Bar Matter No.

850

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 850     August 22, 2000

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)

ADOPTING THE RULES ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine
Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts, the following rules for proper
implementation:

RULE 1
PURPOSE

Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE

Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee

Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE
Committee shall be constituted in accordance with these Rules.

Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE

Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3) years, at least thirty-six
(36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36
hours:

(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.

(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
 (c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws,
and jurisprudence.

(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy.

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by
the MCLE Committee.

RULE 3
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

Section 1. Initial compliance period

The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the constitution of the
MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall
begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.

Section 2. Compliance Group 1.

Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be permanently assigned to
Compliance Group 1.

Section 3. Compliance Group 2.

Members in Luzon outside NCR shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 2.

Section 4. Compliance Group 3.

Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
program.

Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be
permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on
the date of admission or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month
of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the
initial compliance.
 (b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission
or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved
continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be
required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the
number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded
up to the next whole number.

RULE 4
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS

Section 1. Guidelines

The following are the guidelines for computation of credit units (CU):

PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION

PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY
APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE WITH

NUMBER OF HOURS

1.2 LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR'S

CERTIFICATION

1.3 RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR'S

SPEAKER CERTIFICATION

1.4 ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING

PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION REACTOR/COMMENTATOR

1.5 MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING

COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION FACILITATOR

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED

INNOVATIVE TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT

2.2 BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE AUTHOR 12-16 CU 17-20
CU
2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU
3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU

2.3 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF

AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE SINGLE AUTHOR 6 CU 8

CU
 2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU

2.5 LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL EDITOR

3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN CHAIR/BAR 1 CU

PER LECTURE OR BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR REVIEW/ HOUR LECTURE/LAW
TEACHING

Section 2. Limitation on certain credit units

In numbers 2 and 3 of the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total maximum credit units shall
not exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3) years.

RULE 5
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT

Section 1. Classes of credits

The credits are either participatory or non-participatory.

Section 2. Claim for participatory credit

Participatory credit may be claimed for:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, symposia, in-house
education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussions.

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource

speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit

Non-participatory credit may be claimed per compliance period for:

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for

publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to
the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of
the member's practice or employment.

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

RULE 6
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS

Section 1. Computation of credit hours

Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual instruction or speaking
time), in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour.

RULE 7
EXEMPTIONS

Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE

The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executives Departments;

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent
court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial
education;

(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;

(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
least 10 years accredited law schools;

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lectures of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and

(l) Governors and Mayors.

Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE

The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

 (b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.

Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement

A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical
disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or
modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance
with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.

Section 4. Change of status

The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be
exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.

Section 5. Proof of exemption

Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and
supported by documents.

RULE 8
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

Section 1. Approval of MCLE program

Subject to the rules as may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education
program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an
approved provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of this Rules; and (2)
the provider is specially mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.

Section 2. Standards for all education activities

All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects
and the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in
legal writing and oral advocacy.

(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.

(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must
be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the
activity is offered.

(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free
from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
 RULE 9
APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS

Section 1. Approval of providers

Approval of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.

Section 2. Requirements for approval of providers

Any persons or group may be approved as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-
house providers, are eligible to be approved providers. Application for approval shall:

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;

(b) Contain all information requested on the form;

(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;

Section 3. Requirements of all providers

All approved providers shall agree to the following:

(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the
provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the
member on the official record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at
the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the
member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date,
location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be
furnished the IBP.

(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the amount of ________
hours of which hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of
the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities
prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP
pertaining to MCLE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date,
location, subject matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education
activities by members of the IBP Board of Governors, the MCLE Committee, or designees of
the Committee and IBP staff for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time
devoted to each devoted to each topic and identify of the instructors. The provider shall
 make available to each participant a copy of IBP-approved Education Activity Evaluation
Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a
period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the IBP.

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues
a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

Section 4. Renewal of provider approval

The approval of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails
to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education
activities for the preceding period.

Section 5. Revocation of provider approval

The approval of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the IBP
Board of Governors, upon recommendation of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and
for good cause.

RULE 10
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDER APPROVAL FEE

Section 1. Payment of fees

Application for approval of an education activity or as a provider requires payment of an appropriate

fee.

RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

Section 1. Compliance card

Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the
education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the address indicated therein not later than the day after the
end of the member's compliance period.

Section 2. Member record keeping requirement

Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section
3(c) of Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-
participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance

The following shall constitute non-compliance

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;

(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt

status) within the prescribed period;

(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance
within sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-compliance notice;

(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance

A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and
will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following
language in capital letters:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR

PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60
DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A
DELINQUENT MEMBER.

The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for compliance.
Credit hours earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior
compliance period requirement unless hours in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case,
the excess hours may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. lawphil.net

RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

Section 1. Non-compliance fee

A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall
pay a non-compliance fee.

Section 2. Listing as delinquent member

Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a
delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Committee, in which case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.

RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT

Section 1. Process
The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof
of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member
may attain the necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance
during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit hours may not be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained during the period of non-
compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. lawphil.net

Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process

The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature but it shall be made with
notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.

RULE 15
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Section 1. Composition

The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely: a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court, as Chair, and four (4) members, respectively, nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools
and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by
the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be
determined by the Court.

Section 2. Duty of the Committee

The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary
subject to the approval by the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of
Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 3. Staff of the IBP

The IBP shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing,
reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

Section 4. Submission of annual budget

The IBP shall submit to the Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy to establish, operate and
maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.
 AM No. 03-01-09-SC
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is
vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged;

WHEREAS, considering the policy of Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to prioritize the reform of
procedural laws in order to make the disposition of every action and proceeding more just, speedy
and inexpensive, as well as to prevent delays and to decongest the courts, the Sub-Committee for
the Revision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was created to review possible amendments to the
Rules per Memorandum Order No. 04-2019 dated January 14, 2019;

WHEREAS, the Sub-Committee for the Revision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is composed
of the following members:

Chairperson:

Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta

Associate Justice, Supreme Court

Vice-Chairperson:

Hon. Alexander G. Gesmundo

Associate Justice, Supreme Court

Members:

Hon. Francis H. Jardeleza

Associate Justice, Supreme Court

Hon. Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa

Associate Justice, Supreme Court

Hon. Jose Midas P. Marquez

Court Administrator
 Hon. Fernanda Lampas Peralta
Associate Justice, Court of Appeals

Hon. Maria Filomena D. Singh

Associate Justice, Court of Appeals

Hon. Magdangal M. De Leon

Associate Justice, Court of Appeals (Retired)

Hon. Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4

Hon. Niño Delvin E. Embuscado

Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66

Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

Professor, University of the Philippines College of Law

Atty. Tranquil Gervacio S. Salvador III

Professor, Ateneo De Manila University School of Law

Atty. Regan G. Yuliong

Office of Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

Secretariat:

Atty. Ralph Jerome D. Salvador

Office of Associate Justice Disodado M. Peralta

Atty. Antonio Ceasar R. Manila

Office of Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo

Atty. Camille Sue Mae L. Ting

Office of the Court Administrator

WHEREAS, the Sub-Committee members submitted and discussed the possible amendments to the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, taking into account the recent developments in procedural and
substantive laws, jurisprudence and digital technology, as well as international conventions;

WHEREAS, after several exhaustive meetings, the Sub-Committee submitted its proposals to the
reorganized Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court (Mother Rule Committee),1 which is
composed of the following members, who thoroughly reviewed and made further amendments to the
said proposals:

Chairperson:
Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

Vice/Working Chairperson:
Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
 Members:
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza
Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
Justice Secretary Menardo I. Guevarra
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna (ret.)
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (ret.)
Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez
Atty. Francis Ed Lim
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra
Atty. Tranquil Gervacio S. Salvador III
Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino Jr.

Secretariat:
Atty. Ralph Jerome D. Salvador
Atty. Camille Sue Mae L. Ting
Atty. Al-Azree J. Mohammadsali

WHEREAS, after several meetings, the reorganized Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court has finally finished amending and updating the 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to incorporate the technological advances and developments in
law, jurisprudence and international conventions;

NOW, THEREFORE, acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on the

Revision of the Rules of Court, the Court resolves to APPROVE the "2019 Proposed Amendments to
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.'"

The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on May 1,
2020, following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two newspapers of national circulation

October 15, 2019, Manila, Philippines.

Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.
Reyes, Jr., (on leave but left his vote), Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Reorganized per Memorandum Order No. 03-2019 dated January 14, 2019.

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC 2019

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

 RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Title of the Rules. - These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of Court. (1)

Section 2. In what courts applicable. - These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise
provided by the Supreme Court. (2)

Section 3. Cases governed. - These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions,
civil or criminal, and special proceedings.

(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission
punishable by law.

(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seek s to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact. (3)

Section 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (4)

RULE 2
CAUSE OF ACTION

Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of - Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of
action. (1)

Section 2. Cause of action, defined. - A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. (2)

Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. - A party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action. (3)

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of - If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in anyone is available as
a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4)

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
 (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues
or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (5)

Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of
the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. (6)

RULE 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party,
the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)[-]party plaintiff. The term
"defendant "may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-
defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) - party defendant. (1)

Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. (2)

Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended

by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the
title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a
trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or
these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may
sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal. (3)

Section 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided
by law. (4)

Section 5. Minor or incompetent persons. - A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue
or be sued, with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad
litem. (5)

Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. - All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to
all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6)

Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)
Section 8. Necessary party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to
be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8)

Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. - Whenever in any pleading in which a

claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and
shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may
order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a
waiver of the claim against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and
the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. (9)

Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the
complaint. (10)

Section 11. Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties. - Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any
claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (11)

Section 12. Class suit. - When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them
which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of
all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest. (12)

Section 13. Alternative defendants. - Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons
he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right
to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the other. (13)

Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. - Whenever the identity or name of a defendant
is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner, heir, devisee, or by such other designation as
the case may require; when his identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended
accordingly. (14)

Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - When two or more persons not
organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the
name by which they are generally or commonly known.

In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said entity
must all be revealed. (15)

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. (16)

Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. - When a public officer is a party in
an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30)
days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily
shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and
that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his
predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly
assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an
opportunity to be heard. (17)

Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. - If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the

court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the incompetent
or incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem. (18)

Section 19. Transfer of interest. - In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by
or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is
transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. (19)

Section 20. Action on contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery of money arising
from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court
in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of a deceased person. (20)

Section 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who
has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself
and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of dock et and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
dock et and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered
by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is
in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper dock et and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the
court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose. (21)

Section 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. - In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may
require the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through a
representative duly designated by him. (22)

RULE 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1)

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. (2)

Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property
of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of
the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
(3)

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply

(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or

(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof. (3a, 5a)

RULE 5
UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

Section 1. Uniform procedure. - The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in
the Regional Trial Courts, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only
to either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. (1)

Section 2. Meaning of terms. - The term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall
include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (2)

RULE 6
KINDS OF PLEADINGS
Section 1. Pleadings defined. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Pleadings allowed. — The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.

The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim against him or
her.

An answer may be responded to by a reply only if the defending party attaches an actionable

document to the answer.

Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiffs or claiming party's
cause or causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated
in the complaint.

Section 4. Answer. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.

(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the
pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action.

(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of, a new matter which, while hypothetically
admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent
or bar recovery by him or her. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations,
release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.

Affirmative defenses may also include grounds for the dismissal of a complaint, specifically, that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment.

Section 6. Counterclaim. — [No amendment]

Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable

by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must
be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an
original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount. A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same action is barred, unless
otherwise allowed by these Rules.

Section 8. Cross-claim. — A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may cover all or part of the original claim.

Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-cross-claims. — [No amendment]

Section 10. Reply. — All new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. If the plaintiff
wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be set
forth in an amended or supplemental complaint. However, the plaintiff may file a reply only if the
defending party attaches an actionable document to his or her answer.

A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance
of new matters alleged in, or relating to, said actionable document.

In the event of an actionable document attached to the reply, the defendant may file a rejoinder if the
same is based solely on an actionable document.

Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. — A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.

The third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint shall be denied admission, and the court shall require the
defendant to institute a separate action, where: (a) the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant cannot be
located within thirty (30) calendar days from the grant of such leave; (b) matters extraneous to the
issue in the principal case are raised; or (c) the effect would be to introduce a new and separate
controversy into the action.

Section 12. Bringing new parties. — [No amendment]

Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. — [No amendment]

RULE 7
PARTS AND CONTENTS OF PLEADING

Section 1. Caption. — [No amendment]

Section 2. The body. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Signature and address. — (a) Every pleading and other written submissions to the court
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him or her.

(b) The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him or her that he or she has read
the pleading and document; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or jurisprudence, or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing jurisprudence;

(3) The factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after availment of the modes of discovery under
these rules; and

(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
 (c) If the court determines, on motion or motu proprio and after notice and hearing, that this
rule has been violated, it may impose an appropriate sanction or refer such violation to the
proper office for disciplinary action, on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule,
or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held
jointly and severally liable for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
The sanction may include, but not limited to, non-monetary directives or sanctions; an order
to pay a penalty in court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and
other expenses directly resulting from the violation, including attorney's fees for the filing of
motion for sanction. The lawyer or law firm cannot pass on the monetary penalty to the client.

Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath or verified.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said verification. The
authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate
or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following
attestations:

(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his personal knowledge, or
based on authentic documents;

(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation; and

(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations
in the pleading.

A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on "information and belief," or

upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) calendar days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.

The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's
certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.

Section 6. Contents. — Every pleading stating a party's claims or defenses shall, in addition to
those mandated by Section 2, Rule 7, state the following:

(a) Names of witnesses who will be presented to prove a party's claim or defense;

(b) Summary of the witnesses' intended testimonies, provided that the judicial affidavits of
said witnesses shall be attached to the pleading and form an integral part thereof. Only
witnesses whose judicial affidavits are attached to the pleading shall be presented by the
parties during trial. Except if a party presents meritorious reasons as basis for the admission
of additional witnesses, no other witness or affidavit shall be heard or admitted by the court;
and

(c) Documentary and object evidence in support of the allegations contained in the
pleading. (n)

RULE 8
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS

Section 1. In general. — Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be.

If a cause of action or defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their
applicability to him or her shall be clearly and concisely stated.

Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Conditions precedent. — [No amendment]

Section 4. Capacity. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or

quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without
setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. An authenticated copy of the judgment or
decision shall be attached to the pleading.

Section 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon
a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in
the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which
shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading.

Section 8. How to contest such documents. — [No amendment]

Section 9. Official document or act. — [No amendment]

Section 10. Specific denial. — [No amendment]

Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averments in a

pleading asserting a claim or claims, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages,
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

Section 12. Affirmative defenses. — (a) A defendant shall raise his affirmative defenses in his
answer, which shall be limited to the reasons set forth under Section 5(b), Rule 6, and the following
grounds:

1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;

2. That venue is improperly laid;

3. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

4. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; and

5. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a
waiver thereof.

(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty (30)
calendar days from the filing of the answer.

(d) As to the other affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Section 5(b), Rule 6, the
court may conduct a summary hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days from the filing of the
answer. Such affirmative defenses shall be resolved by the court within thirty (30) calendar
days from the termination of the summary hearing.

(e) Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, but may be among the matters to be raised
on appeal after a judgment on the merits. (n)

Section 13. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein. — Upon motion made by a party
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon
motion made by a party within twenty (20) calendar days after the service of the pleading upon
him or her, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order any pleading to be
stricken out or that any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be
stricken out therefrom. (12)

RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Default; Declaration of. — [No amendment]

(a) Effect of order of default. — [No amendment]

(b) Relief from order of default. — [No amendment]

(c) Effect of partial default. — [No amendment]

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — [No amendment]

(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending party in an action for annulment or

declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the Solicitor General or his or her deputized public prosecutor, to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

RULE 10
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Section 1. Amendments in general. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within
ten (10) calendar days after it is served.

Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — Except as provided in the next preceding Section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave shall be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay or confer jurisdiction on the court,
or the pleading stated no cause of action from the beginning which could be amended. Orders of the
court upon the matters provided in this Section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after
notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

Section 4. Formal amendments. — [No amendment]

Section 5. No amendment necessary to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. No amendment of such
pleadings deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence.

Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party, the court may, upon reasonable
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him or her to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading
sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) calendar days from
notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.

Section 7. Filing of amended pleadings. — [No amendment]

Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. — An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be offered in evidence against the
pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be
deemed waived.
 RULE 11
WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

Section 1. Answer to the complaint. — The defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
within thirty (30) calendar days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the
court.

Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. — Where the defendant is a foreign
private juridical entity and service of summons is made on the government official designated by law
to receive the same, the answer shall be filed within sixty (60) calendar days after receipt of
summons by such entity.

Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. — When the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a
matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within thirty (30) calendar days after being
served with a copy thereof.

Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint
within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed
may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed.

This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim, amended
third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, and amended complaint-in-intervention.

Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. — A counterclaim or cross-claim must be

answered within twenty (20) calendar days from service.

Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Reply. — A reply, if allowed under Section 10, Rule 6 hereof, may be filed within fifteen
(15) calendar days from service of the pleading responded to.

Section 7. Answer to supplemental complaint. — A supplemental complaint may be answered

within twenty (20) calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different
period is fixed by the court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the
supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed. (7)

Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. — [No amendment]

Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer. — [No amendment]

Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. — [No amendment]

Section 11. Extension of time to file an answer. — A defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be
granted an additional period of not more than thirty (30) calendar days to file an answer. A defendant
is only allowed to file one (1) motion for extension of time to file an answer.

A motion for extension to file any pleading, other than an answer, is prohibited and considered a
mere scrap of paper. The court, however, may allow any other pleading to be filed after the time
fixed by these Rules.
 RULE 12
BILL OF PARTICULARS

Section 1. When applied for; purpose. — Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter, which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity, to enable him or her properly to prepare his or her responsive pleading.
If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) calendar days from service thereof.
Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained,
and the details desired.

Section 2. Action by the court. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Compliance with order. — If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the
compliance therewith must be effected within ten (10) calendar days from notice of the order, unless
a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars or a more definite statement ordered by
the court may be filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the
adverse party. (3)

Section 4. Effect of non-compliance. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. — After service of the bill of particulars or of a
more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion, the moving party may file his
responsive pleading within the period to which he was entitled at the time of filing his motion, which
shall not be less than five (5) calendar days in any event. (5)

Section 6. Bill apart of pleading. — [No amendment]

RULE 13
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the filing of all pleadings, motions, and other court
submissions, as well as their service, except those for which a different mode of service is
prescribed. (1)

Section 2. Filing and Service, defined. — Filing is the act of submitting the pleading or other paper
to the court.

Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or any other court
submission. If a party has appeared by counsel, service upon such party shall be made upon his or
her counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party and the party's counsel is ordered by the
court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, such counsel shall only be entitled to one
copy of any paper served by the opposite side.

Where several counsels appear for one party, such party shall be entitled to only one copy of any
pleading or paper to be served upon the lead counsel if one is designated, or upon any one of them
if there is no designation of a lead counsel.

Section 3. Manner of filing. — The filing of pleadings and other court submissions shall be made by:

(a) Submitting personally the original thereof, plainly indicated as such, to the court;
 (b) Sending them by registered mail;

(c) Sending them by accredited courier; or

(d) Transmitting them by electronic mail or other electronic means as may be authorized by
the Court in places where the court is electronically equipped.

In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the
second and third cases, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, and other court submissions,
and payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt,
shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be
attached to the record of the case. In the fourth case, the date of electronic transmission shall be
considered as the date of filing.

Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Modes of Service. —Pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other court

submissions shall be served personally or by registered mail, accredited courier, electronic mail,
facsimile transmission, other electronic means as may be authorized by the Court, or as provided for
in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party.

Section 6. Personal Service. — Court submissions may be served by personal delivery of a copy to
the party or to the party's counsel, or to their authorized representative named in the appropriate
pleading or motion, or by leaving it in his or her office with his or her clerk, or with a person having
charge thereof. If no person is found in his or her office, or his or her office is not known, or he or
she has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the
evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein.

Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in
the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or to the party's counsel at his or
her office, if known, otherwise at his or her residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) calendar days if
undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee,
service may be done by ordinary mail.

Section 8. Substituted service. — [No amendment]

Section 9. Service by electronic means and facsimile. — Service by electronic means and facsimile
shall be made if the party concerned consents to such modes of service.

Service by electronic means shall be made by sending an e-mail to the party's or counsel's
electronic mail address, or through other electronic means of transmission as the parties may agree
on, or upon direction of the court.

