Legal Aids

A PAPER ON LEGAL AID FOR THE DEGREE OF T.Y.L.L.B.
INTERPRETATAION OF STATUES
(THROUGH UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI)
SUBMITTED BY PRACHI RATHOD

(ROLL NO. 2223342)
SUBJECT TEACHER: MR. DEEPAK PAWAR

LALA LAJATPATRAI COLLEGE OF LAW (LLC)
MUMBAI
AUGUST 2022
LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)
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Sr.No. Particulars Page No.
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1 Introduction 3
2 What Is Interpretation Of Statutes? 4
3 What Is Construction Of Statutes? 5
4 Difference Between Interpretation And Construction 6
5 Internal Aids To Interpretation 7
6 Short And Long Title 8
7 Case Laws 14
8 Limitations Of Title As Internal Aid To Construction 9
9 Preamble 10
10 Case Laws 11
11 Limitations Of Preamble As Internal Aid To Construction 13
12 Marginal Notes 14
13 Case Laws 15
14 Limitations Of Marginal Notes As Internal Aid To Construction 16
15 Headings 17
16 Case Laws 18
17 Limitations Of Headings As Internal Aid To Construction 18
18 Illustrations 19
19 Exceptions And Saving Clauses 20
20 Schedules 22
21 Punctuation 23
22 Limitations Of Punctuation Marks As Internal Aid To Construction 24
23 Explanations 25
24 Limitation Of Explanation As Internal Aid To Construction 27
25 Definition Or Interpretation Clauses 28
26 Proviso 31
27 External Aid To Interpretation 34
28 Dictionaries 35
29 Statement Of Object And Reasons 36
30 Text Books 37
31 Parliamentary History And Facts 38
32 Reports 39
33 Parliamentary Debates 40
Bills
Foreign Decisions
Constituent Debates/Speech
Legislative Debates/Speech
Committee Reports
34 Conclusion 43
35 Reference 44
INDEX
INTRODUCTION:
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An ‘Aid’ is a device that helps or assists. While performing the function of interpreting
provision of a statute, the court can take help from within the statute or even outside the
statute.
The former is called ‘internal aids’ and the latter is called ‘external aids’.
The internal aids include title, preamble, headings, marginal notes, illustrations, punctuations,
proviso, definition or interpretation clauses, explanations, schedules and punctuation.
WHAT IS INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES?
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Interpretation is the process which is employed by the judiciary to ascertain or to determine
the meaning of the statutes or legal provision. It is basically a process by which court seeks to
ascertain the true meaning of the expression or word or phrase which is in question in any
statute before the court and determine the true intention of the legislature behind such
statutory provision.
A process of interpretation employed by the judiciary can be done through various tools or
principles of statutory interpretation which include seeking help from internal or external aids
to interpretation and applying primary or secondary rule of interpretation which has evolved
over a period of time by the court.
According to Salmond:
Interpretation and construction is the process by which the court seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is
expressed.
According to Blackstone:
The most fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the intention of the
legislature through texts, the subject matter, the effect and consequences or the spirit and
reason of law.
WHAT IS CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES?
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Construction, in strict sense, is the process by which the court assign the meaning to the
ambiguous provision which is beyond the letter of law for the purpose to resolve the
inconsistency. The judges after taking into consideration the factual circumstances before the
court give a particular meaning to the expression or word or phrase in question. Although,
such meaning must be within the ambit of the objective of statute and could not be directly
explained by the statute.
The word interpretation and construction are used interchangeably but there is thin line of
difference between both the concepts.
According to Cooley, Interpretation is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of
words and enabling others to drive from them the same meaning which the author intended to
convey, whereas, construction is the process of drawing conclusions, respecting subjects that
lie beyond the direct expression of the text, which are in the spirit though not within the letter
of law.
Basically, interpretation is a process of discovering, from permissible data, the meaning and
intension of the legislature and if interpretation discloses clear meaning and intention of the
legislature it will be directly applied to factual circumstances but if interpretation doesn't
disclose clearly the meaning in context of factual circumstances, then construction will
undergoes to seek to assign meaning or intention to the words used by the legislature.[4] It is
clearly drawn that construction is more concerned with applying the meaning to the factual
circumstances than mere ascertaining the meaning of the words of provision.
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TABULAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
Interpretation Construction
It is the process by which court assign
It is the process adopted by the court to
the meaning to the ambiguous provision
1 determine the true meaning of the legislative
which is beyond the letter of law for the
provision.
purpose to resolve the inconsistency.
By construction one can find out the way
By interpretation one can find out the true
2 to apply the meaning to the factual
sense of any form of words in statue.
circumstances before court.
Interpretation enables the linguistic meaningConstruction is more concerned in
