Theories of Deviance and the Self-Concept

Author(s): L. Edward Wells

Source: Social Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 189-204
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 Social Psychology
1978, Vol. 41, No. 3, 189-204

Theories of Deviance and the Self-Concept*

L. EDWARD WELLS
Purdue University

Given the sociological use of the selfconcept in accountingfor social control, the paper
considers the analytical use of the self in explanations of deviance. In reviewingtheoretical
patternsin the use ofself-conceptin studyingdeviance, threeprincipalcategoriesof theoriesof
deviance are suggested: (1) structural interactionistanalyses; (2) socialization-control
analyses; and (3) labeling analyses. Additionally, discussion deals with clarifyingthe
explanatoryrole of the selfconcept in deviance accounts. A firstconcern involves the basic
conceptsinvolved?specifyingwhatis to be includedin theselfand whataspects ofdeviance are
to be explainedby it. The second task involvesspecifyingpossible causal relationshipsbetween
self-conceptionand deviance.

One of the major theoretical utilities of "The delinquent as a person," or Tan-

the self-concept in sociology involves its nenbaum's (1938) description of the "tag-
role, in the explanation of social control, ging" process in systematizing deviance.
of accounting for the articulation between However, this work was not systemati-
personal events, interactional processes, cally "self'-conscious, and the functions
and social structures. Correspondingly, of the self in explaining deviance were not
many of the attempts of sociologists to well-specified. The focus of early interac-
understand deviance have relied on the tionist writing on deviance was largely
concept of the self as an integral explana- ecological, centering on the organization
tory construct. Despite its theoretical cen- and disorganization of the communities in
trality, much of the usage has been of an which individual lives are embedded. In
informal nature, so that the role of the contrast, the influence of psychoanalytic
self-concept in deviance theory remains and other psychological approaches in
generally implicit. The intention here is to sociology led generally to a focus on de?
consider this theoretical role, presenting viance as an outcome of intrapsychic
(1) a description of the major historical processes such as "ego dysfunctions" or
trends in the use of the self-concept in instinctual unfoldings. The more or less
deviance analysis, and (2) a consideration conscious processes of reflexive percep?
of the analytical components of such tion, appraisal, and cognition, which are
theorizing. central to the notion of self-conception,
were not explicitly important in such ap?
HISTORICAL TRENDS proaches.
Generally, the early deviance literature
Not surprisingly, one can find examples was characterized by an opposition or
of the informal use of the self-concept in separation between psychological and
early sociological interactionist consid- sociological levels of analysis. While psy?
erations of deviance?e.g., Cooley's chological approaches tended to focus
(1902) descriptions of the social aspects of mainly on psychopathology, macroscopic
conscience, Burgess' (1923) discussion of sociological analysis emphasized struc?
tural accounts of community disorganiza?
* This paper is a revisionof a paper presentedat tion and collective misfortunes. The im-
the 1977 meetings of the American Sociological
plicit theoretical middle ground?where
Association; work was partlysupported by Public on the interpersonal
Health Service Grant No. 1T32 MH 14243-01. The one focuses pro?
authorexpresses special gratitudeto JerryMarwell cesses by which socially distributed con-
forhis substantialinfluenceon the initialversionsof tingencies coordinate with individual
thepaper, along withthanksto editorialreviewersof motivations to produce situated
Social Psychology for their helpfulcriticisms.Ad- This
behavior?remained undeveloped.
dress all communicationto L. Edward Wells, De?
omission is significant for our review,
partmentof Sociology and Anthropology,Purdue
University,West Lafayette,IN 47907. since it is at this microsociological or so-

189

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 190 SOCIAL
cial psychological level of analysis that
self-concept is most actively utilized as a
sociological construct.
A more widespread and theoretically
motivated inclusion of the self concept in
analyses of deviance actually began to
emerge in the 1950's when interactionist
social psychology became a major influ?
ence throughout a broad range of sociolog?
ical thought. Works by Cohen (1955),
Reckless et al. (1956), and Lemert (1951)
stand as perhaps the key works signaling
the emergence of what was to grow during
the 1960's into dominant perspectives on
the use of self-concept in the study of de?
viance. During the next decade, work on
the connections between the self and de?
viance flowered along with the vast gen?
eral expansion of self-concept literature,
and this efflorescence has continued into
the 1970's. However, as we near the end
of the current decade, ostensible signs of
skepticism or of declining utility could be
appearing. Radical new positions have
begun to emerge that have already altered,
or offer the potential to alter, the general
direction of deviance theory, along with
the kinds of accounts that are viewed as
satisfactory explanations of deviance. In
particular, the increasing interest of soci-
ologists in a "conflict perspective" (e.g.,
Turk, 1969;Quinney, 1970) may foreshadow
a return to basically structuralist accounts
of deviance which omit the microsociologi-
cal processes constituting those structures.
Explications of a conflict theoretical posi-
tion by Taylor et al. (1973) and by Collins
(1975) claim to be able to deal with inter-
personal and cognitive considerations
within that framework. However, the
claim remains open to substantiation, and
it seems to run counter to the bulk of
present work on deviance within a conflict
paradigm.
Despite these new trends, my general
impression is that, while future prospects
are always uncertain, the demise of self-
concept approaches to explaining de?
viance remains improbable in the short
run, and rather unlikely in the longer run
as well. The extent to which the self-
concept becomes central to our under-
standing of deviance may be seen by the
variety of approaches utilizing the con-
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PSYCHOLOGY
struct. In reviewing the development of
relevant theoretical positions, this discus-
sion will separate them into three broad
categories, corresponding to the perspec-
tives signalled by the work of Cohen
(1955), Reckless et al. (1956), and Lemert
(1951) mentioned above. These categories
are: (1) structural interactionism, (2)
socialization-control, and (3) labeling per-
spectives.
Structural Interactionism
The focus in structural interactionist
analyses generally has been on deviance
as a "subcultural" phenomenon?
referring to the emergence of divergent,
collectively organized responses to social
contingencies, or what could be termed
more specifically "contraculture"
(Yinger, 1960). The work of A. K. Cohen
in Delinquent Boys (1955) provided the
initial exemplar of this theoretical ap-
proach. This represented an attempt to
plug motivational, interpersonal, and situ-
ational considerations into social struc?
tural theories (principally Merton's
anomie theory) to explain more fully the
differential emergence of gang delin-
quency. In dealing with subcultural de?
viance as the collective solution of indi-
vidually experienced problems of status
and identity maintenance, this effort
began to specify the interactional pro?
cesses by which structurally distributed
conditions influenced the adoption of de-
viant activity. Cohen, in particular, fo-
cused on deviance as a form of systematic
response to "status frustration," which
results from the intersection of social dis-
junction and the fundamental motivation
of people to enhance or validate their self-
identities through social interaction. Such
work suggested the development of a syn-
thesis between ecological and social psy?
chological aspects of interactionism.
After initial suggestions about the use of
self-conception in accounting structurally
for the emergence of deviance, the real
development in this work occurred in the
1960's. By the mid-1960's, interactionist
critiques of structural theories became
more insistent and specific (e.g., Clinard,
1964; Cohen, 1965; Himmelhoch, 1965).
 THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND THE SELF-CONCEPT 191