Service by facsimile shall be made by sending a facsimile copy to the party's or counsel's given
facsimile number. (n)

Section 10. Presumptive service. — There shall be presumptive notice to a party of a court setting if
such notice appears on the records to have been mailed at least twenty (20) calendar days prior to
the scheduled date of hearing and if the addressee is from within the judicial region, or at least thirty
(30) calendar days if the addressee is from outside the judicial region. (n)

Section 11. Change of electronic mail address or facsimile number. — A party who changes his or
her electronic mail address or facsimile number while the action is pending must promptly file, within
five (5) calendar days from such change, a notice of change of e-mail address or facsimile number
with the court and serve the notice on all other parties.

Service through the electronic mail address or facsimile number of a party shall be presumed valid
unless such party notifies the court of any change, as aforementioned. (n)

Section 12. Electronic mail and facsimile subject and title of pleadings and other documents. — The
subject of the electronic mail and facsimile must follow the prescribed format: case number, case
title and the pleading, order or document title. The title of each electronically-filed or served pleading
or other document, and each submission served by facsimile shall contain sufficient information to
enable the court to ascertain from the title: (a) the party or parties filing or serving the paper, (b)
nature of the paper, (c) the party or parties against whom relief, if any, is sought, and (d) the nature
of the relief sought. (n)

Section 13. Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions. — Judgments, final orders, or

resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. Upon ex parte motion of any party
in the case, a copy of the judgment, final order, or resolution may be delivered by accredited courier
at the expense of such party. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the
action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him or her shall be served upon him or her also
by means of publication at the expense of the prevailing party. (9)

Section 14. Conventional service or filing of orders, pleadings and other documents. —

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following orders, pleadings, and other documents must be served
or filed personally or by registered mail when allowed, and shall not be served or filed electronically,
unless express permission is granted by the Court:

(a) Initiatory pleadings and initial responsive pleadings, such as an answer;

(b) Subpoenae, protection orders, and writs;

(c) Appendices and exhibits to motions, or other documents that are not readily amenable to
electronic scanning may, at the option of the party filing such, be filed and served
conventionally; and

(d) Sealed and confidential documents or records. (n)

Section 15. Completeness of service. — Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service
by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) calendar days after mailing, unless the
court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee, or after five (5) calendar days from the date he or she received the first notice of the
postmaster, whichever date is earlier. Service by accredited courier is complete upon actual receipt
by the addressee, or after at least two (2) attempts to deliver by the courier service, or upon the
expiration of five (5) calendar days after the first attempt to deliver, whichever is earlier.

Electronic service is complete at the time of the electronic transmission of the document, or when
available, at the time that the electronic notification of service of the document is sent. Electronic
service is not effective or complete if the party serving the document learns that it did not reach the
addressee or person to be served.

Service by facsimile transmission is complete upon receipt by the other party, as indicated in the
facsimile transmission printout. (10)

Section 16. Proof of filing. — The filing of a pleading or any other court submission shall be proved
by its existence in the record of the case.

(a) If the pleading or any other court submission is not in the record, but is claimed to have
been filed personally, the filing shall be proven by the written or stamped acknowledgment of
its filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the pleading or court submission;

(b) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed by registered mail, the filing shall
be proven by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who mailed it, containing a
full statement of the date and place of deposit of the mail in the post office in a sealed
envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) calendar days if not delivered.

(c) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed through an accredited courier
service, the filing shall be proven by an affidavit of service of the person who brought the
pleading or other document to the service provider, together with the courier's official receipt
and document tracking number.

(d) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed by electronic mail, the same shall
be proven by an affidavit of electronic filing of the filing party accompanied by a paper copy
of the pleading or other document transmitted or a written or stamped acknowledgment of its
filing by the clerk of court. If the paper copy sent by electronic mail was filed by registered
mail, paragraph (b) of this Section applies.

(e) If the pleading or any other court submission was filed through other authorized electronic
means, the same shall be proven by an affidavit of electronic filing of the filing party
accompanied by a copy of the electronic acknowledgment of its filing by the court. (12)

Section 17. Proof of service. — Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the
party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a
statement of the date, place, and manner of service. If the service is made by:

(a) Ordinary mail. - Proof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing stating the facts
showing compliance with Section 7 of this Rule.

(b) Registered mail. - Proof shall be made by the affidavit mentioned above and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office.  The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon
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its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof, the unclaimed letter together with the certified or
sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

(c) Accredited courier service. - Proof shall be made by an affidavit of service executed by
the person who brought the pleading or paper to the service provider, together with the
courier's official receipt or document tracking number.
 (d) Electronic mail, facsimile, or other authorized electronic means of transmission. - Proof
shall be made by an affidavit of service executed by the person who sent the e-mail,
facsimile, or other electronic transmission, together with a printed proof of transmittal.(13)

Section 18. Court-issued orders and other documents. — The court may electronically serve orders
and other documents to all the parties in the case which shall have the same effect and validity as
provided herein. A paper copy of the order or other document electronically served shall be retained
and attached to the record of the case. (n)

Section 19. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real
property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record
in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the
pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the
time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected
thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (14)

RULE 14
SUMMONS

Section 1. Clerk to issue summons. — Unless the complaint is on its face dismissible under Section
1, Rule 9, the court shall, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of the initiatory pleading and
proof of payment of the requisite legal fees, direct the clerk of court to issue the corresponding
summons to the defendants.

Section 2. Contents. — The summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk of
court under seal, and contain:

(a) The name of the court and the names of the parties to the action;

(b) When authorized by the court upon ex parte motion, an authorization for the plaintiff to
serve summons to the defendant;

(c) A direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by these Rules; and

(d) A notice that unless the defendant so answers, plaintiff will take judgment by default and
may be granted the relief applied for.

A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, shall be attached to
the original and each copy of the summons.

Section 3. By whom served. — The summons may be served by the sheriff, his deputy, or other
proper court officer, and in case of failure of service of summons by them, the court may authorize
the plaintiff - to serve the summons - together with the sheriff.
In cases where summons is to be served outside the judicial region of the court where the case is
pending, the plaintiff shall be authorized to cause the service of summons.

If the plaintiff is a juridical entity, it shall notify the court, in writing, and name its authorized
representative therein, attaching a board resolution or secretary's certificate thereto, as the case
may be, stating that such representative is duly authorized to serve the summons on behalf of the
plaintiff.

If the plaintiff misrepresents that the defendant was served summons, and it is later proved that no
summons was served, the case shall be dismissed with prejudice, the proceedings shall be nullified,
and the plaintiff shall be meted appropriate sanctions.

If summons is returned without being served on any or all the defendants, the court shall order the
plaintiff to cause the service of summons by other means available under the Rules.

Failure to comply with the order shall cause the dismissal of the initiatory pleading without prejudice.

Section 4. Validity of summons and issuance of alias summons — Summons shall remain valid until
duly served, unless it is recalled by the court. In case of loss or destruction of summons, the court
may, upon motion, issue an alias summons.

There is failure of service after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the summons on the
defendant in his address indicated in the complaint. Substituted service should be in the manner
provided under Section 6 of this Rule. (5)

Section 5. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person and informing the defendant that he or she is
being served, or, if he or she refuses to receive and sign for it, by leaving the summons within the
view and in the presence of the defendant.(6)

Section 6. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served personally after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may be
effected:

(a) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence to a person at least
eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient discretion residing therein;

(b) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof. A competent person includes, but not limited
to, one who customarily receives correspondences for the defendant;

(c) By leaving copies of the summons, if refused entry upon making his or her authority and
purpose known, with any of the officers of the homeowners' association or condominium
corporation, or its chief security officer in charge of the community or the building where the
defendant may be found; and

(d) By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's electronic mail address, if allowed by the
court.

Section 7. Service upon entity without juridical personality. — When persons associated in an entity
without juridical personality are sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly
known, service may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of them, or upon
the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in such name. But such service
shall not bind individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been
severed before the action was filed. (8)

Section 8. Service upon prisoners. — When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or
institution, service shall be effected upon him or her by the officer having the management of such
jail or institution who is deemed as a special sheriff for said purpose. The jail warden shall file a
return within five (5) calendar days from service of summons to the defendant. (9)

Section 9. Service consistent with international conventions. — Service may be made through
methods which are consistent with established international conventions to which the Philippines is a
party. (n)

Section 10. Service upon minors and incompetents. — When the defendant is a minor, insane or
otherwise an incompetent person, service of summons shall be made upon him or her personally
and on his or her legal guardian if he or she has one, or if none, upon his or her guardian ad
litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the case of a minor, service shall be
made on his or her parent or guardian.

Section 11. Service upon spouses. - When spouses are sued jointly, service of summons should be
made to each spouse individually. (n)

Section 12. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel of the corporation wherever they may be found, or in their absence or
unavailability, on their secretaries.

If such service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing persons, it shall be made upon the person
who customarily receives the correspondence for the defendant at its principal office.

In case the domestic juridical entity is under receivership or liquidation, service of summons shall be
made on the receiver or liquidator, as the case may be.

Should there be a refusal on the part of the persons above-mentioned to receive summons despite
at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may be made electronically, if allowed
by the court, as provided under Section 6 of this rule. (11)

Section 13. Duty of counsel of record. — Where the summons is improperly served and a lawyer
makes a special appearance on behalf of the defendant to, among others, question the validity of
service of summons, the counsel shall be deputized by the court to serve summons on his client. (n)

Section 14. Service upon foreign private juridical entities. — When the defendant is a foreign private
juridical entity which has transacted or is doing business in the Philippines, as defined by
law, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with the law for that
purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or
on any of its officers, agents, directors or trustees within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines, or has no resident agent but
has transacted or is doing business in it, as defined by law, such service may, with leave of court, be
effected outside of the Philippines through any of the following means:

(a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the department of foreign affairs;

(b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the
defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by
registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;

(c) By facsimile;

(d) By electronic means with the prescribed proof of service; or

(e) By such other means as the court, in its discretion, may direct. (12)

Section 15. Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the Republic of the
Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such
other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct. (13)

Section 16. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his or
her whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, within ninety (90)
calendar days from the commencement of the action, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him or her by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such
time as the court may order.

Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
calendar days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (14)

Section 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under Section 6; or as provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party; or
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered
mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than
sixty (60) calendar days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (15)

Section 18. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When any action is commenced against
a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding Section. (16)

Section 19. Leave of court. — Any application to the court under this Rule for leave to effect service
in any manner for which leave of court is necessary shall be made by motion in writing, supported by
affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application.
(17)

Section 20. Return. — Within thirty (30) calendar days from issuance of summons by the clerk of
court and receipt thereof, the sheriff or process server, or person authorized by the court, shall
complete its service. Within five (5) calendar days from service of summons, the server shall file with
the court and serve a copy of the return to the plaintiff's counsel, personally, by registered mail, or by
electronic means authorized by the Rules.

Should substituted service have been effected, the return shall state:

(1) The impossibility of prompt personal service within a period of thirty (30) calendar days
from issue and receipt of summons;

(2) The date and time of the three (3) attempts on at least (2) two separate dates to cause
personal service and the details of the inquiries made to locate the defendant residing
thereat; and

(3) The name of the person at least eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient discretion
residing thereat; name of competent person in charge of the defendant's office or regular
place of business, or name of the officer of the homeowners' association or condominium
corporation or its chief security officer in charge of the community or building where the
defendant may be found. (4)

Section 21. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons shall be made in writing by the
server and shall set forth the manner, place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which
have been served with the process and the name of the person who received the same; and shall be
sworn to when made by a person other than a sheriff or his or her deputy.

If summons was served by electronic mail, a printout of said e-mail, with a copy of the summons as
served, and the affidavit of the person mailing, shall constitute as proof of service. (18)

Section 22. Proof of service by publication. — If the service has been made by publication, service
may be proved by the affidavit of the publisher, editor, business or advertising manager, to which
affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy
of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his or her last known address. (19)

Section 23. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance. (20)

RULE 15
MOTIONS

Section 1. Motion defined. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Motions must be in writing. — All motions shall be in writing except those made in open
court or in the course of a hearing or trial.
A motion made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial should immediately be resolved in
open court, after the adverse party is given the opportunity to argue his or her opposition thereto.

When a motion is based on facts not appearing on record, the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

Section 3. Contents. — [No amendment]

[Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Deleted]

Section 4. Non-litigious motions. — Motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of adverse parties are non-litigious motions. These motions include:

a) Motion for the issuance of an alias summons;

b) Motion for extension to file answer;

c) Motion for postponement;

d) Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution;

e) Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution;

f) Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession;

g) Motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of
sale; and

h) Other similar motions.

These motions shall not be set for hearing and shall be resolved by the court within five (5) calendar
days from receipt thereof. (n)

Section 5. Litigious motions. — (a) Litigious motions include:

1. Motion for bill of particulars;

2. Motion to dismiss;

3. Motion for new trial;

4. Motion for reconsideration;

5. Motion for execution pending appeal;

6. Motion to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed;

7. Motion to cancel statutory lien;

 8. Motion for an order to break in or for a writ of demolition;

9. Motion for intervention;

10. Motion for judgment on the pleadings;

11. Motion for summary judgment;

12. Demurrer to evidence;

13. Motion to declare defendant in default; and

14. Other similar motions.

(b) All motions shall be served by personal service, accredited private courier or registered
mail, or electronic means so as to ensure their receipt by the other party.

(c) The opposing party shall file his or her opposition to a litigious motion within five (5)
calendar days from receipt thereof. No other submissions shall be considered by the court in
the resolution of the motion.

The motion shall be resolved by the court within fifteen (15) calendar days from its receipt of the
opposition thereto, or upon expiration of the period to file such opposition. (n)

Section 6. Notice of hearing on litigious motions; discretionary. — The court may, in the exercise of
its discretion, and if deemed necessary for its resolution, call a hearing on the motion. The notice of
hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing. (5)

Section 7. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof, pursuant to Section 5(b) hereof. (6)

Section 8. Motion day. — Except for motions requiring immediate action, where the court decides to
conduct hearing on a litigious motion, the same shall be set on a Friday. (7)

Section 9. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a
pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (8)

Section 10. Motion for leave. — A motion for leave to file a pleading or motion shall be accompanied
by the pleading or motion sought to be admitted.  (9)
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Section 11. Form. — The Rules applicable to pleadings shall apply to written motions so far as
concerns caption, designation, signature, and other matters of form. (10)

Section 12. Prohibited motions. — The following motions shall not be allowed:

(a) Motion to dismiss except on the following grounds:

1) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
 2) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; and

3) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of

limitations;

(b) Motion to hear affirmative defenses;

(c) Motion for reconsideration of the court's action on the affirmative defenses;

(d) Motion to suspend proceedings without a temporary restraining order or injunction issued
by a higher court;

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers, except a
motion for extension to file an answer as provided by Section 11, Rule 11; and

(f) Motion for postponement intended for delay, except if it is based on acts of God, force
majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear and testify. If the motion is granted
based on such exceptions, the moving party shall be warned that the presentation of its
evidence must still be terminated on the dates previously agreed upon.

A motion for postponement, whether written or oral, shall, at all times, be accompanied by the
original official receipt from the office of the clerk of court evidencing payment of the postponement
fee under Section 21(b), Rule 141, to be submitted either at the time of the filing of said motion or
not later than the next hearing date. The clerk of court shall not accept the motion unless
accompanied by the original receipt. (n)

Section 13. Dismissal with prejudice. — Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to
dismiss or an affirmative defense that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations; that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, shall bar the refiling of the same action
or claim. (5, R16)

RULE 16
MOTION TO DISMISS

[Provisions either deleted or transposed]

RULE 17
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding section, a
complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him or her of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen
(15) calendar days from notice of the motion he or she manifests his or her preference to have his or
her counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his or her evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his or
her action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in
a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.

Section 4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint. — [No amendment]

RULE 18
PRE-TRIAL

Section 1. When conducted. — After the last responsive pleading has been served and filed, the
branch clerk of court shall issue, within five (5) calendar days from filing, a notice of pre-trial which
shall be set not later than sixty (60) calendar days from the filing of the last responsive pleading.

Section 2. Nature and Purpose. — The pre-trial is mandatory and should be terminated

promptly. The court shall consider:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of

dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts arid of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;

(d) The limitation of the number and identification of witnesses and the setting of trial dates;

(e) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(f) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of

dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;

(g) The requirement for the parties to:

1) Mark their respective evidence if not vet marked in the judicial affidavits of their
witnesses;

2) Examine and make comparisons of the adverse parties' evidence vis-a-vis the

copies to be marked;

3) Manifest for the record stipulations regarding the faithfulness of the reproductions
and the genuineness and due execution of the adverse parties' evidence;

4) Reserve evidence not available at the pre-trial, but only in the following manner:
 1) For testimonial evidence, by giving the name or position and the nature of
the testimony of the proposed witness;

2) For documentary evidence and other object evidence, by giving a

particular description of the evidence.

No reservation shall be allowed if not made in the manner described above. (h)

(h) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

The failure without just cause of a party and counsel to appear during pre-trial, despite notice, shall
result in a waiver of any objections to the faithfulness of the reproductions marked, or their
genuineness and due execution.

The failure without just cause of a party and/or counsel to bring the evidence required shall be
deemed a waiver of the presentation of such evidence.

The branch clerk of court shall prepare the minutes of the pre-trial, which shall have the following
format: (See prescribed form)

Section 3. Notice of Pre-trial. — The notice of pre-trial shall include the dates respectively set for:

(a) Pre-Trial;

(b) Court-Annexed Mediation; and

(c) Judicial Dispute Resolution, if necessary.

The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel
served with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him or her.

Non-appearance at any of the foregoing settings shall be deemed non-compliance at the Pre-Trial
and shall merit the same sanctions under Section 5 hereof.

Section 4. Appearance of Parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at
the pre-trial, court-annexed mediation, and judicial dispute resolution, if necessary. The non-
appearance of a party and counsel may be excused only for acts of God, force majeure, or duly
substantiated physical inability.

A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but shall be fully authorized in writing to enter into
an amicable settlement to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and documents.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — When duly notified, the failure of the plaintiff and counsel to
appear without valid cause when so required, pursuant to the next preceding Section, shall cause
the dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant and counsel shall be cause to allow he plaintiff to
present his or her evidence ex-parte within ten (10) calendar days from termination of pre-trial, and
the court to render judgment on the basis of the evidence offered.
Section 6. Pre-trial brief. — The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in
such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) calendar days before the date of
the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

(a) A concise statement of the case and the reliefs prayed for;

(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

(c) The main factual and legal issues to be tried or resolved;

(d) The propriety of referral of factual issues to commissioners;

(e) The documents or other object evidence to be marked, stating the purpose thereof;

(f) The names of the witnesses, and the summary of their respective testimonies; and

(g) Brief statement of points of law and citation of authorities.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. (8)

Section 7. Pre-Trial Order. — Upon termination of pre-trial, the court shall issue an order within ten
(10) calendar days which shall recite in detail the matters taken up. The order shall include:

(a) An enumeration of the admitted facts;

(b) The minutes of the pre-trial conference;

(c) The legal and factual issue/s to be tried;

(d) The applicable law, rules, and jurisprudence;

(e) The evidence marked;

(f) The specific trial dates for continuous trial, which shall be within the period provided by the
Rules;

(g) The case flowchart to be determined by the court, which shall contain the different stages
of the proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and the use of time frames for
each stage in setting the trial dates;

(h) A statement that the one-day examination of witness rule and most important witness rule
under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines for Pre-Trial) shall be strictly followed; and

(i) A statement that the court shall render judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment,
as the case may be.

The direct testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff shall be in the form of judicial affidavits. After the
identification of such affidavits, cross-examination shall proceed immediately.
Postponement of presentation of the parties' witnesses at a scheduled date is prohibited, except if it
is based on acts of God, force majeure or duly substantiated physical inability of the witness to
appear and testify. The party who caused the postponement is warned that the presentation of its
evidence must still be terminated within the remaining dates previously agreed upon.

Should the opposing party fail to appear without valid cause stated in the next preceding paragraph,
the presentation of the scheduled witness will proceed with the absent party being deemed to have
waived the right to interpose objection and conduct cross-examination.

The contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent proceedings, unless modified before
trial to prevent manifest injustice. (7)

Section 8. Court-Annexed Mediation. — After pre-trial and, after issues are joined, the court shall
refer the parties for mandatory court-annexed mediation.

The period for court-annexed mediation shall not exceed thirty (30) calendar days without further
extension. (n)

Section 9. Judicial Dispute Resolution. — Only if the judge of the court to which the case was
originally raffled is convinced that settlement is still possible, the case may be referred to another
court for judicial dispute resolution. The judicial dispute resolution shall be conducted within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of failure of the court-annexed mediation.

If judicial dispute resolution fails, trial before the original court shall proceed on the dates agreed
upon.