3
of the legal text. enabling conclusion to the situation.
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INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION:
Internal aids means those aids which are available in the statute itself, court can interpret the
statute by employing such aids which are as follows:
SHORT TITLE
The short title of the Act is only its name and is given solely for the purpose of facility of
reference.
It is merely a name given for identification of the Act and not for description and generally
ends with the year of passing of the Act, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Even though it is a part of the statute, it has no role to play while interpreting a provision of
the Act. Neither can it extend nor can it delimit the clear meaning of a particular provision.
LONG TITLE
A statute is headed by a long title whose purpose is to give a general description about the
object of the act. Normally, it begins with the words An Act to…
For instance, the long title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says: An Act to
consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure, and that of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 says: ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the
prevention of corruption and matters connected therewith’.
In the olden days the long title was not considered a part of the statute and was, therefore, not
considered an aid while interpreting it.
There has been a change in the thinking of courts in recent times and there are numerous
occasions when help has been taken from the long title to interpret certain provisions of the
statute but only to the extent of removing confusions and ambiguities. If the words in a
statute are unambiguous, no help is derived from the long title.
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CASE LAWS
In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274- the title of the Madras General Sales
Tax, 1939, was utilised to indicate that the object of the Act is to impose taxes on sales that
take place within the province.
In the case of Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa AIR 2014 SC 1716- the Court
has held that the title of a statute determines the general scope of the legislation, but the true
nature of any such enactment has always to be determined not on the basis of the label given
to it but on the basis of its substance.
In Manoharlal v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 418- it was held that no doubt the long title of
the Act extracted by the appellant’s counsel indicates the main purposes of the enactment but
it cannot control the express operative provisions of the Act.
In Fisher v. Raven 1964 AC 210 (HL)
Interpretation of the words ‘obtained credit’ in Section 13(1) of the Debtor’s Act, 1869 was
involved.
The House of Lords looked at the long title of the Act which reads ‘An Act for the Abolition
of Imprisonment for Debt, for the punishment of fraudulent debtors, and for other purposes’
and held that the words refer to credit for the payment of money.
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LIMITATIONS OF TITLE AS INTERNAL AID TO CONSTRUCTION
Title has no role to play where the words employed in the language are plain and precise and
bear only one meaning.
Title can be called in aid only when there is an ambiguity in the language giving rise to
alternative construction.
Title cannot prevail over the clear meaning of an enactment.
Title cannot be used to narrow down or restrict the plain meaning of the language of the
statute.
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PREAMBLE
Preamble is a tool for internal aid to interpretation as it contains the main objects and reasons
of the Act.
The rule of interpretation of preamble is that when a language of an enactment is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble has no part to play but if more than one interpretation is possible,
a help can be taken from preamble to ascertain the true meaning of the provision.
The preamble is mention on the very first page of the act but modern acts doesn't pass with
preamble which is declining its importance.
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali [5], the constitutionality of Section 5 of the West Bengal
special courts act, 1950 was challenged on the grounds of violative of Article 14 of the
constitution as the provision in the act authorize state government to select a particular case
which deserved to be tried by special courts having special procedure. The Supreme Court
take help of the preamble of the said Act and held that state government has discretion to
choose such cases.
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CASE LAWS:
Therefore, in case of any ambiguity or uncertainty, the preamble can be used by the courts to
interpret any provision of that statute. But there is a caution here. The apex court has held
in Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya v. State of M.P. AIR (2013) 15 SCC
677– the court cannot have resort to preamble when the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous.
Similarly it has been held that help from preamble could not be taken to distort clear intention
of the legislature– Burrakar Coal Company v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954.
In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, it was observed that the policy and purpose of the Act can
be legitimately derived from its preamble.
In Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission– it was held that the
object of legislation should be read in the context of the Preamble.
In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. State of Maharashtra, it was held that

