PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
from elements known and given in the text, while
OUTLINE
I Definition of Statutory Construction
II Distinction Between Construction and Interpretation
III Situs of Construction and Interpretation
IV Duty of the Courts to Construe and Interpret the Law;
Requisites
V Power to Construe
A Construction is a judicial function
B Legislature cannot overrule judicial construction
C When judicial interpretation may be set aside
D Condition sine qua non before courts can construe
statutes; ambiguity defined
E Court may not construe where statute is clear
F Verba legis or plain meaning rule
G Rulings of Supreme Court part of legal system
H Judicial rulings have no retroactive effect
I Only Supreme Court en banc can modify or abandon
principle of law, not any division of the Court
J Court may issue guidelines in construing statute
VI Limitations on Power to Construe
A Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
B Courts not to be influenced by questions of wisdom
VII Different Kinds of Construction and Interpretation
VIII Subjects of Construction and Interpretation
DEFINITION OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
· In our jurisdiction, statutory construction has been defined
as the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in
the law. {Caltex [Philippines!, vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 |
1966]).
· Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of
seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a
statute and applying it to a given state of facts. (Martin,
Statutory Construction, p. 1, 6th ed.).
· American jurisprudence defines it as that branch of the
law dealing with the interpretation of laws enacted by a
legislature. A judicial function is required when a statute is
invoked and different interpretations are in contention.
Where legislature attempts to do several things one of
which is invalid, it may be discarded if the remainder of
the act is workable and in no way depends upon the
invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of the
act, and its excision changes the manifest intent of the act
by broadening its scope to include subject matter or
territory which was not included therein as enacted, such
excision is "judicial legislation ・ and not “statutory
construction.” (Ettinger us. Studevent, 219 Ind. 406, 38
N.E. 2d 1000, 1007 [S/ac/c’s Law Dictionary, p. 1412,
Centennial ed.)).
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION
· Strictly speaking, construction and interpretation are not
the same although the two terms are often used
interchangeably. Construction, however, to be technically
correct, is the drawing of conclusions with respect to
subjects that arc beyond the direct expression of the text
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
interpretation is the process of discovering the true
meaning of the language used. Thus, the court will resort
to interpretation when it endeavors to ascertain the
meaning of a word found in a statute, which when
considered with the other words in the statute, may reveal
a meaning different from that apparent when the word is
considered abstractly or when given its usual meaning.
But when the court goes beyond the language of the
statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order
to determine whether a given case falls within the statute,
it resorts to construction.
· Both processes may be used in seeking the legislative
intent in a given statute. If the legislative intent is not clear
after the completion of interpretation, then the court will
proceed to subject the statute to construction.
· It will thus be seen that there is a substantial difference
between interpretation and construction as methods for
the exegesis of written laws. In strictness, interpretation is
limited to exploring the written text, while construction
goes beyond and may call in the aid of extrinsic
considerations. “Interpretation,” says Dr. Lieber, “differs
from construction in that the former is the art of finding out
the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense
which their author intended to convey, and of enabling
others to derive from them the same idea which the
author intended to convey. Construction, on the other
hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects
that lie beyond the direct expressions of the texu, from
elements known from and given in the text; conclusions
which are in the spirit, though not within the letter, of the
text.” (Black, Construction and Interpretation of Law, p. 3).
· Interpretation is the art of finding the true meaning and
sense of any form of words, while construction is the
process of drawing warranted conclusions not always
included in direct expressions, or determining the
application of words to facts in litigation.
CONSTRUCTION
· Construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by
reason of the ambiguity in its Ianguage or of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.'
Construction is the drawing of warranted conclusions
respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression
of the text, conclusions which are in the spirit, though not
within the letter of the text. It is not a mechanical
endeavour. Nor can it be accomplished by modern "brain"
machines. Because of infirmities of language and the
limited scope in legislative drafting, inevitably there enters
into the construction of statutes the play of judicial
judgment within the limits of the relevant legislative
materials. Construction involves the exercise of choice by
the judiciary.
SITUS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
· As aptly discussed above, the purpose of construction
and interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislative intent. It further hints to what branch of
government does construction and interpretation of
1
 written laws belong. One of the manifestations of a
republican government like ours is the observance of the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances. In our system of government, the
legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Art.
VI, Sec. 1, Phil. Constitution). The executive power is
vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, Sec.