The general direction of such critiques Socialization-Control Analyses

was the continuing attempt to specify an
interactional model of deviance which A second theoretical focus on the rela?
would more clearly link structural condi- tionship between self-conception and de?
tions (i.e., the differential distribution of viance involved what might be termed a
resources, experiences, and values) with "socialization-control" approach to de?
the interpersonal events by which social viance, mainly emphasizing individual de-
structural phenomena are produced. Var- velopmental patterns in the production of
iously described as self-role theory, so? deviance, particularly the development of
cial identities theory, or simply role self-control. Although with some attention
theory, the concern was to reflect the to social circumstance and location, the
mutual influence between individual and principal focus here was on the personal
group processes. The key variables in ar- development of an "ego-strength" vari-
ticulating individuals with social forces able which insulates against pressures
were roles (as identifiable social loca- toward deviance. The initial exemplar of
tions, identities, and capacities within this type of theory is containment theory,
which individuals act) and self (as the re- as suggested and developed by Reckless
flexive processes by which conversions and associates (e.g., Reckless et aL, 1956;
between social data and individual cogni- Reckless, 1967). Containment theory
tive activity are behaviorally made). emerged as a modification of social con-
The basic position of a self-role theory trol theory, adding the selffactor as a key
is that persons are constituted by the mechanism of "inner containment" to the
process of interactively validating a self- traditionally depicted external contain?
identity within ongoing activities which ment of deviance by social institutions
are themselves shaped by social struc- through structures of inducements and
tures of available or appropriate identities. constraints. Despite common roots in in?
This socially organized sense of self teractionist thought, containment theory
guides individuals in constructing new ac? diverged in several ways from the struc?
tions and in turn is influenced by the social tural interactionist approach. As formu-
responses to past actions. In this respect, lated by Reckless, containment theory
the process of self-conception provides a seemed more concerned with psycholog?
behavioral interface between social and ical development than with interactional
individual events. Familiar examples of processes. In addition, its analytical focus
this approach in deviance study would be was on inhibition rather than motivation
the continuing work of Cohen (1965, 1966; of behaviors?a distinction roughly paral-
Cohen and Short, 1966) in specifying a lel to the psychoanalytic separation be?
motivational model of deviance adoption, tween superego and ego processes?
or Glaser's (1956) "differential identifica- dealing with socialization essentially as
tion" theory emphasizing that reflected the acquisition of inhibitions and self-
appraisal may be a selective process, de- regulation. The work carried out in the
pendent upon significant others or valued development of containment theory was
reference groups. Within this period, notable for its early attempts at explicit
greater attention was addressed to empiri- measurements of the self-concept in doing
cal investigations attempting to directly empirical research on deviance (e.g.,
test propositions linking deviance, self- Reckless et aL, 1957a; Reckless et aL,
perceptions, and social connections. For 1956, 1957(b); and Dinitz?/ aL, 1962). In-
the most part, structural interactional deed, much of the theory seems to be gen-
analyses continued to focus on deviance erated by such measurements and their
largely in "subcultural" terms, as in the observed associations.
study of gang delinquency (e.g., Short and With the self-concept boom in the
Strodtbeck, 1965) or identification with 1960's, similar development occurred in
unconventional value systems or refer? socialization-control theories of deviance,
ence groups (e.g., Chapman, 1966; Hall, continuing the study of personal factors
1966). which might act as individual insulators