All proceedings during the court-annexed mediation and the judicial dispute resolution shall be
confidential. (n)

Section 10. Judgment after pre-trial. — Should there be no more controverted facts, or no more
genuine issue as to any material fact, or an absence of any issue, or should the answer fail to tender
an issue, the court shall, without prejudice to a party moving for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 34 or summary judgment under Rule 35, motu proprio include in the pre-trial order that the
case be submitted for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, without need of position
papers or memoranda. In such cases, judgment shall be rendered within ninety (90) calendar days
from termination of the pre-trial.

The order of the court to submit the case for judgment pursuant to this Rule shall not be the subject
to appeal or certiorari. (n)

RULE 19
INTERVENTION

Section 1. Who may intervene. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Time to intervene. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Pleadings-in-intervention. — The intervenor shall file a complaint-in-intervention if he or

she asserts a claim against either or all of the original parties, or an answer-in-intervention if he or
she unites with the defending party in resisting a claim against the latter.
Section 4. Answer to complaint-in-intervention. — The answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall
be filed within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a
different period is fixed by the court.

RULE 20
CALENDAR OF CASES

[No amendment]

RULE 21
SUBPOENA

Section 1. Subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. — Subpoena is a process directed to a person
requiring him or her to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any
investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his or her deposition. It may also
require him or her to bring with him or her any books, documents, or other things under his or
her control, in which case it is called a subpoena duces tecum.

Section 2. By whom issued. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Form and contents. — [No amendment]

Section 4. Quashing a subpoena. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Subpoena for depositions. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Service. — Service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal or
substituted service of summons. The original shall be exhibited and a copy thereof delivered to the
person on whom it is served. The service must be made so as to allow the witness a reasonable
time for preparation and travel to the place of attendance.

Costs for court attendance and the production of documents and other materials subject of the
subpoena shall be tendered or charged accordingly.

Section 7. Personal appearance in court. — A person present in court before a judicial officer may
be required to testify as if he or she were in attendance upon a subpoena issued by such court or
officer.

Section 8. Compelling attendance. — In case of failure of a witness to attend, the court or judge
issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of the failure of the witness, may issue a
warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his or her deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him or
her before the court or officer where his or her attendance is required, and the cost of such warrant
and seizure of such witness shall be paid by the witness if the court issuing it shall determine that
his or her failure to answer the subpoena was willful and without just excuse.

Section 9. Contempt. — Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a subpoena served
upon him or her shall be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued. If the
subpoena was not issued by a court, the disobedience thereto shall be punished in accordance with
the applicable law or Rule.
Section 10. Exceptions. — The provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of this Rule shall not apply to a
witness who resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from his or her residence to the place
where he or she is to testify by the ordinary course of travel, or to a detention prisoner if no
permission of the court in which his or her case is pending was obtained.

RULE 22
COMPUTATION OF TIME

[No amendment]

RULE 23
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTIONS

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — Upon ex parte motion of a party, the

testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by
leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

Section 2. Scope of examination. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Examination and cross-examination. — [No amendment]

Section 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had
due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

(a) [No amendment]

(b) [No amendment]

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out
of the Philippines, unless it appears that his or her absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and
notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally
in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and

(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him or her to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party
may introduce any other parts.

Section 5. Effect of substitution of parties. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Objections to admissibility. — [No amendment]

Section 7. Effect of taking depositions. — A party shall not be deemed to make a person his or
her own witness for any purpose by taking his or her deposition.

Section 8. Effect of using depositions. — [No amendment]

Section 9. Rebutting deposition. — At the trial or hearing, any party may rebut any relevant
evidence contained in a deposition whether introduced by him or her or by any other party.

Section 10. Persons before whom depositions may be taken within the Philippines. — [No
amendment]

Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. — [No

amendment]

Section 12. Commission or letters rogatory. — [No amendment]

Section 13. Disqualification by interest. — [No amendment]

Section 14. Stipulations regarding taking of depositions. — [No amendment]

Section 15. Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other
party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name
and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or her or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On
motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or
shorten the time.

Section 16. Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. — [No amendment]

Section 17. Record of examination; oath; objections. — The officer before whom the deposition is to
be taken shall put the witness on oath and shall personally, or by some one acting under his or
her direction and in his or her presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be
taken stenographically unless the parties agree otherwise. All objections made at the time of the
examination to the qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or
to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection to the
proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken
subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties served with notice of
taking a deposition may transmit written interrogatories to the officers, who shall propound them to
the witness and record the answers verbatim.

Section 18. Motion to terminate or limit examination. — [No amendment]

Section 19. Submission to witness; changes; signing. — When the testimony is fully transcribed, the
deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him or her,
unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in
form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the
officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall
Page 30 of 43 then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or
the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness,
the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of
the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together with the reason given therefor, if any, and the
deposition may then be used as fully as though signed, unless on a motion to suppress under
Section 29(f) of this Rule, the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require
rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.

Section 20. Certification and filing by officer. — The officer shall certify on the deposition that the
witness was duly sworn to by him or her and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony
given by the witness. He or she shall then securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed with
the title of the action and marked "Deposition of (here insert the name of witness)" and shall
promptly file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by registered mail to the clerk
thereof for filing.

Section 21. Notice of filing. — [No amendment]

Section 22. Furnishing copies. — [No amendment]

Section 23. Failure to attend of party giving notice. — If the party giving the notice of the taking of a
deposition fails to attend and proceed therewith and another attends in person or by counsel
pursuant to the notice, the court may order the party giving the notice to pay such other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by him or her and his or her counsel in so attending,
including reasonable attorney's fees.

Section 24. Failure of party giving notice to serve subpoena. — If the party giving the notice of the
taking of a deposition of a witness fails to serve a subpoena upon him or her and the witness
because of such failure does not attend, and if another party attends in person or by counsel
because he or she expects the deposition of that witness to be taken, the court may order the party
giving the notice to pay such other party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by him or
her and his or her counsel in so attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. — A

party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them
upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer
them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken. Within ten (10) calendar days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories
upon the party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) calendar days thereafter the latter
may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three
(3) calendar days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

Section 26. Officers to take responses and prepare record. — A copy of the notice and copies of all
interrogatories served shall be delivered by the party taking the deposition to the officer designated
in the notice, who shall proceed promptly, in the manner provided by Sections 17, 19 and 20 of this
Rule, to take the testimony of the witness in response to the interrogatories and to prepare, certify,
and file or mail the deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the notice and the interrogatories
received by him or her.

Section 27. Notice of filing and furnishing copies. — [No amendment]

Section 28. Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. — [No amendment]

Section 29. Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions. —

 (a) As to notice. — [No amendment]

(b) As to disqualification of officer. — [No amendment]

(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence. — [No amendment]

(d) As to oral examination and other particulars. — [No amendment]

(e) As to form of written interrogatories. — Objections to the form of written interrogatories

submitted under Sections 25 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless served in writing upon
the party propounding them within the time allowed for serving succeeding cross or other
interrogatories and within three (3) calendar days after service of the last interrogatories
authorized.

(f) As to manner of preparation. — [No amendment]

RULE 24
DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL

Section 1. Depositions before action; petition. — A person who desires to perpetuate his or her own
testimony or that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the
Philippines, may file a verified petition in the court of the place of the residence of any expected
adverse party.

Section 2. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and
shall show: (a) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action in a court of the Philippines but is
presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought; (b) the subject matter of the expected action
and his or her interest therein; (c) the facts which he or she desires to establish by the proposed
testimony and his or her reasons for desiring to perpetuate it; (d) the names or a description of the
persons he or she expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known; and (e) the
names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which
he or she expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the
depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition for the purpose of perpetuating their
testimony.

Section 3. Notice and service. — The petitioner shall serve a notice upon each person named in the
petition as an expected adverse party, together with a copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner
will apply to the court, at a time and place named therein, for the order described in the petition. At
least twenty (20) calendar days before the date of the hearing, the court shall cause notice thereof to
be served on the parties and prospective deponents in the manner provided for service of summons.

Section 4. Order and examination. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Reference to court. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Use of deposition. — [No amendment]

Section 7. Depositions pending appeal. — If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court,
including the Court of Appeals in proper cases, or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor
has not expired, the court in which the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions of
witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court.
In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the said court
for leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof as if the action was
pending therein. The motion shall state (a) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined
and the substance of the testimony which he or she expects to elicit from each; and (b) the reason
for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to
avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the depositions to be taken, and
thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under the same
conditions as are prescribed in these Rules for depositions taken in pending actions.

RULE 25
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

Section 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof. — Upon ex parte motion, any party desiring to

elicit material and relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf.

Section 2. Answer to interrogatories. — The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and
shall be signed and sworn to by the person making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories
have been served shall file and serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) calendar days after service thereof, unless the court, on motion and
for good cause shown, extends or shortens the time.

Section 3. Objections to interrogatories. — Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to

the court within ten (10) calendar days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion; and
answers shall be deferred until the objections are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is
practicable.

Section 4. Number of interrogatories. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Scope and use of interrogatories. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. — [No amendment]

RULE 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

Section 1. Request for admission. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
fifteen (15) calendar days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he or she cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters.

Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within
the period for and prior to the filing of his or her sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding
paragraph and his or her compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are resolved,
which resolution shall be made as early as practicable.
Section 3. Effect of admission. — Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for
the purpose of the pending action only and shall not constitute an admission by him or her for any
other purpose nor may the same be used against him or her in any other proceeding.

Section 4. Withdrawal. — [No amendment]

Section 5. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission. — [No amendment]

RULE 27
PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his or her possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his or her possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation
thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking
copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

RULE 28
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS

Section 1. When examination may be ordered. — In an action in which the mental or physical
condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may in its discretion
order him or her to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician.

Section 2. Order for examination. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Report of findings. — If requested by the party examined, the party causing the
examination to be made shall deliver to him or her a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his or her findings and conclusions. After such request and delivery,
the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled upon request to receive from the
party examined a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same mental
or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and
notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or
refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his or her testimony if offered at the trial.

Section 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so

ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he or
she may have in that action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of
every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine him or her in respect of the same
mental or physical examination.

RULE 29
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY

Section 1. Refusal to answer. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Contempt of court. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to
obey an order made under Section 1 of this Rule requiring him or her to answer designated
questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying,
or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an
order made under Rule 28 requiring him or her to submit to a physical or mental examination, the
court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:

(a) [No amendment];

(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims
or defenses or prohibiting him or her from introducing in evidence designated documents or
things or items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental condition;

(c) [No amendment];

(d) [No amendment]

Section 4. Expenses on refusal to admit. — If a party after being served with a request under Rule
26 to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter of fact, serves a sworn
denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of such
document or the truth of any such matter of fact, he or she may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him or her the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof,
including reasonable attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for the
denial or that admissions sought were of no substantial importance, such order shall be issued.

Section 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. — If a party or an officer or managing agent
of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his or her deposition, after being
served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25
after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any
part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a
judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him or her to pay reasonable
expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees.

Section 6. Expenses against the Republic of the Philippines. — [No amendment]

RULE 30
TRIAL

Section 1. Schedule of trial. — The parties shall strictly observe the scheduled hearings as agreed
upon and set forth in the pre-trial order.

(a) The schedule of the trial dates, for both plaintiff and defendant, shall be continuous and
within the following periods:

i. The initial presentation of plaintiff s evidence shall be set not later than thirty (30)
calendar days after the termination of the pre-trial conference. Plaintiff shall be
allowed to present its evidence within a period of three (3) months or ninety (90)
calendar days which shall include the date of the judicial dispute resolution, if
necessary;
 ii. The initial presentation of defendant's evidence shall be set not later than thirty
(30) calendar days after the court's ruling on plaintiffs formal offer of evidence. The
defendant shall be allowed to present its evidence within a period of three (3) months
or ninety (90) calendar days;

iii. The period for the presentation of evidence on the third (fourth, etc.)-party claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim shall be determined by the court, the total of which shall
in no case exceed ninety (90) calendar days; and

iv. If deemed necessary, the court shall set the presentation of the parties' respective
rebuttal evidence, which shall be completed within a period of thirty (30) calendar
days.

(b) The trial dates may be shortened depending on the number of witnesses to be presented,
provided that the presentation of evidence of all parties shall be terminated within a period
often (10) months or three hundred (300) calendar days. If there are no third (fourth, etc.)-
party claim, counterclaim or cross-claim, the presentation of evidence shall be terminated
within a period of six (6) months or one hundred eighty (180) calendar days.

(c) The court shall decide and serve copies of its decision to the parties within a period not
exceeding ninety (90) calendar days from the submission of the case for resolution, with or
without memoranda.

Section 2. Adjournments and postponements. — A court may adjourn a trial from day to day, and to
any stated time, as the expeditious and convenient transaction of business may require, but shall
have no power to adjourn a trial for a longer period than one month for each adjournment, nor more
than three months in all, except when authorized in writing by the Court Administrator, Supreme
Court.

The party who caused the postponement is warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be
terminated on the remaining dates previously agreed upon.

[Section 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for absence of evidence. — Deleted]

Section 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel. — A motion to
postpone a trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be granted if it appears upon
affidavit or sworn certification that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial is indispensable
and that the character of his or her illness is such as to render his or her non-attendance excusable.
(4)

Section 4. Hearing days and calendar call. — Trial shall be held from Monday to Thursday, and
courts shall call the cases at exactly 8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.. pursuant to Administrative Circular No.
3-99. Hearing on motions shall be held on Fridays, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 15.

All courts shall ensure the posting of their court calendars outside their courtrooms at least one (1)
day before the scheduled hearings, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 250-2015. (n)

Section 5. Order of trial. — Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court
for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial
order and shall proceed as follows:
 (a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his or her complaint;

(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his or her defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint;

(c) The third-party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his or her defense,
counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth-party complaint;

(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded
by them;

(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall
adduce evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for
good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their
original case; and

(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision,
unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any
further pleadings.

If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses

appear by different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of
their evidence.

Section 6. Oral offer of exhibits. — The offer of evidence, the comment or objection thereto, and the
court ruling shall be made orally in accordance with Sections 35 to 40 of Rule 132. (n)

Section 7. Agreed statement of facts. — The parties to any action may agree, in writing, upon the
facts involved in the litigation, and submit the case for judgment on the facts agreed upon, without
the introduction of evidence.

If the parties agree only on some of the facts in issue, the trial shall be held as to the disputed facts
in such order as the court shall prescribe. (6)

[Section 7. Statement of judge. — Deleted]

Section 8. Suspension of actions. — The suspension of actions shall be governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code and other laws.

Section 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. — The judge of the court where
the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties. However, in
default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the court may
delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court
shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits, which
objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his or her report and the transcripts
within ten (10) calendar days from termination of the hearing.

RULE 31
CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE
[No amendment]

RULE 32
TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER

Section 1. Reference by consent. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Reference ordered on motion. — [No amendment]

Section 3. Order of reference; powers of the commissioner. — When a reference is made, the clerk
shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the order of reference. The order may specify
or limit the powers of the commissioner, and may direct him or her to report only upon particular
issues, or to do or perform particular acts, or to receive and report evidence only, and may fix the
date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of his or her report. Subject to the
specifications and limitations stated in the order, the commissioner has and shall exercise the power
to regulate the proceedings in every hearing before him or her and to do all acts and take all
measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his or her duties under the order.
He or she may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless
otherwise provided in the order of reference, he or she may rule upon the admissibility of evidence.
The trial or hearing before him or her shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.

Section 4. Oath of commissioner. — Before entering upon his or her duties the commissioner shall
be sworn to a faithful and honest performance thereof.

Section 5. Proceedings before commissioner. — Upon receipt of the order of reference unless
otherwise provided therein, the commissioner shall forthwith set a time and place for the first
meeting of the parties or their counsel to be held within ten (10) calendar days after the date of the
order of reference and shall notify the parties or their counsel.

Section 6. Failure of parties to appear before commissioner. — If a party fails to appear at the time
and place appointed, the commissioner may proceed ex parte or, in his or her discretion, adjourn the
proceedings to a future day, giving notice to the absent party or his or her counsel of the
adjournment.

Section 7. Refusal of witness. — The refusal of a witness to obey a subpoena issued by the
commissioner or to give evidence before him or her, shall be deemed a contempt of the court which
appointed the commissioner.

Section 8. Commissioner shall avoid delays. — It is the duty of the commissioner to proceed with all
reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the parties and commissioner, may apply to the court
for an order requiring the commissioner to expedite the proceedings and to make his or her report.

Section 9. Report of commissioner. — Upon the completion of the trial or hearing or proceeding
before the commissioner, he or she shall file with the court his or her report in writing upon the
matters submitted to him or her by the order of reference. When his or her powers are not specified
or limited, he or she shall set forth his or her findings of fact and conclusions of law in his or
her report. He or she shall attach thereto all exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and the
transcript, if any, of the testimonial evidence presented before him or her.

Section 10. Notice to parties of the filing of report. — Upon the filing of the report, the parties shall
be notified by the clerk, and they shall be allowed ten (10) calendar days within which to signify
grounds of objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. Objections to the report based
upon grounds which were available to the parties during the proceedings before the commissioner,
other than objections to the findings and conclusions therein set forth, shall not be considered by the
court unless they were made before the commissioner.

Section 11. Hearing upon report. — Upon the expiration of the period often (10) calendar days
referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall
issue an order adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report in whole or in part, or recommitting it with
instructions, or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the
court.

Section 12. Stipulations as to findings. — [No amendment]

Section 13. Compensation of commissioner. — [No amendment]

RULE 33
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his or
her evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his or her motion is denied, he or she shall have the right
to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, he or
she shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

Section 2. Action on demurrer to evidence. — A demurrer to evidence shall be subject to the

provisions of Rule 15.

The order denying the demurrer to evidence shall not be subject of an appeal or petition
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus before judgment. (n)

RULE 34
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — [No amendment]

Section 2. Action on motion for judgment on the pleadings. — The court may motu proprio or on
motion render judgment on the pleadings if it is apparent that the answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleadings. Otherwise, the motion
shall be subject to the provisions of Rule 15 of these Rules.

Any action of the court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings shall not be subject of an appeal
or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. (n)

RULE 35
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in
answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his or her favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his or her favor as to all or any part
thereof.

Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall cite the supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions, and the specific law relied upon. The adverse party may file a comment
and serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions within a non-extendible period of five (5)
calendar days from receipt of the motion. Unless the court orders the conduct of a hearing, judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions
on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Any action of the court on a motion for summary judgment shall not be subject of an appeal or
petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. — If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court may, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. The facts so ascertained shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on
the controverted facts accordingly.

Section 5. Form of affidavits and supporting papers. — [No amendment]

Section 6. Affidavits in bad faith. — Should it appear to its satisfaction at any time that any of the
affidavits presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith, or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the offending party or counsel to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him or her to incur,
including attorney's fees, it may, after hearing further adjudge the offending party or counsel guilty of
contempt.

x x x           x x x          x x x

RULE 144
EFFECTIVENESS

These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take
effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion
of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which even the former
procedure shall apply.

The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all cases filed
after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all pending proceedings, except to the extent that in
the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case
the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. (n)

The application and adherence to the said amendments shall be subject to periodic monitoring bv
the Sub-Committee, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). For this purpose, all courts
covered by the said amendments shall accomplish and submit a periodic report of data in a form to
be generated and distributed by the OCA. (n)

All rules, resolutions, regulations or circulars of the Supreme Court or parts thereof that are
inconsistent with any provision of the said amendments are hereby deemed repealed or modified
accordingly. (n)

PRESCRIBED FORM NO. 1

NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL

The parties are hereby required to appear personally or through their duly authorized representative,
and their counsel in the Pre-Trial on _____________ at ___________ o'clock A.M./P.M., and in the
following proceedings:

1. COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION: (To be scheduled at pre-trial)

2. JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: (To be scheduled at pre-trial if deemed

necessary by the court.)

The parties and their counsels are required to be present at the pre-trial and to file with the court and
serve on the adverse party at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial their respective pre-
trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

(a) A concise statement of the case and the reliefs prayed for;

(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

(c) The main factual and legal issues to be tried or resolved;

(d) The propriety of referral of factual issues to commissioners;

(e) The documents or other object evidence to be marked, stating the purpose
thereof;

(f) The names of the witnesses, and the summary of their respective testimonies; and

(g) Brief statement of points of law and citation of authorities.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Non-appearance at the Pre-Trial or any of the foregoing settings shall merit the sanction of dismissal
of the action, for the plaintiffs and his or her counsel's non-appearance, and allowance of
plaintiff's ex parte evidence presentation and ex parte judgment, for defendant's and his or her
counsel's non-appearance. The non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused only for
acts of God, force majeure, or duly substantiated physical inability.
A representative, through a special power of attorney, may appear on behalf of a party, but shall be
fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admission of facts and documents.