1, Phil. Constitution). The judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. (Art. VH1, Sec. 1, Phil. Constitution).
In other words, the legislative department makes the law.
The executive department executes the law and the
judiciary interprets the law.
· Simply stated, the situs of construction and interpretation
of written laws belong to the judicial department. Thus,
under the principle of. checks and balances, courts may
declare legislative measures or executive acts
unconstitutional.
· As earlier stated, the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable, and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, supraj. It can be viewed
from this constitutional provision that the Supreme Court
is the one and only Constitutional Court and all other
lower courts are statutory courts or one established by
statute. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and such lower
courts have the power to construe and interpret written
laws.
DUTY OF THE COURTS TO CONSTRUE AND
INTERPRET THE LAW; REQUISITES
Not in all occasions, however, are the courts duty
bound to construe and interpret the laws. Two (2) requisites
must concur:
· There must be an actual case or controversy,
meaning, a case brought to the court by party
litigants to hear and settle their disputes. If there is
no case or controversy, there is no way for the court
to construe or interpret a law.
· There is ambiguity in the law involved in the
controversy. Meaning the law involved is susceptible
of two or more interpretations.
 There is ambiguity when there is doubtfulness,
doubleness of meaning, duplicity, indistinctiveness,
or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a
written instrument. The language used is wanting in
clearness or definiteness, difficult to comprehend
and distinguish, and of doubtful import.
 Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find
different meanings in a statute, document, etc.
(Las/cains us. City of Wisconsin Dells, Inc., App.
389 N. W. 2d. 67, 70, 131 Wis, 2d 525). A patent
ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
instrument and arises from the defective, vague,
obscure or insensible language used. (Btac/c’s Law
Dictionary, pp. 79-80, Centennial ed.J.
 Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning may the court interpret or construe its true
intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or
more meanings, of being understood in more than
one way, or of referring to two or more things at the
same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible
of two or more possible meanings, in which case,
the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial
functions, which is to interpret the law according to
its true intent. {RCBC us. IAC and BE Hornes, Inc.,
320 SCRA 279, December 09, 1999).
 The duty of the court is to apply the law. When the
law is clear and unequivocal, the Court has no other
alternative but to apply the law and not to interpret
{Verba Legis). Stated differently, the Court cannot
shy away from applying the law when no
interpretation is needed no matter how harsh the law
may be (Dura Lex Sed Lex).
 Take for instance the case of a trial judge who was
admonished by the Supreme Court for not applying
the death penalty law because of his religious
conviction. In fact no judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the laws. (Art. 9, NCC).
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law
in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by
judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law,
or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its
terms.
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or
equivocation, there is room only for application.
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may
be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.
The Courts' first and fundamental duty Is the application
of the law according to Its express terms, interpretation
being called for only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction
need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily
calls for application. Equity and equitable principles only
come into full play when a gap exists in the law and
jurisprudence.
The first and fundamental duty of the Courts is to apply
the law.
The duty of the Courts is to apply the law disregarding
their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused.
POWER TO CONSTRUE
2
 CONSTRUCTION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION
· The duty and power to interpret or construe a statute or
the Constitution belong to the judiciary. “It is the duty of
the legislature to make the law; of the executive to
execute the law; and of the judiciary to construe the law.“
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.While the legislative
and the executive departments, by enacting and
enforcing a law, respectively, may construe or interpret
the law, it is the court that has the final word as to what
the law means.
· The Supreme Court construes the applicable law in
controversies which are ripe for judicial resolution. It
refrains from doing so where the case has become moot
and academic and it will instead dismiss the case. A case
or question is moot and academic when its purpose has
become stale or where no practical relief can be granted
or which can have no practical effect. However,
notwithstanding its mootness, the Court may nonetheless
resolve the case and construe the applicable law “if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review," specially where
public interest requires its resolution” or where rendering
a decision on the merits would be of practical value."
· The court does not, however, interpret the law in a
vacuum. It construes or applies the law as it decides
concrete and controverted cases based on the facts and
the law involved. It does not give legal opinion on
hypothetical canes or in cases which have become, as a
rule, moot and academic. It has been held that "laws are
interpreted always in the context of the peculiar factual
situation of each case. Each case has its own flesh and
blood and cannot be decided simply on the basis of
isolated clinical classroom principles. The circumstances
of time, place, event, person, and particularly attendant
circumstances and actions before, during, and after the
operative fact should all be taken in their totality so that
justice can be rationally and fairly dispensed.