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192 SOCIAL
against deviance?namely, a favorable
self-concept?with particular concentra-
tion on the effects of family relationships.
In this sense, the focus of such analyses
was on the development of "socially
competent persons." The treatment of
roles was largely limited to fundamental or
universal "personality-roles" (e.g., sex-
ual identity with a particular emphasis on
masculine identity in boys) which every
normally developing person would be ex?
pected to fulfill, rather than more
context-specific roles which are differen-
tially located. Social structure became
relevant to the extent that not everyone
has the opportunity to "develop nor?
"
mally. Consistent with the devel-
opmental focus, self-concept was treated
more as a personality variable than as an
interactional or situational process
mediating individual-level and group-level
events. Although there was a general
broadening of socialization accounts
deviance during this period, the major fea-
ture of this area for our review continued
to be work in containment theory, both for
the research efforts it included and for
the various responses (critiques, modifica-
tions, extensions, tests) it prompted?
e.g., Schwartz and Tangri (1965), Voss
(1969).
Labeling Analyses
A third theoretical viewpoint includes
the variety of analyses identified with a
labeling perspective on deviance. The
major stimulus to labeling theory seems to
have been the work of Lemert (1951),
which focused on the relationship be?
tween deviating activities and the or-
ganized social responses which identify,
label, and control such deviations. Instead
of addressing traditional etiological ques-
tions, Lemert directed attention to the
ways that social sanctioning processes
may alter social and self-identities, some-
times with ironic effects. In developing
the concept of "secondary deviation,"
Lemert's work served to change the focus
of analysis on deviance from explaining an
initial predisposition to deviance to ex?
plaining the systematization of deviance.
This shifted the implicit role of self-
concept as an explanatory variable by
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PSYCHOLOGY
suggesting that infraction influences self-
conception as well as the reverse.
The labeling perspective was most ex-
tensively and spectacularly expanded dur-
ing the 1960's through such work as
Becker (1963), Kitsuse (1962), and Scheff
(1966)?noting that many later statements
of labeling theory diverged considerably
from Lemert's intentions. As it developed
during this period, the labeling approach
constituted both an analytic and a sub-
stantive challenge to conventional de?
viance study. Analytically, it called into
question the basic conceptualization of
deviance as an a priori objective category
of behavior; instead, labeling theory
viewed deviance as a quality conferred
(retrospectively) on a behavior or person
by an organized social response which
applies a "deviant" label. Substantively,
labeling theory shifted the theoretical
focus from explaining deviant behavior to
of explaining social control processes and
their consequences.
While there were several distinct ana-
lytical tasks involved in the labeling chal?
lenge, the aspect most germane to this
review involved analyzing the dynamic ef?
fects of the labeling events on the persons
labeled. A substantial part of most ver-
sions of a labeling theory of deviance cen-
tered on the "labeling hypothesis" which
directly implicates the continuing process
of self-conception. Drawing from
Lemert's concept of secondary deviation
(as well as Cooley's notion of reflected
appraisal), this proposition asserted that
social control events serve to systematize
and prolong deviance by altering (via
stigmatization) the self-concept and the
social identity of the person labeled. In
this respect, self-concept is at once both a
cause and an effect of deviation, self-
concept change (a) being an effect of ini?
tial deviation as mediated by social con?
trol events, and (b) being also an impor-
tant precondition of secondary deviation.
Most accounts of this labeling process
concentrated on the effects of formal so?
cial control events like arrests, commit-
ment to institutions, criminal convictions,
etc. However, there was also some nota-
ble work on the dynamics of informal so?
cial labeling?e.g., Goffman's (1963) writ-
ing on stigma management, or Davis'
 THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND THE SELF-CONCEPT 193

(1961) discussion of "deviance dis- concept in this theoretical direction re-

avowal." Although the labeling position mains somewhat vague and undefined.
represented an area of deviance research The substantive/propositional content of a
in which the theoretical connection be? "labeling theory" seems to have been in-
tween self-concept processes and de? corporated or tested loosely, if not not
viance seemed more clear-cut and inte- always comfortably, within conventional
gral, it did not generate much actual em- positivist approaches to deviance. Thus,
pirical research directly bearing on this the former "labeling perspective" seems
connection, at least during this period. to be currently represented in two places
The self-concept functioned more as an in the deviance literature. One (most ger-
intuitively obvious intervening process mane to our review) involves a particular
than as a variable to be actually measured sector of conventionally oriented de?
in empirical events. viance analysis where the focus is on the
development of deviant identities and de-
viant roles. The other (corresponding to a
The Present Decade
strict labeling approach) is the
In summarizing earlier work on the phenomenological study of the social con-
theoretical relationship between self- struction and organization of deviance-
concept and deviance, we have used a defining reactions. The confrontations
somewhat arbitrary division of theoretical between labeling theories and other per-
viewpoints into structural interactionist, spectives have left their effects in modifi-
socialization-control, and labeling per- cations of the conventional position as
spectives. For the previous two decades well. Probably the most important change
of work, this division seems persistently for our present interest has been an in-
reasonable. In the 1970's, the division creased attention to a self-labeling phase
continues to an extent, but the dividing in the behavioral process by which de?
lines have been occasionally blurred and viant activities, values, associations, or
redrawn by theoretical confrontations, commitments may be adopted (e.g.,
modifications, and syntheses. While over- Lorber, 1967; Warren, 1974). The labeling
all the descriptive structure holds, it needs perspective, with its emphasis on the reac?
to be modified and updated somewhat. tions of various social audiences, refo-
One principal development has been the cused attention on the reflexive conse-
testing and restating of the division be? quences of social judgments on sub-
tween labeling theory and other theoreti? sequent behavior, whether deviant or
cal viewpoints. The "great labeling de- conventional (see, for example, Roten-
bate" of the early 1970's and late 1960's berg, 1975).
seems to have resulted in new, and some- A second recent development in the
times sharper, distinctions between the deviance/self-concept literature has been
strict labeling position and "conven- the blurring of a distinction between struc?
tional" deviance approaches. This has in- tural interactionist analyses and
volved both repeated attempts to test em- socialization-control analyses. Some dif-
pirically the propositional differences be? ferences remain between a substantive
tween approaches as well as a multitude of focus on personality and moral develop?
reviews trying to outline the fundamental ment versus a focus on socially structured
conceptual disparities. As the dust from interaction contexts and subcultural re-
the battle over labeling theory subsides, sponses to social disjunctions. However,
the earlier labeling position seems to have the division is much less clear-cut than
been divided into two distinct parts and before. One change has been the decreas-
subsumed under two separate ap? ing prominence of containment theory and
proaches. A radical epistemological core with it less of an emphasis on the constric-
(implicit but not very well developed in tive aspects of social control and self-
many earlier labeling statements has been conception. Containment theory's focus
annexed into a phenomenological per? on the self factor as an insulator against
spective on deviance (e.g., Kitsuse, 1972, delinquency seems to have declined, not
1975; McHugh, 1970); the role of the self- from direct disproof, but because it was