The parties and their counsel, who are required to attend the Pre-Trial shall be ready.

No reservation of evidence not available during the Pre-Trial shall be allowed unless done in the
following manner:

(a) For testimonial evidence, by giving the name or position and the nature of the
testimony of the proposed witness;

(b) For documentary evidence and other object evidence, and electronic evidence,
by giving a particular description of the evidence.

The failure without just cause of a party and counsel to appear at the Pre-Trial, despite notice, shall
result in a waiver of any objections to the faithfulness of the reproductions marked, or their
genuineness and due execution.

The failure without just cause of a party and counsel to bring the evidence required at the Pre-Trial
shall be deemed a waiver of the presentation of such evidence.

WITNESS, the HON. ________________________ , Presiding Judge of this Court, this _______
day of ______, 20_____ at _______________.

_________________________________
Branch Clerk of Court

PRESCRIBED FORM NO. 2

PRE-TRIAL ORDER

I. PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE

A. Documentary and other Object Evidence:

Exhibit "A" - Description;

Exhibit "B" - Description;

Exhibit "C" - Description;

B. Testimonial Evidence:

Judicial Affidavit of ____________________;

Judicial Affidavit of ____________________;

 Judicial Affidavit of ____________________;

C. Reserved Evidence:

Description;

II. DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE

A. Documentary and other Object Evidence:

Exhibit "A" - Description;

Exhibit "B" - Description;

Exhibit "C" - Description;

B. Testimonial Evidence:

Judicial Affidavit of ____________________;

Judicial Affidavit of ____________________;

Judicial Affidavit of ____________________;

C. Reserved Evidence:

Description;

Evidence not pre-marked and listed herein shall not be allowed during trial.

III. ADMITTED FACTS AND STIPULATION OF FACTS

IV. ISSUES TO BE TRIED OR RESOLVED

In case there are no more controverted facts or genuine issues to be resolved, the court shall so
declare in the pre-trial order and shall motu proprio consider the case submitted, without prejudice to
a party moving, for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, without need of position
papers or memoranda. In such cases, judgment shall be rendered within ninety (90) calendar days
from termination of the pre-trial. However, if there are controverted facts or genuine issues to be
resolved, the court shall first refer the case to the Philippine Mediation Center Unit for mediation
purposes.

V. MANIFESTATION OF PARTIES HAVING AVAILED OR THEIR INTENTION TO AVAIL OF

DISCOVERY PROCEDURES OR REFERRAL TO COMMISSIONERS

VI. NUMBER AND NAMES OF WITNESSES, THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR TESTIMONIES, AND
APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF HOURS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED BY THE PARTIES FOR THE
PRESENTATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE WITNESSES

VII. SCHEDULE OF CONTINUOUS TRIAL DATES FOR BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
Trial shall proceed on ___________, all at 8:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M., for the plaintiff or claiming party
to present and terminate its evidence; and on _________ , all at 8:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M., for the
defendant or defending party to present and terminate its evidence. *[This will depend on the
number of witnesses listed. It is suggested that for every witness, at least two (2) trial dates should
be allotted. The trial dates may likewise be one (1) day apart.]

The trial dates are final and intransferrable, and no motions for postponement that are dilatory in
character shall be entertained by the court. If such motions are granted in exceptional cases, the
postponement/s by either party shall be deducted from such party's allotted time to present
evidence.

The parties are hereby ordered to immediately proceed and personally appear at the Philippine
Mediation Center located at __________ (PMC Unit) today, (date today) with or without their
counsel/s, for mediation proceedings. The assigned Mediator is ordered to submit a report to this
court on the results of the mediation based on the factual and legal issues to be resolved within a
non-extendible period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the court's referral of this case to
the PMC Unit.

Should mediation fail after the lapse of the said 30-day period, the parties are ordered to appear
before the court so that the trial shall proceed on the trial dates indicated above. Only if the judge of
the court to which the case was originally raffled is convinced that settlement is possible that the
case may be referred to another court for judicial dispute resolution, which shall be conducted within
a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the court-annexed mediation. If
judicial dispute resolution fails, trial before the original court shall proceed on the dates agreed upon.

Failure of the party or his or her counsel to comply with the abovementioned schedule of hearings
and deadlines shall be a ground for imposition of fines and other sanctions by the court.

The parties and their counsel are hereby notified hereof, and the court shall no longer issue
a subpoena to the parties present today.

CONFORMITY

_________________________________ _________________________________
Plaintiff Defendant

_________________________________ _________________________________
Plaintiff's Counsel Defendant's Counsel

ATTESTED:

_________________________________
Branch Clerk of Court
 NOTED BY:

_________________________________
Presiding Judge

AM No. 11-6-10-SC

THIRD DIVISION

August 14, 2019

G.R. No. 228516

RICARDO P. CARNIYAN and among other real parties in interest similarly situated bona
fide residents, Petitioners
vs.
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, Respondent

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the August 26, 2016 Decision  and November 28,
1 2

2016 Resolution  rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127693, both of which
3

upheld the orders dated March 18, 2011,  February 8, 2012,  October 31, 2012,  and November 21,
4 5 6

2012  (the challenged trial court orders), all issued by Hon. Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon (Judge
7

Villordon), Presiding Judge of Branch 224 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-09-64015.

The Factual Antecedents

On September 7, 2010, Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) filed before the Quezon City RTC a
complaint for recovery of possession against Edilberto P. Carniyan, Ricardo P. Camiyan, and Sherly
R. Carniyan (the petitioners), seeking their eviction from a portion of a 7, 113-square meter parcel of
land situated in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
262715.   The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-09-64015 and raffled to Judge Villordon
8

of Branch 224.
Instead of filing an answer, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss  dated October 8, 2010 and,
9

subsequently, a Motion to Archive the Case as May Be Possible in Lieu of Dismissal  dated
10

December 10, 2010. In the former, the petitioners argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to resolve
the complaint (1) due to the fact that HGC has not yet acquired ownership over the contested
property; and (2) because the assessed value thereof fell below ₱400,000.00, the alleged
jurisdictional amount of civil actions filed in Metro Manila.   On the other hand, in the latter motion,
11

they essentially sought to hold in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-09-64015 until HGC
submitted a certified true copy of TCT No. 262715, among other things.  12

The Challenged Trial Court Orders

On March 18, 2011, Judge Villordon issued the first of the challenged trial court orders. She ruled,
for one, that the petitioners' contention as to the jurisdictional amount was misplaced. Since the case
was an action involving title to or possession of real property, and because the subject property had
an assessed value of ₱50,000.00, it was held that the trial court was possessed of the requisite
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.   Next, she likewise denied the motion to archive the
13

case on the ground that the said motion was merely dilatory.   The fallo of the March 18, 2011 Order
14

reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the x x x Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Archive The Case
As Maybe Possible in Lieu of Dismissal filed by the defendants are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.  15

On June 29, 2011, the petitioners filed a Motion to Expunge/Rescind the Interlocutory Order Dated
March 18, 2011 with Motion for Inhibition.   First, they contended that the trial court failed to pass
16

upon their allegation on the non-existence of a cause of action on the part of HGC. Second, they
asserted that their previous motions were not intended to delay the resolution of the issues in the
case.   The petitioners therefore prayed that Judge Villordon inhibit herself from hearing the motion
17

to expunge and that the records of the case be returned to the Executive Judge of the Quezon City
RTC for re-raffle to another branch thereof.  18

It appears, however, that the petitioners had previously sought Judge Villordon' s inhibition, only to
be denied through an earlier order dated August 2, 2010.

On February 8, 2012, Judge Villordon issued the second challenged order. In denying the
petitioners' motion to expunge, she ruled that the same was essentially a motion for reconsideration
of the March 18, 2011 order, the merits of which had already been thoroughly passed upon. Anent
the motion for inhibition, she simply reiterated her position in the said August 2, 2010 order.   She
19

then disposed of the motions and directed the petitioners to file their answer within a non-extendable
period often (10) days, viz.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants' Motion To expunge/Rescind the Interlocutory

Order dated March 18, 2011 with Motion for Inhibition are DENIED for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, the Court notes that the defendants have not yet filed their Answer to the plaintiffs
Amended Complaint. Hence, defendants are hereby given the non-extendable period of 10 days
from receipt of this Order within which to file their Answer to the plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

SO ORDERED. 20
Despite Judge Villordon's directive, the petitioners failed to file an answer within the allotted period.
Consequently, on August 23, 2012, HGC moved to declare the petitioners in default. 21

Meanwhile, before the RTC resolved HGC's motion, the petitioners filed a Motion to Amend the
February 8, 2012 Order to Resolve the Actual Controversy and to Judiciously Resolve the Instant
Motion for Inhibition Upon Receipt Hereof (In the Higher Interests of Justice and Equity) dated
October 8, 2012,  which was set for hearing on October 19, 2012, along with the motion to declare
22

them in default.23

On October 31, 2012, Judge Villordon issued the third challenged order, denying the petitioners'
motion and declaring them in default. She ruled that the said motion partook of the nature of a
second motion for inhibition, which is proscribed under A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC. Hence, the same was
held to be a mere scrap of paper, and was stricken from the records. On the other hand, HGC's
motion was held to be impressed with merit. Despite proper service of summons and the trial court's
earlier order, the petitioners never filed an answer in due time.   For this reason, HOC was allowed
24

to present its evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court on December 9, 2012. The fallo of
the October 31, 2012 Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants' "Motion to Amend xxxxx" is denied due course
for being dilatory. The "Motion for Inhibition" is denied for violating AM. No. No. 11-6-10-SC. Both
motions are considered mere scrap of paper and ordered stricken from the records of this case.

The plaintiffs "Motion to Declare Defendant in Default" is GRANTED. As prayed for, the defendants
are declared in default. As further prayed for, the plaintiff is allowed to present its evidence ex-parte
before the branch clerk of this Court on December 9, 2012 at 2:00 in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.  25

Finally, on November 21, 2012, Judge Villordon issued the last of the challenged trial court orders,
rescheduling the ex parte presentation of HGC's evidence, viz.

It appearing that the December 9, 2012 ex-parte hearing schedule falls on a Sunday, the same is
cancelled and re-scheduled to December 14, 2012 at 2:00 P.M. Notify the parties of the said ex-
parte hearing.

SO ORDERED. 26

Aggrieved, the peht10ners challenged the four aforesaid trial court orders before the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus,   arguing that Judge Villordon had acted with
27

grave abuse of discretion in issuing the same.

The CA's Ruling

On August 26, 2016, the CA promulgated the herein assailed decision, denying the said petition on
the ground that the same was an inappropriate remedy. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners
should have instead filed a motion under oath to set aside the order of default and shown that they
had a meritorious defense through an affidavit of merit. Moreover, the CA held that the petitioners'
failure to file an answer was attributable solely to their own negligence.   The appellate court
28

disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for being the wrong
or improper remedy. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-09-64015,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 29

The petitioners, after their motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed November 28, 2016
Resolution, sought the present recourse before the Court.

The Issue

Whether or not the challenged trial court orders dated March 18, 2011, February 8, 2012, October
31, 2012, and November 21, 2012 were issued with grave abuse of discretion 30

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Judge Villordon, through the first challenged trial court order, dated March 18, 2011, denied the
petitioners' motions to dismiss and archive the case. According to the petitioners, the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that HOC never submitted a copy of TCT No. 262715.
They contended that, in actions for recovery of possession, the identity of the subject land must be
established through the presentation of a certificate of title. They, therefore, prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint and, later, that the same be held in abeyance until HGC presented a certified true
copy of TCT No. 262715.  Upon the denial of their motions, they sought relief before the CA through
31

a petition for certiorari.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.32

An order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory, as opposed to a final, order.

This classification is vital because it is determinative of the remedy available to the aggrieved
party.   In Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,  the difference between a final and an
33 34

interlocutory order was stated in the following manner:

A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by
the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution
of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final
and executory."

xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other,
but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory," e.g., an
order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for
postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment
or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case.   (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
35

Considering that Judge Villordon, through the March 18, 2011 Order, denied the petitioners'
motion to dismiss, the appropriate remedy was to file an answer, proceed to trial, and, in the
event of an adverse judgment, interpose an appeal, assigning as errors the grounds stated in
the motion to dismiss.  For this reason, certiorari did not lie as a remedy in the proceedings a quo.
36

To allow such recourse would not only delay the already-lethargic administration of justice, but also
unduly burden the courts and further clog their dockets.  Moreover, the said order could not have
37

been the proper subject of an appeal due to its interlocutory nature. Clearly, then, the petitioners
committed a fatal procedural lapse when they sought relief before the CA via certiorari.

Jurisprudence, however, provides exceptions to the rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. When such orders are issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or when their issuance is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari lies as a
remedy.   In Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  the Court held:
38 39

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses
the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to
elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain
situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial
court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as
when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently
mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to
go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.  (Citation
40

omitted;)

None of the exceptions apply in this case.

To be sure, the issuance of the March 18, 2011 Order was done in accordance with the rules and
established jurisprudence.  The petitioners' motion to dismiss was grounded on the RTC's alleged
1âшphi1

lack of jurisdiction, which, according to them, was a result of HGC's failure to submit a certified true
copy of TCT No. 262715. The petitioners postulated that, absent a Torrens title, the trial court was
bereft of jurisdiction to hear HGC's complaint.41

The contention fails to impress.

Contrary to the petitioners' stance, the submission of a certified true copy of TCT No. 262715
was not a condition precedent to vest the Quezon City RTC with jurisdiction over HGC's
complaint. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings.   In42

arguing that it is dependent on the presentation of evidence, the petitioners seem to have
overlooked a rudiment of civil procedure-a motion to dismiss is filed before the parties have an
opportunity to offer and present their evidence. Under the rules, the defendant in a civil case is
allowed to file such a motion before responding to the complaint, viz.
Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds[.] 43

Assuming that the motion is denied, the defendant is then given the opportunity to file an answer
within the remainder of the prescribed reglementary period, but in no case less than five days,
computed from notice of the motion's denial.  Then, after the defendant files an answer and the
44

parties serve on each other their respective pleadings, the case may proceed to pre-trial, viz.

Section 1. When conducted. - After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty
of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.45

Upon the termination of the pre-trial, the clerk of court enters the case in the trial calendar. It is only
when the case reaches trial that the parties have an opportunity to substantiate their claims and
defenses through evidence duly presented, viz:

Section 5. Order of trial. - Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for
special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order
and shall proceed as follows:

(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;

(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint;

(c) The third-party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim
and fourth-party complaint;

(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded by
them;

(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce
evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good
reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case;
and

(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the
court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings.

If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by
different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence.  46

Therefore, the petitioners' argument that the trial court had no jurisdiction over HGC's
complaint sans a certified true copy of TCT No. 262715 has no legal leg to stand on, and, for the
same reason, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge Villordon in denying the
motion to archive the case. Clearly, the presentation of a Torrens title was not a condition precedent
to the vesting of jurisdiction in the Quezon City RTC. Couched in general terms, a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction is not dependent on the evidence (or the lack thereof) of the parties.
Moving on to the second challenged trial court order, dated February 8, 2012, the Court remains
unconvinced that Judge Villordon gravely abused her discretion in issuing the same. A perusal of the
motion that occasioned the said order (i.e., the petitioners' Motion to Expunge/Rescind the
Interlocutory Order Dated March 18, 2011 with Motion for Inhibition) reveals that the petitioners
sought the presiding judge's inhibition and, essentially, reconsideration of the previous March 18,
2011 Order.

Anent the motion for inhibition, the record discloses that the petitioners had previously moved that
Judge Villordon inhibit herself from hearing the case. The previous motion, however, was denied
through an order dated August 2, 2010. Pertinently, A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, which finds particular
application to litigations in Quezon City trial courts, specifically prohibits the filing of multiple motions
for inhibition by one party, viz.

9. Inhibitions. - Each party shall only be allowed to file one motion for inhibition in any case strictly on
grounds provided for under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. 47

Since A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC explicitly proscribed the filing by the petitioners of the Motion to
Expunge/Rescind the Interlocutory Order Dated March 18, 2011 with Motion for Inhibition insofar as
Judge Villordon's inhibition was concerned, hardly any grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to
her in denying the same through the second challenged trial court order.

At this juncture, it bears noting that the second challenged trial court order contained a directive to
the petitioners to file an answer to HGC's complaint within a non-extendible period of 10 days from
notice. However, the records reveal that the petitioners never complied with the same.
Consequently, on August 23, 2012, HGC filed a motion to declare them in default, which Judge
Villordon granted through the third challenged trial court order, dated October 31, 2012.

The petitioners assailed the October 31, 2012 Order via certiorari before the CA. In arguing that the
same was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, they maintained that the order was prematurely
issued by Judge Villordon.

Again, certiorari was the improper remedy.

A cursory reading of Section 3 (b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court will reveal that one of the
defending party's remedies against an order of default is to file a motion under oath to set it aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Additionally, the defending party
must append to the said motion an affidavit showing that he or she has a meritorious
defense.   Section 3 (b) of Rule 9 relevantly provides:
48

(b) Relief from order of default. - A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and
before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that
his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. 49

Verily, so that an order of default may be lifted, the following requisites must be met: (a) that a
motion be filed under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (b) that the defending party's
failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (c) that the
defending party shows the existence of a meritorious defense through an affidavit of merit.  50
In addition to a motion to lift the order of default, jurisprudence provides several other remedies at
the disposal of the defendant who fails to file an answer. These were enumerated in Lina v. CA, et
al.   The availability of these alternative remedies, however, depends on when the defending party
51

discovers that he or she has been declared in default, or whether the judgment in the suit is contrary
to law, jurisprudence, or the evidence on record, thus:

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of
Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule
41) 52

As discussed above, resort may be had to a petition for certiorari only in the absence of an appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that no
judgment had yet been rendered a quo, the petitioners, pursuant to Section 3(b) of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, should have filed a motion to lift the order declaring them in default.
Failing to do so, their recourse to the CA via a petition for certiorari was improper. As aptly ruled by
the appellate court:

Petitioners cannot mask their failure to file a Motion under Oath to Set Aside the Order of Default by
the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a Petition for Certiorari. Clearly,
the instant remedy sought by petitioners is premature considering that a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was still available.  53

As a consequence of declaring the petitioners in default, Judge Villordon allowed HGC to present its
evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court.  Originally, the reception of evidence was set to
54

take place on December 9, 2012. However, since that date fell on a Sunday, the presiding judge,
through the last challenged trial court order, rescheduled the same to Friday, December 14, 2012.
According to the petitioners, such scheduling and rescheduling of the ex parte hearing were the
result of Judge Villordon's hasty and preemptive action on HGC's complaint, which was tantamount
to further grave abuse of discretion. 55

However, aside from their bare allegation, the petitioners miserably failed to show any circumstance
indicative of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Villordon. It is well-settled that a petition
for certiorari will prosper only if the act or omission constituting grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and proved.   Hence, the petitioners were duty-bound to show that the presiding judge exercised her
56

official power in an "arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal

hostility"  when she rescheduled HGC's ex parte presentation of evidence. Without such a showing,
57

the Court is left with no alternative other than to uphold the CA's denial of their petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 26, 2016 Decision and November 28, 2016
Resolution rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127693 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, (Chairperson), Leonen, Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 14-80.

 Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba penned the challenged decision, in which

2

Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Jhosep Y. Lopez concurred; id. at 85-91.

3
 Id. at 81-83.

4
 Id. at 213-215.

5
 Id. at 234-235.

6
 Id. at 144-145.

7
 Id. at 146.

8
 Id. at 147-153.

9
 Id. at 155-182.

10
 Id. at 185-207.

11
 Id. at 213.

12
 Id. at 205-206.

13
 Id. at 214.

14
 Id.

15
 Id. at 215.

16
 Id. at 216-233.

17
 Id. at 234.

18
 Id. at 233.

19
 Id. at 235.

20
 Id.

21
 Id. at 86.

22
 Id. at 236-288.
  Id. at 144.
23

 Id.
24

 Id. at 145.
25

 Id. at 146.
26

 Id. at 93-143.
27

 Id. at 89-90.
28

 Id. at 91.
29

 Id. at 54-56.
30

 Id. at 62-65.
31

 Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 716 Phil. 500, 512 (2013).
32

 G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 201378, October
33

18, 2017, 842 SCRA 576, 589.

 232 Phil. 256 (1987).

34

 Id. at 263-264.
35

 G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation, supra note 33, at 589.
36

 Bañez, Jr. v. Judge Concepcion, et al., 693 Phil. 399, 409 (2012).
37

 Id. at 410.
38

 405 Phil. 524 (2001).

39

 Id. at 530.
40

 Rollo, pp. 62-65.