LEGISLATIVE CANNOT OVERRULE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION
· The legislature has no power to overrule the interpretation
or construction of a statute or the Constitution by the
Supreme Court, for interpretation is a judicial function
assigned to the latter by the fundamental law. While the
legislature may indicate its construction of a statute in the
form of a resolution or declaratory act, it cannot preclude
the courts from giving the statute a different interpretation.
· Endencia v. David explains in detail the reasons why the
legislature cannot override the Supreme Court’s
interpretation. It appears that in Perfecto v. Meer, the
Supreme Court, construing Article VIII, Section 9 of the
1935 Constitution to the effect that members of the
judiciary "shall receive such compensation an may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," ruled that the collection of income
tax from the salaries of judicial officers is a diminution of
their salaries in violation of the constitutional provision.
Not having received such ruling favorably, the legislature
thereafter enacted Republic Act No. 590 by providing in
Section 13 thereof that “no salary whenever received by
any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall
be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law."
· There is thus this situation: *The Supreme Court in a
decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly Section
9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt
from the payment of income tax on their salaries,
because the collection thereof was a diminution of such
salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now
comes the Legislature and in Section 13, Republic Art No.
590, says that *no salary whenever received by any
public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial
officer) shall be considered exempt from the income tax,’
and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax
is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the
Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature declare
the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise?"
· The Supreme Court ruled that the legislature cannot
override its interpretation of the constitutional provisions.
Explains the Court: "Under our system of constitutional
government, the legislative department is assigned the
power to make and enact laws. The executive department
is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply the
laws extends to the Constitution. Before the court can
determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will
have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of
said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two. Because if there is. then the law will
have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.” "By legislative fiat m enumerated in
Section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that
taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office,”
found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary." If the
Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a
specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after
the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would
surely cause confusion. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and
different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by
the Legislative department. That would be neither wise
nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental principles of our constitutional system of
government, particularly those governing the separation
of powers."
WHEN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION MAY BE SET
ASIDE
3
· The interpretation of a statute or a constitutional provision
by the courts is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond
modification or nullification. The Supreme Court itself
may, in an appropriate case, change or overrule its
previous construction.
· By amending the Constitution, the framers of the
fundamental law may modify or even nullify a judicial
interpretation of a particular provision thereof Thus, the
interpretation by the court in Endencia v. David of Article
VIII, Section 9 of the 1935 Constitution to the effect that
judicial officers are exempt from paying income tax on
their salaries because the collection of such tax would be
a diminution thereof in violation of said constitutional
provision has been nullified by the 1973 Constitution
when it specifically provided in Article XV, Section 6 that
“No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer
or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax.”
· The rule that the Supreme Court has the final word in the
interpretation or construction of a statute merely means
that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or
annul the judicial construction without modifying or
repealing the very statute which has been the subject of
construction. It can, and it has done so, by amending or
repealing the statute, the consequence of which is that
the previous judicial construction of the statute is modified
or set aside accordingly.
WHEN COURT MAY CONSTRUE STATUTE
· Language “is one of the distinctive qualities of man,
especially of modern thinking man. Man does feel and
analyzes his intellectual and material experiences; but
more than this he has the ability to articulate, and through
articulation he manages, synthesizes and brings forth the
creation and evolution of culture, literature, science and
law. In the process, the unceasing effort is to say what is
meant and to mean what is said." Language is rarely so
free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in
more than one sense. Thus, what the legislature had
actually in mind is not sometimes accurately reflected in
the language of the statute.* As a result, doubt is created
as to what the statute means or as to whether it applies to
a given situation. Construction is the means by which the
court clarifies the doubt to arrive at the true intent of the
law.”
CONDITION SINE QUA NON BEFORE COURTS CAN
CONSTRUE STATES; AMBIGUITY DEFINED
· A condition sine qua non, before the court may construe
or interpret a statute, is that there be doubt or ambiguity
in its language. The province of construction lies wholly
within the domain of ambiguity. For where there is no
ambiguity in the words of a statute, there is no room for
construction. Only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
Ambiguity means a condition of admitting two or more
meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or
of referring to two or more things at the same time. A
statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one
interpretation. In such a case, the court should construe
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
the statute and give it a meaning that is in accord with its
intent.