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 194 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

not very well specified or measured in the enhancement processes. When the situa-
first place. Additionally, a significant de- tional structure of contingencies works
velopment has been the rapprochement against self-esteem maintenance, then the
between structural interactionist accounts theory predicts a tendency to seek be-
and research focusing on socialization havioral alternatives, either individual or
processes. This synthesis seems a natural collective, which are outside the conven?
consequence of the realization that social tional order and which provide more posi?
structural differences are produced tive experiences. Note that the model only
through the distribution of socialization specifies motivational predisposition,
experiences and role-learning opportuni- rather than causal determination. The
ties, as well as through the distribution of adoption of alternative or unconventional
resources. It reemphasizes that socializa? activities will be also a function of their
tion is a social process consisting essen- external feasability (i.e., the external
tially of interpersonal associations and structure of rewards, opportunities, and
patterns which connect individuals inter- resources).
actively to larger social contexts. Com- These theoretical shifts contain two
pared to earlier containment theory, such noteworthy trends. One is the increased
an interactional focus on the social struc- attention to empirical evaluation of
ture of socialization seems to have em- theoretical viewpoints, via direct mea-
phasized more heavily the motivational or surement and systematic observation.
goal-acquiring aspects of socialization and While earlier studies generally utilized
self-conception, rather than simply depict- self-concept as an implicit or unmeasured
ing socialization as the internalization of intervening variable, recent studies have
inhibitions. This is especially evident in tended to use explicit measurements of
recent modifications of containment self-concept in researching deviance?
theory?e.g., Schwartz and Stryker e.g., the line of research pursued by Kap-
(1970), Jensen (1972, 1973). This synthesis lan (1975b, 1976, forthcoming). One area
not only grounds socialization accounts in of special research attention has involved
more extended social processes, but also various empirical tests of the "labeling
helps to extend analyses of structural in- hypothesis," measuring the effects on
fluences beyond explaining only subcul- self-conception of stigmatizing contacts
tural forms of deviance. with labeling agents such as police or
Major examples of this are two recent courts (e.g., Fishman, 1976; L. Gibbs,
efforts by Hewitt (1970) and Kaplan 1974); the effects of institutionalization or
(1975a) in developing what could be called "prisonization" on self-concept (e.g., Tit-
"self-esteem microtheories of deviance." tle, 1972; Bennett, 1974); or the effective-
Both efforts, in explicating the self- ness of treatment programs in "delabel-
conception processes left implicit in var- ing" deviants (e.g., Waldo et aL, 1973).
ious interactional accounts of deviance, The second key trend is a movement
focus on self-esteem as a basic motiva? toward fuller explication of the processes
tional mechanism and on evaluative expe? linking self-conception, deviance, and so?
riences in socialization as the primary cial structure. Much of this seems a nec-
causal dynamic. The fundamental prop- essary parallel of the increased empirical
ositions tying deviance and self-concept to focus?i.e., empirical anomalies or fail-
the social structure are: (1) that commit- ures tend to make theoretical short-
ment to the legitimate social order is a comings more graphic. In addition, there
positive function of the adequacy of self- have been new, strictly theoretical at-
esteem level, and (2) that self-esteem is a tempts to synthesize and structure the
cumulative product of socialization expe? existing research, the primary examples
riences which may be distributed across being the monographs by Hewitt (1970)
different social sectors or different kinds and Kaplan (1975a, 1975b) mentioned
of interpersonal associations. The motiva? above.
tional model depicted here stresses As an essential footnote to this review,
adaptation to social contingencies keyed we might note several areas in the psycho?
on self-esteem maintenance or self- logical literature which are also relevant to

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 THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND THE SELF-CONCEPT 195

our topic. In the clinical area there is a analysis involves the lack of theoretical
considerable literature on the relationship specification. In attempting to sort out
between self-conception and personal ad- various issues and positions in the study
justment that relates to the sociological of deviance and self-conception, the dis-
study of deviance in several ways. First, cussion will focus on two kinds of specifi-
the focus on deviance as a problem in cational tasks?(1) the definition and ex-
socialization of the internalization of so? plication of basic concepts, and (2) the
cial control tends to draw on ideas about specification of interpretive or proposi-
personality dynamics and the develop- tional linkages between such constructs.
ment of personal control, with significant
overlap in the "ego development" litera?
The Concept ofSelf
ture. In addition, one of the main sets of
behavioral indicators used to index malad- One major concern is the ambiguity of
justment in research on personality is the basic terms?self-conception and de?
"deviant behavior"?especially, indices viance. The concept of self has been
of crime, delinquency, and other illegal treated in detail elsewhere?e.g., Diggory
activities. The research reported in the (1966), Gordon and Gergen (1968), Gergen
monographs by Fitts (1972; Fitts and (1971), Wylie (1968, 1974), Wells and
Hamner, 1969) on the connection between Marwell (1976), Hewitt (1976)?so that
self-actualization and personal rehabilita- discussion here will be limited to its use in
tion provides both a good example and a the deviance literature. In deviance dis-
summary of this literature. cussions, as elsewhere, "self-conception"
In the experimental area, a variety of tends to be a rather inclusive and not
studies on the dynamics of cognitive con- clearly specified construct. Little sys-
sistency (nee cognitive dissonance) have tematic attention is given to explicating
investigated the relationship between the events of self-conception, either be-
self-esteem?either experimentally ma- cause such processes seem to be intui-
nipulated (e.g., Aronson and Mettee, tively clear or because such explications
1968; Graf, 1971; Eisen, 1972) or mea- seem "too psychological." As a conse-
sured (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1969; Mussen quence, there has been a frequent ten-
et al., 1970)?and the occurrence of im- dency to overextend the use of the self
moral or dishonest behavior. An alterna- construct, describing virtually all behavior
tive line of experimental work has re- as, in some sense, "self." It consequently
versed this relationship, looking at the ef? becomes difficult to tell clearly what is self
fects of deviance on cognitive processes. (versus nonself) and what such an inclu?
The occurrence of deviance may be ex? sive concept might actually explain. Such
perimentally manipulated and its effects overextension robs the concept of poten-
observed on self-concept itself or on sub- tial usefulness by diluting its explanatory
sequent behaviors through self-concept as value and by rendering its observation or
an intervening process (e.g., Freedman measurement in actual behaviors
and Doob, 1968; Kraut, 1973; Norland et equivocal. As an example, one of the key
al., 1976). The connections between such criticisms of Reckless' statement of con?
experimental work and the sociological tainment theory (Schwartz and Tangri,
literature in deviance need to be made 1965; Orcutt, 1970) has been the theoreti?
clearer, particularly those which illumi- cal vagueness and ubiquity of the "self
nate the personal and interpersonal proc? factor," which seems to have stretched to
esses by which deviance labeling takes refer to the total person or personality.
place. From our perspective, the essential fea-
tures of self-conception are that it is re-
CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS flexive and behavioral; its explication and
use should pertain specifically to these
While empirical research on the rela? properties. First of all, it seems ana-
tionship between self-concept and de? lytically appropriate to focus in behavior-
viance involves other difficulties as well, ally specific terms on concrete distin-
the main problem in evaluating this area of guishable aspects of self-conception (e.g.,