41

 City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, 671 Phil. 610, 629 (2011).
42

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 1.

43

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 16, Sec. 4.

44

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 18, Sec. 1.

45

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 30, Sec. 5.

46
  A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC dated February 21, 2012.
47

 Spouses Manuel v. Ong, 745 Phil. 589, 602 (2014).

48

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, Sec. 3(b).

49

 Sps. Delos Santos v. Judge Carpio, 533 Phil. 42, 55-56 (2006).
50

 220 Phil. 311 (1985).

51

 Id. at 316-317.
52

 Rollo, p. 89.
53

 Rules of Court, Rule 9:

54

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

xxxx

Section 3. Default; declaration of. - If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to
the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
clerk of court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 Rollo, p. 47.
55

 Beluso v. COMELEC, 635 Phil. 436, 443-444 (2010).

56

 Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, et al., 575 Phil. 384, 397 (2008).

57
 AM No. 12-8-8-SC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge volume of cases
filed each year and the slow and cumbersome adversarial syste1n that the judiciary has in place;

Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that complainants
simply give up con1ing to court after repeated postponements;

Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines because its
courts are unable to provide ample and speedy protection to their investments, keeping its people
poor;

Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases
under litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting by trial courts in
Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;

Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about two-thirds the
time used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding up the hearing and adjudication
of cases;

Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, headed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, have recommended for adoption a
Judicial Affidavit Rule that will replicate nationwide the success of the Quezon City experience in the
use of judicial affidavits; and

Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the following:

Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the
reception of evidence before:

(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but
shall not apply to small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;

(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;

(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the
Shari'a Appellate Courts;

(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive
evidence, including the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and

(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are
subject to disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as their existing rules of
procedure contravene the provisions of this Rule. 1

(b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or investigating
officers shall be uniformly referred to here as the "court."

Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The
parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier
service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing
with respect to motions and incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such
witnesses' direct testimonies; and

(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to
the judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the
complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the
respondent or the defendant.

(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his
possession, he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and
authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such
affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness
shall bring the original document or object evidence for comparison during the preliminary
conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not
be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when
allowed by existing rules.

Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known
to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino,
and shall contain the following:
 (a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;

(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the
witness and the place where the examination is being held;

(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that
he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;

(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered,
that:

(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which
he testifies;

(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents;
and

(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and

(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.

Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn
attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer who conducted or supervised the examination of the
witness, to the effect that:

(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the
corresponding answers that the witness gave; and

(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the
witness regarding the latter's answers.

(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including
disbarment.

Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is
neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a
judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things
under his control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the
requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces
tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the
witness in this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a
judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.

Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party presenting the judicial
affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state the purpose of such testimony at the
start of the presentation of the witness. The adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or to
strike out his affidavit or any of the answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall
promptly rule on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by
placing it in brackets under the initials of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender
of excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. - The adverse party shall have the
right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the exhibits attached to the same.
The party who presents the witness may also examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court
shall take active part in examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth of his
testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.

Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his
last witness, a party shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence of his documentary or object
exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for which he
offers the particular exhibit.

(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for his
objection, if any, to its admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling respecting
that exhibit.

(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that describe
and authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their markings
during the offers, the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each
exhibit.

Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:

(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;

(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the
penalty involved; or

(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved
are.

(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days
before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon the accused. The complainant or public
prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he may
have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary,
or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.

(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of
the prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his
witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of
each on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence
previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct
testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.

Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit
the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission.
The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a
valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of
not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.

(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the
scheduled hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause
despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's right to confront by cross-
examination the witnesses there present.

(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content
requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court
may, however, allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement
affidavits before the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not
unduly prejudice the opposing party and provided further, that public or private counsel
responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor
more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.

Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of Court and
the rules of procedure governing investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court
to receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Rule.
1âwphi1

The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby

disapproved.

Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its publication in two
newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It shall also apply to existing
cases.

Manila, September 4, 2012.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DISODADO M. PERLATA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE C. MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 By virtue of the Supreme Court's authority under Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the
1987 Constitution to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies.

AM No. 11-9-4-SC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 213525               January 27, 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN
VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the Reconsideration  of the resolution
1

promulgated on August 19, 2014,  whereby the Court dismissed its petition for certiorari under Rule
2

64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtdue to its non-compliance with the provisions of Rule
64, particularly for:(a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and
verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents. 3

Antecedents

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangaysecretaries, treasurers and
tanod, the former obligating ₱4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting
the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit.  The latter office disallowed
4

the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.  On November 15, 2012,
5

the COA issued its decision denying the petition,  holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of
6

the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power
to secure group insurance coverage for barangayworkers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply
with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,  and filed its motion for
7

reconsideration on January 14, 2013.  However, the COA denied the motion,  the denial being
8 9

received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. 10

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari
was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19,2014 for (a) the
late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and
(c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

Issues

In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within the
reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals;  and 11

that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked the submission of a verified declaration; and prays
that the declaration attached to the motion for reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial
compliance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule  by previously submitting a compact disc (CD)
12

containing the petition for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it
showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed
decision.

Ruling

We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.

I
 Petitioner did not comply with
the rule on proof of service

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with
the requirement on proof of service.

The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz:
Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be
filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with
the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus
requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of
the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the
paper being served. A compliance withthe rule is mandatory, such that

there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted. 13

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T.
Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under
Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces
found on pages 64-65 of the petition."  The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what
14

appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts
themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions. Hence,
the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held
in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof
of service.15

II

Fresh Period Ruleunder Neypes

did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a
petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh
period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial. 16

The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under
Rule 64.

As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a
question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a
prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the
reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.  In contrast, the petition for
17

certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment
or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The
petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.  Questions of
18

fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party
is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or
from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.  In the latter, the petition is filed
19

within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any
event, reckoned from the notice of denial. 20

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after
receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.  Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
21

64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to
file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections  that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari
22

under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period ruleshould apply was fatal to the recourse. As such,
the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period
rule under Neypes  applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an
23

injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.  Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
24

III

Petition for certiorari further lacked merit

The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.

The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, to
wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a
year before promulgating its decision, and more thana year in resolving the motion for
reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution; (3) the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4) the matter involved a
novel issue that called for an interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L.
Mendoza made it appear that they knew the Local Government Code better than former Senator
Aquilino Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter. 25

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 26

A close look indicates that the petition for certioraridid not sufficiently disclose how the COA
committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not
approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in
deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local
Government Codein the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA
Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and
decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the
authority for that purpose.

It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the further
reason of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that light,
the COA acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.

IV

Petitioner and its counsel

exhibited harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members

The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner’s non-compliance with the
requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even "a perfunctory scrutiny" of the petition for
certiorari and its annexes could have easily shown that it had attached an affidavit of service to the
petition. It goes on to make the following statements, viz:

25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its annexes up to
its last page, thus, the erroneous finding that there was non-submission of the proof of service; 26. In
turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this Honorable Court who took the
observation from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in truth and in
fact, it is not;
27

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill consequences of
their own shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to readily lay blame on
others like the Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed harsh and disrespectful language
that accused the Court and its Members of ignorance and recklessness in the performance of their
function of adjudication.

We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the Court and its
Members. We consider the accusatory language particularly offensive because it was unfounded
and undeserved. As this resolution earlier clarifies, the petition for certiorari did not contain a proper
affidavit of service.We do not need to rehash the clarification. Had the petitioner and its counsel
been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and more contrite, they would have desisted from
their harshness and disrespect towards the Court and its Members. Although we are not beyond
error, we assure the petitioner and its counsel that our resolutions and determinations are arrived at
or reached with much care and caution, aware that the lives, properties and rights of the litigants are
always at stake. If there be errors, they would be unintended, and would be the result of human
oversight. But in this instance the Court and its Members committed no error. The petition bore only
cut reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere "perfunctory scrutiny" would
not pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully explain in writing
why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh and disrespectful
language towards the Court and its Members; and, in his case, Atty. Fortaleza should further show
cause why he should" not be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit; ORDERS the
petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing within ten (10) days
from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court; and FURTHER
DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why he should not be disbarred.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO** PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION***
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes

* On Leave.

** Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1914.

*** On official leave.

1
 Rollo, pp. 229-242.

2
 Id. at 226.

3
 Id. at 226.

4
 Id. at 18.

5
 Id. at 13-22.

6
 Id. at 71-91.

7
 Id. at 92.

8
 Id. at 92-104.

9
 Id. at 70.

10
 Id. at 6.

11
 G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.

12
 A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC, November 13, 2012.

13
 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 72, 80-81.

14
 Rollo, p. 224.

15
 Supra note 1.

16
 Rollo, pp. 234-235.

17
 Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

18
 Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011, 647 SCRA 210, 225.

19
 Section 1, Rule 42, Rules of Court.
  Section 3, Rule 64, Rules of Court, states:
20

Section 3. Time to file petition. – The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of
a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution,
if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt
the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in
any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

 Rollo, p. 7.
21

 Pates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 481, 488.
22

 Supra, note 11.

23

 Canton v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 152898, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 441, 448.
24

 Rollo, pp. 239-242.

25

 Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 169498, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 690,
26

700.

 Rollo, p. 238.
27
 AM No. 15-06-10-SC

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 243411, August 19, 2020 ]

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN THIRD

DIVISION AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of petitioner Jessica Lucila G. Reyes
who ascribes to respondent Sandiganbayan, Third Division, grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution dated June 28, 2018 (hereinafter June 28 Resolution)2 which denied her motion for
bail ad cautelam, and Resolution dated December 7, 2018 (hereinafter December 7
Resolution)3 which similarly denied her motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration in SB-14-CRM-0238, entitled People of the Philippines v. Juan Ponce Enrile.

Relevant Facts and Proceedings

In 2014, petitioner and four other persons were arrested and charged for plunder based on the
following Information filed by the Office of the Ombudsman:

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout[s], in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile's Office, both public officers, committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:

(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE'S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE'S endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non government
organizations which became the recipients- and/or target implementors of ENRILE'S PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Over the period of 2014 through 2018, a number of incidents revolving around the sufficiency of the
weight and value of the prosecution's testimonial and documentary evidence were resolved by this
Court.

In Reyes v. Hon. Ombudsman5 the Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan that the allegations and evidence in SB-14-0328 engender probable cause to
believe that petitioner 1) acted in conspiracy with her co-accused, and 2) committed one count of
plunder and 15 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019. The Court
summarized the allegations against petitioner as follows:

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistle-blowers
Benliur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging
of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years
2004 to 2010, in the total amount of P172,834,500.00 x x x Tersely put, petitioners were charged for
the following acts:

(a) Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, for fraudulently
processing the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements — through: (1) project
identification and cost projection;(2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, project reports,
and pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Implementing Agencies (IAs); and (3) endorsement of the preferred JLN controlled Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) to undertake the PDAF-funded project — and for personally receiving
significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds representing Senator Enrile's "share," "commissions,"
or "kickbacks" therefrom, as well as her own.6 (Citations omitted)

xxxx

The evidence which the Court declared sufficient to establish probable cause that petitioner was part
of a conspiracy and that she performed a central role in it are "records x x x that [petitioner] as Chief
of Staff of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile), dealt with the parties involved; signed
documents necessary for the immediate and timely implementation of the Senator's PDAF-funded
projects that, however, turned out to be "ghost projects;" and repeatedly received "rebates,"
"commissions," or "kickbacks" for herself and for Senator Enrile representing portions of the latter's
PDAF."7 The Court adopted the following summary of the accounts of the whistle-blowers Luy, Sula,
and Suñas regarding the participation of petitioner:

[O]nce a PDAF allocation becomes available to Senator Enrile, his staff, in the person of either
respondent Reyes or [Atty. Jose Antonio Evangelista, the then Deputy Chief of Staff of Senator
Enrile], would inform Tuason of this development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the information to
either Napoles or Luy. Napoles or Luy would then prepare a listing of the projects available where
Luy would specifically indicate the implementing agencies. This listing would be sent to Reyes who
would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile. After the
listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give Tuason a
down payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes. After the SARO and/or NCA is released,
Napoles would give Tuason the full payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.8

The Court further held that the foregoing account "is corroborated in all respects by Tuason's verified
statement," specifically the following pertinent parts:

11.... It starts with a call or advise from Atty. Gigi Reyes or Mr. Jose Antonio Evangelista (also from
the Office of Senator Enrile) informing me that a budget from Senator Enrile's PDAF is available. I
would then relay this information to Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy.

12. Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy would then prepare a listing of the projects available indicating the
implementing agencies. This listing would be sent to Atty. Gigi Reyes who will endorse the same to
the DBM under her authority as Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile.

13. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give
me a clown payment for delivery for the share of Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles would give me the full payment for
delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

15. Sometimes Janet Napoles would have the money for Senator Enrile delivered to my house by
her employees. At other times, I would get it from her condominium in Pacific Plaza or from Benhur
Luy in Discovery Suites. When Benhur Luy gives me the money, he would make me scribble on
some of their vouchers [or] even sign under the name "Andrea Reyes," [Napoles's] codename for
me. This is the money that I would deliver to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

16. I don't count the money I receive for delivery to Senator Enrile. I just receive whatever was given
to me. The money was all wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles or
Benhur Luy. For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely on the accounting records of Benhur
Luy for the PDAF of Senator Enrile, which indicates the date, description and amount of money I
received for delivery to Senator Enrile.

xxxx

18. As I have mentioned above, I personally received the share of Senator Enrile from Janet
Napoles and Benhur Luy and I personally delivered it to Senator Enrile's Chief-of-Staff, Atty. Gigi
Reyes. Sometimes she would come to my house to pick up the money herself. There were also
instances when I would personally deliver it to her when we would meet over lunch. There were
occasions when Senator [Enrile] would join us for a cup of coffee when he would pick her up. For
me, his presence was a sign that whatever Atty. Gigi Reyes was doing was with Senator Enrile's
blessing.

xxxx

25. Initially, I was in-charge of delivering the share of Senator Enrile to Atty. Gigi Reyes, but later on,
I found out that Janet Napoles dealt directly with her. Janet Napoles was able to directly transact
business with Atty. Gigi Reyes after I introduced them to each other. This was during the Senate
hearing of Jocjoc Bolante in connection with the fertilizer fund scam. Janet Napoles was scared of
being investigated on her involvement, so she requested me to introduce her to Atty. Gigi
Reyes who was the Chief of Staff of the [sic] Senate President Enrile. (Emphases supplied, in the
original, and citation omitted)9

The Court then concluded that, on the basis of the foregoing evidence, there is probable cause to
charge petitioner:

Indeed, these pieces of evidence are already sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that the
crimes charged were committed and Reyes is probably guilty thereof as it remains apparent that: (a)
Reyes, a public officer, connived with Senator Enrile and several other persons (including the other
petitioners in these consolidated cases as will be explained later) in the perpetuation of the afore-
described PDAF scam, among others, in entering into transactions involving the illegal disbursement
of PDAF funds; (b) Senator Enrile and Reyes acted with manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith
by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-controlled10 NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF without the benefit
of public bidding and/or negotiated procurement in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations
on government procurement; (c) the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts
caused undue injury to the government, and at the same time, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference to the beneficiaries of the scam; and (e) Senator Enrile, through Reyes,
was able to accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00.11 (Citation omitted)

The foregoing conclusions of the Court took into account the issues raised by petitioner that the
evidence against her are weak and insufficient. The accounts of the whistle-blowers are hearsay and
unsubstantiated as they "merely mentioned her name in general terms but did not positively declare
that they saw or talked with her at any time or that they had seen her receive money from Janet
Napoles or anyone else connected with the latter." Even her purported "signatures found on the
documentary evidence presented were forged, falsified, and fictitious."12 The Court addressed these
issues, thus:

Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely hearsay, it must be reiterated that
— as held in the Estrada case — probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, so long
as there is substantial basis for crediting the same. As aforestated, the modus operandi used in
advancing the PDAF scam as described by the whistle-blowers was confirmed by Tuason herself,
who admitted to having acted as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the office of Senator Enrile.
The Ombudsman further pointed out that the collective statements of Luy, Sula, Suñas, and Tuason
find support in the following documentary evidence: (a) the business ledgers prepared by witness
Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his
"commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (b) the 2007-2009 Commission on Audit (COA) Report
documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements — that there were
serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded projects, including those
endorsed by Senator Enrile; and (c) the reports on the independent field verification conducted in
2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn statements of local government officials
and purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent. Clearly,
these testimonial and documentary evidences are substantial enough to reasonably conclude that
Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand trial therefor.

xxxx

Finally, anent Reyes's claim that her signatures in the documentary evidence presented were false,
falsified, and fictitious, it must be emphasized that "[a]s a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must
be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself
reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized' upon to have been forged." Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to
present clear and convincing evidence to prove her claim of forgery, especially in light of the
following considerations pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment on the
petition in G.R. Nos. 212593-94: (a) in a letter dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the COA, Senator
Enrile himself admitted that his signatures, as well as those of Reyes, found on the documents
covered by the COA's Special Audit Report are authentic; and (b) Rogelio Azores, the supposed
document examiner who now works as a freelance consultant, aside from only analyzing
photocopies of the aforesaid documents and not the originals thereof, did not categorically state that
Reyes's signatures on the endorsement letters were forged. As there is no clear showing of forgery,
at least at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot subscribe to Reyes's contrary submission.
Notably, however, she retains the right to raise and substantiate the same defense during trial
proper.13 (Citations omitted)

Meanwhile, in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,14 the Court ordered the provisional release of co-accused

Enrile on account of the latter's frail health, without addressing the issue of whether there is strong
evidence against said accused. On the other hand, in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan,15 this Court
upheld the denial of the bail application of co-accused Napoles in view of strong evidence as to 1)
the existence of a conspiracy to commit plunder involving Napoles and her co-accused, and 2)
Napoles' commission of acts of plunder and corruption. The conclusion of the Court on the existence
of conspiracy reads:

Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among the
accused, the Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole." It was therefore
unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former
Senator Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the
transaction that furthers the common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to
prove that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.

Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.16 (Citations omitted)

The "interlocking evidence" of implied conspiracy to which the Court referred consisted of the
testimony of Garcia regarding the modus operandi whereby the PDAF of Senator Enrile were
released to bogus non-government organizations for ghost projects;17 the testimonies of the local
officials whose local government units were designated as beneficiaries but never received any of
the proceeds of the projects; the testimonies of the whistle-blowers regarding their own participation
in the scheme; and the testimony of Tuason that she "personally met with Napoles to negotiate the
respective shares of the conspirators, and received the amount on behalf of former Senator Enrile,
which she subsequently turned over to Reyes."18 In view of this evidence, the Court concluded:

It is plain from the foregoing that Napoles and her co-accused, as well as the former employees of
Napoles who were eventually admitted as State witnesses, had a common design and objective —
to divert the PDAF of former Senator Enrile from its lawful purpose and to their own personal
accounts. The individuals involved in this case performed different criminal acts, which contributed,
directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent
with the doctrine on implied conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are
sufficient to prove the existence of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any proof that an
actual agreement took place.19

Prior to the release of the decision of the Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan, herein petitioner
applied for bail on May 30, 2017.20 Respondent Sandiganbayan, Third Division, denied the
application in the assailed June 28, 2018 Resolution, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Bail ad cautelam dated May 29, 2017 filed by
accused-movant Atty. Jessica Lucia G. Reyes, through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were denied in
the assailed December 7, 2018 Resolution.22

Issues and Arguments

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE

PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL WITNESS, RUBY TUASON, AS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT
PETITIONER REYES COMMITTED THE CRIME OF PLUNDER OR CONSPIRED TO COMMIT
THAT CRIME WITH HER CO-ACCUSED, HER [TUASON'S] TESTIMONY BEING VAGUE,
INCONCLUSIVE, UNCORROBORATED AND WORSE, CONTRADICTED BY OTHER EVIDENCE
OF THE PROSECUTION.

A. The respondent Court erred in holding that some payments were made by Ruby
Tuason in the house of Petitioner Reyes because in truth, Ruby Tuason never made
any such claim.

