the DAR in
said petition gave weight to the reports and recommendations of the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer of Hermosa, Bataan and the Legal Division of DAR Bataan Provincial Office, to which the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer concurred with, which were all one in concluding that the Notice
of Coverage should be upheld.28 Considering all these circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be
denied that the subject property is within the land reform area. As such, the issue on the possession
or use thereof is well-within the jurisdiction and competency of the DARAB.

Petitioner's narrow and restrictive understanding of the concept of agrarian matters within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be sustained.  To reiterate, the DARAB's jurisdiction is not limited
1âшphi1

to agrarian disputes where tenancy and leasehold agreement issues between the parties are raised.
Also, there is nothing under Section 1(a), Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure which limits
the jurisdiction of the DARAB only to agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of
the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines.29 As above-stated, all cases involving agrarian
matters, which include issues on the management, cultivation, or use of all agricultural lands
covered by the CARL, are within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In Sarne v. Maquiling,30 the Court
explained that under Section 431 of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARP include all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
A notice of coverage, therefore, is not necessary in order for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a
case that involves "[t]he rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in
the management, cultivation, or use of an agricultural land covered by R.A. No. 6657."32

Furthermore, while it is true that the issuance of the Notice of Coverage is merely a preliminary step
in land acquisition for agrarian reform purposes and issuance of the same does not vest title upon
the State, it does not take the fact that the DAR has already determined through its preliminary
identification that the land subject thereof is under the coverage of the CARP. In all, it is inaccurate
to argue that the case simply involves an ordinary recovery of possession controversy. The subject
of petitioner's Complaint undoubtedly involves the use of an agricultural land, which is the subject of
the implementation of the CARP. Verily, the RTC and the CA correctly found that the case falls
squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of the DARAB.33

In these lights, the Court finds the RTC's dismissal of the petition a quo, as affirmed by the CA, in
order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 105421, which affirmed the Order dated January 19, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 in Civil Case No. DH-1341-14 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), on official business.

Caguioa, (Acting Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 8-24.

2 Penned by Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of the Court), with Associate
Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; id. at 25-33.

3 Id. at 34-35.

4 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Amelita Cruz Corpuz, id. at 57-62.

5 Id. at 11.

6 Id. at 12.

7 Id. at 11-12.

8 Id. at 43-44.

9 Records, pp. 93-99.

10 Id. at 50-51.

11 Id. at 2-4.

12 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

13 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTIONS 7 AND 50-A OF R.A. NO. 6657, ALSO KNOWN AS

THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS RESPECTIVELY
AMENDED BY SECTIONS 5 AND 119 OF R.A. NO. 9700 (AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE
ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING
NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR,
April 28, 2010.

14 Records, pp. 54-56.

15 Rollo, p. 62.

16 Id. at 64.

17 Id. at 32.

18 Union Bank of The Philippines v. The Hon. Regional Agrarian Reform Officer, 806 Phil.
545, 561 (2017).

19 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, 775 Phil. 133, 146 (2015), citing Heirs of Julian
dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 512 Phil. 389, 401 (2005).

20 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, id.

21 AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

(CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL LANDS,
INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on August 7, 2009.

22 MODIFYING ORDER NO. 129 REORGANIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on
July 26, 1987.

23 Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018, 855
SCRA 377, 388.

24 REVISED RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO.

9700 (JURISDICTION ON AND REFERRAL OF CASES THAT ARE AGRARIAN IN
NATURE), effective July 23, 2011.

25 482 Phil. 208, 211 (2004).

 26 Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 221484,
November 19, 2018.

27 Records pp. 93-99.

28 Id. at 96.

29 Id.

30 431 Phil. 675 (2002).

31 Sec. 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1989 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

32 See Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, supra note 19, at 149.

33 See Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 538 Phil. 899, 908 (2006).

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