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 1% SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

self-evaluations, self-descriptions, self- studying deviance, for example, does any

representations, self-judgments), rather kind of change in self-perception lead to
than on an ambiguously global entity like the likelihood of deviance, or does the pro?
"the self." Our concern is with analyzing cess pertain more specifically to situated
behaviors and behavior structures, not issues and causal factors? Seemingly,
with the description of a hypothetical psy- these ought to be empirical questions,
chological entity. Secondly, it is important rather than matters of routine presump-
to limit "self terms to behavioral phe- tion, recognizing the importance of distin-
nomena which are genuinely reflexive (or guishing substantive components in self-
"reflective," in Mead's terms). We can conception and focusing on its mul-
distinguish "self from "person" in the tidimensionality. As examples, the most
sense that the former is reflexive and developed explications of such a frame-
intrapersonal while the latter is interper? work to date has been in the work of Gor-
sonal or intersubjective. To be sure, the don (1968; 1976), developing a taxonomy
two concepts are vitally interrelated but of situated social identities and general
they need to be analytically distinguished. role behavior, and of Stryker (1968), out-
For clear treatments of the distinctions lining a propositional schema for integrat-
involved, we refer to discussions in Miller ing diverse role-self identities. An exam?
(1963) or Hewitt (1976). We might distin? ple from the deviance literature would be
guish "self from "personality" by the study by Schwartz and Stryker (1970)
suggesting that not every movement, which initially identified the primary so?
thought, or perception must directly im- cial contexts of adolescent males and then
plicate self-conception. As Lindesmith constructed measurements and analyses
and Strauss (1968:324) have noted, "The of the relationship between self-
self . . . does not enter significantly evaluations and delinquency in terms of
into all behavior but is differentially in? these role-situated identities. More re?
volved in various acts; at one extreme in- search needs to be focused along such
volvement is very slight." role-specific or identity-specific lines.
An additional issue in the use of self-
concept in the deviance literature is the
tendency to deal with "self as a single, The Concept of Deviance
homogenous thing, rather than a dynamic
collection or organization of separable and The conclusion that the self is a difficult
distinguishable self-conceptions, each tied concept, generally resistant to precise
to specific situations, roles, relationships, explication and straightforward measure-
skills, physical features, etc. As a variety ment, is very common. However, in com-
of writers have noted (e.g., Stryker, 1968; parison with the problem of defining "de?
McCall and Simmons, 1966), the self con- viance," the self may be the less trouble-
cept may be unitary and yet it is essen- some concept. This seems surprising,
tially multiple. The sense of self involves a since the general usage of deviance mea-
unity construed or asserted out of a mul- sures in self-concept research (e.g., delin?
tiplicity of images, identities, and experi- quency rates) treats them as rather
ences which are distributed across time, straightforward behavioral indicators, and
situation, and behavioral realms. How? within positivist social science, the idea of
ever, while the unity of self-conception is deviance traditionally has been regarded
a key theoretical feature (being tied to the as unproblematic. Conventionally, de?
development of mind, conscience, and viance has been simply defined as conduct
personality), we might question whether a that violates social rules or norms, and a
simple unitary approach is automatically deviant then defined as a person who has
appropriate to the analysis of actual be? engaged in such conduct (either habitually
havior and situations. Stryker (1968:559) or occasionally). While operationalization
has argued that in actually doing research frequently might be difficult (e.g., the re-
on self-conception, "It is essential to treat current critiques of the use of official rec-
the self as a complex differentiated unit ords as data sets or institutionalized per?
rather than an undifferentiated unity." In sons as samples of deviants), the funda-

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 THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND THE SELF-CONCEPT 197

mental conceptualization was clear-cut. often associated with divergent ap?