· Thus, the Court in a case" explained that "Only when the
law is ambiguous or doubtful of meaning may the court
interpret or construe its intent. Ambiguity is a condition of
admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in
more than one way, or of referring to two or more things
at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it admissible
of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the
Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial
functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true
intent.”
COURT MAY NOT CONSTRUE WHEN STATUTE IS
CLEAR
· The first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the
law. Construction or interpretation comes only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without it. It is the very last function which the
court should exercise, for if there is more application and
less construction, there would be more stability in the
law.“
· It is well-settled that the court may not construe a statute
that is clear and free from doubt. “Time and time again, it
has been repeatedly declared by this court that where the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation. There is only room for
application.“For nothing is better settled than that the first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they
find it, not as they like it to be. Fidelity to such a task
precludes construction or interpretation, unless
application is impossible or inadequate without it.’ Where
the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but
to see to it that its mandate is obeyed."
· Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not
introduce exceptions or conditions where none is
provided from considerations of convenience, public
welfare, or for any laudable purpose, nor may it engraft
into the law qualifications not contemplated, nor construe
its provisions by taking into account questions of
expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar
reasons so as to relax noncompliance therewith. A statute
that is clear and unambiguous is not susceptible of
interpretation. It should be applied regardless of who may
be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous."
For as the court said in a case, the “law is the law. We
cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation.
Under our system of government, we may not tread on
forbidden grounds; we cannot rewrite the law. This is the
function of Congress.” And as the courts reminded
themselves, “ours is not the duty nor the power to amend
the statute, which by the way presents no interstitial
space wherein to insert, in the words of Cardozo, judge-
made innovations.
· A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be
placed therein by construction. In accordance with this
rule, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A which provides that the
“EPZA, in the exercise of its sole police authority over the
export processing zones and areas owned or
administered by the authority, shall have the power to
receive and investigate complaints relative to violations of
4
 penal laws committed inside the zones and areas owned
or administered by the authority, and when the evidence
warrants, to file and be deputized herein to prosecute the
corresponding criminal cases before the appropriate court
or body,” may not be construed as an exception to; or a
limitation on, the authority of the Tanodbayan to
investigate complaints for violation of the Anti-Graft Law
committed by EPZA officials within the zone because
there is nothing in Section 7 to intimate that EPZA’s
power “to file and be deputized xxx to prosecute” cases is
exclusive and the use of the adjective “sole” to describe
“police authority” is not employed to describe its other
power."
VERBA LEGIS OR PLAIN MEANING RULE
· Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis
derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that
the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctiy express its intention or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently.
· The Court in Republic v. Lacap [G.R. No. 158253, March
2, 2007], explained the doctrine of verba legis, as follows:
The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory
construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation. This rule derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express
its intention or will and preclude the court from construing
it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and
to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
· Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by
its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others.
RULINGS OF SUPREME COURT PART OF LEGAL
SYSTEM
· “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.” The decisions referred to are those of the
Supreme Court, the latter being the tribunal that by
constitutional mandate, has the final word in the interpretation
of a statute or a constitutional provision.” By statutory fiat,
rulings of the court of last resort applying or interpreting a
statute become part of the statute itself. Legis interpretato legis
vim obtinet. This legal maxim means that the authoritative
interpretation of the Supreme Court of a statute acquires the
force of law by becoming a part thereof’ as of the date of its
enactment, since the court’s interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the statute thus
construed intends to effectuate. The rulings of the Supreme
Court are laws in their own right because they interpret what
the laws say or mean.”
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
· Article 8 of the Civil Code expresses the principle of stare
decisis et non quieta novere. It means that when the
Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts
are substantially the same. This principle assures
certainty and stability in the legal system.* In other words,
the interpretation by the Supreme Court placed upon the
law has the force of law and establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of law, which
constitutes part of the law as of the date the statute is
enacted. The interpretation continues until overruled and
the new doctrine is applied prospectively in favor of the
parties who have relieved on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith."
· As part of the legal system and until reversed by the
Supreme Court itself rulings of the highest tribunal are
binding upon inferior courts.” They become, to the extent
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations not
only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of
those duty-bound to enforce obedience thereto.”
JUDICIAL RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE
EFFECT
· While a judicial ruling of the high tribunal construing a law
forms part of the law as of the date of its enactment, it
cannot be given retroactive effect if to do so will impair
vested rights. Nor may a judicial ruling overruling a
previous one be applied retroactively so as to nullify a
right which arose under the previous ruling before its
abandonment.