Preamble of the Act is a guiding Light to its interpretation.
Another important example is found in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC
1461– wherein the apex court strongly relied on the Preamble to the Constitution of India in
reaching a conclusion that the power of the Parliament to amend the constitution under
Article 368 was not unlimited and did not enable the Parliament to alter the Basic Structure of
the Constitution.
In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration AIR 1973 SC 913

In this case, the appellant challenged his conviction under Section 5 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947.
His main ground was that after the establishment of the Delhi Special Police Establishment,
the anti-corruption department of the Delhi Police has ceased to have power of investigating
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bribery cases because the preamble of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
pointed out to this effect.
The court, however, held that no preamble can interfere with clear and unambiguous words of
a statue.
Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, 1946 empowered the Delhi Special
Police also to investigate such cases.
In Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. NTC (South Maharashtra), the Supreme Court while
interpreting certain provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Take over of Management) Act,
1983 held that when the language of the Act is clear, preamble cannot be invoked to curtail or
restrict the scope of an enactment.
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LIMITATIONS OF PREAMBLE AS INTERNAL AID TO
CONSTRUCTION
Preamble can be resorted to only when the language of a provision is reasonably capable of
alternative construction.
Preamble cannot either restrict or extend the meaning and scope of the words used in the
enacting part.
In case of conflict between Preamble and a section, the preamble would succumb and section
shall prevail.
Preamble cannot be regarded as source of any substantive power or of any prohibition or

limitation.
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MARGINAL NOTES
Marginal notes are those notes which are inserted at the side of the sections in the Act and
express the effect of the sections. These are also known as side notes.
In the olden times help used to be taken sometimes from the marginal notes when the clear
meaning of enactment was in doubt. But the modern view of the courts is that marginal notes
should have no role to play while interpreting a statute.
The basis of this view is that the marginal notes are not parts of a statute because they are not
inserted by the legislators nor are they printed in margin under the instructions or authority of
the legislature. These notes are inserted by the drafters and many times they may be
inaccurate too.
However, there may be exceptional circumstances where marginal notes are inserted by the
legislatures and, therefore, while interpreting such an enactment help can be taken from such
marginal notes. The Constitution of India is such a case. The marginal notes were inserted by
the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, while interpreting the Indian Constitution, it is
always permissible to seek guidance and help from the marginal notes.
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CASE LAWS
In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court held that the marginal
notes to Article 286 of the Constitution was a part of the Constitution and therefore, it could
be relied on for the interpretation of that Article.
In Tara Prasad Singh v. Union of India, it was held that marginal notes to a section of the
statute cannot take away the effect of the provisions.
In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh AIR 2015 SC 1420 – the apex court held that
marginal note appended to Section 47 of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1955 makes it clear that idea of section 47
was not to discriminate against employees who acquire disability during service.
In S.P. Gupta v. President of India

The Supreme Court held that if the relevant provisions in the body of a statute firmly point
towards a construction which would conflict with the marginal note, the marginal note has to
yield.
If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute, the
marginal note may be looked into as an aid to construction.
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LIMITATIONS OF MARGINAL NOTES AS INTERNAL AID TO
CONSTRUCTION
Marginal notes are very rarely used for interpretation as they are not considered to be a good
aid to construction.
Only those marginal notes can be used for construing a provision which have been inserted
with assent of the legislature.
Marginal notes can be called in aid only when language suffers from ambiguity and more
than one construction is possible.
Marginal notes cannot frustrate the effect of a clear provision.
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HEADINGS
In all modern statutes, generally headings are attached to almost each section, just preceding
the provisions. For example, the heading of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 is “When bail may be taken in case of non- bailable offence”.
Headings are not passed by the Legislature but they are subsequently inserted after the Bill
has become law.
Headings are of two kinds- one which are prefixed to a section and the other which are
prefixed to a group or set of sections. These headings have been treated by courts as
preambles to those sections or set of sections.
Naturally, the rules applicable to the preamble are followed in case of headings also while
interpreting an enactment. Therefore, if the plain meaning of enactment is clear, help from
headings cannot be taken by the courts.
However, if more than one conclusion are possible while interpreting a particular provision,
the courts may seek guidance from the headings to arrive at the true meaning.
A heading to one set of sections cannot act as an aid to interpret another set of sections–
Shelly v. London County Council, 1949 AC 56

But chapter heading can be used to interpret ambiguous provisions– Bullmer v. I.R.C.
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CASE LAWS
In Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, it was held that sectional headings
have a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. The heading of Ch. XXXVI,
Cr.P.C. is not an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is the date on which limitation
period commences.
In Novartis Ag. v. Union of India, the sectional headings were relied on while interpreting
Section 5, 3(d), 2(1) (j) and (ja) and 83 of the Patents Act, 1970.
In Union of India v. ABN Amro Bank
It was held that the heading of a section can be regarded as key to interpretation of the
operative portion of said section.
If there is no ambiguity in the language of the provision or if it is plain and clear, then
heading used in said section strengthens that meaning.
In N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, it was held that “Heading” can be relied upon to clear
the doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative
intent.
LIMITATIONS OF HEADINGS AS INTERNAL AID TO