The labeling perspective fundamentally proaches.
challenged the normative conception of The major source of conceptual differ-
deviance with vigorous critiques of the entiation pertains to how the categoriza-
conventional position, arguing persua- tion of "deviant" is analytically assigned
sively that deviance as a positive or fac- to persons or events. Three main
tual category is illusory. The effects of possibilities appear in the literature, and
such critiques on normative deviance as Gould (1969) suggests, the three do not
sociology have been substantial, signifi- necessarily yield equivalent mea?
cantly undermining its preeminent status. surements of deviance, nor can they be
Several major proponents of the conven? explained necessarily in the same terms.
tional perspective have weakened their One approach is the conventional norma-
positions to the point of virtual abandon- tive conception, in which behavior is de
ment, either leaving deviance without a facto deviant by reference to an appropri-
clear definition (e.g., Gibbs, 1972; Gibbs ate social norm external to the deviant
and Erickson, 1975) or specifying it simply actor and collectively held. Since de?
as a "sensitizing concepf which is not viance is an objective property of be?
really measurable (e.g., Clinard, 1973). havior, the state of awareness of the per?
The point in mentioning this debate here son enacting the deviant behavior or pos-
is not to join in, only to consider its impli- sessing the deviant characteristics is gen?
cations. Principally, since deviance might erally not specified nor definitionally
be conceptualized or defined in several necessary. A second alternative is the
alternative ways (none clearly preferable labeling position, in which behavior is
for all analytic purposes), the theoretical post facto deviant by its retrospective
role of self-concept in explaining deviance categorization through an organized social
will vary with the definition used. How labeling response (which identities and
sanctions the ostensible deviation). The
self-concept figures in the analysis of de?
viance will depend on what we mean by deviant quality of a person or event de-
"deviance," which after all determines rives directly from the social response to
what we are trying to explain and the them, again not necessarily involving the
terms by which it can be explained. intentions or interpretations of the deviant
One possible difference within concep- actor. The third possibility is to focus on
tions of deviance is the fact that either the subjective meaning of behavior for its
persons or behavioral events may be enactors; that is, behavior is consciously
called "deviant." While the two uses are "deviant" according to the enacting per?
often closely related empirically, they are son's awareness that the act is in some
analytically separate phenomena and gen- sense wrong, disapproved, or likely to
erally explained in somewhat different prompt a punishment. The measure of de?
terms. For deviant behavior, the explana- viance here is the extent to which the per?
tory focus is generally etiological; how do son knew what he or she was doing.
people come to engage in certain be- Sociological writers have generally
haviors which are categorized as deviant? fought over which of the first two concep-
For deviant identities, the explanatory is- tions is correct?e.g., the debate over
sues are how persons come to be known "labeling theory." The "subjective mean?
or categorized (labeled) in certain terms, ing" position deals with deviance as it is
and what the effects of such identifica- generally treated in the experimental so?
tions might be. The impact of this distinc? cial psychological literature (e.g., Freed-
tion on the use of the self-concept is sig- manandDoob, 1968; Norlande/a/., 1976)
nificant. In the analysis of deviant be- as well as in a few descriptions of self-
haviors, self-concept generally functions labeling processes (e.g., Lorber, 1967;
as an independent variable; in the analysis Rotenberg, 1975). In a sense, however, it
of deviant identity, self-concept is the de- is the third approach that is most directly
pendent variable. Certainly, the analyses amenable to explication by self-
of these two issues are not mutually ex- conception processes, since it is the only
clusive, but they do involve distinct tasks conceptualization which deals with de-

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 198 SOCIAL
viance as interpreted and intentional be?
havior. The point here is that self-
conception is fundamentally an interpre-
tive process and it is relevant to the expla-
nation of behaviors as it relates to the
meanings that those behaviors have (con-
sciously or unconsciously) for the enact-
ing persons. While self-concept may be
theoretically linked to "objective" states
or outcomes, this linkage is indirect and
mediated through interpretive events. Un-
less intentionality and awareness of the
meaning of behavior is included in the
conceptualization of deviance, self-
conception does not seem to provide a
very direct explanatory variable for its
analysis. Deviance as a normatively ob?
jective quality of behavior is external to
the processes by which behaviors are
motivationally constructed. The argument
is that self-conception might be used to
explain particular behaviors as behaviors
(which coincidentally happen to be con-
sidered deviant by others) but not neces-
sarily as deviance.
This difficulty is exemplified in the
monograph on deviance and self-concept
by Kaplan (1975a), which develops an ex-
planation of deviant motivation and be?
havior tied to the person's awareness that
activities are acceptable or unacceptable
within the conventional order. Yet in re-
viewing the empirical findings applicable
to this theoretical model, behaviors are
usually examined because of their general
or objective categorization, rather than for
their meaning to the persons engaged in
them. The theory pertains to deviance in a
particular sense, while the data pertain to
behaviors that are not necessarily deviant
in this same sense. In using such a norma?
tive conception of deviance, it seems to be
assumed that awareness of meaning is a
constant in behavior, an assumption that
ought instead to be an empirical question.
THE PROPOSITIONS
Beyond the initial conceptualization of
basic terms, the task in generating or
comparing theoretical positions is one of
structural specification?(a) specifying the
key linkages postulated to hold between
elements, and (b) specifying the causal or
interpretive ordering of these linkages
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PSYCHOLOGY
within the structure of an explanatory
model or scheme. Demonstrating a gen?
eral association between self-conception
and deviance seems fairly simple, but the
issue of causal order is much more am-
biguous. The problem of order arises in
the study of self-conception processes be-
cause, as most rigorously described, the
relationship between self-concepts and
behavior tends to be bidirectional and
complex. At any instant, self-conception
is both an independent variable, constitut-
ing a causal influence on subsequent be-
haviors, and a dependent variable, reflect-
ing the effects of prior events and be-
haviors; self-conception within behavior
thus involves a continuously developing,
causally extended process. The issue in
analyzing the relationship between self-
conception and behavior is where to focus
analysis within this sequence, extracting
and abstracting out a set of elements to
represent the basic causal links. How is
the flow of such a continually developing
process to be unfolded and partitioned so
as to isolate the appropriate causal links?
In simplest terms, we might separate out
two explanatory possibilities: (1) where
self-concept functions as an explanation
of deviance (as deviant behavior), or (2)
where deviance functions as an explana?
tion of self-conception. While seemingly
discrete, these possibilities are often re-
lated or blended in actual analysis. We
suggest them here as elementary analytic
possibilities which may constitute the
components of more extended or complex
accounts.
Self-Concept as Explanation of Deviant
Behavior
The most basic proposition linking
self-concept and deviance seems to be
that the self-concept is a causal antece-
dent of deviant behavior. This is consis-
tent with the etiological focus in conven?
tional deviance study and with the general
analytic focus in social psychology on the
self-concept as a causal agent in behavior.
Earlier discussion has already suggested
two broad analytic uses for the self-
concept in explaining the occurrence of
deviant behavior: (a) the motivational
function; (b) the "superego" function.
 THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND THE SELF-CONCEPT 199