· While Supreme Court decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are however subject to Article 4 of die Civil
Code which provides that “laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided.” This is expressed
in the legal maxim, lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against retro-
activity is based on the principle that retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional.
· The Supreme Court may abandon or overrule its earlier
decision construing a statute whenever it is right and
proper to do so. For more important than anything else is
that courts should be right." The Constitution provides
that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.”
The ruling by the court modifying or reversing a doctrine
or principle operates prospectively, and rights acquired
under such doctrine or principle prior to its modification or
reversal may not be affected thereby.
· In other words, the interpretation of a statute by the
Supreme Court remains to be part of the legal system
until the latter overrules it and the new doctrine overruling
the old is applied prospectively in favor of persons who
have relied thereon in good faith."
· In Benzonan v. Court of Appeals," the issue raised is
when to count the five-year period to repurchase under
Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 granting
applicant, his widow or legal heirs the right to repurchase
the land “within the period of five years from date of
conveyance.” In Monge v. Angeles91 and Tupas v.
5
 Damaso" decided in 1957 and 1984, respectively, the
Supreme Court held that the five-year period of
repurchase should be counted from the date of
conveyance or foreclosure sale. However, in Belisario v.
Intermediate Appellate Court9* decided in 1988, the
Supreme Court ruled that the five-year period should be
counted after the expiration of the one-year period of
repurchase in extrajudicial foreclosure sale. In Benzonan,
the Court held that the doctrine that should apply is that
which was enunciated in Monge and Tupas because the
transactions involved took place prior to Belisario and not
that which was laid down in the latter case which should
be applied prospectively.
ONLY SUPREME COURT EN BANC CAN MODIFY OR
ABANDON PRINCIPLE OF LAW, NOT ANY DIVISION
OF THE COURT
· Artide VIII, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution provides:
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, That no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc”
· Pursuant to the above-quoted constitutional provision, no
division of the Court has the power to modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle of law enunciated by either another
division of the Court or the Court en banc, except the
Court en banc itself.
· A division of the Court cannot modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle of law enunciated by another division
thereof. However, if what the Court has stated in a
decision is not a principle of law or doctrine, but is merely
an obiter dictum, a division of the Court may validly reject
or disregard such obiter dictum. Thus, in Tapiador v.
Ombudman, 42^ Phil. 47 (2002), a division of the Court
stated by way of obiter dictum that the Ombudsman has
no power to directly dismiss erring officials under the
Constitution and that its disciplinary power is only
recommendatory. A Court division in a subsequent case
rejected such obiter dictum and ruled that the pertinent
constitutional provision read in relation to the
Ombudsman law granting the latter the power to directly
dismiss erring officials makes the word “recommend” in
the constitutional provision mandatory, as held in Office of
Ombudsman v. Masingt G.R. No. 165416, January 22,
2008.
COURT MAY ISSUE GUIDELINES IN CONSTRUING
STATUTE
· It has been held that the Supreme Court has the duty to
“formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, of rules. It has 'been said
that such guidelines are not judicial legislation, but the
Court merely defines what the law is. Thus, in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, the Court
issued guidelines in the determination by COMELEC as
to which parties comply with the requirements of party-list
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
election system.
· In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may
tread on sensitive areas of constitutional rights, the Court
may issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to
enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law
requires. This is not judicial legislation but an act to define
what the law is. Thus, in People u. Ferrer, the Supreme
Court said that "even as we uphold the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the need for
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expression and belief. Accordingly, we issue the following
guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the
Act.
· The question is whether or not the Court’s issuance of
guidelines constitutes judicial legislation, or an
encroachment on the legislative prerogative to enact
laws. While the Court has the final say on what the law is
as it interprets it, the interpretation should be based not
only on law but also on the facts obtaining in the specific
case resolved by the courts and not on future facts or
circumstances.
LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
COURTS MAY NOT ENLARGE NOR RESTRICT
STATUTES
· The vital difference between initiating policy, often
involving a decided break with the past, and merely
carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively
narrow limits within which choice is rarely open to courts
and the extent to which interpreting law is inescapably
making law." This restricts judicial freedom in the
construction of a statute. While statutory construction
involves choice, the court should resist the temptation to
roam at will and rely on its predilections as to what policy
should prevail. Interpolation must be eschewed and
evisceration avoided. Common sense and good faith are
the leading stars that should guide judicial construction.