CONSTRUCTION
Headings can neither cut down nor extend the plain meaning and scope of the words used in
the enacting part.
Headings cannot control the clear and plain meaning of the words of an enactment.
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ILLUSTRATIONS
Illustrations are sometimes appended to a section of a statute with a view to illustrate the
provision of law explained therein. A very large number of Indian Acts have illustrations
appended to various sections.
They being the show of mind of the legislature are a good guide to find out the intention of
the farmers. But an enactment otherwise clear cannot be given an extended or a restricted
meaning on the basis of illustrations appended therein.
CASE LAWS
The Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma observed that
illustration is a part of the section and it helps to elucidate the principle of the section.
However, illustrations cannot be used to defeat the provision or to modify the language of the
section. This is reflected by a legal maxim “Exampla illustrant, non-restringent legem” which
means examples only illustrate but do not narrow the scope of rule of a law.
In Mudliyar Chatterjee v. International Film Co., it was observed that in construing a section,
an illustration cannot be ignored or brushed aside.
In Mohommed Sydeol Ariffin v. Yeah Ooi Gark, it was held that the illustrations are of
relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section, although they donot form
part of the section. Therefore, they should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the sections.
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EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES
Exceptions are generally added to an enactment with the purpose of exempting something
which would otherwise fall within the ambit of the main provision.
For instance, there are ten exceptions attached to section 499, IPC which defines
‘Defamation’. These ten exceptions are the cases which do not amount to defamation.
Similarly there are five exceptions attached to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code which
defines ‘murder’. These five exceptions are the cases which are not murders but culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.
An exception affirms that the things not exempted are covered under the main provision.
In case a repugnancy between an operative part and an exception, the operative part must be
relied on.
Some decisions have, however, been given on the principle that an exception, being the latter
will of the legislature, must prevail over the substantive portion of the enactment.
CASELAWS
In Director of Secondary Education v. Pushpendra Kumar, the Supreme Court held that a
provision in the nature of an exception cannot be so interpreted as to subserve the main
enactment and thereby nullify, the right conferred by the main enactment.
In Collector of Customs v. M/s. Modi Rubber Limited, the Supreme Court held that
whenever there is a provision in the nature of an exception to the principal clause thereof; it
must be construed with regard to that principal clause.
Saving clauses are generally appended in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute.
By this the rights already created under repealed enactment are not disturbed nor new rights
are created by it. A saving clause is normally inserted in the repealing statute.
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In case of a clash between the main part of statute and a saving clause, the saving clause has
to be rejected.
In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, the Supreme Court did
not allow the use of a saving clause, which was enacted like a proviso, to determine whether
a section in an Act was retrospective in operation.
In Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Union of India, the Supreme Court while
interpreting the saving clause in the Export Control Order, 1988 held that the clause only
saved the rights which were in existence before the order was issued and it did not confer any
new rights which were not in existence at that time.
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SCHEDULES
Schedules attached to an Act generally deals with as to how claims or rights under the Act are
to be asserted or as to how powers conferred under the Act are to be exercised. The Schedules
are appended towards the end of the enactment.
Sometimes, a schedule may contain some subjects in the form of a list as is the case with the
Constitution of India to enable the Union and the states to legislate in their respective fields.
Schedules are parts of the Statute itself and may be looked into by the courts for the purpose
of interpreting the main body of the statute.
Similarly, while interpreting the schedules help may always be taken from the main body of
the Act to find out the true spirit of the Act.
Sometimes, a schedule may contain transitory provisions also to enable an Act to remain in
existence till the main provisions of the Act begin to operate, such as the Ninth Schedule of
the Government of India Act, 1935.
CASE LAWS
In M/s. Aphali Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that
in case of a clash between the schedule and the main body of an Act, the main body prevails
and the schedule has to be rejected.
In Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan and others, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose
of a schedule is to advance the object of the main provision and deletion of schedule cannot
wipe out provisions of an Act in effect and spirit.
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PUNCTUATION
In ancient times, statutes were passed without punctuation and naturally, therefore, the courts
were not concerned with looking at punctuation.
But in modern times statutes contain punctuation. Therefore, whenever a matter comes before
the courts for interpretation, the courts first look at the provision as they are punctuated and if
they feel that there is no ambiguity while interpreting the punctuated provision, they shall so
interpret it.
However, while interpreting the provision in the punctuated form if the court feels
repugnancy or ambiguity, the court shall read the whole provision without any punctuation
and if the meaning is clear will so interpret it without attaching any importance whatsoever to
the punctuation.
CASE LAWS
In Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, the Supreme Court held that a punctuation cannot be
regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a
text.
Therefore, in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme court held that the
word ‘which’ used twice in Article 22(7) of the Constitution, followed by a comma after
each, was to be read conjunctively because the context so required.
In Mohammad Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra

Interpretation of Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was in question.
This provision says that whoever ‘manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or
distributes’ a drug without licence would be liable to punishment.
The Supreme Court held that mere stocking of a drug is not an offence and an offence is
made out only when stocking is for sale.
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There is no comma after the word ‘stocks’ which means that the words ‘stocks or exhibits’
are both qualified by the words ‘for sale’ used thereafter.
In Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu, the Supreme Court held that the punctuation marks by themselves
do not control the meaning of a statute where its meaning is otherwise obvious.
In the English case of I.R.C. v. Hinchy, it was held that it is very doubtful if punctuation
marks can be looked at for the purposes of construction.
In Bihar SEE v. Pulak Enterprises, it was held that punctuation mark (comma) is a minor
element in the interpretation of statute, especially in case of subordinate legislation.
In Director of Public Prosecution v. Schildkamp, LORD REID agreed that punctuation can be
of some assistance in construction.
LIMITATIONS OF PUNCTUATION MARKS AS INTERNAL AID TO

CONSTRUCTION
Some jurists have opined that punctuation marks are of no use as internal aids to construction
and it is an error to rely on punctuation marks in construing the Acts of Legislature.
Presence of comma or absence of comma must be disregarded if it is contrary to plain
intention of the statute.
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EXPLANATIONS
Explanations are inserted with the purpose of explaining the meaning of a particular
provision and to remove doubts which might creep up if the explanation had not been
inserted.
It does not expand the meaning of the provision to which it is added but only ties to remove
confusion, if any, in the understanding of the true meaning of the enactment.
A large number of Indian Acts have explanations attached to various sections. For instance,
Section 108 of the Indian Penal Code which defines the word ‘abettor’ has five explanations
attached to it. Sometimes, explanations are inserted not at the time of enactment of a statute
but at a later stage. For instance, the two explanations to Section 405 of the Indian Penal
Code, which defines the crime of ‘Criminal breach of trust’, were inserted in 1973 and 1975
respectively.
There may be a case where in spite of many clauses in a section only one explanation is
attached to the section as is the case with Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In
such a case it must be seen as to which clause the explanation is connected with– Patel
Roadways limited v. Prasad Trading Company.
CASE LAWS
In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court has observed that an
explanation is a part of the section to which it is appended and the whole lot should be read
together to know the true meaning of the provision.
In Bihta Co-operative Development Cane Marketing Union v. State of Bihar, the Supreme
Court said that in case of a conflict between the main provision and the explanation attached
to it, the general duty of the court is to try to harmonise the two.
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In S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhiraman, the Supreme Court observed that it is now well settled
that an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense
of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain or
clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision.
The object of an explanation to a statutory provision is:
to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself;
where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to
make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve;
to provide additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful
and purposeful.
An explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment of any part thereof
but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the explanation, in order to
suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the court in
interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and it cannot, however, take
away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught
the working of the Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.
CASE LAWS
In M.K. Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar Shamsunder Chaudhari, the Supreme Court observed that
where a provision is related to two kinds of accommodation—residential and non-residential,
and the explanation attached to it refers to only residential accommodation, it cannot control
non-residential accommodation and, therefore, cannot be looked into in matters connected
with the latter.
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LIMITATION OF EXPLANATION AS INTERNAL AID TO
CONSTRUCTION
Explanation cannot have the effect of modifying the language of section.