The major usage certainly involves the self-regard. The more firmly structured or
motivational function of self- consistently ordered the individual1 s self-
perception?i.e., self-concept as a conception, the more that individual's
ubiquitous source of motivational pushes self-conception is postulated to serve as a
and as an energizer of behavior. Several source of behavior independent of exter?
aspects of self-conception are presumed nal contingencies. Examples of this focus
to have motivational implications?the might be the analysis of dishonest be?
level of self-regard or self-esteem, the havior according to cognitive dissonance
internal structure of the overall self- theory (e.g., Aronson and Mettee, 1968),
concept, and the content of self-identity. as well as some clinical models of
Self-esteem is the motivational element psychopathology (e.g., Fitts, 1972).
most frequently invoked, drawing on what The identity content of self-conception
is sometimes called the self-esteem motive is considered to have motivating
or self-esteem hypothesis which postu- significance, because social actors are en-
lates that people are universally motivated gaged in the effort to assert, validate, or
to behave in ways that maintain their realize particular "selves" or identities
levels of self-regard at appropriately high (Foote, 1951). They behaviorally con?
levels. The self-esteem hypothesis is basic struct lines of action consistent with iden?
to structural accounts of deviance, which tities that have been previously validated,
either implicitly or explicitly relate the ef? thus engaging in a process of self-
fects of social conditions on behavior realization that interactively affirms the
through self-esteem striving (e.g., Cohen, identities. Such a process is implicated in
1955). The self-esteem motivation is taken the notion of "self-fulfilling prophecy,"
to be a psychological foundation of the often used to account for the effects of
social drive to achieve status, social es- labeling processes in the development of
teem, or respectability (e.g., Zetterberg, deviant roles. In addition, some modifica-
1966), which in turn generates subcultural tions of differential association theory
deviation. Although explicitly developed (e.g., Glaser, 1956) seem to focus primar-
and specified in only a few efforts (e.g., ily on the content of self-identifications as
Hewitt, 1970; Kaplan, 1975a), such a motivational source.
motivational assumption seems to under- As suggested in earlier discussion,
lie most of the etiological work in de? self-conception as self-control also
viance. Such an assumption remains gen? provides an explanation of deviant
erally unexamined and untested in sociol? behavior?a focus on self-development as
ogy, perhaps since motivational questions the internalization of external social con-
seem "too psychological." However, it is straints or what might be termed the
worth noting that there is a significant and superego function. In a sense, this is the
continuing debate within the experimental flip side of the motivational function, em-
social psychological literature concerning phasizing the inhibition of motivational
the form and operation of such a motive impulses, rather than their generation.
(e.g., Jones, 1973; Wilson, 1973; The difference primarily is a matter of
Shrauger, 1975). While universally as- what is taken to be analytically problem-
sumed as a basic truism, the evidence is atic and what is taken for granted. The
by no means conclusive in establishing the focus on motivational functions presumes
existence of such a singular drive or its conformity to a conventional order as a
universal operation. background constant, and takes the ex?
The structure of self-conception as a planation of "why does deviance occur?"
dynamic collection of specific self-images as the theoretical problem. The focus on
and self-ideals may also be motivationally control functions takes a motivation to be
important. The focus here is on the inter? deviant as the background assumption,
nal consistency of the self-concept as a and attempts to explain "what keeps de?
source of ego strength in rendering an in? viance from occurring." As already de-
dividual more or less vulnerable to situa- scribed, Reckless' containment theory
tional pressures to engage in deviance, provides the most familiar example of the
rather than simply the overall level of superego function in explaining deviance.