The search must be for, and the end result should be,
reasonable interpretation.
· Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include therein situations not
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at
the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated,
cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to
insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
supply what they think the legislature should have
supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.
· They should not, by construction, revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite
the law to conform with what they think should be the law.
Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which
the law does not prescribe. Where a statute, contains no
limitations in its operation or scope, courts should not
engraft any. And where a provision of law expressly limits
its application to certain transactions, it cannot be
extended to other transactions by interpretation." To do
any of such things would be to do violence to the
language of the law and to invade the legislative sphere.
Neither should courts construe statutes which are
6
 “perfectly vague.” As a rule, a statute may be vague when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution because it violates due process for failure to
accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and
leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions. But the act must be utterly vague on its face,
that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction. A “perfectly vague” act should
be distinguished from a legislation which is couched in
imprecise language or from one which is ambiguous, as
the latter types of legislation are subject to proper
construction.
· Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied
upon by petitioner objects which were neither specifically
mentioned nor enumerated would be to run afoul of tie
dictum that where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters. In other
words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that
the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare taciturn —
what is expressed puts an end to what ip implied. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body
would not have made specific enumerations in a statute,
if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
· Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative
gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court
presume otherwise and supply the details thereof^
because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial
fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers.
An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law
what they think should be in it or to supply what they think
the legislature would have supplied if its attention has
been called to the omission.
· Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite
the law to conform with what they think should be the law.
Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which
the law does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no
limitations in its operation or scope, courts should not
engraft any. And where a provision .of law expressly
limits its application to certain transactions, it cannot be
extended to other transactions by interpretation. To do
any of such things would be to do violence to the
language of the law and to invade the legislative sphere.
COURTS NOT TO BE INFLUENCED BY QUESTIONS
OF WISDOM
· “It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the
Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to
construe the law.” This division of responsibility, as
mandated by the Constitution, precludes one department
from encroaching upon the power of the other.
KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A
Accordingly, since the legislature, by the very nature of its
function, is primarily the judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law,134
courts may not take any of these matters into account in
construing or interpreting the law.
· Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice, or
expediency of legislation, for it is not within their province
to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern. Hence, as long as laws
do not violate the Constitution, the courts merely interpret
and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise or salutary. While “judges may regard a certain law
as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend
to the authority or department concerned its amendment,
modification or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force,
they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the
law-making body.
· Courts do not sit to resolve the merit of conflicting
theories for debatable questions are for the legislature to
decide. If courts think that a particular statute is unwise or
harsh, a becoming sense of decency and a recognition of
their own limited sphere forbid them from amending or
rewriting the law, in the guise of interpretation, to suit their
own predilections or prejudices.*® Any shortcoming of a
statute is for the legislature alone to correct by
appropriate enactment.”
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION
· The science or art of construction and interpretation is
called Hermeneutics. The phrase legal hermeneutics is
understood to be the systematic body of rules which are
recognized as applicable to the construction and
interpretation of legal writings. (Black's Legal Dictionary,
Centennial ed.).
· Dr. Lieber in his work on Hermeneutics gives the
following classification of the different kinds of
interpretation:
CLOSE INTERPRETATION
· adopted if just reasons connected with the character and
formation of the text induce as to take the words in their
narrowest meaning. This specie of interpretation is also
generally called "literal."
EXTENSIVE INTERPRETATION
· also called liberal interpretation, adopts a more
comprehensive signification of the words.
EXTRAVAGANT INTERPRETATION
· is that which substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the
true one. It is therefore not genuine interpretation.
FREE OR UNRESTRICTED INTERPRETATION
· proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation
in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior
principle.
LIMITED OR RESTRICTED INTERPRETATION
· is when we are influenced by other principles than the
strictly hermeneutic ones.
PREDESTINED INTERPRETATION
· takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias
of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived
7
 views and desires. This include artful interpretation by
which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text
other than the one he knows to have been intended.
(Lieber, Hermeneutics, 54-60).

SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION
· Authorities hold that the most common subjects of
construction and interpretation are the constitution and
statutes which include ordinances. But we may also add
resolutions, executive orders and department circulars.

REFERENCES

Notes from Statutory Construction by Agpalo and Diaz

KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A 8

 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

KIMBERLY GRACE ANNE J. PILAPIL | JURIS DOCTOR 1A 9