B. Tuason's bare and general claim that Petitioner Reyes received various
unspecified sums from her is vague, inconclusive and totally uncorroborated by any
evidence of the Prosecution;

C. The respondent Court failed to consider established facts and circumstances

extant from the Prosecution's evidence which additionally rendered the testimony of
Tuason unreliable and not worthy of belief.
 II

THE TESTIMONY OF COA COMMISSIONER SUSAN GARCIA THAT THE ENDORSEMENT

LETTERS ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER REYES "ACTUALLY TRIGGERED THE START OF
THIS SO-CALLED 'PORK BARREL SCAM'" IS HEARSAY AND INCONSISTENT WITH HER OWN
TESTIMONY BECAUSE FAR FROM PRECIPITATING ANY EVENT, THE EVIDENCE SHOW THAT
THE PDAF FUNDS OF SENATOR ENRILE WERE PROCESSED, RELEASED AND DISBURSED
EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER REYES' SUPPOSED LETTERS.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO

RESOLVE (1) PETITIONER REYES' MOTION FOR BAIL AD CAUTELAM WITHIN THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF NINETY (90) DAYS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION MANDATED
IN SECTION 6 OF PD NO. 1606 AND IN SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE; AND (2) PETITIONER
REYES' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITHIN THE NON-EXTENDIBLE PERIOD OF TEN (10) CALENDAR DAYS
FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION OF THE MOTION MANDATED IN SUBHEADING III, ITEM 10(a)
OF A.M. NO. 15-06-10-SC, OR THE REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF
CRIMINAL CASES.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING

PETITIONER REYES BAIL BY PRINCIPALLY ADOPTING BY REFERENCE, THE
PRONOUNCEMENTS AND FINDINGS MADE BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ITS DECISION
DATED 7 NOVEMBER 2017 IN G.R. NO. 224162 ENTITLED "JANET LIM NAPOLES V.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)," A CASE INVOLVING ACCUSED NAPOLES' PETITION
FOR BAIL.

A. In the adjudication of cases pending before it, whether criminal or civil, the
respondent Court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are actually pending before the
respondent Court.

B. The Court Order granting or denying bail should be based on the evidence
presented at the bail hearing.

C. Petitioner Reyes cannot and should not be prejudiced by the respondent Court's
adverse ruling on the Petition for Bail filed by accused Napoles subject of
the Resolutions dated 16 October 2015 and 2 March 2016, which was affirmed by
this Honorable Court in G.R. No. 224162, Petitioner Reyes being a stranger to both
proceedings.

IN ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS DATED 28 JUNE 2018 AND 7 DECEMBER 2018, THE
RESPONDENT COURT ADOPTED BY REFERENCE NOT ONLY THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
FOURTEEN (14) OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES ACCEPTED BY PETITIONER REYES,
BUT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE FIVE (5) PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHOM COUNSEL FOR
PETITIONER REYES RESERVED FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION. THE TESTIMONIES OF THESE
NINETEEN (19) PROSECUTION WITNESSES DO NOT SUBSTANTIATE, BUT IN FACT NEGATE,
THE RESPONDENT COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE IS [EVIDENT PROOF] THAT PETITIONER
REYES PARTICIPATED IN THE PDAF SCHEME AND MUST NECESSARILY
BE DENIED TEMPORARY LIBERTY.

VI

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE

ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED 28 JUNE 2018 WHICH IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE IN THAT IT DID NOT CONTAIN A COMPLETE SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE HONORABLE COURT
FORMULATED ITS OWN CONCLUSION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SO
PRESENTED IS STRONG ENOUGH TO INDICATE THE GUILT OF PETITIONER REYES FOR
THE CRIME OF PLUNDER CHARGED.

VII

IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS, THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THAT IT
DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION DURING THE BAIL HEARINGS ON PETITIONER REYES' MOTION FOR BAIL AD
CAUTELAM WHICH NEGATE THE RESPONDENT COURT'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER
REYES "ACTED TOWARDS THE COMMON GOAL OF MISAPPROPRIATING THE PDAF OF
FORMER SENATOR ENRILE."

IX

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MERELY

COPYING WITHOUT MORE, THIS HONORABLE COURT'S RULING IN ITS DECISION DATED 7
NOVEMBER 2017 IN G.R. NO. 224162 ON THE PRESENCE OF AN "IMPLIED CONSPIRACY
AMONG ACCUSED NAPOLES AND HER CO-ACCUSED." IT IS WELL-SETTLED THAT
CONSPIRACY MUST BE PROVED CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY AS THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE ITSELF FOR IT IS A FACILE DEVICE BY WHICH AN ACCUSED MAY BE
ENSNARED AND KEPT WITHIN THE PENAL FOLD.23

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Procedural Grounds

Petitioner would have the Court set aside the resolution denying her bail application, and issue an
order setting her provisionally free on the ground that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in taking more than five months to issue said resolution, thereby violating the three-month
period prescribed under Section 6 of Presidential Decree 1606, and more than five months to
resolve her motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration, thereby
violating the 10-day non-extendible period prescribed under Part III, Section 10(a) of A.M. No. 15-06-
10-SC24 (Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases).25

In other words, petitioner refers to the delay in only one segment of the proceedings in SB-14-CRM-
0238, that is, her bail application, and argues that said delay constitutes a violation of her right to
speedy disposition, which violation in turn warrants a reversal of the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan denying her bail application. Petitioner does not argue that the delay stalled the
entire trial, or that the consequent violation of her right to speedy disposition deprived the
Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction as would warrant the dismissal of the entire case against her.

In addition, petitioner questions the sparse discussion of the facts and the law in the assailed
resolutions.26

The Court holds that delay in one segment which does not stall the main proceedings in the entire
case does not give rise to a violation of the right of a party to speedy trial or disposition; much less,
when the delay in one segment can be attributed to the conduct of said party of swarming the court
with other incidental motions and petitions that can sap its time and attention. Moreover, petitioner
asks too much of bail proceedings, which need not be comprehensive or detailed, for all that is
required is a mere summary treatment of a limited question of whether there is strong evidence
against the bail applicant.27

Segment delay vis-a-vis delay in the totality of a case

In several cases where it exercised administrative supervision, the Court imposed sanctions on
judges for failing to resolve the main28 or incidental and interlocutory29 issues in criminal30 and
civil31 cases within either the fixed period prescribed by law32 or the rules of court33 or, where no
period is prescribed, within a reasonable time.34 While in these administrative cases the Court
declared that the delay constituted a violation of the right of a party to speedy trial or disposition, it
characterized the inaction, for periods varying from two35 to 1036 years, of the respondent judges
as mere breach of duty,37 undue38 or unreasonable39 delay, or gross inefficiency,40 rather than as
grave or ordinary abuse of authority or discretion as defined in administrative cases.41 Moreover,
the cases or motions were merely ordered to be resolved with dispatch.42

On the other hand, in a number of civil,43 criminal44 or administrative cases,45 the Court has

declared that delay which is oppressive, capricious and vexatious46 constitutes a violation of the
right of a party to speedy trial or disposition. In those cases, the delay took place during either the
preliminary investigation stage,47 the trial stage48 or the resolution of a mere incidental or
interlocutory matter.49 Moreover, the consequent violation of the right to speedy trial or disposition
warranted the ouster of the court of jurisdiction and the dismissal of the cases.50

It is notable that even where the delay occurred in only one segment involving the proceedings on or
the resolution of an interlocutory matter, the resulting violation of the right to speedy trial or
disposition led to the dismissal of the entire case.51 However, in those instances, the Court
assessed the delay in one segment in relation to the totality of the trial or disposition of the case, and
found that the segment delay stalled the entire case.

In the present petition, there is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan incurred delay in one segment for it
failed to resolve an interlocutory matter within the period prescribed by law and the rules of
court.52 However, there is no allegation much less evidence by petitioner that this segment delay
stalled the entire proceedings in a way that is vexatious, capricious and oppressive. On the contrary,
petitioner and her co-accused saddled the Sandiganbayan with numerous and simultaneous
incidents that, in the long-run, had the effect of slowing it down as it attends to these various
incidents and, at the same time, resolve the main case.

Reason for the delay in the trial of a case or the disposition of an incident therein is among the four
indicators of whether such delay is oppressive and vexatious as to amount to a violation of the right
of a party to speedy trial or disposition.53 This particular test entails an examination of the conduct
of the court and the parties in both the main case and the specific segments.54

As explained by the Sandiganbayan in its December 7, 2018 Resolution, the delay was due to the
need for the ponente, who had just been appointed and was fresh to the case, to examine the 17
volumes of pleadings and motions and the testimonies of 19 witnesses who had been presented
before the Sandiganbayan as well as the Philippine Senate.55 Moreover, after the ponente prepared
the draft resolution, this was circulated among the other two members of the court. Meanwhile, the
main case, proceeded apace even as several other incidents also had to be resolved. The Court
takes cognizance of these other incidents as most of them were elevated to it for review. It therefore
takes into consideration that the members of respondent court had to address simultaneously, not
just the main case, but also the various incidents that were initiated by petitioner and her co-
accused.56

Thus, set against the pace of the entire proceedings in SB-14-CRM-0238, the delay in the segment
involving petitioner's bail application is not unreasonable. As the Ombudsman argued in its
Comment, taking into account practical considerations, the delay does not amount to a violation of
the right of petitioner to speedy disposition.57 It does not warrant a declaration that the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions.

Sufficiency of resolutions on bail applications

Moreover, as bail applications pertain to a collateral issue, and the proceedings thereon are
summary in nature and "avoid unnecessary thoroughness,"58 the resolution denying or granting bail
need not be detailed or exhaustive. In fact, an exhaustive treatment of the evidence runs the risk of
preempting the outcome of the substantive issues of the main case. A resolution is sufficient if it
informs the applicant and oppositor of the facts and the law that form the basis of the denial or grant
of bail.

The June 28, 2018 Resolution is sufficient. It apprises the parties of the facts and the evidence relied
upon by the Sandiganbayan. Though not detailed, the narrative and discussion inform the applicant
of the outcome and explain the reasons therefor. Moreover, whatever details petitioner may have
found wanting in the June 28, 2018 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan supplied in its December 7,
2018 Resolution in which 240 pages were devoted to poring over and weighing the prosecution's
evidence.59

In sum, petitioner failed to establish that, on procedural grounds, the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion.

Substantive Grounds

On the bases of the substantive grounds raised by petitioner, the issues to be resolved by the Court
are as follows:

The first issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in invoking
and applying the findings and rulings of the Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan to resolve the bail
application of petitioner. This issue underlies the fourth and eighth grounds raised by petitioner.

The second issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring that the prosecution presented strong evidence of the guilt of petitioner. This issue
underlies the first, second, fifth and seventh grounds raised by petitioner.
The Court holds that its findings and conclusions in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan regarding the
strength of the evidence on the existence of conspiracy and the commission of acts of plunder and
corruption by Napoles are not binding on the right to bail of petitioner. The Sandiganbayan was
mistaken when it applied these findings and conclusions wholesale to resolve the bail application of
petitioner. Nonetheless, the Court's definition of the legal rule regarding the type of evidence
necessary to establish conspiracy is the law of the case that shall govern even petitioner's bail
application. Moreover, the Court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of
their testimonies is relevant. Finally, the Court notes that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its own
determination that there is strong evidence that petitioner was in conspiracy with her co-accused and
that she committed the acts of plunder and corruption for which she was charged. This assessment
is well-founded. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that
there is strong evidence of the guilt of petitioner, and in denying her bail application.

First issue: applicability of Napoles v. Sandiganbayan

In its Resolution dated June 28, 2018, the Sandiganbayan held that while the Decision of this Court
in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan pertains to the bail application of Napoles, nonetheless there is "no
sound reason not to adopt the same" given that the conclusions in said case "delve not only directly
on the facts of this [Reyes'] case but also substantively on the testimonies given by the prosecution
witnesses recalled by accused-movant Reyes."60 To ignore Napoles v. Sandiganbayan, is to
"render inadequate any findings" on petitioner's bail application.61

Accordingly, on the question of the existence of conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan adopted the findings
and conclusions of this Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan that "the implied conspiracy among
Napoles and [her] co-accused was proved through various documentary and testimonial evidence
showing that they acted towards the common goal of misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator
Enrile."62 On the question of the strength of the testimonies of the witnesses as evidence regarding
the commission of the acts of plunder, the Sandiganbayan relied on the following rulings of this
Court in said case:

First, that "the respective testimonies of Commissioner Garcia and the supposed beneficiaries were
corroborated on material points by the whistleblowers;"63 and

Second, that the testimonies of the whistleblowers "were consistent, clear, and corroborative of each
other" and that "[o]ther testimonial and documentary evidence also substantiated the veracity of the
whistleblowers' statements during the bail hearing [on Napoles' application]."64

The Sandiganbayan overruled the objection of petitioner to the direct application of the ruling of this
Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan. According to the Sandiganbayan as co-conspirator petitioner
was indicted based on the same set of facts and evidence presented against Napoles.65 Even the
evidence presented at the bail hearing of petitioner were exactly those that were cited in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan.66 At said hearing, petitioner accepted the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
who were presented at Napoles' bail hearing, except the testimonies of Garcia, Sula, Suñas, Luy
and Tuason.67 As to the testimonies of the five witnesses, the Court's ruling in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan is that these are reliable, consistent, clear and corroborative of each other.68

Petitioner argues before this Court that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it took judicial notice of the contents of the records of another case69 to which petitioner is a
stranger.70 Even the finding of conspiracy in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan is not binding on petitioner,
for conspiracy must be proved by evidence of overt act separate from the crime itself.71

Both parties are partly mistaken.

Inapplicability of res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment

This Court has adopted two mechanisms to enforce the principle of estoppel and bar the relitigation
of issues between the same parties or their privies regarding a right, fact or matter that have been
fully and finally adjudicated upon.

The doctrine of res judicata under Section 47(b), Rule 39, Rules of Court bars a second case on the
basis of a former final judgment if the following elements are present: there is a former final
judgment that was rendered on the merits; the court in the former judgment had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action
between the first and second cases.72 Conclusiveness of judgment under Section 47(c) operates
under the same element, except that there is identity only of issues and parties, but not of causes of
action.73 For this reason, except in those instances allowed under the law or rules of court,74 a
former final judgment rendered by a competent court in another action between the same parties
based on a different claim or cause of action will not bar a second case; however, as said former
final judgment is conclusive, "any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same."75

Res judicata applies to civil cases76 while conclusiveness of judgment has been applied also to
criminal cases and administrative cases.77 However, neither is an appropriate device for grafting
this Court's findings and conclusions in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan unto SB-14-CRM-0238, whether
in the main proceedings or incidental proceedings. Our decision in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan attained finality but it is not the final say on the matter of conspiracy or commission
of plunder by Napoles or her co-accused. Our decision pertained to an interlocutory order denying
the bail application of Napoles. Being interlocutory, the order is not immutable for it remains under
the control of the Sandiganbayan to maintain or change, depending on new developments in the
presentation of evidence before it.78

Law of the case

The concept of law of the case is more appropriate, for our decision in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan declared a legal rule that is controlling of the determination of the existence of
conspiracy among the accused in SB-14-CRM-0238.79 As quoted earlier, this legal rule is that the
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence. Rather, it can be inferred from the totality of
the facts and circumstances regarding their participation that they pursued a common design and
purpose. No direct proof of agreement is necessary.

This rule shall govern the determination of whether there is strong evidence of the involvement of
petitioner in the conspiracy to commit plunder and corruption by causing the release of the PDAF for
ghost projects and the diversion of the funds to the accused persons. It should be emphasized that
applying to petitioner's bail application the foregoing law of the case as defined in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan is quite different from denying petitioner's bail application because, as held
in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan, the prosecution had presented strong evidence against Napoles and,
by extension, her co-conspirators.

Relevance of People v. Escobar

Moreover, the Court is aware that in People v. Escobar80 the provisional release of the alleged co-
conspirators of Manuel Escobar was regarded as "a new development" which warranted the grant of
the latter's second bail application. One particular new matter was that, due to the weakness of the
testimony of the state witness, Rolando Fajardo, an alleged co-conspirator and adviser of the
kidnap-for-ransom group, was released on bail.81 As the testimony of this state witness was
declared unreliable, and said testimony is the basis of Rolando's and Escobar's "alleged participation
in the crime,"82 the Court held that the continued refusal by the trial court to provisionally release
Escobar was a violation of the latter's fundamental rights and liberty.83

Thus, though not binding, the findings and conclusions of this Court in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan regarding the strength of the evidence of the prosecution on the existence of
conspiracy involving Napoles and her co-accused, and the commission of acts of plunder and
corruption by Napoles, must be taken into account by the Sandiganbayan for purposes of a
complete assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of their testimonies.

Petitioner invoked Occidental Land Transportation v. Court of Appeals84 that courts are "not

authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have
been heard or are actually pending before the same judge."85 This rule is hardly applicable. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out in its December 7, 2018 Resolution, petitioner requested that the same
sets of witnesses, testimonies and documentary evidence that were presented at the bail application
of Napoles be deemed submitted in her (petitioner's) own application, subject to cross-examination
of five selected witnesses. Thus, the evidence to which the Sandiganbayan referred were those
already submitted to it in connection petitioner's bail application.

As the same sets of witnesses, testimonies and documents regarding the same events and
characters were submitted in both bail applications, and as this Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan
had declared the credibility of these witnesses, the reliability of their testimonies and the evidentiary
value of their documents, it would have been bizarre if the Sandiganbayan had compartmentalized
those same evidence, and declared that as to the parts pertaining to petitioner, the witnesses were
untrustworthy, their testimonies unconvincing and their documentary evidence untruthful.

In summary, in its June 28, 2018 Resolution the Sandiganbayan was mistaken in adopting
wholesale our findings and conclusion in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan as though it were a final and
binding determination of the right to bail of petitioner. However, this Court's delineation of the
governing law in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan is applicable to petitioner's bail application. The Court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of their testimonies are also
indispensable.

Second issue: strength of the evidence of the prosecution

Having adopted the law of the case in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan that conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, and having due regard to the conclusion in said case that the
witnesses for the prosecution are credible and their testimonies reliable, the Court must now
consider whether petitioner established that grave abuse of discretion marred the Sandiganbayan's
assessment that there is strong evidence of the guilt of petitioner.

By strong evidence of guilt, the law contemplates more than evidence that engenders a belief that a
crime has probably been committed and that it has been committed by the accused.86 However, it is
less than evidence beyond reasonable doubt, but rather evident guilt or a great presumption of
guilt87 such as would lead a dispassionate judge to conclude that the offense has been committed
as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that accused will probably be meted the capital
punishment.88 The evidence to be considered is on the 1) the existence of conspiracy involving
petitioner; and 2) the commission of the acts ascribed to petitioner.
In its December 7, 2018 Resolution, detailed across one hundred ninety-four (194) pages the
testimonies of the 19 witnesses on direct, redirect and cross-examination at the bail hearing.89 It
then quoted the parts of the discussion of this Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan that pertained or
referred to petitioner.90 However, it also explained in full the basis of its findings that there is strong
evidence of the guilt of petitioner, specifically the following evidence:

First, the testimony of Garcia regarding the significance in the scheme of things of the endorsement
letters of petitioner.

Pros. Se:

Q: x x x You mentioned that x x x this SARO were already released when these endorsement letters
of Jessica Lucila Reyes was prepared or signed x x x.

Witness

A. Yes Maam.

Q. x x x what is the connection, if any, of this endorsement letter of Jessica Lucila Reyes x x x to the
release of the SAROs?

A. To the release, none, Maam.

Pros. Se:

xxxx

Q. If you know, Madam Witness, x x x what is the importance of this endorsement letter of Jessica
Lucila Reyes?

Witness:

A. The endorsement letter of Jessica Lucila Reyes to Honorable Arthur Yap, there are four (4) letters
[that] triggered the release of funds by DA to NABCOR, and also serves as an authority of Mr.
Antonio Evangelista to request the transfer of funds to NGOs.

xxxx

Pros. Se:

Q. What is the importance x x x of the endorsement letter of Jessica Lucila Reyes?

Witness

A. This was made the basis by DA.

Q. Basis for what?

A. To release the funds to NABCOR.

Q. Okay.  So, if you know, without that letter, what [would have] happened to the fund?
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

A. The fund would have not x x x been released by DA to NABCOR.91

Second, the letters dated April 18, 2007, July 7, 2008, April 7, 2009 and December 7, 2009 wherein
petitioner informed the various implementing government agencies of the designation of the fictitious
NGOs created by Napoles as PDAF beneficiaries and the designation of Evangelista as
representative. This is confirmed by the subsequent memorandum agreements which Evangelista
entered into with said implementing agencies and NGOs.92

Third, the letter dated March 21, 2012 of Enrile confirming to Associate Commissioner Carmela
Perez that petitioner and Evangelista are his representatives, and that the latter's signature appears
on the MOAs, endorsement letters and other documents.93

Finally, the disbursement vouchers indicating the amounts coming from the PDAF that were
funnelled into the NGO's.