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200 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In contrasting the motivation and con? self-identification as "me, the kind of per?
trol functions of the self, we might note son who does X." The key term in analyz-
that they are not mutually exclusive ideas. ing deviance as a labeling process is
In accounting for deviance, both derive "differentiation"?i.e., the imputation of
from the "moraf content of self- differentness which is interacted by the
conception?e.g., Gordon's (1968) moral labeled actor and a relevant social audi-
systemic sense of self, or Fitt's (1965) ence. As a particular instance of related
"ethical self component. The content of appraisals, deviance labeling is presumed
self-definition includes not only "the kind to have special potency because imputa-
of person I am" but also conceptions of tions of deviance involve a "master
"the kind of person I am not" or the status" which overrides or subsumes
"kinds of things I do not do." A primary other possible identifications (Becker,
intervening variable in the relationship be? 1963). In this respect, a deviant is a person
tween self-conception and deviance is whose self has been reorganized around
generally the process of normative com- deviating activities, values, and identities.
mitment or commitment to a particular While persuasive and appealing, the
conventional order, which functions both labeling process has been often over-
as a positive inducement td behavior simplified or overstated. If strictly inter-
(where conforming behavior or qualities preted, the labeling hypothesis seems to
are rewarded) and as a brake on behavior specify a highly deterministic, mechanis-
(where deviance is punished). Both com- tic process in which self-conception is
ponents seem necessary for an adequate merely a rubber stamp of social labeling
account. events. If less rigorously specified, such a
hypothesis seems difficult to test and
sometimes tautological. The difficulty is
Deviance as an Explanation of
to specify those social conditions and
Self-Conception
cognitive processes by which labeling
While the primary theoretical emphasis takes place and to specify them in
in the literature seems to be on self- measurable or testable terms. A criticism
conception as an antecedent of deviant has also been made that the focus on label?
behavior, the explanatory roles of self- ing has been too narrow and negative.
concept and deviance are sometimes re- Negative labeling events may have posi?
versed. Attention may be focused instead tive consequences, such as deterrence or
on the ways in which deviance can sub- rehabilitation (e.g., Trice and Roman,
sequently affect self-conception, generally 1970; Warren, 1974); also, labeling may
involving either (1) the labeling process, involve positive events (such as "cred-
or (2) deviant behavior as an adaptive itization" or the attribution of charisma).
esteem-maintenance process. At this point, the empirical evidence bear-
The most familiar approach with self- ing on the plausibility of the labeling hy?
concept as the dependent variable is un- pothesis seems equivocal, despite its in-
doubtedly the focus on labeling. Although tuitive appeal (e.g., Mahoney, 1974).
labeling involves a more socially exten- Perhaps the most direct analysis of label?
sive process (e.g., Lemert, 1951, 1972; ing processes comes from experimental
Lofland, 1969), one key part of that proc? studies which show that deviance-
ess pertains to the way in which deviance imputing manipulations yield the pre-
labeling produces changes in the actors' dicted effects on self-perceptions and be?
own self-identifications and self- havior (e.g., Freedman and Doob, 1968;
evaluations. The basic proposition is sim- Kraut, 1973; Norland et aL, 1976). How?
ply that the social act of tagging or labeling ever, a strong connection between such
a person as deviant tends to alter the self- experimental conditions and the kinds of
conception of the labeled person toward labeling events generally analyzed in de?
incorporating this identification. Labeling viance studies has yet to be made.
events, both public and private, will pre- The second area in which deviance may
cipitate a transformation from identifica? serve to explain variation in self-concept
tion as "the person who did X" into a involves the focus on deviance as an

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 THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND THE SELF-CONCEPT 201

adaptive response to social disjunction. rather are given in more extended or se-
What we have termed the adaptive quential terms as a combination of these
esteem-maintenance process deals with two elementary processes. This seems
the idea that the adoption of deviant ac- theoretically desirable because the actual
tivities may have some positive conse- empirical relationships seem too complex
quences for deviating persons, following to be completely described by such simple
the model of delinquency suggested by propositional assertions. The imposition
Cohen (1955). Deviance may represent an of a linear ordering of simple causal steps
adaptive response by individuals to situa? on the actual flow of social and behavioral
tions that inhibit the basic effort to events is just that?an analytical imposi?
achieve social- and self-esteem. When tion. And yet, without an attempt to iden-
conventional activities prove unreward- tify and specify the propositional elements
ing, then activities outside the conven? of which interpretive schemes are con-
tional normative order may provide an al- structed, we are stuck with the problem of
ternative source of status, and positive ambiguous correlational data that seem to
evaluations or experiences. Such ac? characterize this literature. The inability
counts focus largely on subcultural forms to separate out these basic linkages and to
of deviance, where unconventional activi? be clear about the ordering of events ren-
ties are collectively organized into a sub? ders the interpretation of associations in-
cultural alternative to the social order. determinate and problematic. The point to
This element of collective organization is be made here is that while a sequential or
often described as crucial, since it is the simultaneous model may be more inter-
socially supportive reference group that pretively complete, it also imposes a
rejects or "neutralizes" the values of the greater burden to be clear about the prop?
conventional normative system. For in- ositional contents and structure of what is
stance, Short and Strodtbeck (1965) assert included within the more extended
that in delinquent gangs, the effect of de? scheme.
viance on self-esteem is positive, while A second qualification is the possibility
outside the gang context, the relationship that the relationship between deviance
between deviance and self-concept seems and self-conception, rather than being
to be negative. Beyond studies of gang simple and additive, is more appropriately
delinquency, the literature on the "pris- treated as interactive or socially contin-
onization" process (e.g., Wheeler, 1961; gent. The effects of self-conception on de?
Tittle, 1972), focusing on the development viance (or vice versa) seem to often de-
of inmate subcultures to replace the pend on the effective values of additional
largely negative outside order within total psychological or social variables, espe-
institutions, represents a similar focus. cially those describing "social location."
We might note also the continuing re? That is, self-conception may be a causal
search of Kaplan (e.g., 1975a, 1975b, explanation of deviance only for some
forthcoming) as the most concentrated kinds of persons or for persons in particu-
work on establishing the functionality of lar circumstances. For example, Ageton
deviance for self-esteem. and Elliott (1974) suggest that the labeling
effects of contact with law enforcement
agencies may occur only for persons in
Concluding Qualifications certain categories (e.g., sex, social class,
The preceding discussion has focused and race as qualifying variables). The data
heuristically on the basic elements of the reported in Schwartz and Stryker (1970)
relationship between self-conception and and Jensen (1973) also suggest the
deviance in terms of relatively static, possibility of an interaction in the rela?
bivariate links. Such an extractive de- tionship between self-concept and delin-
scription may be misleading without sev? quency which is dependent upon Black-
eral key qualifications. First of all, as we White differences, or upon family struc-
have already suggested, most theoretical tures. While general descriptions of the
accounts of deviance are not specified in relationship between self-conception and
terms of such elemental propositions, but deviance (e.g., Hewitt, 1970; Kaplan,

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 202 SOCIAL
1975a) seem to challenge such interac?
tional qualifications, suggesting that the
basic relationship is constant across var-
ious social settings, the data reported in
various studies suggest that interactional
relationships are probable modifications
of the self-concept/deviance relationship.
We suggest that this possibility reempha-
sizes the need for breaking theoretical
statements down to basic propositions.
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