Explanation cannot control the plain meaning of words of the section.
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DEFINITION OR INTERPRETATION CLAUSES
Definition or interpretation clauses are generally included in a statute with the purpose of
extending the natural meaning of some words as per the definition given or to interpret such
words, the meanings of which are not clear, by assigning them the meaning given in the
definition clause.
Generally, the meaning given to a particular word in the interpretation clause will be given to
that word wherever it is used in that statute.
The only exception to this rule is that if the court feels that in the context of a particular
provision the definition clause, if applied will result in an absurdity, the court will not apply
the definition clause while interpreting that provision.
Similarly, the definition clause of one Act cannot be used to explain the same word used in
another statute. However, if both the statutes are in pari materia and the word has been
defined in one Act, the same meaning may be assigned to the word in the other Act also.
Whenever the words means or means and includes are used in the definition clause, they
afford an exhaustive explanation of the word in the statute.
The language in which both words ‘includes and shall not include’ are used, such definitions
are inclusive and exclusive.
The word includes is generally used in the definition clause to enlarge the ordinary and
natural meaning of that particular word.
CASE LAWS
In M/s. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, the Supreme Court
observed that when an interpretation clause uses the word ‘includes’, it is prima facie
extensive.
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When it uses the words ‘means and includes’, it will afford an exhaustive explanation to the
meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the word or
expression.
In Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court observed that the use of the
word ‘includes’ indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the statute.
The use of the word denotes in the interpretation clause shows that the expressions denoted
therein are covered within the ambit of that particular word.
The expression deemed to be in the interpretation clause creates a fiction. The use of the
phrase that is to say in the definition clause is illustrative of the meaning and not restrictive.
In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, the JJ Group of Hospitals was held by the
Supreme Court an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
court observed that Section 2 (J) of the Act of 1947 is an inclusive definition clause and is,
therefore, liable to be interpreted in an extended way and not in a restrictive way.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saith and Skelton Private Limited, the Supreme Court, while
interpreting the word ‘Court’ in Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, held that its
meaning given in Section 2 (c) of the Act that it means a Court which would entertain a suit
on the subject-matter, cannot be accepted in the light of the context, and that ‘Court’ in the
present instance must mean a court which appoints the arbitrator.
The Supreme Court in Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar
Was seized of the question of interpreting the word ‘owner’ in the Bihar Taxation on
Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961 which defined it
as the owner and includes bailee of a public carrier vehicle or any manager acting on the
owners behalf.
The Court held that the use of the word includes gives a wider concept to the word and so it
means the actual owner as well as the others included in the definition.
30 | P a g e
In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras, v. G.R. Karthikeyan
The question was whether prize money received by a participant in a motor rally was
‘income’ within the premise of Section 2 (24) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
The Supreme Court held that several clauses in Section 2 (24) were not exhaustive in nature
and, therefore, money received under any new head not covered under the provision is
income and so subject to income-tax under the law.
In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, the Supreme Court ruled that:
‘Housing construction’ comes within the meaning of ‘service’ as defined in section 2(o) of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, even though the provision gives an inclusive definition
of the word ‘service.
In the aftermath of the case, the Parliament amended the section and expressly included
‘housing construction’ in ‘service’.
In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat

The words “including the power to punish for contempt of itself” occurring in Article 129 of
the Constitution of India were construed by the Supreme Court.
This Article declares the Supreme Court to be a Court of Record.

It was held that these words do not limit the inherent power of the Supreme Court to punish
for contempt of itself as also of subordinate courts.
31 | P a g e
PROVISO
In some sections of a statute, after the main provision is spelled out, a clause is added, with
the opening words “provided that…”.
The part of the section commencing with the words “Provided that…” is called Proviso.
A proviso is a clause which is added to the statute to accept something from enacting clause
or to limit its applicability.
As such, the function of a proviso is to qualify something or to exclude, something from what
is provided in the enactment which, but for proviso, would be within the purview of
enactment.
The general rule about the interpretation of a proviso is that proviso is not to be taken
absolutely in its strict literal sense but is of necessity limited to the ambition of the section
which it qualifies.
The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge its scope. The
proviso must reasonably be conveyed by the words used therein.
Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a
repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers.
CASE LAWS
In Union of India v. Sanjay Kumar Jain, the function of proviso was declared that it qualifies
or carves out an exception to the main provision.
In Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, the Supreme Court held that a proviso cannot be
permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision.
In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh, it has been held that though a proviso does not
travel beyond the provision to which it is appended, golden rule is to read the whole Section,
32 | P a g e
inclusive of the proviso in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and
result in a harmonious construction.
It has been held in R. v. Leeds Prison (Governor), that the main part of an enactment cannot
be so interpreted as to render its proviso unnecessary and ineffective.
In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal v. M/s. Shelly Products, the Supreme Court:
While interpreting the proviso to Section 240 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 clarified that
where a proviso consists of two parts, one part may be declaratory but the other part may not
be so.
Therefore, merely because one part of the proviso has been held to the declaratory, it does not
follow that the second part of it is also declaratory.
Since proviso (b) to Section 240 of the Act is declaratory, it was held to be retrospective in
operation.
In Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, the Apex Court held that a proviso should be construed in
relation to the main provision.
But, in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. V. State of Tamil Nadu, the apex court clarified
that where the main provision is clear and unambiguous, recourse to the proviso cannot be
taken to interpret it.
In State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, the Supreme Court held that the proviso has to read as an
exception to the main provision of a section.
Sometimes more than one provisos are attached with the section. If there is any repugnancy
between the two provisos, the latter shall prevail.
A proviso may serve four different purposes:
qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;
it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on
certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable;
33 | P a g e
it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and
thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and
it may be used merely to act as an option addenda to the enactment with the sole object of
explaining the real intentions of the statutory provision.
LIMITATIONS OF PROVISO AS INTERNAL AID TO

CONSTRUCTION
Proviso is constructed in relation to the section to which it is appended.