The Sandiganbayan concluded:

Evidently, the accused-movant had no participation in the preparation and/or signing of any project
proposals, reports, memoranda and or certificates of acceptance. This fact, however, does not
negate her complicity to the present charge x x x she signed the endorsement letters which actually
triggered the start of this so-called "pork-barrel scam" and repeatedly received the kickbacks from
Tuason and accused Napoles.94

Against the foregoing array of evidence, petitioner interposed the arguments that the testimony of
Garcia is hearsay for the latter merely reviewed the documents submitted to COA.95 Nowhere did
Garcia state that petitioner initiated, processed, disbursed, caused the release or liquidated the
PDAF funds.96 Rather, the letters attributed to petitioner and which the Sandiganbayan
characterized as the starting point of the alleged scheme were released after issuance by the DBM
of the SAROs and the NCAs.97 Moreover, Tuason failed to detail the dates, places and amounts of
alleged payments to petitioner. Luy, Sula, and Suñas testified that they never received instructions
from petitioner regarding the PDAF or see her receive proceeds from it.98

The foregoing arguments of petitioner fail to establish that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in concluding that there is strong evidence against petitioner. This Court
in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan relied on the very same testimony for it is axiomatic that investigation
reports rendered by an official in the performance of official duties and on the basis of a personal
examination and analysis of official documents and interpretation of the rules and regulations of the
latter's office are accorded much weight.99 By extension, any testimony by said official regarding the
procedure and findings in said reports is not hearsay.100 Such was the nature of Garcia's testimony
to the effect that she conducted an audit of the PDAF funds of Senator Enrile and that she arrived at
the findings that, without petitioner's letter, public funds would not have been plundered, that is, the
funds would not have been released according to the scheme formulated by Napoles. Petitioner has
not denied signing these letters or disputed the statement of Senator Enrile that she signed said
letter. While at this point the testimonies of Tuason, Luy, Sula and Suñas do not directly establish
that petitioner received the proceeds from the said funds, this gap is not enough to overcome a
heightened presumption that petitioner partook of the P172,834,500.00 PDAF funds which, but for
her letters, would not have been funneled into bogus projects.

In sum, petitioner failed to establish on substantive grounds that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in finding strong evidence of her guilt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated June 28, 2018 and
December 7, 2018 denying petitioner's bail application are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., (Chairperson), Carandang,* Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa per Raffle
dated July 15, 2020.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-110.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Bernelito R. Fernandez, with Associate Justice Amparo M.

Cabotaje-Tang and Associate Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez, concurring; id. at 114-129.

3 Penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, with Associate Justice Sarah

Jane T. Fernandez, Associate Justice Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. and Associate Justice Maryann
E. Mañalac, concurring, and Associate Justice Bernelito R. Fernandez, dissenting; id. at 130-
256.

4 Resolution dated December 18, 2018; id. at 133-134.

5 783 Phil. 304 (2016).

6 Id. at 317-318.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 338.

9 Id. at 338-339.

10 JLN refers to Janet Lim Napoles Corporation.

11 Id. at 340-341.

12 Id. at 341.

13 Id. at 341-342, 347-348.

14 767 Phil. 147 (2015).

15 G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017.

16 Id.
17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Rollo, p. 10.

21 Resolution, June 28, 2018, p. 16; id, at 129.

22 Resolution, December 7, 2018, p. 253; id. at 256.

23 Petition, rollo, pp. 19-23.

24 Effective September 21, 2017.

25 Petition, pp. 72-73; rollo, pp. 53(74)-54(75).

26 Id. at 95-101; id. at 76 (97)-82 (103).

27 Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235, 218266,
218903 & 219162, July 24, 2018.

28 Bernardo v. Judge Fabros, 366 Phil. 485 (1999).

29 Spouses Sustento v. Lilagan, 782 Phil. 270 (2016); Alminaza v. Pagapong-Agraviador,

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2445 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4323-RTJ) (Notice), January 25,
2016; Bacolot v. Hon. Judge Paño, 660 Phil. 303 (2011); Blanco v. Judge
Andoy (Resolution), 581 Phil. 302 (2008).

30 Moncada v. Judge Cervantes (Resolution), 529 Phil. 1-8 (2006).

31 Angelia v. Judge Grageda (Resolution), 656 Phil. 570 (2011).

32 Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan (Resolution), 422 Phil. 246
(2001).

33 Spouses Eson v. Acosta (Notice), March 25, 2019.

34 Atty. Beltran, Jr. v. Judge Paderanga, 455 Phil. 227 (2003).

35 Bangco v. Gatdula, 428 Phil. 598 (2002).

36 Bulan v. Cardenas, 189 Phil. 596 (1980).

37 Id.

38 Hebron v. Garcia II (Resolution), 698 Phil. 615-626 (2012); Arquero v. Judge Mendoza,

374 Phil. 105 (1999).
39 Hon. Bonilla v. Hon. Gustilo (Resolution), 399 Phil. 16 (2000).

40 Re: Irma Zita V. Masamayor (Resolution), 374 Phil. 556 (1999); Office of the Court
Administrator v. Guiling, A.M. No. RTJ-19-2549, June 18, 2019.

41 There is abuse of authority where "the inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize
such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle x x x [such that] the judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious
that he deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of
authority." See Office of the Court Administrator v. Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March
6, 2018.

42 Bernaldez v. Avelino (Resolution), 553 Phil. 685-697 (2007); Bacolot v. Hon. Judge

Paño, supra note 29.

43 Regner v. Logarta, 562 Phil. 862 (2007).

44 Villa v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 219548, October 17, 2018.

45 Navarro v. Commission on Audit Central Office, G.R. No. 238676, November 19, 2019.

46 Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil, 215 (1938).

47 People v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 232737, October 2, 2019.

48 Magno v. People, G.R. No. 230657, March 14, 2018.

49 People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019; Magno v.
People, supra.

50 People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018.

51 Supra note 49.

52 Pagdanganan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 202678, September 5, 2018.

53 The other tests the length of delay; accused's assertion or non-assertion of his right to
speedy trial; and prejudice caused to the accused resulting from the delay. See People v.
Macasaet, supra note 50; Remulla v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 808 Phil. 739-762
(2017); People v. Leviste, 325 Phil. 525 (1996).

54 Magante v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. Nos. 230950-51, July 23,

2018; Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 483 Phil. 451 (2004).

55 Resolution, December 7, 2018, pp. 252-253; rollo, p. 255 (dorsal portion).

56 Id.

57 Id. at 314-316.
58 People v. Escobar, 814 Phil. 840, 861 (2017).

59 Resolution, December 7, 2018, pp. 12-252.

60 Supra note 2.

61 Id. at 14.

62 Id.   

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 Resolution, December 7, 2018, p. 126.

66 Id.

67 Id. at 10-11.

68 Id. at 242-243.

69 Petitioner, rollo, pp. 61-62.

70 Id. at 66-68.

71 Id. at. 98-99.

72 Ley Construction & Development Corp. v. Philippine Commercial and International Bank,
635 Phil. 503-514 (2010).

73 Gomeco Metal Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 202531, August 17, 2016; Spouses
Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, 639 Phil. 483-494 (2010).

74 See Chiok v. People, G.R. Nos. 179814 & 180021, December 7, 2015.

75 Francisco v. Co, 516 Phil. 588-604 (2006); Pacasum, Sr. v. Zamoranos, 807 Phil. 783-
794 (2017).

76 Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191-204 (1999). In criminal cases, the applicable
principle is res judicata in prison grey or double jeopardy. See Trinidad v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 564 Phil. 382-396 (2007).

77 Co v. People, 610 Phil. 60-71 (2009); Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140656,
13 September 2007, 533 SCRA 205.

78 Philippine National Bank v. Urieta, G.R. No. 180264 (Notice), September 25, 2019.

79 Development Bank of the Phils, v. Guariña Agricultural & Realty Development Corp., 724
Phil. 209-226 (2014).
80 814 Phil. 840-864 (2017).

81 Id.

82 Id.

83 Id.

84 Occidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 292-A Phil. 269 (1993).

85 Petition, rollo, pp. 61-67.

86 Cabrera v. Marcelo, 487 Phil. 427-448 (2004).

87 People v. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697-719 (1999).

88 People v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 213104, July 29, 2015.

89 Rollo, pp. 130-256.

90 Id. at 209-214.

91 Id. at 216-218.

92 Id. at 219 (dorsal portion).

93 Id. at 221-225.

94 Id. at 235-236.

95 Petition, rollo, p. 35.

96 Id. at 36-47.

97 Id. at 48-52.

98 Id. at 21 -27.

99 Jaca v. People, 702 Phil. 210-262 (2013).

100 Id.
 AM No. 08-8-7-SC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC             November 21, 2000

RE: THE RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson, Technical Working Group, Committee on

Revision of the Rules of Court, submitting for the consideration and approval of the Court the
proposed "The Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases," the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
same.

The Rule shall take effect on October 01, 2008 following its publication two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.

September 9, 2008

(Sgd.)REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(Sgd.)LEONARDO A. (Sgd.)CONSUELO YNARES-

QUISUMBING SANTIAGO
Associatie Justice Associatie Justice

On Official Leave (Sgd.)MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MARTINEZ
Associatie Justice Associatie Justice

(Sgd.)CONCHITA CARPIO
(Sgd.)RENATO C. CORONA
MORALES
Associatie Justice
Associatie Justice
 (Sgd.)ADOLFO S. AZCUNA (Sgd.)DANTE O. TINGA
Associatie Justice Associatie Justice

(Sgd.)PRESBITERO J.
(Sgd.)MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
VELASCO, JR.
Associatie Justice
Associatie Justice

(Sgd.)ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
(Sgd.)RUBEN T. REYES
NACHURA
Associatie Justice
Associatie Justice

(Sgd.)TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
(Sgd.)ARTURO D. BRION
DE CASTRO
Associatie Justice
Associatie Justice

RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

Section 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as " The Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases."

Section 2. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for
payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

Section 3. Definiton of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Plaintiff - refers to the party who initiated a small claims action. The term includes a
defendant who has filed a counterclaim against plainfill;

(b) Defendant - is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a small claims action. The
term includes a plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a claim, or a person who replies
to the claim;

(c) Person - is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability partnership, association,

or other juridical entity endowed with personality by law;

(d) Individual - is a natural person;

(e) Motion - means a party's request, written or oral, to the court for an orderaction. It shall
include an informal written request to the court, such as a letter;

(f) Good cause - means circumtances sufficient to justify the requested order or other action,
as determined by the judge; and
 (g) Affidavit - means a written statement or declaration of facts that are shown or affirmed to
be true.

Section 4. Applicability - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions which are; (a)
purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or
reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of criminal action, or reserved upon the
filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule of 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

These claims or demands may be;

(a) For money owned under any of the following;

1. Contract of Lease;

2. Contract of Loan;

3. Contract of Services;

4. Contract of Sale; or

5. Contract of Mortgage;

(b) For damages arising from any of the following;

1. Fault or negligence;

2. Quasi-contract; or

3. Contract;

(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a

money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Section 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims action is commenced by filing
with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1 - SCC) in duplicate,
accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum Shopping (Form 1-A,SCC), and two (2) duly certified
photocopies of the actionable document/s subjects of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses
and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was
not attached to or submitted together with the Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission
of additional evidence.

No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim described in this Rule, is necessary to initiate
a small claims action.

Section 6. Joinder of Claims - Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or more separate
small claims against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interest and
costs, does not exceed P100,00.00.
Section 7. Affidavits - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence.

A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted the party in the
preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action. The inadmissible affidavit(s) or
portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.

Section 8. Payment of Filing Fees. - The plaintiff shall pay the docket and other legal fees
prescribed under Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, unless allowed to litigate as an indigent.

A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be referred to the Executive Judge
for immediate action in case of multi-sala courts, or to the Presiding Judge of the court hearing the
small claims case. If the motion is granted by the Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or
assigned to the court designated to hear small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall
be given five (5) days within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be dismissed
without prejudice. In no case shall a party, even if declared an indigent, be exempt from the payment
of the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and processes in civil cases.

Section 9. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that the case falls under this Rule, it
may, from an examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim and such evidence attached
thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright of any of the grounds apparent from the Claim for the
dismissal of a civil action.

Section 10. Summons and Notice of Hearing - If no ground for dismissal is found, the court shall
forthwith issue Summons (Form 2-SCC) on the day of receipt of the Statement of Claim, directing
the defendant to submit a verified Response.

The court shall also issue a Notice (Form 4-SCC) to both parties, directing them to appear before it
on a specific date and time for hearing, with a warning that no unjustified postponement shall be
allowed, as provided in Section 19 of this Rule.

The summons and notice to be served on the defendant shall be accompanied by a copy of the
Statement of Claim and documents submitted by plaintiff, and a copy of the Response (Form 3-
SCC) to be accomplished by the defendant. The Notice shall contain an express prohibition against
the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other motion under Section 14 of this Rule.

Section 11. Response - The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the plaintiff a duly
accomplished and verified Response within a non - extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of
summons. The Response shall be accompanied by certified photocopies of documents, as well as
affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during
the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the Response, unless good cause
is shown for the admission of additional evidence.

Section 12. Effect of Failure to File Response - Should the defendant fail to file his response within
the required period, the court by itself shall render judgement as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the Statement of claim limited to what is prayed for. The court however, may, in its
discretion, reduce the amount of damages for being excessive or unconscionable

Section 13. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule - If at the time the action is
commenced, the defendant possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the coverage of
this rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b) arises out of the same transaction or event that is the
subject matter of the plaintiff's claim; (c) does not require for its adjudication the joinder of third
parties; and (d) is not the subject of another pending action, the claim shall be filed as a
counterclaim in the response; otherwise, the defendant shall be barred from suit on the
counterclaim.

The defendant may also elect to the file a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence , provided that the amount and nature thereof are within the
coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket and the other legal fees are paid.

Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, and petitions shall
not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the compliant except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement, or for reopening of trial;

(d) Petiton for relief from judgement;

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;

(f) Memoranda;

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court;

(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j) Reply;

(k) Third-party complaints; and

(l) Interventions.

Section 15. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel. - The Clerk of Court or other
personnel shall provide such assistance as may be requested by a plaintiff or a defendant regarding
the availability of forms and other information about the coverage, requirements as well as
procedure for small claims cases.

Section 16. Appearance. - the parties shall appear at the designated date of hearing personally or
through a representative authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 5-SCC ) to enter into
an amicable settlement, to submit of Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) and to enter into stipulations
or admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits

Section 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf of or

represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense and needs
assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist
that party upon the latter's consent.

Section 18. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be cause for the
dismissal of the claim without prejudice. The defendant who appears shall be entitled to judgement
on a permissive counterclaim.

Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as failure to file a Response under
Section 12 of this Rule. This shall not apply where one of two or more defendants who are sued
under a common cause of action and have pleaded a common defense appears at the hearing.

Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of both the claim and
counterclaim.

Section 19. Postponement When Allowed. - A request for postponement of a hearing may be

granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the
scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

Section 20. Duty of the Court. - At the beginning of the court session, the judge shall read aloud a
short statement explaining the nature, purpose and the rule of procedure of small claims cases.

Section 21. Judicial Dispute Resolution. - At the hearing, the judge shall conduct Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) through mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, or any other mode of
JDR. Any settlement (Form 7-SCC) or resolution (Form 8-SCC) of the dispute shall be reduced into
writing, signed by the parties and submitted to the court for approval (Form 12-SCC).

Section 22. Failure of JDR. - If JDR fails and the parties agree in writing (Form 10-SCC) that the
hearing of the case shall be presided over by the judge who conducted the JDR, the hearing shall so
proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and terminated within one (1) day.

Absent such agreement, (a) in case of a multi-sala court , the case shall, on the same day, be
transmitted (Form 11-SCC) to the Office of the Clerk of Court for immediate referral by the Executive
Judge to the pairing judge for hearing and decision within five (5) working days from referral; and (b)
in case of single sala court, the pairing judge shall hear and decide the case in the court of origin
within five (5) working days from referral by the JDR judge.

Section 23. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based
on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the
parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Section 24. Execution. - If the decision is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, execution shall issue
upon motion (Form 9-SCC).

Section 25. Applicability. of the Rules of Civil Procedure - The Rules of Civil procedure shall apply
suppletorily insofar as they are not inconsistent with this rule.
Section 26. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on October 01, 2008 for the pilot courts
designated to apply the procedure for small claims cases following its publication in two newspaper
of general circulation.

RATIONALE
of the
Proposed Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases

a. Introduction

The most significant recurring theme of every program for judicial reform of the Supreme
Court is the pressing need for a more accessible, much swifter and less expensive delivery
of justice. Undeniably, the slow grind of the wheels of justice is the result of a variety of
factors, foremost of which is the perennial congestion of court dockets which has
transformed court litigation into a protracted battle, that invariably exhausts the time, effort
and resources of party-litigants, especially the poor. Many strategies have been devised to
unclog heavy court dockets, and one such approach is the use on mandatory Pre-trial and
Alternative Dispute Resolutions mechanisms such as mediation, arbitration and conciliation.
Another scheme that has been widely used in many foreign legal system but which has yet
to be tried in the Philippines is the small claims case processing method used by small
claims courts, often referred to as the "People’s Court," as it comes most directly into contact
with the citizenry of a jurisdiction.

Small claims courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that hear civil cases between private
litigants. Courts authorized to try small claims may also have other judicial functions, and the
name by which such a court is known varies by jurisdiction: it may be known by such names
as county court or magistrate’s court. Small claims courts can be found in Australia, Canada,
Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom and
the United States.

b. The History and the Reforms of Small Claims Court

1.In the United States1

For almost a century now, small claims courts have provided a form of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the United States. Originating around
1912 or 1913, these courts were established primarily as a means for small
businesses to collect money from borrowers through a process that was
faster, less formal, and less expensive than traditional civil litigation.

Following the lead of the establishment of the initial small claim court in
Kansas, USA in 1912 or 1913, every state in the United States has created
some form of a small claims court system. Although the financial claims
limits, methods or procedure, and overall structure vary from state to state,
the concept is essentially the same, i.e., that relatively minor disputes,
involving dollar amounts that are insufficient to warrant processing the case
through the normal court procedure, justify expeditious and simplified
handling.
 The consumer justice reform movements of the 1960s and 1970s brought
renewed research and interest in the small claims courts. This movement
emphasized the need for reform of small claims courts to facilitate the
adjudication of consumer grievances. Although "consumer justice reformers"
were concerned that businesses and corporations were more likely to use
attorneys in small claims courts thereby placing inexperienced individual
defendants at a disadvantage, studies showed that defendants with an
attorney were more likely to win against plaintiff’s than unrepresented
defendants, whereas palintiffs without attorneys did just as well as
represented plaintiffs against unrepresented defendants. The result was an
appraisal of the need to bar attorneys and collection agencies from the
small claims courts. lawphil.net

Small claims courts in the United States are often considered courts of equity
and are not necessarily bound by the letter of the law. The courts have
flexibility to use more holistic approaches to problem solving and dispute
resolution than what is typical. Most judges act according to what makes
sense to them, even if this means setting aside legal formalities. Moreover,
traditional rules of evidence and court processes do not apply. The rules of
small claims courts emphasize conciliation and pragmatism over winning,
and rules of evidence and evil procedure have been simplified to allow
maximum access to the courts by individuals unable to afford an attorney.

2. Small Claims Courts in Canada2

All provinces in Canada have procedures for small claims. In general, there
are two different models. In most provinces, as in British Columbia, Alberta,
and new Brunswick, small claims courts operate independently of the
superior courts. In other jurisdictions, the small claims courts are either
branches or divisions of the superior courts.

The small claims courts are meant to be an easier and less expensive way to
resolve disputes than in the superior courts. Small Claims Court procedure is
regulated both by provincial legislation and rules in most provinces. It is
simplified and less costly with no strict pleading requirements and formal
discovery process.

3. Small Claims Courts in England and Wales?3

From early times, England had a tradition of local courts where ordinary men
could pursue justice in the form of civil claims without the aid of lawyers.
Some were set up by local statutes, others by custom. These local courts
could not keep pace with the changes in the society brought about by the
Industrial Revolution. By the 1830s, the decade of great liberal reform, there
was a great public awakening to the urgent need for constitutional reform in
the administration of justice. The result was the County Courts Act of 1846,
described in its preamble as an "Act For The More Easy Recovery of Small
Debts and Demands in England. " It was initially a poor man’s court. Andrew
Amos, the first judge at Marylebone County, described regular litigants as
being "a great proportion of the poorer classes, gaining their livelihoods by
bricklaying, gardening or other out of door occupations against whom are
usually issued in the summer months." The county court’s jurisdiction for
 claims brought in contract and tort gradually increased from ₤50 in1888 to
₤5,000 in 1894.