The ambition and scope of enacting sections cannot be widened or curtailed by the proviso.
34 | P a g e
EXTERNAL AID TO INTERPRETATION
The role of external aids to interpretation comes into play in case where internal aid
fails. Internal aid is considered more valuable in interpretation as compared to the external
aid. External aid are doesn’t form a part of the enactment itself like some internal aid and
neither they are connected to any specific provision.
However in some cases where internal aid fails, help can be taken from external aids to
ascertain the intention of the legislature as generally they talk about the history of an
enactment and reasons for its introduction.
CASE LAW
PrabhakarRao v. State of Andhra Pradesh[11]
In this case it was observed that external aid comes into play only when the internal aid fails
but not otherwise. It is for the purpose of the justice the external aids should be used.
Legislative history, committee reports, debates etc may be considered for the same.
35 | P a g e
DICTIONARIES
When a word used in the statute is not defined therein or if defined but the meaning is unclear
only in such situation, the court may refer to the dictionary meaning of the statute to find out
meaning of the word in ordinary sense.
The meaning of such words shall be interpreted so to make sure that it is speaking about the
particular statute because words bears different meaning in different context.
Motipur zamindary company private limited v. State of Bihar [10], the question was whether
sales tax can be levied on Sugarcane.
The applicant argued that it is green vegetable and should be exempted from tax. The
dictionary meaning of vegetable said anything which derived or obtained from the plants. The
SC rejected dictionary meaning and held that in common parlance vegetable is something
which is grown in kitchen garden and used during lunch and dinner and held that sugarcane is
not vegetable.
CASE LAW
Alamghir v. State of Bihar[12]

In this case the interpretation of Article 498 of Indian Penal Code was done. The word
“detain” was under consideration. It was accompanied by other words such as takes or entices
or conceals. Now in ordinary sense the word detain would mean without consent of the
person detained. But the court observed that Section 498 protect the interests of husband. So,
detain would include the case of taking away the wife from her husband even with her
consent.
36 | P a g e
STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND REASONS
This is not considered as a reliable source to interpretation. It tells us about the reasons
and intention for bringing the bill into the legislature. However after the bill has been
introduced it still have to be passed by both the houses due to which there is always a chance
that the bill gets changed along with its intention at certain point of time.
Bill goes through many processes before it gets passed, so the intention at the start for
introducing the bill cannot be relied upon. It also does not show the will of majority.
Thus, if the meaning of a provision is clear then it has no role to play but if it a case where
the meaning is ambiguous then only some help can be taken from it to ascertain the intention
of the legislature.
CASE LAW
State of West Bengal v. Union of India[13]

In this it was observed that when the bill is brought in the Parliament it consist of some
statement of objects and reasons which can be used to understand the background of the Act
and can only be used in a limited sense. It cannot be relied upon as an aid to interpretation
and it doesn’t tell legislative intention.
37 | P a g e
TEXT BOOKS
The court while construing an enactment, may refer to the standard textbooks to clear the
meaning. Although, the courts are not bound to accept such view.
The court time and again referred to mulla, kautiliya, manu, arthshastra.
Sometimes courts while determining a law takes help from the textbooks. But this view has
been criticized because textbook contains the personal views of the author and different
textbooks have different opinions. Personal views of the author cannot tell us about the
intention of the legislature. Thus is not a reliable source of interpretation.
38 | P a g e
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY AND FACTS
This includes all the debates in the parliament, reports of committees, letters etc. In
traditional English practise it was considered that parliamentary history cannot be considered
while interpretation. The modern view is different which says that parliamentary history and
facts may be considered for interpretation in order to determine the intention of the legislature
while passing an act.
However it can also be used in case of ambiguity and not in case where meaning of a
provision is clear.
CASE LAWS
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India[14]

In this case it was observed that the Parliament history may be considered for the purpose of
the interpretation in case where the meaning of a provision is not clear.
It contains the following things-
39 | P a g e
REPORTS
They are generally not considered as useful tool to interpretation. Courts refrain from using
the reports for interpretation. However in some cases where ambiguity arises in a provision
then court can refer these reports which are formed by committees which advices the
legislature at the passing of an act. They can help in determining the intention of the
legislature.
G. Sekar v. Geetha[15]
In this case the court observed that the reports such as of Law Commission of India can be
considered for interpretation if a provision in ambiguous.
40 | P a g e
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
These include the debates that take place in the legislature while passing of the act. In case of
ambiguity these can be used by the courts for interpretation to determine the reasons for
which the act was passed and the mischief which the legislature wanted to cure.
S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and Ors[16]