The purpose and structure of the county court system has in many ways
remained the same since 1846. The aim is still to make civil justice available
locally – there are now 223 county courts in England and Wales. They have
continued to be responsive to the needs of smaller cases which, although
small in terms of their financial value, are important to the litigants involved.
However, recent decades have seen two major changes in relation to small
claims – first, the introduction of the Civil procedure Rules reforms of 1998
with emphasis on proportionality.

Since January 1996, when the small claims limits in England and Wales was
trebled overnight to ₤3,000, district judges have been expected to play the
role of "interventionist" and assist litigants in presenting their own cases
personally at small claims hearings. Like adjudicators in other parts of the
world, district judges in these countries have been encouraged to intervene
to an increasing extent at small claims hearings. Such interventionism is,
indeed, vital and although there may be wide variations between jurisdictions
in the methods that are adopted to deal with small claims, the idea of the
adjudicator freely entering the arena of the dispute to assist unrepresented
litigants is fundamental in almost all matters about small claims.

4. Small Claims Tribunals in Singapore5

The Small Claims Tribunals in Singapore have been in operation since 1

February 1985. The tribunals have fulfilled an integral role in providing the
community with accessible justice for civil claims involving small amounts.
Various features and programs have been put in place to enhance access to
justice for the community, by removing barriers such as cost, delay, distance,
time and inconvenience. The Tribunals, constituted as part of the
Subordinate Courts of Singapore, were established for the primary purpose
of providing a quick and inexpensive avenue for the resolution of small claims
arising from disputes between consumers and suppliers. There was a need
for a less expensive and less formal forum to deal with such small claims.
Hence, in 1985, the Small Claims Tribunals Act was passed, which
authorized the setting up of one or more Tribunals to help consumers who
have claims of up to $2,000 relating to disputes arising from contracts for the
sale of goods or the provision of services.

c. Introduction of the Concept of Small Claims Court in the Philippines

The idea of establishing Small Claims Courts in the Philippines was first proposed to the
Supreme Court through a study conducted in 1999 by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, former
Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. After observing small claims courts and
interviewing judges of such courts in Dallas, Texas, United States in 1999, Justice Bellosillo
proposed in a Report that courts can be established in the Philippines to handle exclusively
small claims without the participation of lawyers and where ordinary litigants can prosecute
and defend a small claims action through ready-made forms. He envisioned the small claims
courts as another positive approach, in addition to mandatory pre-trial, for solving court
congestion and delay. 6The study and report was subsequently endorsed for legislative
action to Senator Franklin Drilon who later funded a project for this purpose.

At the regular session of the Fourteenth Congress, House Bill No. 2921 entitled "An Act
Establishing Small Claims Courts" was introduced by Congressman Jose V. Yap. Thereafter,
on July 3, 2007, Senate Bill No. 800 entitled "Philippines Small Claims Court Act" was filed
by Senator Ramon A. Revilla, Jr. and, on September 3, 2007, the bill passed First Reading
and was referred to the Committee(s) on Justice and Human Rights and Finance. The same
is still pending with these committees at present.

In 2007, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded a two-
year grant to the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI) to pursue
judicial reform activities in the Philippines for the fiscal period October 2007 to September
30, 2009. 7In a letter to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno dated October 10, 2007, ABA-ROLI
proposed the establishment of small claims pilot courts among first level courts in different
regions of the Philippines. The small claims pilot court project was proposed by ABA to
USAID after consultation with various Supreme Court officials in conjunction with the 2000
Action Plan for Judicial Reform.

Among the critical issues being addressed by the APJR are case congestion and delay. The
congestion of case dockets is central to a multitude of problems, either as cause or effect; it
is either the manifestation of the source of other difficulties. Addressing this concern is thus
an imperative8 which is why present reforms in judicial systems and procedures have
included the following:

1. streamlining procedural rules to eliminate provisions that cause delay and permit
dilatory tactics;
2. re-engineering the jurisdictional structure of the courts to ensure easy geographical
access to the courts particularly by the poor litigants.

3. improving the case management system toward more transparency, accountability

and integrity of the judicial process and for better efficiency; and
4. strengthening of the mediation mechanism to promote early dispute resolution
nationwide. This involves the institutionalization of court-annexed mediation, and the
establishment of a Mediation Center to continually monitor and assess the
performance of the system and provide training and research.

Notwithstanding the absence of a law at the present time creating small claims courts in our
country, 10the Supreme Court through a program in partnership with ABA-ROLI and USAID,
can promulgate and implement a simplified rule of procedure exclusively for small claims and
assign a certain number of existing first level courts to take cognizance of small claims. 11This
does not need legislative action as the Court can designate several first level courts all over
the country to jump-start the pilot project. Thus, pursuant to its rule-making power, 12the
Court under the present Constitution can adopt a special rule of procedure to govern small
claims cases and select pilot courts that would empower the people to bring suits before
them pro se to resolve legal disputes involving simple issues of law and procedure without
the need for legal representations and extensive judicial intervention. This system will
enhance access to justice especially by those who cannot afford the high costs of litigation
even in cases of relatively small value.13 It is expeditious rules and means, our Court can
improve the perception of justice in this country, thus giving citizens a renewed "stake" in
preserving peace in the land. This is a hopeful message to our people that "there is no need
to despair for there is deliverance in law; that is a promise that has been fulfilled by law in the
past; it is a promise law will again fulfill in the future." 14

In December 2007, the Supreme Court established a Technical Working Group composed of
the Court Administrator, the Program Management Office Administrator, selected judges and
other officials of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to undertake
the following activities:

5. The development of Rules and Procedures to Implement pilot Small Claims Courts;
6. The establishment of Criteria to Select Appropriate regions/Judges for pilot Small
Claims Courts and set Peso Limits for the Small Claims Courts;
7. Through the Philippine Judicial Academy, the conduct of training programs for
Judges and their personnel participating in the Pilot Small Claims Courts project; and
8. The employment of "justice on Wheels" buses to launch pilot small claims tribunals.

15

On June 23, 2008, the Technical Working Group finalized its draft of a Rule of procedure for
Small Claims Cases. Highlights of the Proposed Rule are the following;

IX. The Rule governs the procedure in actions before the first level courts, i.e.,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trials Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (excluding Shari’a Circuit Courts) for
the payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₧100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

Explanatory note: The purpose of a small claims process is to provide an

inexpensive and expeditious means to settle disputes over small amounts. For
purposes of the project, the amount has been set for claims involving amounts of not
more than ₧100,000.00.

The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring
practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small, because the time and
expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the
amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute. The small claims
process is designed to function quickly and informally. There are no attorneys, no
formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence. The small claims court system
is not a " typical inferior court." Parties are encouraged to file small claims court
actions to resolve their minor disputes as opposed to resorting to self-help or forcible
means to seek their remedy. (Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co.,161 Cal. Rptr. 663, 664 Ct.
App. 1980)

X. This Rule applies to all actions that are: (a) purely civil in nature where the
claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment/reimbursement
of a sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed prior
to the institution of the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the
criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. These claims or demands may be:
a. For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of lease;
2. Contract of loan;
 3. Contract of services;
4. Contract of sale; or
5. Contract of mortgage;
b. For damages arising from:
1. Fault or negligence;
2. Quasi-contract; or
3. Contract;
c. Enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration
award involving money claims covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec.
417 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991."

Explanatory Note: The kinds of cases that can be filed in Small Claims Court
vary, but the case must seek money only. For example, a suit cannot be
brought in Small Claims Court to force a person or business to fix a damaged
good; or to demand fulfillment of a promised obligation which is not purely for
money, or to seek money to compensate for pain and suffering. Some of the
kinds of cases which are allowed as small claims include the following:

4. Actual damage caused to vehicles, other personal property, real

property or person;
5. Payment or reimbursement for property, deposit, or money loaned;
6. Payment for services rendered, insurance claim, rent, commissions,
or for goods sold and delivered;
7. Money claim pursuant to contact, warranty or agreement; and
8. Purely civil action for payment of money covered by bounced or
stopped check.

11. A small claims action is commenced by filing with the court an accomplished
and verified Statement of Claim in duplicate, accompanied by Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping, a nd two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable
document/s subject of the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the
hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the Claim,
unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence.
12. Plaintiff may join in a single Statement of Claim one or more separate small
claims against a defendant as long as the costs, does not exceed P100,000.00.
13. The plaintiff shall pay the prescribed fees upon filing, unless allowed to litigate
as an indigent.
14. For the purposes of this rule: (a) Plaintiff is the party who has filed a small
claims action. The term includes a defendant who has filed a counterclaim
against a plaintiff, (b) Defendant is the party against whom the plaintiff has a
filed a small claims action. The term includes a plaintiff against whom
defendant has filed a claim, or a person who replies to the claim; (c) Person is
an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability partnership,
association, or other entity; (d) Individual is natural person: (e) Motion means a
party’s request, written or oral, to the court for an order or other action. It shall
include an informal written request to the court, such as a letter; (f) Good
cause means circumstances sufficient to justify the requested order or other
action, as determined by the judge; and (g) Affidavit means a written statement
or declaration of facts that are sworn or affirmed to be true.
 Explanatory Note: A plaintiff may commence an action in the small claims court by
filing a Statement of claim under oath with the Clerk of the first level court in person
or by mail. The claim form shall be a simple non technical form approved or adopted
by the Supreme Court. The claim form shall set forth (1) the name and address of the
defendant, if known; (2) the amount and the basis of the claim: (3) that the plaintiff,
where possible, has demanded payment and, in applicable cases, possession of the
property; (4) that the defendant has failed or refused to pay, and where applicable,
has refused to surrender the property; and (5) that the plaintiff understands that the
judgement on his or her claim will be conclusive and without a right of appeal. The
plaintiff should attach to the claim all documents necessary to proved his/her right to
reliefs prayed for. The form or accompanying instructions shall include information
that the plaintiff (1) may not represented by an attorney; (2) has no right to appeal;
and (3) may ask the court to waive fees for filing and serving the claim on the ground
that the plaintiff is indigent unable to pay them, using the forms approved by the
Supreme Court for the purpose.

15. The Court may dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for dismissal
of a civil actions provided by the Rules of the Civil Procedure. A defendant
may challenges jurisdiction or venue or court location by including these
defenses in his Response before appearing in the hearing, the court shall
inquire into the facts sufficiently to determine whether jurisdiction and
authority of the court over the action are proper, and shall make its
determination accordingly.

Explanatory Note: Jurisdiction and venue requirements in small claims action shall
be the same as in other civil actions provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. A
defendant may challenge jurisdiction or venue or court location by including these
defenses in his Response before appearing in the scheduled hearing. In all cases,
even if the defendant does not ask for dismissal of the case in the Response or
appear at the hearing, the court shall inquire into the facts sufficiently to determine
whether jurisdiction and authority of the court over the action are proper, and shall
make its determination accordingly.

16. No Motion to Dismiss shall be allowed except on the grounds under Section 13
thereof (See No. X below).
17. Should the defendant fail to file a response within the required period, the
court shall render judgement as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
Statement of Claim and limited to what prayed for therein. The court may, in its
discretion, reduce the amount of damages for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable.
18. If at the time the action is commenced, a defendant possesses a claim against
the plaintiff that (a) is within the coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and
costs; (b) arises out of the same transaction or event that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff’s claim; (c) does not require, for its adjudication, the joiner or
third parties; and (d) is not the subject of another pending action, this claim
shall be included as a counterclaim in the Response, otherwise, such
counterclaim shall be barred.

The defendant may also elect to include in the Response a counterclaim

against the plaintiff that does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence
provided that the amount and nature thereof are within the coverage of this
Rule and the prescribed docket fees are paid.
 Explanatory Note: If a defendant has claim against a plaintiff that exceeds the limits
stated in Section 2 of this Rule, and the claim relates to the contract, transaction,
matter, or event which is the subject of the plaintiff’s claim, the defendant may
commence an action against the plaintiff in a court of competent jurisdiction. If said
claim which is beyond the limit of money claim provided in this Rule is filed with the
Response befire the Small Claims Court, the latter shall dismiss the counterclaim.

19. Prohibited pleadings and motions: (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint except
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; (b) Motion for bill of particulars; (c)
Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement, or for reopening of
trial; (d) Petition for relief from judgement; (e) Motion for extension of time to
file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper; (f) Memoranda; (g) Petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court; (h) Motion to declare the defendant in default; (i) Dilatory motions
for postponement; (j) Reply; (k) Third-party complaints; and (l) Interventions.
20. Availability of Forms for the Parties who shall be assisted by Clerk of Court.
21. The parties must personally appear at the hearing; if unable, then through a
designated representative who must be duly authorized to enter into an
amicable settlement.
22. Attorneys are not allowed at the hearing, except as plaintiff or defendant.
However this does not preclude them from offerings their services in assisting
the party to small claims case to prepare for the hearing or for other matters
outside of the hearing. If the court determines that a party cannot properly
present his/her claim of defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its
discretion, allow another individual, who is not an attorney, to assist that party
upon the latter’s consent.

Explanatory Note: Except as permitted by this section, no attorney shall appear in a

small claims action except when the latter shall maintain or defend an action in any
of the following capacities:

1. By or against himself or herself;

2. By or against a partnership in which he or she is general partner and in which
all the partners are attorneys; or
3. By or against a professional corporation of which he or she is an officer or
director and of which all other officers and directors are attorneys.

Nothing in this section shall prevent an attorney from doing any of the following:

4. Providing advice to a party to a small claims action, either before or after the
commencement of the action; or
5. Submitting an affidavit as a witness for a party in order to state facts of which
he or she has personal knowledge and about which he or she competent to
do so.

If the court determines that the party does not speak or understand English or
Filipino sufficiently to comprehend the proceedings or give testimony, to the
questions of the court, if any, and needs assistance in so doing, the court may permit
another individual (other than an attorney) to assist that the party. Any additional
continuances shall be at the sound discretion of the court. If the court interpreter or
other competent interpreter of the language or dialect known to the party is not
available to aid that party in a small claims action, at the first hearing of the case the
 court shall postpone the hearing one time only to allow the party the opportunity to
obtain another individual (other than an attorney) to assist that party An additional
continuances shall be at the sound discretion of the court.

XV. Non-appearance of Parties. Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be a cause

for the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. The defendant who
appears shall be entitled to judgement on a permissive counterclaim.

On the other hand failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect
as failure to file a Response under Section 12 of this Rule. This is however
shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common
cause of action and who pleaded a common defense shall appear at the
hearing.

Failure of both parties to appear shall causes the dismissal with prejudice of
both the claim and counterclaim.

XVI. A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of
the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on that date and
time. Every party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

Explanatory Note: A Party may submit an oral or written request to postpone a

hearing date for good cause, as follows:

0. If the written request is writing, it may be made either by letter or on a form

adopted or approved by the Supreme Court;
1. The request shall be filed before the hearing date and accompanied by proof
of physical inability, unless the court determines that the requesting party has
good cause to file the request on the date of hearing itself: and
2. If the court finds that the interest of justice would be served by postponing the
hearing, the court shall do so and shall notify all parties by mail on the same
day of the new hearing date, time and place.

This section does not limit the inherent power of the court to order postponement of
hearing in strictly appropriate circumstances. The postponement fee of One Hundred
Pesos (or as provided in Rule 141, Revised Rules of Court, as amended on Legal
Fees) shall be charged and collected before the filing of a request for postponement
and rescheduling of a hearing date.

XVII. Judicial Dispute Resolution. At the hearing, the court shall exert all efforts to
encourage the parties to resolve their dispute through mediation, conciliation,
early neutral evaluating or any other mode of JDR. Any settlement or
resolution of the dispute shall be reduced into writing, signed by the parties,
and submitted to the court for approval.
XVIII. If JDR fails and the parties agree in writing (Form 10-SCC) that the hearing of
the case shall be presided over by the judge who conducted the JDR, the
hearing shall so proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and
terminated within one (1) day.

Absent such agreement, (a) in case of a multi-sala court, the court shall, on the
same day, be transmitted (Form 11-SCC) to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
immediate referral by the Executive Judge to the pairing judge for hearing and
 decision within five (5) working days from referral; and )b) in case of a single
sala court, the pairing judge shall hear and decide the case in the court of
origin within five (5) working days from referral by the JDR judge.

Explanatory Note: In hearing before the small claims court, witnesses shall still be
sworn in. The judge shall conduct the hearing in an informal manner so as to do
substantial justice between the parties. The judge shall have the discretion to admit
all evidence which may be of probative value although not in accordance with formal
rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence provided in the Rules of Court,
except that privileged communications shall not be admissible. The object of such
hearings shall be to determine the rights of the litigants on the merits and to dispense
expeditious justice between the parties.

An interventionist role by judges in such hearings is effective in eliciting evidence

from litigants in person. It is seen by unrepresented parties as a "helping hand" which
they appreciate, provided that judges avoid the danger of appearing to be partial. By
discussing the facts of the case, judges find what common ground does exist
between the parties. This tends to narrow the differences between the parties and
make the final judicial decision easier – whereas traditional open court trials, with the
presence of lawyers and the use of cross-examination tend to polarize the parties,
increase antagonism and heighten the differences.

In this regard, Lord Woolf, Great Britain’s case management expert, has observed:

"The role of the judge in small claims is not only that of an adjudicator. It is a
key safeguard of the rights of both parties. In most cases, the judge is
effectively a substitute for a legal representative. His duty is to ascertain the
main matters at issue, to elicit the evidence, to reach a view on the facts of
the matter and to give a decision. In some cases he may encourage the
parties to settle. In doing so he should ensure that both parties have
presented the evidence and called the witnesses germane to their case and
that he has identified and considered any issue of law which is pertinent to
the case in hand. He must also hold the ring and ensure that each party has
a fair chance to present his own case and to challenge that of his opponent."

The key judicial skills in conducting such hearings are to maintain a balance between
informality and fairness, to ensure a level playing field and to protect the weak and
the scrupulous. In practice, this is achieved by preventing interruptions and parties
talking over each other, and making it clear that both parties will have plenty of time
to say all that they wish before the end of the hearing.

XIX. Decision. After the hearing, the court shall, on the same day, render its
decision using the form provided. The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof
served on the parties. The decision is final and unappealable.

Explanatory Note: Despite the relative informality of the procedure, judgements are

based upon a strict application of the substantive law and an objective judicial
analysis of the facts. The judge is duty-bound to give the legal basis for the findings.

The prohibition against appeals assures immediate and swift justice.

 The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law
authorizing such exercise. The applicable provisions of the law allowing appeals from
decisions of the first level courts are Sections 36 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, also
known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." The procedure on appeal is
subject to the limitations and restrictions provided by this Act and any such rules as
the Supreme Court may hereafter prescribe. Sec. 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides an
instance wherein the Supreme Court may adopt special procedures, including cases
where appeal may not be allowed, to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of particular cases requiring summary disposition.

XX. Execution. If the decision is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, execution shall
issue upon motion (Form 9-SCC).

Footnotes

 " The People's Court Examind: A Legal and Empricial Analysis of the Small Claims Court
1

System, by Bruce Tucker and Monica Her, San Francisco Law Review, Winter 2003.

2
 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/small_claims_court.

 " Small Claims Hearings: The Interventionist Role Played District Judges" by John Baldwin,
3

Civil Justice Quarterly, Sweet and Maxwell limited and Contributors, January 17, 1998.

4
 See Note 2.

 "The Singapore Small Claims Tribunals - Accessible Justice to the Community" by Chong
5

Kah Wei, paper prepared for the 2nd Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference held in Sydney,
Australia on 10 September 1999.

6
 " A Moral Renaissance For A Lasting Peace" Speech delivered by Senior Associate Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo as Keynote Speaker of the 3rd Annual National Seminar-Convention of
the Philippine trial Judges Lague, Inc. on the theme Championing Peace Through Justice,
"held3-5 October 2002 at Prince Hotel, Baguio City.

 "The Totality of Reforms for a transformed Judiciary" by Former Chief Justice Artemio V.
7

Panganiban (ret), The Court Systems Journal, December 2005, p. 69

 Action Program for Judicial Reform (APJR) 2001-2006 published by the Supreme Court in
8

August 2001, p.6

9
 Ibid.

10
 Supplement to APJR, published by the Supreme Court in 2001 at p. 2-12.

11
 See Note 7 at p. 12
 12
 See Note 9 at p. 2-15.

 Memorandum For the Honorable Reynato S. Puno, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
13

dated December 19, 2007, from Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño , Re: Proposal to
Establish a Pilot Project on Small Claims Courts in First Level Courts in the Philippines.

 " Justice, Peace and Development: The Role and Responsibility of Lawyers, "Article by
14

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, The Court System s Journal, March 2006 Volume 11 No. 1,
p. 26.

15
 See Note3, 20-34 at Chapter 26.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

See the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims (November 2009)