In this case the debates of the Constituent Assembly were taken into consideration for the
determination of provisions. It was stated that through it the intention of the legislature can be
ascertained.
BILLS
This contains the stage of debate before passing of the act by the minister. However this is
not considered as reliable form of interpretation because the bill goes through a lot of
amendments once it goes through both the houses in parliament and neither it shows the will
of majority. So only some help can be taken from it.
FOREIGN DECISIONS
In case when there is uncertainty regarding a point on law then reference can be taken from
the foreign decisions, where there is same system of law is being followed on that point of
uncertainty as it is followed in India. They will have a binding force upon the Indian courts.
Economic, Scientific, Political and Social Changes
Today’s environment is more dynamic than before due to which lot of development and

changes occur as time passes by. Many situations are not anticipated by the legislature at the
time of passing of the act which may arise in future due to these changes. Thus, enough
discretion and flexibility is given to courts to interpret according to the needs of the present
environment while seeing these changes.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India[17]

41 | P a g e
In this case it was observed that the interpretation of a enactment must always take according
the dynamic environment so that justice can be served and judges must adapt to the changes
in the environment.
CONSTITUENT DEBATES/SPEECH
It shall compromises all such debate which had taken place in the parliament at the time of
formation of Constitution of India.
In case of inconsistency or repugnancy in the Constitution the court can clearly refer to such
debates.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [12], the interpretation of the expression backward class of
citizen' used in Article 16(4) was in question before the court. The SC under this case referred
to the speech given by B.R. Ambedkar to understand the context, background and object
behind its use of the given expression.
LEGISLATIVE DEBATES/SPEECH
It is referred as to debates or speeches which are made in the course of passing a bill in the
parliament by the parliamentarians to put forth their view.
It is not considered as a conclusive aid to interpretation and is therefore, not admissible
because many times speeches are influenced by the political pressure or maybe incorrect to
rely upon.
COMMITTEE REPORTS
Before the framing of the Bill, usually the matter is referred to a committee to consider it in
detail and give its report thereon.
These reports of the commissions and committee have been referred to as evidence of
42 | P a g e
historical facts or of surrounding circumstances and used for interpreting the Act.
When there is an ambiguity in the meaning of a provision and the act was passed on the
recommendation of a committee report, aid can be taken from that report to interpret the
provision.
Example: the criminal amendment act was based on the recommendation by J.S. Verma
Committee Report such report can be referred in case of any ambiguity in amendment.
43 | P a g e
CONCLUSION
We can conclude that the need of interpretation arises only when then ambiguity in a
provision and not otherwise. While interpretation we determine the intention of the
legislature.
After considering all the aids to interpretation we can conclude that internal aid of
interpretation is more reliable source of interpretation than the external aid to interpretation.
Internal aid forms the part of the enactment whereas external aid is separate from the
provision. Internal aids are considered as first option for interpretation and when they fails
only then external aids come into play.
44 | P a g e
REFERENCES
https://blog.ipleaders.in/internal-aids-to-construction/
http://lawtimesjournal.in/aids-to-interpretation-of-statutes/
https://www.legalbites.in/internal-aids-construction/
https://lawhelpbd.com/jurisprudence/internal-aid-interpretation/
https://www.legalbites.in/external-aids-construction/
https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/130519/11/11_chapter%203.pdf
Prof. T. Bhattacharya, The Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Agency, 8th Edition, 2012
45 | P a g e

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A PAPER ON LEGAL AID FOR THE DEGREE OF T.Y.L.L.B.

(THROUGH UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI)

SUBMITTED BY PRACHI RATHOD

SUBJECT TEACHER: MR. DEEPAK PAWAR

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

WHAT IS INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES?

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

WHAT IS CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES?

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

Title cannot prevail over the clear meaning of an enactment.

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. State of Maharashtra, it was held that

In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration AIR 1973 SC 913

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

Preamble cannot be regarded as source of any substantive power or of any prohibition or

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

In S.P. Gupta v. President of India

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

Marginal notes cannot frustrate the effect of a clear provision.

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

Shelly v. London County Council, 1949 AC 56

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

In Union of India v. ABN Amro Bank

LIMITATIONS OF HEADINGS AS INTERNAL AID TO

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

In Mohammad Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LIMITATIONS OF PUNCTUATION MARKS AS INTERNAL AID TO

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

The object of an explanation to a statutory provision is:

to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself;

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

Explanation cannot have the effect of modifying the language of section.

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat

This Article declares the Supreme Court to be a Court of Record.

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

A proviso may serve four different purposes:

qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;

LIMITATIONS OF PROVISO AS INTERNAL AID TO

Proviso is constructed in relation to the section to which it is appended.

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

PrabhakarRao v. State of Andhra Pradesh[11]

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

Alamghir v. State of Bihar[12]

LEGAL AID PRACHI A. RATHOD T.Y.L.L.B. (Roll No. – 2223342)

State of West Bengal v. Union of India[13]